18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(8) does not permit a defendant to collaterally attack the protective order underlying a firearms charge when the statute’s required safeguards are met.

United States v. Wescott · filed 2009-08-03(g)(8)

All of the courts to consider the issue, as we noted above, have determined a defendant may not collaterally attack the predicate protective order, and we now adopt that rule.

Section 922(g)(8) bars firearm possession while a qualifying no-contact order remains in effect, even if a state court removes the firearm prohibition from the order.

Weissenburger v. Iowa District Court for Warren County · filed 2007-10-26(g)(8)

In view of these governing principles, we conclude the district court had no power to authorize Joseph to possess firearms in violation of federal law. Once the court determined the no-contact order should continue in effect, Joseph was prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms regardless of whether this prohibition was included in the court’s no-contact order.

Section 922(g)(8) does not make an acquittal on charges underlying a protective order a defense when the order remained in effect at the time of firearm possession.

United States v. Arledge · filed 2007-04-04(g)(8)

Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the criminal charges brought based on the allegations underlying the protective order, the order was in effect at the time Arledge possessed the firearm and ammunition. ... Therefore, Arledge’s state court acquittal was not relevant to the issue at hand – whether Arledge possessed a firearm and ammunition while subject to a protective order.

Section 922(g)(8) applies to a person subject to a protective order even if the order may be invalid; the person cannot challenge that order collaterally in the firearms prosecution when it has more than a frivolous pretense to validity.

United States v. Hicks · filed 2004-12-07(g)(8)

Thus, the protective order at issue had more than a frivolous pretense to validity. ... Because Hicks did not take any of these steps, he violated the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) by possessing firearms and ammunition while he was subject to a protective order, and his conviction stands.

Section 922(g)(8) applies to people subject to a protective order even if the order may be invalid.

United States v. Hicks · filed 2004-11-30(g)(8)

Like the provisions at issue in Lewis and Chambers, nothing in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) indicates that it applies only to persons subject to a valid, as opposed to an invalid, protective order.

Section 922(g)(8) requires actual notice and an opportunity to be heard before a restraining order is issued, but does not require witnesses to testify or evidence to be offered.

United States v. Lippman · filed 2004-05-27(g)(8)

A hearing requires actual notice and an opportunity to be heard, but the statute does not require that evidence actually have been offered or witnesses called.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) does not require an express finding that the restrained person poses a credible threat, but the order must explicitly prohibit physical force reasonably expected to cause bodily injury.

United States v. Emerson · filed 2001-11-02(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Though we are concerned with the lack of express findings in the order, and with the absence of any requirement for same in clause (C)(ii) of section 922(g)(8), we are ultimately unpersuaded by Emerson’s argument. Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires an actual hearing with prior notice and an opportunity to participate, and section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) requires that the order “explicitly” prohibit the use (actual, threatened or attempted) of physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession when a protection order follows notice and a hearing, restrains specified conduct toward an intimate partner, and contains the required finding or prohibition on physical force.

Benson v. Muscari · filed 2001-02-02(g)(8)

Under the federal statute, the prohibition on possessing a firearm is applicable if (A) the order was issued after a hearing of which defendant had notice and in which he had the opportunity to participate; (B) the order restrains defendant from "harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner" or engaging in conduct that would place an intimate partner "in reasonable fear of bodily injury"; and (C) the order contains a finding that defendant "represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner" or explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury against such intimate partner. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The order in this case meets each of these requirements.

Section 922(g)(8) does not require intent to harm the person protected by the restraining order.

United States v. Reddick · filed 2000-02-15(g)(8)

The statute does not require any intent to harm the person protected by the restraining order.

A protection order that prohibits abusing a spouse satisfies the physical force requirement when the governing definition of abuse includes causing bodily injury.

Dragani v. Dragani · filed 1999-06-22(g)(8)(C)(ii)

It is clear that, in light of the definition of abuse, that paragraph 1 of order which prohibits Husband from abusing Wife, meets the criteria that the order explicitly prohibit the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force that would be expected to cause bodily injury.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is satisfied by a protective order directing a person to refrain from abusing an intimate partner.

United States v. Bostic · filed 1999-02-17(g)(8)(C)(ii)

The Order's directive that Bostic "shall refrain from abusing [Kelly]," J.A. at 55, unambiguously satisfies subsection (C)(ii)'s requirement that the court order prohibit the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Section 922(g)(8) applies when a person received actual notice of a protective-order hearing and an opportunity to participate, even if the person did not attend.

United States v. Bunnell · filed 2000-07-11(g)(8)

The prohibitions of § 922(g)(8) apply only to orders that were issued after a hearing of which a defendant received actual notice and in which he had an opportunity to participate.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires notice and an opportunity to participate in a hearing, but does not require a hearing on the merits.

United States v. Calor · filed 2001-09-17(g)(8)(A)

Calor’s would-be imposition of a hearing on the merits requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A), a statute that otherwise merely requires an “opportunity to participate” in the hearing, is problematic beyond the obvious attempt at a judicial “rewriting” of the statute.

Section 922(g)(8)(B) can be satisfied by a protective order that bars harassment and disturbance of an intimate partner’s peace, even if it does not use the statute’s exact words.

United States v. Rolle · filed 2001-09-27(g)(8)(B)

The order states that Rolle “must not harass, annoy, or disturb the peace of” his former girlfriend. This language prohibits Rolle from engaging in conduct “that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury,” and, thus, meets the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(B).

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is satisfied by an order prohibiting “domestic violence and abuse” because that language includes actual, attempted, and threatened physical force.

United States v. Hopper · filed 2001-12-28(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Although “domestic violence and abuse” is language which may contemplate a broader range of activity than physical assault, we believe that the language is sufficiently explicit so as to include actual, attempted and threatened physical force within its meaning.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires a protective order to have been issued after an actual hearing of which the person received notice; an agreed order entered without a hearing does not qualify.

United States v. Spruill · filed 2002-05-15(g)(8)(A)

Moreover, the wording of section 922(g)(8)(A) likewise expressly requires that the defendant have “received actual notice” of the hearing, which necessarily means that the hearing must have been set for a particular time and place and the defendant must have received notice of that and thereafter the hearing must have been held at that time and place. None of these things occurred here.

Section 922(d)(8)(B)(ii) requires a restraining order to expressly address physical force involving bodily injury before it can trigger the firearm transfer prohibition.

Magoon v. Thoroughgood · filed 2002-07-26(d)(8)(B)(ii)

Therefore, in order for a restraining order to trigger 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(8)(B)(ii), the term “explicitly” requires that the order facially contain specific language concerning physical force involving bodily injury.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession while a person is subject to a qualifying protective order; an expired order does not trigger the prohibition.

Skillett v. Sierra · filed 2002-09-13(g)(8)

We believe Sierra should have no concern about this statute because insofar as the PFA order is concerned, he is no longer “subject to a court order.”

Section 922(g)(8) bars a person subject to a qualifying protective order from possessing a firearm, including a hunting rifle, while the order is in effect.

People v. Adams · filed 2002-09-18(g)(8)

The defendant, for as long as the COOP is in effect, is barred by 18 USC § 922 (g) (8) from possessing a firearm, including a hunting rifle.

Section 922(g)(8)’s notice and hearing requirement is satisfied when the person received notice and had an opportunity to participate, even if the person did not attend; a later address change does not undo a qualifying order.

United States v. Wynne · filed 2003-01-07(g)(8)

Thus, Wynne had an opportunity to be present and chose not to be. Because Wynne was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, the 1994 VPO complies with the notice requirements of § 922(g)(8). ... Indeed, for purposes of § 922(g)(8)’s notice and hearing requirements, the 1997 change-of-address amendment had no effect at all, and the 1994 VPO was in full force and effect when Wynne purchased the firearm in 1999.

Section 922(g)(8) requires actual notice of the hearing, but does not require the defendant to know that the restraining order issued.

United States v. Coccia · filed 2003-03-12(g)(8)(A)

Thus, although- actual notice of a hearing is a requirement under the plain language of the statute, actual knowledge of a court order is not.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession while a person is subject to a qualifying court order; the prohibition ends when the order expires.

Flaherty v. Meyer · filed 2003-06-10(g)(8)

However, that section appears to only prohibit the appellant from possessing a firearm while he is “subject to the court order.” After it expires, Appellant will no longer be subject to the court order.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession only while a person remains subject to the court order.

Johnson v. Meyer · filed 2003-06-10(g)(8)

However, that section appears to only prohibit the appellant from possessing a firearm while he is “subject to the court order.” After it expires, the appellant will no longer be subject to the court order.

An agreed domestic violence protective order can support a § 922(g)(8) prosecution when the defendant had notice of a scheduled hearing and an opportunity to be heard before a judge.

United States v. Banks · filed 2003-07-15(g)(8)(A)

Reading Spruill, Emerson, and Henry in harmony, we find that an agreed order can form the basis for a § 922(g)(8) prosecution at least where a hearing on a domestic violence order was set for a particular time and place, the defendant received notice of it, the defendant appeared in court with an attorney, the judge was present and ready to hear his case, the court had evidence before it that domestic violence had occurred, and the court gave the defendant an opportunity to be heard.

Section 922(g)(8) restricts firearm possession while a person is subject to a qualifying protective order, but an expired order does not trigger the restriction.

Creaser v. Creaser · filed 2003-07-29(g)(8)

The Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act restricts possession of firearms by a person subject to a court order that restrains certain behavior toward an intimate partner or the child of the person or the partner (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000)), but once the order is expired, the person cannot reasonably be deemed to be “subject to a court order.”

Section 922(g)(8) requires actual notice and an opportunity to participate in the hearing before a protective order triggers its firearm prohibition.

United States v. Calor · filed 2003-08-15(g)(8)

In order for a court proceeding to be the predicate hearing for a court order that triggers the § 922(g)(8) firearm disability, the statute straightforwardly requires that the subject of the court order be given actual notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to participate.

Section 922(g)(8) requires actual notice and an opportunity to participate in the hearing before a protective order triggers the firearm prohibition; the person need not use that opportunity.

United States v. Calor · filed 2003-11-05(g)(8)(A)

In order for a court proceeding to be the predicate hearing for a court order that triggers the § 922(g)(8) firearm disability, the statute straightforwardly requires that the subject of the court order be given actual notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to participate.

Section 922(g)(8)'s opportunity-to-participate requirement is not defeated merely because domestic violence was not discussed at the protective-order hearing when the defendant had notice, attended with counsel, and was not prevented from raising relevant issues.

United States v. Leary · filed 2004-01-21(g)(8)

In order to obtain a conviction under § 922(g)(8), the government must prove that the protective order “was issued after a hearing of which [the defendant] received actual notice, and at which [the defendant] had an opportunity to participate.” ... Although Mobley would have testified that no one discussed domestic violence at the hearing, that testimony does not tend to prove that Leary was not afforded an opportunity to participate at the hearing. Leary was on notice that the hearing would determine whether a domestic violence protective order would continue in effect. He attended the hearing and was represented by counsel. Leary offered no evidence to establish that he or his counsel was prevented from discussing issues relevant to the protective order.

Under § 922(g)(8), a judge may determine the legal meaning of a domestic violence order before trial, while the jury decides whether the government proved each element of the offense.

United States v. Cline · filed 2004-03-26(g)(8)

Determining the legal meaning of the DVO did not require trial of the general issue of guilt on any count and thus did not invade the province of the jury. ... The jury instructions properly set forth each element of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), and the jury was instructed to determine whether the government had proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession based on a protection order only when the order followed notice and an opportunity to participate in a hearing.

United States v. Hamm · filed 2005-05-31(g)(8)

Hamm misunderstands § 922(g)(8). According to the explicit terms of that federal statute itself, a defendant is subject to federal prosecution pursuant to § 922(g)(8) only if the state protection order was issued “after a hearing of which [the defendant] received actual notice, and at which such person had the opportunity to participate.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A). The Act does not violate due process or the right to bear arms on the grounds asserted by Hamm because a defendant cannot be prosecuted pursuant to § 922(g)(8) where the state protection order was issued without notice and a hearing.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person subject to a qualifying protection order issued after notice and an opportunity to participate.

United States v. Merrill D. Olvey, Jr · filed 2006-02-14(g)(8)

The protection order as modified by the journal entry satisfies the requirements of § 922(g)(8)(B) and (C) because it restrains Olvey from threatening assaulting, molesting, attacking, or otherwise disturbing the peace of his wife. Furthermore, the journal entry “was issued after a hearing of which [Olvey] received actual notice, and at which [Olvey] had an opportunity to participate.” § 922(g)(8)(A). Therefore, on its face the protection order as modified rendered Olvey a prohibited person according to the three requirements of § 922(g)(8).

A restraining order that prohibits abuse can satisfy § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) without using the statute’s exact words.

United States v. Coccia · filed 2006-05-05(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Thus, the commonly understood definition of "abuse" includes violent acts involving physical force within the definition. This suffices.

Under § 922(g)(8), consent to a protective order during plea negotiations obviates the hearing and findings requirements for that order.

People v. Charland · filed 2006-06-22(g)(8)

In addition, we note that the federal statutory requirements that the court order be issued following a hearing and state certain findings (see 18 USC § 922 [g] [8] [A], [C]) were obviated by defendant’s consent to entry of such an order during the plea negotiations.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires actual notice of the hearing, but does not require advance notice that a restraining order might issue.

United States v. Young · filed 2006-08-16(g)(8)(A)

The statute does not require notice of the fact that a restraining order would issue, nor does it require any other form of “advance” notice.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires actual notice of the hearing, but does not require advance notice that a restraining order may issue.

United States v. Young · filed 2006-08-17(g)(8)(A)

The statute does not require notice of the fact that a restraining order would issue, nor does it require any other form of “advance” notice.

Section 922(g)(8) makes it illegal for a person subject to a qualifying protective order to possess a firearm or ammunition.

Rodvik v. Rodvik · filed 2006-12-08(g)(8)

Karsten has pointed to no case concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not prohibit possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who is subject to a protective order. As it is not disputed that the trial court entered a valid protective order when it issued the divorce decree, Karsten’s possession of any firearm, whether received before the issuance of the restraining order or after, was illegal under the statute. Thus, based on the case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the superior court was at least reasonable in concluding that federal law imposes a barrier to awarding firearms to Kar-sten while a protective order is in effect.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) does not require a person to have counsel at the protective-order hearing to have an opportunity to participate.

United States v. Edge · filed 2007-06-27(g)(8)(A)

As to the opportunity to participate, M r. Edge appears to argue that the order could comply with the statute’s opportunity requirement only if he w ere represented by counsel. But he cites no support for that proposition, and we are aware of none.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits a person subject to a qualifying restraining order from possessing firearms and ammunition while the order remains in effect.

In Re Peirano · filed 2007-07-20(g)(8)

As a matter of law, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) prohibits the petitioner from possessing firearms and ammunition during the pendency of the restraining order.

Section 922(g)(8) requires actual notice of the protective-order hearing and an opportunity to participate in it.

United States v. Stanley · filed 2008-03-21(g)(8)

On this record, we cannot say that the district court had an adequate factual basis to conclude that Stanley received “actual notice” of the order-of-protection hearing and an opportunity to participate in it, as required by section 922(g)(8).

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) does not require a protective order to repeat the statute’s exact words; an order prohibiting someone from “hurting” an intimate partner or child qualifies.

United States v. DuBose · filed 2010-03-01(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Following the analysis of our sister circuits, we conclude that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not require that the precise language found in subsection (C)(ii) must be used in a protective order for it to qualify under the statute.

Section 922(g)(8) does not permit a defendant to challenge the merits of the underlying state protective order in a firearms prosecution.

United States v. Reese · filed 2010-12-10(g)(8)

The government is also correct in noting that the overwhelming weight of federal case law precludes a defendant in a § 922(g)(8) prosecution from mounting a collateral attack on the merits of the underlying state protective order.

Section 922(g)(8) applies when a protective order meets the federal statutory elements, regardless of the state court’s intention to restrict firearm possession.

United States v. Miller · filed 2011-07-28(g)(8)

Federal law—not the state court’s intention—determines whether Miller’s possession of firearms was unlawful. Even if box (4) had not been checked, it is clear from the face of the protective order that the elements of § 922(g)(8) were met.

Section 922(g)(8) does not require a formal domestic violence protective order; a court order satisfying its listed conditions can trigger the firearm prohibition.

United States v. Larson · filed 2012-02-16(g)(8)

However, contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the language of the statute does not require a formal DVPO issued pursuant to state law. Instead, § 922(g)(8) requires only a “court order” that satisfies the elements of the statute outlined in subsections (A)-(C).

Section 922(g)(8) applies to a person subject to a domestic violence protective order even if the order is not being enforced.

United States v. Elkins · filed 2012-10-15(g)(8)

Elkins encourages an entirely different interpretation, one that requires a protective order to be “enforced” in order for § 922(g)(8) to apply. We find no support for this position within the language of the statute. At the time that Elkins possessed the firearms in question, he was subject to a domestic violence protective order; thus, § 922(g)(8) was properly applied to him.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) does not restrict firearm possession under a general no-contact order that lacks an explicit prohibition on the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Mahar v. Acuna, II · filed 2012-10-18(g)(8)(C)(ii)

A no-contact order that lacks such a specific provision does not result in firearms restrictions under § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

An order prohibiting harassment, stalking, or threats against an intimate partner satisfies § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

United States v. Larson · filed 2013-01-03(g)(8)(C)(ii)

We conclude that Larson’s state court order, which prohibited him from harassing, stalking, or threatening his intimate partner, was sufficient under § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) to evidence the state court’s finding that he represented a credible threat to his intimate partner.

Section 922(g)(8) does not require a person to know that a domestic-violence protective order remains in effect when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Stetler · filed 2013-05-20(g)(8)

Accordingly, Stetler cannot argue that the government failed to establish the second element of his crime—that his possession of firearms occurred at a time when he was subject to a domestic-violence order of protection—simply by asserting that he mistakenly thought that the protective order had already expired.

Section 922(g)(8) restricts firearm possession only while a person is subject to a qualifying protection order.

Turner v. Turner · filed 2013-12-18(g)(8)

The word “is” implies that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) applies only to a respondent currently constrained by a protection order.

Section 922(g)(8) applies to a protective order only when it contains the required restraints and either a credible-threat finding or an explicit prohibition on physical force.

Long v. Brown · filed 2014-01-28(g)(8)

The trial court’s order in this case is not an order that “fully complies” with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The order does not restrain respondent “from harassing, stalking, or threatening” petitioner; it does not “include[] a finding that [respondent] represents a credible threat to the physical safety of” petitioner; and it does not “by its terms explicitly prohibit[] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against” petitioner.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) covers a person subject to a restraining order only if the order was issued after notice and a hearing.

United States v. Vargem · filed 2014-03-28(g)(8)(A)

Section 922(g)(8)(A) covers persons subject to restraining orders, but only when such orders were issued after notice and a hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A). Here, it is undisputed that the EPRO was issued without either notice or a hearing. Accordingly, the government properly concedes that Section 922(g)(8) did not apply, that Vargem was not a prohibited person under § 2K2.1, and the base offense level should have been 18 pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(5).

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person subject to a qualifying intimate-partner protective order, but does not require a state court to include that prohibition in its order.

M.S. v. C.B. (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-03-29(g)(8)

Presumably, the trial court based its conclusion on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which, generally stated, provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person” ... who is subject to an order protecting a current or former “intimate partner” to possess any firearm or ammunition. However, the fact that this federal criminal statute prohibits firearm possession by an individual like M.S. does not mean that a state trial court issuing a protective order is required to include the same prohibition in the order.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires proof that the defendant received actual notice of the protection-order hearing and had an opportunity to participate.

United States v. Raymond Fryberg, Jr. · filed 2017-04-21(g)(8)(A)

In order to convict Defendant of violating § 922(g)(8), the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed firearms while “subject to a court order that was issued after a hearing of which [he] received actual notice, and at which [he] had an opportunity to participate.”

Section 922(g)(8) applies to a protection order only if it was issued after a hearing with actual notice and an opportunity to participate; an ex parte order does not qualify.

Panzella v. Sposato · filed 2017-07-17(g)(8)(A)

We note, however, that because the Temporary Order was issued ex parte, § 922(g) would not apply to Panzella because § 922(g) makes criminal the possession of a firearm only when an order of protection has been “issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession when a qualifying protection order bars harassment, stalking, or threats against an intimate partner and bars physical force likely to cause bodily injury.

Doe v. Tierney · filed 2018-07-17(g)(8)

Even if the extended protection order had not included an explicit prohibition against the possession of firearms, that prohibition would have arisen by operation of federal law as a result of the provisions of the order that ... prohibited the defendant from threatening, harassing, or stalking the plaintiff,4 and that prohibited him from using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against the plaintiff that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-196).

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is satisfied when a protective order expressly prohibits conduct involving physical force that could reasonably cause bodily injury to an intimate partner.

Nicaise v. Sundaram · filed 2018-09-27(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Sundaram does not dispute that she and Nicaise were “intimate partners,” see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32), and the protective order issued against Sundaram included language comporting with section (C)(ii) of the statute: “[Sundaram] shall not commit any crimes, including but not limited to harassment, stalking, or conduct involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury against [Nicaise].”

Section 922(g)(8) does not restrict firearm possession under a protection order without a finding of an intimate partner relationship.

Hart v. Hawtin · filed 2019-04-09(g)(8)

As a result, if a court does not factually determine that there was an intimate partner relationship, the firearm restrictions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) are inapplicable.

Section 922(g)(8) bars firearm possession by a person subject to a qualifying domestic violence protection order; placing firearms in a private trust does not avoid that restriction.

McGrady v. Muench · filed 2019-07-01(g)(8)

The fact that Muench may have placed his firearms in a so-called "private trust" does not change this outcome. This is because, just as the domestic relations court found, "[p]utting one's weapons into a private trust is not sufficient to subvert federal law."

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires evidence that a reasonable person subject to a protective order would have understood they could object to or argue against it before it was issued.

United States v. Bramer · filed 2020-04-16(g)(8)(A)

In order to prove that Bramer had an “opportunity to participate” under § 922(g)(8)(A), we hold that the government must present sufficient evidence for a jury to be able to conclude that a reasonable person in Bramer’s position would have understood that he was permitted to interpose objections or make an argument as to why an order of protection should not be imposed.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) permits a conviction when the protective order uses terms whose ordinary meanings include acts involving physical force.

United States v. McGinnis · filed 2020-04-21(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Consistent with these cases, we hold that if the commonly understood definitions of terms in the protective order include acts involving “physical force,” the protective order is sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Section 922(g)(8)'s opportunity-to-participate requirement can be satisfied when a person has opportunities to challenge a protection order after the hearing at which it was entered.

Kinkaid v. United States · filed 2020-05-28(g)(8)

Physical presence at a proceeding is but one way an individual may have the opportunity to object or otherwise engage with the court as to the merits of a protection order. Following the September 11, 1996 hearing, Plaintiff failed to engage with the court as to the merits of the protection order, despite opportunities to do so, and his inaction should not inure to his advantage more than two decades later. ... Based on the foregoing, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) applies to Plaintiff and prohibits him from possessing a firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(8)(A)'s opportunity-to-participate requirement can be satisfied when a person has an opportunity to engage with the issuing court about the merits of a protection order, even without attending the original hearing.

Kinkaid v. United States · filed 2020-06-15(g)(8)(A)

Plaintiff’s belated showing that he moved to modify and terminate the permanent protection order shows only that Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to engage with the court.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person subject to a qualifying protective order from purchasing, receiving, or possessing a firearm.

Moore v. Moore · filed 2009-04-16(g)

The trial court's order of protection is erroneous in that it does not provide the protection necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or threat of violence, it fails to address the issue of parenting time, and it fails to implement the Brady law's prohibition on the purchase, receipt, or possession of a firearm by Damon.

Section 922(g)(8) applies only while a person is subject to a qualifying court order.

Kroon v. Kroon · filed 2016-07-21(g)(8)

Because the record did not establish that predicate domestic violence offense, we vacate the order of protection and the simultaneously issued Brady Notice. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (Brady firearm prohibitions apply only if person is subject to a qualifying court order).

Section 922(g)(8) requires proof that the defendant knew he was subject to a qualifying protective order when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Boyd · filed 2021-05-28(g)(8)

After Rehaif, the Government must show not only that a defendant was subject to a qualifying protective order at the time he possessed a gun, but also that he knew about the protective order.

Section 922(g)(8) applies when a protective order issued after a hearing expressly prohibits qualifying physical force against an intimate partner; a separate credible-threat finding is unnecessary.

Alaniz v. Alaniz · filed 2022-03-03(g)(8)(C)(ii)

However, courts may prohibit an individual from owning firearms if they either make a finding that the defendant is a credible threat to the plaintiff’s safety or that the order itself contains explicit language prohibiting the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the plaintiff. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), (ii). ... The superior court issued the protective order following a contested evidentiary hearing. Therefore, in view of the order language, we need not address the sufficiency of the court’s finding that Husband posed a credible threat to Wife’s safety.

Section 922(d)(8) and (g)(8) require an intimate partner relationship for the firearms restrictions tied to a stalking order to apply.

P. O. B. v. Harny · filed 2022-03-23(d)(8), (g)(8)

Petitioner and respondent are strangers, preclud- ing the “intimate partner” findings necessary to trigger the ... federal firearms restrictions in 18 USC sections 922(d)(8) and (g)(8).

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person who knows they are subject to a qualifying no-contact order involving an intimate partner.

United States v. Junior Roldan Marin · filed 2022-04-20(g)(8)

Viewed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to find that Roldan-Marin possessed a firearm with knowledge that he was subject to a no- contact order involving an intimate partner, in violation of § 922(g)(8).

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession while a person is subject to a qualifying protective order, even if a court later vacates that order.

Kaspereit v. United States · filed 2022-06-07(g)(8)

Consequently, even if trial counsel had successfully obtained the retroactive Order to Vacate prior to his federal trial, the outcome of Defendant’s case would not have been different because Mr. Kaspereit was subject to an underlying protective order when he purchased and possessed firearms, in violation of § 922(g)(8).

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person subject to a court order restraining threats or harassment of an intimate partner, even if the order does not expressly prohibit firearms.

Pittman v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2023-08-26(g)(8)

In fact, however, Pittman was prohibited from possessing a firearm under both federal and state law. As the defendants note,62 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) prohibits anyone who is subject to a court order that “restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person” from possessing “any firearm or ammunition.”

Section 922(g)(8) does not require a credible-threat finding when a qualifying protective order expressly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against an intimate partner.

Flynn v. Christopher Cody Allen Flynn · filed 2024-01-22(g)(8)(C)

Here, because the superior court’s order contained § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)’s language, the federal statute did not require a separate credible-threat finding.

Section 922(g)(8) does not require a credible threat finding when the protective order explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force and the other statutory conditions are met.

Crane v. Crane · filed 2024-02-01(g)(8)(C)(ii)

And while the evidence may have also supported a finding that Husband presented a credible threat to Wife’s safety, the court did not need to make this finding for Brady to apply because the protective order contained the language required under § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Section 922(g)(8) may constitutionally bar firearm possession while a restraining order is in force when a court has found that the person poses a credible threat to another’s physical safety.

United States v. Rahimi · filed 2024-06-21(g)(8)(C)(i)

Like the surety and going armed laws, Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found to threaten the physical safety of another. This provision is “relevantly similar” to those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens the Second Amendment right.

Section 922(g)(8) requires a restraining order to follow a hearing at which the person had notice and an opportunity to participate before it can bar that person from possessing a firearm.

People v. Rock · filed 2024-10-17(g)(8)

The TRO and 1994 and 1995 orders do not permit an inference that the purported August 19, 1993 restraining order was issued after a hearing where defendant had an opportunity to meaningfully participate or that he forfeited that opportunity by not appearing (see 18 USC § 922 [g] [8]; United States v Kaspereit, 994 F3d 1202, 1212 [10th Cir 2021]; United States v Bramer, 956 F3d 91, 97-99 [2d Cir 2020]).

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is constitutional because its temporary firearm restriction for people subject to qualifying restraining orders fits the historical tradition of disarming people who threaten others.

United States v. Combs · filed 2024-10-17(g)(8)(C)(ii)

The historic and “common sense” tradition that allows the disarmament of those who “pose[] a clear threat of physical violence to another” with respect to Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies with equal force to Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Section 922(g)(8) covers a continuing domestic violence protective order that protects a former spouse and includes a finding that the respondent poses a credible threat, even after its specific firearm prohibition expires.

Eng v. State of Alaska, Department of Public Safety · filed 2024-10-25(g)(8)

The DVPO remains a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) survives a facial Second Amendment challenge because it can constitutionally disarm a person whose protective order reflects a clear threat of physical violence.

United States v. Perez-Gallan · filed 2024-12-31(g)(8)(C)(ii)

Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is not unconstitutional in all its applications, Perez-Gallan’s facial challenge fails.

Section 922(g)(8)(C) is satisfied when a protective order either finds a credible threat to an intimate partner or child or expressly prohibits force likely to cause bodily injury.

State of Iowa v. Cole · filed 2025-06-27(g)(8)(C)

Finally, under § 922(g)(8)(C), the order must either “include[] a finding that” the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child,” id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury,” id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The consent order satisfied the second alternative.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm purchase or possession under a qualifying protective order that contains either a credible threat finding or the specified prohibition on physical force.

Pineda v. Campos · filed 2025-08-07(g)(8)(C)

But the federal statute expresses a disjunctive requirement—a court may impose a firearm restriction upon either a credible threat finding, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), or the statutory prohibitory language, id. at (ii). Because the superior court here found that Husband posed a credible threat to Wife, the federal firearm restriction was appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i).

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires a protective order to have been issued after a hearing before its firearm prohibition applies; scheduling a hearing does not suffice when the record shows none occurred.

PSP v. C.M. Gress · filed 2025-08-13(g)(8)(A)

We conclude that the record before the ALJ did not show that the PFA order was entered after a hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s determination.

A protective order's finding that a person poses a credible threat to an intimate partner's physical safety satisfies § 922(g)(8)(C) without additional specific findings.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2026-03-23(g)(8)(C)

Michelet asserts the court failed to include specific findings supporting its Brady Indicator, which prohibits an individual subject to a protective order from having a firearm when the order “includes a finding that [the] person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C); see also A.R.S. § 13-3602(G)(4). In both the original and amended orders of protection, the court found that Michelet “pose[d] a credible threat to the physical safety of [Keeley].” And in its minute entry, the court determined it was appropriate to amend the order of protection to include the Brady Indicator. Michelet has cited no authority suggesting any other findings were necessary.

Section 922(g)(8)(C) may constitutionally disarm a person subject to domestic violence restraining orders based on a credible-threat finding or issued after domestic violence convictions.

United States v. Deborba · filed 2026-06-03(g)(8)(C)

Under both Rahimi and VanDyke, application of Section 922(g)(8)(C) to DeBorba is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(3) covers regular heroin use because using heroin necessarily entails unlawful possession of it.

United States v. Davey · filed 2025-08-20(g)(3)

The better reading is that § 922(g)(3) determines unlawfulness through the legal status of the controlled substance.

Section 922(g)(3) requires the defendant’s unlawful drug use to cover the same time period as firearm possession.

United States v. Stephenson · filed 2023-05-12(g)(3)

To be sure, we have previously expressed our preference for a plea colloquy in which the defendant does more than answer yes-or-no questions, see United States v. Lloyd, 901 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2018), but we nevertheless agree with the district court that Stephenson’s knowing and voluntary admission in his plea agreement, corroborated by the uncontested proffer, establishes a factual basis that Stephenson’s use of marijuana covered the same time period as his firearm possession.

A firearm prohibition based on § 922(g)(3) requires a factual basis that the person is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance.

State of Iowa v. Lillibridge · filed 2023-02-22(g)(3)

There was no hearing on this issue—Lillibridge’s entire case was dealt with “on paper”—and the district court made no pertinent findings. ... As it is possible a factual basis could be shown, we conclude the best course is to vacate the prohibition and remand for further proceedings to give the State an opportunity to establish a factual basis.

Section 922(g)(3) covers a firearm possessor whose drug use is consistent, prolonged, and close enough in time to possession to establish unlawful-user status and notice of that status.

United States v. Oneil South · filed 2022-08-18(g)(3)

We conclude that, viewing the evidence as a cumulative whole and in the light most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence that South’s drug use was consistent, prolonged, and close enough in time to his gun possession to show that he was an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance for purposes of § 922(g)(3) and to put him on ... notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under the statute.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that the defendant was a user of a controlled substance during the time he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Drake Banks, Sr. · filed 2022-08-09(g)(3)

Under § 922(g)(3), the government was required to prove that Banks was a user of a controlled substance “during the time” that he possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) treats a person as an unlawful user when their controlled substance use is regular and close in time to firearm possession; drug use at the moment of possession is not required.

United States v. ONE (1) SIG SAUER, MODEL P320, 9 MM SEMI-AUTOMATIC PISTOL BEARING SERIAL NUMBER 58C008744 · filed 2020-12-28(g)(3)

The statute does not require current use of drugs. Rather, a claimant must have “engaged in regular use over a period of time proximate to or contemporaneous with the possession of the firearm.”

Section 922(g)(3)’s prohibition on firearm possession by an unlawful drug user requires a temporal nexus between firearm possession and regular drug use.

United States v. Figueroa-Serrano · filed 2020-08-21(g)(3)

Together, this evidence provided a “fair probability” that there was a “temporal nexus between the gun possession and regular drug use,” as required by § 922(g)(3). See Turnbull, 349 F.3d at 561. Thus, at the moment they seized the gun, Morgan and Leusink had probable cause to believe Figueroa-Serrano possessed the gun in violation of that statute. See Lewis, 864 F.3d at 944.

Section 922(g)(3) requires ongoing drug use contemporaneous with firearm possession, but does not require proof that the person was under the influence when possessing the firearm.

United States v. Bullin · filed 2020-08-26(g)(3)

We have held that to be an “unlawful user of” a controlled substance, the “defendant’s use must be ongoing and contemporaneous with” other prohibited conduct, such as firearm possession. United States v. Edmonds, 348 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal quotation mark omitted). But the government need not show that a defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance at the exact time he possessed a firearm. Id.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a defendant to know that he unlawfully uses controlled substances, but does not require him to know that this status bars him from possessing firearms.

Coward v. Napier · filed 2020-02-05(g)(3)

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court is clear that the government must prove that the defendant knew his “relevant status,” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194, in this case meaning that Coward knew he was illegally using drugs, not that he knew that he could not possess firearms as a result.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a temporal connection between firearm possession and regular drug use.

United States v. Turner · filed 2016-11-22(g)(3)

In order to rule on Turner's as applied constitutional challenge, the district court therefore had to determine whether he had engaged in "regular drug use" at the time he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits a user of controlled substances from possessing a firearm; testimony from associates and drugs found with firearms can support a conviction.

United States v. Kraeger · filed 2015-07-31(g)(3)

Testimony from Kraeger’s associates along with the firearms and personal-sized amounts of drugs seized from Kraeger’s bedroom also supported Kraeger’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm as a user of controlled substances.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful drug user from possessing firearms.

United States v. Rodríguez-Romero · filed 2014-05-14(g)(3)

Second, Rodríguez-Romero admitted to being an active marijuana and cocaine user, making him a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2), as logic dictates that individuals who use illegal narcotics lack the requisite mental capacity/restraint to safely possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose regular controlled substance use covers the period of possession.

United States v. Yepez · filed 2012-01-24(g)(3)

Drawing all inferences in the government’s favor, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Yepez regularly used marijuana during the time period he possessed the two guns.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose regular and repeated controlled substance use occurs during a period reasonably covering the possession.

United States v. Ocampo · filed 2010-11-15(g)(3)

To prove a violation of § 922(g)(3), the Government must establish that a defendant “was engaged in a pattern of regular and repeated use of a controlled substance during a period that reasonably covers the time a firearm was possessed.” Id.

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to firearm possession to establish that the possessor was an unlawful user.

United States v. Sperling · filed 2010-11-09(g)(3)

To sustain a conviction, the government must prove that the defendant’s drug use was “sufficiently consistent, ‘prolonged,’ and close in time to his gun possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user” under the terms of the statute.

Section 922(g)(3) covers firearm possession during a period of regular drug use; the drug use need not occur where the firearm is kept.

United States v. Richard · filed 2009-10-21(g)(3)

We reject these distinctions. Mr. Richard cites no case authority for his requirement of a “physical nexus” between the defendant’s drug use and the firearm, nor can we find any such case law. And, Mr. Richard’s attempt to distinguish “a pattern of use” from “habitual abuse” is, simply, unavailing in the circumstances of this case. There was ample evidence that Mr. Richard was a regular user of methamphetamine during a time period when he possessed at least one firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close to firearm possession to put a person on notice that he is an unlawful drug user.

United States v. Mashore · filed 2009-10-09(g)(3)

To sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(3), the Government must establish that Mashore’s drug use was sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to his gun possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under the statute.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a pattern of regular, repeated controlled substance use during a period that reasonably covers firearm possession; one-time or infrequent use is insufficient.

United States v. Burchard · filed 2009-09-02(g)(3)

The term “unlawful user of a controlled substance” contemplates the regular and repeated use of a controlled substance in a manner other than as prescribed by a licensed physician. The one time or infrequent use of a controlled substance is not sufficient to establish the defendant as an “unlawful user.” Rather, the defendant must have been engaged in use that was sufficiently consistent and prolonged as to constitute a pattern of regular and repeated use of a controlled substance. The government need not show that defendant used a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed a firearm. It must, however, establish that he was engaged in a pattern of regular and repeated use of a controlled substance during a period that reasonably covers the time a firearm was possessed.

Section 922(g)(3) does not require a jury instruction defining “unlawful user” in the terms used in the vacated Herrera I decision.

United States v. Tellez · filed 2007-10-24(g)(3)

Muniz Tellez’s argument that the district court erred in refusing to give the jury a Herrera I instruction is foreclosed by our precedent, particularly our decision in United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d 832, 837-39 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2043 (2006).

Section 922(g)(3) requires the government to prove that a defendant charged with possessing a firearm was a drug user unless the defendant stipulates to that element.

United States v. Clint Ball · filed 2007-08-22(g)(3)

Ball was charged with being a drug user in possession of a firearm, in violation of § 922(g)(3). Because Ball did not stipulate to being a drug user, the government was required to prove that element of the offense. Evidence demonstrating Ball tampered with a urinalysis test and used methamphetamine while on pretrial release, therefore, was directly relevant to an element of the charged offense, and thus admissible.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by an unlawful user of a controlled substance; evidence of regular drug use that is not remote in time can support a conviction.

United States v. Rattler · filed 2007-08-15(g)(3)

Ratter first claims there was no evidence he used drugs “close in time” to the possession of weapons or that his drug use was prolonged or consistent for purposes of the § 922(g)(3) conviction (count three). ... Contrary to these ... arguments, the evidence presented at trial would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Rattler’s drug use was neither infrequent nor in the distant past. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Rattler’s conviction on count three.

Section 922(g)(3) requires firearm possession contemporaneous with unlawful drug use, regardless of when the person acquired the firearm.

United States v. Rodrick Monroe, Sr. · filed 2007-01-24(g)(3)

Under the statute, the date the defendant acquired the firearm is irrelevant so long as the defendant possessed the firearm contemporaneously with the unlawful drug use.

Section 922(g)(3) can cover possession of a firearm kept at a person's residence even if it was not recovered at the scene of arrest.

United States v. Wineinger · filed 2006-11-14(g)(3)

The fact that the AMT was recovered at Wineinger’s residence, and not at the scene of his arrest, is irrelevant to the question of whether he possessed a firearm within the meaning of § 922(g)(3).

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful drug user from possessing a firearm that affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2006-04-05(g)(3)

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Williams’ conviction. ... The parties stipulated that Williams was a user of illegal drugs at the time of his arrest and that the firearm affected interstate commerce, and one police officer testified Williams admitted he had obtained the gun.

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to firearm possession to put the defendant on notice that he is an unlawful user.

United States v. Parris · filed 2004-10-01(g)(3)

In order to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(3), the Government must prove that the Defendant’s drug use was sufficiently consistent, “prolonged,” and close in time to his gun possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under the statute.

Section 922(g)(3) requires regular unlawful drug use at or about the time of firearm possession; one isolated use is insufficient.

United States v. Augustin · filed 2004-07-23(g)(3)

Quite simply, Congress intended the statute to cover unlawful drug use at or about the time of the possession of the firearm, with that drug use not remote in time or an isolated occurrence.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms without requiring them to use a controlled substance at the same time.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2002-02-07(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) does not forbid possession of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance. Rather, the statute prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances (and those addicted to such substances) from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm and is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a user at or about the time of possession.

United States v. Terrell · filed 1999-02-26(g)(3)

So, under Easter and Reed, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is not facially vague, and a charge of vagueness is to be “examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.” The “facts” in the instant case are such that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague.

Section 922(g)(3) reached McGruder’s firearm possession because his drug use made his prohibited status clear when officers found the gun.

United States v. McGruder · filed 2001-05-16(g)(3)

McGruder next argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). ... The evidence was clearly sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that McGruder was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. ... McGruder’s last argument on appeal is that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to him. ... Given the evidence reviewed above concerning McGruder’s drug use, an ordinary person would clearly understand that McGruder’s actions established him as an unlawful user of a controlled substance at the time the officers discovered that McGruder possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, and evidence that the defendant was such a user when he possessed the firearm supports a conviction.

United States v. Desena · filed 2001-08-09(g)(3)

At Mihalitsianos’ request, the district judge (rather than the jury) found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mihalitsianos was, at the time he possessed the firearm, an unlawful user of crack cocaine, and convicted him on Count Thirty-Three. Again, this finding is adequately supported.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by unlawful drug users and does not punish drug use as a status.

United States v. Letts · filed 2001-08-31(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) targets the act of possessing a firearm, not a defendant's status as a drug user.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that the defendant used drugs regularly over an extended period and contemporaneously with the purchase or possession of a firearm.

United States v. Purdy · filed 2001-08-31(g)(3)

Under the law of this circuit, these established facts concerning Purdy’s drug use were sufficient to put him on notice that his conduct was criminal under § 922(g)(3). We find, therefore, that § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose narcotics use is frequent and substantial enough to impair self-control and pose a danger to the public.

United States v. Herrera · filed 2002-04-17(g)(3)

Giving the term a narrow construction, we hold that an "unlawful user" is one who uses narcotics so frequently and in such quantities as to lose the power of self control and thereby pose a danger to the public morals, health, safety, or welfare. In other words, an "unlawful user" is someone whose use of narcotics falls just short of addiction, as that term is defined by the Controlled Substances Act.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a sufficient temporal connection between unlawful drug use and firearm possession, though drug use at the exact moment of possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2002-07-24(g)(3)

This evidence, taken together, adequately demonstrates that Mr. Sanders used drugs in sufficient temporal proximity to his possession of one or more of the firearms discovered on his premises on May 26, 1999; § 922(g)(3), as applied to Mr. Sanders’s case, is not unconstitutionally vague.

Section 922(g)(3) requires evidence of a pattern of drug use; a single use near the time of firearm possession is insufficient.

United States v. Williams · filed 2002-08-09(g)(3)

Accordingly, there being no evidence suggesting a pattern of use, continuous use, or prolongeduse of a controlled substance on the part of the defendant, the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 must, under the law of this circuit, be granted as to Count Two.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by a person who is then an unlawful user of a controlled substance or addicted to one.

United States v. Herrera · filed 2002-11-26(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits possessing firearms if the accused is then either addicted to a controlled substance ( not at issue here) or an unlawful user of it.

Section 922(g)(3) requires evidence that the defendant was an unlawful user of or addicted to controlled substances during the same period that he possessed firearms.

United States v. Oleson · filed 2002-11-20(g)(3)

In order to sustain a conviction, there must be evidence that Oleson was an unlawful user of or addicted to controlled substances during the same period of time that he possessed firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by a person who is then either addicted to a controlled substance or an unlawful user of one.

United States v. Herrera · filed 2002-12-19(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits possessing firearms if the accused is then either addicted to a controlled substance (not at issue here) or an unlawful user of it.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that the defendant was an unlawful user of controlled substances at the time she possessed the firearm.

United States v. Flowers · filed 2002-12-16(g)(3)

First, we find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Flowers was an unlawful user of controlled substances at the time she possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) requires unlawful drug use during the period of firearm possession, but does not require drug use at the moment of possession.

United States v. Mack · filed 2003-09-11(g)(3)

Accordingly, it was not necessary to prove that Mack was actually smoking marijuana at the time that the officers discovered him in possession of firearms. It was sufficient under McIntosh for the government to demonstrate that Mack was a "user of any controlled substance" during the period of time he possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) does not require drug use and firearm possession to occur simultaneously.

United States v. Hatches · filed 2003-09-17(g)(3)

Hatches objects to the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury that it could only convict him of the § 922(g)(3) count if it determined that he was using a controlled substance while simultaneously pos- sessing a firearm. We rejected this argument in United States v. Jack- son, 280 F.3d 403, 406 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 911 (2002). Thus, Hatches’s argument is without merit.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a sufficient temporal nexus between regular drug use and firearm possession to establish unlawful-user status.

United States v. Turnbull · filed 2003-11-14(g)(3)

From this evidence the jury could clearly infer a sufficient temporal nexus between regular drug use and Turnbull's possession of firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a sufficient temporal nexus between regular drug use and firearm possession to establish that a person is an unlawful user.

United States v. Jesse E. Turnbull, Also Known as Jesse E. Turnbough · filed 2004-01-07(g)(3)

The term “unlawful user” is not otherwise defined in the statute, but courts generally agree the law runs the risk of being unconstitutionally vague without a judicially-created temporal nexus between the gun possession and regular drug use. ... From this evidence the jury could clearly infer a sufficient temporal nexus between regular drug use and Turnbull’s possession of firearms.

Section 922(g)(3) does not treat a single use of marijuana during firearm possession as enough to establish that a person is an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

United States v. Freitas · filed 2004-02-27(g)(3)

This single use, however, does not make the appellant an “unlawful user” as defined by the federal courts.

Section 922(d)(3) bars disposing of firearms to a current unlawful user of controlled substances; drug use ten to fourteen years earlier alone does not establish that status.

State v. Oaks · filed 2004-04-20(d)(3)

The federal courts have consistently held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) applies where a defendant’s possession of a firearm is concurrent with his or her habitual drug use. ... Because we conclude that the trial court may not use Deputy Woods’s testimony as evidence of Elizabeth’s recent drug use, we hold that evidence tending to show drug use ten to fourteen years prior is not sufficient to support a finding or conclusion that Elizabeth is presently an unlawful user of controlled substances.

Section 922(g)(3) covers knowing firearm possession by an unlawful user of a controlled substance.

United States v. Wyatt · filed 2004-09-03(g)(3)

As to Count Four, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Wyatt knowingly possessed the gun and that Wyatt was an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance within the meaning of § 922(g)(3).

Section 922(g)(3) covers a person who regularly and unlawfully uses a controlled substance over an extended period contemporaneous with possessing a firearm.

United States v. Grover · filed 2005-04-08(g)(3)

Combining language from both Bennett and Purdy, this court holds that an unlawful user of any controlled substance, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is an individual who regularly and unlawfully uses any controlled substance over an extended period of time that is contemporaneous with the possession of a firearm.

Evidence of marijuana use around the time of a firearm purchase can support a finding that the buyer was an unlawful user of a controlled substance under § 922(g)(3).

United States v. Marsch · filed 2005-05-05(g)(3)

On this evidence, we agree that a rational factfinder could infer that Marsch was an “unlawful user” of the controlled substance marijuana at the time he sought to purchase the handgun.

Section 922(g)(3) requires more than evidence of drug use on a single occasion to support a conviction for possessing a firearm as a drug user.

United States v. Robles · filed 2005-05-06(g)(3)

Robles challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by a drug user, Counts 3, 7, and 12, citing this Court’s ruling in his co-defendant’s case, United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2004), in which we stated that evidence of the defendant’s drug use on a single occasion is insufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Pursuant to our opinion in Augustin, we will vacate Robles’ conviction as to Counts 3, 7, and 12.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Larson · filed 2005-07-27(g)(3)

Finally, the government presented sufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of possession of firearms by an unlawful user of a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): that Larson “took drugs with regularity, over an extended period of time, and contemporaneously with his purchase or possession of a firearm.” United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)(3) covers a firearm possessor whose unlawful drug use was contemporaneous with the offense; evidence of long-term marijuana use can establish that status.

United States v. Perez · filed 2006-05-15(g)(3)

Under § 922(g)(3), it is unlawful for a person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” to ship or transport, possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. ... Evidence in the record of Perez’s long-term marijuana use provides an ample basis for the court to determine that Perez’s marijuana use was contemporaneous with the offense, regardless of the disputed admissions evidence.

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use contemporaneous with firearm or ammunition possession, but does not require use at the exact moment of possession.

United States v. Moran · filed 2006-06-28(g)(3)

Rather, the Government need only show that the drug use was “contemporaneous with” the possession of the firearm or ammunition to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms; admitted regular marijuana use can make possession unlawful for a firearms sentencing enhancement.

United States v. Wallace · filed 2006-08-14(g)(3)

However, as the government points out, the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (prohibiting a "fugitive from justice" from possessing a firearm) and § 922(g)(3) (prohibiting an ..."unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance" from possessing a firearm). The defendant offers no argument as to why his possession of a firearm would not be unlawful under these provisions. The defendant was a fugitive from justice and, according to the PSR, he admitted to regularly using marijuana. We therefore find no plain error in the application of this sentencing enhancement.

Section 922(g)(3) requires a temporal connection between regular unlawful drug use and firearm possession; admissions and witness testimony can establish that connection.

United States v. Bertling · filed 2006-11-13(g)(3)

Although Vincent essentially contends the evidence was insufficient to show a temporal nexus between his drug use and his possession of guns, his own admissions and the testimony elicited from multiple witnesses who witnessed Vincent partake in drug activity and usage refute this argument.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful user of or person addicted to a controlled substance from possessing a firearm affecting commerce.

United States v. Baker · filed 2006-11-17(g)(3)

Section 922(g)(3) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance . . . to possess in or affecting commerce . . . any firearm.” ... Here, sufficient evidence was presented at Baker’s trial that he was an unlawful user of marijuana contemporaneously with his possession of firearms. ... We reject Baker’s contention that he was not on notice that his marijuana use and firearms possession violated section 922(g)(3).

Section 922(g)(3) treats a person as an unlawful user when the person’s drug use is ongoing and contemporaneous with firearm possession.

United States v. Davis · filed 2007-04-03(g)(3)

We have previously defined an unlawful user as a person whose drug use is “ongoing and contemporaneous with his firearm possession.” ... The district court’s instruction was consistent with that definition, and we have never required a “mixed meaning” instruction in the context of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924.

Section 922(g)(3) requires drug use sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to firearm possession to put the defendant on notice that he is an unlawful user.

United States v. Marsh · filed 2007-05-09(g)(3)

To sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(3), the Government must prove that the defendant possessed a firearm and that his drug use was sufficiently consistent, prolonged, and close in time to the gun possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under the statute.

Section 922(g)(3) requires unlawful drug use to be contemporaneous with possession of a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. McMullin · filed 2007-07-03(g)(3)

Defendant, therefore, obviously understood the requirement under Section 922(g)(3) that his drug use must have been contemporaneous with possession of firearms/ammunition.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that the defendant used drugs regularly over an extended period and contemporaneously with possessing a firearm.

United States v. Parett · filed 2008-01-02(g)(3)

To convict Parett under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the Government was required to prove, inter alia, Parett took drugs with regularity, over an extended period of time, and contemporaneously with his possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits an unlawful user of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Shan · filed 2008-07-03(g)(3)

However, it is illegal for any person who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) prohibits firearm possession by an unlawful drug user; testimony of regular marijuana use shortly before possession can establish that status.

United States v. Dalhouse, Germaine · filed 2008-07-24(g)(3)

On the disputed element—whether Dalhouse was a marijuana user when he possessed the gun—there was also sufficient independent evidence.

Section 922(g)(3) bars firearm possession by an unlawful user of a controlled substance; unlawful use requires regular drug use close in time to the possession.

United States v. Marceau · filed 2009-01-26(g)(3)

The district court found that Marceau fit ... within § 922(g)(3), which bars firearm possession by a person "who is an unlawful user of . . . any controlled substance." We agree. In order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, courts have held that the critical term “unlawful user” requires a “temporal nexus between the gun possession and regular drug use.”

Section 922(g)(3) does not require drug use at the exact moment of firearm possession.

United States v. Roberge · filed 2009-05-20(g)(3)

And as we noted above, the government need not establish that Roberge used methamphetamine at the exact moment he possessed the firearms. The court did not err — let alone plainly err — in instructing the jury.

Section 922(g)(3) requires unlawful drug use to be contemporaneous with possession of a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. McMullin · filed 2009-05-29(g)(3)

Appellant, therefore clearly understood that under Section 922(g)(3), his drug use must have been contemporaneous with his possession of firearms and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that the defendant was an unlawful user of a controlled substance when possessing the firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2009-07-10(g)(3)

The Government need only prove that Johnson was an unlawful user of marijuana at the time he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(3) does not require drug use at the same moment as firearm possession; use during the period of possession is sufficient.

United States v. Soltani · filed 2010-01-11(g)(3)

To establish that a defendant was an unlawful user of marijuana while possessing a firearm, the government need not prove "contemporaneous use of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm." United States v. Mack, 343 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 2003). Indeed, it is sufficient "for the government to demonstrate that [Soltani] was a 'user of any controlled substance' during the period of time he possessed the firearms." Id.

Section 922(g)(3)’s unlawful-user category requires controlled-substance use that is ongoing and contemporaneous with the firearm offense.

United States v. Antonoff · filed 2011-04-21(g)(3)

To be an “unlawful user” for sentencing purposes, the “defendant’s use must be ongoing and contemporaneous with the commission of the offense.”

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof of regular, repeated controlled substance use during a period reasonably covering firearm possession.

United States v. Gross · filed 2011-07-25(g)(3)

To establish that Gross was an unlawful user of a controlled substance, the government had to prove that Gross “was engaged in a pattern of regular and repeated use of a controlled substance during a period that reasonably covers the time a firearm was possessed.”