18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(3) covers a person whose regular drug use has a temporal connection to firearm possession; drug use at the precise moment of possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Caparotta · filed 2012-04-05(g)(3)

We have held that the term "unlawful user" in section 922(g)(3) "requires a 'temporal nexus between the gun possession and regular drug use.'" ... Here, Caparotta cannot establish prejudice, because there was ample evidence for the district court to conclude that he was a "prohibited person" even without the bail interview information.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof of controlled substance use during the period of firearm possession, but not at the exact time the firearm was possessed.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2013-04-04(g)(3)

It is sufficient for the government to demonstrate use of a controlled substance “during the period of time” that the defendant possessed firearms, not that there was actual use “at the time that the officers discovered [the defendant] in possession of firearms.”

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use that is ongoing and contemporaneous with firearm possession, though use need not occur at the precise time of possession.

United States v. Clanton · filed 2013-04-04(g)(3)

As a preliminary matter, we agree that the district court properly stated that an unlawful user must be “actively engaged in the use of a controlled substance during the time he possessed the firearm, but [that] the law does not require that he used the controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm.”

Section 922(g)(3) bars an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce; evidence of regular marijuana use and firearm possession can support a conviction.

United States v. DeShawn Miller · filed 2016-02-22(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) provides “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce,2 any firearm or ammunition.” ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(3) requires unlawful drug use to be regular and contemporaneous with firearm possession; a later negative drug test does not establish whether the person was an unlawful user at that time.

Sobolewski v. United States · filed 2016-05-02(g)(3)

In sum, Dr. Ginory’s expert opinion and Sobolewski’s negative drug test were not probative of whether Sobolewski was an “unlawful user” of marijuana during the time he possessed his gun on February 6, 2013.

An admission of drug use contemporaneous with a firearm offense can establish that a person is an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

United States v. Dillard · filed 2016-05-12(g)(3)

Our precedent confirms, however, that “personal information given during a routine presentence interview” admitting to drug use contemporaneous with the time of the offense satisfies the “unlawful user” test.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose regular, repeated use of a controlled substance occurs during a period reasonably covering the possession.

United States v. Rickie Bellamy, Jr. · filed 2017-03-16(g)(3)

For these reasons, we hold that there was evidence in the record that Defendant engaged in repeated use of marijuana, and that there is evidence that said pattern of use occurred during a period of time in which he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm; possession of a firearm and a user quantity of methamphetamine can support a finding of unlawful drug use at that time.

United States v. Espinoza · filed 2018-03-13(g)(3)

That Espinoza was found in possession of a firearm and a user quantity of methamphetamine permitted a rational jury to infer he was an unlawful methamphetamine user at that time.

Section 922(g)(3) bars a person who regularly uses a controlled substance outside a physician’s directions from possessing a firearm while that use continues.

United States v. Blair Cook · filed 2019-01-28(g)(3)

Moreover, there is, as we have discussed, a readily appreciable core of conduct that the statute reaches: If one regularly uses marijuana or another controlled substance other than as directed by a physician, he may not possess a firearm so long as the use persists.

A conviction under § 922(g)(3) cannot rest on an uncorroborated admission that the accused was a regular, long-term drug user.

United States v. Tanco-Baez · filed 2019-11-04(g)(3)

Accordingly, we conclude that Cepeda's conviction on Count One rested on an uncorroborated admission and thus must be reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful marijuana user from possessing firearms in or affecting interstate commerce. Drug use must be regular, ongoing, and contemporaneous with firearm possession.

United States v. A Glock Model · filed 2019-11-13(g)(3)

In short, Talley has failed to dispute the Government’s assertion of facts that would sufficiently prove each element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), and he has failed to support his assertion of facts that would support a prescription-based defense.

Section 922(g)(3) covers drug use that is unlawful, regular, and ongoing when the person possesses a gun.

United States v. Blair Cook · filed 2020-08-17(g)(3)

As our analysis with respect to the “unlawful user” jury instruction demonstrates, unlawful use of a drug entails (1) use other than as lawfully prescribed by a physician, but also (2) use that was both regular and ongoing at the time that the defendant possessed a gun.

Section 922(g)(3) does not require proof that a firearm possessor used controlled substances regularly over an extended period.

United States v. Carnes · filed 2022-01-03(g)(3)

We reject Carnes’s expansive interpretation of “regular drug use” that would require evidence of use over an extended period.

Section 922(g)(3) does not require drug use at the exact moment the defendant possesses a firearm.

United States v. Darrell Two Hearts · filed 2022-04-25(g)(3)

This statute does not require use of a controlled substance at the exact moment that the defendant possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use to be ongoing and contemporaneous with firearm possession, but does not require use at the moment of possession or proof of intoxication then.

United States v. Breon D. Hicks · filed 2023-11-20(g)(3)

In that context, we held that to be an unlawful user of marijuana, “a defendant’s use must be ongoing and contemporaneous with the commission of the offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bernardine, 73 F.3d 1078, 1082 (11th Cir.1996)). However, we clarified that the government is not required to show that the use was simultaneous with the firearm possession or that the defendant was under the influence at the time of the possession. Id. Here, sufficient evidence was presented at Hicks’s trial that he was an unlawful user of marijuana contemporaneously with his possession of firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) covers a person whose regular marijuana use continued through the time he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Claybrooks · filed 2024-01-04(g)(3)

His own statements, and other evidence available to the court below, are sufficient to support the sentencing court’s conclusion that Claybrooks was an unlawful user of controlled substances as contemplated by the statute. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s finding and reject the as-applied challenge on appeal.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a temporal nexus between drug use and firearm possession, which may be established through circumstantial evidence of regular and ongoing use.

United States v. Morales-Lopez · filed 2024-02-09(g)(3)

Because the Government introduced sufficient evidence of the requisite temporal nexus between Defendant’s drug use and firearm possession, Defendant’s as applied challenge must fail.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by marijuana users, including medical marijuana users, because federal law treats marijuana as a controlled substance.

Com. v. Rivera, A., Jr. · filed 2024-03-04(g)(3)

The United States Code prohibits firearm possession by anyone “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” as defined in federal law. ... Under this statutory structure, a Pennsylvanian who uses marijuana, even medical marijuana, is unable to obtain a license to carry a concealed firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a temporal nexus between firearm possession and regular drug use for a person to be an unlawful drug user.

United States v. Deng · filed 2024-06-20(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits anyone “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” from possessing firearms. Because the term “unlawful user” “runs the risk of being unconstitutionally vague,” we interpret it to “require a temporal nexus” between the gun possession and regular drug use.

Section 922(g)(3) cannot support a conviction under jury instructions that permit disarming someone solely for prior, occasional, or habitual marijuana use.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2025-01-06(g)(3)

Because of this ... instructional error, § 922(g)(3) must thus again be held unconstitutional as applied to Daniels.

Section 922(g)(3) cannot be enforced against a regular marijuana user on the theory that regular use alone justifies disarmament under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Hemani · filed 2026-06-18(g)(3)

And the habitual drunkard laws on which the government relies here differ dramatically from §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision on every single metric the government invites us to consider: They targeted different kinds of people, did so for different purposes, and operated in different ways. Whether any one of these problems taken in isolation would prove fatal to the government’s cause, we need not decide. Taken cumulatively, we hold, they certainly do.

Section 922’s firearm restrictions apply to a domestic violence conviction under a municipal ordinance when the offense qualifies as a misdemeanor, even if the ordinance does not label it one.

Marquez v. Schaefer · filed 2025-05-01(d)(9), (g)(9)

Applying the plain language of the municipal code to the commonly understood meaning of misdemeanor, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Marquez’s conviction met the definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) and § 922.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence conviction; a former live-in girlfriend can satisfy the required domestic relationship.

Schinke v. Kaul · filed 2025-04-15(g)(9)

Federal law prohibits any person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). ... We conclude that substantial evidence supports the DOJ’s finding that Schinke’s relationship with the victim in his 2004 conviction satisfied the domestic relationship requirement for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor conviction; a brief live-in relationship alone did not establish the spousal relationship required under the federal definition applicable to this conviction.

J.C. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Licensing · filed 2024-05-22(g)(9)

Because the victim was not a person similarly situated to a spouse within the meaning of the federal statute, the Department erred when it concluded that J.C.’s state law battery conviction was a misdemeanor offense of domestic violence that disqualified him under federal and state law from receiving a concealed-carry license.

Section 922(g)(9)’s domestic relationship requirement may be proved with evidence outside the record of the predicate misdemeanor conviction.

Brinson v. Garland · filed 2024-05-28(g)(9)

So, whether Plaintiff’s relationship with the battery victim satisfies the “domestic relationship” requirement of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is a question of fact that may be proven by evidence outside the conviction record.

Section 922(g)(9) bars a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from receiving or possessing a firearm when a state expungement leaves the conviction valid.

Van Oudenhoven v. Wisconsin Department of Justice · filed 2024-06-04(g)(9)

Under this latter authorization, the DOJ was permitted to deny Van Oudenhoven’s handgun purchase because the “receipt of a firearm by [Van Oudenhoven] would violate 18 U.S.C. [§ ]922,” despite the fact that his misdemeanor conviction was expunged under Wisconsin law.

In a § 922(g)(9) prosecution, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on whether a prior domestic violence misdemeanor conviction falls within the jury waiver exception.

United States v. Shamsid-Deen · filed 2023-03-06(g)(9)

We agree with the district court that the § 921(a)(33)(B) defenses do not negate an element of the § 922(g)(9) crime. ... Nothing in Laroche or Johnson prevents us from holding, as we do: the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(II)(bb) defense.

Section 922(g)(9) does not bar firearm possession when the predicate conviction is not a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law.

Brush v. United States · filed 2023-01-24(g)(9)

Therefore, plaintiff’s state court conviction is not under federal law a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence that bars him from possessing a firearm or ammunition under federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, with no exception for later good behavior or the passage of time.

Harley v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-22(g)(9)

For these reasons, we adopt the approach of our sister circuits and decline to read into Section 922(g)(9) an exception for good behavior or for the passage of time following a disqualifying conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm unless a federal exception applies.

Brown v. Illinois State Police · filed 2021-01-04(g)(9)

Therefore, unless the limited exception under the FGCA applies, Brown is prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) can bar firearm possession after a misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction if the conviction involved the use or attempted use of physical force against a qualifying domestic partner.

Com. v. Sasse, O. · filed 2020-01-15(g)(9)

We agree with the reasoning in McPherson and Wolak, and conclude that a misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct may constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Therefore, such a conviction may stand as a bar to possession of a firearm, if the facts of the conviction establish the individual was convicted of using or attempting to use physical force against, among other individuals, a current or former spouse, someone who is cohabitating with the defendant, or someone who shares a child with the defendant.

A Tennessee domestic assault conviction under the fear-of-injury prong does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9) because that prong need not involve the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2018-05-01(g)(9)

The court therefore holds that a "use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon" is not a necessary element of § 39-13-101(a)(2) ; that, as a result, Daniels' conviction for "domestic assault" under § 39-13-111(b) did not necessarily include a "use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon" as an element; and that Daniels' conviction does not therefore qualify as "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) covers a tribal domestic violence misdemeanor conviction when the defendant was represented by lay counsel admitted to practice in tribal court.

United States v. Michael Lee Long, Jr. · filed 2017-08-29(g)(9)

Because lay counsel are admitted to practice before the tribal court, we conclude that Long was represented by counsel in the tribal-court proceeding within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B), and that his conviction there thus constituted a valid predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Walton v. The Illinois State Police · filed 2015-09-16(g)(9)

Accordingly, we find petitioner's 1991 battery conviction is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in section 921(a)(33) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, and thus petitioner is prohibited from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(9) of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

Section 922(g)(9) covers a North Carolina assault conviction based on completed battery because that form of assault satisfies the physical force requirement for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Vinson · filed 2015-07-21(g)(9)

Thus, any conviction for the completed-battery form of assault would necessarily include a use of physical force sufficient to satisfy the federal definition of an MCDV.

Section 922(g)(9) can apply when physical force against an object is directed at frightening or intimidating a person.

State v. Leonard · filed 2015-06-16(g)(9)

Instead, for purposes of applying § 922(g)(9), we conclude an act of physical force against an inanimate object may qualify as being "directed at" a person when the evidence shows that the act was directed at frightening or intimidating the person.

Section 922(g)(9) covers a Maine reckless domestic assault conviction because Maine’s definition of recklessness is sufficiently volitional to qualify as a use of physical force.

United States v. Voisine · filed 2015-02-02(g)(9)

We decide only that the Maine definition is sufficiently volitional that it falls within the definition of "use of physical force" applied in § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) covers a Kentucky harassment conviction based on physical contact because that contact satisfies the physical force element of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Laubis v. Witt · filed 2015-01-09(g)(9)

After the Supreme Court’s reversal of that decision, it is now clear that a couviction pursuant to KRS 525.070(1)(a) would qualify as a misdemeanor crime of dOmestic violence under § 922(g)(9) because “physical contact” meets the “physical force” element as defined in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, subject to the exception in Section 921(a)(33).

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Dorsett · filed 2014-08-29(g)(9)

Because subsection (a)(33) defines the disqualifying offense identified in Section 922(g)(9), and the DPS based its decision on Section 922(g)(9), we conclude that the “civil rights restored” exception in (a)(33) applies here.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor; a prior conviction cannot support the charge when the conviction records do not establish the required physical-force element.

United States v. Stokes · filed 2014-08-18(g)(9)

Here, the use or attempted use or threatened use of physical force is not a facially evident element of the conviction; therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is GRANTED as the underlying crime fails to support a federal offense.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction as a predicate for a firearm possession charge.

United States v. Smith · filed 2014-08-18(g)(9)

Here, the use or attempted use or threatened use of physical force is not a facially evident element of the convictions; therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is GRANTED as the underlying crimes fails to support a federal offense.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor conviction for offensive touching of a spouse, even if the offense does not require a domestic relationship as an element.

Fisher v. Kealoha · filed 2014-07-18(g)(9)

That is, every element of the Hawaii offense satisfies the Supreme Court’s definition of “physical force” under § 922(g)(9). This Court therefore holds that Plaintiff is prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(9) requires courts assessing a prior conviction under a divisible assault statute to use approved conviction records to identify the offense of conviction.

United States v. Carter · filed 2014-04-30(g)(9)

Thus, to determine which subsumed offense under Maine's assault statute formed the basis for Carter's guilty plea and conviction, we look to the relevant "approved" documents from the record of that earlier assault conviction.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm receipt by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; an arrest alone does not trigger the bar.

Ross v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives · filed 2012-08-07(g)(9)

Although the NICS Section labeled Ross’s 1965 arrest for assault on a female as “potentially prohibitive,” the relevant statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), bars receipt of firearms by individuals who have “been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

Section 922(g)(9) does not categorically bar firearm ownership after a harassment conviction if the state offense also covers nonviolent conduct.

Fisher v. Kealoha · filed 2012-04-19(g)(9)

In applying the categorical approach, harassment will not be a categorical “match” with the federal statute if its statutory definition includes both conduct that is of a non-violent nature and conduct that is of a violent nature. ... However, Plaintiffs Complaint sufficiently alleges that he was not prohibited under federal or state law from gun ownership when Defendants denied his permit to acquire a firearm under H.R.S. § 134-7, and consequently sufficiently alleges that Plaintiffs Second Amendment right to bear arms was infringed.

Section 922(g)(9) permits a misdemeanor offense committed recklessly to serve as a domestic violence predicate.

United States v. Booker · filed 2011-05-02(g)(9)

We therefore hold that an offense with a mens rea of recklessness may qualify as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) permits an undifferentiated conviction under Maine’s assault statute to serve as a predicate conviction.

United States v. Wyman · filed 2009-10-28(g)(9)

The Court disagrees with Mr. Wyman’s contention that a prior undifferentiated conviction under the Maine assault statute cannot constitute a predicate conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce or receiving one transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2008-11-18(g)(9)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006), it is unlawful for an individual who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." ... Because it appears that the statute makes Brenna's possession of a firearm under particular circumstances illegal, the Court remands this case to the chancellor for the narrow purpose of reconsideration of the distribution of the firearms owned by the parties in light of the statute.

Section 922(g)(9) covers a prior misdemeanor assault involving a domestic relationship even if that relationship is not an element of the state offense.

United States v. Garrett · filed 2007-03-14(g)(9)

The district court correctly found Garrett’s conviction qualified as a crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). W hile it is unclear whether the district court considered Garrett’s amended conviction, even the amended conviction meets the definition of misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) does not require the underlying misdemeanor offense to have, as an element of the crime, a domestic relationship. ... Information presented to the district court by Garrett shows a domestic relationship was involved in the underlying offense, even though the state assault statute did not include a domestic relationship element.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof of a domestic relationship as an element of the federal offense, but the predicate misdemeanor need not include that relationship as an element.

United States v. Liapis · filed 2007-02-14(g)(9)

W e affirm because we conclude that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and proof of a domestic relationship is only a required element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and not of the underlying state law conviction.

Section 922(g)(9) applies even when the predicate misdemeanor lacks a domestic relationship element, but the government must prove a qualifying relationship at trial.

United States v. Watkins · filed 2006-01-06(g)(9)

Of course, at trial the United States must prove the existence of a qualifying domestic relationship, but the fact that the Kentucky assault statute under which Defendant was convicted does not have a domestic relationship as an element is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(9) does not require the predicate misdemeanor to include a domestic relationship as an element, but the victim must have a qualifying domestic relationship with the offender.

In re Parsons · filed 2005-11-29(g)(9)

We adopt the reasoning of the Belless court and its sister courts and hold that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by one who has a prior misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence, does not require that the underlying statute include as an element of the offense a domestic relationship between the victim of the domestic violence and the misdemeanant. It requires only that the misdemeanor was committed against a person who is enumerated in one of the domestic relationships specified in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm or ammunition possession after a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, including assault and battery against a cohabiting family or household member.

United States v. Morse · filed 2004-05-18(g)(9)

We find that Morse’s conviction for assault and battery against a family or household member was properly considered a predicate crime for his § 922(g)(9) conviction.

Section 922(g)(9) does not require the predicate misdemeanor to include the victim’s domestic relationship with the offender as an element.

King v. Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation · filed 2004-05-07(g)(9)

Contrary to Mr. King’s argument, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not require that § 6-6-102 have, as an element, that the physical force be perpetrated upon a household member.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a conviction under Maine’s general assault statute for assaulting a person in the required domestic relationship, because both forms of assault require physical force.

United States v. Nason · filed 2001-10-19(g)(9)

The short of it is that both variants of assault regulated under Maine's general-purpose assault statute necessarily involve the use of physical force. As a result, all convictions under that statute for assaults upon persons in the requisite relationship status qualify as misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) treats an undifferentiated conviction under Maine's general-purpose assault statute as a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Hill · filed 2001-10-25(g)(9)

This appeal was argued on September 14, 2001, in conjunction with several other appeals raising the same principal question: does an undifferentiated conviction under Maine's general-purpose assault statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207, constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)? We answered that question affirmatively in United States v. Nason, ___ F.3d ___ (1st Cir. 2001) [No. 01-1440]. Nason is fully dispositive here.

An undifferentiated conviction under Maine’s general-purpose assault statute qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9).

United States v. Hesketh · filed 2001-10-25(g)(9)

does an undifferentiated conviction under Maine's general-purpose assault statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207, constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)? We answered that question affirmatively in United States v. Nason, ___ F.3d ___ (1st Cir. 2001) [No. 01-1440]. Nason is fully dispositive here.

Section 922(g)(9) treats an undifferentiated conviction under Maine’s general-purpose assault statute as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Brackett · filed 2001-10-25(g)(9)

This appeal was argued on September 14, 2001, in conjunction with several other appeals raising the same principal question: does an undifferentiated conviction under Maine's general-purpose assault statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207, constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)? We answered that question affirmatively in United States v. Nason, ___ F.3d ___ (1st Cir. 2001) [No. 01-1440].

Section 922(g)(9) requires a defendant who pleaded guilty to the predicate misdemeanor without counsel to have been informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before the waiver of counsel counts as knowing and intelligent.

United States v. Akins · filed 2001-03-27(g)(9)

We hold that for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a defendant pleading guilty to a misdemeanor must be informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before waiver of the right to counsel will be deemed knowing and intelligent.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a conviction for assault by striking, beating, or wounding a spouse when the offense involves physical force.

United States v. Chavez · filed 2000-02-29(g)(9)

Here, the offense has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force. It was committed against a spouse. Therefore, the offense meets the statutory definition of "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." See United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir.1999). Chavez is thus subject to § 922's prohibition.

Section 922(g)(9) bars people convicted of qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence offenses from possessing firearms, subject to the statutory exceptions.

United States v. Smith · filed 1999-03-24(g)(9)

We hold that, because Smith can receive a pardon from the governor of Iowa, similar to a felon who can receive restoration of his civil rights, § 921(a)(33) does not invidiously discriminate against him. Further, it was entirely rational for Congress to extend the firearm ban to those convicted of misdemeanors where physical force was used involving domestic relationships, relying on state law to determine who would fit within the exception. Thus, Smith's equal protection rights were not violated.

Section 922(g)(9) uses federal law to determine whether a misdemeanor domestic violence offense counts as a conviction.

United States v. Cadden · filed 2000-05-18(g)(9)

The Court finds that the omission of any reference to state law was Congress’s clear message to the courts that the determination of whether or not a conviction is a conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), must be decided as a matter of federal, not state law.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Larson · filed 2001-07-10(g)(9)

It is undisputed that only clause (2) of the above-quoted statute satisfies "the use or attempted use of physical force" element required to prosecute defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). In United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit held that a state misdemeanor assault conviction is sufficient as a predicate crime for purposes of § 922(g)(9) as long as the underlying conviction is for assault involving use of physical force rather than merely placing the victim in fear of imminent bodily harm. Id. at 620. ... Having considered the record and the arguments of the parties, we agree with the District Court that the state-court record does not make it clear whether Larson pleaded guilty under clause (1) or (2) of Minn. Stat. § 609.224 subd. 1. Accordingly, the ruling of the District Court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for trial on the pending § 922 charges, none of which has been dismissed in its entirety.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence whose elements include the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.

United States v. White · filed 2001-07-13(g)(9)

Because the indictment on its face reflects as a matter of law that neither of the only two predicate offenses alleged in the count of conviction for violating section 922(g)(9) was a “crime of domestic violence” as required by that section and section 921(a)(33)(A), White’s conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

Section 922(g)(9) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived counsel and jury trial rights in the predicate domestic violence case.

United States v. Bethurum · filed 2002-07-31(g)(9)

The court has concluded that the waiver issues are factors the government was obligated to establish, and that for the defendant to be convicted there would have to be sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the existence of those factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the victim of the predicate misdemeanor had a domestic relationship with the defendant, but that relationship need not be an element of the misdemeanor.

United States v. Kavoukian · filed 2002-12-31(g)(9)

The question is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) requires that such a domestic relationship between the assailant and the victim be included as an element of the predicate state offense. ... In the instant case, a convincing argument has been made that the plain language of the statute expresses Congress’s intention that only the mode of aggression is required as an element of the predicate offense of conviction.

Section 922(g)(9) applies after a Texas misdemeanor assault conviction requiring bodily injury because that offense has use of physical force as an element.

United States v. Shelton · filed 2003-03-18(g)(9)

Thus, we hold that because Shelton’s predicate offense of misdemeanor assault requires bodily injury it includes as an element the use of physical force.

Section 922(g)(8) covers the defendant’s protective order; the court reserved whether the prior disorderly-conduct conviction qualified under § 922(g)(9).

United States v. Medicine Eagle · filed 2003-05-21(g)(8)

The Court finds and concludes that the protection order falls within the prohibitions of § 922(g)(8) and that Defendant’s contentions to the contrary must fail. ... The Court finds and concludes that it is appropriate here to review the file so that it can make an unequivocal adjudication as to whether Defendant’s disorderly conduct offense is a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when firearm possession occurs after its effective date.

United States v. Wilhelm · filed 2003-05-21(g)(9)

The conviction does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because Defendant’s illegal conduct, the possession of firearms, occurred about three years after 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) took effect.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a qualifying misdemeanor assault when the victim’s domestic relationship with the offender is proven separately, even if that relationship was not an element of the offense.

James A. White, Jr. v. Department of Justice · filed 2003-05-12(g)(9)

In order to sustain a removal based on the interaction of a prior simple assault conviction with § 922 of the federal penal code for any employee who is required at work to carry a firearm, an agency, if challenged before the Board, must simply prove the domestic nature (here, spouse-like) of the employee's relationship with the victim as of the time of the assault, or anytime before the assault. We hold that the Board correctly sustained the Warden's decision that White's legal disability to lawfully possess a firearm constituted a "Loss of Qualifications" and warranted removal.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant was convicted in a court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Whittaker · filed 2003-07-23(g)(9)

To obtain a conviction against Mr. Whittaker on Count I, one element of proof the prosecution had to establish was that Mr. Whittaker was a person “who ha[d] been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) requires a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor; a battery statute that also covers mere rude touching is too broad to supply the predicate conviction.

United States v. Belless · filed 2003-08-11(g)(9)

But the Wyoming law against rude touchings does not meet the requirements for the federal statute that defines the predicate offense for a felony firearm conviction: “the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.”

Section 922(g)(9) applies when the portion of a state misdemeanor statute to which a person pleaded guilty includes the use of physical force against a spouse as an element.

Pennsylvania State Police v. McPherson · filed 2003-09-08(g)(9)

Thus to determine whether McPherson's misdemeanor conviction constitutes a predicate offense for purposes of the Federal gun disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), we must first look to the statutory definition of the offense to which McPherson pled guilty. ... This evidence clearly supports the conclusion that McPherson pled guilty to a portion of the statute which includes the use of physical force as an element.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; a prior conviction cannot serve as the predicate when the plea record does not clearly establish the facts admitted.

United States v. Serrao · filed 2004-01-13(g)(9)

The court, therefore, cannot determine what Serrao pled guilty to, and the prior state conviction cannot serve as a predicate for a § 922(g) or § 924(a)(2) charge.

Section 922(g)(9) can bar firearm possession after a misdemeanor conviction for assaulting an affair partner who is similarly situated to a spouse.

United States v. Cuervo · filed 2004-01-22(g)(9)

A common read of the statute would alert a person of ordinary intelligence that the phrase “similarly situated to a spouse” is meant to include assaults perpetrated against those who are not spouses, yet share their defining characteristics.

Section 922(g)(9) bars a person from receiving a firearm when a misdemeanor conviction involves physical force against someone with whom the person had a qualifying domestic relationship.

Eibler v. DEPARTMENT OF TREAS., BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS · filed 2004-01-30(g)(9)

Accordingly, because Eibler’s simple assault conviction contained the element of use or attempted use of physical force, and because the underlying assault was against a person Eibler had a domestic relationship with, the denial of a firearm purchase did not violate § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm even when state law permits possession.

United States v. Brailey · filed 2005-05-18(g)(9)

Under fed- eral law, a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence makes firearm possession a federal crime. Brailey stands convicted of such a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and he was properly charged with committing a fed- eral crime.

Section 922(g)(9) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm when the conviction satisfies the applicable requirements.

United States v. Artis · filed 2005-05-27(g)(9)

Title 18 ... U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000) provides that it shall be unlawful for a person who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (“MCDV”) to possess a firearm. ... We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion ... that Artis was not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of law.

Section 922(g)(9) cannot disqualify a firearm license applicant without proof of a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

D'Alessandro v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2005-06-24(g)(9)

Because there is no other admissible evidence regarding whether Petitioner and the victim lived together, we must conclude that the State Police failed to prove that Petitioner was convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as that term is defined in Section 921(33)(A) of the Federal Gun Control Act. As such, the State Police has failed to show that Petitioner is^barred from obtaining a license to carry a firearm by Section 922(g)(9) of the Federal Gun Control Act.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor even if the domestic relationship ended before the offense.

Woods v. City and County of Denver · filed 2005-06-30(g)(9)

We also conclude that, under the statute, once such a domestic relationship has begun, violence in the context of that relationship is domestic regardless of whether the parties terminated their relationship before or after the violence occurred.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits possessing a firearm after a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, which the government must prove as a qualifying predicate offense.

United States v. Trimble · filed 2006-02-24(g)(9)

In order to prove the defendant guilty of unlawfully possessing a weapon, the government must prove that the defendant was previously found guilty of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” ... The defendant’s motion in limine (filing 27) is granted as provided herein. The government may not use Government’s Exhibit 1 or the conviction described by that exhibit to prove the predicate offense alleged in the indictment.

Section 922 bars a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm.

Wolak v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2006-02-27

The basis of the denial is Section 922 of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968(Act), 18 U.S.C. § 922, which precludes a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm. ... In response, PSP argues that each of the elements of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in the Act, is satisfied. We agree with PSP.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Brock · filed 2006-02-28(g)(1)

We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the firearm conviction based upon Brock’s possession of the 12-gauge shotgun found in the bedroom.

Section 922(g)(9) requires the domestic relationship to be proved as part of the firearm offense, but the predicate misdemeanor need not have a domestic relationship element.

United States v. Heckenliable · filed 2006-04-27(g)(9)

Properly construed, a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” requires the domestic relationship element to be charged and proven as an element of a § 922(g)(9) violation, not as an element of the underlying misdemeanor.

Section 922(g)(9) covers firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction involving abuse of a live-in girlfriend, who is similarly situated to a spouse.

Buster v. United States · filed 2006-05-23(g)(9)

We agree with the First and Fifth Circuits and hold abuse perpetrated on a live- in girlfriend is domestic abuse committed “by a person similarly situated to a spouse” for purposes of sections 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

Section 922(g)(9) treats Georgia simple battery based on insulting or provoking physical contact as a qualifying domestic violence offense because that contact requires physical force.

United States v. Griffith · filed 2006-07-17(g)(9)

A person cannot make physical contact—particularly of an insulting or provoking nature—with another without exerting some level of physical force.

Section 922(g)(9) makes the domestic relationship an element of the federal offense that the government may prove at trial.

United States v. Nobriga · filed 2006-12-29(g)(9)

Thus, under Belless, the domestic relationship element need not be an element of the predicate offense. Rather, it is an element of the federal offense under § 922(g)(9), to be proven at trial.

A conviction under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1) does not qualify as a predicate for § 922(g)(9) because causing bodily injury does not necessarily involve the use of physical force.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2007-07-10(g)(9)

Therefore, the Court follows Vargas-Duran II and Villegas-Hemandez in finding that Defendant’s conviction for assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1) does not constitute a crime of violence. Because there is no predicate offense, Count One of the indictment, alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), must be dismissed.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; a battery conviction that may rest on mere rude touching does not establish that predicate when the conviction record does not identify a qualifying offense.

United States v. Hays · filed 2008-05-20(g)(9)

Accordingly, we hold that in the context presented here Wyoming’s battery statute, W YO . S TAT . A NN . § 6-2-501(b), does not satisfy the “use of physical force” element of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. As such, Mr. Hays’ underlying conviction pursuant to the Wyoming statute did not support his conviction.

A Wyoming simple battery conviction does not necessarily qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9).

United States v. Rael · filed 2008-05-22(g)(9)

On appeal he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Count One because a battery under the Wyoming statute can be committed without the use or attempted use of physical force, and thus convictions under this statute do not meet the federal definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we REVERSE for the reasons stated in our holding in United States v. Hays, No. 07-8039, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir., filed May 20, 2008).

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a qualifying domestic assault misdemeanor even when the assault was reckless.

United States v. Booker · filed 2008-05-27(g)(9)

There is no evidence that Congress intended to keep firearms out of the hands of only those individuals who intentionally or knowingly assault their domestic partners, but not those who recklessly do so.

Section 922(g)(9) does not bar firearm possession based on a misdemeanor conviction that lacks an element of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon.

United States v. Howell · filed 2008-07-07(g)(9)

By the plain meaning of the words of the statute, subsection (4) does not require as an element either the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon. Howell’s predicate conviction was not for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; the motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted.

Section 922(g)(9) covers a qualifying misdemeanor conviction even when the domestic relationship was not an element of the predicate offense, but the government must prove that relationship beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Hayes · filed 2009-02-24(g)(9)

To obtain a conviction in a § 922(g)(9) prosecution, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the predicate offense was the defendant’s current or former spouse or was related to the defendant in another specified way. But that relationship, while it must be established, need not be denominated an element of the predicate offense.

Section 922(g)(9)'s firearm ban can apply to a misdemeanor labeled non-domestic when the conviction involved a cohabiting victim.

Koll v. Department of Justice · filed 2009-04-01(g)(9)

In 1996, Congress extended the prohibition on gun possession to persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). ... We conclude that the DOJ properly denied Koll's application for a gun permit. The 1998 conviction for disorderly conduct arose from an event involving Koll and his live-in girlfriend. This falls within the definition provided in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), which provides that a domestic relationship exists where the aggressor and the victim are cohabiting or have cohabited. Koll, therefore, has committed a predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as that term is used in the Gun Control Act, and he may not possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession when a prior misdemeanor satisfies the force requirement and the offender had a domestic relationship with the victim.

United States v. Fischer · filed 2011-06-17(g)(9)

Because Fischer's state court conviction satisfied the force requirement and there was no question that he had a domestic relationship with the victim, that conviction served as a predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) permits a misdemeanor unlawful-imprisonment conviction to serve as a domestic-violence predicate when the defendant forcibly restrained his spouse.

United States v. Wells · filed 2011-11-28(g)(9)

This undermines defendant’s assertion that he did not use any physical force or violence during the incident that ultimately resulted in his conviction for unlawful imprisonment. Therefore, this misdemeanor offense is an appropriate predicate for purposes of § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) bars a person convicted of a domestic-violence crime from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

State of Vermont v. Voog · filed 2012-09-26(g)(9)

As noted, moreover, the federal statute expressly forbids the possession of any “firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly declined to return both the .45 caliber automatic gun and the .45 caliber ammunition clip on the ground that their possession by defendant would be a violation of federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) applies when a predicate domestic violence misdemeanor conviction is based on offensive physical contact under Maine’s assault statute.

United States v. Armstrong · filed 2013-01-18(g)(9)

To conclude, the statute on its face, its legislative history and this court's precedent do not distinguish between "violent" or "non-violent" misdemeanor convictions when they involve the kind of conviction at issue here, and in any case, the court fails to see how a conviction for an offensive touching such as the offensive physical contact for which Armstrong was convicted fails to constitute a predicate offense based on our prior interpretation of § 922(g)(9) predicate offense requirements of "physical force."

Section 922(g)(9) does not exclude a predicate misdemeanor conviction merely because it involved purportedly non-violent offensive physical contact.

United States v. Voisine · filed 2013-01-18(g)(9)

Defendant-Appellant Stephen L. Voisine asks us to reconsider arguments heard in and decided by this court regarding: (1) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) should be construed to exclude a purportedly non-violent offensive physical contact misdemeanor conviction as a predicate offense; ... The Court considered and denied the exact same arguments in United States v. Armstrong, III, Case No. 12-1216 (1st Cir. 2012). Since there are no pertinent factual differences distinguishing the instant case from Armstrong, we accordingly incorporate its reasoning here and affirm the district court's denial of Defendant-Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor conviction involving the required force and a qualifying domestic relationship; that relationship must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Flatt v. State of Tennessee · filed 2013-04-22(g)(9)

As the Supreme Court stated in Hayes, “the domestic relationship . . . must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a § 922(g)(9)” case, even though it need not be a defining element of the predicate offense. Id. at 418. The record before us does not establish that Petitioner pled guilty to assaulting his ex-wife instead of assaulting Eric Jones. Therefore, the record does not contain substantial and material evidence to support the Department’s determination that Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, including California misdemeanor battery under Penal Code section 242.

James v. State of Cal. · filed 2013-09-24(g)(9)

Accordingly, James‘s conviction under the state statute is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence within the meaning of title 18 United States Code section 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) does not bar firearm possession based on a harassment conviction that does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under the categorical or modified categorical approach.

Fisher v. Kealoha · filed 2013-09-30(g)(9)

As a result of the above analysis, the Court concludes that, under both the categorical and modified categorical approaches, Plaintiffs convictions for harassment do not disqualify him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; its physical force requirement includes the force needed for common-law battery.

United States v. Castleman · filed 2014-03-26(g)(9)

We therefore hold that the requirement of “physical force” is satisfied, for purposes of §922(g)(9), by the degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; restoration of firearm rights alone does not remove that bar when the person never lost the rights to vote, hold office, or serve on a jury.

United States v. Horse Looking · filed 2015-03-10(g)(9)

Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person “who has been convicted ... of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). ... Because Horse Looking’s conviction satisfies the force requirement of § 921 (a)(33)(A)(ii) and did not result in the loss of any civil rights within the “core cluster,” this Court denies Horse Looking’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence conviction; a North Carolina assault conviction does not qualify when it can rest on culpable negligence.

United States v. Vinson · filed 2015-11-03(g)(9)

To determine whether a prior conviction renders the defendant a prohibited person under § 922(g), we apply the familiar “categorical approach.” ... Thus, none of the different forms of assault categorically qualifies as an MCDV, because each form permits conviction for conduct that does not amount to a “use” of force under Leocal.

Section 922(g)(9) does not bar firearm possession based on North Carolina convictions for communicating threats or misdemeanor stalking because neither offense necessarily involves physical force or a threatened deadly weapon.

Underwood v. Hudson · filed 2015-12-15(g)(9)

In sum, neither of Defendant’s convictions constitutes a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), does not preclude Defendant from having or possessing a firearm, even if Defendant and Plaintiff were in a “personal relationship” as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(b).

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; a conviction from a bench trial remains a predicate when the defendant does not invoke an available jury trial on appeal.

United States v. Brown · filed 2016-03-31(g)(9)

We hold, instead, that the record of trial enabled both the military judge and this court to decide, as a matter of law, that the appellant’s North Carolina domestic violence conviction is a predicate offense under the Lautenberg Amendment.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction based on reckless conduct.

Voisine v. United States · filed 2016-06-27(g)(9)

Once again, the word “use” does not exclude from §922(g)(9)’s compass an act of force carried out in conscious disregard of its substantial risk of causing harm.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; an inconclusive record of which offense formed the prior conviction cannot establish that predicate.

United States v. Cody James Horse Looking · filed 2016-07-11(g)(9)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), any person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is prohibited from possessing a firearm. ... But the judicial record does not establish that Horse Looking necessarily was convicted of an assault that has the required element. ... We are thus constrained to hold that the district court should have dismissed the indictment.

Section 922(g)(9) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior domestic violence conviction under a municipal ordinance.

United States v. Pauler · filed 2017-05-23(g)(9)

Accordingly, because Defendant’s prior violation of a Wichita municipal ordinance was not a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by § 921(a)(33), the government has not demonstrated that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, including a conviction for reckless assault under Maine law.

United States v. Carter · filed 2017-06-22(g)(9)

As the district court first held in 2012, Carter's conviction for assault was a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. We must, therefore, reverse the decision below and order the indictment reinstated in light of Voisine.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, including a battery conviction involving a spouse.

People v. Heitmann · filed 2017-10-02(g)(9)

Under the Gun Control Act, it is unlawful for anyone “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). ... For example, a conviction of simple battery where the victim is the petitioner’s spouse or child is considered a crime of domestic violence. ... However, without that avenue, petitioner is still under the federal firearm disability.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction even when the offense does not include a domestic relationship as an element.

People v. Heitmann · filed 2018-01-10(g)(9)

Under the Gun Control Act, it is unlawful for anyone “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). Like under the FOID Card Act, the domestic relationship need not be an element of the offense the petitioner is convicted of.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm; a simple assault conviction involving the offender’s spouse qualifies.

C.S. LaMarche, Sr. v. PSP · filed 2018-01-25(g)(9)

Upon review, Petitioner’s simple assault conviction is a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which prohibits him under state and federal law from possessing firearms. See 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9); 18 Pa. C.S. §6105(c)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof of a domestic relationship between the defendant and the victim of the predicate misdemeanor.

United States v. Williams · filed 2018-03-06(g)(9)

The record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Ronnessa Williams, the assault victim, was Williams’s wife at the time of the incident.

A misdemeanor domestic violence conviction can trigger § 922(g)(9)’s firearm ban when the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to a jury trial.

United States v. Ler Wah Guide · filed 2018-06-06(g)(9)

Section 922(g)(9) generally prohibits persons who have been convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms. ... The district court did not err in determining that Guide knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial when he pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic abuse.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms.

Com. v. Whistler, E. · filed 2018-08-27(g)(9)

Thus, pursuant to both state and federal law, Appellant could not lawfully possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; a charge alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Marshall · filed 2018-11-27(g)(9)

That is because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)’s terms require a “conviction”—not a mere charge.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by a person with a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; one qualifying conviction is enough.

United States v. Locke · filed 2019-07-30(g)(9)

Since 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(9) only requires one predicate offense, and since we find that his Virginia conviction is a valid predicate, we do not reach issues relating to the Georgia offense.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew of the prior domestic violence misdemeanor conviction that barred firearm possession, but failure to make that finding does not warrant reversal on plain error review without prejudice.

United States v. Martinez · filed 2020-04-20(g)(9)

While the decision in Rehaif establishes that the district court made an obvious error in failing to address whether Martinez knew of his domestic violence conviction, id., the third and fourth prongs of the plain error test are not satisfied because Martinez has not shown a “probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 1189.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by a person with a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; a conviction under Maine’s assault statute qualifies.

United States v. Swain · filed 2001-11-02(g)(9)

Swain’s appeal was heard as part of a consolidated set of appeals challenging whether or not Maine’s misdemeanor assault statute, tit. 17-A, § 207, is a sufficient predicate misdemeanor to sustain a conviction, and therefore an indictment, under the federal statute making it a crime for a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1994). ... Therefore, by pleading guilty to an assault against his wife under the Maine assault statute, Swain necessarily pled guilty to a crime with an element of physical force as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(A)(ii). As a result, the district court was correct to find that Swain was a “prohibited person” under Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) when it sentenced him for illegal possession of an unregistered short-barreled rifle.

Section 922(g)(9) requires a prior misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; the government must establish that the victim had a relationship to the defendant covered by the federal definition.

United States v. Nobriga · filed 2005-05-19(g)(9)

Because the relationship between Nobriga and the vic- tim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic vio- lence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor battery conviction involving a qualifying domestic relationship, even if that relationship is not an element of the offense.

Odle v. The Department of State Police · filed 2015-12-28(g)(9)

The relevant federal provision in this case is section 922(g)(9) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act), which provides that it is unlawful for any person “who has been convicted *** of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to acquire, transport, or possess a firearm. ... The State Police next contends that the court erred in finding that it had discretion to overturn the decision to revoke the petitioner’s FOID card because he is not allowed to acquire or possess a firearm under federal law. We agree.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits a person with a prior misdemeanor domestic abuse conviction from possessing firearms.

United States v. Doney · filed 2006-06-01(g)(9)

Doney was nonetheless prohibited from possessing firearms at the time of the search because he had a previous misdemeanor conviction for domestic abuse. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) does not establish a firearm disqualification without facts showing a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

Bell v. Hargrove · filed 2020-11-17(g)(9)

Nothing in the record before us constitutes facts establishing Bell’s ineligibility pursuant to the Federal Provision.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a conviction for a qualifying crime of domestic violence.

United States v. ROBERTSON · filed 2021-10-18(g)(9)

This is a crime of domestic violence, which triggers the prohibition against firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; Wisconsin disorderly conduct does not qualify because physical force or a deadly weapon threat is not a required element.

Doubek v. Kaul · filed 2022-05-20(g)(9)

In this case, that federal law is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits anyone convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" from possessing a firearm. ... In short, the crime of disorderly conduct defined in § 947.01(1) is a single indivisible crime that does not require the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon as an element, even if that conduct could serve as the basis for a disorderly conduct conviction. It is therefore not a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) covers possession of a firearm by a person convicted under a state domestic violence law that forbids unconsented touching, even without direct physical force.

United States v. Swinton · filed 2022-09-21(g)(9)

United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014), holds that a state law establishes a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for the purpose of §922(g)(9) if it forbids an unconsented touching, even without direct applica- tion of physical force. ... The meaning given to that phrase in Castleman leads inexorably to the conclusion that Ind. Code §35-42-2- 1.3(a)(2) establishes a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. In a handgun certificate appeal involving a divisible predicate offense, courts assess the domestic relationship from the circumstances and the use of force under the modified categorical approach.

Scalise v. Davis · filed 2022-09-30(g)(9)

Section 922(g)(9) makes it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a fire- arm. ... As such, when considering an appeal from the denial of an application for a handgun certificate, Nebraska courts should employ the circumstance-specific approach to the specified domestic relationship requirement, but employ the modified categorical approach to the “use of physical force” requirement.

Section 922(g)(9) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a local-law misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction entered before local offenses were added to the federal definition on March 15, 2022.

Humphrey v. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations · filed 2023-12-08(g)(9)

Mr. Humphrey’s 2010 MCDV convictions under the Anchorage Municipal Code do not prohibit him from possessing firearms under federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession based on a local misdemeanor domestic violence conviction even if the conviction predates the 2022 change that included local offenses.

Humphrey v. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations · filed 2024-02-29(g)(9)

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no ex post facto violation here, and Mr. Humphrey’s 2010 local MCDV convictions now federally prohibit him from possessing any firearms.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a qualifying misdemeanor domestic violence conviction; an Article 128 battery against a spouse qualifies even if the charge does not identify the victim as a spouse.

United States v. Warrant Officer One JOSEPH S. BURCH · filed 2024-10-21(g)(9)

As applied here, all three of the Lautenberg Amendment qualifying requirements are present: (1) Article 128, which has a maximum punishment of six months, qualifies as a misdemeanor offense under federal law; (2) Article 128 requires the use of force, and appellant admitted that he used unlawful force when he grabbed the victim’s wrist; and (3) appellant admitted both in the stipulation of fact and plea colloquy that the victim was his spouse. Finally, the fact that the wording of the specification did not specifically allege that the victim was appellant’s spouse does not change the analysis.

Section 922(g)(9) does not bar firearm possession based on a Montana partner or family member assault conviction under § 45-5-206(1)(a), because that offense can be committed without physical force.

United States v. Defrance · filed 2024-12-30(g)(9)

Accordingly, a conviction for violating this statute does not qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and Appellant’s § 922(g)(9) conviction must be reversed.

A conviction for intimidating a spouse by damaging her property does not qualify under § 922(g)(9) without physical force against or injury to the spouse.

United States v. Warrant Officer One JOHN R. FREESTONE · filed 2025-08-13(g)(9)

Accordingly, even though the government correctly charged Specification 10 as a “domestic violence” offense pursuant to Article 128b, because there was no allegation or evidence that appellant used any physical force against, or caused any injury to the person of his spouse, his conviction does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) permits a Washington fourth degree assault conviction to serve as a domestic violence predicate because that offense requires the use or attempted use of physical force.

United States v. Wright · filed 2026-04-17(g)(9)

Because Washington’s fourth degree assault statute incorporates the generic common law definition of “assault,” the statute has the necessary element of “the use or attempted use of physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). The district court correctly observed that “the decision in DeFrance does not apply to the conviction underlying Wright’s § 922(g)(9) charge” and did not abuse its discretion by holding that there was “no ‘fair and just’ reason to allow Wright to withdraw his guilty plea.”

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, including a conviction for willfully or recklessly causing bodily injury to a household member.

United States v. Ross · filed 2026-05-29(g)(9)

Ross’s conviction therefore constitutes a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g) allows only one conviction and sentence for a single firearm-possession incident, even when the defendant falls within two prohibited categories.

United States v. Haynes · filed 2020-01-10(g)

Here, as the government concedes, under our prior holding in Winchester, and the Supreme Court’s prior holdings in Ball and Rutledge, the district court committed plain error by sentencing Haynes to concurrent sentences and imposing two special assessments for his two § 922(g) convictions based on the same criminal incident, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) treats possession of the same firearm as one continuing offense unless the person relinquishes both actual and constructive possession before reacquiring it.

United States v. Ellis, Bernard · filed 2010-09-17(g)(1)

Therefore, to charge and punish a defendant for more than one § 922(g)(1) offense for separate “possessions” of the same gun, there must be a relinquishment of both actual and constructive possession of the gun before it is reacquired.

Section 922(g)(3) permits separate counts for firearm possession by an unlawful drug user when the counts charge offenses occurring at different times.

United States v. Newman · filed 2004-06-17(g)(3)

It is clear that Count Seven charged a violation of § 922(g)(3) occurring on February 24, 2002, and that Count Four charged such a violation during an earlier distri- bution to Lambert in February. Thus, the counts do not charge the same crime.

Section 922(g) requires proof of a prior felony conviction and firearm possession; a conviction under it may stand alongside a § 924(c) conviction because each offense requires proof of a different element.

United States v. Gary Steven Stotts, Also Known as Jackie Wayne Simmons · filed 1999-05-12(g)

Count 4 required proof that Stotts had a prior felony conviction and possessed a firearm. Count 2 required that Stotts used or carried the specified destructive device during and in relation to a controlled substance offense. Thus, the § 924(c) charge and the § 922(g) charge each required proof of an element that the other did not. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated.

Simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition in the same criminal act cannot support separate convictions and sentences under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Saldua · filed 2005-02-10(g)(1)

As the Government concedes, simultaneous convictions and sentences for the same criminal act involving possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition violate double jeopardy.

Section 922(g)(1) and § 922(j) permit separate convictions because each requires proof of an element the other does not.

United States v. Moye · filed 2006-07-24(g)(1), (j)

A conviction under § 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm was stolen, while a conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not. A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires proof of felony status, while a conviction under § 922(j) does not.

A conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2) requires proof that the firearms offense was completed.

United States v. Colson · filed 2007-01-26(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)

Conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 requires proof that two or more persons conspired to commit an offense, but does not require proof that the offense was completed, which is an element necessary for conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and (2).

Section 922(g)(1) creates a separate felon-in-possession offense; a conviction under it and a conviction for possessing the same firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking do not violate double jeopardy when each offense requires proof of a different element.

United States v. Barber · filed 2008-12-18(g)(1)

Section 924 merely provides a punishment provision for the other crime, “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,” which is charged under a separate statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).