18 U.S.C. § 922

Eyewitness testimony can establish firearm possession for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Whitis v. United States · filed 1995-08-03(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the testimony of Linda Martin was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably infer that defendant possessed a firearm on the night of March 5, 1994. ... Therefore, we conclude that sufficient evidence sustains defendant's convictions of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (count two) and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (count three).

Evidence that a firearm belonged to a convicted felon and was found in a vehicle he exclusively possessed can support a conviction under § 922(g).

United States v. Felan · filed 1995-11-30(g)

Roman Felan, III challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... The evidence adduced at trial overwhelmingly established that Felan had exclusive possession of the pickup truck and that the pistol was his. His challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is totally without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon's possession of firearms, but does not prohibit ownership alone.

United States v. Clementi · filed 1995-12-01(g)(1)

Claiming ownership of the property by joining the action would not be self-incriminating, however, because the statute at issue does not forbid ownership of firearms. It forbids possessing or transporting firearms in or affecting interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on actual, constructive, or joint firearm possession.

Parsons v. United States · filed 1996-03-18(g)(1)

However, the charge against petitioner is premised on his possession of the firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which can be constructive, actual or joint, and the court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that he possessed the 12 firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm, but the government need not prove it was the specific gun identified in the indictment.

United States v. Anderson · filed 1996-03-18(g)(1)

Under § 922(g), the government was required to prove that Anderson possessed a "firearm" within the meaning of § 921(a)(3), not that he possessed the .38 revolver which was alleged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction when the government proves a felon possessed a firearm on one of the dates charged in a continuous possession.

United States v. Rivera · filed 1996-03-20(g)(1)

Although the indictment charges two dates of possession in the conjunctive, the Government is not required to prove possession on both dates to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Circumstantial evidence can establish possession of a firearm for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Wilkerson · filed 1996-04-02(g)(1)

Ivan Francion Wilkerson appeals his convictions for possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence at trial from which the jury could have found that he had possessed the firearm. ... Having done so, the jury was justified in finding that Wilkerson had, indeed, possessed at least one of the shotguns found that night.

Section 922(g) permits possession of a firearm to be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant exercised dominion over it, even if it was registered to someone else.

United States v. Botelho · filed 1996-05-24(g)

Finally, there was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Botelho, during the period charged in the indictment, exercised dominion over the gun registered to his wife.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm.

United States v. Miller · filed 1996-05-20(g)

For the reasons stated, Mr. Miller's convictions for violating using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2)) are VACATED and his case is REMANDED for resentencing in light of our decision to vacate certain of his convictions.

An admission of actual possession of firearms supplies a factual basis for the possession element of a § 922(g) offense.

United States v. Melvin Persky, A/K/A Melvin R. Slager · filed 1996-06-27(g)

Further, during the hearing, Persky admitted to actual possession of the firearms. Consequently, there was more than sufficient evidence on which the trial court could base the possession element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. White · filed 1996-07-15(g)(1)

Mitchell Lynn White appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for firearm possession by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). White contends the government presented insufficient evidence that he, rather than his friend Mark McClure, possessed the shotgun found in McClure's car. ... The jury also reasonably could have concluded that the boots, Officer Oleyar's testimony, and the documents in the shotgun case showed that White lied to the police when he said he had been sleeping rather than driving the car. See id. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.

A § 922(g) conviction can rest on a stipulated prior felony, evidence that a firearm was near the defendant, and proof of its interstate movement.

United States v. Willie Causey, Jr. · filed 1996-07-17(g)

Moreover, inasmuch as Causey stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a felony, the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was supported by the fact that the firearm in question was close to Causey at the time of the arrest, and that it had previously travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Oliver Underwood and Gerald K. Underwood · filed 1996-09-20(g)(1)

Both actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element for purposes of § 922(g).

A felon-in-possession charge may go to the jury when witness testimony and circumstantial evidence support a finding that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Norwood · filed 1996-11-15(g)(1)

Accordingly, upon viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, as this Court must do when deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal, I conclude that the' Government presented substantial evidence at trial upon which a reasonable jury could have based a verdict of guilty on the “felon-in-possession” charge contained in Count Six of the Second Superseding Indictment, and therefore, will deny Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Six.

Section 922(g) possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew the firearm was present.

United States v. Barry Earl Williams, United States of America v. Barry Earl Williams · filed 1997-01-27(g)

There was ample evidence, albeit primarily circumstantial, allowing for a reasonable inference by the jury that Williams knew that the firearm was in the trunk, and circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires actual or constructive possession of a firearm; ownership alone is insufficient without physical access or dominion and control.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry Ross CASTERLINE, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-12-24(g)(1)

Ownership without physical access to, or dominion and control over, the firearm does not constitute possession. If the felon owns a firearm, but does not actually possess or have dominion and control over it, then he does not possess the firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Testimony that an undercover agent bought firearms from the defendant can establish the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Chandler · filed 1997-02-13(g)(1)

The evidence supporting the jury's verdict was overwhelming. The possession element was established through the testimony of the undercover ATF agent who personally bought the two firearms.

A felon’s actual or constructive possession of a firearm can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Czeck · filed 1997-01-30(g)(1)

Even aside from the evidence of his actual possession of the firearms, then, there was sufficient evidence of his constructive possession of them to support the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be satisfied by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Favale · filed 1997-02-21(g)(1)

Possession may be actual or constructive.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction may rest on eyewitness testimony alone; lack of physical corroboration affects the evidence’s weight rather than its sufficiency.

United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Esteban Gonzalez and Alfredo Colon, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Ap · filed 1997-04-14(g)(1)

The jury plainly rejected this theory, and thus was entitled, if it so chose, to rest its verdict solely on Crowe’s testimony. ... We easily conclude that the evidence against both defendants was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on possession of a firearm before a vehicle stop, even if another person possessed it when the vehicle was stopped.

United States v. Stroble · filed 1997-04-24(g)(1)

As the government correctly notes, “[t]he fact that [Carley] was present and possessed the gun at the time the police officer stopped the vehicle does not exculpate the defendant from being in possession of the firearm prior to the vehicle being stopped.” (PL’s Resp. at 3^4). Officer Daniels testified, and the jury believed, that he saw the driver of the vehicle (whom it is uncontroverted was the defendant) holding and firing a gun outside the driver-seat window. The evidence of these pre-stop acts are more than sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant possessed one firearm; the government need not prove possession of every firearm named in the indictment.

United States v. Bevans · filed 1997-07-09(g)

A conviction under § 922(g) requires proof of possession of a “firearm,” not multiple firearms.

Section 922(g) permits a finding that multiple people jointly possessed a firearm in a car.

United States v. Theodore A. Tirrell, Cross-Appellee · filed 1997-07-15(g)

Joint possession simply recognizes that more than one individual can exercise control over a firearm. The concept does not require that the individuals and the firearms be in any certain locale.

Eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the person who dropped a firearm can support a finding of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Jackson · filed 1997-08-13(g)(1)

After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1978), we conclude that the jury could have found, based on the witnesses' testimony, that Jackson possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; evidence that the defendant used a gun can support a conviction.

UNITED STATES of America v. PEREZ-GARZA · filed 1997-09-12(g)(1)

The same evidence supports Perez-Garza's conviction as a felon in possession of a weapon.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive or joint possession; mere presence is insufficient.

United States v. Alvin Moore, AKA Shahid Mutee · filed 1997-10-24(g)(1)

While mere presence does not establish possession, proof of constructive or joint possession is sufficient.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be established by evidence identifying the defendant as the person who fired the gun.

United States v. Donnie Harris, United States of America v. Tremayne Johnson · filed 1998-04-27(g)

Not only did Johnson have access to the guns in the closet, he also was identified, through his clothing and build, as the person who discharged a weapon outside the residence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could have found that Johnson possessed the gun he was alleged to have fired outside Harris' residence.

When a defendant stipulates to two elements of a § 922(g) charge, the government must prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Dale · filed 1998-04-30(g)

As stated previously, Dale stipulated to the first two elements of the crime. Accordingly, the government's only burden was to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

Witness testimony that a convicted felon possessed a shotgun can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Patton · filed 1998-09-10(g)(1)

From this evidence we find that a jury could reasonably find that Patton had possessed a sawed-off shot- gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Eyewitness testimony identifying a defendant running away with a weapon can be sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g).

United States v. Perkins · filed 1998-11-16(g)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the testimony of Brooks, who identified Perkins as running away and in possession of a weapon, is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied even when the firearm is not found on the defendant at arrest, if the evidence shows he possessed and then abandoned it.

United States v. Minor · filed 1998-11-25(g)(1)

His claim is without merit because any reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed, then abandoned, the revolver.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by evidence that the defendant knew of and had access to the firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 1999-05-05(g)(1)

... evidence is sufficient to support Smith’s conviction because the Government presented evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that Smith had knowledge of, and access to, the weapon in question.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which a jury may infer when a driver hands a passenger cases containing guns to throw from the car.

United States v. Pfeiferling · filed 2000-03-10(g)(1)

As to counsel’s arguments, first, we find the evidence that Mr. Pfeiferling, who was driving a borrowed car and attempting to flee law enforcement officials at high speeds, handed two cases containing guns and ammunition to his passenger to throw out the window, was sufficient to establish his knowing possession of the guns.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can be sustained by proof of firearm possession reasonably near the date alleged in the indictment.

United States v. Ferguson · filed 2000-05-04(g)(1)

In light of Powers, the additional evidence that Ferguson possessed a firearm close to the date charged in count eighteen is sufficient to sustain a conviction on that charge.

Section 922(g)’s possession element includes actual and constructive possession; using a gun during a robbery establishes actual possession.

United States v. Fortune · filed 2000-05-30(g)

“It is well settled the required ‘possession’ for purposes of § 922(g) includes both actual and constructive possession.” ... The evidence fully establishes that Fortune actually possessed a weapon.

Testimony that a defendant sold firearms can support a finding of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Davis · filed 2000-06-19(g)(1)

Despite Davis’ testimony to the contrary, the agent’s testimony supported the conclusion that Davis possessed the firearms.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can be supported by evidence that a defendant's flight from police was explained by his possession of a firearm.

United States v. Royal T. Arrington · filed 2000-06-20(g)(1)

We reject Arrington's claim that the district court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because Arrington's conviction was supported by substantial evidence, see United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1999), and as the district court observed, "[a] juror could reason that [Arrington's] possession [of a firearm] was the explanation for his dangerous and lengthy flight from police."

Section 922(g) makes possession of a firearm by a felon the relevant issue; ownership of the firearm is not required.

United States v. Hawkins · filed 2000-06-21(g)

The fact of consequence in this case was whether Hawkins possessed the gun, and the ammunition found in the upper unit has nothing to do with possession. While the ammunition may be relevant to proving ownership of the gun, ownership is not relevant to the offense in question. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (offense for felon to possess firearm).

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the date of firearm possession a material element of the offense.

United States v. Stuckey · filed 2000-08-09(g)(1)

The date of the offense is not a material element of a firearm possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can stand when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Evans · filed 2001-02-13(g)(1)

James Hampton Evans was convicted of being a felon in posses- sion of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). ... We have reviewed the record, however, and find that the facts of this case are more closely analogous to the facts of United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976 (4th Cir. 1995), in which we held that the evidence was sufficient to sup- port a finding of firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by credible informant testimony and corroborating circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2001-02-21(g)(1)

While it is true that Davis supplied the only direct evidence linking Matthews to actual possession of the firearms, there was a good deal of indirect, circumstantial evidence making the same link. ... There certainly was enough evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the Government had proved Matthews possessed the firearms described in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, firearm possession, and the firearm’s prior movement in interstate or foreign commerce; credible eyewitness testimony can establish possession.

United States v. Burl · filed 2001-06-28(g)(1)

To convict Burl of possession of a firearm by a felon, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) prior to June 1, 2000, he was convicted of a felony; (2) he possessed a firearm on or about June 1, 2000; and (3) the firearm traveled in interstate or foreign commerce before Burl possessed it. ... After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that Burl held the firearm and will not disturb this determination on appeal.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant possessed the firearm; mere presence near it is insufficient.

United States v. Ricks · filed 2001-06-26(g)

We conclude that the mere presence instruction was not necessary. The instructions taken as a whole fairly and adequately instructed the jury that, in order to convict, it had to find that Ricks himself possessed the firearm.

Under § 922(g)(1), evidence of either actual or constructive possession can establish the firearm possession element.

United States v. O'Neal · filed 2001-07-20(g)(1)

Furthermore, O’Neal was arrested in close proximity to the shotgun, and he had been traveling for several months in the automobile where the gun was discovered. This was sufficient evidence to establish either constructive or actual possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by actual, constructive, or joint possession.

United States v. Carrasco · filed 2001-07-23(g)(1)

A showing of actual, constructive or joint possession is sufficient to establish the possession element of a section 922(g) offense.

Section 922(g)’s possession element is supported by testimony that firearms were found in the defendant’s home and by his statements admitting possession.

United States v. Solomon · filed 2001-12-10(g)

However, not only were Mrs. Solomon’s statements and the ATF Form 4473 properly admitted, as we have held, but other evidence, as well, established Solomon’s possession of the firearms in question.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Cassell, Dwayne · filed 2002-06-11(g)(1)

In order to convict Cassell of the possession charges, the government was required to prove that he knowingly pos- sessed the firearms recovered from his bedroom.

Section 922(g)(1) allows the government to prove knowing possession of a firearm through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Smith · filed 2002-06-11(g)(1)

To establish knowing possession under § 922(g)(1), the government must demonstrate actual or constructive possession of the firearm.

A § 922(g)(1) firearm conviction can rest on eyewitness testimony despite the witnesses’ drug use and memory gaps when the jury could reasonably credit their account.

United States v. Cheatwood · filed 2002-07-15(g)(1)

In light of their testimony and Mr. Cheatwood’s opportunity to challenge their credibility through cross-examination, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed the firearm; mere proximity to it is insufficient.

United States v. Lusk · filed 2002-07-24(g)(1)

Even if the jury credited this testimony, and made the further inference that Lusk did hop the fence between 3715 and 3725, Lusk’s presence in the backyard of 3725 would not, of itself, establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the gun later found in that backyard. Mere proximity is insufficient to establish possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; a signed statement admitting that he carried it can provide sufficient evidence.

United States v. Edward v. Burris · filed 2002-07-08(g)(1)

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence--most notably, Burris’s signed statement admitting that he carried the firearm for protection--for a reasonable jury to conclude that Burris knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2002-07-18(g)(1)

There is no merit to Johnson’s contention that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he possessed the firearms or ammunition as required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence sufficiently shows that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Donald Miggins, Edward McDaniels and Charles Moore, Jr. · filed 2002-08-16(g)(1)

Here, there was no “manifest miscarriage of justice,” as the evidence was clearly sufficient to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm, and witness testimony can establish that possession.

United States v. Lassiter · filed 2002-09-03(g)(1)

The testi- mony of the Government’s witnesses established Lassiter knowingly possessed a firearm as a convicted felon, and that he knowingly pos- sessed marijuana.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; a shotgun found in the backseat of the defendant’s truck, with shells throughout its interior, was sufficient evidence of knowing possession.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2002-09-11(g)(1)

The defendant also challenges his conviction on Count Six, being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2) (2002). The defendant’s only challenge to this conviction, asserted at trial and not further articulated in this pending motion, is that he did not “knowingly” possess a shotgun. During the execution of a valid search warrant, the gun in question was found in the backseat of the defendant’s truck, along with numerous shotgun shells found throughout the truck’s interior. Accordingly, the court FINDS that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant possessed the shotgun knowingly and to convict on Count Six.

Evidence that officers saw a defendant drop an object where a gun was recovered can support a finding of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Bright · filed 2002-09-24(g)(1)

We conclude, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, that there was sufficient evidence to find that Bright possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a conviction when the evidence sufficiently establishes that a person with prior felony convictions knowingly possessed firearms.

United States v. Corkell · filed 2002-09-27(g)(1)

Daniel Lee Corkell appeals his conviction and sentence for knowingly possessing three firearms after having been convicted of three violent felonies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). ... We have reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and hold that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Corkell’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require actual or exclusive possession; constructive or joint possession is sufficient.

United States v. Clark · filed 2002-10-09(g)(1)

However, neither § 5861(d) nor § 922(g)(1) require proof of actual or exclusive possession; construc- tive or joint possession is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hudson · filed 2002-10-25(g)(1)

We also agree with counsel that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Hudson was a felon who possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

Circumstantial evidence connecting a defendant to a firearm can support a conviction for possession by a convicted felon under § 922(g).

United States v. Chambers · filed 2003-01-16(g)

Chambers challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on count III, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base on June 25, 1999, count IV, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (as set forth in count III), and count V, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. ... The most relevant evidence that the cocaine ... base and firearm may be attributed to Chambers is the discovery of several personal papers, including check books, in the room with the drug paraphernalia. ... We find that this evidence is sufficient to sustain the challenged convictions.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by evidence that the defendant knew a firearm was in his vehicle and had access to it.

United States v. Oveal · filed 2003-01-24(g)(1)

... there was sufficient evidence that Oveal knew of the firearm’s presence in his vehicle and that he had access to the firearm.

Evidence that a defendant knew where to find a gun and had purchased it can establish knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Price · filed 2003-01-28(g)(1)

We conclude that sufficient evidence existed to establish Price’s knowing possession of the gun. As noted above, Walters testified that Price told him where to find the gun and an ATF agent testified that the gun had been sold to Price by an Illinois retailer. This evidence, whether considered alone or in conjunction with Rebecca’s 911 call, established that Price knowingly possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from knowingly possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Young · filed 2003-02-11(g)(1)

Young stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony and had not had his right to own or possess a firearm restored. He further stip- ulated that the handgun and rifle were manufactured outside of Vir- ginia and therefore had traveled in interstate commerce. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find that Young had knowledge of and access to the firearms and possessed the firearms to further his drug activity.

Section 922(g) criminalizes possession of a firearm in specified circumstances, regardless of who owns it.

United States v. Ramsey · filed 2003-02-14(g)

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000), criminalizes possession, not ownership, of a firearm in limited circumstances.

Circumstantial evidence can support a jury finding of firearm possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Foy · filed 2003-02-14(g)(1)

We find this circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Foy possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction for knowing and intentional possession of a firearm even when the possession is momentary.

United States v. Hendricks, James · filed 2003-02-21(g)(1)

Because the instruction fairly and accurately sum- marized the law, we must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury that momentary possession of the firearm was sufficient to convict.

Witness testimony can establish possession of the charged firearm under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Ryncarz · filed 2003-04-10(g)(1)

Because the testimony of at least four witnesses overwhelmingly supports a finding that Ryn-carz possessed the firearm listed on the indictment, no error exists.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a person with a prior felony conviction possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hubbard · filed 2003-05-29(g)

In view of the abundant evidence that Hubbard possessed a firearm on or about August 4, 2001, and taking into account Hubbard’s stipulation that the firearm in question traveled in interstate commerce, as well as his stipulation that he had a prior felony conviction, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Schreane · filed 2003-06-09(g)(1)

Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g).

Circumstantial evidence can establish possession under § 922(g)(1) even when the defendant denies possession and no fingerprints are found on the gun.

United States v. Norman · filed 2003-06-16(g)(1)

This testimony, when all reasonable inferences are drawn from the circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to prove posses- sion. Norman’s denial of possession on appeal and the Government’s failure to detect Norman’s fingerprints on the gun are not sufficient to overturn the jury’s finding of guilt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires evidence of firearm possession and an interstate commerce nexus to support a conviction.

United States v. Ivander James, Jr. · filed 2003-07-21(g)(1)

The government adduced substantial evidence at trial that James possessed the firearm that the police found in his vehicle after a high-speed chase. There was also sufficient evidence establishing the interstate commerce nexus.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a felon controlled access to a room containing firearms and ammunition and admitted possessing the guns.

United States v. Acklin · filed 2003-08-01(g)(1)

Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s ruling that, based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Acklin possessed the firearms and the ammunition found in the locked bedroom.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm.

United States v. Gill · filed 2003-08-25(g)(1)

In any event, we find that, viewing all evidence and credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the government, a rational fact finder could have found that Gill possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when circumstantial evidence sufficiently links the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Boyer · filed 2003-10-16(g)(1)

Deondre Boyer appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. ... The logical inference is that the person she saw was indeed Boyer. ... The bottom line is that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm possession element can be proved by eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2003-12-17(g)(1)

The testimony of Mr. McElroy and Mr. Wells that Mr. Bryant was the man who shot at them is clearly sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bryant possessed a firearm.

Evidence of prior felony convictions, a shotgun purchase, and the shotgun’s manufacture abroad and importation into the United States can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Wallette · filed 2003-11-26(g)(1)

The jury was not required to find that he was manufacturing injectable methamphetamine for him to be sentenced to more than 5 years imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); the evidence at trial--that Wallette had 3 prior felony convictions, he had purchased a shotgun from a witness, and the shotgun had been manufactured in Brazil and imported at Miami--supported his conviction under section 922(g), see United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 978 (8th Cir. 1999); section 924(e) is a sentencing enhancement, which did not require findings by the jury, see United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 946 (2002); and the district court’s misstatement as to the amount of possible good-time credit did not affect Wallette’s substantial rights, see United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir.) (standard of review), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 914 (2002).

Brief, voluntary possession of a firearm can support § 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element.

United States v. Gooding · filed 2003-12-12(g)(1)

Under Jackson, there was patently sufficient evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have concluded that Gooding knowingly possessed the firearm. Gooding himself admitted to a brief, voluntary possession of the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by evidence that a defendant had dominion or control over firearms.

United States v. Cropp · filed 2004-01-05(g)(1)

A reasonable ... juror could have concluded from Cropp’s proximity to the weapons which were in plain view, the number of weapons found in the vehicle, Cropp’s furtive movements, and the concealment of a pistol in the crack of the seat underneath Cropp, that Cropp had dominion or control over the weapons.

A felon may be found to possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) when the evidence supports that he occupied the room where it was kept and knew it was there.

United States v. Ruth Lee, United States of America v. Michael Sandmeyer · filed 2003-12-31(g)(1)

He contends that he did not have possession of a handgun buried under some clothing in a cedar chest. Mr. Sandmeyer argues that he did not know of the presence of the gun and that the government failed to produce evidence showing that he even used the room where it was found. The chest, however, was located in the bedroom where Mr. Sand-meyer kept his safe; it is the master bedroom of the house, and Mr. Sandmeyer and Ms. Lee were the home’s only inhabitants. After their arrest, Mr. Sandmeyer and Ms. Lee were married, and the record shows that they lived together at the time of their arrest. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Sandmeyer occupied the room in question and that he was aware of the contents of the chest.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm, and possession may be proved through eyewitness and circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Carter · filed 2004-01-27(g)(1)

Carter stipulated to all elements of the crime, except for possession of the pistol. However, there was ample evidence that Carter possessed the pistol.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, and officers’ eyewitness testimony can provide sufficient evidence of possession.

United States v. Kent · filed 2004-01-30(g)(1)

Kent contends, next, that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm, a .357 Smith & Wesson, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We disagree. ... Although Kent points to what he believes to be discrepancies in the testimony, under the “particularly deferential” standard of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find that there was more than sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant pawned the firearm.

United States v. Guillory · filed 2004-02-10(g)

In light of this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Guillory possessed the shotgun at issue.

Possession under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(k) may be proved by evidence that the defendant threw an object into an area where a firearm was immediately found.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2004-04-01(g)(1), (k)

Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude it was sufficient to prove Rodriguez’s possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction charging possession of one or more firearms can rest on proof that the defendant possessed any one of them.

United States v. Harvey · filed 2004-06-02(g)(1)

The indictment charged that Harvey violated §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) by possessing “one or more firearms, namely, a Smith & Wesson .357 caliber handgun and a Mossberg .410 shotgun.” Harvey does not dispute that he is a convicted felon and that the charged firearms had traveled in interstate commerce. Accordingly, proof that Harvey possessed either firearm is sufficient to support his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the felon legally owned the firearm he possessed.

United States v. Wells · filed 2004-06-04(g)(1)

Moreover, the legal ownership of the pistol is neither determinative of nor particularly relevant to whether defendant, a felon whom the law proscribes from possessing a firearm, actually possessed it.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant constructively possessed the firearm.

United States v. Hall · filed 2004-11-09(g)

When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer Hall constructively possessed the firearm.

Officers’ testimony that a defendant admitted a gun was his can provide sufficient evidence of possession for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Hendricks · filed 2004-11-22(g)(1)

A rational juror could have credited Ms. Jester’s testimony, which was corroborated by three police officers, all of whom heard defendant state that the gun belonged to him. Even without her testimony, the testimony of the three police officers is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Possession of a firearm under § 922(g) can be proved by testimony that the defendant handled and hid the gun, supported by testimony that he brought guns into the home.

United States v. Hayden · filed 2004-11-23(g)

Ms. Taylor testified that Mr. Hayden had taken the shotgun out, had threatened her with it, and had hidden it behind the bed. Furthermore, Mr. Hayden’s step-children testified that the guns in the house had been brought in by Mr. Hayden. Accordingly, sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that Mr. Hayden possessed the gun.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction may be supported by eyewitness testimony that the defendant possessed a gun and by the defendant’s admissions of possession.

United States v. Lockett · filed 2005-01-07(g)(1)

Lockett has not demonstrated that a reasonable jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his possession of the sawed off shotgun. Three witnesses testified to the removal of the gun from Lockett, and four officers testified to Lockett's various admissions of gun possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when a gun is found in the defendant’s pants, despite uncertainty about which officer found it and when.

United States v. Lee · filed 2005-02-25(g)(1)

Lee challenges the conviction on the ground that the officer who made the arrest did not find the gun, which was buried deep in a pocket of his cargo pants. Still, the gun was found, and uncertainty about just which officer found it and when does not preclude a reasonable jury from finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Vehicle ownership can bear on constructive possession of a firearm under § 922(g), but it does not determine whether the defendant actually possessed the firearm.

United States v. Carpenter · filed 2005-03-29(g)

The vehicle’s ownership was relevant only to the constructive possession issue, not actual possession, and the detail and consistency of the police officers’ accounts vouched for their credibility.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant physically possessed a firearm.

United States v. Duncan · filed 2005-05-04(g)(1)

After careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence in this case was sufficient to allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan actually possessed the pistol.

Under § 922(g), mere presence near a firearm does not establish possession; constructive possession requires knowing power and intent to control it.

United States v. Frederick · filed 2005-05-05(g)

The court cautioned that “just being present where something is located does not equal possession.” ... We disagree. The district court’s instruction was unexceptionable.

Possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1) may be proved by evidence that the defendant dropped an object where a gun was recovered minutes later.

United States v. Light · filed 2005-05-09(g)(1)

Despite the absence of a direct observation of Light possessing the gun, we conclude it was a reasonable inference that the unidentified object the officers saw Light drop at the northwest corner of Winslow’s was the gun Cohen recovered there approximately three to eight minutes later.

Section 922’s firearm possession offenses permit proof of actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Howard · filed 2005-06-28(g)(1), (g)(3), (j)

Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, this court finds that a reasonable juror would not have reasonable doubt as to Howard's possession of the shotguns. Possession may be actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant exercised dominion and control over a firearm.

United States v. Wiley · filed 2005-07-05(g)(1)

Despite Wiley’s testimony contradicting the version of the facts presented by Eggers and her son, we hold that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that Wiley exercised dominion and control over the firearm found under a bed in the hotel room that Wiley occupied.

Section 922(g)'s possession element includes constructive possession, which a jury may infer from a nearby firearm and the defendant's presence as the only person on that floor of the house.

United States v. Whitehead · filed 2005-07-20(g)

These facts, taken together, could lead a reasonable trier ... of fact to conclude that Whitehead was in constructive possession of the weapon.

Section 922(g) covers both actual and constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Bonee · filed 2005-07-26(g)

The term “possession,” as it is used in § 922(g), includes actual possession and constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by evidence that the defendant exercised dominion over the room where the firearm was found.

United States v. Claybourne · filed 2005-08-01(g)(1)

Sufficient evidence supports Claybourne’s conviction. The evidence discovered inside the small bedroom singularly pointed to Claybourne as the person who exercised dominion over the bedroom where the firearm was discovered.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s constructive possession of ammunition, which may be proved by ammunition found in the defendant’s trailer.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2005-08-17(g)(1)

Similarly, the collection of ammunition found in Johnson’s trailer was sufficient to prove constructive possession of ammunition in violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when sole occupancy of a residence supports an inference of knowledge and control of firearms found there.

United States v. Young · filed 2005-08-19(g)(1)

In that case, our precedent assessing constructive possession in the context of joint occupancy would be inappo- site, and a rational finder of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt from the government’s evidence that Young’s sole occupation preceding the search was sufficient to establish his constructive possession of the firearms therein, without additional evidence connecting him to the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by a firearm accessible to a felon driving a vehicle.

United States v. Hoffman · filed 2005-09-13(g)(1)

Hoffman argues that there was insufficient evidence to find that he was in possession of the firearm found in the console of his truck after he was arrested for running a red light because it was not within his control. Hoffman’s argument is without merit. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that if firearm is in passenger compartment of vehicle and is accessible, it is within control of driver).

Section 922(g)(1) requires voluntary constructive possession: the defendant must intentionally exercise dominion and control over the firearm, or have both the power and intention to do so.

United States v. Scott · filed 2005-09-20(g)(1)

When the gov- ernment seeks to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1), it must prove that the defendant intentionally exercised dominion and control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention to exer- cise dominion and control over the firearm. Constructive possession of the firearm must also be voluntary.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when substantial evidence supports constructive possession of the firearms.

United States v. Gattis · filed 2005-09-26(g)(1)

Next, counsel and Gattis claim that the district court erred by failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, on three counts--possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine and less than 500 grams of cocaine, possession of firearms by a convicted felon, and using and carrying firearms during and in relation to, or possessing firearms in furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime. ... Gattis asserts that he did not live at that address and therefore did not have constructive possession of the guns and drugs recovered during the search. ... Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury’s verdict on the challenged counts.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control the firearm.

United States v. Craft · filed 2005-09-26(g)(1)

Constructive possession is established when a person knowingly has the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant had dominion and control over a firearm.

United States v. Perry · filed 2005-09-30(g)(1)

Therefore, to sustain the conviction, the government had to prove that Perry had “constructive possession” of the gun. ... Based on all of this circumstantial evidence it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Perry had shot the gun, and that he had dominion and control over the gun.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant controls the residence where firearms are found and his statements connect him to the firearms.

United States v. McCutchen · filed 2005-10-18(g)

Applying these standards to the present case, the record contains ample evidence to support a finding that Defendant had constructive possession of the house and the firearms found inside the cabinet.

In a joint occupancy case, knowledge of and access to a firearm provide the nexus needed to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Ledford · filed 2005-11-15(g)(1)

However, Colonna squarely forecloses his argument that nexus is lacking here: we made it clear that knowledge and access together are sufficient to show nexus, and the jury was instructed on that principle.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by showing that a person had the power and intent to control a firearm without physically holding it.

United States v. Harris, Bryant · filed 2005-11-21(g)(1)

Conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires proof of (1) knowing possession of a firearm (2) in or affecting commerce (3) after a felony conviction. ... Constructive possession exists when, although a person does not have actual possession, he has the power and intent to exercise control over an object either directly or through others. ... In this case Harris confessed orally and in writing that he bought the gun and could get it from the apartment he shared with his mother; police recovered the gun from his apartment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession, shown through ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm.

United States v. Glover · filed 2005-11-29(g)(1)

Knowing possession can be demonstrated by proof of “either actual or constructive” possession. ... To establish constructive possession, the government must show “ownership, dominion, or control” over the firearm. ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find Glover had constructive possession of the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm-possession element may be satisfied by proof of constructive possession.

United States v. Hadley · filed 2005-12-06(g)(1)

First, even if the district court had excluded all of Mrs. Hadley’s statements to the police on the night of Defendant’s arrest, the evidence still would have been sufficient to sustain Defendant’s felon-in-possession conviction under a theory of constructive possession. “Evidence of constructive possession suffices to satisfy the requirement under § 922(g)(1) of proof that a defendant possessed a firearm,” and constructive possession, in turn, “exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant has dominion over the firearm or the premises where it is located.

United States v. Urick · filed 2005-12-09(g)(1)

Constructive possession is established if a person has ownership, dominion, or actual control over the firearm itself or has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located.

Sufficient evidence of firearm possession supports a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Evans · filed 2005-12-15(g)(1)

Accordingly, after a de novo review, this court finds sufficient evidence to support Evan's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession even while the defendant is incarcerated.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2005-12-30(g)(1)

Our caselaw, however, suggests a defendant may have constructive possession of a firearm even while incarcerated, see United States v. Moore, 97 F.3d 561, 562-64 (1996); therefore, Thomas’ counsel reasonably advised him concerning the entry of a bargained guilty plea. ... Because, as explained above, a jury could have found Thomas had constructive possession of the firearms, there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved through constructive possession of ammunition.

United States v. Greer · filed 2006-01-10(g)(1)

The government need not prove actual possession in order to establish knowing possession; it need only show constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a defendant had dominion over the house where the firearms were found.

United States v. Coffee · filed 2006-01-20(g)(1)

Similarly, in the case at hand, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the government, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that at the time of the search, defendant had dominion over the house where the firearms were located.

When a firearm is found in a jointly occupied home, § 922(g)(1)'s possession element requires evidence supporting a plausible inference that the defendant knew of and had access to it.

United States v. McGrew · filed 2006-02-01(g)(1)

In addition to the joint tenancy inquiry, which focused on McGrew’s dominion and control over the residence, we must also find that the evidence supports at least a plausible inference that McGrew had knowledge of and access to the firearm. ... Viewing the evidence as a whole and in t he light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a rational jury could have reasonably concluded that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that McGrew had knowing control over the assault rifle.

Section 922(g)(1) covers both actual and constructive possession of a firearm; constructive possession requires the ability to exercise knowing dominion and control over it.

United States v. Booker, Charles · filed 2006-02-03(g)(1)

However, we have long held that “possession” for purposes of both §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1) “may be either actual or constructive.” ... We agree with the government that there was ample evidence to justify the jury’s verdict that Booker “constructively possessed” the handgun for purposes of both Count Three and Count Four.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm, but proximity to the gun alone does not establish possession.

United States v. Hames · filed 2006-01-31(g)(1)

In this case, the court made it clear in its instructions to the jury that proximity to the gun alone could not establish constructive possession. We have reviewed the court’s instructions in light of the law of this ... circuit concerning constructive possession and find no abuse of discretion.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Greer · filed 2006-02-24(g)(1)

The only element of the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that Greer argues was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt is knowing possession of the ammunition. ... The government need not prove actual possession in order to establish knowing possession; it need only show constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence.

In a joint occupancy case, knowledge of and access to a firearm provide the nexus needed to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1); the government need not prove intent to exercise control.

United States v. Ledford · filed 2006-03-27(g)(1)

However, Colonna squarely forecloses his argument that nexus is lacking here: we made it clear that knowledge and access together are sufficient to show nexus, and the jury was instructed on that principle.

Section 922(g)(1) allows the government to prove a convicted felon's possession of a firearm or ammunition through constructive possession.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2006-03-29(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the government must prove, inter alia, that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This means the government must prove that the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of the firearm. ... The evidence the government presented to convict Thomas sufficiently proved that Thomas constructively possessed both the shotgun and the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when the evidence shows the defendant knew of the firearms and had the power to control them.

United States v. Griffin · filed 2006-04-12(g)(1)

We conclude that this evidence is more than sufficient to establish Griffin’s constructive possession of the crack cocaine and firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) covers both actual and constructive possession of a firearm by a felon.

United States v. Montgomery · filed 2006-04-24(g)(1)

With regard to the possession conviction, the evidence showed that Montgomery carried the guns to the car and thus had actual possession of the firearms and that he had constructive possession of the firearms while riding in the car.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction for possessing ammunition based on constructive possession when the defendant lived where the ammunition was found.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2006-04-24(g)(1)

Proof that Taylor lived at the home is sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession, which supports a conviction for violating § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. McGehee · filed 2006-05-02(g)(1)

Proof of actual possession is not required to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1); constructive possession is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and a conviction can stand when a rational trier of fact could find its elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Seaton · filed 2006-04-28(g)(1)

With respect to Seaton’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,7 in light of the physical evidence identifying Seaton, the testimony of Vincent Seaton and James Seaton identifying Seaton as the sole resident of the bedroom, and the testimony of Seaton’s cellmate Gregory Jefferies, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that the government had established the elements of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C) ... (possession with intent to deliver cocaine) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under § 922(g)(1), a felon constructively possesses a firearm in a shared vehicle when evidence shows a connection to the firearm and the knowing ability to control it.

United States v. Michel · filed 2006-05-10(g)(1)

We conclude the evidence presented by the government was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Mr. Michel was a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant knew of and had access to the firearm.

United States v. Ruiz · filed 2006-05-16(g)(1)

Applying these standards, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to infer that M r. Ruiz had knowledge and access to the Glock pistol and therefore constructively possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through evidence that a felon had the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Young · filed 2006-05-18(g)(1)

Moreover, the evidence that Young lived at the apartment, kept his clothes in the closet, and had a key to the apartment demonstrates that Young had “the power and intention to exercise dominion or control” over the firearm and ammunition contained in the master bedroom closet.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by a person’s power and intent to control a firearm.

United States v. Zwibel · filed 2006-05-22(g)(1)

Accordingly, we read “[a]s long as the firearm is within the person’s control or the person has the power and intention to exercise control over the firearm, he possesses it,” as setting forth the proper definition of constructive possession, Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 96, and we discern no error in the instruction.

Section 922(g)(1) covers firearm possession by a convicted felon, including constructive or joint possession.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2006-06-05(g)(1)

The evidence sufficiently shows Hernandez: assisted the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and had constructive and joint possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant resided where the firearm was found.

United States v. Davis · filed 2006-06-07(g)(1)

The jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances that Davis had exercised constructive possession of the firearm.

When a firearm is found in a jointly occupied car, a felon-in-possession conviction requires evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2006-06-22(g)(1)

Here, there was a sufficient nexus for the jury to convict Mr. Johnson of possessing the Colt .45 located in Mr. Washington’s car.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession, but mere presence near a firearm is insufficient.

United States v. Newsom · filed 2006-06-29(g)(1)

But the defendant’s mere presence in a car where a gun is found and proximity to a gun are insufficient proof of constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits possession of a firearm to be proved by circumstantial evidence, including evidence of constructive possession.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2006-07-31(g)(1)

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence presented to the jury, although ... circumstantial, was sufficient to prove that Johnson possessed the firearm in question.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; possession may be constructive.

United States v. Tindall · filed 2006-07-31(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction under section 922(g)(1), the government must prove that Tindall knowingly possessed the firearm. ... This was sufficient evidence under our precedents to establish that Tindall constructively possessed the gun found in his car.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Horton · filed 2006-08-02(g)(1)

This evidence provided a sufficient basis to support the jury’s finding that Horton at least constructively possessed the rifle found in his car.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to find possession when evidence shows the defendant controlled the premises where firearms were found.

United States v. Bell · filed 2006-07-27(g)(1)

This evidence was more than sufficient to convict M r. Bell of possessing the firearms found in the home.

For § 922(g)(1), possession requires direct physical control of a firearm, and an instruction referring to holding it briefly was not plainly erroneous.

United States v. Mims · filed 2006-08-16(g)(1)

Although M r. M ims points out that the word “held” in the second sentence of the jury instruction may suggest that M r. M ims could be guilty if he merely had his hand on the gun without having exclusive control over it, such a reading would contradict the clear import of the prior sentence, which equates possession with “direct physical control.” The purpose of the second sentence was to clarify the temporal element of the crime, not to alter the meaning of the prior sentence. Even if the possible ambiguity of the second sentence caused the instruction to be erroneous, it was not plainly so.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be supported by circumstantial evidence and the defendant's admission that he received the gun.

United States v. Bolden, Emanuel · filed 2006-08-17(g)(1)

Because a rational finder of fact could conclude from this evidence that Bolden possessed the gun, ... we agree with counsel that any challenge on this ground would be frivolous.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a jury to find constructive possession of a firearm when the defendant had dominion over the place where it was found.

United States v. Mann · filed 2006-08-18(g)(1)

Mann was also convicted of possessing a firearm though a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Although, as Mann indicates, Arnold was once observed operating the vehicle, a rational trier of fact could infer that Mann had dominion over the vehicle; he was arrested in its vicinity and, most importantly, he owned it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction for constructive possession of a firearm even without eyewitness evidence of handling or fingerprints, if the evidence supports a reasonable jury’s finding of possession.

United States v. Collins · filed 2006-08-18(g)(1)

As we have held before, there may be sufficient evidence to convict a defendant for constructive possession even if no one sees the defendant handle the gun and if the gun has no fingerprints. ... Because, construing all evidence in favor of the Government, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Collins did constructively possess the firearm, we affirm Collins’s conviction.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not require fingerprints on the firearm when other evidence sufficiently proves possession.

United States v. Hibbler · filed 2006-08-23(g)(1)

Finally, there is no requirement that fingerprints be present on a firearm in order to support a verdict that the defendant possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when a defendant knows of a firearm or ammunition and has the power to control it.

United States v. Boysaw · filed 2006-09-06(g)(1)

A person has constructive possession of an item if he knows of its presence and exercises or has the power to exercise dominion and control over it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of constructive possession when a defendant has the ability to reduce a firearm to actual possession.

United States v. Abbott · filed 2006-09-11(g)(1)

Here, Defendant possessed a key that gave him access to 1739 West Fontain Street, where the police recovered a wide assortment of illegal drugs and two loaded pistols. Accordingly, Defendant had the ability to reduce the drugs and firearms to his actual possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to find constructive possession of a firearm from a defendant’s dominion and control over the apartment where it was found.

United States v. Black · filed 2006-09-21(g)(1)

Turning to Count Two, the felon-in-possession charge, we note that the parties stipulated to Black’s prior felony conviction and that the handgun recovered traveled in interstate commerce. ... Considering that Black had unfettered access to the apartment, kept personal papers there, and inhabited the apartment with the latitude of a resident — albeit a part-time resident — the jury could have reasonably concluded Black had sufficient dominion and control over the apartment to support a finding of constructive possession.