18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Gutierrez · filed 2000-01-31(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by evidence of constructive possession that links the accused to the firearm.

United States v. Richardson, Clarence · filed 2000-04-03(g)(1)

Establishing constructive possession requires that the government establish a nexus between the accused and the contraband, in order to distinguish the accused from a mere bystander. ... Without any help from Purnell, this evidence establishes Richardson’s constructive possession over the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession requirement can be met by evidence that a person controlled the residence where a firearm was found alongside his personal items.

United States v. Clarence Richardson, Jr. · filed 2000-04-03(g)(1)

The officers found the gun in Richardson’s bedroom along with his personal items. Without any help from Pur-nell, this evidence establishes Richardson’s constructive possession over the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(5) permits proof of constructive firearm possession without requiring control over the premises where the firearm is found.

United States v. Ramirez-Soberanes · filed 2000-04-11(g)(5)

Accordingly, the district court’s omission of the words “and the premises where it is found,” whether intentional or accidental, was not error.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession, including evidence that the defendant owned the firearm.

United States v. Moore · filed 2000-05-15(g)(1)

This testimony was sufficient evidence of constructive possession for a reasonable juror to find Moore guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the evidence permits a rational jury to find that the defendant possessed the firearms.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2000-06-13(g)(1)

Taking this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir. 1996), we think a rational jury could conclude that appellant constructively possessed the firearms during the time charged in the indictment.

A felon can constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) by exercising dominion and control over the vehicle containing it.

United States v. Harris · filed 2000-07-07(g)(1)

At the time police discovered the weapon, Harris exerted complete dominion and control over the vehicle in which the firearm was found and therefore over the firearm itself.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a handgun is partially visible beside the driver's seat and the defendant is the vehicle's sole occupant.

United States v. Molina · filed 2000-07-28(g)(1)

Based on this evidence, a rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Molina had constructive possession of the handgun which was found in his truck on that date.

For § 922(g)(1), joint occupancy alone does not prove constructive possession; the government must present evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Hishaw · filed 2000-12-20(g)(1)

Thus, in cases of joint occupancy in which the government relies on circumstantial evidence of dominion, control, and knowledge, “it must present evidence to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly has the power to control the firearm.

United States v. Heckard · filed 2001-01-08(g)(1)

Constructive possession requires a showing that a defendant knowingly holds the power to exercise dominion or control over the firearm.

A felon constructively possesses ammunition under § 922(g) when the evidence establishes knowledge of and control over it.

United States v. Lemon · filed 2001-01-26(g)

Like the district court,2 we conclude that this evidence, viewed in its entirety, is more than sufficient to convict Lemon of constructively possessing the crack cocaine and ammunition found in Hicks’s apartment.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive as well as actual possession of a firearm.

United States v. Turner · filed 2001-02-05(g)(1)

For purposes of § 922(g)(1), “possession” includes both actual and constructive possession.

Under § 922(g)(1), possession of a firearm may be constructive and may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Gathers · filed 2001-02-06(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm for the purposes § 922(g) may be actual or constructive, id., and may be proven by direct or circumstantial evi- dence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when a person constructively possesses ammunition by exercising dominion over the premises where it is located.

United States v. Black · filed 2001-03-02(g)(1)

All the jury needed find to convict Black of violating § 922(g)(1) is that Black constructively possessed any of the ammunition in his home. The law of this circuit states that constructive possession exists when the person has dominion over the premises where the ammunition is located.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Dhinsa · filed 2001-03-21(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction under section 922(g), the government need not prove that Dhinsa physically possessed the firearm; rather, proof of constructive possession is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through constructive possession.

United States v. Whitaker · filed 2001-04-12(g)(1)

For purposes of § 922(g)(1), “possession” includes both actual and constructive possession. ... Accordingly, we hold that the evidence in the record provides an adequate basis from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant constructively possessed the assault rifle beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is satisfied when a felon knowingly has the power and intention to control ammunition.

United States v. Fair · filed 2001-04-20(g)(1)

The ammunition was undisputedly found in defendant’s bedroom, premises over which he clearly had dominion. Defendant’s own testimony concerning his receipt of such ammunition and his custom of giving it to a friend supports the finding that he knowingly had the power and intention of exercising dominion and control over the ammunition. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence clearly supports the finding that defendant constructively possessed the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Mosley · filed 2001-08-15(g)(1)

For purposes of being a felon in possession of a firearm, possession may be either actual or constructive. ... In this case the evidence overwhelmingly supports both actual and constructive possession: Mosley admitted to officers that he actually possessed the firearm by handling it in the vehicle where the weapon was recovered--a vehicle that Mosley controlled.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of ammunition possession through dominion and control over the premises where it is found; possession need not be exclusive.

United States v. Bellegarde · filed 2001-08-15(g)(1)

The government’s burden under the circumstances was to prove that Bellegarde constructively possessed the ammunition, i.e., that he “exercised dominion and control over the premises in which the [ammunition was] located.” United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 676 (2d Cir.2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). His possession of the ammunition need not have been exclusive. See id. at 677 (“It is of no moment that other individuals also may have exercised control over the weapons.”). We therefore conclude that the prosecution offered sufficient evidence indicating that Bellegarde possessed the ammunition within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Section 922(g)(1) allows possession of ammunition to be proved through a sufficient connection between the defendant and the residence where it was found.

United States v. Quilling, Gary C. · filed 2001-08-20(g)(1)

We agree with the district court that the Government established a sufficient nexus between Mr. Quilling and the ammunition. ... These factors were sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Quilling was in possession of the firearm ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ammunition possession element can be proved by a sufficient connection between the defendant and the ammunition found at his residence.

United States v. Quilling · filed 2001-08-20(g)(1)

We agree with the district court that the Government established a sufficient nexus between Mr. Quilling and the ammunition. Most importantly, Mr. Quilling stated at the time of his arrest that 9 Cahokia Street was his residence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a firearm is found in a bedroom the defendant shares with its owner.

United States v. Alanis, Antonio · filed 2001-09-07(g)(1)

However, it is not material that Alanis’s wife might have owned the pistol because "[c]onstructive possession may be either sole or joint." Kitchen, 57 F.3d at 521. Thus, her ownership does not preclude Alanis’s possession.

Section 922(g)(1) allows constructive possession of a firearm to be joint; another person’s ownership does not preclude a felon’s possession.

United States v. Alanis · filed 2001-09-07(g)(1)

However, it is not material that Alanis’s wife might have owned the pistol because “[c]onstructive possession may be either sole or joint.” ... Thus, her ownership does not preclude Alanis’s possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Nowden · filed 2001-11-08(g)(1)

Constructive possession over a firearm is sufficient to uphold a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) covers constructive possession of a firearm when a felon knows its location and has unhindered access to it.

United States v. Boykin · filed 2001-12-18(g)

Boykin’s knowledge of the gun’s location and unhindered access gave him constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of constructive possession through evidence connecting a defendant to a firearm; joint occupancy of a room alone is insufficient.

United States v. Estrada · filed 2002-01-25(g)(1)

We agree these three cases establish that joint occupancy of the motel room alone is not sufficient to support the inference Mr. Estrada possessed the gun. However, the evidence linking Mr. Estrada to the gun goes beyond the evidence in any of those cases.

Section 922(g)(1) requires more than proximity or access to a firearm to prove constructive possession.

United States v. Clark · filed 2002-03-18(g)(1)

In order to show dominion and control, the prosecution must show more than “mere proximity” to the firearm, or that the firearm was accessible to the defendant.

Constructive possession under § 922(g)(1) requires the position or right to control the gun and the intent to exercise that control.

United States v. Snyder · filed 2002-03-19(g)(1)

The instruction makes clear that “to prove constructive possession of a gun, the government must show that the defendant was in a position or had the right to exercise dominion and control over the guns and had the intention to exercise the control.” Having considered the instructions as a whole in light of Snyder’s contention, we conclude the instructions are legally correct, and the case was fairly and adequately submitted to the jury.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the defendant constructively possessed the firearms.

United States v. Fama · filed 2002-04-11(g)(1)

The government introduced ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that he possessed the firearms.

A defendant who facilitates a firearm purchase may violate § 922(g)(1) or § 922(k) through constructive possession if able to assure delivery of the firearm.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2002-05-02(g)(1), (k)

We agree with the trial judge, for we are convinced that Hernandez’s proposed instruction ignores the relevant case law in this Circuit, which makes clear that a defendant who facilitates the purchase of a weapon may, in fact, violate both 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).

Section 922(g) permits proof of firearm possession through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Harris · filed 2002-06-12(g)

Under § 922(g), either actual or constructive possession is sufficient. ... In addition, there is clear evidence that the defendant exercised constructive possession over the gun by ordering Delaney to bring it to the hotel room.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through physical possession or the power and intention to control the firearm.

United States v. Gaines · filed 2002-07-12(g)(1)

There are two ways in which the government can prove possession within the meaning of § 922(g). The first, .actual possession, requires the government to show defendant physically possessed the firearm. The second, constructive possession, “exists when a person has the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object, [which] may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.”

A § 922(g)(1) firearm conviction can rest on evidence that the defendant owned and drove the car where the gun was found, others lacked ready access to it, and the defendant admitted it was his.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2002-08-22(g)(1)

Jackson does not challenge the admissibility of evidence supporting the narrative set forth above (supra H.A.), which we conclude was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on both counts. ... As to the gun count: Jackson was the registered owner of the car in which the gun was found; the gun was found under the driver’s seat of the car he was driving; and neither passenger had ready access to the gun (the rear-seat passenger was behind the other passenger) or an ammunition clip. In addition, according to the testimony of the detective who conducted the first precinct interview, Jackson admitted that the gun was his.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a convicted felon constructively possessed a gun found in his home.

United States v. Rushie · filed 2002-09-18(g)(1)

Likewise, there was sufficient evidence that Rushie exercised constructive possession of the gun found in his home.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Parker · filed 2002-10-18(g)(1)

Under well-established Sixth Circuit precedent, possession sufficient to violate the statute may be either actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of ammunition.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 2002-10-21(g)(1)

Possession may be either actual or constructive to satisfy the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

When premises are jointly occupied, § 922(g)(1)'s knowing possession element requires a connection between the defendant and the firearm.

United States v. Gorman · filed 2002-12-03(g)(1)

Knowledge and control can be inferred where a defendant has exclusive possession of the premises, but where a defendant jointly occupies the premises the government must “show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband.” Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1145.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm, which can be established by showing that the firearm was seized at the defendant's residence.

United States v. Carman · filed 2002-12-23(g)(1)

As the court correctly noted, constructive possession is sufficient for conviction under § 922(g)(1) and it can be established "by a showing that the firearm was seized at the defendant's residence." Boykin, 986 F.2d at 274.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by constructive possession when a person knows of a gun and has dominion and control over the place where it is found.

United States v. Ambartsumyan · filed 2003-01-14(g)(1)

Ambartsumyan, however, did have constructive possession of the gun because he had knowledge of the gun, admitted that he had held it, and had dominion and control over the apartment in which the officers found the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires control over a firearm to establish constructive possession; mere proximity is insufficient.

United States v. Thomas, Robert · filed 2003-02-25(g)(1)

There is no indication that Thomas lived in the apartment building, either in his sister’s apartment or else- where in the building, and therefore constructive pos- session could not be established by his mere proximity to the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by evidence that the defendant knowingly controlled a bag containing a gun.

United States v. Williams · filed 2003-03-07(g)(1)

Contrary to Williams’s assertion, the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that he constructively possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession requirement can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. White · filed 2003-06-05(g)(1)

Evidence of constructive possession suffices to satisfy the requirement under § 922(g)(1) of proof that a defendant possessed a firearm.

A convicted felon’s knowing possession of firearms may be proved by actual possession or by control over the firearms or the premises where they are concealed.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 2003-06-19(g)(1)

Counts IV and VI alleged that Hamilton possessed with the intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine and possessed four firearms as a convicted felon. Hamilton contends that he did not knowingly possess the drugs and firearms seized during the September 9, 1999, search. Our cases establish that knowing possession may be actual or constructive. ... This evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Hamilton possessed the drugs and the firearms seized from the trailer on September 9, 1999.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant controlled a vehicle containing the firearm.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2003-07-16(g)(1)

To convict under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that 1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; 2) the defendant possessed a firearm: and 3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. ... Here, circumstantial evidence presented at trial suggested that prior to the attempted robbery Lewis had possession of- the car in which the firearm was eventually found, thereby supporting the jury’s decision to convict Lewis on both counts.

Section 922(g)(3)'s possession element includes constructive possession when a person knows firearms are present and has dominion over the premises where they are kept.

United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Casey Marie Yirkovsky, Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 2003-07-31(g)(3)

Under this definition, Yirkovsky had constructive possession of the firearms because it is undisputed that she had dominion over the residence and knew the firearms were present.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of knowing possession; when a firearm is found in a jointly occupied vehicle, the government must establish a connection between the defendant and the firearm.

United States v. Pahulu · filed 2003-08-04(g)(1)

In this case more than one possibility existed as to who the jury might have found to possess the firearm — the defendant or the other occupant of the vehicle. Accordingly, in order to establish a reasonable inference that defendant knowingly possessed the firearm within the minivan, the government had the burden of proof to establish a nexus or connection between the defendant and the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a felon sells the firearms.

United States v. Abfalter · filed 2003-08-22(g)(1)

For Mr. Williams to have sold the firearms, we conclude that he must have had at least constructive possession over those firearms. We thus hold that the evidence suffices on the felon-in-possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intent to control a firearm.

United States v. Burts · filed 2003-08-23(g)(1)

Possession, the only element Burts challenges, can be actual or constructive; constructive possession occurs when a person knowingly has the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant has both the power and intent to control the firearm.

United States v. Gary · filed 2003-09-09(g)(1)

To show constructive possession, the government had to prove both the power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the gun.

Constructive possession of a firearm can satisfy the possession element of § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3).

United States v. Tignor · filed 2003-09-12(g)(1), (g)(3)

Further, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Tignor had constructive possession of the .12 gauge shotgun found in a closet near a bedroom in Tignor’s resi- dence.

Section 922(g) permits constructive possession of a firearm to be established through circumstantial evidence of control and knowledge.

United States v. Carter · filed 2003-09-16(g)

"Constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises or has the power to exercise, dominion and control over the item[,]" United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir. 1980), and has knowledge of the item’s presence. United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1992). Both elements may be established by cir- cumstantial evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on constructive or joint possession of a firearm; actual or exclusive possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Joyce · filed 2003-09-17(g)(1)

We have held that proof of actual or exclusive posses- sion of a firearm is not necessary and that proof of constructive or joint possession is sufficient to establish a violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Sizemore · filed 2003-09-25(g)

Regarding the element of “knowing possession of a firearm” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), such possession may be either actual or constructive.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Pannell · filed 2003-10-09(g)

Possession may be actual or constructive. ... Our review of the evidence in this case con- vinces us that the evidence was sufficient to establish Pannell’s know- ing possession of the marijuana and the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession of ammunition in a jointly occupied home when evidence supports a plausible inference that the defendant knew of and had access to it.

United States v. Hinojosa · filed 2003-11-19(g)(1)

Thus, in cases of joint occupancy, we will find constructive possession only when there is “some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to” the illegal item. ... Therefore, viewing the evidence in favor of the verdict, the evidence presented at trial supports a plausible inference that Hinojosa had knowledge of, and access to, the ammunition.

An indictment charging a felon with firearm possession need not specify whether the possession was actual or constructive.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2003-11-20(g)(1)

Mr. Bryant's indictment stated simply that he possessed a firearm without any qualification as to whether the possession was actual or constructive. ... Neither the prosecutor nor the district court by its supplemental instruction altered the essential elements of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, which was the charge that appeared in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon’s possession of a firearm to be established through evidence supporting a plausible inference that the felon knew of and could access it.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2003-11-24(g)(1)

The Government presented evidence, including Coleman’s admission that weapons were inside the car, supporting at least a plausible inference that Coleman had knowledge of and access to the firearms in question.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be satisfied by actual, constructive, or joint possession.

United States v. Hardin · filed 2003-12-19(g)(1)

On a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a showing of actual, constructive or joint possession is sufficient to establish the possession element.

Section 922(g)(1) permits an inference of constructive possession in a shared home when the defendant knows of and has access to the firearms; ownership or intent to exercise control is unnecessary.

United States v. Colonna · filed 2004-02-09(g)(1)

“Possession” under § 922(g)(1) includes both actual and constructive possession. ... Under Tenth Circuit precedent, where the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowledge of and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer dominion or control. See Mills, 29 F.3d at 550. It is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to exercise that dominion or control, nor is it necessary to show that the defendant actually owned the weapons–mere possession is enough.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon’s constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. DeCarlo · filed 2004-02-13(g)(1)

Moreover, DeCarlo’s own testimony before the jury was sufficient to establish that he constructively possessed the firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm, directly or through others.

United States v. Williams · filed 2004-03-24(g)(1)

Moreover, the above evidence is adequate for the jury to find constructive possession, i.e., that Williams knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the rifle, either directly or through others.

Section 922(g) requires more than mere proximity to a firearm to establish constructive possession.

United States v. Motley · filed 2004-04-01(g)

Motley’s mere proximity to the firearm does not, without more, constitute probative evidence that he was in constructive possession of the weapon.

Constructive possession of a firearm can satisfy § 922(g)(1), but mere proximity alone cannot establish possession.

United States v. Miller · filed 2004-04-02(g)(1)

While mere proximity to contraband is not adequate to establish possession, see United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1984), there was ample evidence in addition to proximity supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Miller constructively possessed the drugs and firearms at issue.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Maxwell · filed 2004-04-14(g)(1)

We hold that ample evidence exists to support a finding that Maxwell had constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a firearm possession conviction based on constructive or joint possession.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2004-04-26(g)(1)

A conviction for violating § 922(g) may be based on constructive or joint possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g) allows a firearm possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant controls premises where a firearm and drugs are found.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2004-04-27(g)

Proof that a person has domain over premises is sufficient to establish constructive possession of a firearm where witnesses testified that the person was at the location where drugs were distributed, and a firearm and the drugs were found at the location.

Section 922(g)(1) permits constructive possession of a firearm to be proved by circumstantial evidence, including control over the premises where the firearm was found.

United States v. Kimbrough · filed 2004-06-15(g)(1)

As we noted earlier in this opinion, constructive possession may be shown by means of circumstantial evidence, including proof that a defendant had control over the premises in which the firearm was located.

A felon may constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) when evidence supports an inference that he knew of and had access to it, even in a jointly occupied home.

United States v. Labuff · filed 2004-06-16(g)(1)

This was sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine that La-Buff had knowledge of and access to the weapon. ... Therefore, we affirm LaBuffs conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

For a felon-in-possession offense under § 922(g), constructive possession of a firearm does not require control of the premises where it is found.

United States v. Lopez · filed 2004-06-23(g)

Control or dominion over the premises where the item is found is therefore a factor, Parrish, 925 F.2d at 1296, but not a requirement, for finding constructive possession of the item itself.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows the gun is present and intends to exercise dominion and control over it.

United States v. Sabetta · filed 2004-06-24(g)

The jury, as the finder of fact, was required to determine whether the defendant knew that a gun was in the glove compartment and whether the defendant had the intention to exercise dominion and control over the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by a shotgun found in plain view in a home the defendant occupies, even if others also live there.

United States v. Ashlock · filed 2004-08-03(g)(1)

Moreover, although Ashlock implies that he was not the sole inhabitant of the house where the guns were seized, the government’s evidence that the shotgun was found in plain view by the back door of the house is legally sufficient to sustain the charge under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) covers a felon's constructive joint possession of firearms when the evidence supports shared control over them.

United States v. Payne · filed 2004-08-05(g)

At a minimum, the close personal relationship between Payne and Eason and their joint undertakings provided sufficient evidence of constructive joint possession of the guns in the console.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of and had access to the firearm.

United States v. Tate · filed 2004-08-11(g)(1)

Considering the evidence in its totality and keeping the standard of review in mind, the evidence presented in this case could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The possession element of § 922(g)(1) can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Sullivan · filed 2004-08-23(g)(1)

Both constructive and actual possession of a gun satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Under § 922(g)(1), dominion over the premises where a firearm is found can establish constructive possession of the firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 2004-09-17(g)(1)

When a defendant has dominion over the premises in which the firearm is located, that fact can suffice to prove that the defendant had control over the firearm.

Section 922(g) permits a felon’s firearm possession to be proved through circumstantial evidence of constructive joint possession.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, — v. LONNIE DWAYNE PAYNE, — · filed 2004-09-21(g)

At a minimum, the close personal relationship between Payne and Eason and their joint undertakings provided sufficient evidence of constructive joint possession of the guns in the console.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require ownership of a firearm to prove constructive possession.

United States v. Liranzo · filed 2004-09-30(g)(1)

Constructive possession for § 922(g) purposes does not require ownership of the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows of the firearm and has dominion and control over it.

United States v. Dill · filed 2004-11-02(g)(1)

The Government is not required to prove that Dill had actual possession of the contraband, merely that he had constructive possession. United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993). Constructive possession requires that the Government show that an individual had both dominion and control over an object and knew about that object’s existence. Id. Here, the government provided evidence at trial to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Dill had both dominion and control over the weapon and narcotics.

A person may constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) even if it is not readily accessible at the time of arrest.

United States v. Norman · filed 2004-11-09(g)(1)

While the accessibility of the weapon may be a factor to consider, a defendant may constructively possess a weapon under § 922(g)(1) even though that weapon is not readily accessible at the time of arrest.

Section 922(g) covers a felon’s constructive possession of a firearm when the felon has the power and intention to exercise control over it.

United States v. Washington · filed 2004-11-16(g)

Even if they were not in his immediate control (because they were in the trunk of Kenneth Hill’s car), the evidence strongly suggested that Washington had the power and intention, upon his arrival in Chicago, to exercise dominion and control over those three guns. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Washington possessed at least three of the unlawfully acquired guns, if not actually, then constructively.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a firearm is visible and accessible to the defendant.

United States v. Horne · filed 2004-11-23(g)

The weapon was visible and accessible to him from the driver’s seat. Horne therefore had constructive possession of the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires more than mere presence in a room with a firearm to establish constructive possession.

United States v. Gilbert, Stanley · filed 2004-12-09(g)(1)

Gilbert’s mere presence in the room, however, without more, would not be enough to establish constructive possession.

Mere presence in a room containing a firearm, without more, does not establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Gilbert · filed 2004-12-09(g)(1)

Gilbert’s mere presence in the room, however, without more, would not be enough to establish constructive possession.

Section 922(g) permits a conviction based on either actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Barnett · filed 2005-02-16(g)

It is well-established that actual or constructive possession of a firearm is sufficient to give rise to liability under section 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s possession element does not support a constructive-possession instruction when the government presents evidence only of actual possession.

United States v. Bowman · filed 2005-03-17(g)

A district court should not give a constructive-possession instruction where the government presents evidence only of actual possession.

Section 922(g) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly has the power and intent to control the firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Echevarria · filed 2005-03-30(g)

Viewing the record from this perspective, we are convinced that substantial evidence existed that Echevarria constructively possessed the contraband. ... On the basis of this evidence, a rational jury could conclude that Echevarria “knowingly ha[d] both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over [the contraband], either directly or through another person or persons.”

Section 922(g) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of ammunition.

United States v. Pittman · filed 2005-04-13(g)

Criminal liability under 28 U.S.C. § 922(g) may be found based on either actual or constructive possession. ... Examining the record under the prescribed standard of review, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession, but in a jointly occupied home, control of the premises alone is insufficient without evidence linking the defendant to a firearm.

United States v. Vanhook · filed 2005-05-04(g)(1)

Because the firearms in this case were found in a home where three people resided, this is a joint occupancy case. Therefore, the mere fact Vanhook may have had control over the premises where the firearms were found is insufficient to establish his constructive possession of them. Consequently, the government was required to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, some connection or nexus individually linking Vanhook to at least one of the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of knowing firearm possession through constructive possession when evidence links the defendant to the firearms and the residence where they were found.

United States v. Booker · filed 2005-05-12(g)(1)

Therefore, unlike the facts in Pedro, the government established evidence linking Booker to the firearms and more than “mere presence” in the vicinity of them.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows of the gun and has the power and intention to control it.

United States v. Herring · filed 2005-05-17(g)(1)

Even accepting Herring’s theory that Harpchak owned the gun and brought it into the car, there was evidence that Herring knew of the gun’s existence. The jury rationally could have found that Herring knew the gun was under the driver’s seat and had the “power and intention” to hide or take it.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence establishes constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Patterson · filed 2005-06-15(g)(1)

Viewed as a whole, the evidence — including the fact that the car was purchased by and registered to Patterson and that it contained some items linking it to Patterson (including the airline tickets and receipts), Honore’s testimony that he simply moved the car at Patterson’s request and removed some items from the front, while unaware of a rear compartment, and the expert witness’s testimony that it is rare to recover usable fingerprints from firearms — was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Patterson had constructive possession of the firearm located in the car.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm; presence near a gun alone does not establish constructive possession without evidence of knowledge or control.

United States v. Arnold · filed 2005-06-21(g)(1)

With no evidence of Arnold’s knowledge of the gun’s location and no evidence that he exercised dominion or control over the vehicle in which it was found, no rational trier of fact could find Arnold guilty of constructively possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g) does not require a defendant to own the firearm to be convicted of possessing it.

United States v. Barnard · filed 2005-06-14(g)

A conviction under § 922(g), however, does not require proof of ownership of the firearms in question.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant dropped the recovered gun.

United States v. Light · filed 2005-06-20(g)(1)

Despite the absence of a direct observation of Light possessing the gun, we conclude it was a reasonable inference that the unidentified object the officers saw Light drop at the northwest corner of Winslow’s was the gun Cohen recovered there approximately three to eight minutes later.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2005-06-29(g)

And while Defendant was not physically holding the firearms when he was apprehended, he constructively possessed the guns for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) is supported when the evidence permits a reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon.

United States v. Valenciano · filed 2005-02-01(g)(1)

A review of the trial record under these standards establishes that the evidence set forth by the government was more than sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Mr. Valenciano guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

A § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction is supported by evidence that the defendant owned the firearm, had a prior felony conviction, and the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Quinn · filed 2005-02-07(g)(1)

We conclude that the trial evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, amply supports the jury’s guilty verdict. Quinn admitted at both the house and the police station that the military rifle described in the indictment was his. He stipulated at trial that he was a convicted felon, and that the rifle had traveled in and affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through actual or constructive possession, whether sole or joint.

United States v. Demarko S. Walker · filed 2005-01-13(g)(1)

The government could prove Walker knowingly possessed the firearm if he had actual or constructive possession of the firearm, and possession of the firearm could ... have been sole or joint.

Under § 922(g)(1), an admission that the defendant found and took a firearm, together with its presence in his home, can sufficiently prove knowing possession.

United States v. Branch · filed 2005-01-20(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, Branch’s admission, coupled with evidence of the firearm’s presence in his home, is legally sufficient to support his conviction.

Possession under § 922(g)(1), (g)(3), and (j) may be actual or constructive; evidence connecting the defendant to the firearms can support a conviction.

United States v. Howard · filed 2005-01-05(g)(1), (g)(3), (j)

Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, this court finds that a reasonable juror would not have reasonable doubt as to Howard's possession of the shotguns. Possession may be actual or constructive. ... The government sufficiently connected Howard with the stolen guns. The district court properly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Sharbutt · filed 2005-01-05(g)(1)

In this case, the government was required to prove Mr. Sharbutt knowingly possessed a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and in so doing, had to counter Mr. Sharbutt’s defense argument and evidence he did not possess the gun; he did not live, stay or reside in the house where the gun was found; and that several other individuals either lived in, or had access or keys to the house.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by direct testimony that the defendant possessed a firearm reasonably near the time specified in the indictment.

United States v. Martinez · filed 2004-12-08(g)(1)

The direct testimony of Martinez’s ex-girlfriend suffices to establish possession “reasonably near” the time specified in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm.

United States v. Bazan · filed 2004-12-02(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and giving the Government the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility choices, the record is not devoid of evidence that Bazan knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession requirement can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Jesse Wright, Jr. · filed 2004-12-08(g)(1)

The government need not prove actual possession in order to fulfill the “knowing” requirement of § 922(g)(1). Rather, it may be shown through constructive possession.

Evidence that a defendant had and moved a firearm, together with proof of a prior felony conviction, can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Broadie · filed 2004-11-24(g)(1)

Here, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict, including Broadie’s own trial testimony in which he admitted the shotgun was in his apartment and further admitted that he moved it. ... Additional evidence established that Broadie was a convicted felon. We find this evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms, but ownership alone does not violate it.

United States v. Yeley · filed 2004-10-27(g)(1)

It is possession, not ownership, of firearms that is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)’s knowing-possession element can be proved through testimony that the defendant carried and discarded a firearm and through the defendant’s admission.

United States v. Kennedy · filed 2004-08-13(g)

Furthermore, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence shows that Kennedy knowingly possessed the firearm. Witnesses testified that a chase occurred, an object was thrown onto the roof, and a pistol was retrieved. Kennedy himself signed a statement, admitting that he was running with a gun.

Section 922(g) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when the defendant exercised dominion and control over firearms and ammunition, had a prior felony conviction, and the items traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Abdelhay · filed 2004-08-11(g)

Abdelhay stipulated at trial that he had been convicted of a felony and that the firearm and ammunition in question had traveled in interstate commerce. In addition, there was evidence establishing that Abdelhay exercised dominion and control over the firearms and ammunition found at his place of employment. Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence at trial to find Abdelhay guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

Evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed firearms was sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Cannon · filed 2004-07-09(g)(1)

We conclude that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient evidence that Cannon knowingly possessed both firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be established by evidence of dominion or control over the firearm or the vehicle in which it is found.

United States v. Shamblin · filed 2004-06-17(g)(1)

In order to establish possession, “the government must produce evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle in which contraband is concealed.” ... Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the government, a reasonable juror could have found that Shamblin exercised dominion and control over the truck in which the gun and ammunition were found.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally possessed the firearm.

United States v. Carroll · filed 2004-06-15(g)(1)

In order to prove a § 922(g) violation, the Government had to show that Carroll voluntarily and intentionally possessed the firearms.* ... Our de novo review of the trial transcript leads us to conclude that the evidence established that Carroll possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant stole the firearm.

United States v. Stewart · filed 2004-06-08(g)(1)

Although circumstantial, this evidence is clearly sufficient to support a jury’s finding that Stewart was the one who stole — and therefore possessed— the firearm in question.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of possession even if someone else owns the firearm, when the defendant knowingly possesses it jointly.

United States v. Smith · filed 2004-05-19(g)(1)

The joint possession instruction took into account the situation where the jury could believe that in fact Ealey was the owner of the gun, as defense counsel argued, but could also believe that Smith had some involvement in possessing it. Accordingly, we find no error in the giving of the instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's constructive possession of a firearm, and even brief physical possession counts.

United States v. Coles · filed 2004-05-03(g)(1)

Moreover, counsel correctly recognizes that it mattered not that Coles held the four guns only briefly before he was arrested; Coles had constructive possession even before he took the bags, ... and in any event “fleeting” possession is still possession, United States v. Lane, 267 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Barela · filed 2004-04-29(g)(1)

The jury then found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant “possessed” a firearm. Our study of the record convinces us that there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

Evidence that a felon kept firearms at home for protection, knew the combination to a safe containing firearms, and had his wallet in the same room supports knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. McCall · filed 2004-03-24(g)(1)

We also reject McCall’s argument that there was insufficient evidence he had knowingly possessed firearms. According to trial testimony, McCall advised the police he had the firearms in the home for protection, and he indicated “he stayed in” the room where the firearms were found. McCall also knew the combination to a safe that contained two loaded firearms, and the police found his wallet in the same room as the firearms.

Evidence supports the knowing possession element of § 922(g)(1) when a rational factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2004-02-20(g)(1)

We find the Government presented sufficient evi- dence from which a rational factfinder could conclude that Campbell knowingly possessed the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

“[P]ossession may be actual or constructive.” ... The evidence submitted at trial was more than sufficient to prove Coleman’s knowing possession of the firearms.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction is supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s nexus with interstate commerce.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2003-04-24(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson had been convicted of a felony and that he was in possession of a firearm that had a nexus with interstate commerce.

A stipulation to prior felony convictions and witness testimony that the defendant possessed a firearm can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Burnett · filed 2003-03-27(g)(1)

We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Burnett stipulated to having one or more earlier felony convictions, and police officers and another witness testified Burnett possessed a firearm on June 1.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction is supported by evidence that a felon possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Love · filed 2003-03-27(g)(1)

Here, any such challenge would be frivolous as sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Love was a felon who possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

Evidence sufficient to prove knowing firearm possession by a felon supports a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Perry · filed 2003-04-02(g)(1)

Charles A. Perry appeals his conviction and sentence for knowingly possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). ... We have reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the ... parties and hold that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Perry’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession requirement can be satisfied by constructive possession of ammunition.

United States v. Rhodes · filed 2003-03-27(g)(1)

Thus, under the constructive possession standard articulated above, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Rhodes knowingly possessed the 9 mm ammunition in Count 1.

Evidence of a prior felony conviction and firearm possession supported the conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Morgan · filed 2002-01-30(g)(1)

Mr. Morgan also testified about his prior felony conviction and that he indeed pleaded guilty and possessed firearms. Without restating all of the evidence adduced at trial, we simply note that the evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is more than sufficient to support Mr. Morgan’s conviction.

Section 922(g)'s possession element is satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Cribbs · filed 2002-01-02(g)

The district court did not err in finding that Cribbs was in constructive possession of the firearms that were the subject of count 1. “Both actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).”

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm; evidence that the gun was found in Brown’s jacket was sufficient to prove possession.

United States v. Carnell Brown, Cross-Appellee · filed 2001-12-07(g)

Carnell Brown appeals his conviction on a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), but his appeal has little merit. ... Brown also makes a half-hearted attack on the sufficiency of the evidence against him, but once the gun was received, any attempt to claim — as Brown did to the jury — that he didn’t “knowingly” possess it was feeble. The evidence was clearly sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be supported by evidence that the defendant was aware of a firearm in his car.

United States v. Ochoa · filed 2001-11-27(g)(1)

That testimony was sufficient to support an inference by the jury that Mr. Ochoa was aware of the firearm in the glove compartment of his car.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can be supported by a firearm found in the defendant’s home and testimony that he possessed firearms.

United States v. Bolden · filed 2001-11-21(g)(1)

Likewise, the government produced a firearm found during the search of defendant’s chest of drawers. Although defendant denied any knowledge of the weapon, one witness testified that he traded a .380 handgun, which he specifically identified as the handgun in evidence, to defendant for crack cocaine. Another witness testified she had seen defendant with a pistol on numerous occasions, and that she had personally traded other guns to defendant for crack cocaine. ... We therefore conclude, after a thorough review of the record, that the evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each of the eight counts.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of a firearm by a felon even if the firearm belongs to someone else.

United States v. Scott · filed 2001-10-30(g)(1)

Mr. Scott’s refutation of ownership of the firearm does not preclude the conviction for illegal possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon's knowing holding of a firearm as possession, including when the felon holds it to inspect it.

United States v. Lane, Donald K. · filed 2001-10-03(g)(1)

For the reasons above, we find that holding a firearm establishes possession as a matter of law in the context of a charge under 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1) and that neither of the district court’s challenged rulings were erroneous.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms or ammunition; items kept at the person's home can support a finding of possession.

United States v. Posival · filed 2001-04-30(g)(1)

That Posival “possessed” the ammunition found in plain view throughout his home, as well as the shotguns kept at his home which he referred to as “my shotgun” and “my other shotgun” in his pretrial statement, is also amply supported by the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of the location or exact address where firearm possession occurred.

United States v. Teague · filed 2001-04-26(g)(1)

None of the various charges mandate proof of the location, much less the exact address, where the alleged possession and manufacturing occurred. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c).

Evidence that a defendant was a convicted felon, was seen discarding a firearm, and left a fingerprint on it was sufficient to support a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Horton · filed 2001-02-20(g)(1)

The Government presented evidence establishing that Horton was a convicted felon, a police officer saw him throw a fire- arm while running from law enforcement officers, and the firearm recovered from the scene contained Horton’s fingerprint. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find this was sufficient to convict Horton.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon’s possession of a firearm to be proved through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Phillips, Jarrode E. · filed 2001-02-01(g)(1)

The only element at issue is Phillips’ "possession" of a firearm. Possession may be demonstrated by either actual or constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual control of a firearm or by constructive possession inferred from a defendant's ability to control it.

United States v. Phillips · filed 2001-02-01(g)(1)

In fact, the government presented sufficient evidence to show both actual and constructive possession of firearms located at 303 LaPorte. Phillips had direct control of the Taurus handgun found under the cushion next to him on the sofa. He had constructive possession of the other firearms in the sense that he had been observed at the house during the week of the raid and he was a higher- ranking member of Dawg Life at a Dawg Life crack house.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved through credible eyewitness testimony and corroborating circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2000-09-14(g)(1)

There certainly was enough evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the Government had proved Matthews possessed the firearms described in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by eyewitness testimony that the defendant held and fired a gun.

United States v. McKissick · filed 2000-02-24(g)(1)

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude it was substantial and sufficient to overcome a motion for acquittal and to allow a reasonable jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. McKissick was a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of felony status, firearm possession, and an interstate connection, which out-of-state manufacture can establish.

United States v. Hart · filed 2000-01-06(g)(1)

Having reviewed the record, we conclude the government met its burden of proof. Specifically, Hart stipulated to his status as a convicted felon, three eyewitnesses testified they saw him possess a gun and fire shots at an individual, and a law enforcement official testified Hart's gun and ammunition were not manufactured in North Dakota.

Section 922(g) imposes liability for even momentary firearm possession by a felon who knows the object is a firearm and has no legal justification for holding it.

United States v. Adkins · filed 1999-11-12(g)

Thus, even if a felon held a firearm for a mere second or two, unless that felon truly did not know that what he possessed was a firearm or there was some recognized legal justification for his holding the firearm, § 922(g) will still impose criminal liability.

Evidence that guns were found among a felon’s belongings in his home, together with a bullet-proof vest that fit him, was sufficient to support a finding that he knowingly possessed the guns under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Hopson · filed 1999-07-01(g)(1)

The police found the guns among Hopson’s things, in Hopson’s home (viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government), together with a bullet-proof vest that fit Hopson to a T. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g) permits a felon’s possession of firearms to be established by testimony that he kept the guns and handed them out for robberies.

United States v. Quintus Smith · filed 1999-06-28(g)

However, there was considerable testimony that Smith kept the weapons and handed them out for robberies, in light of which a rational jury might find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith possessed the guns. The district court did not err when it allowed the jury verdict to stand with respect to the § 922(g) charge.

Under § 922(g), ownership of a gun and knowledge of it earlier in the day are irrelevant to knowing possession when the gun is in plain view at the time of possession.

United States v. Harvey · filed 1999-05-28(g)

In light of the evidence adduced at trial showing that the gun was in plain view on the car seat at the time the officers approached Harvey, whether Harvey owned the car or knew the gun was in the car earlier in the day was not relevant to the issue of whether he knowingly possessed the gun in violation of § 922(g).

Evidence of a 911 gun identification, mail near one handgun, and admissions about buying and hiding another handgun can support a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Blanche · filed 1998-07-23(g)(1)

Here, the proof adduced by the government included (1) the taped 911 call made by Shawana accusing appellant of assault, identifying appellant, and describing the gun ultimately found in the basement, (2) mail addressed to appellant found in the same room where the Lorein handgun was found, (3) appellant’s admission that Slayden purchased the Ruger pistol for him, and (4) appellant’s admission that he placed the Ruger pistol in the ceiling rafters in the basement. ... Wé hold that this' evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove knowing possession of a firearm.

United States v. Ramsey · filed 1998-07-02(g)(1)

To prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government was required to show Mr. Ramsey’s knowing possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to find firearm possession from witness evidence and the defendant’s admissions that a gun was purchased for him and that he hid it.

United States v. Blanche · filed 1998-06-23(g)(1)

Here, the proof adduced by the government included (1) the taped 911 call made by Shawana accusing appellant of assault, identifying appellant, and describing the gun ultimately found in the basement, (2) mail addressed to appellant found in the same room where the Lorcin handgun was found, (3) appellant’s admission that Slayden purchased the Ruger pistol for him, and (4) appellant’s admission that he placed the Ruger pistol in the ceiling rafters in the basement.10 We hold that this evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm; testimony that the defendant bought a gun and directed where it was stored can support a conviction.

United States v. Bull · filed 1998-05-20(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to support Dodson's convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. There was a stipulation that Dodson was a convicted felon and that the firearm in question, an AK-47, was manufactured outside Virginia. Page testified that he saw Dodson purchase the weapon, which subsequently was stored, at Dodson's direction, in various locations.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence establishes every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Hutchinson · filed 1998-05-29(g)(1)

We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties and hold that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Hutchin- son guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and posses- sion with the intent to distribute heroin. ... At trial, the defendant stipulated that he was a convicted felon and that the firearms had pre- viously been transported in interstate commerce. The facts clearly establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) is supported when the evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Sain · filed 1998-05-04(g)(1)

The evidence, in our view, supports the jury’s determination that Sain knowingly possessed a firearm on November 5, 1996.

A qualifying prior conviction, testimony that the defendant possessed a gun, and evidence that the gun was manufactured in another state can satisfy the government's burden under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Crafton · filed 1998-04-15(g)(1)

At trial, Crafton stipulated he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; a number of witnesses testified they observed Crafton holding a gun one evening during a scuffle at an Arkansas bar; and the bar owner testified he took the gun from Crafton and gave it to the police. In addition, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms testified that the gun had been manufactured in Massachusetts. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the government met its burden of proof.

A defendant's admission that a gun was his, together with stipulations to his felony conviction and the gun's statutory coverage, is sufficient evidence for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Cunningham · filed 1998-05-05(g)(1)

Following a bench trial, Eric Cunningham was convicted of possessing a firearm despite a felony conviction that made such possession unlawful, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 67 months' imprisonment. ... At trial the parties stipulated that Cunningham had a felony conviction and that the gun was among the weapons proscribed by statute. ... Cunningham essentially confessed to the crime by telling an officer that the gun was his; a rational trier of fact could find the evidence sufficient.