18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when a driver has sufficient control over a firearm in the vehicle’s glove compartment.

United States v. Player · filed 2006-10-16(g)(1)

Applying the logic of Birmley, Player had sufficient control over the firearm located in the glove compartment to be convicted pursuant to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon’s firearm possession to be proved through dominion and control over the residence where the firearm was found.

United States v. Arnold · filed 2006-10-16(g)(1)

Arnold’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him on Count 2 (possession of a firearm by a felon) recapitulates much of what he argued as to Count 1, namely that he did not have dominion and control over the residence. We reject this argument for the reasons cited above.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to infer a felon’s constructive possession of a firearm from sufficient circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Bellinger · filed 2006-11-08(g)(1)

Although there is no direct evidence that Bellinger knew of or had control and dominion over the Beretta, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government established that a jury could have reasonably inferred that Bellinger put it underneath his seat.

In a shared home, constructive possession under § 922(g)(1) requires evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm, including knowledge of and access to it.

United States v. Jimenez · filed 2006-11-09(g)(1)

When two or more people occupy a given space, however, the government must present additional evidence “to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or contraband.”

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon.

United States v. Adewani, Wale · filed 2006-11-14(g)(1)

Considering this record evidence “in the light most favorable to the government,” we find that a “rational trier of fact could have found” that Adewani constructively possessed the handgun and its complement of ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires sufficient evidence that a convicted felon possessed a firearm for a conviction.

United States v. Jefferson · filed 2006-11-22(g)(1)

We have repeatedly held there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for felon in possession where a gun was immediately recovered from the location where the defendant was observed dropping something.

Section 922(g)(1) allows the government to prove a felon possessed a firearm through either actual, knowing possession or constructive possession.

United States v. Waterbury · filed 2006-11-29(g)(1)

To prove that a felon illegally possessed a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must show either (1) actual, knowing possession of a firearm, or (2) constructive possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by showing control over the place where a firearm was located or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.

United States v. Guenther · filed 2006-12-07(g)(1)

Constructive possession of a firearm is established if Guenther had control over the place where the firearm was located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.

Testimony that a felon took guns after their purchase can establish knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Bowen, Shawn · filed 2006-12-12(g)(1)

The record is hardly “devoid of evidence” on this point: Schlemmer testified that Bowen urged her to buy the guns for him and took them from her as soon as they left the store. That testimony alone is enough to render frivolous any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Bowen’s conviction for possession.

Section 922(g) allows knowing possession to be proved through constructive possession supported by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Carpenter · filed 2006-12-26(g)

A conviction for a violation of § 922(g) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) the defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm; and (3) the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. ... A defendant has constructive possession if he “exercises ownership, dominion, or control over the item or has the power and intent to exercise dominion or control.” ... Here, the government presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Carpenter possessed the pistol and the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence shows that the defendant knowingly had the power and intention to control a firearm.

United States v. Ferguson · filed 2006-12-27(g)(1)

The jury reasonably could have inferred from the location of the firearm and Ferguson’s continued hand movements toward the center console that Ferguson had both the power and intention to later take control over the firearm, and that Ferguson voluntarily and intentionally had the firearm in the SUV with him.

A felon may constructively possess a firearm through ownership, dominion, or control over it.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2006-12-27(g)

Like constructive possession of drugs, the government can establish constructive possession of a firearm by proving “ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm.” Molina, 443 F.3d at 830 (citing United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1974) (internal quotations omitted). ... Because all of the evidence, including the inferences the jury could draw from Thompson’s testimony, was sufficient to convict him on the Oglethorpe Avenue drug and firearms counts, the district court did not err in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.

A defendant’s admission that he placed firearms in his bedroom can support the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Russo, Joseph N. · filed 2006-12-18(g)(1)

The only issue at trial was whether Russo possessed the firearms, and Russo told the police early on that he had personally placed the weapons in his spare bedroom. Therefore, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conviction and it will not be overturned.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Walker · filed 2006-12-18(g)(1)

Knowing possession of a firearm, however, is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and Walker placed his knowledge of the firearm’s presence in the headboard of the bed at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A jury may find knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) when a gun is found in a truck the defendant regularly drove, even if other evidence suggests he did not know it was there.

United States v. Mayes · filed 2006-12-29(g)(1)

Although there was other evidence presented permitting the conclusion that Mayes did not normally drive the truck, did not know his mother owned the gun, and did not know that the gun had been placed in the truck before he drove it, a reasonable juror could have also determined Mayes knew the gun was in the truck that he regularly drove.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession of a firearm by a felon; proximity to the firearm coupled with furtive gestures can establish possession.

United States v. Herrion · filed 2007-01-04(g)(1)

Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The only issue in dispute was whether appellant constructively possessed the firearm. Appellant’s proximity to the firearm, coupled with his furtive gestures, were sufficient to establish that he constructively possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. McCarty · filed 2007-01-09(g)(1)

This was sufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that McCarty constructively possessed the gun and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly has the ability and intent to control the firearm or the area where it is located.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2007-01-11(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that Robinson constructively possessed the firearms found in the engine compartment. ... All that is necessary is that the defendant knowingly have the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control of the firearm or area where it is located.

Under § 922(g)(1), mere proximity to a firearm does not establish constructive possession, but a jury may infer control when the gun protrudes in plain view from beneath the defendant's seat.

United States v. Bradley · filed 2007-01-11(g)(1)

Although mere physical proximity is insufficient to establish constructive possession, the jury could find that Bradley had control over the firearm since it was seized from a location immediately below his seat where it was found protruding from underneath in plain view.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction may rest on constructive possession when the evidence shows the defendant exercised dominion and control over the firearms.

United States v. Powell · filed 2007-02-01(g)(1)

We reject Powell’s arguments that the testimony reviewed above is insufficient to prove that he exercised dominion and control over the firearms located in the house.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on knowing constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2007-02-05(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolving all evidentiary conflicts in the government’s favor, we hold a reasonable jury could have concluded Johnson constructively possessed the firearm.

Evidence of a tossing motion followed by the immediate recovery of a gun nearby can establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Eskridge · filed 2007-02-28(g)(1)

Moreover, the Government produced police testimony establishing the police saw Eskridge walking, witnessed him make a tossing motion, heard a loud thump, and immediately recovered a gun in the vicinity Eskridge made the tossing motion. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to establish Eskridge constructively possessed the firearm recovered by police.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of actual possession or a nexus between the defendant and the firearm to establish constructive possession in a jointly occupied area.

United States v. Jameson · filed 2007-03-01(g)(1)

To be clear, when the government seeks to convict a defendant under § 922(g)(1), and the firearm was found in an area occupied by two or more persons, it must prove either (1) actual possession, or (2) constructive possession by w ay of demonstrating a nexus between the defendant and the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits constructive possession of ammunition to be inferred from a defendant’s residence in the home where it is found.

United States v. Brannon, Sean · filed 2007-03-07(g)(1)

But neither is a § 922(g) case, and, as discussed above, it is well-established that a defendant’s residency in the home where the firearms or ammunition are found constitutes sufficient evidence of constructive possession in the § 922(g) context.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction of a convicted felon who constructively possesses a firearm.

United States v. Ramsey · filed 2007-03-28(g)(1)

And, in any event, the record demonstrates that Miller is a convicted felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and that, as described above, she constructively possessed firearms. Constructive possession is sufficient for conviction under that statute.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved through constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Gilliam · filed 2007-04-03(g)(1)

The gun in question was found where Gilliam was seated in the car. He therefore had the power to exercise dominion and control over it.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing ammunition, including through constructive possession.

United States v. Perotti · filed 2007-04-05(g)(1)

Here the evidence was more than sufficient to support a finding that Perotti had constructive possession of the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved through constructive possession when testimony shows that the defendant possessed and used a gun later found with another person.

United States v. Molina · filed 2007-04-09(g)(1)

In determining whether a person is in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1), the government may present evidence of either actual or constructive possession. ... Accordingly, Bergeron’s testimony that Defendant possessed and used the gun was sufficient such that a rational trier of fact could have found, as the jury did, that Defendant had constructive possession of the gun that was found in Bergeron’s purse.

Section 922(g)(1) and (k) allow possession to be established by evidence that a firearm was within the reach of a vehicle’s sole driver.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2007-04-20(g)(1), (k)

In addition to his statement to Steinbach that he possessed two firearms, Thomas, as the driver and sole occupant of the van in which the shotgun was found, was clearly in constructive possession of the shotgun, which was within his reach.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the firearm.

United States v. Clark · filed 2007-04-23(g)(1)

A review of the evidence indicates that it was sufficient for the district court to infer that Clark exercised dominion and control over the gun, and therefore, that he had constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant could control the firearm.

United States v. Horace · filed 2007-05-07(g)(1)

But, the jury was entitled to find that the evidence of Horace’s association with the car along with his concealment of a gun in the car raised an inference that he had the right to exercise some degree of control over the car.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by showing that the defendant knew the firearm was present and could exercise dominion and control over it.

United States v. Smith · filed 2007-05-14(g)(1)

The government can prove the possession element of § 922(g)(1) by showing that possession was constructive, see United States v. Carrasco, 257 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir.2001), which means the government had to show Smith was (1) aware of the gun’s presence and (2) that he could “exercise dominion and control over it.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession requirement may be satisfied by constructive possession when a person knows of a firearm and intends to exercise control over it.

United States v. Maxwell, Clifford R. · filed 2007-05-23(g)(1)

Here, as counsel acknowledges, there was ample evidence upon which the jury could find that Maxwell knew the shotguns were in his car and that he intended to exercise dominion and control over them, including the deputy’s testimony that the shotguns were plainly visible on the floorboard of the passenger seat, and the presence of shotgun shells in Maxwell’s coat pocket that matched the gauge of one of the shotguns.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Abdul-Aziz · filed 2007-05-29(g)(1)

Possession under § 922(g) may be either actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be established through ownership, dominion, or actual control over a firearm, or dominion over the place where it is found.

United States v. Hanson · filed 2007-06-07(g)(1)

We find the supplemental instruction given was an accurate, clear, and neutral statement of this circuit's view of constructive possession. See United States v. Urick, 431 F.3d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Constructive possession is established if a person has ownership, dominion, or actual control over the firearm itself or has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located.").

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that a defendant had access to the gun and acted evasively when police arrived.

United States v. Littlejohn, Andrew · filed 2007-06-19(g)

This is a close case, but given our deferential standard of review, we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. Contrary to Littlejohn’s claim, proximity to the weapon was not the government’s only evidence. According to trial testimony, after seeing several fully-uniformed Park Police officers on his doorstep, Littlejohn ran upstairs. Officer Adamchik then discovered Littlejohn exiting the very room in which the gun was recovered, and the weapon was hidden in an easily accessible location only a few feet inside the room.

A felon’s admission that he used a handgun for protection can support a finding of constructive possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Radosh · filed 2007-06-25(g)(1)

At trial, St. Louis Police Officers Martinous Walls and Matthew Wiedemann testified that, after they advised Radosh of his Miranda rights, he told them that most of the guns belonged to his deceased father, but he used the handgun found in the dresser for protection. This evidence, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to convict Radosh of constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) allows constructive possession to be inferred from knowledge of and access to firearms in a jointly occupied residence, without proof of intent to exercise dominion or control.

United States v. Watters · filed 2007-06-26(g)(1)

Tenth Circuit precedent requires only knowledge and access. It does not require an intent to exercise dominion or control.

Under § 922(g)(1), possession of the sole key to a storage space can establish knowing constructive possession of the firearms and ammunition inside.

United States v. Piwowar · filed 2007-07-05(g)(1)

So too here, we find his possession of the sole key to the refrigerator as being sufficient to prove knowing possession of the firearms and ammunition inside.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by proof that the defendant knowingly had the power and intention to control the ammunition.

United States v. McFarlane · filed 2007-07-12(g)(1)

The constructive possession instruction accurately described the elements required for a conviction under this theory. As they indicated, a conviction for constructive possession requires proof that a "person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion over an object . . . ." United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2006).

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Brown · filed 2007-08-14(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), “the government must prove that the defendant (1) has been convicted of a felony; (2) possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce; and (3) knew that he was in possession of the firearm.” ... The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Brown, at least constructively, knew he possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by joint constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Maxwell · filed 2007-08-17(g)(1)

This evidence is sufficient to establish Maxwell had constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when evidence permits a rational factfinder to find knowing control over a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Newland · filed 2007-08-22(g)(1)

In this case, there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Smart Jr. · filed 2007-09-06(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence to convict Smart of constructive possession of the Norinco .45 handgun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; constructive possession requires knowledge of the gun and the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Bethly · filed 2007-09-19(g)(1)

In other words, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Bethly had knowledge of the gun’s existence; (2) Bethly had the power to exercise dominion and control over the gun; and (3) Bethly had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the gun. ... Specifically, the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bethly had actual or constructive possession of the gun discovered in his vehicle.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a person intends and is able to gain actual possession of a firearm later.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2007-09-19(g)(1)

Both examples conveyed the instruction that constructive possession can be found where an individual did not have actual physical possession of an object but had the intention and ability to gain actual possession of it later.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can rest on evidence that the defendant controlled the locked room where firearms were found.

United States v. Christian · filed 2007-09-19(g)(1)

Based on witness testimony and physical evidence that Christian lived in, and controlled access to, the locked bedroom where firearms and materials bearing his name were found, the evidence was sufficient to support Christian’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's constructive possession of a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Roebuck · filed 2007-09-25(g)(1)

The facts of this case were sufficient to show that Roebuck had at least constructive possession of the Smith & Wesson and the .40 caliber ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element may be proved by evidence supporting an inference of constructive possession.

United States v. Greene · filed 2007-09-28(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Greene’s conviction. Witness testimony established Greene’s presence as the driver of the Ford truck minutes before the collision, and DNA evidence established Greene’s blood was on a rifle found in the truck after the collision. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Greene constructively possessed the firearm.

A fugitive can constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(2) by exercising dominion over the vehicle in which it is found.

United States v. Chisom · filed 2007-10-01(g)(2)

In this case, a rational juror could conclude that Chisom constructively possessed the loaded revolver found underneath the driver’s seat of the Cadillac when he was stopped on July 27, 2005.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant was near a firearm and had a connection to it.

United States v. Mackey · filed 2007-10-02(g)(1)

We accordingly reject Mackey’s arguments and conclude that the jury could have found that Mackey constructively possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)’s firearm-possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession, supported by control over the premises and a statement indicating ownership of the firearm.

United States v. Guillory · filed 2007-10-15(g)

There was evidence that Guillory had constructive possession of the shotgun. He had control and dominion over the house, he had spent the previous night at the house, he was there during the day of the arrest, and he made a statement indicating that the shotgun belonged to him, describing it as a “toy” that he had “picked up.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed the firearm identified in the indictment; possession of an unidentified gun at some earlier time is insufficient.

United States v. Grubbs · filed 2007-10-17(g)(1)

Furthermore, it is not enough that the defendant possessed a firearm at some unidentified point in the past; the evidence must prove that the defendant possessed the same handgun “identified in the indictment.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved through constructive possession when the evidence supports both knowledge of the firearm and control over the vehicle containing it.

United States v. Wooten · filed 2007-11-08(g)(1)

Therefore, construing the evidence in favor of the government, there was ample evidence from which the jury would find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wooten constructively possessed the shotgun. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by constructive possession, including evidence of knowledge of and access to a firearm.

United States v. Hanrahan · filed 2007-11-13(g)(1)

To establish this element, the Government must show the defendant actually or constructively possessed the firearm. ... Even under the most stringent instruction — the instruction pertaining to constructive possession in a joint-occupancy situation — there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Hanrahan knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon’s firearm possession to be proved by constructive possession: knowledge of the firearm and the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2007-12-10(g)(1)

Constructive possession is established when “a person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons.” ... This was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Wilson intended to exercise dominion and control over that weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s constructive possession of a firearm when the evidence sufficiently shows power and intent to control it.

United States v. Billman · filed 2007-12-14(g)(1)

Given the testimony that adults must supervise minors when hunting, Billman’s testimony that he accompanied his children during hunts, and the agent’s testimony that Berring stated Billman had possession of a key to the safe, the district court’s finding that there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession was not clearly erroneous.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through constructive possession, including evidence of unrestricted access to the premises where the firearm was found.

United States v. McCoy · filed 2007-12-18(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that McCoy constructively possessed the firearm. ... Accordingly, because a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that McCoy violated § 922(g), no miscarriage of justice occurred.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession shown by dominion and control over firearms.

United States v. Lesure · filed 2008-01-09(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict, we conclude that there was ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lesure was, at the very least, in constructive possession of multiple firearms at the time of his arrest in the motel room. Although he was not holding a firearm when the police entered the motel room, the government demonstrated that he exerted dominion and control over the firearms and ammunition through evidence that he had rented the motel room in which the contraband was seized, and that the book bag of firearms and ammunition were located “right next to him” when the police officers entered the room.

Possession under § 922(g)(1) and (g)(9) may be actual or constructive, sole or joint.

United States v. Alexander · filed 2008-02-05(g)(1), (g)(9)

To satisfy the statutes, “possession” of a weapon may be “either actual or constructive, sole or joint.” ... There was sufficient evidence to prove that Alexander was in possession of the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive firearm possession when a felon knows the firearm is present and has the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2008-02-19(g)(1)

Richardson argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that he possessed the firearm, a required element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Based on this evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Richardson had dominion and control over the firearm placed between his seat and the door and that he knew of its existence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2008-02-19(g)(1)

“Possession” within the meaning of § 922(g)(1) may be actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession even when another person also has access to the firearm.

United States v. Lowery · filed 2008-02-20(g)(1)

Yet, the fact that others also have access to a firearm does not preclude a finding of constructive possession. ... Based on that testimony, the fact that Lowery’s sister procured the gun, the U-Haul padlock on the bedroom door, and the evidence suggesting that Lowery slept on the side of the bed where the gun was hidden, a reasonable jury could have inferred that Lowery had constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied when a defendant instructs another person to use a firearm.

United States v. Staples · filed 2008-02-22(g)(1)

Evidence that a defendant instructed another to use a weapon amounts to constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a firearm possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence shows the defendant knowingly controlled the gun.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2008-03-10(g)(1)

Given Kelly’s substantial ties to the apartment and his own statement that the firearm and the “rocks” were his and not Washington’s, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Kelly possessed both the firearm and the cocaine.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the defendant constructively possesses a firearm by knowingly having the power and intention to control it.

United States v. Kelly, Vernell · filed 2008-03-10(g)(1)

Constructive possession exists when, although the object is not in the defendant’s actual possession, he knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the object.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through constructive possession when the defendant can take possession of a firearm or controls the vehicle containing it.

United States v. Horton · filed 2008-03-19(g)(1)

These facts alone would allow a jury to conclude that Horton had at least constructive possession of the firearm by virtue of his ability to take actual possession of it or his control over the car where it was located.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms; control over a residence can establish constructive possession of firearms found there.

United States v. Joseph Lee Holmes, Jr. · filed 2008-03-25(g)(1)

Although Holmes was not holding a weapon at the time of his arrest, his control over the Stone Street residence established his constructive possession of the firearms and his guilt for possession of a weapon as a felon.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a convicted felon constructively possessed firearms.

United States v. Cunningham · filed 2008-03-27(g)(1)

Accordingly, these facts support a finding that Cunningham, a convicted felon, had constructive possession of the shotguns found in his home on February 7, 2005.

Section 922(g)(1) allows firearm possession to be proved through constructive possession.

United States v. Galloway · filed 2008-04-17(g)(1)

At least with respect to the § 922(g)(1) offense and the 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) offense, each can be proven under the theory of constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) allows firearm possession to be proved by showing that the defendant intentionally and voluntarily controlled the firearm or had the power and intention to control it.

United States v. Crandle · filed 2008-04-22(g)(1)

If the Government seeks to prove constructive possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally and voluntarily “exercised dominion and control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon's firearm possession to be proved through constructive possession when the evidence shows knowledge of the firearm and dominion and control over it.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2008-04-25(g)(1)

Given this deferential standard of review, we hold that a reasonable jury could have concluded from the totality of the circumstances that Bryant exercised “dominion and control” over both firearms sufficient to support a conviction under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence establishes joint dominion and control over a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Fambro · filed 2008-05-02(g)

From these facts, a reasonable jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Fambro had joint dominion and control over the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which may be established through constructive possession.

United States v. Hawkins · filed 2008-05-22(g)(1)

One of the elements of a § 922(g) violation is the knowing possession of a firearm. ... Applying this deferential standard, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through constructive possession; when others share the location, proximity plus circumstantial evidence of knowledge and access can suffice.

United States v. Reed · filed 2008-05-28(g)(1)

Contrary to Reed’s argument, his statement to Siddons constituted the requisite “circumstantial indicium of possession”—the “something else . . . besides mere joint occupancy”—that, when taken together with the evidence of Reed’s proximity to and furtive movements toward the .357 revolver, sufficiently proved constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing possession requirement can be satisfied by constructive possession: the power and intent to control a firearm.

United States v. DeCologero · filed 2008-06-23(g)(1)

Knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) can be established by proving that the defendant had constructive possession of a firearm; that is, that he "knowingly ha[d] the power and the intention at a given time of exercising dominion and control over a firearm . . . , directly or through others." Id. at 1398 (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by control over the place where firearms are found, even when others have access to it.

United States v. Abumayyaleh · filed 2008-07-01(g)(1)

The location of the firearms in the office and Abumayyaleh’s control over the area were sufficient grounds to establish Abumayyaleh possessed the firearms, regardless of whether other people had access to the office.

The evidence was sufficient to prove knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Edmondson · filed 2008-07-02(g)(1)

Consequently, we hold that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Edmondson knowingly possessed the three firearms specified in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) allows constructive possession of a firearm to be established through dominion and control over the residence where it is found.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2008-07-03(g)(1)

With respect to the Johnsons’s § 922(g) convictions, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that both Isaac and Michelle had constructive possession over the firearms found in the apartment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm; proof of actual possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Rasberry · filed 2008-07-07(g)(1)

We also note that the government need not prove actual possession. Even in the absence of Ianule’s testimony, there is sufficient evidence that would have provided a basis for the jury to find constructive possession (e.g. the tape recording of appellant negotiating the sale price of the firearm with Ianule).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows of the firearm and has the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Bellinger · filed 2008-07-09(g)(1)

To prove constructive possession, the Government must have shown that Bellinger knew of the gun and had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which may be shown by dominion over the place where it is concealed.

United States v. Bloate · filed 2008-07-25(g)(1)

Bloate claims the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt his knowing possession of the firearms, a required element of § 922(g)(1), or his knowing possession of the cocaine, a required element of § 841(a)(1). ... Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, there was sufficient evidence of Bloate’s dominion over the bedroom where the firearms and cocaine were discovered.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by actual or constructive possession; others’ access to the premises does not require acquittal.

United States v. Iglesias · filed 2008-07-25(g)(1)

Possession is also an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). ... The jury could convict Iglesias of the possession charges if it concluded that he actually or constructively possessed the methamphetamine and the Taurus. ... The aforementioned facts far exceeded the minimum quantum of evidence necessary for the jury to find that Iglesias exercised dominion and control over Apartment A and its contents, and that he possessed the drugs and the Taurus firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction when the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant constructively possessed ammunition.

United States v. Weaver · filed 2008-07-28(g)(1)

This evidence, combined with the evidence Weaver had discharged a firearm before fleeing in the Durango, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine Weaver constructively possessed the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through constructive or joint possession; actual or exclusive possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Japanese Rifle, Serial No. 1270821 · filed 2008-08-14(g)(1)

The government need not prove “actual or exclusive possession” to establish a § 922(g) violation; rather, “constructive or joint possession is sufficient.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence shows that the defendant controlled the vehicle concealing the firearm and knew of its contents.

United States v. Branch · filed 2008-08-20(g)(1)

Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see id., these facts would allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Branch was in control of the Mercedes on October 29 and thereby constructively possessed the firearm concealed in the vehicle. Branch’s nervousness, lack of truthfulness, and the presence of drugs and cash also support a reasonable inference that Branch both exer- cised control over the car and was aware of its contents, including the firearm. Thus, we affirm Branch’s conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession when a defendant knowingly has the power and intent to control a firearm without physically holding it.

United States v. Mayberry · filed 2008-08-21(g)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to allow a jury to find that Peoples had constructive possession of a firearm at the time of his arrest.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm.

United States v. Peoples · filed 2008-08-21(g)(1)

Moreover, possession can be shown if Peoples had constructive possession of the firearms—that is, if he did not “have actual possession but instead knowingly ha[d] the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control” over the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Cook · filed 2008-08-28(g)(1)

Based on this evidence, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cook knowingly had the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the firearm and ammunition. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Cook constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) allows firearm possession to be proved through constructive possession, including joint control of a firearm.

United States v. Rogers · filed 2008-09-04(g)(1)

Second, the government presented ample evidence to prove that Rogers possessed both of the firearms found in the apartment, in violation of § 922(g)(1). ... Constructive possession is sufficient, and under that theory our case law requires only that a defendant knowingly have “the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on joint constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Rogers, Anthony L. · filed 2008-09-04(g)(1)

Also, constructive possession may be joint, see id., and here, the evidence of joint constructive possession of the firearms was substantial.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a convicted felon’s constructive possession of firearms.

United States v. Blanchard · filed 2008-09-08(g)(1)

And Marshall Jr.’s testimony, coupled with the seizure of the firearms from Blanchard’s Roberts residence, provided evidence of constructive possession of the porch firearms, in support of Count Two.

Section 922(g) includes constructive possession of a firearm when a felon has the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Porter · filed 2008-09-09(g)

A defendant possesses a firearm within the meaning of the felon in possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), when he actually possesses it or has constructive possession of it. ... There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Porter had constructive possession of the pistol found in his car when he was arrested.

Section 922(g)(1) allows constructive possession to be established through control of premises and evidence supporting a plausible inference that the defendant knew of and could access the firearms or ammunition.

United States v. McDaniel · filed 2008-09-10(g)(1)

This evidence supports a plausible inference that McDaniel had knowledge of and access to the guns and ammunition that the ATF agents found at 1500 Dewalt Avenue; he constructively possessed these items.

Under § 922(g)(1), evidence of a motive to possess a firearm, together with proximity to it and evasive conduct, can support a finding of constructive possession.

United States v. Castano · filed 2008-10-07(g)(1)

The above evidence demonstrated that Castano had a strong motive to possess a firearm to protect himself and his drugs during the planned drug transaction at the Norway Bar. Under these circumstances, we AFFIRM his § 922(g) conviction.

Section 922(g) bars a convicted felon from choosing who receives his seized firearms because directing their transfer amounts to constructive possession.

United States v. Approximately 627 Firearms, More or Less · filed 2008-10-22(g)

Hummel’s request that this Court permit him to assign or otherwise convey his ownership interest in any of the 627 firearms at issue to a person of his choosing is denied, as this would result in his constructive possession of the seized firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of firearms found in the defendant’s home.

United States v. Reid · filed 2008-10-30(g)(1)

The record reveals that the District Court conducted a fair proceeding and made permissible inferences as to the likelihood that Reid had constructive possession of the firearms found in the apartment, as well as the similarity of the drugs and drug paraphernalia.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding that a felon possessed a firearm when evidence shows knowledge of the firearm and the ability to control it; proximity alone is insufficient.

United States v. Godson · filed 2008-10-30(g)(1)

Constructive possession requires 1) “dominion and control” over an object, and 2) knowledge of the object’s existence. ... Taken together, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Godson constructively possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Williams · filed 2008-11-03(g)(1)

Possession under § 922(g)(1) may be either “actual” or “constructive.”

A felon can constructively possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) through dominion over the premises where it is found.

United States v. Davis · filed 2008-11-12(g)(1)

The fact that the firearm in the instant case was found in the bedside table in the room shared by Davis and his girlfriend provided sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that Davis constructively possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant knew of and constructively possessed the firearm.

United States v. Wright · filed 2008-11-12(g)(1)

Second, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Wright knowingly possessed the firearm and drugs. The government presented ample evidence from which a jury could have reasonably concluded that Wright was aware of the drugs and the firearm and constructively possessed them.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant knows of the firearm and can exercise control over it.

United States v. Walker · filed 2008-11-14(g)(1)

Likewise, there was sufficient evidence to show that Walker too was in “close proximity” to, and exercised dominion and control over, the Harrington & Richardson shotgun. ... When coupled with the fact that there was ample evidence that Walker and Bryant were working in concert, see Bryant, 523 F.3d at 356, a rational juror could find that Walker constructively possessed the Harrington & Richardson shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a felon knows of a firearm and has the intent and power to control it.

United States v. Grider · filed 2008-11-21(g)(1)

The evidence shows that Grider intended to use the shotgun to protect his chickens, therefore, establishing his intent to exercise dominion and control over the shotgun. Thus, there was sufficient evidence at trial for a rational trier of fact to find that Grider constructively possessed the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(9) require proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; constructive possession can be established through control of the premises where the gun was found.

United States v. Pruitt · filed 2008-11-26(g)(1), (g)(9)

While the government’s evidence in this case was not overwhelming, it was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pruitt constructively possessed the gun based on the following things and the inferences: (1) Charese Pruitt stated in the 911 call that Pruitt had a gun and that she had seen it that morning; (2) a gun was discovered in a bag containing men’s clothing in the house; and (3) officers obtained Pruitt’s consent to search the house, indicating that he had dominion and control over the premises where the gun was discovered.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm when other incriminating evidence supplements the defendant’s proximity to it.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2008-12-02(g)(1)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a conviction may be based on actual or constructive possession of a firearm. ... Here, the jury’s conclusion that Campbell constructively possessed the Colt pistol was drawn rationally from the evidence, and we therefore will not disturb the verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports a plausible inference that the defendant knew of and controlled the firearms.

United States v. Patt · filed 2008-12-15(g)(1)

The evidence raised a plausible inference that Patt exercised dominion and control over the firearms found in the Cadillac’s console.

Section 922(g)(1) requires evidence of knowledge and dominion or control to establish constructive possession of a firearm in a jointly occupied vehicle; proximity alone is insufficient.

United States v. Hooks · filed 2009-01-09(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we hold that no reasonable jury could have found Mr. Ferrell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if we assume that Mr. Ferrell’s mere presence in the pickup establishes proximity, see Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209-10, the government still has failed to show that Mr. Ferrell had knowledge of or dominion or control over the Uzi, as opposed to the two passengers in the back of the pickup.

Section 922(g)(1) permits knowing possession to be proved by actual or constructive possession; constructive possession requires ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2009-01-14(g)(1)

Knowing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession, and constructive possession is established by proving “ownership, dominion, or control” over the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of possession; driving a car containing a firearm does not establish constructive possession without additional evidence connecting the driver to the gun.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2009-01-20(g)(1)

Because the evidence in this case is limited to the fact that Bailey was driving the car in which police found the loaded gun, there exists insufficient evidence for any rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bailey had constructive possession of the gun. We therefore vacate part III.C. of our prior panel opinion, and we reverse the district court's denial of Bailey's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the felon-in-possession count.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; proximity to another person’s guns alone does not establish actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Rodriguez-Lozada · filed 2009-02-24(g)(1)

In the absence of evidence that Rodriguez knowingly possessed the guns found in Rivera’s bedroom, either actually or constructively, a reasonable jury could not have found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm as charged in Count Seven of Criminal Case No. 03-284.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through constructive possession when the defendant controlled the premises, knew of the firearm, and had access to it.

United States v. Poe · filed 2009-03-03(g)(1)

Evidence of control of the premises, knowledge of the weapon, and access to it were sufficient to establish constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Hunter · filed 2009-03-09(g)(1)

A jury could reasonably find that Hunter had actual possession of the gun by carrying the cocaine and gun into the hotel, or that he had constructive possession by having the knowledge and power to exercise control over it while inside.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Brye · filed 2009-03-13(g)(1)

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Brye’s conviction, as the law enforcement officers’ testimony allowed the jury to conclude that Brye constructively possessed the firearm that was found.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence of constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. McClain · filed 2009-03-16(g)(1)

Although witnesses testified that the firearm did not belong to McClain, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that McClain had constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by a defendant's ability and intention to grab a firearm, even if police prevent him from touching it.

United States v. Crawford · filed 2009-03-26(g)(1)

We disagree. The evidence showed that Crawford had the ability and the intention to grab the firearm. Since he does not dispute the remaining elements of the § 922(g) offense, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict him knowing, constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by constructive possession when the defendant knew of and had access to the firearm.

United States v. Frost · filed 2009-03-27(g)(1)

Applying these standards, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Mr. Frost had knowledge of and access to—and thus dominion and control over—the pistol, and therefore at the very least constructively possessed it.

A felon’s control over a bedroom and closet can support a finding that he possessed a firearm found there under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Mobley · filed 2009-04-07(g)(1)

Second, with regard to the conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a reasonable jury could have found that Mobley possessed the firearm because he had dominion and control over his bedroom, his bedroom closet, and likewise, the firearm that was located in his closet and next to his bookbag.

Section 922(g) covers firearms held by others when a felon retains control, ownership, or dominion over them.

United States v. Miller · filed 2009-04-09(g)

Miller is eligible for this enhancement if she possessed a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the statute banning possession of firearms by felons. ... Possession exercised through another is still possession: a felon may not “have the firearms held in trust for him by a third party.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by proof that a felon knew of a firearm and had the power and intent to control it.

United States v. Webster · filed 2009-04-14(g)(1)

The court concludes that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a reasonable jury to find that defendant knew of the Ruger revolver and that he had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over that firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm that was in or affected interstate commerce; constructive possession can satisfy the possession requirement.

United States v. Gonzalez · filed 2009-04-15(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 6), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. ... Hartsfield stipulated that (1) he was a convicted felon and (2) that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce; thus, the only element at issue was whether he knowingly possessed a firearm. In light of our discussion in subpart 2 above, we must conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Hartsfield on Count 6.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by exercising control over a firearm through another person.

United States v. Scott · filed 2009-04-22(g)(1)

A reasonable jury could conclude that Scott exercised dominion and control over the shotgun through his sister, by telling her where to hide the firearm so that it would not be found during the probation inspection.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to find possession of firearms when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant knew of them and exercised dominion and control over them.

United States v. Boone · filed 2009-04-29(g)(1)

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the jury had sufficient evidence from which to infer and find that Boone had knowledge of and exercised dominion and control over the cocaine base and firearms seized in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a convicted felon from constructively possessing firearms by transferring them to a third party.

United States v. Roberts · filed 2009-04-28(g)(1)

In United States v. Felici, the court, noting that because convicted felons are prohibited from possessing guns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), held that they are also barred from constructively possessing firearms by transferring them to a third party. ... We are persuaded by the Felici decision.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession; actual or exclusive possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2009-05-22(g)(1)

As this court held in Gallimore, 247 F.3d at 136-37, section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of actual or exclusive possession; constructive or joint possession is sufficient. ... The evidence was sufficient to convict Bailey on counts 2 and 3. Although Bailey was not in actual possession of the loaded .22 caliber firearm seized from the living room of the residence from which he was observed selling cocaine base, the jury could infer his knowledge of and dominion and control over the firearm, as it was found on the floor under a couch in the residence’s living room, a room close to the residence’s front door.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through constructive possession when proximity to a firearm is accompanied by conduct showing an intent to control it.

United States v. Giovanni Wright · filed 2009-05-26(g)(1)

The evidence therefore is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on a constructive possession theory.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved through actual or constructive possession, including by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Dwaine Wright · filed 2009-06-04(g)(1)

He stipulated to every element of the § 922(g) charge except possession. Either “actual” or “constructive” possession may support a conviction, and the government may prove possession by circumstantial evidence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through constructive possession of a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Rush · filed 2009-06-15(g)(1)

In conclusion, the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Rush constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Clements · filed 2009-06-24(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a defendant may be convicted for either actual or constructive possession of a firearm. ... Contrary to Clements’s argument, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements both knew of the firearm and had constructive possession of it.

Dominion or control over a residence, together with participation in a drug conspiracy, can support a finding that a felon constructively possessed firearms kept near drug distribution items there.

United States v. Burton · filed 2009-07-08(g)(1)

Likewise, as for Count 5, because the evidence was sufficient to support that Burton had dominion or control over the residence and participated in the drug conspiracy, the evidence also supports that Burton constructively possessed the three firearms that were in the kitchen drawer, which were near the items associated with drug distribution, as the jury could infer that he had the power to exercise dominion or control over the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) allows constructive possession to be established when a defendant’s statement and proximity to a firearm show knowledge of it and the ability to control it.

United States v. McCane · filed 2009-07-28(g)(1)

McCane’s statement, together with the proximity of the firearm, supports the conclusion that McCane had knowledge of the firearm as well as the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports knowing control over the firearm.

United States v. King · filed 2009-08-06(g)(1)

Given the evidence of King’s proximity to the bedroom, dominion of the room, knowledge of the contents of the residence, and knowledge of and participation in past narcotic distribution, the jury could conclude that King knowingly possessed the firearm and narcotics.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant exercises dominion and control over the gun.

United States v. Morris · filed 2009-08-10(g)(1)

To determine constructive possession of both the drugs and the gun, we apply the same test. ... Instead, the defendant must exercise dominion and control over the item.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of ammunition when a person has the power and intention to control it.

United States v. Hicks · filed 2009-08-11(g)(1)

A rational jury could have found that appellant had the requisite "power and intention . . . to exercise dominion and control" over the items in the drawer, including the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence shows the defendant knowingly controlled the firearm through another person.

United States v. William Pike, Jr. · filed 2009-08-19(g)(1)

We therefore conclude that based upon the evidence and making all inferences in support of the prosecution, a rational fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pike possessed the firearm under a theory of constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a firearm’s presence to establish constructive possession; control of the vehicle containing it alone is insufficient.

United States v. Dooley · filed 2009-09-01(g)(1)

Instruction No. 17 incorrectly stated that Dooley was in constructive possession of the firearm if he had control over the vehicle in which it was located. We have long held that knowledge is required to establish constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits knowing possession to be actual, constructive, or joint; circumstantial evidence can establish a sufficient connection between the defendant and the firearm.

United States v. Byas · filed 2009-09-16(g)(1)

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “may be based on constructive or joint possession” of a firearm. ... Applying these principles, we find the district court’s inference of a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the firearm was not clearly erroneous.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through constructive possession.

United States v. Davis · filed 2009-09-17(g)(1)

The Government produced evidence showing that Davis was in constructive possession of the guns.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence of constructive possession when the defendant shares the premises with another person.

United States v. Roach · filed 2009-09-21(g)(1)

Each of Roach’s crimes of conviction has possession as an element. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 922(k), 924(c)(1)(A)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). ... This evidence, although admittedly circumstantial, was sufficient viewed as a whole to provide the requisite “nexus” to show that Roach was in constructive possession of the gun, the ammunition, and the drugs.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm after the felony conviction; constructive possession requires a connection showing knowledge of the firearm and intent to control it.

United States v. Katz · filed 2009-09-22(g)

There is no nexus between the intruder and the home’s possession, and no reason for a jury to conclude that the intruder has the knowledge that the weapon is in the home or the intent to exercise dominion or control over it. The constructive possession standard loses all of its grounding if interpreted as the government would so as to include intruders such as Katz. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; possession may be actual or constructive when the defendant has dominion and control over the firearm or the premises where it is concealed.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2009-10-05(g)(1)

Knowing possession can be shown by either actual or constructive ... possession, as long as there is a reasonable inference that the accused maintained “dominion and control” over the weapon or drugs or over the premises on which the weapon or drugs are concealed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm.

United States v. Fields · filed 2009-10-09(g)(1)

While we acknowledge that proof of actual possession does not exist in this case, there is sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to find constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when the defendant knows the firearm is present and has the power to control it.

United States v. Squirewell · filed 2009-10-13(g)(1)

“Constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises, or has the power to exercise, dominion and control over the item,” United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir. 1980), and has knowledge of the item’s presence. ... Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Squirewell’s conviction on Count Two.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of knowing possession through constructive possession; in a jointly occupied room, evidence must support a plausible inference that the defendant knew about the firearm.

United States v. Hordge · filed 2009-10-28(g)(1)

This is “some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference” that Hordge had knowledge of and access to the weapon. The evidence supporting Hordge’s conviction is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Hampton · filed 2009-11-04(g)(1)

In order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government needed to prove Hampton had either actual or constructive possession of the gun. ... The government presented sufficient evidence to show both constructive and actual possession of the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by evidence connecting a felon to firearms found near his identification cards.

United States v. Brown · filed 2009-11-10(g)(1)

The proximity of Brown’s identification cards to the firearms and the drug paraphernalia was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact that Brown was guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a defendant owns or exercises dominion and control over the premises where a firearm is concealed.

United States v. Baggin · filed 2009-11-23(g)

A defendant has constructive possession of contraband when he owns or exercises dominion and control over the premises in which the contraband is concealed.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to prove firearm possession through either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Harris · filed 2009-11-25(g)(1)

The government can prove either actual or constructive possession to satisfy the possession requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant knew of and had access to the firearms.

United States v. Rivers · filed 2009-12-07(g)(1)

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, creates a reasonable inference that Mr. Rivers had both knowledge of and access to the firearms listed in the indictment; it therefore adequately supports his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm in a jointly occupied vehicle when the evidence supports a plausible inference that the defendant knew of and could access it.

United States v. Allen · filed 2009-12-23(g)(1)

The jury had more than sufficient evidence to conclude that Allen knowingly possessed the firearm discovered in his vehicle. His conduct the night ... of his arrest, coupled with his ownership of the vehicle and the implausibility of the contention that Jack secreted the gun while being watched, was sufficient to create a plausible inference of knowledge and the Government was under no obligation to affirmatively disprove Allen’s theory of the case.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Spencer · filed 2010-02-03(g)(1)

Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g)(1).