18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed the ammunition and knew he had been convicted of a felony, but does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Harris v. United States · filed 2024-07-29(g)(1)

But the government is not required to prove ... that defendant knew his conduct was prohibited by law or that defendant knew his felon status prohibited him from possessing the ammunition. ... Rather, the government is only required to prove that defendant knew he possessed the ammunition, and he knew he had been convicted of a felony.

A Rehaif argument concerning § 922(g)(1) and (g)(5) has no merit when the defendant never claims to have been unaware of the status that barred firearm possession.

United States v. White · filed 2024-09-03(g)(1), (g)(5)

White has never suggested he was unaware of his status as both a felon (§ 922(g)(1)) and a non-citizen unlawfully present in the United States (§ 922(g)(5)), so we fail to see why Rehaif is a significant, relevant development.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Fisher · filed 2024-09-04(g)(1)

To satisfy the knowledge-of-status element, the government simply must prove that, when the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition, he knew the fact of his own prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, but does not require knowledge of the label “felon.”

DCOSTA v. United States · filed 2024-10-01(g)(1)

While the case law refers to the defendant’s knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, the use of the “felony” terminology does not mean that the defendant must know he was a “felon.” Instead, it is a shorthand way of referring to “the relevant status” under § 922(g)(1), specifically a conviction in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g) requires knowledge of prohibited status; records of felony proceedings and years of incarceration can support a finding that the defendant knew he was a felon.

United States v. Hearnes · filed 2024-10-07(g)

The charging documents aside, a reasonable juror could conclude that the evidence — including the abundant records showing that hearings were held in the Virginia proceedings and that Hearne spent four years incarcerated — collectively establishes that he knew that he possessed a felony conviction and, accordingly, violated § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of the prior conviction that barred firearm possession.

Lewis v. United States · filed 2025-01-09(g)(1)

To be convicted under section 922(g)(1) of title 18 of the U.S. Code, the government must prove the defendant was aware of his prior conviction for a term of imprisonment greater than one year; this court instructed the jury accordingly.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove a defendant knew his firearm rights had not been restored when the defendant presents no evidence that he believed they had been restored.

United States v. Sjodin · filed 2025-06-11(g)(1)

And in the absence of such evidence, the Government did not have to prove Mr. Sjodin’s knowledge that his rights to possess firearms had not been restored.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know that he belongs to a category barred from possessing a firearm; prior felony convictions and prison terms can establish that knowledge.

Shamsideen · filed 2025-09-29(g)(1)

Petitioner has not challenged any other aspect of his conviction and likewise cannot challenge actual knowledge of his prohibited status under § 922(g)(1), given his multiple prior felony convictions and accompanying terms of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the indictment to allege that the defendant knew of his prohibited status; omitting that element is plain error, but relief requires an effect on substantial rights.

United States v. Dennison · filed 2026-02-24(g)(1)

Neither element was alleged in Dennison’s indictment, which predated Rehaif and Erlinger. As a result, the district court plainly erred in convicting Dennison of the § 922(g)(1) charge and applying the ACCA enhancement. Nevertheless, we conclude that neither error affected Dennison’s substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

United States v. Ingram · filed 2021-09-30(g)(1)

To the extent Ingram challenges the validity of his guilty plea, and to the extent that challenge is not also waived, Ingram’s argument lacks merit. See United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding § 922(g) does not require Government to prove defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms); see also Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 (2021) (holding that, to obtain relief based on Rehaif error, defendant must demonstrate that “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would not have pled guilty” had district court “correctly advised him of the mens rea element of the offense”).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year when possessing a firearm.

Copeland v. USA-2255 · filed 2022-04-05(g)(1)

Indeed, the Plea Agreement expressly states that the government was required to prove that the defendant knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at the time he possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a person possessing a firearm knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

Underwood v. United States · filed 2023-07-24(g)(1)

In Rehaif, the Court extended the knowledge requirement; the Government must prove that the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm” at the time of possession.

A conviction under § 922(j) carries a ten-year statutory maximum sentence under § 924(a)(2), even if the guideline range is higher.

United States v. Loving · filed 2001-04-30(j)

With respect to the second challenge to his sentence, on Count Two of the indictment Loving was charged with knowing that the firearms were stolen in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Loving was sentenced to 220 months’ imprisonment on that count. Loving is right when he notes that the 220 months’ imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum of ten years, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).

A conviction for providing false information on a firearm purchase application carries a maximum sentence of ten years, even if the defendant is an armed career criminal.

United States v. Williams · filed 1999-12-07(a)(6)

Williams and the government agree that under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2) the maximum sentence for providing false information on an application to procure a firearm from a lawfully authorized dealer is ten years. This reading of these statutes is correct, and Williams’ status as an armed career criminal does not affect his sentence for this crime.

Section 922(g)(2) convictions can survive review for a manifest miscarriage of justice when evidence shows the defendant left a state knowing charges were pending, failed to appear in court, and misled authorities about his identity and address.

United States v. Clark · filed 2004-03-03(g)(2)

Along that line, it is not disputed that Clark intentionally left Illinois, knowing charges were pending against him there under a false name. There is evidence that: Clark failed to appear before the court in Illinois where charges were pending; he had failed to appear in Illinois court once before; and he deliberately misled Illinois authorities by providing both a false name (Bailey) and false address (Mississippi). In sum, the record is not “devoid of evidence” pointing to Clark’s guilt — far from it.

Section 922(g)(2) requires a fugitive to know that charges are pending, that he has refused to answer them, and that he has left the charging jurisdiction; he need not know he is called a “fugitive.”

United States v. Ballentine · filed 1993-10-08(g)(2)

By way of contrast, “fugitive” status necessarily involves a defendant’s knowledge that charges are pending against him. It is not necessary for him to understand that he carries the name or status of “fugitive.” Instead, a defendant need only know that charges are pending against him, that he has refused to answer to those charges and that he has left the jurisdiction where the charges are pending.

Section 922(g)(2) requires proof that a person fled a jurisdiction to avoid prosecution; mere absence from that jurisdiction is insufficient.

United States v. Gonzalez · filed 1997-09-26(g)(2)

Here, the evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Gonzalez was ever in Puerto Rico, much less that he intentionally absented himself—that is, took himself away—from Puerto Rico to avoid prosecution there. In fact, the government was unable to produce evidence that Gonzalez had ever been in Puerto Rico or, for that matter, had been outside of Florida during the pertinent time. Gonzalez, therefore, does not meet the statutory definition of "fugitive"; his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2) is reversed.

Section 922(g)(2) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a fugitive from justice when he possessed a firearm.

Turner v. United States · filed 2023-04-12(g)(2)

Thus, the indictment alleges that the Defendant “knowingly” possessed a firearm but not that he “knowingly” was a fugitive from justice, the latter of which is required under Rehaif.

Section 922(g) does not preempt state laws restricting firearm possession by felons.

Helmer v. Miller · filed 1993-10-14(g)

Federal law makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; [j|] . . . [([] to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” (18 U.S.C. § 922(g).) Helmer contends this federal code section preempts regulation by California of the possession of firearms by felons. ... The regulation of the possession of firearms by felons is within the historic police powers of the states. Congress did not intend to preempt such authority, indeed it appears to have meant to augment state law dealing with firearm possession. Section 12021 is not preempted by federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) may prohibit a felon from possessing firearms even when state law permits possession, if the state has not substantially restored the felon’s civil rights.

United States v. Carey · filed 2005-03-15(g)(1)

State laws that allow felons to possess firearms are not dispositive in determining whether a felon has violated 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Section 922(g) prohibits firearm possession by certain people but does not give others a right to possess firearms or prevent states from imposing additional restrictions.

Brown v. Handgun Permit Review Board · filed 2009-10-28(g)

Section 922(g) does not establish any sort of right to possess a firearm; it simply prohibits firearm possession by certain persons.

Section 922(g)(3) does not preempt Oregon’s requirement to issue concealed handgun licenses to qualified applicants who use medical marijuana.

Willis v. Winters · filed 2011-05-19(g)(3)

Ultimately, then, we reject the sheriffs’ contention that, to the extent that ORS 166.291 requires county sheriffs to issue CHLs to qualified applicants without regard to their use of medical marijuana, the statute is preempted by the federal prohibition on gun possession by marijuana users at 18 USC section 922(g)(3).

Section 922(g)(9) does not preempt Washington’s restoration of firearm possession rights under state law, although federal possession restrictions may still apply.

Terry L. Kincer, V. State Of Washington · filed 2023-05-23(g)(9)

We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not preempt RCW 9.41.040(4).

Section 922(q)(2)(B)(i)'s private-property exemption does not cover firing bullets onto school grounds from private property.

United States v. Campbell · filed 1994-01-04(q)(2)(B)(i)

Discharging a pistol aimed at a school does not amount to a discharge of a firearm on private property not part of school grounds. In any common sense interpretation of the exemption, shooting a bullet on to school grounds, as was the case here, is not discharging the pistol on private property.

Section 922(q)(2)(B) excludes firearm possession on private property outside school grounds, but circumstantial evidence can support an inference that possession also occurred elsewhere.

United States v. Alvira-Sanchez · filed 2015-10-30(q)(2)(B)

Many crimes are proved by reasonably probative circumstantial evidence, and a rational jury could conclude due to the nature of the seized gun and evidence of Alvira-Sanchez's involvement in the drug trade that he did not keep his gun dutifully at home. Other juries appear to have inferred § 922(q) violations based on guns found at private residences.

In a felon-in-possession trial under § 922(g)(1), the court may deny a request to have the jury decide firearm possession before learning of the prior felony conviction.

United States v. Higdon · filed 2012-08-16(g)(1)

It would cause undue confusion to have a jury first determine whether Higdon in fact possessed the firearm. A reasonable juror would properly question why Higdon’s possession was criminal.

Bifurcation of § 922(g)(1)’s prior felony and firearm possession elements requires an extraordinarily unusual case.

United States v. Cruz · filed 2004-11-08(g)(1)

Cruz has not shown how the case at hand presents such an “extraordinarily unusual case” to warrant bifurcation, and the Court has not found any bases for such a ruling. Therefore, Cruz’s motion for bifurcation is denied.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, and a court may not try that element separately from firearm possession.

United States of America, Cross-Appellee v. Barker · filed 1994-03-31(g)(1)

We hold that the district court may not bifurcate the single offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm into multiple proceedings.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a trial court to bifurcate the firearm possession and prior conviction elements of a single charge.

United States v. Jacobs · filed 1995-01-12(g)(1)

Joshua is not directly applicable to this case because here the defendant was charged in a single-count indictment, but the defendant maintains that the logic of Joshua required a bifurcated trial nevertheless. ... In view of these authorities, we hold that the district court in this case acted correctly in denying the defendant's bifurcation request.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a court to bifurcate the prior felony element from the firearm possession element when trying a felon-in-possession count.

United States v. Mangum · filed 1996-11-22(g)(1)

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not severing the prior felony element from the other elements of the crime.

A defendant charged in a single count under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to separate trials of the prior-conviction and possession elements.

United States v. Jones · filed 2002-09-20(g)(1)

In this Circuit a defendant in a single-count indictment under Section 922(g) is not entitled to bifurcate trial of the “convicted felon” from the “in possession” elements.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction; the court may hear evidence of that status after the jury considers firearm possession to avoid prejudice.

United States v. Lake · filed 2002-10-05(g)(1)

Count six charges Lonnie Lake with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Count seven charges Lake with the same crime. To prove the defendants’ guilt of these crimes, the Government must establish that Lonnie Lake and Lake are felons. However, evidence of their prior convictions would not otherwise be admissible on the remaining counts. Accordingly, the Government proposes that, instead of issuing a limiting instruction, the Court bifurcate the presentation of evidence and jury deliberations for these charges. The Court agrees and finds that bifurcation is appropriate in this case to avoid any possible prejudicial spillover. The Government’s motion to bifurcate is granted.

A court may refuse to bifurcate a § 922(g)(1) trial to have the jury consider possession and prior conviction separately.

United States v. Belk · filed 2003-10-09(g)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err when it refused to bifurcate defendant’s trial to provide for separate consideration of the elements of the felon-in-possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) generally requires the elements of a single-count felon-in-possession charge to be tried together absent the government’s consent, though unusually heinous facts underlying the prior felony may justify bifurcation.

In Re: United States of America, United States of America v. Amante · filed 2005-08-09(g)(1)

Based on these three related decisions and consistent with other circuits that have granted writs of mandamus prohibiting district courts from ever bifurcating the trial, ... we hold that bifurcation of the elements of a single-count felon-in-possession trial, absent the government’s consent, is generally error. ... We do not rule out bifurcation where the facts underlying the prior felony would be presented to the jury and are so heinous as to overwhelm the trial of firearm or ammunition possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a court to try the firearm-possession and prior-felony elements together when the government offers to stipulate to the prior conviction.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2007-10-10(g)(1)

Johnson’s first claim—that the District Court erred by declining to bifurcate his trial—is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a separate jury phase for possession before the jury learns of the defendant’s prior felony conviction in a single-count trial.

United States v. Tyrone Fields · filed 2012-12-05(g)(1)

Our prior precedents compel us to reject Fields’ argument that bifurcation is mandated whenever a defendant stands trial on a felon-in-possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a court to bifurcate a single-count felon-in-possession trial so the jury considers firearm possession before the prior conviction.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2017-01-17(g)(1)

Thus, while bifurcation for single-count cases is perhaps permissible, it is certainly not required, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to bifurcate.

A court may decline to bifurcate proof of a felon-in-possession count when it limits evidence of the prior felony to a stipulation and gives a limiting instruction.

United States v. Epps · filed 2018-07-31(g)(1)

Considering the circumstances present here, including that the district court limited the evidence of Epps’s prior felony to a single stipulation and provided a limiting instruction, we are not convinced that the denial of the motion to bifurcate constituted an abuse of discretion.

Section 922(t)(3) does not require a sheriff to verify lawful firearm possession when issuing a concealed handgun license.

Willis v. Winters · filed 2010-06-16(t)(3)

But more to the point, section 922(t)(3) does not impose any obligations on the sheriff with respect to the issuance of a concealed handgun license. The statute does not require him to verify whether possession of a firearm “would be in violation of law.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by officers’ testimony that they saw the defendant draw a handgun, corroborated by a gun recovered nearby.

United States v. Delaney · filed 2024-06-11(g)(1)

“A jury may convict a defendant for a § 922(g)(1) violation based on either actual or constructive possession of a firearm.” ... The government presented sufficient evidence that Delaney possessed a firearm. ... Thus, a rational jury could find from this evidence that Delaney possessed the Tanfoglio handgun.

Another person’s ownership of a firearm does not rule out joint possession under § 922(g)(5).

United States v. Botello-Segundo · filed 2015-08-10(g)(5)

Joel’s ownership would not be dispositive of Botello-Segundo’s possession, which may be joint possession.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a convicted felon to receive proceeds from a third party’s sale of lawfully owned firearms if the felon has no power to control them.

United States v. Zaleski · filed 2012-07-13(g)(1)

The possibility that Zaleski will receive a financial benefit from Rando’s sale of the firearms and ammunition to compensate him for his non-possessory property interest in them does not, standing alone, mean that he constructively possesses them.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant possessed the firearm during the charged period.

United States v. Hackley · filed 2011-12-20(g)(1)

Since a jury could infer from this evidence that Hackley pos- sessed the gun on August 19th, before he was arrested, we affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a convicted felon who exercises dominion and control over a firearm during the charged period.

United States v. James Hackley, IV · filed 2011-12-06(g)(1)

A convicted felon is guilty under § 922(g) if he "exercised dominion and control over" a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm; proximity to one alone is insufficient.

United States v. Fields · filed 2011-05-20(g)(1)

Absent Fields’ possession, there simply was no crime that could be improperly attributed to him by his presence at the residence. Further, the district court’s instructions regarding the possession requirement were adequate to prevent a conviction based solely on Fields’ proximity to a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the defendant to own the firearm; constructive possession can sustain a conviction.

United States v. Ledingham · filed 2011-03-17(g)(1)

Ownership, however, is not required to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the jury heard significant evidence that Ledingham constructively possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g)(5) does not require exclusive control of the place where a firearm is found to establish possession when other evidence links the defendant to the gun.

United States v. Cota-Gastelum · filed 2010-12-09(g)(5)

As to the gun charges, Cota-Gastelum argues that a new trial should be granted because the guns forming the basis of those convictions were found in an area that was not under Cota-Gastelum’s exclusive control—his bedroom closet. Officers also discovered cash, a drug ledger, methamphetamine, a methamphetamine cutting agent, and numerous documents bearing Cota-Gastelum’s alias in the bedroom. Further, a cooperating witness identified one of the guns as a firearm she traded to Cota-Gastelum in exchange for a quarter ounce of methamphetamine. This evidence is plainly sufficient to establish possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a firearm possession conviction based on actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2010-10-15(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Gardner · filed 2010-08-19(g)(1)

Under the circumstances, a reasonable finder of fact could find that Gardner had actual or constructive possession of the guns.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession requirement can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Adams · filed 2010-04-14(g)(1)

Nevertheless, actual possession is not necessary to fulfill the possession requirement of § 922(g)(1). It is enough that the evidence show that Adams had constructive possession.

Section 922(g) permits proof of knowing firearm possession through constructive possession; in a jointly occupied home, evidence supporting a plausible inference of knowledge and access can suffice.

United States v. Hooper · filed 2009-12-21(g)

To prove a felon-in-possession offense, the Government had to establish that Hooper had been convicted of a felony, he possessed a firearm in or affecting ... interstate commerce, and he knew he possessed the firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); United States v. Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995). ... As to whether Hooper knew he possessed the firearm, evidence of constructive possession is sufficient, and constructive possession may be shown in joint occupancy cases by some evidence “supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.” Ybarra, 70 F.3d at 365. ... A rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hooper resided in the house and that he had knowledge of and access to the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly exercised control over the firearm to establish possession.

United States v. Love · filed 2009-10-23(g)(1)

In order to establish possession, the government had to establish that Love knowingly exercised control over the gun. ... Despite Love’s testimony, a rational jury could have inferred that Love brought the gun with him even if he was at the body shop to pick up his girlfriend’s vehicle, and any argument to the contrary would be frivolous.

Section 922(g)(1) allows joint possession to support a felon-in-possession conviction when the defendant knows of the firearm and intends and is able to control it.

United States v. Jones · filed 2009-09-29(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence that Jones jointly possessed the firearms with his passengers. Possession need not be exclusive, so long as each person knows of the object’s presence and has the intention and ability to control it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; another person’s ownership does not defeat possession when the defendant knowingly can control it.

United States v. Shipp · filed 2007-05-17(g)(1)

M s. Shipp’s alleged ownership of the firearms does not influence this crucial inquiry into whether M r. Shipp had the knowing ability to control the firearms in his home.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be satisfied by actual, constructive, or joint possession.

United States v. Cox · filed 2007-02-20(g)(1)

Possession may be actual, constructive, or joint.

Section 922(g) does not treat a felon’s designation of a recipient for seized firearms as constructive possession when the government controls the firearms and the felon retains only minimal ownership rights.

United States v. Parsons · filed 2007-02-07(g)

Because the government already had taken possession and control over the firearms, and in doing so has also already deprived defendant Parsons of nearly all vestiges of ownership, the court concludes that permitting defendant Parsons to now designate to whom his firearm collection should be given does not rise to the level of constructive possession but is, instead, permitting defendant Parsons to exercise only the merest indicia of ownership.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm regardless of who owns it.

United States v. Shoup · filed 2007-02-07(g)(1)

Given the Carvalho testimony that he had seen a gun in Shoup’s waistband, the prosecutor aptly noted that it was irrelevant who owned the gun, and that Shoup was guilty of section 922(g)(1) possession even if he had found the Nobile gun in the console and brandished it during his encounter with Carvalho.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon-in-possession conviction based on either actual, knowing possession or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Harris · filed 2007-01-31(g)(1)

But, to prove that Harris illegally possessed a firearm on this count, the government may show either actual, knowing possession or constructive possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of knowing possession; when a vehicle is jointly occupied, constructive possession requires evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Pahulu · filed 2004-09-01(g)(1)

To establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1), the government must demonstrate, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant “knowingly [held] ownership, dominion, or control over the object and the premises where it [wa]s found.” ... We conclude the government has failed to establish that Pahulu constructively possessed the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of firearm possession through constructive possession, but control of a vehicle alone does not establish possession of a gun when strong evidence shows someone else controlled it.

United States v. Wright · filed 1994-06-15(g)(1)

Thus, while dominion over the vehicle certainly will help the government's case, it alone cannot establish constructive possession of a weapon found in the vehicle, particularly in the face of evidence that strongly suggests that somebody else exercised dominion and control over the weapon.

Section 922(g) permits a finding of constructive possession when a felon knows of a firearm and has both the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over it.

United States v. Holmes · filed 1994-06-22(g)

It was proper for the jury to rely on the testimony of Madeline Darby and Don Brown as well as on other evidence to conclude that Holmes had knowledge of the weapon and both the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over it. Therefore, Holmes had constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through constructive possession; when control of the premises is shared, the evidence must show a nexus between the defendant and the firearm.

United States v. Evans · filed 1994-06-30(g)(1)

However, if dominion or control over such premises was not exclusive, the evidence must establish a nexus between the defendant and the firearm. ... Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish Evans's constructive possession of the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of knowing firearm possession; when premises are jointly occupied, constructive possession requires evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Samuel Ervin Mills · filed 1994-07-08(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government is required to show that Mifis knowingly possessed a firearm. ... In cases of joint occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm through ownership, control, or dominion.

United States v. Hiebert · filed 1994-07-27(g)(1)

For the purposes of section 922(g)(1), possession of the firearm may be constructive. ... An individual constructively possesses a firearm if he owns it or has control or dominion over it.

Under § 922(g)(1), a felon may constructively possess a firearm when the evidence shows knowledge of and control over the weapon.

United States v. Speer · filed 1994-08-22(g)(1)

We conclude that this is sufficient evidence that Weeks was in constructive possession of the weapon in violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on sufficient evidence of constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Randy Falls, A/K/A Robert Falls · filed 1994-10-25(g)

Although Falls contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he constructively possessed the firearms in question, we find that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be proved by constructive possession when evidence connects the defendant to a firearm and supports an inference of dominion and control.

United States v. Wong · filed 1994-12-19(g)(1)

The only element in dispute here is whether Wong "possessed" the guns. Possession may be proven by showing "actual" (physical) possession or "constructive" possession. The government argues that Wong had constructive possession of the guns. To show this, the government must prove "a sufficient connection between the defendant and the contraband to support the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over" the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant owned and drove a vehicle and a firearm was within reach near the driver's side.

United States v. Deon Harris, A/K/A Kemu Harris · filed 1995-01-18(g)(1)

First, Harris, unlike Blue, was the owner and driver of the car. Thus, he clearly had dominion and control over the vehicle. Furthermore, the Glock pistol, which was fully loaded, was well within Harris's reach, unlike the weapon in Blue. Finally, the Glock pistol was closer to the driver's side of the car, whereas another firearm was located closer to the front passenger's side. Under the familiar standard of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the evidence was sufficient to convict Harris.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession of a firearm when a felon can control it through others, even while briefly away from home.

United States v. Woods · filed 1995-01-20(g)(1)

Even an incarcerated person can be guilty of constructive possessions of firearms under Sec. 922(g), where "incarceration [does] not affect his power to exercise control over the firearms through other persons." Moreno, 933 F.2d at 373. Mr. Woods' brief absence from home did not vitiate his power to exercise control over the pistol through his relatives.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant controlled the firearm.

United States v. Crawford · filed 1995-01-27(g)(1)

Possession may be actual or constructive. ... On the basis of this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find that the positioning and contents of the nylon bag, as well as the presence of a three-inch shotgun shell on Appellant's seat, constituted constructive possession of the weapons. Therefore, we affirm the convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through constructive possession, which requires knowledge of the firearm or ammunition and the power to exercise dominion and control over it.

United States v. Bernard · filed 1995-02-16(g)(1)

Because Bernard was not in the hospital room at the time the officers found the firearm and ammunition, the Government must establish that Bernard constructively possessed the items. To prove constructive possession, the Government must demonstrate: 1) that Bernard knew of the presence of the firearm and ammunition, and 2) that Bernard had the power to exercise dominion and control over the items.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of possession through constructive possession when proximity to firearms is supported by substantial other incriminating evidence.

United States of America v. McClain · filed 1995-05-25(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under Sec. 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant (1) was convicted of a felony and (2) possessed a firearm that had moved through interstate commerce. ... McClain's presence near the guns, coupled with the substantial other incriminating evidence presented, was sufficient to establish constructive possession and we affirm on this issue.

Section 922(g)(1)'s firearm possession element may be proved through constructive possession.

United States v. Roberson · filed 1995-07-11(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Roberson "knowingly possessed" the firearms found in the bedroom. One of the firearms was found on the night stand next to Roberson's insulin on his side of the bed. The other was found near the night stand, also on Roberson's side of the bed. The second gun was traced to Roy Parmaly, a good friend of Roberson's and a fellow officer of the Cossacks Motorcycle Club. For the reasons discussed more fully in Section III.A, supra, we hold that this evidence is sufficient for a jury to conclude that Roberson had constructive possession of the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when evidence shows that a felon lived in the home where firearms were found.

United States v. Isiah Kitchen · filed 1995-07-27(g)(1)

The evidence is therefore sufficient to support Kitchen’s conviction for a felon’s possession of a firearm under Section 922(g)(1). The jury might have determined that he lived at the residence and occupied the bedroom where the guns were located. Under these circumstances, we believe that Kitchen constructively possessed the guns in question.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm charged in the indictment.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1995-09-11(g)

Since Jackson's indictment charged him with violating statutes that criminalize possession of "a firearm," see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and use or carriage of "a firearm," see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), his firearm convictions could have been based on his constructive possession of any of the three firearms alleged in the two firearm counts in his indictment.

A firearm found under a defendant’s bed can support constructive possession under § 922(g) when there is no indication that the defendant shared the bedroom.

United States v. Nick Alfred Owens, United States of America v. Kevin Lee Johnson · filed 1995-11-15(g)

Nick Owens contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... We disagree. Mr. Owens was arrested in his bedroom while he was lying asleep in his bed. There was a semiautomatic handgun under the bed. There is no indication he shared his bedroom with anyone else. Thus Mills and our other decisions addressing constructive possession in cases of “joint occupancy” are distinguishable.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that a defendant lived where the gun was found, dealt drugs there, and made a corroborated admission that he owned it.

United States v. Ybarra · filed 1995-11-22(g)(1)

The combination of his residence in the house where the gun was found, his drug dealing at the house and his corroborated confession that he owned the gun clearly allowed a factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction when a felon actually or constructively possesses a firearm; constructive possession requires the power and intention to control it, directly or through others.

United States v. Lloyd · filed 1995-12-05(g)(1)

The jury instruction on actual and constructive possession was a proper statement of the law, as the transcript provides evidence that Lloyd had dominion and control over the weapon whether it was in his own hand or in the hands of his security guards. Thus, we are of the opinion that the trial judge did not commit error when he instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm under a theory of either actual or constructive possession of the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm when the evidence supports that theory.

United States v. Wimberly · filed 1996-03-28(g)(1)

Although Wimberly’s actual possession of the gun in the alley was part of the government’s case, the evidence also included testimony that Wimberly stashed the gun in a kitchen drawer before the officers entered the apartment. That evidence supported the district court’s decision to instruct the jury on alternative theories of possession.

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession of a firearm; physical possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Ward · filed 1996-03-28(g)(1)

A defendant need not be in actual possession of a weapon to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), constructive possession is sufficient.

Section 922(g) permits a conviction based on joint or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Santomauro · filed 1996-04-24(g)

That Ryan may have owned, and Reuter physically possessed, the firearms is of no consequence, because a § 922(g) conviction may be based on joint or constructive possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm without proof of actual possession.

United States v. Grubb · filed 1996-04-25(g)(1)

Constructive possession is sufficient for a conviction under § 922(g)(1), and proof of actual possession is not required.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be satisfied by either actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Leonard Bingham (94-4330) Terrance B. Bagley (95-3006) Josephus M. Petaway (95-3171) Craig S. Houston ( · filed 1996-05-23(g)

Both actual and constructive possession satisfy the possession element for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Chavers · filed 1996-05-30(g)(1)

A conviction for violating § 922(g)(1) may be based on constructive possession of a firearm.

When a defendant shares the premises, § 922(g)(1)’s possession element requires a connection between the defendant and the firearm; constructive possession can satisfy that element.

United States v. Mack · filed 1996-06-19(g)(1)

However, this case involves joint occupancy by Mr. Mack and Ms. Jackson. Therefore, to prove the defendant’s constructive possession, the government was required to show some connection or nexus between Mr. Mack and the firearm.

Section 922(g) permits a finding of constructive possession when a person knowingly has both the power and intent to control a firearm.

United States v. Afaneh · filed 1996-07-03(g)

Our test for constructive possession in § 922(g) cases has been straightforward. "Constructive possession requires that a person knowingly have power and intention to exercise control over an object." United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)).

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element is satisfied by constructive possession when the defendant has the power and intention to control the firearms.

United States v. Argento · filed 1996-08-19(g)(1)

On the basis of the above explication of the evidence before the jury, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Argento had both the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over both the firearms and the methamphetamine found at the residence; therefore, that he had constructive possession of these items.

Section 922(g) permits proof of possession through evidence that the defendant knew of the firearm and had the power and intent to exercise dominion over it.

United States v. Previtte · filed 1996-10-25(g)

Constructive possession may be proved by showing that the defendant had the power and intent to exercise dominion over the firearm and knew it existed. ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find that a rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Previtte had dominion and control over the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant intends to exercise dominion or control over the firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 1997-01-03(g)(1)

This instruction explicitly requires a determination that the defendant intended to exercise dominion over something in order to find that he had constructive possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon's firearm possession to be proved through circumstantial evidence of constructive possession.

United States v. McBee · filed 1997-01-10(g)(1)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the evidence must be sufficient to satisfy three elements: (1) that the defendant was convicted of a felony punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (2) that following his conviction, the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment; and (3) that the firearm specified in the indictment travelled in or affected interstate commerce. ... McBee's challenge to his firearm conviction must also fail. The testimony of the officer that the location of the weapon was such as to make it most accessible to the passenger of the car, namely, McBee, is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish constructive possession. McBee's alleged statement to the agent, while not actually admitting the gun was his, "but if it was, it was not for the police," also qualifies as circumstantial evidence of a knowing intention to exercise dominion and control over the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm or ammunition; actual physical possession is unnecessary.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1997-02-20(g)(1)

“Constructive possession”--again ownership, dominion, or control-- is sufficient for a conviction under § 922 (g)(1); proof of actual possession is not required.

Section 922(g)'s firearm possession element can be proved by constructive possession when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knew of and controlled the firearm.

United States v. Durhan J. Clay · filed 1997-03-17(g)

We reject Clay's challenge, because we believe a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Clay constructively possessed ... the firearm in question.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of constructive possession of a firearm through dominion over the premises where it is stored; possession of a key need not be proven.

United States v. Balanga · filed 1997-04-01(g)(1)

As our decision in Mabry makes clear, such dominion may be inferred, and possession of a key did not have to be proven.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a driver exercises dominion and control over a car containing firearms.

United States v. William Sherod, III · filed 1997-04-09(g)(1)

He exerted complete dominion and control over the car in which the firearms were found and therefore over the firearms themselves.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by evidence that a defendant knew of and exercised control over guns found in his car.

United States v. Moore · filed 1997-04-15(g)(1)

Of course, the mere fact that three handguns were found in Moore's car is insufficient to establish possession. However, the presence of the guns in a car owned and operated by Moore coupled with the fact that two of the guns fit the shoulder holster worn by Moore suggests that he knew of and exercised control over the guns.

Section 922(g)(1) requires evidence connecting a defendant to a firearm to prove constructive possession when the room where it was found was jointly occupied.

United States v. Taylor · filed 1997-05-12(g)(1)

Not only did the government fail to present any evidence tending to show Mr. Taylor had any knowledge of the gun, but it also failed to establish any nexus between Mr. Taylor and the gun. Consequently, we find Mr. Taylor's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) must be reversed based on insufficient evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon’s firearm possession to be proved by shared power to exercise dominion and control over the firearms.

United States v. Stotts · filed 1997-07-03(g)(1)

Stotts, Fonville, and Wilson, all convicted felons, claim that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions for possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... This testimony, along with the other evidence about their involvement in the group's activities, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Stotts, Fonville, and Wilson had the power to exercise dominion and control over the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm when the evidence shows the defendant's ability to control it.

United States v. McFatridge · filed 1997-08-07(g)(1)

However, here there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that McFatridge himself was in constructive possession of the firearms, and constructive possession is sufficient for conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through constructive possession, which requires knowledge of the firearm and the power to control it.

United States v. Drennen · filed 1997-09-05(g)

"Knowing possession," under the relevant statutes, may be established by proving that the defendant was in con- structive possession of a firearm. ... We find that this evidence is sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Sandoval · filed 1997-10-02(g)(1)

Under § 922(g)(1) it is sufficient for the finder of fact to determine that a convicted felon was in constructive possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm to be proved through constructive possession supported by circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to the firearm.

United States v. Horey · filed 1997-10-23(g)(1)

The evidence also was sufficient to satisfy the second element of § 922(g)(1), i.e., that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearms, albeit constructively.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction for constructive possession of a firearm; actual possession is not required.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1997-12-22(g)(1)

The statute does not require a defendant to have had actual possession of a firearm; constructive possession is enough.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Marty · filed 1998-01-07(g)(1)

Constructive possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession in a shared home when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant knew of and could access the firearm.

United States v. Millikin · filed 1998-01-09(g)(1)

Rather, in such situations, we require evidence “supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of the firearm; knowing a gun is hidden in a shared vehicle does not establish possession without control of the gun or vehicle.

United States v. Leonard · filed 1998-04-08(g)(1)

While it is unwise, merely sharing a vehicle in which one knows cocaine and a gun are hidden does not amount to possession or aiding or abetting their possession. The evidence is insufficient to show either that Leonard possessed the cocaine or the Glock pistol, or that he aided and abetted their possession. Therefore, his convictions on Counts One and Three of the indictment must be reversed.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence of constructive possession, including control over the home where the firearm was found.

United States v. Reed · filed 1998-04-15(g)(1)

Like actual possession, constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. ... Sufficient evidence existed to allow a rational trier of fact to reasonably find that Reed constructively possessed the contraband found in the flat that he alone inhabited.

Section 922(g) permits a conviction based on constructive possession when the person has the capability and intent to exercise dominion and control over a gun.

United States v. McKinney · filed 1998-04-30(g)

Constructive possession requires proof that a person has the capability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over a gun without having actual possession.

Knowing that a gun is hidden in a shared vehicle does not establish possession under § 922(g)(1) without evidence of control over the gun or vehicle.

United States v. Juan Phillip Leonard Scott Lee Moore, A.K.A. Dennis L. Spinks · filed 1998-06-24(g)(1)

While it is unwise, merely sharing a vehicle in which one knows cocaine and a gun are hidden does not amount to possession or aiding or abetting their possession. The evidence is insufficient to show either that Leonard possessed the cocaine or the Glock pistol, or that he aided and abetted their possession.

Section 922(g) allows a felon's firearm possession to be proved through constructive possession, including control of a vehicle containing a firearm.

United States v. Washington · filed 1998-06-24(g)

Possession of a fire- arm for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922 may be constructive. ... Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to show that Washington constructively possessed the firearm at issue.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession.

United States v. Willie Kincaide (96-1771), Christian R. Key (96-1915), Keith Elbert Riley (96-1772) · filed 1998-07-20(g)(1)

Evidence of constructive possession suffices to satisfy the requirement under § 922(g)(1) of proof that a defendant possessed a firearm.

Possession of a firearm under § 922(g) may be constructive.

United States v. Coates · filed 1998-07-29(g)

Possession of a firearm for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922 may be constructive.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession requirement can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Samuel T. Taylor, United States of America v. Samuel T. Taylor · filed 1998-08-26(g)(1)

It is a short step under these facts from finding that Taylor lived at the residence to finding that he constructively possessed the weapons found there. The weapons were found in a padlocked closet near the bed in which he slept, and the closet contained only men’s clothing and cologne, as well as a receipt with his name on it.

Section 922(g) permits proof of firearm possession through constructive possession; physical possession is unnecessary.

United States of America, Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. James Payton, AKA James Perkins, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appelle · filed 1998-10-05(g)

The government need not prove that Payton physically possessed the firearm to establish a § 922(g) violation; proof of constructive possession is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved through constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Richardson, John · filed 1998-10-27(g)(1)

Accordingly, we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that appellant constructively possessed the fire- arm in question.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm found in a car over which the defendant exercises dominion.

United States v. Darnell L. Walker (96-3073) William A. McKinley (96-3938) · filed 1998-11-19(g)(1)

Indeed, the evidence that Walker constructively possessed the firearm is overwhelming. There is strong evidence that the firearm was found in the car, over which it is indisputable that Walker exercised dominion.

For a § 922(g)(3) conviction, constructive possession of a firearm may be established by dominion and control over it together with knowledge of its presence.

United States v. Bob · filed 1998-12-29(g)(3)

Constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises, or has the power to exercise, dominion and control over the item, United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir. 1980), and has knowledge of the item's presence. See United States v. Schocket, 753 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1985).

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's actual or constructive possession of ammunition.

United States v. Toliver · filed 1999-01-11(g)(1)

Possession of a firearm for the purposes of§ 922(g) may be either actual or constructive. ... By throwing the clip from the car, Toliver exerted the necessary dominion and control over the ammunition to establish that he possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to prove firearm possession through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. McGeorge · filed 1999-02-12(g)(1)

To establish possession for purposes of section 922(g)(1), the government must show actual or constructive possession.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, and constructive possession satisfies its possession element.

United States v. Surratt · filed 1999-03-31(g)

It is well established that the government need not prove actual possession, constructive possession is sufficient. ... "Constructive possession of [contraband] is established if a person has 'ownership, dominion or control over the contraband itself, or dominion over the premises in which the contraband is concealed.'" ... We hold, therefore, that a reasonable jury could conclude that Romelle Surratt "had sufficient dominion over the premises to establish constructive possession of the [drugs and weapon]."

Section 922(g)(1) covers constructive possession of ammunition when the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of and controlled it.

United States v. De Leon · filed 1999-04-14(g)(1)

After a careful consideration of all the evidence presented to the jury, we conclude that a jury could have reasonably inferred that De Leon was in constructive possession of the ammunition in violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of knowing possession when a defendant knows a firearm is in a vehicle he controls.

United States v. Barnhart · filed 1999-05-04(g)(1)

At trial, Appellant testified that he owned the vehicle where the firearm was located and that he knew the firearm was in the vehicle. We hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most ... favorable to the government, supports that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant constructively possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)'s possession requirement can be satisfied by constructive possession of a firearm through dominion over the premises where it is concealed.

United States v. Romelle Monte Surratt, United States of America v. Gregory Surratt, Sr. · filed 1999-05-04(g)

The government’s evidence in this case is more than sufficient to support a conclusion that Romelle Surratt constructively possessed the drugs and gun found during the search of his apartment.

Section 922(g)'s possession element requires proof that the defendant had power and intent to control the firearm; being present with its possessor and able to influence him is insufficient.

United States v. Martin Jr · filed 1999-06-10(g)

Far from powerful for this purpose, this evidence, at best, indicates that Martin was in a position to influence G.M. It is, however, insufficient to prove power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the rifle.

Section 922(g) requires proof of knowing firearm possession; mere presence with the person holding the firearm does not establish the power and intent needed for constructive possession.

No. 98-3569 · filed 1999-06-10(g)

The United States suggests that the "most powerful evidence" of constructive possession is the fact that Martin was with G.M. through the entire episode. Far from powerful for this purpose, this evidence, at best, indicates that Martin was in a position to influence G.M. It is, however, insufficient to prove power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the rifle.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive or joint possession of a firearm.

United States v. Boyd · filed 1999-06-21(g)(1)

A conviction for violating § 922(g) may be based on constructive or joint possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a firearm possession conviction based on constructive or joint possession.

No. 98-3583 · filed 1999-06-21(g)(1)

A conviction for violating § 922(g) may be based on constructive or joint possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Lewis · filed 1999-06-23(g)(1)

Thus, the facts of the instant case are within the realm of evidence necessary to find constructive possession and the evidence was sufficient to convict Lewis of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by constructive possession when a felon knowingly has the power and intention to control a firearm.

United States v. Smallwood · filed 1999-08-26(g)(1)

Possession may be either actual or constructive. In this case, the government alleged constructive possession. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Smallwood knowingly had the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to prove firearm possession through constructive possession, including control over the premises where the firearms are located.

United States v. Layne · filed 1999-09-16(g)(1)

The government may prove possession under § 922(g)(1) by proving constructive possession, which exists “when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports a plausible inference that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm.

United States v. Springfield · filed 1999-11-17(g)(1)

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s convictions of defendant for possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute, carrying a firearm during a drug offense, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government presented evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that defendant constructively possessed the drugs and gun in the van.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on constructive possession of a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Cook · filed 1999-12-20(g)(1)

In this case, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Cook was in constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition.