18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearms.

United States v. Rios-Lopez · filed 1998-04-07(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Rios knowingly possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g) covers a felon’s possession of ammunition when he holds a gun and fires it until all the bullets are discharged; that possession is not too fleeting to fall within the statute.

United States v. Paul · filed 1997-03-26(g)

We need not decide in this case whether section 922(g) applies to every instance in which a felon momentarily takes hold of a gun or ammunition because here the plaintiff, on his own version of the episode, grabbed the weapon and made the decision to hold and fire it until all of the bullets were discharged. Even if his action was as well intentioned as he claims, possession under these circumstances was not so fleeting as to extend the statute beyond its arguable limits.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence allows a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant possessed the firearms.

United States v. Adams · filed 1997-03-26(g)(1)

Without repeating the summary of the evidence set forth above, we conclude that that evidence would allow, if indeed not compel, a reasonable jury to conclude that Adams possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) covers both actual and constructive possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, regardless of who owns it.

United States v. Snelling · filed 1997-03-17(g)(1)

However, the mere fact that someone else actually owned the firearm is irrelevant to possession under the statute. Instead, "[b]oth actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)."

The Ninth Circuit’s model possession instruction may be used to explain the possession element of § 922(g).

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louise Han PEREZ; Joseph E. Perez; And John Velasco Cruz, Defendants-Ap · filed 1995-10-02(g)

Although a trial court’s use of a model jury instruction does not necessarily preclude a finding of error, we have not found any reason, thus far, to reject the model instruction on possession.

The possession element of § 922(g)(1) and § 922(k) can be proved by an officer’s observation of a gun in the defendant’s hand, supported by recovery of a matching gun nearby.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 1995-09-13(g)(1), (k)

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was direct and sufficient evidence at trial to establish that Rodriguez possessed the gun found at the accident scene. Because this is the only element of his conviction under §§ 922(g) and 922(k) that Rodriguez contests, we conclude that a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require ownership of a firearm for actual possession or an attempt to hide it for constructive possession.

United States v. Jibri Ali, Also Known as Charles L. Pirtle · filed 1995-09-21(g)(1)

This proposed instruction not only mis-charaeterized the government’s position, it also erroneously implied that, in the present case, actual possession required ownership of the gun and constructive possession required an attempt to hide it.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce; witness testimony linking the defendant to the firearms can support a conviction.

United States v. Davis · filed 1995-08-02(g)(1)

Counts 5-7 charge Jefferson with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." ... Jerry Kyser testified that Jefferson gave him the Stallard to take to the Alamatt Motel and that he had seen Jefferson on prior occasions with the Smith & Wesson. Antoine Gilmore testified that Jefferson gave him the Ruger to protect the business from other drug dealers. Again, Jefferson's only challenge is that these witnesses are not credible. This argument was for the jury, which obviously did not accept Jefferson's argument. The evidence was sufficient to support the firearms convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce; eyewitness testimony and the gun's ownership history can support a finding of possession.

United States v. Davis · filed 1995-08-23(g)(1)

For purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), both sides stipulated that Davis was a convicted felon and that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce. The sole issue at trial was whether Davis "possessed" the firearm. ... This court evaluates challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by determining "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Penny, No. 94-2934, slip op. at 9 (7th Cir. July 26, 1995). The eye-witness testimony of the police officers, coupled with the chain of ownership of the weapon, clearly meets this standard.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by firearms found in a defendant’s bedroom closet and his admission that the bedroom’s contents belonged to him.

United States v. Christopher Fredrick Vonwillie, AKA Christopher Fred Vonwillie · filed 1995-07-06(g)(1)

VonWillie argues that no rational trier of fact could have found that he possessed the firearms seized in his house or that he possessed and used the weapons “in relation to” a drug trafficking crime. However, the evidence presented in this case permits a rational trier of fact to reach both conclusions. For example, three guns were found in VonWillie’s bedroom closet. ... VonWillie told Detective Blalock at the time of the search that anything found in his bedroom belonged to him and that he “handled the business.” In light of this evidence, VonWillie’s Rule 29 motion was properly denied.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by officers' testimony that they saw the defendant discard an object where they immediately found a revolver.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1995-06-13(g)(1)

From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Johnson had possessed the weapon Officer King found, thereby satisfying the possession element of § 922(g).

Substantial evidence of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition can sustain a § 922(g) jury verdict.

United States v. Martez Deroy Smith · filed 1995-05-04(g)

Here, substantial evidence supports the jury verdict that Smith unlawfully possessed a firearm and ammunition on December 14, 1993.

Section 922(g) requires proof of possession; a stipulation that a weapon is a firearm does not establish that the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Antonio Jermald Green, A/K/A Antonio Jamel Greene, United States of America v. Antonio Jermald Green, A · filed 1995-03-29(g)

Green's stipulation only established that the Tec-9 satisfied the definition of a firearm for the purposes of Sec. 922(g); it did not establish that Green possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm, and a conviction may stand when properly admitted evidence sufficiently supports it.

United States v. Short · filed 1995-03-08(g)(1)

We hold that the properly admitted evidence in this case was sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a possession instruction to say that mere proximity to a firearm is not possession when the instructions otherwise adequately cover that point.

United States v. Alonzo Rice, Jr. · filed 1993-06-07(g)(1)

The theory of defense outlined in the tendered instruction was adequately covered by the instructions given. ... We have rejected the contention that possession instructions must include a qualifier that “mere proximity” is not possession.

Section 922(n) requires knowing possession of the firearm, whether actual or constructive; constructive possession requires dominion or control.

United States v. Ford · filed 1993-05-25(n)

Under both of these statutes, the Government must show that the defendant was knowingly in possession — either constructive or actual — of the illegal items in question. Constructive possession typically requires a showing that the defendant knowingly was in a position or had the right to exercise dominion or control over the item in question.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a convicted felon’s constructive possession of a firearm carried by another person when the felon has the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Jose Hernandez, United States of America v. Aguilino Jose Sanchez, United States of America v. Jorge L. · filed 1993-05-12(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to establish Sanchez’ constructive possession of the firearm carried by Hernandez.

Mere presence near a firearm is insufficient to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Manuel Pedro, A/K/A Manuel Condiles · filed 1993-04-09(g)(1)

We concur with Pedro’s assertion that the Government proved no more than Pedro’s “mere presence” in the vicinity of the gun, which is insufficient to constitute constructive possession.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive or joint possession of a firearm.

United States v. Boykin · filed 1993-04-21(g)

A conviction for violating § 922(g) may be based on constructive or joint possession of the firearm. ... We find that the evidence was sufficient to establish constructive possession and supports the jury’s verdict on this charge.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm.

United States v. Lawrence C. Duso, Susan C. Duso, Michael A. Mercier · filed 1993-04-27(g)(1)

It is elementary that possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive and need not be exclusive but may be joint. ... These facts are more than sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Lawrence Duso knew the gun was under his mattress and had the power and intention to exercise control over it.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's constructive possession of ammunition kept in an area under his dominion and control.

United States v. Chapdelaine · filed 1993-05-04(g)(1)

However, the bullets retrieved from Chapdelaine’s closet were in an area within his “dominion and control.” Further, they matched those found in the .357 Magnum recovered from the laundry bag. This was enough to prove that Chapdelaine was at least in “constructive, possession” of the ammunition in his closet.

Knowing possession under § 922(g) can be inferred when a person carries a suitcase containing a rifle, then abandons it and flees from police.

United States v. Wind · filed 1993-03-04(g)

We hold there was sufficient evidence that Wind knowingly possessed a firearm. As noted by the government, Wind had actual possession of the suitcase. The rifle was inside the suitcase. Wind abandoned the suitcase and attempted to flee when the police approached him; both actions support the inference that he knew what was inside the suitcase.

Section 922(g)(1) covers actual or constructive possession of a firearm; constructive possession exists when a person has the power to exercise dominion and control over it.

United States v. Pixley · filed 1993-03-01(g)(1)

For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a defendant "possesses" a firearm if he has either actual or constructive possession of the firearm. Actual possession of a firearm occurs when the person has physical control over it. Constructive possession of a firearm occurs when a person has the power to exercise dominion and control over it.

A conviction under § 922 may rest on actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Nelson · filed 1993-02-25

Finally, the government can prove that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922, by showing “that the defendant either actually or constructively possessed the firearm." ... After carefully reviewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Nelson knowingly possessed the sawed-off shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Blue · filed 1993-01-25(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm for purposes of the statute may be actual or constructive; constructive possession occurs when a person knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise control over the firearm either directly or through others.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession of firearms when a person controls the keys to the trunk where they are stored.

United States v. Dale Eldridge, Also Known as Dale Smith, United States of America v. John David Fuget, Also Known as Po · filed 1993-01-29(g)(1)

In this instance, Fuget had dominion and control over the firearms because he had control of the keys to the trunk of the car.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm was present.

United States v. Benford · filed 1993-01-15(g)(1)

We have held, in regard to 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), that the possession element of an offense under that chapter requires knowing possession, whether actual or constructive, thus making the offense a general intent crime. ... We interpret 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in a similar fashion. Accordingly the prosecution was obligated to show that defendant was aware of the presence of the firearm at issue as part of its contention that he violated § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a felon to knowingly possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce; actual or constructive possession suffices.

United States v. Titus Connally, David Connally, and Greg Swinney · filed 1993-01-15(g)(1)

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession by a felon of a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce. The parties stipulated that David and Swinney are convicted felons and that the gun traveled across state lines. Evidence of actual or constructive possession is enough to sustain the convictions.

A § 922(g) felon-in-possession conviction can be supported by testimony linking the defendant to a gun despite inconsistent descriptions of the weapon.

United States v. Arthur Lee Harris Kenneth Kelly Harris And, Arthur Lavaughn Harris · filed 1992-12-31(g)

The convictions on Counts Four, Five, and Six also were supported by sufficient evidence. Harris was linked to the gun by Deborah Young, a testifying coconspirator, who had seen him with a gun on numerous occasions and had seen John Harris give the suspect gun to Harris. She also described seeing Harris with the .38 handgun prior to the search where he was arrested. Even Harris, on the day following his arrest, effectively admitted ownership of the weapon. Though the witnesses did not exactly describe the gun in evidence, such inconsistency would not prevent a reasonable juror from concluding either that the gun described was the same firearm as the gun seized, despite the incongruity, or that Harris possessed more than one firearm.

Section 922(g)'s knowing possession element is supported by evidence that the defendant handled a gun, removed its clip, and was later found with the clip while the gun was nearby.

United States v. Daniel Michael Tavale, Also Known as Malaki S. Faafeai · filed 1992-12-29(g)

Mr. Tavale also contends that the district court should not have denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence of his knowing possession of the firearm. ... The evidence at trial revealed that Mr. Tavale had been patted down by an officer who found a gun clip on Mr. Tavale. The officer then discovered the gun in the glove box of the vehicle. The gun clip fit into the gun. There was also testimony that Mr. Tavale was seen with a gun, and that he removed the clip in front of the witness and placed it in his pocket. This evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to find Tavale guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(j) can stand when a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearms.

United States v. Watts · filed 1993-01-12(g)(1), (j)

We have reviewed the record and find that a reasonable jury could have found that Watts had knowingly possessed the guns beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires more than proximity to a gun on shared premises and association with those who control it to establish constructive possession.

United States v. Dean · filed 1992-12-04(g)(1)

The government’s argument that Dean had constructive possession of the gun lacks merit. “When premises are shared by more than one person, more than the mere proximity to the contraband, presence on the property where it is found, and association with the person or persons having control of it is required to establish constructive possession.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm in a car the defendant drives.

United States v. Larry Bodie, A/k/a/ Louis L. Speight, United States of America v. Calvin Wells · filed 1992-12-30(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922 may be constructive. ... We, therefore, hold that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bodie possessed the gun in the back seat of the car.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Hill · filed 1992-12-03(g)(1)

For the purposes of § 922(g)(1), possession may be either actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)'s firearm possession element can be supported by evidence that a gun was within the defendant's reach and his fingerprint was on another gun.

United States v. Vincent G. Williams and Mark J. Clarke · filed 1992-10-15(g)(1)

Williams was also convicted on a charge of illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Appellants next contend that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that they knowingly possessed cocaine or weapons. ... The guns were also in plain view. One weapon was behind the driver's seat within Williams' reach. The other had Williams' fingerprint on it. ... This evidence was sufficient to convict both appellants.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be satisfied by constructive possession, and proof of ownership alone is sufficient.

United States v. Burke · filed 1992-10-08(g)(1)

Although, as the appellant argues, constructive possession is frequently proven by showing that the defendant was in close proximity to the firearm, proof of ownership alone is sufficient to show constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of constructive possession without an affirmative act asserting control over the firearm.

United States v. Garcia-Cruz · filed 1992-10-30(g)(1)

Constructive possession can be proved even where a defendant never actively “asserts” dominion and control over the contraband.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed the firearm; helping a friend obtain a loan secured by a gun does not establish constructive possession without evidence of control over it.

United States v. Fitzpatrick · filed 1992-11-10(g)(1)

We agree that Black as well as the other cases relied upon by the government are distinguishable. There is nothing in the record from which a juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Fitzpatrick's role was other than that of accommodating a friend who needed money by, in effect, vouching for the transaction with his employer and promising to repay the money that was loaned on the firearm.

A defendant can constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) when the evidence shows knowledge of its location and unhindered access to it.

United States v. Rosales · filed 1992-11-17(g)(1)

There is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that Rosales' "knowledge of the gun[s]' location and his unhindered access to [them] ... gave him constructive possession of the weapon[s]." Terry, 911 F.2d at 278.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm.

United States v. Shuler · filed 1992-11-18(g)(1)

Constructive possession occurs when a person knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise control over the firearm either directly or through others.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is supported by evidence that the defendant exclusively controlled the area where the gun was found and admitted possessing it.

United States v. Hunt · filed 1990-01-08(g)(1)

Here, Hunt had exclusive control of the area where the gun was found, United States v. Castillo, 844 F.2d 1379, 1393 (9th Cir.1988), and also made statements conceding his possession of the gun. The record amply supports the verdict of guilty.

Section 922(g)(5)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm; actual possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Patterson · filed 1989-09-29(g)(5)

The principles set forth in our discussion on the requisites for the establishment of possession under 21 U.S.C. § 841 are equally applicable in our determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to show Patterson’s possession of the firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). ... It is unnecessary for Patterson to have had actual possession of the gun; the circumstances surrounding the location of the weapon serve to establish his constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(5)'s possession element may be proved by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez · filed 1989-12-06(g)(5)

The element of possession may be established by proof of actual or constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession when a felon knowingly controls a firearm or the premises where it is concealed.

United States v. Vincent · filed 1990-04-03(g)(1)

While Vincent did not specifically raise the issue, we have considered it and conclude that Vincent had constructive possession of the weapon. The gun was located in Vincent’s locked bedroom closet and Vincent carried a key to that closet on his person. These facts sufficiently establish that Vincent knowingly had "ownership, dominion or control over the [gun] itself, or dominion over the premises in which the [gun was] concealed.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by testimony that the defendant dropped an object and an officer immediately recovered a gun where it fell.

United States v. Rankin · filed 1990-06-22(g)(1)

Although the officers did not testify that the gun they found was the dark object taken from Rankin’s waistband, they did state both that Rankin dropped a dark object to the ground and that, after immediately running to the spot where the object fell, one of the officers retrieved a dark gun from that location. We are satisfied that this is sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to support the conviction.

Possession under § 922(g)(1) can be proved by circumstantial evidence linking a felon to a firearm found in his home.

United States v. Donlon · filed 1990-07-27(g)(1)

The jury, however, could reasonably credit testimony showing that the police officers found the gun in Donlon’s house, only a few feet from where he was standing, that shattered glass and damage to an outside trailer might have been caused by bullets, that Donlon asked the police, when they seized the gun, when he could get it back, and that Donlon’s girlfriend said he had both “short” and “long” guns in the house. ... Given their legal power to decide which witnesses to believe, the jury could easily have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g) allows a felon in possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly has the power to control the firearm.

United States v. Bennie Wren Bolton · filed 1990-05-30(g)

There we defined constructive possession as when “ ‘a person knowingly holds the power to exercise dominion and control’ ” over the item. ... Bolton admitted the sawed off shotgun had been in the car and that he knew it was there. The gun was also in close physical proximity to Bolton in the car because it fell to the ground when he exited. ... There was sufficient evidence to convict Bolton on the charges against him.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Garrett · filed 1990-05-31(g)(1)

We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession for purposes of the section 922(g) conviction.

Evidence that a firearm was found in a car a felon drove and had been turned over to him can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Reis · filed 1990-07-03(g)(1)

Applying the test in this case, we note that the jury heard evidence that the weapon at issue in Count Five was found in the car Reis had been driving, and also that Wells, while claiming to have sold that gun to Elite Security, actually turned the gun over to Reis himself. Taken in conjunction with Reis’ prior felony conviction, this is ample evidence to support the verdict in Count Five.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by testimonial and circumstantial evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Ronnie L. Thomas A/K/A Ronnie Lee Thomas A/K/A Ronald L. Thomas-Bey · filed 1990-09-11(g)(1)

The testimonial and circumstantial evidence were sufficient to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas-Bey possessed the guns.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a felon, and sufficient evidence supported Williams’s conviction.

United States v. Williams · filed 1990-08-27(g)(1)

Based on this demanding test, we cannot say that the evidence submitted to the jury made conviction impermissible. The evidence included eyewitness accounts tying Mr. Williams to the firearm and statements made by Mr. Williams to an undercover police officer bragging about owning and firing a .44 magnum.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on proof of joint constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Sullivan · filed 1990-11-16(g)

Russell Sullivan challenges on the same basis his conviction on Count 7 for illegal possession of the same firearm after former conviction of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The government does not point to any evidence of actual possession, but argues that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an inference of joint constructive possession by Mary and Russell Sullivan. We agree.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by testimony that a firearms dealer delivered the guns to the defendant.

United States v. Hayes · filed 1990-12-10(g)(1)

The employees’ testimony that they delivered the firearms to Hayes is sufficient evidence to establish that Hayes had actual, physical possession of the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) and (5) require knowing firearm possession, which may be proved by ownership of the gun and knowledge of where it is kept in the defendant’s residence.

United States v. Barron-Rivera · filed 1991-01-07(g)(1), (g)(5)

Because Barron-Rivera owned the gun, lived in the apartment in which it was found, and knew where it was kept, a rational fact-finder could conclude that the element of knowing possession was met beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when circumstantial evidence shows that the defendant controlled a firearm he discarded as police approached.

United States v. Jeffrey Mullins and William H. Young · filed 1991-01-07(g)(1)

Appellant Young was charged with possession with intent to distribute crack and with two firearms offenses: possession in connection with a drug trafficking offense and possession as a convicted felon. ... This fact, coupled with the proximity of the weapon to the Appellant, would permit the jury to infer that Young kept the gun to protect his investment and quickly tossed it away when the SWAT team began to raid the Apartment. ... Because this evidence would also permit a juror to find the Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court correctly denied Appellant Young's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g) possession can be proved through evidence supporting an inference of joint constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Sullivan · filed 1991-02-22(g)

Russell Sullivan challenges on the same basis his conviction on Count 7 for illegal possession of the same firearm after former conviction of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). The government does not point to any evidence of actual possession, but argues that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an inference of joint constructive possession by Mary and Russell Sullivan. We agree.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied by a finding that the defendant used or carried a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime.

United States v. Kemper · filed 1991-03-05(g)(1)

Possession, constructive or actual, is necessarily included in a finding that a defendant used or carried a firearm in relation to his drug trade.

A § 922(g) possession conviction can be supported by a defendant's admission that the gun was his when other evidence corroborates it.

United States v. Byers · filed 1991-05-22(g)

Because the evidence was sufficient to conclude that Byers possessed the gun and because the trial court reasonably concluded that the probative value of Byers' admission was not substantially outweighed by its prejudice, we affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing ammunition regardless of where the possession occurs.

United States v. Khalil Muhammad, A/K/A Jerry Jackson · filed 1991-04-04(g)(1)

In this instance, the possession of the ammunition by a convicted felon is as illegal at one location as at another.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by actual or constructive possession, and evidence that a defendant rented the premises and admitted owning the firearms can support a conviction.

United States v. Gardner · filed 1991-04-11(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive. ... Given the circumstantial evidence showing that Gardner rented the apartment and the testimony of the agents concerning Gardner's admission to ownership of the firearms, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict Gardner of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on actual or constructive possession; incarceration does not preclude control of firearms through others.

United States v. Isidro Moreno (90-5832), Paul R. Morris (90-5867) · filed 1991-05-09(g)(1)

The jury also could find him guilty of constructive possession either before his arrest on December 20, 1989, or after his arrest. Morris’ incarceration did not affect his power to exercise control over the firearms through other persons.

A felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g) can rest on circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Carter · filed 1991-07-19(g)

We believe this evidence sufficient for the jury to infer that Carter threw something away as he attempted to evade capture, and that what he threw away was the shotgun later found by the police.

Section 922(g) permits a finding of constructive possession of a firearm when evidence links the defendant to the gun beyond mere presence at the scene.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1991-07-09(g)

The jury convicted Mr. Brawner of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B); using or carrying a firearm in the course of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm in interstate commerce by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Upon careful review of the evidence and the testimony adduced at trial, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support each of these charges. ... This evidence indicates more than mere presence at the scene of the crime and does suffice to prove constructive possession of the drugs and the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a person has the power to exercise dominion and control over a firearm.

United States v. Norman D. Wright, United States of America v. George W. Kirby, Jr. · filed 1991-07-11(g)(1)

With respect to the violation of section 922(g)(1), Wright contends there was insufficient evidence to establish that he “knowingly possessed” the rifle — an essential element of the crime. We again disagree. The district court properly instructed the jury that knowing possession may be actual or constructive, and that a person knowingly in constructive possession of an item has the power to exercise dominion and control over it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Wayland Williamson, Jr. · filed 1991-08-13(g)(1)

As to each count, possession may be constructive. ... We find that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of constructive possession as to each of these counts.

A jury may find possession under § 922(g)(1) from testimony that the defendant took a gun from a car, even if it disbelieves another part of the witness’s testimony.

United States v. Colston · filed 1991-07-03(g)(1)

This argument must fail because the jury could have believed Mr. Skenadore’s testimony that the defendant took the gun out of the car, and thus had possession of it, without believing that two shots were fired.

Section 922(g)(1) permits liability for constructive possession of another person’s firearm or for aiding and abetting that person’s unlawful possession.

United States v. Moore · filed 1991-07-19(g)(1)

Moore was clearly aware of Miles’ use of a gun in both armed robberies and, thus, satisfied this prong of the “aiding and abetting” test. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Moore was guilty of the firearms offense both as a principal and/or under an aiding and abetting theory.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is supported when substantial evidence permits a reasonable jury to find that the defendant possessed the gun.

United States v. Junior George Brown · filed 1991-08-22(g)(1)

The jury could have plausibly rejected Brown's testimony that the first time he saw the gun was when the deputies found it in a bathroom cabinet. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Brown possessed the gun.

Section 922(g) allows possession of a firearm to be proved through circumstantial evidence from which a jury can reasonably infer possession.

United States v. Steger · filed 1991-08-26(g)

We conclude, after construing all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, that the circumstantial evidence presented allowed the jury to reasonably infer that Steger possessed the guns.

Witness testimony and circumstantial evidence can establish firearm possession under § 922(g) even when officers do not find the gun in the defendant’s apartment.

United States v. Smith · filed 1991-09-18(g)

The shotgun was not found in defendant's apartment when the search warrant was executed, but the owner's manual for the shotgun was found. Buttressing this piece of circumstantial evidence was the testimony of Andre Smith and Jermaine Smith that they had both seen the defendant with the shotgun in his physical possession. ... This is adequate evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant Smith was in possession of the Mossberg shotgun.

Evidence sufficient to prove use of a firearm under § 924(c) necessarily proves possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Payne · filed 1991-09-24(g)(1)

If the evidence is sufficient to establish use under § 924(c), it is by necessity sufficient to prove possession under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant has dominion or control over the place where the firearm is found.

United States v. Woodall · filed 1991-09-03(g)(1)

In the present case, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Woodall constructively possessed the firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Woodall had listed the car hauler in which the gun was found on his hotel registration card. When the government performed a license plate check on the car hauler, it was discovered that the license plate had been issued to Woodall. Also, the car hauler was parked in the parking lot almost directly below Woodall’s room. Thus, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Woo-dall had ownership, dominion or control over the car hauler and that he constructively possessed the gun found in the car hauler.

Section 922(g) covers actual and constructive possession of a firearm; constructive possession requires knowing power and intention to control it.

United States v. Green · filed 1991-09-10(g)

For the purposes of § 922(g), possession may be actual or constructive. ... "Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others." ... The evidence established that Green had constructive possession on the dates charged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a weapon.

United States v. James Michael Weathers, United States of America v. James Michael Weathers · filed 1991-10-09(g)(1)

Constructive possession of a weapon is sufficient to support a conviction under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Douglas Wayne Fauls, United States of America v. Douglas Wayne Fauls · filed 1991-10-16(g)(1)

However, evidence of constructive possession is sufficient to sustain a verdict under section 922.

Section 922(g)(1)'s firearm-possession element may be proved through constructive possession.

United States v. Price · filed 1991-10-24(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we find that substantial evidence supports a finding that Price constructively possessed the firearm in question.

Section 922(g)(1) covers both actual and constructive firearm possession by a convicted felon.

United States v. Miscellaneous Firearms and Ammunition, Mary Elizabeth Wheadon · filed 1991-10-28(g)(1)

For purposes of § 922(g)(1), firearm possession may be either actual or constructive.

When a § 922(g)(1) prosecution proceeds solely on actual possession, the jury may be instructed on that theory of possession.

United States v. Coles · filed 1991-11-25(g)(1)

The court was clearly correct in its initial charge to the jury, both as to the definitions of actual possession, and in telling the jury that the government was presenting only an actual possession case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of knowing possession; a jury instruction must not assume that the defendant acquired the firearm when possession is disputed.

United States v. Desoto · filed 1991-11-14(g)(1)

Although the instruction stated that defendant’s motive for acquiring a firearm is not a defense if all the essential elements of the charge have been proved, the jury would probably interpret the instruction to mean that defendant acquired the firearm and that he therefore must have knowingly possessed it, thereby satisfying the central and disputed element of the offense. We conclude, therefore, that defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction.

Possession under § 922(g) may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including a gun found in the defendant’s home and testimony that he held a similar gun days earlier.

United States v. Ingram · filed 1992-02-21(g)

In Ingram's case, the evidence, when viewed as a whole, would allow a rational jury to convict. Ingram argues that the gun introduced at trial was not his, but the police found the gun in the home where Ingram lived. The only other people living in the house were Andrea Newman and her baby, and Newman denied that the gun was hers. Furthermore, three days before the gun was seized, two witnesses saw Ingram holding a similar gun. This evidence provides enough information to allow a rational jury to conclude that Ingram possessed the gun which police found.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be supported by evidence that a gun was in plain view in the defendant's residence.

United States v. Bateman · filed 1992-02-07(g)(1)

Bateman also argues there was insufficient evidence he possessed the guns present at the residence. Since there was evidence the house was Bateman's residence, and at least one of the guns was hanging in plain view, the jury reasonably could have inferred the gun belonged to Bateman. We reject Bateman's arguments that the evidence in this case was insufficient to sustain the convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of firearm possession when a felon exercises dominion over guns in his home, even if the guns belong to others.

United States v. McKnight · filed 1992-01-31(g)(1)

Thus, it was reasonable for a jury to infer that McKnight exercised dominion, and constructive possession over, the guns in his house, at the very least the handgun.

Section 922(g) covers actual, constructive, or joint possession; constructive possession requires the intent and power to control the firearm.

United States v. White · filed 1992-02-12(g)

Finally, unlawful possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) may be actual, constructive, or joint. ... The defendant had constructive possession if he had the intent and power to exercise dominion and control over the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) allows proof of constructive possession, but a passenger’s shoulder movement and a gun beneath his seat alone do not establish dominion or control.

United States v. Blue · filed 1992-02-19(g)(1)

These facts alone do not justify a finding of constructive possession. To uphold a finding of constructive possession, this court requires more evidence of dominion and control than the government has offered here.

A conviction under § 922(g) can be sustained by evidence of actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Ulysses Simpson Branch · filed 1992-03-10(g)

Evidence that appellant had actual or constructive possession of the firearm is sufficient to sustain the verdict.

Section 922(g) covers a felon's constructive possession of a firearm when the evidence shows power and intent to control it.

United States v. Deondra D. Gray (91-1242) Frank Johnson (91-1262) Lonnie L. Griffin (91-1265) · filed 1992-03-24(g)

A rational juror could find that Griffin had the power and intent to exercise control over the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Maxey · filed 1992-04-23(g)(1)

The government presented abundant evidence through arresting officers to prove that Maxey constructively possessed the firearm found under his car seat after he exited the vehicle.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant possessed at least one firearm; the government need not prove possession of every firearm charged.

United States v. Perdomo · filed 1992-04-06(g)

The court properly instructed the jury that to convict Perdomo they must find that he possessed at least one firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to infer possession from a firearm found in a felon's bedroom, even when another person claims to own it.

United States v. George W. Lowry, III · filed 1992-04-22(g)(1)

The evidence in this case is ample under the foregoing standards. The firearm in question was found in defendant's room within defendant's residence. Moments before the raid occurred, defendant was seen looking out the window of that very bedroom. The $27,000 in cash found in the safe in his bedroom may have furnished a sufficient motive, in the jury's eyes, for defendant's possession of a weapon, and the jury was free to reject defense testimony that Jens Stendera spent the night in that bedroom and owned the weapon in question.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by evidence that the defendant dropped an object later found to be a gun.

United States v. Pettiford · filed 1992-05-05(g)(1)

We think that a rational jury could have concluded from this evidence that Pettiford possessed the gun in the trash can.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Franks · filed 1992-05-26(g)

The record reveals that Franks, at the very least, constructively possessed the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant exercised dominion over and constructively possessed the firearm.

United States v. Huffhines · filed 1992-06-15(g)(1)

Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Huffhines exercised dominion over, and had constructive possession of, the gun that was found in the motel room.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Knezek · filed 1992-06-16(g)(1)

Illegal possession of firearms may be either actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's constructive possession of a firearm even without actual possession.

United States v. Donaldson · filed 1992-06-23(g)(1)

We also affirm Mr. Donaldson's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. While he did not have actual possession of the gun, we find that he had constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be established when a convicted felon knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm or the area where it is located.

United States v. Wight · filed 1992-07-07(g)(1)

We hold that as long as a convicted felon knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time of exercising dominion and control over a firearm or over the area in which the weapon is located, directly or through others, he is in possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g) permits a jury to convict for possession of one firearm when the indictment lists multiple firearms conjunctively.

United States v. Hager · filed 1992-07-07(g)

We find no merit to Hager’s argument. The decision of the district court to instruct the jury in the disjunctive, even though the indictment was worded in the conjunctive, was entirely proper.

Section 922(g) permits conviction on a charge involving two firearms if the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed either one.

United States v. Simpson · filed 1992-09-22(g)

We begin our discussion of Simpson’s challenges to his conviction by noting that in order to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government only needed to produce sufficient evidence to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Simpson possessed either the handgun or the rifle, or both.

Section 922(g) convictions for possessing and receiving a firearm can be supported by pawnshop records and testimony identifying the defendant as the person who pawned and redeemed it.

United States v. Warren · filed 1992-09-02(g)

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment charged defendant with possessing and receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). As to these counts, the evidence showed that defendant’s fingerprint was on the pawncard made out at the time defendant pawned the pistol and that his signature appeared on the ATF Form 4473 he was required to execute upon redeeming the pistol. Contrary to defendant’s assertions, this evidence, together with the testimony of the pawnshop personnel concerning their record keeping routines, is sufficient evidence that defendant was the person who pawned and redeemed the pistol. Moreover, John Williams' testimony to the effect that defendant solicited him to commit perjury indicates consciousness of guilt on defendant’s part. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there is ample evidence in this case that a rational trier of fact could rely on to convict.

Pawn and redemption records, supported by pawnshop testimony, can establish possession or receipt of a firearm under § 922(g).

Walter P. Niecko and Thelma A. Niecko v. Emro Marketing Company · filed 1992-09-01(g)

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment charged defendant with possessing and receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Contrary to defendant's assertions, this evidence, together with the testimony of the pawnshop personnel concerning their record keeping routines, is sufficient evidence that defendant was the person who pawned and redeemed the pistol.

A conviction under § 922(g) may rest on circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed firearms, despite testimony that someone else owned them.

United States v. Haas · filed 1993-03-01(g)

Count 4 charged him with being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Appellant additionally argues that he merely kept the guns for his step-father but did not own them or use them. ... The Court concludes that the jury was not required to credit this evidence. The government put on evidence, albeit largely circumstantial evidence, to the contrary.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ammunition possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence tying a defendant to a loaded firearm.

United States v. Raymond Moreno, Jr. · filed 1993-05-06(g)(1)

We think a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from this evidence that Moreno possessed the sawed-off shotgun and its ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is not established by a defendant's mere presence as a passenger in a car containing a gun.

United States v. Madkins · filed 1993-06-04(g)(1)

Under Flenoid, Madkins's mere presence in the car is insufficient to support a finding that he possessed a gun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm, but a passenger’s mere proximity to a weapon does not establish the required dominion or control.

United States v. Gutierrez · filed 1993-06-10(g)(1)

We agree that “[t]he mere proximity of a weapon to a passenger in a car goes only to its accessibility, not to the dominion or control which must be proved to establish possession.” ... We are satisfied that the jury had ample evidence to support its finding that Gutierrez had constructive possession of the weapons.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by showing that a defendant knew where a firearm was and had unhindered access to it when another occupant was absent.

United States v. Pelozzie · filed 1993-06-17(g)(1)

This standard may be met through evidence that the defendant knew the location of the weapon and had unhindered access to it when the other joint occupant was absent. ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence that Pelozzie constructively possessed the firearms found in the mobile home.

Section 922(g)(1) requires evidence beyond joint occupancy of a residence to establish constructive possession of a firearm found there.

U.S. v. Mergerson · filed 1993-07-12(g)(1)

Instead, we believe that mere control or dominion over the place in which contraband or an illegal item is found by itself is not enough to establish constructive possession when there is joint occupancy of a place.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by pawnshop records bearing the defendant’s thumbprint and signature identifying him as the firearm’s owner.

United States v. Billue · filed 1993-07-14(g)(1)

A reasonable jury could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Billue was in knowing possession of the firearm and that Harris did not deliberately falsify the documents. After weighing the evidence and determining the witnesses’ credibility, the jury found Billue guilty. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to reach this determination, and Billue’s argument on this ground must fail.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be supported by evidence that the defendant controlled the apartment where the firearm was found.

United States v. Tyrone Clark, United States of America v. Anthony Ford · filed 1993-07-15(g)(1)

Clark was also convicted under § 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a handgun which was seized from his apartment on July 1, 1991. ... To establish constructive possession, " 'the government must produce evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband is concealed.' " United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Clark's landlord testified that Clark leased the apartment where the gun was discovered on November 28, 1990, and "moved in on December 15, 1990." His lease did not expire until January 14, 1992, well after the date of the search. We find this evidence to be sufficient.

Section 922(g) permits a finding of constructive possession when a firearm is found at the defendant’s residence and no evidence refutes the inference of dominion.

United States v. Mabry · filed 1993-08-13(g)

In the absence of evidence refuting the normal inference of dominion, showing that a firearm was discovered at the defendant’s residence suffices to prove constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of possession when a person knows a firearm is present and either physically controls it or has the power and intention to control it.

United States v. Middleton · filed 1993-08-02(g)(1)

Further, the district court instructed the jury that in order to find that Middleton possessed each weapon, they must find that he knew of its presence, and either had physical control of it, or had the power and intention to control it. The instructions therefore adequately cover Middleton's defense theory.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is supported by testimony that a defendant received a handgun and threw handguns from a car, corroborated by their recovery.

United States v. Hamell · filed 1993-09-02(g)(1)

Hopkins next asserts the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm. We disagree. The police officer testified that he saw Hopkins receive a handgun from Amer-son and then throw two handguns out the car window. The police later recovered these handguns from the roadside. We conclude this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support Hopkins’s conviction.

Section 922(g) permits conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant controls the firearm or the premises where it is found.

United States v. Mabry · filed 1993-09-22(g)

Proof of constructive possession, that is, proof that the defendant "exercised ownership, dominion or control over the firearms or dominion over the premises," will support a Sec. 922(g) conviction.

Section 922(g) permits possession to be proved through evidence that the defendant knew of the firearms and could exercise control over them.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1993-09-29(g)

We find this evidence sufficient to establish possession. The jury could infer knowledge of the weapons from the evidence showing that Wilson purchased many of them. The jury could infer that Wilson had access to the firearms, and the opportunity to exercise control over them, from the evidence that the safe was in an apartment that he shared with his wife, and that she denied ownership of all but one of the weapons.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by testimony that a defendant received and discarded handguns, corroborated by their recovery.

United States v. Hamell · filed 1993-11-08(g)(1)

A jury convicted the defendants of being felons in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), but the convictions were reversed on appeal. ... The police officer testified that he saw Hopkins receive a handgun from Amerson and then throw two handguns out the car window. The police later recovered these handguns from the roadside. We conclude this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support Hopkins's conviction.

Section 922(g) possession may be inferred when a person knows firearms are in his home and has physical access to and control over them.

United States v. Christopher Frushon, United States of America v. Christopher Frushon · filed 1993-11-30(g)

The jury could properly infer that he possessed the weapons since he must have known of their presence in his home and must have had physical access to, and control over, them.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual possession or by knowing power and intent to exercise dominion and control over a firearm.

United States v. Holmes · filed 1993-10-29(g)

Both actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). Actual possession occurs when a party has immediate possession or control over a tangible object. Constructive possession exists when, although no actual possession exists, the party knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time "to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others."

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon's firearm possession to be proved through actual, constructive, or joint possession.

United States v. Forte · filed 1993-11-05(g)(1)

Proving unlawful possession of a firearm under Sec. 922(g) requires either a showing of actual possession or proof of constructive or joint possession.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be supported by corroborated testimony that a convicted felon carried and discarded a gun.

United States v. Nururdin · filed 1993-11-03(g)

After reviewing the record, we are convinced that the testimony of the government’s rebuttal witnesses not only corroborated the testimony of the arresting officers, but provided overwhelming evidence that the defendant’s version of events was less than plausible, much less truthful. We hold, therefore, that the evidence was more than sufficient to permit a rational juror to find the defendant guilty of having been a felon in possession of a gun.

A jury may infer knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) when a firearm is under the driver's seat and the driver carries matching ammunition.

United States v. Prudhome · filed 1994-01-20(g)(1)

A reasonable jury was entitled to discredit defense testimony and infer knowing possession from the facts that Prudhome was driving, the gun was located directly under his seat, and he had three rounds of matching ammunition in his waist pouch.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by officers' testimony that the defendant carried a gun, recovery of the gun near where he fell, and testimony that he admitted owning it.

United States v. Parker · filed 1993-12-15(g)(1)

A jury convicted Michael Parker of knowingly possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). ... The single issue of appeal is whether Parker possessed a gun. ... However, we conclude that the government has provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Parker guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when the defendant knows where the firearm is and has unrestricted access to it.

United States v. Omar · filed 1993-12-23(g)(1)

Second, the uncontested evidence before the jury was sufficient for a finding of constructive possession. Omar owned the house, held one of the two keys to the room where the gun was kept, stored his money in that room, had unrestricted access to the gun, and was the only person present in the house when the police executed the search warrant.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession even when another person owns the firearms.

United States v. Stotler · filed 1994-01-13(g)(1)

The fact that the guns may have been owned by his girlfriend is irrelevant. See United States v. Stanley, 597 F.2d 866 (4th Cir.1979) (another's ownership is not inconsistent with felon's possession). Stotler's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession has no merit.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports an inference of dominion or control over the firearm.

United States v. John Evers Koton, Jr. · filed 1994-01-14(g)(1)

Even under this stricter standard, the jury could properly find constructive possession.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction is supported by evidence of the defendant's felony status, the firearm's interstate movement, and the defendant's knowledge that the firearms were present.

United States v. Richard Anthony Aloi, Cross-Appellee · filed 1993-12-29(g)(1)

As a final basis for attacking his convictions, defendant raises a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. This claim has no merit. It was stipulated that defendant was a convicted felon and that the gun and ammunition traveled across state lines, and there was ample evidence that defendant knew of the presence of the guns in the car.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; evidence that Delano Oakie possessed the rifle used in the assaults was sufficient to support his conviction.

United States v. Delano Romanus Oakie, United States of America v. Kirk Morin Oakie · filed 1994-01-28(g)(1)

Applying our familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard, see United States v. Schmidt, 922 F.2d 1365, 1368 (8th Cir.1991), we conclude that there was more than enough evidence to convict each defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm and of using a firearm during a crime of violence (or of aiding and abetting Rooks to commit those crimes), and to convict Delano Oakie of being a felon in possession of the rifle used in the assaults.

Section 922(g)(1) allows firearm possession to be proved by constructive possession when the evidence shows ownership, dominion, or control.

United States v. Pugh · filed 1994-02-14(g)(1)

In this case, there was much more than the mere presence of the firearm at Mr. Pugh's residence to establish constructive possession.

Section 922(g)’s possession element is adequately explained by an instruction requiring knowledge of the firearm’s presence and either physical control or the power and intention to control it.

United States v. Sablan · filed 1994-02-16(g)

The district court instructed the jury that in order to find that Sablan possessed the shotgun, it must find that he knew of its presence and either had physical control of it or had the power and intention to control it. Accordingly, we hold the instructions adequately covered Sablan's defense theory.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a constructive possession conviction when the defendant has knowledge of the firearm and dominion and control over it.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1994-03-09(g)(1)

However, because the court's instruction adequately stated both the knowledge and the dominion and control elements of constructive possession, the court did not abuse its discretion in using its own formulation rather than Jackson's.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession requirement can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant knew of and constructively possessed the firearms.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1994-03-18(g)(1)

Having determined that Johnson knew that the firearms and cocaine were present in the blue bag, see supra Part II.A, and that Johnson had constructive possession of the firearms, see supra Part I.B, Johnson’s arguments concerning his convictions on Counts III and IV of the Indictment do not support overturning those convictions.

A felon constructively possesses a firearm when he has the ability to exercise control over it.

United States v. Magnus A. Wilson, United States of America v. Ivan K. Huggins · filed 1994-03-24(g)(1)

In that regard, the government must show that Wilson had "the ability to exercise control" over the narcotics and firearms--that is, that he had the power to possess them.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by joint constructive possession of firearms.

United States v. Eric Jones, A/K/A Erick Jones, A/K/A Warren J. Lacy · filed 1994-03-30(g)(1)

As in Craven, we conclude that the evidence presented in this case is sufficient to establish, at a minimum, joint constructive possession and therefore to support the jury's verdict on the firearms charge.

A conviction for firearm possession by a convicted felon under § 922(g)(1) stands when substantial evidence supports it.

United States v. Shannon · filed 1994-04-22(g)(1)

On February 26, 1992, Shannon was charged in a six-count indictment with armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) (Counts 1 and 4), using a firearm during and in relation to a federal crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts 2 and 5), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Counts 3 and 6). ... We find that there is substantial evidence to support the conviction on Counts 1, 2, and 3.

Evidence supporting a conviction for using a firearm in a drug crime may also support a conviction under § 922(k).

United States v. Reyes-Mercado · filed 1994-04-28(k)

The very evidence supporting defendant's conviction under section 924(c) also supports his conviction under section 922(k).

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when prior felony status and interstate travel of the firearm are established and the evidence sufficiently proves possession.

United States v. Emmit Lewis Yarbrough, Jr. (93-1769), Roosevelt Dix, Jr., (93-1796) · filed 1994-05-09(g)(1)

At trial, both defendants stipulated that they were previously convicted felons and that the guns seized by the police had traveled in interstate commerce. Based upon the evidence described above, particularly Rynold Collins' testimony, sufficient evidence was presented to sustain defendants' convictions of being felons in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by an officer's testimony that he saw the defendant hold a gun and drop it where police found it.

United States v. Haney · filed 1994-05-09(g)(1)

Haney first argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict on count I, being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... In sharp contrast, in the present case, Arnett testified that he saw Haney holding what appeared to be a gun and further testified that he saw Haney drop an object on the seat of the track in the precise location where the gun was found. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a defendant knows firearms are stored in a shared bedroom and has unrestricted access to them.

United States v. Zapata · filed 1994-05-27(g)(1)

We need not determine whether Zapata exercised exclusive control over his bedroom because Zapata concedes that the bedroom was his and, even if his girlfriend shared it with him, the jury need only have found that Zapata was aware that firearms were stored there and that he had unrestricted access to them to conclude that he constructively possessed them.

Constructive possession under subsections (g)(1) and (k) exists when a person knowingly can exercise dominion or control over a firearm.

United States v. Nichols · filed 1994-06-01(g)(1), (k)

This evidence is sufficient to establish Nichols's constructive possession of the firearm: he was knowingly in a position to exercise dominion or control over it. ... As it is sufficient to support Nichols's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, the evidence also supports his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Roper · filed 1994-06-07(g)(1)

Both actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g).

Section 922(g) does not require actual possession of a firearm; constructive or joint possession can suffice.

United States v. Simpson · filed 1994-06-09(g)

Conviction of the present offenses does not require actual possession of a firearm but can be satisfied by proof of constructive or joint possession.

Section 922(g)’s knowing possession element can be supported by eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant with a gun and the gun’s later recovery from the car he was driving.

United States v. Patterson · filed 1994-07-14(g)

This evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that the defendant was knowingly in possession of the .38 caliber revolver on the day of the incident in Comer Cox Park.

A conviction under § 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Rosas · filed 1994-07-19(g)

From this evidence, a rational jury could easily have found that Rosas knowingly possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm; a jury may infer possession from evidence that he discarded an object where a firearm was found.

United States v. Burton · filed 1994-07-27(g)(1)

Martin Burton seeks to reverse his convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1), use of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1), and possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), claiming that the evidence against him was insufficient. ... Possession is an essential element of all three of his convictions. ... On this record, the jury was free to infer that Burton possessed both the firearm and the cocaine and we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Burton's convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge and intent to possess the firearm.

United States v. Martinez · filed 1994-11-09(g)(1)

The instructions given by the district court did include the necessary elements of knowledge and intent to possess.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to introduce the firearm itself to prosecute a felon for possession.

United States v. Overstreet · filed 1994-11-18(g)(1)

The gun in question was never recovered and was not available at trial. However, the government was not required to introduce the actual firearm to proceed on the section 922(g) charge.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) can be supported by officers’ testimony that they saw the defendant holding a revolver and reaching into a car as if to place it there.

United States v. Boyd · filed 1994-11-29(g)(1)

Jeffrey Boyd appeals his jury conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). We affirm that conviction. ... We find the evidence is sufficient to sustain Boyd's conviction. Boyd only challenges the evidence presented to show that he possessed the revolver. However, both Officers Bolden and Fleming testified that they saw Boyd holding the revolver by his side as they approached. Each saw Boyd reach into the car as if to place the gun there.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that a defendant handled firearms or directed others to buy them and then took them.

United States v. Lopez-Robles · filed 1994-12-20(g)(1)

The evidence in this case is sufficient. Two pawn shop employees, Fliegman and Collazo, testified that Lopez-Robles discussed the sale of the guns and actually handled the guns in the store. Two relatives of Lopez-Robles also testified that they bought the guns at the direction of Lopez-Robles and that Lopez-Robles took the guns after they were purchased. Crediting this testimony, the jury could have found that Lopez-Robles had (at a minimum) constructive possession of the guns.

A felon’s knowing possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) can be proved by testimony that the felon claimed to own it.

United States v. Dwight Wade Seaton, Cross-Appellee · filed 1995-01-17(g)(1)

Here, put simply, the jury believed Finney’s testimony regarding the defendant’s assertions of ownership of the shotgun. It was justified in doing so. The jurors were entitled to conclude that both the defendant and his brother Roger lied in order to prevent the defendant’s conviction. We hold that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant knowingly possessed the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant threw the firearm from his car.

United States v. Grajeda · filed 1994-12-14(g)(1)

Based upon this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Grajeda exercised dominion and control over the firearm when he threw it out of the car window.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's brief handling and examination of a firearm, even if he does not keep it.

United States v. Cecil Coulter, Jr. · filed 1995-01-19(g)(1)

Coulter's acceptance of Capps' delivery of the AK-47, as evidenced by Coulter's holding and examining the firearm, clearly demonstrates that the AK-47 was within his dominion and immediate control. See United States v. Hayes, 919 F.2d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir.1990) (mere delivery of firearm to defendant sufficient to demonstrate dominion and control). The fact that Coulter chose not to retain possession of the weapon does not excuse his violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm was present and exercised dominion and control over it; proximity and shared occupancy alone do not prove possession.

United States v. Murphy · filed 1995-02-13(g)(1)

To prove the element of possession, the government had to show that Murphy knew the gun and ammunition were present in the garage, and that he exercised dominion and control over those items. ... At most, the evidence established Murphy's proximity to the gun and ammunition, and his joint occupancy and use of a residence and garage in which the items were found. As we have repeatedly held, this showing is insufficient as a matter of law to prove possession.

Section 922(g) requires proof of dominion and control to establish possession of a firearm found in another person’s car.

United States v. Bice · filed 1995-02-22(g)

To prove that Bice possessed the gun found in Pitts' car, the government needed to prove that Bice exercised dominion and control over it.