18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a defendant knew of, had access to, and intended to control ammunition in a jointly occupied home.

United States v. Stepp · filed 2023-12-26(g)(1)

The ammunition’s presence in areas Mr. Stepp actively used, alongside his personal belongings, supports a rational inference that he had access to, knowledge of, and an intent to control the ammunition.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence allows a rational jury to infer that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm.

United States v. McGregor · filed 2024-01-31(g)

Therefore, rational jurors could reasonably infer that McGregor constructively possessed the drugs and firearms, that he intended to distribute the drugs, and that he possessed at least one firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying McGregor’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits firearm possession by a person unlawfully present in the United States; possession may be constructive when the person knowingly has the power and intention to control the firearm.

United States v. Rangel-Tapia · filed 2024-03-06(g)(5)(A)

The guns’ and drugs’ presence in a bedroom that Rangel-Tapia actively used, alongside his personal belongings, is enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Rangel-Tapia knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the guns and drugs.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the evidence connects the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Shamone White · filed 2024-03-15(g)(1)

In sum, the evidence was more than suf- ficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that White construc- tively possessed the firearm on the day of his arrest.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; circumstantial evidence can establish constructive possession.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2024-05-09(g)(1)

Johnson was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it a crime for anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment to ... possess a firearm, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which makes it a crime to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. ... We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at trial for the jury to conclude that Johnson knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence shows that the defendant had dominion and control over a firearm, even if others could access it.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2024-05-29(g)

The totality of the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the guns did not belong to the landlord but, rather, were in Robinson’s dominion and control. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction on Count 30.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction for constructively possessing ammunition in a shared home when evidence shows the defendant knew of and controlled it.

United States v. Walker · filed 2024-06-03(g)(1)

A reasonable jury could conclude that these conversations reflected Walker’s knowledge of and control over the ammunition found in the apartment where he was living. Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker constructively possessed ammunition as charged in Count 6.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knowingly constructively possessed the firearm.

United States v. Harvey · filed 2024-06-04(g)(1)

Given these facts, a rational juror could have found that Harvey had constructive possession of the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a defendant knows of a firearm and has control over the room where it is kept.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2024-06-13(g)(1)

A reasonable jury could have found that Johnson had dominion and control over the gun by virtue of her control over the master bedroom, where she lived according to her address on various papers and where she stored her personal effects.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved through constructive or joint possession, including dominion over premises where firearms are located.

United States v. Trammell · filed 2024-06-25(g)(1)

A rational jury could conclude that these facts are at least ... sufficient for Trammell’s constructive or joint possession of the firearms found in the Chrysler. Moreover, a rational jury could infer that Trammell possessed the guns located in Butler’s apartment—he frequented the apartment and possessed a key to it; thus, he exercised dominion over the apartment, meaning he constructively possessed the guns located there.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a jury to infer constructive possession of a firearm from exclusive control of a vehicle; joint ownership alone does not establish joint occupancy requiring further proof of a nexus to the firearm.

United States v. Curry · filed 2024-06-28(g)(1)

As these cases demonstrate, joint occupancy requires more than a mere name on a car’s title. Instead, there must be some evidence that another person actually ... used or controlled the vehicle.

Section 922(g) covers constructive possession of ammunition when a person has dominion or control over the vehicle where it is found.

United States v. Monthie · filed 2024-07-05(g)

These facts sufficiently demonstrate that Monthie had dominion or control over her vehicle, which was where the ammunition was located, so as to have constructively possessed the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows of the firearm, has access to it, and intends to exercise dominion or control over it.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2024-07-09(g)(1)

Specifically, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sanchez had knowledge of, access to, and an intent to exercise dominion or control over the firearm on or about March 10, 2021.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of firearms found in a residence the defendant controls.

United States v. Curry · filed 2024-07-16(g)(1)

Based on these principles and the facts taken together and viewed in a light most favorable to the Government, substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that, for the purposes of § 922(g), Curry knowingly possessed the firearms found during the execution of the search warrant for the apartment that Curry shared with his girlfriend.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2024-07-26(g)(1)

However, just as for the drug count, either actual or constructive possession is sufficient for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by evidence supporting a plausible inference that the defendant knew of and had access to the firearm.

United States v. Estes · filed 2024-09-05(g)(1)

Because constructive possession only requires “some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the illegal item,” Estes is unable to demonstrate clear or obvious error.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession through dominion or control over the firearm.

United States v. Pierce · filed 2024-09-11(g)(1)

Such possession may be constructive, as reflected by dominion or control over the firearm. United States v. Fields, 977 F.3d 358, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2020). We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pierce constructively possessed the firearm and that he did so knowingly.

Section 922(g) covers constructive possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

United States v. Henry · filed 2024-10-24(g)

Lastly, we conclude that the government adduced sufficient evidence to prove that Henry “constructively possessed” the firearm in question.

Section 922(g)(1) permits knowing possession of ammunition to be proved through circumstantial evidence of constructive possession.

United States v. Deandrea Young · filed 2024-11-06(g)(1)

Here, the district court did not err in denying Young’s motions for a judgment of acquittal because there was ample circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Young constructively possessed the ammunition found in the trunk of the car he was driving.

Section 922(o)(1) covers constructive possession of a machinegun when circumstantial evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant knowingly possessed it.

United States v. Mar Maluoth · filed 2024-11-20(o)(1)

Here, weighing the inconsistent testimony of Maluoth and Officer Belter regarding the furtive movements, Maluoth’s disregard of commands, and the location and placement of the firearm, a reasonable jury could find that Maluoth knowingly possessed the firearm found under the Kia passenger seat he had occupied.

Section 922(g)(1) allows possession to be proved constructively when a person knows a firearm is present and has the ability and intent to control it.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2024-12-05(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence that Thompson construc- tively possessed the firearm. Officers found the firearm in the cen- ter console of the car Thompson owned and was driving.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person with a prior felony conviction from possessing ammunition, including through constructive possession.

United States v. Louie-Jackson · filed 2024-12-13(g)(1)

Given the corroborating evidence, the record allowed the jury to attribute the ammunition to Mr. Louie-Jackson. We thus affirm his conviction of unlawfully possessing ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant has dominion over where the firearm is located.

United States v. Walz · filed 2024-12-31(g)(1)

The Government also presented evidence establishing that Walz had constructive possession over the firearm because he “ha[d] dominion over the premises where the firearm . . . [was] located.” See United States v. Coleman, 909 F.3d 925, 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2018) (possession may be constructive for 922(g)(1) purposes.) Walz was alone and behind the steering wheel of the car registered in his name where the gun was found.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by evidence that the defendant knew of the firearm and controlled it.

United States v. Young · filed 2025-02-20(g)(1)

The temporal and spatial proximity to the gun prior to it being thrown out of Young’s vehicle in combination with control over the weapon is sufficient evidence of constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2025-03-06(g)(1)

Possession under § 922(g)(1) may be either actual or constructive. ... The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon to own or exclusively possess a firearm; constructive possession can satisfy the possession element.

United States v. Whitlow · filed 2025-04-16(g)(1)

But the government didn’t need to prove that he had exclusive possession or ownership to demonstrate that he had constructive possession.

A driver’s control of a vehicle can support constructive possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Smith · filed 2025-04-24(g)(1)

Smith asserts that the Government failed to prove he constructively possessed the controlled substances and firearm in Counts 4 through 7. “Constructive possession requires ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband was concealed and knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” ... Here, Smith was the sole occupant and driver of the vehicle in which the contraband was found. We therefore conclude that Smith’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. See Freitekh, 114 F.4th at 308.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm-possession element can be proved by constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intent to control a gun, directly or through others.

United States v. Fairley · filed 2025-05-08(g)(1)

And “constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved through actual or constructive possession.

Brazier v. United States · filed 2025-05-14(g)(1)

Possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) may be shown through either actual or constructive possession.

A felon can constructively possess a firearm found in his bedroom when evidence of his control over the room links him to the gun.

United States v. Rick Coley · filed 2025-05-15(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, however, the evidence amply supports constructive possession. Coley directed the arresting officers to his bedroom to retrieve clothing and sandals from his closet, demonstrating his authority and control over the bedroom and its contents. His clothing is sufficient physical evidence linking him with the bedroom and other items found there, including the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that a defendant controlled the bedroom where a firearm was found.

United States v. Duggar · filed 2025-05-15(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, however, the evidence amply supports constructive possession. Coley directed the arresting officers to his bedroom to retrieve clothing and sandals from his closet, demonstrating his authority and control over the bedroom and its contents. His clothing is sufficient physical evidence linking him with the bedroom and other items found there, including the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when evidence connects the defendant to the place where the firearm was found.

United States v. Rick Coley · filed 2025-06-10(g)(1)

Coley directed the arresting officers to his bedroom to retrieve clothing and sandals from his closet, demonstrating his authority and control over the bedroom and its contents. His clothing is sufficient physical evidence linking him with the bedroom and other items found there, including the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that a firearm was found in a bedroom the defendant controlled.

United States v. Duggar · filed 2025-06-10(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, however, the evidence amply supports constructive possession. Coley directed the arresting officers to his bedroom to retrieve clothing and sandals from his closet, demonstrating his authority and control over the bedroom and its contents.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence shows the defendant had control over the firearms.

United States v. Bolling · filed 2025-06-16(g)(1)

Taken together and viewing this evidence in favor of the prosecution, this evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Bolling had constructive possession over the firearms he was charged with possessing in the second superseding indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a firearm is in plain view on the floorboard of a vehicle the defendant is driving.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2025-06-17(g)(1)

Here, the trial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. At trial, the jury heard testimony that Jackson was in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, and upon his removal from the vehicle officers saw—in plain view—a firearm on the driver’s side floorboard. This alone can establish Jackson’s constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through constructive possession, which requires knowledge of the firearm and the ability and intent to control it.

United States v. Holmes · filed 2025-06-23(g)(1)

Of course, Holmes is correct that to convict a defendant of a § 922(g)(1) offense, the government must prove either actual or ... (as relevant here) constructive possession of the firearm. United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th Cir. 2011). To prove constructive possession of a firearm, the government must show that “the defendant (1) was aware or knew of the firearm’s presence and (2) had the ability and intent to later exercise dominion and control over that firearm.” Id.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew about a firearm and exercised dominion and control over the area where it was found to establish constructive possession.

United States v. Guyton · filed 2025-07-18(g)(1)

To prove constructive possession, the Government was required to demonstrate that Guyton knew about the guns and exercised dominion and control over the area where they were found.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through constructive possession when the evidence shows a substantial connection between the defendant and the guns.

United States v. Fulwiley · filed 2025-07-25(g)(1)

This may be so; the mere presence of his DNA did not compel the conclusion that he possessed the gun under § 924(c)(1)(A) or § 922(g)(1). ... Considered as a whole, the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to demonstrate a substantial connection be- tween Fulwiley and the guns.

A felon can constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) when DNA on the gun and other evidence substantially connect him to it.

United States v. Maxwell · filed 2025-07-25(g)(1)

This may be so; the mere presence of his DNA did not compel the conclusion that he possessed the gun under § 924(c)(1)(A) or § 922(g)(1). ... Considered as a whole, the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to demonstrate a substantial connection be- tween Fulwiley and the guns.

Section 922(g)(1) allows firearm possession to be proved through constructive possession, including dominion over a vehicle containing the firearm.

United States v. Butler · filed 2025-07-25(g)(1)

Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... The evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that Butler had dominion over the Jeep and therefore constructively possessed the firearm found in it.

Section 922(g)(1) allows possession to be proved through evidence that a defendant knew of and had access to a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Moya · filed 2025-08-04(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to convict Moya under § 922(g)(1).

Under § 922(g)(1), mere proximity to a firearm does not establish constructive possession.

United States v. Scott · filed 2025-09-02(g)(1)

In order to prove constructive possession of a firearm, the government must establish more than the mere proximity of a defendant to the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by a defendant’s control over the premises where a firearm is found, together with evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm when the premises are shared.

United States v. Juan A. Otero, III · filed 2025-09-17(g)(1)

Otero’s control over ... the Kent Court residence, combined with his statements affirming that the firearm belonged to him, is enough to support a jury finding of at least constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by circumstantial evidence that a defendant arranged and completed a firearm sale.

United States v. Miller · filed 2025-10-20(g)(1)

In this case, the Government presented evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that Miller constructively possessed an AR-style rifle and was trying to sell it. ... This evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Miller constructively possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows about the firearm and has the power to control it.

United States v. Abercrombie · filed 2025-12-16(g)(1)

There are two kinds of knowing possession that may support a conviction under § 922(g)(1) -- actual and constructive.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when evidence supports an inference that the defendant knew of the firearm and intended to control it.

United States v. Conner · filed 2026-01-15(g)(1)

Ultimately, we believe that a rational juror could have determined that Defendant constructively possessed the gun, and we thus hold that there was sufficient evidence to convict him under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through circumstantial evidence that the defendant controlled the premises and knew firearms were present.

United States v. Jones · filed 2026-02-04(g)(1)

Jones was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count 3) and under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for the possession of a firearm by a felon (Count 4). ... But the other circumstantial evidence, as described above, allowed the jury to infer that Jones knew that the guns were in the room in which he kept his drugs.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a jury to find constructive possession when evidence shows that a convicted felon knew of a firearm and had the ability and intent to control it.

United States v. Myking Green · filed 2026-04-21(g)(1)

Here, a reasonable jury could and did find constructive possession. The body camera showed Green exiting the car from the front passenger door. And the loaded gun was found sitting on top of a white t-shirt on the floorboard in front of his seat.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) requires the jury to decide whether an institution actually provides elementary education under state law for the school-zone element.

United States v. Burns · filed 2020-01-14(q)(2)(A)

The district court violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when it decided that Leola provided elementary education under California law and therefore satisfied the school-zone element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A), rather than submitting that question to the jury.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the place of firearm possession was a school zone.

United States v. Figueroa-Ocasio · filed 2015-10-16(q)(2)(A)

Figueroa did not admit, nor was there any proffer stating, that he possessed a firearm knowing or having reasonable cause to believe he was in a school zone.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe he was in a school zone; proximity to a school alone does not establish that knowledge.

United States v. Guzman-Montanez · filed 2014-06-13(q)(2)(A)

The evidence presented by the government was insufficient to establish that Guzmán knew or reasonably should have known he was in a school zone. Consequently, the conviction as to count two must be vacated.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) covers constructive possession of a firearm in a school zone when the person knows of and can control the firearm; a necessity arising later does not excuse that earlier possession.

United States v. Benally · filed 2007-05-24(q)(2)(A)

Thus, the record supports but one conclusion: Benally constructively possessed the firearm when she entered the school zone—before the alleged necessity arose.

Section 922(q)(2)(B) exempts licensed firearm possession in a school zone when state law requires the issuing authority to verify eligibility; it does not require a particular verification procedure.

United States v. Tait · filed 1999-05-03(q)(2)(B)

Moreover, if Congress intended that the § 922(q)(2) exception would apply only if the state used a specific type of verification procedure it could have said so. It did not.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it requires a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Dorsey · filed 2005-08-10(q)(2)(A)

Dorsey’s motion to dismiss Count Three of the indictment on the ground that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) is not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause was properly denied.

Section 922(q)(2)(A)’s prohibition on firearm possession in school zones withstands a Second Amendment challenge under Heller.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2008-12-24(q)(2)(A)

With respect to Count One of the indictment, this Court need not decide today what level of scrutiny should apply to post-Heller challenges to Section 922(q)(2)(A). ... Indeed, Heller unambiguously forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to that offense under any level of scrutiny. Lewis’s motion will therefore be denied with respect to Count One.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm knew or had reasonable cause to believe the place was a school zone.

United States v. Guzman-Montañez · filed 2012-10-22(q)(2)(A)

The evidence presented at trial was also sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Guzman knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the area where he possessed a firearm was a “school zone.”

Section 922(q)(2)(A) requires sufficient evidence that the defendant knew or should have known of the school's location to sustain a conviction for possessing a firearm in a school zone.

United States v. Fernandez-Jorge · filed 2018-06-26(q)(2)(A)

Therefore, because the government fails to convince us that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Fernández-Jorge knew or should have known of the School's location, we affirm the district court's grant of his motion for acquittal.

Section 922(q)(2)(A) prohibits openly carrying firearms in a school zone, including property within 1,000 feet of a school.

Kentucky Concealed Carry Coalition, Inc v. City of Pikeville, Kentucky · filed 2021-12-02(q)(2)(A)

Nevertheless, we find that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) prohibits the open carrying of firearms within the Expo Center, as the Expo Center is within 1,000 feet of a school zone.

Section 922(a)(5) permits a private individual to sell a personal firearm to another private individual residing in the same state; that rule does not apply to a sale from a dealer's business inventory.

United States v. Zakaria · filed 1997-03-28(a)(5)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) (1994), a private individual may sell a personal firearm to another private individual as long as both persons are residents of the same state. ... We agree with the district court that Zakaria's sale to his cousin was from his business inventory as a matter of law and that any evidence concerning Zakaria's state of residence was immaterial.

Section 922(a)(1) generally prohibits unlicensed dealers from selling firearms as defined by § 921(a)(3).

United States v. Hopper · filed 1991-08-02(a)(1)

The provision under which Hopper was not charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) is a general provision making it illegal for anyone not a licensed dealer to sell firearms. That provision applies to a person who sells any firearm as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).

Section 922(b)(1) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling handgun ammunition when it has reasonable cause to believe the buyer is under twenty-one, even without actual knowledge of the buyer’s age.

Appalachian Resources Development Corp. v. McCabe · filed 2004-10-20(b)(1)

In light of these facts, we find that sufficient evidence exists to support the district court’s determination that appellant “had reasonable cause to believe” Mr. Rains was less than twenty-one years of age at the time it sold him .25 ACP ammunition.

Section 922(b)(1) permits a dealer to sell ammunition usable in both rifles and handguns to an adult under twenty-one without asking how the buyer intends to use it.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tamez · filed 1998-02-19(b)(1)

We conclude, therefore, that Wal-Mart, absent a duty to inquire into the intended use of the ammunition, did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) by selling interchangeable ammunition to Salinas, a nineteen-year-old buyer.

Section 922(b)(1) may prohibit a sale of ammunition usable in both handguns and rifles to a buyer under 21 when the seller has not sufficiently determined the buyer’s age and intended use.

Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-06-09(b)(1)

The Phillips case and ATF’s interpretation do not provide Defendant automatic cover because a material issue of fact exists as to whether Wal-Mart’s clerk made a sufficient inquiry to determine Mr. Cavnor’s age and the type of weapon he intended to use with his new bullets. Accordingly, Plaintiff could eventually prove duty and breach by establishing that Defendant violated § 922(b).

Section 922(b)(1) treats .25 ACP cartridges as handgun ammunition despite the existence of a few antiquated rifles that can fire them, because the cartridges are marketed and regarded as handgun ammunition.

Appalachian Resources Development Corporation v. Mccabe · filed 2004-10-20(b)(1)

Although there is evidence that a limited number of antiquated rifles exist on the gun show circuit that are capable of firing.25 caliber ACP ammunition, we nonetheless find that this cartridge is not "interchangeable" because it is universally regarded and marketed as strictly handgun ammunition.

Section 922(n) applies when a state files a felony complaint that is functionally equivalent to an indictment or information.

United States v. Brede · filed 2007-02-23(n)

Consequently, Brede became subject to the prohibitions of § 922(n) when the state of Minnesota filed the felony complaints against Brede.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce, so an indictment may allege that the firearm affected commerce.

United States v. Harden · filed 2000-11-29(g)(1)

Accordingly, an indictment under § 922(g)(1) is not defective for stating only that the firearm affected “commerce.”

Section 922(a)(3) does not require a particular number of firearms to be transported; an indictment’s allegation of eight firearms is surplusage.

People v. Walls · filed 2000-11-13(a)(3)

The allegation in the Federal indictment that defendant in fact transported eight firearms constituted surplusage under the Federal statute and *960should not have been considered by the court in determining whether the Federal crime was equivalent to a New York felony (see, People v Muniz, 74 NY2d 464, 468; People v Gonzalez, 61 NY2d 586, 589; People v Olah, 300 NY 96, 98).

Section 922(n) treats a state complaint/information charging a felony as an indictment.

United States v. Williams · filed 1997-11-26(n)

For the same reasons as set forth in Fillman, the court finds that the language of the underlying charging document (“complainVinformation”) falls within the definition of “indictment” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) and accordingly overrules defendant’s motion to dismiss on that stated ground.

Under § 922(n), a guilty plea extinguishes a Missouri indictment even when imposition of sentence is suspended, so the person is no longer under indictment.

United States v. Arlando Hill · filed 2000-04-10(n)

While we appreciate the need to keep firearms from the hands of dangerous offenders, we cannot rewrite Missouri law and hold that Hill was “under indictment” to save a prosecution under § 922(n).

Section 922(n) applies to a person charged with a qualifying felony by information in state court.

United States v. Gann (Ralph) · filed 2003-01-17(n)

However, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(14) provides that “the term indictment includes an indictment or information in any court under which a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may be prosecuted.” See United States v. Fillman, 162 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1998). Counsel’s effort to distinguish Fillman from the present one is unavailing.

Section 922(n) treats a person on Texas deferred adjudication for a felony charge as under indictment.

United States v. Valentine · filed 2005-02-25(n)

One may therefore be under in- dictment for purposes of § 922(n) while being subject to deferred adjudication in Texas, and yet be free from indictment were the defendant under deferred adjudication in Missouri.

Section 922(n) treats a Massachusetts criminal complaint as placing a person under indictment even when a police officer, rather than a prosecutor, signed it.

United States v. Daniells · filed 2023-08-22(n)

But a Massachusetts criminal complaint constitutes a formal charging document even when signed only by a police officer. And, we conclude that Quinones's reasoning warrants the conclusion that such a criminal complaint is the kind of formal charging mechanism that brings the person subject to it within the "class of potentially dangerous persons" that Congress intended to be considered "under indictment."

Section 922(n) treats a person as under indictment while a felony information remains pending during Michigan’s youthful trainee diversion program.

United States v. Rolon · filed 2026-01-30(n)

Because we must look to state law to determine whether a defendant has a previous “conviction” for criminal liability under § 922(g), 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), the reality that Michigan does not treat trainee status as a conviction for criminal liability purposes indicates that a trainee remains “under indictment” for liability under § 922(n).

Section 922(n) requires a person to be under indictment, but does not require a prior felony conviction.

Alston · filed 2026-01-30(n)

Alston’s assertion that he is not a convicted felon does not establish actual innocence, as § 922(n) by its terms does not require that one charged with the offense be a convicted felon. Rather, it mandates that one be under indictment, a fact Petitioner does not challenge.

Under § 922(g)(1), refusing an instruction that mere touching is not possession is harmless when the evidence shows conduct far beyond mere touching.

United States v. Etienne · filed 2022-07-15(g)(1)

Even if the district court erred in denying Etienne’s requested jury instruction, any error was harmless as the video evidence showed that Etienne’s conduct went far beyond the mere touching of, or laying his hands or fingers on, a firearm.

When an indictment under § 922(g)(1) specifies a firearm, the government must prove the defendant knowingly possessed that firearm.

United States v. Forrest · filed 2011-04-04(g)(1)

Here, the district court correctly ruled and instructed the jury that the government had to prove that Forrest knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment charging him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to be instructed on the prior felony element even when the defendant stipulates to the conviction.

United States v. Higdon · filed 2011-03-17(g)(1)

In addition, failing to instruct the jury about the prior felony element of the § 922(g)(1) offense would have the impermissible effect of allowing the district court to modify a congressionally enacted criminal statute by eliminating an element of the crime through stipulation.

Section 922(g)(1) did not require an instruction that the duration of firearm possession could bear on knowing possession under these facts.

United States v. Byers · filed 2010-04-28(g)(1)

Leaving open the question whether the duration of possession might ever be relevant to a finding of knowing possession, see for example United States v. Teemer, 394 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2005), the facts in the instant case did not warrant or require an instruction to that effect, and thus the district court did not commit error of any kind in failing to give such an instruction.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a jury may be instructed on multiple theories of possession when the evidence supports them.

United States v. Douglas · filed 2010-03-25(g)(1)

However, the opposite is also true – the district court may reasonably give instructions on multiple theories of possession if they are supported by the evidence.

A separate mere-presence instruction is unnecessary for a § 922(g)(1) charge when the jury is properly instructed on the elements and the evidence of possession goes beyond the defendant’s presence near the firearms.

United States v. Gooch · filed 2007-11-01(g)(1)

No “mere presence” instruction was necessary here. The jury was properly instructed on all of the elements of the charged offense, and the government’s case for possession rested on more than Gooch’s presence in the room with the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a mere presence instruction when the evidence does not support that theory of defense.

United States v. Meads · filed 2007-03-14(g)(1)

Meads timely requested the mere presence instruction, which correctly stated the law. However, the evidence at trial did not support the instruction and therefore the district court’s rejection of the instruction was not an abuse of discretion.

For a false statement charge under § 922(a)(6), a deliberate ignorance instruction is generally improper when the defendant claims ignorance of the law rather than avoidance of facts.

United States v. Helguero · filed 2006-03-17(a)(6)

One must know the substance of a law to attempt to avoid its sanctions. For that reason, in circumstances such as this one, in which the defendant claims legal ignorance, the instruction is generally irrelevant and improper.

A felon-in-possession conviction involving multiple firearms withstands plain-error review when jurors are instructed to agree on which firearm the defendant possessed and closing arguments reinforce that requirement.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2004-09-23(g)(1)

Furthermore, any confusion in the jury instructions was countered by the explicit instructions given by both Stevens and the government during closing argument that it could find Stevens guilty of Counts 2 and 3 only if they unanimously agreed on whether he possessed the pistol or the shotgun. Thus, we find that the district court did not commit plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the identity of the firearm an element of felon-in-possession, so jurors need not agree on which firearm the defendant possessed in every case.

United States v. Harb · filed 2004-05-13(g)(1)

We are convinced by Verrecchia’s careful analysis of the statute, and we hold accordingly that the particular firearm possessed is not an element of the crime under § 922(g), but instead the means used to satisfy the element of “any firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to consider the prior felony conviction element even when the defendant stipulates to it.

United States v. Chevere · filed 2004-05-12(g)(1)

We therefore conclude that, in a prosecution under § 922(g)(1), there are no circumstances in which a district court may remove the element of a prior felony conviction entirely from the jury’s consideration by accepting a defendant’s stipulation to that element.

Section 922(g)(1) need not be read to the jury when the instructions adequately cover the elements of the offense.

United States v. Yazzie · filed 1998-02-23(g)(1)

The district court also did not err in refusing Yazzie's request that the court read 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to the jury. The instructions given by the district court adequately covered the elements of the charged offense.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a convicted felon, so an instruction that firearm possession is lawful was unwarranted where the evidence did not support it.

United States v. Haslip · filed 1998-11-24(g)(1)

The trial court properly concluded such an instruction would confuse the jury given the fact Mr. Haslip was charged with the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The evidence presented at trial in no way supported Mr. Haslip’s proposed instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury instruction that lists alternative statutory ways a weapon qualifies as a firearm without requiring jurors to agree on one way.

United States v. McMurtry · filed 2001-11-27(g)(1)

We can discern no distinction between the trial objection and the argument on appeal; however the standard of review is of little consequence because under either standard the instruction was permissible. ... The Supreme Court and this circuit have repeatedly held that where there are several acts upon which a jury could convict, a general instruction listing all of the possible acts under which the jury can convict is permissible.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a “mere presence” instruction is permissible when the jury also receives correct instructions on possession.

United States v. Bradford · filed 2002-11-26(g)(1)

However, it is not erroneous or inconsistent with the law of possession to include such an instruction. The court gave correct and detailed instructions on the law of possession which cured any conceivable confusion caused by the inclusion of the “mere presence” instruction.

A jury convicting under § 922(g)(1) need not agree on the specific firearm involved.

United States v. Drayton · filed 2002-11-07(g)(1)

Drayton further argues the jury was required to be unanimous as to the specific firearm involved. We disagree.

For a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1), the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant possessed at least one firearm named in the indictment.

United States v. Harris · filed 2003-04-08(g)(1)

Finally, the District Court did not err when it gave Instruction 12, which accurately stated the elements of the felon-in- possession offense and clearly informed the jury that they had to agree unanimously that the defendant possessed at least one of the firearms named in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant’s proposed instruction on knowing possession when the instruction given is adequate and accurate.

United States v. Miller · filed 2003-09-02(g)(1)

The instruction the district court used was adequate and accurate, United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir. 1988), and its decision to deny the instruction did not constitute reversible error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; a jury instruction must make that requirement clear even when it discusses constructive possession.

United States v. Washington · filed 2003-08-26(g)(1)

Unlike in Hastings, the district court in this case stated clearly that knowing possession of the firearm was required: ... We find that these instructions were sufficient to rectify any ambiguity created by the instruction on constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is adequately explained by an instruction requiring proof that the defendant controlled the firearm or ammunition and possessed it purposefully, voluntarily, and not by accident or mistake.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2003-09-10(g)(1)

The instructions given to the jury properly advised the jury that the Government was required to prove the firearm and ammunition were within Robinson’s control, and that he possessed them purposefully, voluntarily, and not by accident or mistake.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a separate mere presence instruction when the evidence shows more than presence and the jury is properly instructed on knowledge and control.

United States v. Owens · filed 2004-04-28(g)(1)

The Government’s case against Owens, however, rested on more than his mere presence at the scene of the crime. ... Additionally, the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the knowledge and control elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court therefore did not err by excluding a “mere presence” instruction from the jury instructions.

A separate mere presence instruction is unnecessary in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution when the evidence shows more than mere presence and the jury is properly instructed on knowledge and control.

United States v. Owens · filed 2005-07-25(g)(1)

The Government’s case against Owens, however, rested on more than his mere presence at the scene of the crime. ... Additionally, the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the knowledge and control elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court therefore properly did not provide the jury with a “mere presence” instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require jurors to agree on a particular firearm in every case involving possession of multiple firearms; the need for a specific unanimity instruction depends on the facts.

United States v. Villegas · filed 2007-07-25(g)(1)

For all of these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury that it had to make a unanimous finding with respect to at least one of the firearms set forth in count one of the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be explained by a jury instruction that sufficiently covers constructive possession without separately defining it.

United States v. Rushwam · filed 2008-04-28(g)(1)

Rushwam’s argument that the district court’s possession instruction did not provide the jury with an explanation of constructive possession fails also. ... This instruction sufficiently covers constructive possession.

A separate mere presence instruction is unnecessary for a § 922(g) possession charge when the jury is properly instructed on possession, knowledge, and the government’s burden of proof.

United States v. Cantrell · filed 2008-06-23(g)(1), (g)(3)

Even if some basis existed for giving a “mere presence” instruction, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Cantrell’s instruction because the jury was correctly instructed on the burden of proof, the definition of “possession,” and the requirement that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt Cantrell “knowingly” possessed a weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a mere-presence jury instruction when the prosecution’s case rests on more than the defendant’s presence and the jury is properly instructed on every element.

United States v. King · filed 2009-07-24(g)(1)

King contends that the district court erred in denying his request for a “mere presence” jury instruction. The district court did not err because “the government’s case [was] based on more than just a defendant’s presence, and the jury [was] properly instructed on all elements of the crime[.]”

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element is adequately explained by instructions requiring knowing possession of a firearm and separately defining “knowingly” and “firearm.”

United States v. Robinson · filed 2010-02-18(g)(1)

The Court found the remainder of the instruction to be already covered by this Court’s instructions numbered 17 and 21, which set forth the elements of the offense (including that the defendant must have “knowingly possessed a firearm”), and defined “knowingly” in accordance with the Seventh Circuit’s pattern instructions. ... Because this Court finds that the defense’ theory of the case instruction was already sufficiently covered by other instructions and this Court’s refusal to provide the instruction in full did not deny the Defendant a fair trial, this Court’s failure to give the theory of the case instruction as tendered by the defense does not necessitate a new trial.

Using “felon” to describe the prior-conviction element of a § 922(g)(1) offense in jury instructions is not plainly erroneous.

United States v. Swain · filed 2010-10-15(g)(1)

Finally, the district court’s use of the term “felon” in defining the § 922(g) counts in its instructions was not plainly erroneous.

In a § 922(g) prosecution based solely on actual possession, unsupported constructive and joint possession instructions are erroneous but may be harmless.

United States v. Smith · filed 2011-04-14(g)

In sum, the constructive- and joint-possession instructions were harmless errors under Mari and Griffin.

An error in the destructive-device instruction for a § 922(g)(1) count is harmless when the jury finds the same device is a destructive device under a correct instruction on another count.

United States v. Kennedy · filed 2014-09-08(g)(1)

Had count three been phrased identically, there is no doubt that the jury would have concluded that Kennedy was a felon in possession of a firearm (destructive device), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), for the same device.

Section 922(g)'s possession element permits an instruction requiring knowledge of the firearm and an intent and ability to control it, including through control of a vehicle carrying it.

United States v. Levon Dean, Jr. · filed 2015-12-29(g)

Possession was defined in the instructions as follows: "A person possessed something if all three of the following are true: the person knew about it, and the person had physical control over it or a vehicle in which it was concealed or transported, or the power, or ability, to control it, and the person had the intention to control it . . . ." ... Because the instruction fairly and adequately represented the evidence and the law, we reject this point.

For a § 922(k) charge, an instruction addressing good faith within the knowledge requirement can suffice without a separate good-faith instruction.

United States v. Clendinen · filed 2017-06-22(k)

We see no deficiency in discussing the good faith defense in the context of the knowledge requirement and conclude that the decision not to issue a standalone instruction on good faith was not an abuse of discretion.

When a jury asks whether knowledge of a firearm or ammunition in a vehicle suffices under § 922(g)(1), the court may refer it to adequate instructions defining the offense, knowledge, and constructive possession.

United States v. Frias · filed 2018-06-28(g)(1)

Here, the jury asked whether Ms. Frias would violate § 922(g)(1) if she only had knowledge that the firearm or ammunition were in the vehicle. ... Instructions 20–22 clearly articulated the correct standards necessary to answer the jury’s question, defining the crime, the term knowingly, and what constitutes constructive possession. 1 R. 109–11. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in directing the jury back to the correct instructions.

For a § 922(g)(3) charge, failing to define “unlawful user” in the jury instruction is not plain error when the defendant admitted daily marijuana use during the period she purchased the firearm.

United States v. Yates · filed 2018-08-03(g)(3)

Yates also cannot show plain error with regard to the district court’s decision not to define the term “unlawful user,” as she admitted smoking marijuana daily during the period in which she purchased the firearm and evidence showed that she smoked marijuana on the date of the firearm’s purchase.

A felon-in-possession jury charge need not include a separate mere-presence instruction when its constructive- and joint-possession definitions adequately address that point.

United States v. Drew · filed 2021-08-16(g)(1)

Likewise, including a mere- presence instruction here “would have been largely duplicative” of the interlocking constructive- and joint-possession definitions.

Section 922(g)(1) permits federal prosecution even when the United States does not own the land where the offense occurred.

United States v. Knight · filed 1998-03-26(g)(1)

Section 255, which pertains to purchase of land by the United States, does not require that the government acquire title to the property on which a crime occurred as a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution. Therefore, we hold that the federal district court had jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for violating § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies regardless of where the prohibited act occurs; federal jurisdiction rests on interstate transportation or shipment of the firearm.

United States v. McReynolds · filed 2021-11-23(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) is a law of general applicability that makes certain actions criminal regardless of where the act is committed and regardless of who committed the act. ... Federal jurisdiction under the statute is predicated on the interstate transportation or shipment of a firearm.

Section 922(i) prohibits any person from bringing a firearm into the United States and does not require the person to be in the import business.

United States v. Racich · filed 1999-01-25(i)

Subsection (Z) does not require that the defendant engage in the import business. Subsection (Z) simply provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person to ... bring into the United States ... any firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(Z) (emphasis added).

Section 922(r) prohibits assembling certain non-sporting firearms from imported parts but does not authorize importing those parts.

Firearms import/export Roundtable Trade Group v. Melson · filed 2012-03-12(r)

Likewise, plaintiffs argument that the July Open Letter must be considered legislative because it amends 27 C.F.R. § 478.112 and conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 922(r) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.39 is without merit. The letter is consistent with the three provisions.

Section 922(l) prohibits unauthorized importation of firearms without distinguishing firearms reserved for military use.

Matter of Extradition of Valdez-Mainero · filed 1998-05-08(l)

Applying the standard for dual criminality set forth in Clarey, this Court concludes that Article 84, Section I of the Mexican Federal Law on Firearms and Explosives, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(l) are “aimed at the same category of conduct,” i.e., unauthorized importation of firearms. The Court finds that the statutes are “substantially analogous,” because they punish acts of the same general character, and both statutes can be used to punish the act with which Valdez is charged, i.e., bringing a firearm into the country without authorization.

Section 922(l) prohibits knowingly importing firearms, including silencers; evidence that the defendant knew the silencers came from abroad can support a conviction.

United States v. Schieferle · filed 2024-05-01(l)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(l), it is unlawful for a person to “knowingly . . . import or bring into the United States . . . any firearm or ammunition.” ... Further, the jury reasonably concluded that Schieferle knew that the silencers originated outside the United States.

Section 922(l) prohibits knowingly importing firearms or ammunition into the United States or knowingly receiving them after an unlawful importation.

UNITED STATES v. APPROXIMATELY $188 · filed 2025-09-12(l)

As Plaintiff describes above, the complaint’s allegations about Mr. Halderman’s importation and sale of firearms into the United States satisfies § 922(l) and thus the resulting forfeiture of the funds relating to his illegal activity under § 981(a)(1)(C).

Section 922(a)(3) prohibits unlicensed interstate importation of firearms and does not cover allegations of infection, unauthorized bank withdrawals, or a shooting.

Roberts v. Olson · filed 2023-01-05(a)(3)

Moreover, these claims have no relation whatsoever to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), which is a criminal statute prohibiting the unlicensed interstate importation of firearms.

Section 922(g)(8)(C) provides alternative grounds for a firearm restriction: a credible-threat finding or protective-order language prohibiting physical force against an intimate partner or child.

Robledo v. Robledo · filed 2025-04-29(g)(8)(C)(i)–(ii)

These are disjunctive requirements—a credible-threat finding is sufficient to impose a Brady Indicator, but not necessary if the order of protection contains language prohibiting physical force against an intimate partner. ... Here, the superior court did not make a credible-threat finding, but the order of protection contained language prohibiting the use of physical force against an intimate partner. The requirements of Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) have at least been facially met.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) requires a finding that the restrained person poses a credible threat to the protected person’s physical safety for a protection order to trigger its firearms restriction.

Hodges v. Hodges · filed 2023-02-02(g)(8)(C)(i)

But an order of protection triggers a firearms restriction under the federal Gun Control Act “only if the order ‘includes a finding that [the] person represents a credible threat to the physical safety’” of the protected person.

Section 922(g)(8) does not permit a defendant to collaterally attack the merits of the underlying state protective order in a firearms prosecution.

United States v. Owens · filed 2022-12-20(g)(8)

Further, we agree with the decisions of our sister circuits precluding a defendant in a § 922(g)(8) prosecution from mounting a collateral attack on the merits of the underlying state protective order.

Section 922(g)(8) applies when a protective order protects an intimate partner in fact, even if the order does not identify the person as an intimate partner.

United States v. Sholley-Gonzalez · filed 2021-05-10(g)(8)

Section 922(g)(8) simply does not require that the court-order form identify the protected party as an intimate partner. Section 922(g)(8)(B) requires that the “court order . . . restrain[] such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner.” The text demands only that the order protect an intimate party in fact.

Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires actual notice of a protection order hearing and an opportunity to participate; submitting written documents can satisfy the opportunity requirement without attending.

Charles Kinkaid, Jr. v. Thurston County Sheriff · filed 2021-04-21(g)(8)(A)

The record also demonstrates that he “had an opportunity to participate” in the hearing, because he was able to submit written documents to the court pertaining to the hearing. Actual participation is not necessary, because “the statute requires only the mere ‘opportunity to participate.’” Id. at 1009 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A)).

Section 922(g)(8) requires an opportunity to participate in a protective-order hearing, either in person or through counsel, and to contest the order’s merits.

United States v. Kaspereit · filed 2021-04-20(g)(8)

Today, we conclude that, at minimum, “opportunity to participate” means the defendant must have been present at a hearing on the protective order either in person or by counsel and have had an opportunity to object to the entry of, or otherwise engage with the court on the merits of, the order.

Section 922(g)(8)’s intimate-partner requirement is not met merely because the person subject to an order sexually assaulted the victim.

Com. v. Getkin, K. · filed 2021-04-12(g)(8)

If we assume, arguendo, that Appellant entered his plea of nolo contendere after a hearing for which he had notice and an opportunity to participate, we are nevertheless unable to agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the judgment of sentence in this case restrained ... Appellant’s conduct toward an intimate partner, as that term is used in § 922(g)(8).

A protective order triggers the firearm restriction under § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) only if it expressly finds that the restrained person poses a credible threat to the protected person's physical safety.

Graves v. Slawson · filed 2021-01-14(g)(8)(C)(i)

The court may prohibit a party from possessing or purchasing a firearm for the duration of the order of protection only if the order “includes a finding that the person represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of the protected person. ... However, the record does not include a credible threat finding, nor does it include any allegations or discussion relating to firearms. Thus, the Brady notice must be vacated.

Section 922(g)(8) covers a person subject to a qualifying domestic abuse protective order issued after notice and an opportunity to participate.

King v. King · filed 2019-02-20(g)(8)

Because Richard is the subject of a domestic abuse protective order as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), it would be a violation of section 724.26(2)(a) for Richard to possess a firearm for the duration of the protective order.

Section 922(g)(8) does not apply to a protective order protecting a neighbor who is not the respondent’s intimate partner.

Fox v. Tracy Bonam and Doug Bonam · filed 2015-10-16(g)(8)

John’s argument is compelling, but we need not address it because the trial court relied solely on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in ordering him to surrender his firearms, and that statute does not apply in this case because Tracy is not John’s “intimate partner.”

Section 922(g)(8) requires a qualifying protection order to protect an intimate partner or child; a niece does not qualify as an intimate partner solely because she is a niece.

State of Tennessee v. Carman-Thacker · filed 2015-09-08(g)(8)

For purposes of dispossession of firearms, an otherwise valid order of protection must comply with the additional requisites of 18 United States Code section 922(g)(8). ... A niece is not a relative listed in the relevant federal statute as an intimate partner, and no evidence was presented to show that Ms. Carman cohabitated or had cohabitated with the Defendant.

Section 922(g)(8)'s firearm restriction does not apply to a stalking injunction when the protected person and the restrained person are not intimate partners.

Sheeran v. Thomas · filed 2014-12-11(g)(8)

This warning likely refers to United States Code title 18 section 922, which prohibits a person subject to a stalking injunction for the protection of an “intimate partner” from possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012). In a situation such as the instant one, where Thomas and Sheeran are not now and never have been intimate partners, the federal restriction on firearm possession simply does not apply.

Section 922(g)(8) permits a jury to determine whether people cohabited using the word’s ordinary meaning, without a special definition.

United States v. Ladouceur · filed 2014-08-19(g)(8)

The jury was entitled to determine ‘cohabitation’ from its experience in light of the evidence presented because “cohabitation” is not an arcane legal term incomprehensible to the general public.

Section 922(g)(8)(A)'s actual-notice requirement is satisfied when the defendant appears at the protective-order hearing.

United States v. Myers · filed 2014-08-04(g)(8)(A)

The fact that Myers appeared at the hearing necessarily means that he had actual notice of it.

A protection order with a credible-threat finding can trigger § 922(g)(8)’s firearm restriction.

Savord v. Morton · filed 2014-07-24(g)(8)

A firearm restriction under the federal Gun Control Act is triggered by an order of protection “only if the order ‘includes a finding that [the] person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [the] intimate partner or child.’”

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person subject to a court order restraining harassment, stalking, or threats against an intimate partner.

Marriage Of Kara Underwood v. Underwood · filed 2014-06-03(g)(8)

The order here prohibited Robert from " harassing or stalking" Kara, and Robert does not show why 18 U. S. C. § 922( g)( 8) does not apply to him. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered a restraining order preventing Robert from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(8) applies to a person subject to a qualifying no-contact order even if that order could be challenged in another proceeding.

United States v. Bena · filed 2011-12-21(g)(8)

Like § 1202(a)(1) (and § 922(g)(1)), the text of § 922(g)(8) is not limited to persons whose no-contact orders are not subject to collateral attack.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) requires an order to prohibit physical force in explicit terms substantially similar in meaning to the statute; a no-contact order without such terms does not qualify.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2011-05-05(g)(8)(C)(ii)

However, a court order must contain explicit terms substantially similar in meaning to the language of (8)(C)(ii). Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Sanchez’s motion for acquittal, because a no-contact order that lacks explicit prohibitions on the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against an intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury cannot satisfy (8)(C)(ii).

Section 922(g)(8) bars firearm possession while a person is subject to a qualifying court order, but the bar ends when the order expires.

Schroeder v. Hunn · filed 2011-05-03(g)(8)

As the protection order has expired, Appellant is no longer subject to it and is not prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922 from possessing a firearm.