18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) does not permit separate convictions for a felon and an illegal alien possessing the same firearms; the convictions violate double jeopardy.

United States v. Esquivel · filed 2011-05-17(g)(1) and (g)(5)

Esquivel is correct that his convictions for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm and a felon in possession of a firearm violate his rights against double jeopardy.

Section 922(o) is a lesser included offense of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) when both charges arise from the same machinegun possession, so one conviction must be vacated.

United States v. Mann · filed 2012-12-06(o)

Because we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is a lesser included offense of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), we remand Mann’s convictions for Counts 5 and 6 to the district court with instructions to vacate one of the convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under Blockburger.

United States v. Spencer · filed 2013-04-10(g)(1)

Insofar as Spencer fairly contends that § 922(g)(1) itself violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, we conclude that his argument is unavailing under the principles established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant is a felon, so a conviction under it and a conviction for possessing an unregistered firearm do not punish the same offense twice.

United States v. Werle · filed 2017-12-13(g)(1)

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant is a felon, while a conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) requires proof that the firearm is unregistered.

Section 922(g)(1) permits cumulative punishment with 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) because the offenses have distinct elements.

United States v. Olmeda · filed 2018-06-22(g)(1)

We have previously considered a claim that a conviction of both 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, and rejected it, holding that: ... Because Olmeda was charged with these “distinct offenses,” his double jeopardy challenge fails.

Section 922(a)(6) requires a material false statement or false identification in connection with acquiring a firearm and is a separate offense from § 924(a)(1)(A).

United States v. Padilla · filed 2019-01-23(a)(6)

Padilla’s two offenses contain different elements, and neither offense is a lesser-included offense of the other.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm and that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce, making it a separate offense from Puerto Rico's unlicensed firearm offense for double jeopardy purposes.

United States v. Almonte-Nunez · filed 2020-06-18(g)(1)

Section 922(g) does not require a showing that the defendant did not have a license, and Article 5.04 does not require proof that the defendant was a prohibited person or that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. We conclude that ... the federal § 922(g) offense and the Commonwealth Article 5.04 offense are separate offenses because each offense requires an element of proof that the other does not.

Section 922(g)(1) has elements distinct from Puerto Rico's unlicensed firearm-carrying offense, so successive prosecutions for the two offenses do not violate double jeopardy.

Rodriguez-Mendez v. United States · filed 2025-04-08(g)(1)

As we explained in Almonte-Núñez, Article 5.04 and § 922(g)(1) contain distinct elements and are thus separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes.

Section 922(d)(5)(A) requires the seller to know or have reasonable cause to believe that the firearm purchaser is unlawfully in the United States.

United States v. Copeland · filed 2011-06-07(d)(5)(A)

To show that the defendant had the criminal intent to commit the offense, the Government must show that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser was an illegal alien.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm; omitting that requirement from the jury instructions is error.

United States v. Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif · filed 2019-09-05(g)

Thus, based on the Supreme Court’s judgment, we remand this case to the district ... court to consider in the first instance whether the district court’s error in failing to instruct the jury that the government must prove that Rehaif knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States was harmless such that the conviction can be affirmed.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Jawher · filed 2020-02-24(g)(5)(A)

On this record, Jawher has established that at the time of his plea, he did not have full knowledge of the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty. Where, as here, the government needed to establish that Jawher knew about a collateral legal issue—being illegally or unlawfully in the country—Jawher has sufficiently established that but for the violation of Rule 11, there is a reasonable probability he would have gone to trial.

A conviction for firearm possession by an alien unlawfully in the United States requires knowledge of that unlawful status; Gayle’s admissions established that knowledge.

Gayle v. United States · filed 2020-07-28(g)(5)(A)

Movant cannot satisfy this standard because the record reflects evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that he was unlawfully present in the United States at the time he possessed the firearms and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(5)(B) requires proof that a person knew they had been admitted under a nonimmigrant visa when they possessed a firearm.

United States v. Singh · filed 2020-10-28(g)(5)(B)

Based on the plain language of § 924(a)(2) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif, the Government must prove only that Azano knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he belonged to one of the prohibited status groups enumerated in § 922(g)—e.g., nonimmigrant visa holders.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a defendant who possessed a firearm knew he was unlawfully in the United States.

United States v. Patrone · filed 2021-01-14(g)(5)(A)

As relevant here, Rehaif's holding means that had Patrone gone to trial, the government would have needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when he possessed the gun, he knew that he was unlawfully in the United States.

Section 922(g)(5)(B) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was admitted under a nonimmigrant visa; knowing only the visa’s label is insufficient.

United States v. Gear · filed 2021-01-19(g)(5)(B)

We hold that after Rehaif, the government must prove a defendant knew he had a nonimmigrant visa to satisfy the statute’s mens rea requirement.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a person charged with possessing a firearm while unlawfully in the United States knew of that unlawful status at the time of possession.

United States v. Zelaya-Guerra · filed 2023-12-05(g)(5)(A)

After “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict,” Ragsdale, 426 F.3d at 770-71, we conclude that the evidence, including Zelaya-Guerra’s nervous behavior, inconsistent statements, and statements evincing his knowledge that his adjustment of status was ongoing during the pertinent traffic stop, was sufficient to establish that Zelaya- Guerra knew at the time of offense that he was in the country unlawfully. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200; see also United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 954–55 (5th Cir. 1990).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a defendant knew he was unlawfully in the United States when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Silva · filed 2024-02-12(g)(5)(A)

At trial, the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he possessed the firearm and ammunition, Contreras Silva knew he was an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew he was unlawfully in the United States when he possessed a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Atilano · filed 2024-05-20(g)(5)(A)

Viewing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time Atilano was found in possession of firearms and ammunition he knew he was an alien unlawfully in the United States.

Section 922(g)(5) requires a defendant to know of his unlawful immigration status; an unpreserved failure to instruct the jury on that requirement does not warrant relief without a reasonable probability of a different verdict.

Cervantes-Torres v. United States · filed 2025-06-24(g)(5)

Cervantes-Torres was convicted under § 922(g)(5) by a jury of his peers for possessing a firearm as an alien unlawfully present in the United States. Several years later, the Supreme Court held that an alien must know his unlawful immigration status. See Rehaif, 588 U.S. at 237. Even if the jury had been correctly instructed on that requirement, however, there is no reasonable probability that it would have reached anything but the original verdict.

Section 922(g) defines general intent crimes, so expert psychological testimony offered to negate specific intent is inadmissible on those charges.

United States v. Bumagin · filed 2015-09-29(g)

The Government is correct as to the non-admissibility of expert psychological testimony in relation to Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment, which charge violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Two) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Counts Three and Four). ... The crimes charged in Counts Two, Three, and Four are general intent crimes. ... Accordingly, expert psychological testimony is not admissible as to Counts Two, Three, and Four.

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the defendant knew a statement was false; a reasonable mistake of fact can defeat that requirement.

United States v. Bowling · filed 2014-11-07(a)(6)

To that end, § 922(a)(6) requires that the government establish that the defendant acted “knowingly,” meaning that Bowling knew that his statement was false. ... In either case, a mistake of fact on the part of a defendant— determined by the jury to be reasonable—can serve as a full defense to criminal liability.

Section 922(g)(9) does not allow a defendant to avoid conviction by proving a lack of prospective risk of violence.

In Re US · filed 2009-08-13(g)(9)

On the second condition, the government has met its burden of showing a clear and indisputable right to the writ because the district court’s order offers no support for its conclusion that an affirmative defense exists based upon “no prospective risk of violence,” and the instruction invites the jury to second-guess the congressional classification inherent in § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(e) requires proof that a person delivering firearms to a carrier without written notice knew the conduct was unlawful, but does not require proof that the person knew the specific notice requirement.

United States v. Orellana · filed 2009-08-06(e)

In order to establish that Orellana knowingly and willfully violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), the government was required to prove that Orellana knew that his conduct was unlawful, but it was not required to prove that he was aware of § 922(e)’s notice requirement.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require specific intent to possess a firearm.

United States v. Spears · filed 2007-03-15(g)(1)

The crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm does not require any specific intent.

A claimed necessity for possessing a firearm does not negate the intent required by § 922(g).

United States v. Caldwell · filed 2005-12-05(g)

Caldwell admitted possessing the firearm and his necessity defense does not negate his intent under § 922(g). Therefore, his sufficiency of the evidence argument fails.

Section 922(g)(1) has no innocent possession defense based on a felon's lack of illicit motive or brief possession of a firearm.

United States v. Gilbert · filed 2005-11-28(g)(1)

The statute in no way invites investigation into why the defendant possessed a firearm or how long that possession lasted.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow an innocent possession defense based on a felon’s lack of illicit motive and efforts to dispose of a firearm quickly.

United States v. Alphonso Buster Gilbert, Sr. · filed 2005-11-28(g)(1)

Gilbert requests that we find an exception to § 922(g)(1) when a felon has no illicit motive and attempts to quickly rid himself of the weapon. We decline to adopt such an exception.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow an innocent possession defense to a felon-in-possession charge in the Fourth Circuit.

United States v. Oxendine · filed 2005-10-12(g)(1)

We decline to recognize innocent possession as a defense to an offense under § 922(g)(l).

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow a defendant to rely on a good faith belief or mistake of law that his right to possess firearms was restored.

United States v. Hunter · filed 2001-02-09(g)(1)

Moreover, we agree with the district court that a good faith belief or mistake of law defense was unavailable as a matter of law to Hunter, and evidence pertaining to it was properly excluded.

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know the weapon is a firearm, but not to know that possessing it is illegal.

United States v. Frazier-El · filed 2000-03-02(g)

We believe that the district court's instruction correctly stated the mens rea required for a violation of § 922(g). Under the district court's instruction, while the jury would have to find that Frazier-El knew that his weapon was a firearm, it would not have to find that he knew the possession of a firearm constituted a violation of law.

Section 922(g)(9) does not require proof that the defendant knew possessing a firearm was illegal.

United States v. Beavers · filed 2000-02-16(g)(9)

We therefore conclude that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, even though it does not require the government to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that his possession of a firearm was illegal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a convicted felon's voluntary possession of a firearm, without a separate intent to violate the law.

United States v. Shires · filed 1999-05-10(g)(1)

The statute, possession of firearm by a convicted felon, requires no more than Shires's voluntary possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) does not require specific intent, and advice of counsel is not a defense to a charge under it.

United States v. Blomberg · filed 1999-06-01(g)(9)

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Robert Earl Blomberg was convicted of nine counts of possession of a firearm after conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). ... Blomberg appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the district court2 erred in: (1) ruling that specific intent was not an element of the offense, and that advice of counsel was not a defense; ... Having carefully reviewed the parties' arguments and submissions, we find no error of law or fact. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 922(g) has no specific intent element, and that omission does not violate due process.

United States v. Pruess · filed 2001-06-19(g)

Neither does the absence of a specific intent element under § 922(g) offend due process.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant intended to use the firearm for an illegal purpose.

United States v. Oliver · filed 2002-08-22(g)(1)

It is true that Oliver was not charged with poaching, and that the government did not need to prove that Oliver intended to use the firearm for illegal purposes.

Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent offense, so voluntary intoxication does not excuse knowing firearm possession by a felon.

United States v. Williams · filed 2005-04-15(g)(1)

Thus, despite his inebriated state, Williams was still capable of having the general intent necessary to support a § 922(g) conviction.

Intoxication is not a defense to unlawful firearm possession by a convicted felon because the offense requires only general intent.

United States v. Archambeau · filed 2006-06-07(g)(1)

Intoxication is a defense to possessing stolen guns, a specific intent crime, United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2004), but it is not a defense to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, a general intent crime.

A defendant charged with being a felon in possession is not entitled to a justification instruction without evidence justifying continued possession of the gun.

United States v. Holliday · filed 2006-08-02(g)(1)

As we indicated above, to prevail on the theory that he terms self-defense, the defendant would have had to show legal justification both for his seizure of Lydstone’s gun and for keeping the gun as long as he did.

Section 922(g)(1) makes a felon’s knowing possession of a gun criminal regardless of the felon’s motive or belief that the conviction was expunged.

United States v. Barbour, Derrick A. · filed 2006-08-15(g)(1)

Barbour’s felony conviction makes the mere possession of the weapons a crime regardless of his intentions or his belief that his conviction had been expunged. All that Barbour had to know was that the objects in his possession were guns; what he intended to do with them and whether he thought he was entitled to own them are not relevant considerations.

Section 922(g)(5)(B) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition, not that he knew possession was unlawful.

United States v. Uresti-Careaga · filed 2008-06-16(g)(5)(B)

Uresti-Careaga complains that he did not know his possession of the ammunition was unlawful; however, a § 922(g)(5)(B) violation is not a specific intent crime. ... To obtain a conviction, the Government was required to prove that Uresti-Careaga knowingly possessed the ammunition, not that he knew his conduct violated the law.

Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent offense, so voluntary intoxication is no defense to knowing firearm possession.

United States v. Fuller · filed 2011-06-28(g)(1)

Because voluntary intoxication is no defense to knowing possession of a firearm, Fuller’s proposed voluntary intoxication instruction was not a correct statement of the law.

Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent offense for which voluntary intoxication is not a defense.

United States v. Collier · filed 2013-10-01(g)(1)

A § 922(g)(1) offense is a general intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is not a defense.

Section 922(u) does not require proof that the defendant specifically intended to permanently deprive the dealer of the firearm.

United States v. Glinn · filed 2017-07-19(u)

This additional language was unnecessary, however. This circuit has held that proof of the act of stealing does not require proof of a defendant's specific intent to permanently deprive.

Section 922(i) requires proof of intent for transporting stolen firearms in interstate commerce; evidence of similar, related offenses may establish that intent.

United States v. James Waldo Clifton · filed 1971-09-10(i)

Additionally, if the jury rejected this theory and decided that no conspiracy existed before the first contacts between Clifton, Rhodes and Heafner about October 18, 1969, proof of the commission of similar and clearly related offenses by Clifton earlier that month was clearly admissible as going to establish Clifton's intent which was a requisite element of proof under each of the three counts being tried.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession after a state misdemeanor carrying a maximum prison term greater than two years, even when the sentence imposed was shorter.

Suarez v. Holder · filed 2015-02-18(g)(1)

Therefore, we find that a State misdemeanor conviction only falls within the exclusion of § 921(a)(20)(B) if the maximum penalty the court was capable of imposing was two years or less. Because the court was capable of sentencing Plaintiff to a maximum term of three years imprisonment, he does not fall within the exclusion. Thus, there is no question whether § 922(g)(1) prohibits Plaintiff from possessing a firearm. It does.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison even if the defendant received a shorter sentence or served no prison time.

United States v. Davis · filed 2001-12-27(g)(1)

Contrary to Davis’s argument, however, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) do not require that a defendant’s prior sentence involve actual prison time in excess of one year.

Section 922(g) treats a conviction punishable by three years’ imprisonment as disqualifying, but not a summary offense punishable by ten days.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Rush · filed 2001-04-27(g)

At the time of his 1968 arrest and conviction, the offense relating to a duty to stop in event of an accident was graded as a misdemeanor and carried a maximum sentence of not more than three years imprisonment. On the other hand, the offense relating to reckless driving was a summary offense which carried a maximum sentence of not more than ten days imprisonment. Hence, the former serves as a disqualifying conviction under Section 922(g) of the Gun Control Act, whereas the latter does not.

Section 922(g)(1) uses the maximum penalty available at the time of conviction to determine whether a prior offense disqualifies a person from possessing a firearm, even if the statutory penalty is later reduced.

Bellum v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2000-11-29(g)(1)

The strong language in Place leaves us with little doubt that we must look to the penalty at the time of conviction without regard to any “after-the-fact” changes, be they in the punishment imposed or to the statute itself.

Section 922(g)(1) uses the statutory maximum for the crime to determine whether a prior conviction is punishable by more than one year, regardless of the defendant’s individual sentencing range.

United States v. Jones · filed 1999-11-10(g)(1)

Jones’ contentions notwithstanding, section 922(g)(l)’s language can comfortably be reconciled with North Carolina’s sentencing scheme by viewing the offense statutory maximum as the statutory maximum for the crime, regardless of the prior criminal record status of the defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the imprisonment authorized for the prior offense, rather than the sentence actually imposed, to determine whether it is punishable by more than one year.

United States v. Crudup · filed 2002-10-10(g)(1)

That the Defendant was actually sentenced to a shorter term than that is of no moment because the federal statute is concerned with the extent to which the offense is punishable, not the extent to which the offense was actually punished.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year from possessing a firearm.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Swinehart · filed 2003-05-07(g)

In the case sub judice, the parties agree that the state statute, itself, does not list tax fraud as an enumerated offense, but that it was a state crime punishable by up to three years imprisonment. It, therefore, comes within the ambit of Section 922(g) of the Gun Control Act. Thus, we agree with the ALJ that, but for the trial court’s order, Swinehart’s application would have been correctly denied.

A state jail felony conviction for possession of less than one gram of cocaine qualifies as a prior conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Lewis · filed 2004-01-19(g)(1)

Lewis argues that the district court erred in treating his prior state jail felony conviction for possession of less than one gram of cocaine as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lewis’ prior conviction ... qualified as a predicate offense for his felon-in-possession conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Fagans · filed 2005-04-27(g)(1)

A felony in Vermont is a crime punishable by more than two years in prison, see Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1 (2003). Thus, the Defendant falls within 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s definition of prohibited person: It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

A prior state conviction with a five-year statutory maximum qualifies as punishable by more than one year under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Blount · filed 2005-12-23(g)(1)

Nevertheless, these state convictions satisfy the predicate offense requirements for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) and imprisonment under § 924(e) because the statutory maximum, five years, is “a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a juvenile adjudication as a disqualifying conviction when the law of the jurisdiction where it occurred does not classify it as a conviction.

United States v. Emerson · filed 2006-05-11(g)(1)

Mr. Emerson argues that Maine law determines whether a Maine juvenile adjudication constitutes a “conviction” as required by § 922(g)(1). This Court agrees. ... As a juvenile adjudication does not constitute conviction of a crime under Maine law, U.S. S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) does not apply and Mr. Emerson’s base offense level is eighteen pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5).

Prior state convictions can qualify as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1) even when their maximum guideline sentences were under 12 months.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2006-06-15(g)(1)

He argues that following Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the maximum statutory penalty in a mandatory state sentencing guideline system is the maximum applicable guideline range, and so his prior state convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because the maximum guideline sentence for both was under 12 months. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 922(g)(1) uses the state statutory maximum to determine whether a prior crime was punishable by more than one year, rather than the maximum sentence available under sentencing guidelines in the particular case.

United States v. Diaz · filed 2007-02-09(g)(1)

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), did not change the definition of what constitutes a maximum sentence under state law for purposes of prosecution under § 922(g)(1). ... Accordingly, the maximum sentence remains the statutory maximum, not the maximum sentence available in the particular case under the sentencing guidelines.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as a predicate felony when someone convicted of that offense could receive more than one year in prison, even if the defendant’s own maximum sentence was shorter.

United States v. Garner · filed 2007-08-16(g)(1)

Because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of conspiracy to sell and deliver methamphetamine in North Carolina, the district ... court properly considered Garner’s prior conviction as a predicate felony for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as qualifying when the crime’s statutory maximum exceeds one year, even if the defendant’s guideline range is shorter.

United States v. Hill · filed 2008-08-22(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1), like the statute explored in Rodriquez, demands that courts focus on the maximum statutory penalty for the offense, not the individual defendant.

A separate state conviction carrying a five-year maximum sentence can satisfy § 922(g)’s felony predicate requirement.

United States v. Cherry · filed 2008-09-15(g)

The second claim also fails, as the record reveals that Cherry also had a South Carolina conviction for possession of crack cocaine, which has a maximum sentence of five years.

Section 922(g)(1) uses the maximum possible sentence for a prior conviction to determine whether it is punishable by more than one year.

United States v. Wall · filed 2009-07-06(g)(1)

However, as Wall acknowledged, this court has held that, under § 922(g)(1), we look to the maximum possible sentence, not to the sentence actually imposed, United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming Jones holding after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, based on the sentence the particular defendant could have received.

United States v. Barnes · filed 2011-10-26(g)(1)

Under Simmons, it does not appear that Barnes’ prior North Carolina convictions were crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year for purposes of the federal felon-in-possession statute. ... Accordingly, we vacate Barnes’ conviction and sentence on the felon in possession of a firearm count and remand for further proceedings.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; a conviction carrying no such term cannot serve as the predicate.

United States v. Jones · filed 2011-12-22(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Jones’ prior North Carolina conviction was not punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, measured by the sentence the defendant could have received.

United States v. Parker · filed 2012-02-14(g)(1)

The reasoning in Simmons applies with equal force to predicate convictions used to establish mandatory minimums at sentencing, advisory Guidelines ranges, and § 922(g)(1) offenses. The Government concedes, and the record supports a conclusion that, under Simmons, Parker’s prior North Carolina convictions were not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Parker has no other prior convictions that were punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Thus, his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm is invalid, as is his sentence as a career offender.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the maximum sentence the defendant could have received for a prior conviction, not the sentence actually imposed, to determine whether the crime was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Cozart · filed 2012-10-31(g)(1)

Cozart’s actual sentence of 10 to 12 months’ imprisonment was not determinative of the issue whether he had been convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) covers Pennsylvania first degree misdemeanors punishable by up to five years in prison because the misdemeanor exception applies only when the maximum sentence is two years or less.

Dutton v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2012-11-08(g)(1)

Section § 922(g)(1) prohibits individuals who have been convicted of “ a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm. ... Accordingly, a conviction for a first degree misdemeanor in Pennsylvania does not satisfy the exception created in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), and the District Court properly granted Appellees‟ motion to dismiss Dutton‟s complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a prior crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment even if the defendant received a shorter sentence.

United States v. Rego · filed 2013-05-20(g)(1)

In fact, neither case supports Rego’s claim that a defendant convicted of a crime which may be punishable by a period of incarceration of more than one year has not committed a felony if he was sentenced to less than one year.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as a qualifying felony when the defendant could have received more than one year in prison, even if the judge imposed a shorter mitigated sentence.

United States v. Kerr · filed 2013-12-03(g)(1)

As we have already explained, Kerr faced a presumptive maximum sentence of 14 months’ imprisonment for his state convictions. Therefore, Kerr has the requisite predicate felony for his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Groomes · filed 2014-10-02(g)(1)

Federal law has long prohibited firearm possession by someone convicted “in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Because the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes punishable by over one year of confinement, his “domestic violence” conviction had no effect on his ability to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm.

Com. v. Murphy, C. · filed 2014-12-22(g)(1)

Thus, because Appellant’s record tampering and theft convictions were crimes “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” he was subjected to the firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession after a state misdemeanor conviction punishable by up to five years in prison.

Schaffer, P.J. v. York County Sheriff's Department · filed 2015-05-05(g)(1)

Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)2 prohibits a person from possessing firearms if that person was “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[.]” ... Appellee is prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law.

A state sentence that includes mandatory post-release supervision does not make a prior conviction punishable by more than one year under § 922(g)(1) when serving more than a year in prison would require a hypothetical supervision violation.

United States v. Williams · filed 2015-07-07(g)(1)

Consequently, his conviction is not a predicate felony for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a North Carolina felony with a maximum sentence exceeding one year as a predicate conviction even when part of that sentence is served on mandatory post-release supervision.

United States v. Stone · filed 2015-07-10(g)(1)

In light of Edmonds, Stone’s sentence (which. was in the presumptive range) of 5-15 months is a qualifying felony for § 922(g)(1) purposes.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to whether a prior offense was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.

United States v. Bates · filed 2017-11-20(g)(1)

In determining whether Bates’s Arizona conviction is a qualifying predicate offense under § 922(g)(1), the relevant inquiry is not whether Bates received a sentence exceeding one year of incarceration—he indisputably did not—but rather whether the offense for which he was convicted is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a Kansas conviction as a qualifying prior crime when the defendant could have received more than one year in prison, even if the sentence was suspended in favor of probation.

United States v. Wheaton · filed 2018-09-17(g)(1)

Because Defendant was required under Kansas law to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment - suspended or not - and the maximum potential term was 14 months, the court finds that Defendant's prior Kansas conviction qualified as a felony under section 922(g).

For a Washington conviction under mandatory sentencing guidelines, § 922(g)(1)’s one-year predicate offense requirement depends on the sentencing range or actual sentence.

Nair v. United States · filed 2020-03-30(g)(1)

This is so because, due to the nature of Washington’s mandatory guidelines system, it is the guidelines range (or actual sentence) which establishes whether the predicate conviction was a crime “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) covers a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the person served less time.

United States v. Brooks-Davis · filed 2021-01-07(g)(1)

In our view, this is a distinction that does not make a plain error difference. The relevant status, § 922(g)(1), requires only a prior conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year.

Section 922(g)(1) covers prior convictions for crimes carrying a possible prison term of more than one year, regardless of the sentence imposed or served.

Fralix v. United States · filed 2021-12-10(g)(1)

Instead, § 922(g)(1) refers to crimes that carry a possible punishment of more than one year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession after a conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of whether the offense is labeled a felony.

Hills v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2022-05-04(g)(1)

As part of that background check, Hills is required to complete ATF Form 4473, which asks, “Have you ever been convicted in any court, including a military court, of a felony, or any other crime for which the judge could have imprisoned you for more than one year, even if you received a shorter sentence including probation?” ATF Form 4473, Bureau of ATF, https://perma.cc/CG2J-8GTB; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”). There is no dispute that Hills was given a 46-month sentence. And there is no dispute that a 46-month sentence was affirmed on appeal. So felony or not, Hills has not adequately pled that the FBI or ATF are unlawfully prohibiting him from obtaining a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a prior conviction that exposed the defendant to more than one year of imprisonment, even if the defendant received probation.

United States v. Hussein · filed 2022-08-30(g)(1)

Because Hussein’s crime of conviction actually exposed him to a term of imprisonment that exceeded one year, the district court correctly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on this basis.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a person whose prior state drug convictions were punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.

Outley v. United States · filed 2023-11-20(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of a firearm by any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Despite defendant’s arguments, his prior state drug convictions qualified as crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

A prior state conviction qualifies under § 922(g)(1) only if facts in the record of conviction could have exposed the defendant to more than one year in prison.

United States v. Davis · filed 2025-05-21(g)(1)

We hold that the conviction was not punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year because there is no fact in the record of conviction that could have permitted the state court to impose a sentence above the presumptive maximum of one year’s imprisonment.

An Alabama Class B felony punishable by two to twenty years qualifies as a prior conviction under § 922(g)(1), even if the defendant served only six months.

Blackshire v. United States of America (INMATE 2) · filed 2025-09-25(g)(1)

Upon de novo review, the Court concludes that Blackshire procedurally defaulted this claim by not raising it on direct appeal, and he has not demonstrated that he is actually innocent of violating § 922(g)(1). Under Alabama law in effect in 2012, Blackshire was convicted of a Class B felony, which was punishable by a term of imprisonment of “not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not automatically treat every foreign conviction as a disqualifying conviction regardless of the offense’s severity or the process afforded to the defendant.

Bean v. United States · filed 2000-02-22(g)(1)

This case is a perfect illustration as to why the phrase “any court” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) cannot be interpreted to mean “any court in the world regardless of the severity of the crime or the due process which the defendant was entitled during the defense of his case.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s reference to a conviction in any court does not, by itself, resolve whether foreign convictions count.

United States v. Concha · filed 2000-12-01(g)(1)

Thus, the plain language of § 922(g)(1) gives no more guidance than does § 924(e)(1) as to what constitutes “convictions by any court.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat convictions entered by foreign courts as predicate offenses for its firearm possession prohibition.

United States v. Kirk Gayle, Ann-Marie Richardson, Rohan Ingram · filed 2003-08-27(g)(1)

As a matter of statutory interpretation, we conclude that foreign convictions cannot constitute predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s phrase "convicted in any court" covers domestic convictions but not foreign convictions.

Small v. United States · filed 2005-04-26(g)(1)

The question before us focuses upon the words "convicted in any court." Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well? We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.

Section 922(t)(5) requires knowledge, rather than willfulness, to impose a civil fine for a dealer’s prohibited firearm transfer without a background check.

A-TAC Gear Guns Uniforms LLC v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2021-03-31(t)(5)

The statute is explicit that the standard of culpability for a fine under the provision is knowledge, not willfulness.

A state firearm permit substitutes for a point-of-sale NICS check only if state officials verify that available information shows no applicable firearm prohibition.

Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. U.S. Justice Department · filed 2020-12-17(t)(3)(A)(ii)

The Brady Act provides an exception for state permits issued after a state official “verified that the information available to such official does not indicate that possession of a firearm by such [applicant] would be in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(3)(A)(ii). There is no exception for permits issued after state officials verified that possession would not violate some laws.

Section 922(t)(5) does not require background-check information to be accurate at the time of a firearm transfer, and a civil fine requires knowing conduct rather than willfulness.

Bankston v. Then · filed 2010-08-26(t)(5)

We conclude that the accuracy of the information at the time of the check is irrelevant for purposes of this statute, and that the government need only prove the licensee acted knowingly.

Section 922(t)(1) allows a dealer who has completed the required background-check inquiry to sell a firearm after a NICS “proceed” response, but that response does not authorize the buyer to possess it.

Fehr v. NHSP Warden · filed 2003-11-04(t)(1)

Rather than an authorization, issued by an agency empowered to give such authorization, for Fehr to purchase a firearm, the “proceed” response simply meant that the dealer could sell the weapon to Fehr without violating federal law, since the dealer was not aware of (or on notice of) Fehr’s felony conviction and had complied with the inquiry requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).

Section 922(t)(3)(B) places ATF applications under 26 U.S.C. § 5812 outside the dealer-initiated NICS background-check process.

Kaszycki v. United States of America · filed 2020-06-01(t)(3)(B)

The Court agrees that the statutory lay-of-the-land creates a carve-out for ATF to approve or deny applications under 26 U.S.C. § 5812, and that this is different than applications ... approved or denied after an FFL initiates an NICS background check pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(t).

Section 922(t)(3)(A)(ii) requires state officials to verify available information for signs of a federal firearms prohibition, but does not require them to investigate every circumstance of an applicant’s underlying offense.

Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v. DOJ · filed 2021-11-09(t)(3)(A)(ii)

We cannot take one phrase (“verify that the information available”) and give it a different, and far more burdensome, meaning (“verify that the circumstances of the underlying offense do not violate federal law”).

Section 922(t)(1)(C)’s enhanced background check and possible ten-business-day wait for purchasers aged eighteen to twenty were not shown likely to violate the Second Amendment.

McRorey v. Garland · filed 2023-08-14(t)(1)(C)

Beyond that general assertion, which would apply to those above and below the age of twenty-one, Plaintiffs ... have not shown that the potential waiting periods here are “indefinite” or that a potential ten-business-day waiting period is unconstitutional in all cases.

Section 922(t)(1) requires a firearms dealer to conduct a NICS background check or obtain a NICS alternative permit before transferring a firearm.

Wilson Gun Works And Design, LLC v. Albro · filed 2023-08-25(t)(1)

Respondent has presented evidence showing that it is undisputed that Wilson Gun Works committed the following violations of the GCA: (1) it failed to conduct a NICS background check or obtain a NICS alternative permit, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(a); ... Here, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Petitioner violated the GCA.

Section 922(t)(5) requires a firearms dealer to perform and await a background check before selling a firearm to an unlicensed person.

Posey v. Garland (JRG1) · filed 2024-04-22(t)(5)

In seeking summary judgment, Mr. Posey directs the Court’s attention only to one other alleged willful violation, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(5) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(a), both of which require a firearms dealer to perform and wait for the results of a background check before selling a firearm to a person who is unlicensed under the Gun Control Act to ensure the sale does not violate federal or state laws.

Section 922(t)(1)(C)’s expanded background checks for firearm buyers under 21 are presumptively lawful.

McRorey v. Garland · filed 2024-04-26(t)(1)(C)

Background checks such as those in the challenged provisions are presumptively lawful.

Section 922(t) imposes obligations on federal firearms licensees, so a firearm purchaser cannot be prosecuted under it.

Clark v. Garland · filed 2024-05-30(t)

Plaintiff could not be prosecuted under § 922(t), since that statute imposes obligations on the Federal Firearms Licensees (“FFLs”).

Section 922(t)(3) exempts a qualifying permit holder from a background check, but the dealer must document the valid permit when transferring the firearm.

Williamson Gun and Archery, LLC v. Rogers · filed 2024-07-08(t)(3)

Regardless of permit status, every individual must complete a Form 4473 when purchasing a firearm, and the licensee must then either complete an NICS check or document that the customer has a valid CCW permit.

Section 922(t)(1)(B)(ii) permits a dealer to transfer a firearm after three business days if the background check system has not reported that the transfer would violate the law.

Sedita v. United States of America · filed 2025-02-04(t)(1)(B)(ii)

And the Brady Act only discusses a particular type of denial—one triggered by an explicit communication to the firearms dealer that the transaction would violate state or federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t). Under the statute, there is no denial at all without such an explicit communication, as dealers may complete the transaction in such a case.

Section 922(t) permits denial of a firearm transfer when state law bars the recipient from possessing the firearm.

Godfrey · filed 2026-04-02(t)

Because Kentucky law bars Godfrey from possessing a firearm, he was properly denied his attempted transfer under § 922(t).

Section 922(d)(9) and (g)(9) restrict firearm transfers and possession involving people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, but do not automatically bar their employment as police officers.

City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Police, Unpublished Decision (5-11-2000) · filed 2000-05-11(d)(9), (g)(9)

The prohibition against possession of a firearm does not automatically prohibit Marek from employment as a police officer. ... Therefore, we cannot say that enforcement of the CBA as construed by the arbitrator would contravene 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(9) or (g)(9) or the public policy behind them.

Section 922(k) does not entitle a defendant to a jury instruction treating possession during lawful police duties as a defense.

United States v. George Greene, Jr. · filed 2011-06-17(k)

The court‟s language tracked the Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions, see Model Third Circuit Crim. Jury Instruction No. 6.18.922K, and Greene cites to no legal authority establishing possession within the lawful discharge of law enforcement duties as a viable defense to a charge under § 922(k). The court was not obligated to fashion an instruction with no basis in the law.

Section 922(t)(2)(C) requires destruction of NICS records for approved firearm transfers but does not require immediate destruction, permitting limited retention for audits.

National Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Reno · filed 2000-07-11(t)(2)(C)

Indeed, by limiting retention of NICS information to "the minimum reasonable period for performing audits on the system," the Attorney General has obeyed the "destroy" command of section 922(t)(2)(C) while fulfilling her section 103(b) and 103(h) responsibilities.

Section 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a person previously committed to a mental institution withstands the Second and Fifth Amendment challenges raised here.

United States v. Goodrich · filed 2011-03-01(g)(4)

Facing a charge of possession of a firearm by a person previously committed to a mental institution, Kenneth L. Goodrich moves to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the indictment violates the Second and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and that the prosecution is barred by the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel. Consistent with prior rulings on the constitutional question, the Court denies that portion of the motion.

Section 922(g)(4) covers Maine emergency involuntary admissions to a mental institution.

United States v. Roy · filed 2010-10-06(g)(4)

The defendant’s first argument— that the federal statute does not extend to his blue paper admissions in Maine—is foreclosed in this court by previous decisions of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

Section 922(g)’s prohibition for people committed to a mental institution does not cover a voluntary hospital stay.

In re Robert T · filed 2009-09-22(g)

Therefore, Robert T’s voluntary stay at the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center in 1994 does not constitute a commitment within the purview of 18 USC § 922 (g).

Section 922(g)(4) bars a person committed to a mental institution from possessing a firearm.

Carnohan v. United States · filed 2008-10-20(g)(4)

The district court properly granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment because Carnohan failed to raise a triable issue as to the nature of his commitment to a mental health facility.

Section 922(g)(4)'s firearm prohibition for people previously committed to mental institutions survived the constitutional challenge presented in this case.

United States v. One (1) Vyatskie Polyany MacHine Building Plant "Molot" VEPR Rifle · filed 2007-02-09(g)(4)

Accordingly, the Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) is not unconstitutional for the reasons urged.

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits a person previously committed to a mental institution from possessing firearms, regardless of whether the person is currently psychotic.

United States v. Jones · filed 2005-01-21(g)(4)

Congress has prohibited people with medical histories like the defendant from having weapons at any time, irrespective of whether they were then psychotic.

Section 922(g)(4) bars firearm possession by a person formally committed to a mental institution, including through an involuntary commitment after a hearing.

United States v. Dorsch · filed 2004-04-13(g)(4)

We hold that Dorsch was committed to a mental institution as contemplated by § 922(g)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

Section 922(g)(4) supports denying a firearm purchase when a VA finding that the applicant cannot manage his affairs remains in effect.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Heggenstaller · filed 2001-10-16(g)(4)

Also as noted above, Section 922(g)(4) of the Gun Control Act provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person .... who has been adjudicated as a mental defective” to possess a firearm. ... The evidence described above constitutes sufficient justification to deny Heggenstaller the right to purchase a firearm.

Section 922(g)(4) can treat a five-day involuntary psychiatric hospitalization as a commitment when medical certification corroborates the admission, even without a formal judicial order.

United States v. Vertz · filed 2002-06-20(g)(4)

We agree that a judicial determination is not always necessary in order to have a “commitment” for purposes of the firearm statute. ... This certification, though untimely under Michigan law, provides the necessary affirmation of the validity of the involuntary admission, rendering it a “commitment” for purposes of the firearm statute. ... Therefore, we conclude that under the above facts, the five days Vertz spent at YRPH following his involuntary admission constituted a “commitment” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

Court-ordered emergency detention at a mental institution can place a person within § 922(g)(4)'s firearm prohibition.

United States v. McFadden · filed 2002-07-29(g)(4)

This Court CONCLUDES that the described proceedings show Defendant to be, because of such proceedings in Cherokee County, Texas, at the time of his possession of weapons, as that was alleged in Count II of the Indictment, a person within the scope of the broad “prohibition against ownership of firearms by ‘mentally unstable’ or ‘irresponsible’ persons,” enacted by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) covers a court-ordered involuntary stay in a mental institution even if the court later changes the person’s status without entering a final commitment order.

United States v. Miller · filed 2005-02-14(g)(4)

The New Jersey Superior Court found probable cause to believe that Defendant was in need of involuntary commitment, and Defendant was in fact so committed for a period of thirteen days. Accordingly, as in Chamberlain, the Court finds that Defendant was committed to a mental institution for purposes of § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits a firearm sale when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the buyer was adjudicated mentally defective or involuntarily committed to a mental institution.

Estate of Pemberton v. John's Sports Center, Inc. · filed 2006-06-02(d)(4)

As stated previously, for a 18 U.S.C. § 922 violation to have occurred, the seller would have had to know or had reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser had been adjudicated as a mental defective or had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution.

Section 922(g)(4) treats a judicial order for involuntary hospitalization as a commitment regardless of the outcome of a later examination.

United States v. Holt · filed 2006-09-28(g)(4)

We conclude that the term “committed” in the statute refers to a judicial (or possibly an administrative) order of commitment and does not depend on the ultimate outcome of the commitment.

Section 922(g)(4) treats a formal commitment for outpatient treatment as a commitment to a mental institution.

United States v. B.H. · filed 2006-12-07(g)(4)

The foregoing statutory scheme demonstrates that a person who is ordered to undergo outpatient treatment in Iowa is clearly committed to a mental institution, as contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat a finding of incompetence to stand trial, by itself, as an adjudication as a mental defective.

State v. Buchanan · filed 2007-05-30(g)(4)

Subsection 922(g)(4) — the provision at issue in this case — prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone who “has been adjudicated as a mental defective.” ... Therefore, because the trial court impermissibly equated incompetency to stand trial with “adjudicated as a mental defective,” we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 922(g)(4)'s firearm prohibition requires a formal commitment to a mental institution; temporary observation followed by voluntary treatment does not qualify.

Gallegos v. Dunning · filed 2009-04-17(g)(4)

We conclude that Gallegos was not committed to a mental institution for purposes of § 922(g)(4) and therefore was not prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(4) requires proof that the defendant was previously committed to a mental institution and possessed a firearm shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Reynolds · filed 2009-04-21(g)(4)

To prove Count One, the Government must establish that Ms. Reynolds had previously been “committed to a mental institution,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), and that she possessed a firearm that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(4) treats emergency involuntary hospitalization ordered by a Maine judge as commitment to a mental institution, even without a full hearing.

United States v. Murphy · filed 2010-02-04(g)(4)

In accordance with clear First Circuit precedent, when the Maine District Judge signed the emergency commitment order, Mr. Murphy was “committed” under § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits a person who has been committed to a mental institution from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Kaminsky · filed 2012-09-13(g)(4)

Section 922(g) prohibits one who “has been committed to a mental institution” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). We have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support each element of Kaminsky’s convictions.

Section 922(g)(4) covers commitments to a mental institution that occurred while a person was a juvenile, and its firearms prohibition continues into adulthood.

Keyes v. Lynch · filed 2016-07-11(g)(4)

Under § 922(g)(4), Congress intended to prohibit persons who had ever at some point been committed to a mental institution, even if the person no longer was currently committed. This can include a commitment when a person was under the age of 18, even though the person is now an adult.

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat a temporary hospitalization ordered ex parte without a hearing as a commitment to a mental institution.

United States v. Yoo · filed 2020-06-04(g)(4)

We conclude that Yoo’s temporary hospitalization based on an ex parte order, signed by a judge without a hearing, does not constitute “commitment to a mental institution” within the meaning of § 922(g)(4).

Section 922(g)(4) uses “mental defective” in its narrow, historical sense of intellectual disability, rather than to cover mental illness generally.

United States v. Tucker · filed 2022-05-09(g)(4)

The term has long carried a particular meaning, which speaks not to generalized mental illnesses but instead to an archaic class of intellectual disability.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a convicted felon; an indictment that alleges those elements is sufficient despite omitting a citation to § 924(a)(2).

Hall v. United States · filed 2024-06-10(g)(1)

Because Count 6 contained all of the essential elements of the offense as set out in the relevant statutes, clearly apprised Hall of the facts constituting the offense – including that he knew he was a convicted felon, and fairly informed him of the charge against which he must defend, the failure to cite § 924(a)(2) did not prejudice Hall and did not render Count 6 insufficient.

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) is sufficient when it tracks the statute’s language, even if it does not allege that the defendant knew of his prohibited status.

United States v. Perkins · filed 2023-03-31(g)(1)

“[a]n indictment is normally sufficient if its language tracks the statutory language,” United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2008), even if it does not charge the defendant with knowledge of his prohibited status. ... Perkins’s indictment closely tracks the language of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) is not jurisdictionally defective merely because it omits the defendant’s knowledge of his felon status.

United States v. McCall · filed 2023-02-21(g)(1)

McCall argues that his indictment is jurisdictionally defective because it did not allege that he knew his status as a felon, also known as the “knowledge-of-status” element. ... But, as McCall concedes, our precedent forecloses this argument.

An indictment charging a § 922(g) offense need not reference the penalty provision, § 924(a)(2).

Fredericks v. United States · filed 2021-03-01(g)(1)

In summary, Fredericks’ knowledge of his convicted felon status belies his Rehaif claim, and an indictment charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not defective for failing to reference § 924(a)(2).

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant was a felon, knew of that status, knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, and that the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Manansingh v. United States of America · filed 2021-01-04(g)(1)

To obtain an indictment under § 922(g)(1), the government must allege: “(1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status, but omitting that element from an indictment does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

United States v. Pruitt · filed 2020-12-16(g)(1)

An indictment’s omission of the element that the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not require proof of the precise type of ammunition possessed, so a discrepancy in its name does not create a fatal variance.

United States v. Levy · filed 2006-04-03(g)(5)(A)

The type of weapon or ammunition possessed is not essential to a conviction for a Section 922(g) charge, and thus cannot form the basis of a fatal variance.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon possessed a gun in or affecting commerce; an indictment tracking those elements is sufficient.

United States v. Hill · filed 2004-10-20(g)(1)

The statute in question requires proof that Hill, a felon, possessed a gun “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The indictment tracks this language, and we fail to see how an indictment under § 922(g)(1) that tracks the statutory elements is defective.

An indictment that tracks § 922(g)(1)’s language and alleges that the firearm was possessed in and affected interstate commerce alleges the elements of the offense.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2001-12-13(g)(1)

Thomas’s challenge to the indictment as being defective for alleging merely that the firearm he possessed was possessed in and affected interstate commerce fails because the language of his indictment tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and ... alleges each of the elements of the offense.

An indictment charging a violation of § 922(g)(8) can fairly convey the knowledge requirement through its factual allegations and statutory citation when read with maximum liberality.

United States v. Henry · filed 2002-04-10(g)(8)

In sum, although the term “knowingly” was omitted from the indictment, we are persuaded that the facts set forth in the indictment (reinforced with the appropriate statutory citation), read with maximum liberality, fairly imported the knowledge requirement contained in the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an indictment to allege that firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Wesley · filed 2002-10-31(g)(1)

Wesley argues that his conviction is invalid because the indictment did not allege that his firearms possession had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. We rejected this argument in United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1997).