18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status element can be supported by a defendant’s stipulation that he knew of a qualifying conviction when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Austin · filed 2021-12-16(g)(1)

We are satisfied that those facts are sufficient to establish the knowledge-of-status element recognized in Rehaif, and we thus reject Austin’s challenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis.

A § 922(g) plea challenge based on an omitted knowledge-of-status element fails on plain-error review when the defendant acknowledged his felony conviction at the plea hearing.

United States v. Washington · filed 2021-12-16(g)

Washington’s second argument is also unavailing: that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the district court failed to apprise him of each of the elements of the § 922(g) offense and relied on an insufficient factual basis because it omitted the knowledge element. This claim fails for the same reason as Washington’s first argument, namely that he cannot establish plain error given his acknowledgement of his felony conviction at his Rule 11 hearing.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm; a prior firearm conviction and a supervision condition barring firearm possession can support that finding.

Chiles v. United States · filed 2021-12-20(g)(1)

Given that he knew he was a felon, and had admitted that fact to law enforcement, and given that he had spent ten years in prison for a firearm conviction and that, as a convicted felon, he was bound by a condition of supervision that prohibited him from possessing a firearm, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to conclude Chiles knew he was a felon prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Unpreserved errors concerning knowledge of felon status under § 922(g)(1) do not warrant relief without a showing that they affected the outcome of the proceedings.

United States v. Norris · filed 2021-12-28(g)(1)

In short, Norris has made no showing that the Rehaif-based errors in his indictment, evidence, and jury instructions affected the outcome of his proceedings, and he has identified no distinction from Greer and Lara that would permit us to grant relief without such a showing.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew his prior offense was punishable by more than one year in prison; circumstantial evidence can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Harris · filed 2021-12-30(g)(1)

In other words, in § 922(g) prosecutions, the government must prove the defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to the prohibited class charged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)’s knowledge-of-status requirement does not warrant plain-error relief for a defendant who stipulated that he was a convicted felon.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2022-01-12(g)

Finally, we address the impact of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019) (holding a § 922(g) offense requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status) on Johnson’s § 922(g) conviction. ... Here, Johnson stipulated that he was a convicted felon. Accordingly, he cannot establish plain error under Rehaif and Greer.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Montano · filed 2022-01-07(g)(1)

To convict a defendant under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove the defendant knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the firearm.

A felon-in-possession conviction requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon; an unpreserved error concerning that requirement warrants relief only if it affected the defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. Delton Warren · filed 2022-01-07(g)(1)

And on appeal, Warren has not made a sufficient showing that he would have presented evidence in the district court that he did not in fact know he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. Thus, under Greer, Warren has not carried the burden of showing that the Rehaif errors affected his substantial rights and therefore, under plain-error review, his convictions are affirmed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had a felony conviction that barred him from possessing one.

Lewis v. United States · filed 2022-01-24(g)(1)

To obtain a § 922(g)(1) conviction post-Rehaif, the government had to prove that Lewis knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he was the type of felon described in § 922(g)(1) who is barred from pos- sessing a firearm.

A defendant’s unpreserved challenge to a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea can fail plain-error review when a prior felon-in-possession conviction shows he knew his felony status.

United States v. Woodberry · filed 2022-01-18(g)(1)

We find that Woodberry’s Rehaif challenge fails the third prong. ... In fact, Woodberry had a prior North Carolina conviction for felony possession of a firearm by a felon, which in and of itself placed Woodberry on notice of his felon status. ... We therefore conclude that Woodberry’s guilty plea remains valid after Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

FORLER v. United States · filed 2022-01-26(g)(1)

Now, "in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) . . . , the government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." ... Forler has identified a defect in his Indictment that brings it out of step with Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon, but not that he knew felons were prohibited from possessing firearms.

Weston v. Howard · filed 2022-01-31(g)(1)

Rehaif does not require proof that the defendant knew that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm; it simply requires the defendant to knowingly possess a firearm and to know that he had previously been convicted of a felony at the time he did so.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status; omitting that element from the indictment and jury instructions is error.

United States v. Hobbs · filed 2022-02-01(g)

In the present case, it is undisputed that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the mens rea required for a conviction under Section 922(g), and that the indictment was defective for failing to allege this element of the offense. We nonetheless conclude that Hobbs has not established that these errors affected his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

United States v. Streeter · filed 2022-02-07(g)(1)

Here, the district court did not advise Streeter that, with respect to his § 922(g)(1) offense, the Government was required to “prove both that [Streeter] knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm.

Hatcher v. United States · filed 2022-02-08(g)(1)

Because Mr. Hatcher acknowledged during his plea colloquy that he knew of his status as a felon, Rehaif cannot now avail him.

A defendant seeking plain error relief from a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea after an omitted knowledge-of-status advisement must show a reasonable probability that proper advice would have changed his decision to plead guilty.

United States v. Enyinnaya · filed 2022-02-09(g)(1)

Enyinnaya makes no such argument on appeal; rather, he has never “argued or made a representation that [he] would have presented evidence . . . that [he] did not in fact know [he was a] felon[] when [he] possessed firearms” if the district court had informed him of that element of the offense. Id. at 2098. Accordingly, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status; a defendant who admitted that status and offered no evidence that he was unaware of it did not establish plain error in his guilty plea.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2022-02-04(g)(1)

Here, in connection with his guilty plea, Thomas admitted that he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm. Also, Thomas did not present any evidence showing that he was not, at that time, aware of his felony status. We therefore find no plain error under Rehaif in the district court’s acceptance of Thomas’ guilty plea.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Saheed Grant · filed 2022-02-08(g)(1)

As it is undisputed that Grant was fully aware he was a convicted felon at the time he committed the crime to which he pled guilty, Rehaif affords Grant no relief.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Walker, Santino v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2022-02-09(g)(1)

Applying that statutory interpretation to Walker’s case, the government’s burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker knew, at the time of the offense, he had “been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; knowledge of the federal firearms prohibition is not required.

Van, Lafayette v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2022-02-09(g)(1)

Yet even assuming both of Van’s assertions are true, that does not suggest that the government could not meet its burden of proof as to his knowledge that he had been convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year of confinement, which is all that is required under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status; a person who served more than a year for a felony cannot plausibly claim ignorance of that status without supporting evidence.

Frazier v. United States · filed 2022-02-14(g)(1)

However, Frazier has not shown that he is actually innocent of a § 922(g) violation due to not knowing that he had been convicted of a felony. Ignorance of felon status is implausible where the individual was incarcerated for more than one year.

A defendant seeking relief from a § 922(g)(5)(A) guilty plea on plain-error review for lack of advice about the knowledge-of-status element must show a reasonable probability that proper advice would have changed the plea.

United States v. Martinez-Melquiades · filed 2022-02-16(g)(5)(A)

As the Supreme Court recently explained, to obtain relief based on a Rehaif error on plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty” had the district court “correctly advised him of the mens rea element of the offense.” Id. at 2097 (internal quotation marks omitted). Martinez-Melquiades makes no such argument on appeal. Moreover, the record reflects that Martinez-Melquiades knew that he was a citizen of Mexico and that he has lived in the United States illegally since 1999. We therefore conclude that he is not entitled to relief.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, rather than knowledge of the legal label “felon.”

COLEN v. ORTIZ · filed 2022-02-17(g)(1)

As the Supreme Court held, the critical inquiry is whether a person “know{s] that the crime is ‘punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.’” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct, at 2198 (emphasis in original} (quoting § 922(g)(1)).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status; a defendant challenging a guilty plea on plain error review must show a reasonable probability that proper advice about that element would have changed his plea.

United States v. Molette · filed 2022-02-24(g)(1)

As the Supreme Court recently explained, to obtain relief pursuant to Rehaif on plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty” had the district court “correctly advised him of the mens rea element of the offense.” Id. at 2097 (internal quotation marks omitted). Molette makes no such argument on appeal; rather, he has never “argued or made a representation that [he] would have presented evidence . . . that [he] did not in fact know [he was a] felon[] when [he] possessed firearms” if the district court had informed him of that element of the offense. Id. at 2098. Accordingly, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Tullies · filed 2022-02-10(g)(1)

Their reasoning was that the Government did not prove, as required by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019), that each of them knew he was a felon (meaning someone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison) at the time he possessed the firearms at issue. Indeed, that is correct.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know he was a felon when he possessed a firearm; admitting that knowledge during a guilty plea satisfies the element.

JEFFERSON v. United States · filed 2022-02-17(g)(1)

Petitioner thus admitted the element Rehaif requires at his plea colloquy – both that he was a felon, and that he knew that he was a felon at the time he possessed the weapons in question. Thus, even though his indictment may not have specifically charged the element – not surprising in light of the two year gap between Petitioner’s guilty plea and the decision in Rehaif – Petitioner admitted to it and it is completely clear that even if Petitioner had been told that such knowledge was a requirement for a § 922(g) conviction, he still would have pled guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

United States v. Clark · filed 2022-02-24(g)(1)

We reject Clark’s suggestion that his conviction is no longer lawful under Rehaif. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that, to obtain a felon in possession conviction, “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200. The record reflects that Clark knew he was a felon at the time of the offense and that he was previously convicted of numerous felonies. Under the circumstances, Rehaif affords him no relief.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felon status when possessing a firearm; omission of that element from a plea colloquy does not invalidate the conviction without a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded differently.

United States v. Hill · filed 2022-02-25(g)(1)

We therefore conclude that Hill’s § 922(g) conviction remains valid.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his convicted-felon status when possessing a firearm; on plain-error review, a challenge to that element fails when the record shows the defendant knew his status.

United States v. Tanner Larch · filed 2022-03-03(g)(1)

We conclude that Larch cannot reasonably argue that he did not know he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearms and, therefore, any Rehaif error did not affect his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit firearm possession by a felon after Rehaif clarified the offense’s knowledge element.

Moore v. Young · filed 2022-03-07(g)(1)

This reasoning is unpersuasive. Rehaif did not change the scope of the criminal offense so as to decriminalize Petitioner’s underlying conduct. It merely clarified the elements of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove that a defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Carl McNeil, Jr. · filed 2022-03-07(g)(1)

In conducting the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court failed to fully advise McNeil of the elements of the § 922(g)(1) charge because it did not advise him that the Government ... had to prove that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a felon who knew his felony status.

Turner v. Streeval · filed 2022-03-11(g)(1)

In addition to Turner’s failure to allege or offer any proof that he did not know he was a felon, there is ample proof in the record to support the knowledge-of-status element. ... Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Turner cannot demonstrate that the conduct for which he was convicted is no longer a crime.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status when possessing a firearm, but does not require knowledge that the law prohibits felons from possessing one.

Jones v. Warden of USP Lee · filed 2022-03-18(g)(1)

He alleges that he did not know he could not possess a firearm, but knowledge that the law prohibits felons from possessing a firearm is not required to prove a violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a felon; a defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after being uninformed of that element must show a reasonable probability he would have gone to trial.

Howard III v. Rivers · filed 2022-03-11(g)(1)

He has offered no evidence or even asserted that he did not know he was a felon, and so cannot satisfy his burden to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty.

Lack of knowledge of felon status can be a defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge.

United States v. Leach · filed 2022-03-15(g)(1)

While a lack of knowledge about felon status can be a defense to a § 922(g) charge, Leach never claimed he lacked such knowledge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Phillips · filed 2022-03-18(g)(1)

Here, it is undisputed that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea requirement for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) in light of Rehaif and that this error was plain, but we conclude that Phillips has failed to show a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted absent the Rehaif error.

On plain-error review, omitting the knowledge-of-felon-status element from a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea does not warrant relief unless the defendant shows a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty without the error.

United States v. Bruce Jones, Jr. · filed 2022-03-22(g)(1)

In light of this substantial evidence that Jones knew he was a felon, we conclude that he has not shown a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but for the Rehaif error.

A § 922(g) guilty plea remains valid despite an unpreserved failure to explain the knowledge-of-status element when the defendant cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

United States v. Torain · filed 2022-03-25(g)

Furthermore, applying Greer, we conclude that Torain’s § 922(g) conviction is valid.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of the prior conviction, but does not require knowledge that possessing the firearm is a federal offense.

Smiley v. United States · filed 2022-04-06(g)(1)

Nothing in the statute requires that a § 922(g) defendant know he has committed a federal offense.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew a prior conviction was for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; knowledge of the facts underlying that conviction alone is insufficient.

United States v. Minor · filed 2022-04-11(g)(9)

To establish that Minor "knowingly" violated section 922(g)(9), the government need prove that he "knew he violated the material elements of § 922(g)," Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2196, which in this case means that he knew he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that, when the defendant possessed the firearm, he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Moore · filed 2022-04-06(g)(1)

At trial, the district court did not instruct the jury that, to convict Moore of unlawful gun possession under § 922(g)(1), the government was required to prove that, at the time he possessed the firearm, he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. ... Because the record establishes that Moore knew he was a felon at the time of his firearm offense, there is no reasonable probability of an acquittal had the jury been properly instructed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of the prior felony conviction, but does not require knowledge that possessing the firearm is a federal offense.

Crawford v. United States · filed 2022-04-08(g)(1)

Nothing in the statute requires that a § 922(g) defendant know he has committed a federal offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of the prior felony conviction, but does not require knowledge that possessing a firearm is a federal offense.

Hodge v. United States · filed 2022-04-14(g)(1)

Nothing in the statute requires that a § 922(g) defendant know he has committed a federal offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person possessing ammunition to know of his felony conviction, but does not require him to know that possession is illegal.

McDonald v. Williams · filed 2022-04-19(g)(1)

By its terms, the statute does not require the defendant to know that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm or ammunition; it simply requires the defendant to knowingly possess a firearm or ammunition and to know that he had previously been convicted of a felony at the time he did so.

Under § 922(g)(1), prior imprisonment and notice that a felony bars firearm possession can establish knowledge of prohibited status.

Williams v. United States · filed 2022-04-28(g)(1)

The remainder of the record provides substantial evidence that Petitioner did, in fact, have the requisite knowledge of his prohibited status under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the ammunition; knowledge during later federal proceedings does not establish knowledge at that time.

Delgado v. United States · filed 2022-04-26(g)(1)

Rehaif requires evidence of “knowledge” at the time of the possession of ammunition and not at the time of federal proceedings.

An omitted knowledge-of-felon-status allegation or instruction does not warrant relief from a § 922(g)(1) conviction on plain-error review when the defendant cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

United States v. Mack · filed 2022-04-28(g)(1)

Applying Greer here, we conclude that Mack has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of these proceedings would have been different had the indictment included, and the jury been instructed of, the knowledge-of-status element under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon when he possessed it.

United States v. Dodd · filed 2022-04-27(g)(1)

“In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government must prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.” ... Here, Dodd had served over four years in prison on a prior drug conviction. And, he admitted at his sentencing hearing that he knew he was not allowed to possess a firearm. Accordingly, we find that Dodd cannot establish plain error with respect to this claim.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Clark · filed 2022-04-28(g)(1)

So, the Government had to prove at trial that Clark knew he was a felon at the time he was possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

Shegonee v. Streeval · filed 2022-05-03(g)(1)

In other words, the government must prove that the defendant knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Shegonee has failed to demonstrate that the conduct of which he was convicted is no longer criminal in light of Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know they belong to a category barred from possessing firearms; an unpreserved omission of that element from the indictment or plea colloquy warrants reversal only if it satisfies plain error review.

United States v. Davis · filed 2022-05-13(g)(1)

Following entry of his guilty plea and both sentencing proceedings, the Supreme Court clarified in Rehaif that to be a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a defendant must know that they “belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” ... Because the Rehaif omissions in both Davis’ indictment and plea colloquy do not satisfy plain error review, we affirm his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed firearms or ammunition.

United States v. Bishop · filed 2022-05-17(g)(1)

Here, we conclude that the district court erred at the Rule 11 hearing by not advising Bishop that the Government had to prove he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearms and ammunition in the offense; and we further conclude that the error was plain.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to a category of people barred from possessing a firearm.

Campbell v. Rivers · filed 2022-05-31(g)

If nothing else, the length of those two separate incarcerations would have caused him to realize he was a felon. Moreover, his 1997 conviction was for being a felon in possession of a firearm, so for that additional reason he would have realized he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge that a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison; knowing that a state called the crime a felony does not necessarily establish that knowledge.

United States v. Werle · filed 2022-06-03(g)(1)

Instead, Section 922(g)(1) identifies the fact the defendant must know: that he has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” That a state labels a crime a “felony” for purposes of state law does not necessarily mean that it is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew his felony status, so omitting that element from the jury instructions is error.

United States v. Adams · filed 2022-05-26(g)(1)

The District Court’s failure to instruct the jury on § 922(g)’s “knowledge-of-status” element was erroneous, and that error was plain after Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew, when possessing the firearm, that they had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Fogg, Corey v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2022-06-02(g)(1)

Applying this statutory interpretation to Fogg’s case, the government’s burden included proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Fogg knew, at the time of the offense, he had “been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, but does not require knowledge that firearm possession is prohibited.

Santiago v. J.C. Streeval · filed 2022-06-02(g)(1)

Rehaif does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Knowledge of the relevant status is enough.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; that knowledge may be inferred from criminal history.

Pacheco v. Streeval · filed 2022-06-03(g)(1)

As indicated above, Rehaif clarified that a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant “knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2095 (emphasis omitted). In other words, the government must prove that the defendant knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant convicted of possessing ammunition to have known of his felony status; a challenge fails when the record establishes that knowledge.

Verter v. USA-2255 · filed 2022-06-08(g)(1)

Given that the record shows that Verter knew of his felon status, his claim fails.

An admission of a prior felony conviction and a prison sentence of more than one year can establish knowledge of felony status under § 922(g)(1).

Courtney v. USA-2255 · filed 2022-06-08(g)(1)

He cannot show actual innocence because he stipulated to having a prior felony conviction in his guilty plea and because he had been sentenced to more than one year in prison on at least one occasion. It defies logic to suggest, then, that he was unaware that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) and (9) require proof that the defendant knew of the convictions that gave him prohibited status.

United States v. Harris · filed 2022-07-08(g)(1), (g)(9)

For Harris, that means proof that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison and a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; a plea stipulation and sentencing history can establish that knowledge.

Rogers v. USA-2255 · filed 2022-07-13(g)(1)

He cannot show actual innocence because he stipulated to having a prior felony conviction in his guilty plea and because he had been sentenced to more than one year in prison, or had been advised that the maximum penalty exceeded one year, on more than one occasion. It defies logic to suggest, then, that he was unaware that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status, but Rehaif did not decriminalize firearm possession by a person with a qualifying felony conviction.

Taylor v. Warden · filed 2022-07-19(g)(1)

In sum, Mr. Taylor’s possession of a firearm while prohibited was not decriminalized by Rehaif. Instead, Rehaif merely reformulated the elements of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his prohibited status when possessing a firearm; prior convictions and imprisonment can establish that knowledge.

Clay v. United States · filed 2022-07-20(g)(1)

In light of these facts, Petitioner cannot claim that he is actually innocent of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation on of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). There is simply “no doubt” that, after serving several years in prison, Petitioner was aware of his status as a person convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year in prison.

A belief that civil rights were restored does not negate § 922(g)'s knowledge requirement without evidence that the defendant believed his right to possess firearms was restored.

Gates v. United States · filed 2022-07-21(g)

In other words, even if Mr. Gates believed what he now says he believed, he offers no evidence that he believed his right to possess firearms had been restored as would be needed to negate scienter.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant whose prior state misdemeanor qualifies as a disqualifying conviction knew, when possessing the firearm, that the misdemeanor was punishable by more than two years in prison.

United States v. Heyward · filed 2022-08-03(g)(1)

For that reason, had this case gone to trial, the government would have ... needed to prove that Heyward knew, when he possessed the firearm, that his prior state conviction was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Guthary · filed 2022-08-05(g)(1)

In conducting the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the district court failed to fully advise Guthary of the elements of the § 922(g)(1) charge, because it did not advise him that the Government had to prove that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

United States v. Todd · filed 2022-08-09(g)

In Rehaif v United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019), the Supreme Court held “that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” ... Although Rehaif error is plain in this case, see Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 269 (2013) (holding that error is “plain” if clear or obvious at time of appellate consideration), Todd cannot demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights. ... Accordingly, Todd has failed to show plain error under Rehaif.

Section 922(g) requires knowledge of prohibited status, which a jury may infer from prior felony convictions.

BOND v. WARDEN OF FORT DIX · filed 2022-08-12(g)

Petitioner fails to provide any reason to believe that he did not know about his felon status, and the trial record is utterly devoid of any testimony to suggest that Petitioner was unaware of his felonious history.

Section 922(g)(1) covers qualifying state misdemeanors punishable by more than two years of imprisonment, and the government must prove that the defendant knew his conviction placed him in a class barred from possessing firearms.

United States v. Floyd · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

While recognizing that Pulley’s misdemeanors do place him into the category of people prohibited from possessing firearms, there is a lack of record evidence that Pulley knew that he was convicted of a state crime for which the punishment was for more than two years, especially when his crimes were labeled as misdemeanors. Therefore, we agree with Pulley that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, and his challenge thus survives plain-error review.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant whose qualifying conviction is a state misdemeanor knew the offense was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.

United States v. Sivells · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

While recognizing that Pulley’s misdemeanors do place him into the category of people prohibited from possessing firearms, there is a lack of record evidence that Pulley knew that he was convicted of a state crime for which the punishment was for more than two years, especially when his crimes were labeled as misdemeanors. Therefore, we agree with Pulley that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, and his challenge thus survives plain-error review.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he belonged to a class barred from possessing a firearm; when the qualifying conviction is a state misdemeanor, that includes knowledge that it was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.

United States v. Tillman · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

While recognizing that Pulley’s misdemeanors do place him into the category of people prohibited from possessing firearms, there is a lack of record evidence that Pulley knew that he was convicted of a state crime for which the punishment was for more than two years, especially when his crimes were labeled as misdemeanors. Therefore, we agree with Pulley that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, and his challenge thus survives plain-error review.

For a § 922(g)(1) conviction based on a state misdemeanor, the government must prove that the defendant knew the conviction was punishable by more than two years when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Barronette · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

In a case like this one, where the defendant’s qualifying predicate conviction is a state-law misdemeanor, that means the government must “prove that [the defendant] knew, when he possessed the firearm, that his prior state conviction was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.” Heyward, 2022 WL 3051258, at *4.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant whose qualifying conviction is a state misdemeanor knew it was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Broughton · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

While recognizing that Pulley’s misdemeanors do place him into the category of people prohibited from possessing firearms, there is a lack of record evidence that Pulley knew that he was convicted of a state crime for which the punishment was for more than two years, especially when his crimes were labeled as misdemeanors. Therefore, we agree with Pulley that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, and his challenge thus survives plain-error review.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant whose qualifying conviction is a state misdemeanor to know that the offense was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.

United States v. Harrison · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

While recognizing that Pulley’s misdemeanors do place him into the category of people prohibited from possessing firearms, there is a lack of record evidence that Pulley knew that he was convicted of a state crime for which the punishment was for more than two years, especially when his crimes were labeled as misdemeanors. Therefore, we agree with Pulley that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, and his challenge thus survives plain-error review.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant whose qualifying conviction was a state misdemeanor knew it was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.

United States v. Pulley · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

In a case like this one, where the defendant’s qualifying predicate conviction is a state-law misdemeanor, that means the government must “prove that [the defendant] knew, when he possessed the firearm, that his prior state conviction was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.” Heyward, 2022 WL 3051258, at *4.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew his prior conviction placed him in a class barred from possessing firearms; when the qualifying conviction is a state misdemeanor, he must have known it was punishable by more than two years of imprisonment.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2022-08-18(g)(1)

While recognizing that Pulley’s misdemeanors do place him into the category of people prohibited from possessing firearms, there is a lack of record evidence that Pulley knew that he was convicted of a state crime for which the punishment was for more than two years, especially when his crimes were labeled as misdemeanors. Therefore, we agree with Pulley that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, and his challenge thus survives plain-error review.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm or ammunition and knew of his felon status when he possessed it.

United States v. Hardiman · filed 2022-09-07(g)(1)

Although there was plain error in this case under Rehaif, we conclude that Hardiman has not shown that his substantial rights were affected, i.e., that absent the error, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Saucedo-Delgado · filed 2022-08-26(g)(1)

In order for a court to find a defendant guilty of a felon-in-possession offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2),1 his admissions must establish that he was previously convicted of a felony, that he knowingly possessed a firearm while knowing of his felon status, and that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Church v. Butler · filed 2022-08-31(g)(1)

Second, contrary to Church’s argument, Rehaif does not hold that the government was required to prove that Church knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew his status prohibited firearm possession.

United States v. Clark · filed 2022-09-12(g)(1)

In Moody, we explained that Rehaif only requires the government to prove knowledge of felon status, not knowledge that felon status prohibits firearm possession, as Clark argues here.

Section 922(g)’s knowledge-of-status element may be supported by circumstantial evidence, including prior felony convictions, imprisonment, and a stipulation to felon status.

Stewart v. Warden Canaan USP · filed 2022-09-28(g)

The evidence accordingly suggests that Stewart knew that he was a felon when he possessed the subject weapon, and he has presented no argument to the contrary. See Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097. Thus, in light of all the evidence, Stewart has not shown that it is more likely than not that any reasonable juror properly instructed on the mens rea element would have acquitted him.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his qualifying felony conviction when he possessed the firearm.

Rigsby v. United States · filed 2022-09-23(g)(1)

Thus, for defendants charged under § 922(g)(1), which applies to felons, the government must prove, or the defendant must admit, “that he knew he had been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Ocampo v. Hemmingway · filed 2022-09-28(g)(1)

Thus, under Rehaif, the government would have to prove that Petitioner knew of his status of having a felony conviction—specifically, that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. White · filed 2022-09-30(g)(1)

For the § 922(g)(1) offense, the indictment and the factual basis omitted the element that White knew of his status as a felon when he possessed the firearm. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194. However, White has not contended on appeal that he did not know he was a felon and, given his criminal history, he could not raise a reasonable argument that he was not aware that he was a felon. See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2021) (noting showing required to demonstrate plain error based on Rehaif). Therefore, we conclude that the factual basis was sufficient to support White’s guilty pleas.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of one’s felony status when possessing a firearm; prior convictions, imprisonment, and plea admissions can establish that knowledge.

Sampson v. Williams · filed 2022-10-19(g)(1)

Further, given his prior convictions and multiple terms of incarceration in excess of one year, the Court is satisfied that Petitioner knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the gun in the instant case.

A defendant challenging an unpreserved § 922(g)(1) knowledge-of-status error must sufficiently argue that he would have offered evidence that he did not know he was a felon.

United States v. Pridgen · filed 2022-10-03(g)(1)

To succeed on a Rehaif claim on plain error review, a defendant must “make[] a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2021). In light of the evidence presented at trial and Pridgen’s arguments on appeal, we conclude that he has not made such a showing.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person to know of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, but does not require the person to know the legal label “felon.”

Jones v. United States · filed 2022-10-26(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) does not state that one must know he is a “felon” (although, to be clear, the record supports a finding that Jones knew he was a convicted felon). Rather, section 922(g)(1) requires only that one must know he “has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding a year.”

Section 922(g) requires knowledge of the defendant’s prohibited status, but not knowledge that the statute bars firearm possession.

United States v. Curtis · filed 2022-10-27(g)

Because the record shows that Curtis knew about his felon status at the time he possessed a firearm, it is irrelevant whether he was aware that section 922(g) specifically restricted his ability to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when possessing a firearm; a stipulation to prior felony convictions can establish that knowledge.

Holden v. Reiser · filed 2022-11-04(g)(1)

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that to convict a defendant under § 922(g), the Government must prove, relevantly, that the defendant knew he belonged to the pertinent category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. ... In fact, he stipulated at trial to having prior felony convictions, which is “sufficient evidence to establish that he knew he was a felon” under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(5) requires a defendant charged with possessing a firearm while illegally in the United States to have known of that immigration status.

Ramirez v. United States · filed 2022-11-07(g)(5)

When the applicable category of §922(g)(5) is considered, the record amply demonstrates that Ramirez was aware of his status as an alien illegally in the country.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status requirement may be satisfied by evidence that a defendant knew his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

Jefferson v. Williams · filed 2022-11-02(g)(1)

These statements alone support an inference that Petitioner was aware that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one-year imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew his relevant status when he possessed it.

Jensen v. United States · filed 2022-11-18(g)(1)

Moreover, Jensen’s conviction complies with the requirements of Rehaif, which holds the government “must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S. Ct. at 2194.

For a § 922(g) felon in possession conviction, multiple prior felony convictions can provide circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew he was a felon.

Oscar v. Warden Allenwood USP · filed 2022-11-28(g)

The record here contains strong circumstantial evidence that Oscar was aware that he was a convicted felon at the relevant time. ... Oscar has not shown that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person possessing a firearm to know that a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

Cole v. United States · filed 2022-11-29(g)(1)

He therefore knew at the time of his firearm offense that he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing a firearm.

Hernandez v. USA - 2255 · filed 2022-12-15(g)(1)

Here, given that Hemandez has a lengthy criminal history, see ECF No. 32 (“PSR”); see also ECF No. 37 at 1 (“Defendant’s criminal history category is IV based on a total of 8 criminal history points”), it is certain that he was aware of his status as a prohibited felon. Ultimately, he has failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea would have changed had this Court advised him of ... the knowledge-of-status requirement under Rehaif.

A prior unlawful-firearm-possession conviction supports a finding that a § 922(g)(1) defendant knew of his prohibited status.

Shorter v. USA-2255 · filed 2022-12-15(g)(1)

Here, given that Shorter’s criminal record, which includes a previous Unlawful Possession of Firearm, see ECF No. 31 (“PSR”), it is certain that he was aware of his continued status as a prohibited felon.

For a § 922(g) felon-in-possession charge, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Fletcher · filed 2022-12-28(g)

The district court's instructions to the jury, delivered before Rehaif was decided, did not inform jurors of the need to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Fletcher knew that a crime for which he had previously been convicted was punishable by more than one year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

United States v. Roberts · filed 2023-01-04(g)(1)

Here, the district court failed to ensure that Roberts understood that “the Government must prove both that [Roberts] knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, ... 139 S. Ct. at 2200.

Section 922(g)(5) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew of their unlawful immigration status when possessing a firearm.

Cejas v. Adams · filed 2023-01-17(g)(5)

If the Government charged the Petitioner with being an alien who was illegally or unlawfully in the United States in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(5) today, the Government would need to prove that he knew he was an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States at the time of the offensive conduct.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status; a lengthy criminal history can establish that the defendant knew he was a felon.

Stevenson v. USA-2255 · filed 2023-01-25(g)(1)

Here, given that Stevenson has a lengthy criminal history, see ECF No. 24 (“PSR”) ... it is certain that he was aware of his status as a prohibited felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison, but does not require proof that he knew it barred him from possessing a firearm.

YANG v. WATSON · filed 2023-03-02(g)(1)

Yang was not entitled to notice that he was barred from possessing a firearm as a result of his state convictions. Instead, the government need only prove that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm.

Ortiz-Correa v. United States · filed 2023-03-14(g)(1)

It is undoubtably true that, after Rehaif, the Government needed to prove four elements of § 922(g) at trial, including that Petitioner “knew of his restricted status” as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(9) requires knowledge that a prior conviction has the features of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, but does not require knowledge of that legal label.

United States v. Minor · filed 2023-03-24(g)(9)

We hold that if Minor's knowledge about his prior conviction included everything necessary to satisfy the definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), then, for all purposes relevant here, he knew that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. And that remains true even if he did not know that such an offense had been labeled in sections 922(g)(9) and 921(a)(33)(A) as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

On plain-error review of a § 922(g) conviction, failure to prove knowledge of felon status does not warrant relief unless the omission affected the defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. Wiggins · filed 2023-03-27(g)

Here, the Government did not present evidence that Wiggins knew he was a felon at the time of the offense, but we conclude that Wiggins cannot show that the omission affected his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Waters · filed 2023-03-30(g)(1)

The Supreme Court has made clear that Rehaif’s knowledge-of-prohibited-status mens rea requirement applies to all firearms-possession offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1), together with § 924(a)(2), requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; it does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Garrett v. United States · filed 2023-04-12(g)(1)

Rehaif does not stand for the proposition that the government must prove the defendant knew his possession of the firearm was unlawful. Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires knowledge of unlawful immigration status; an alien’s admissions of that status can defeat a claim of actual innocence.

MALDONADO-ORTEGA v. KNIGHT · filed 2023-05-09(g)(5)(A)

Where the record contains evidence that an alien knew he was illegally in the United States — such as admissions of illegal status to the police — an alien will be unable to show actual innocence.

When charged with § 924(a)(2), § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he belonged to a class barred from possessing firearms.

In re: Randolph McNeill · filed 2023-05-22(g)(1)

Thus, although the conduct of possessing a firearm remains a valid part of the criminal offense with which McNeill was charged, proving that conduct is not enough to secure a conviction under §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after Rehaif unless the government also proves that the defendant knew he was in the class of persons barred from doing so.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm or ammunition knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; prior prison sentences can establish that knowledge.

Napoli v. Warden Schuylkill FCI · filed 2023-05-26(g)(1)

We agree with the District Court that it is clear from the record that Napoli knew he was a felon and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment on the ground that, even if he can bring his claim under § 2241, Napoli has not shown that he is actually innocent.

For § 922(g)(1), records of prior felony convictions can establish that a defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm.

Shaw v. United States · filed 2023-05-26(g)(1)

What is more, the records in Petitioner’s underlying criminal case and in the present matter demonstrate that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant had a prior felony conviction and knew of that status; prior convictions can help prove both elements.

United States v. Smith · filed 2023-06-09(g)(1)

To carry its burden of proof at trial, the government had to offer evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt two essential elements of the charged crime: (1) Smith had a prior felony conviction and (2) he knew that status. Evidence of prior felony convictions has a significant tendency to prove both facts—multiple prior felony convictions are substantial evidence that Smith knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know he is a felon; prior convictions and imprisonment can show that knowledge.

White v. United States · filed 2023-06-13(g)(1)

The Sixth Circuit has held that Rehaif required White to know only that he was a felon. Wallace, 43 F.4th at 607. White, who is in fact a felon, has difficulty showing that, given his convictions and state incarceration, no reasonable juror would have convicted White on the § 922(g) charge at trial. His arguments about restoration of rights are not persuasive. White has not demonstrated actual innocence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; it does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

McFarland v. United States · filed 2023-06-14(g)(1)

So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged ... to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction survives plain-error review of an omitted felon-status knowledge advisement when the defendant does not claim he was unaware of his felon status.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2023-06-16(g)(1)

Anderson has not argued or represented on appeal that he did not know he was a felon when he possessed the firearm at issue in count 8. There is no dispute that, at the time of his possession, he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and he admitted that fact when he pled guilty. Because he has failed on appeal to make the argument or representation required by Greer, we conclude that Anderson has failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights. He thus fails to establish invalidity in his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

An unpreserved failure to advise a defendant of § 922(g)(1)'s felon-status knowledge element does not invalidate the conviction unless the error affected substantial rights.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2023-06-16(g)(1)

Because he has failed on appeal to make the argument or representation required by Greer, we conclude that Anderson has failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights. He thus fails to establish invalidity in his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

A defendant challenging a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea because he was not advised that he must know his felon status must show that the error affected his substantial rights.

United States v. Bob Biongo · filed 2023-06-16(g)(1)

Because he has failed on appeal to make the argument or representation required by Greer, we conclude that Anderson has failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights. He thus fails to establish invalidity in his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

A defendant pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm must be advised that knowledge of felony status is an element of the offense.

Hogue v. United States · filed 2023-06-30(g)(1)

Therefore, after Rehaif, a defendant who pleads guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm must be advised by the district court during the plea colloquy of the knowledge-of-status element.

A felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

Seawright v. United States · filed 2023-07-05(g)(1)

So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of the disqualifying status, which prior prison sentences can establish circumstantially.

DAVIS v. United States · filed 2023-07-20(g)(1)

Davis’s criminal history makes it highly unlikely, indeed implausible, that he did not know of his status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status, which a jury may infer from the defendant’s prior felony convictions.

McGhee v. United States · filed 2023-07-07(g)(1)

Even without the signed judgment sheets, the fact of his prior convictions is sufficient for a jury to infer that he knew that he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison when he possessed a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Montes Miller · filed 2023-07-21(g)(1)

Contrary to Miller’s contention, the district court clearly explained that a conviction under § 922(g)(1) required Miller to know that he was previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment.

A challenge to a § 922(g)(1) conviction based on an omitted felony-status knowledge element fails on plain-error review when the defendant does not claim he was unaware of his felony status.

United States v. Littlejohn · filed 2023-07-25(g)(1)

In Greer v. United States, the Supreme Court held that, to succeed on a Rehaif claim on plain error review, a defendant must “make[] a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.” 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2021). Littlejohn does not contend on appeal that he did not know that he previously had been convicted of a felony. Moreover, Littlejohn was still on supervised release from his most ... recent felony conviction when he committed the instant offense. We therefore conclude that Littlejohn’s conviction on Count 1 is valid.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of whether the state classified the offense as a felony.

Guardado v. United States · filed 2023-08-07(g)(1)

It does not matter whether it was explained to Guardado that his crimes were felonies or misdemeanors under state law. At issue is whether he knew that he was a convicted felon under § 922(g)(1) -- that is, whether he knew that he had been convicted of crimes that were punishable by more than a year's imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of their prohibited status when possessing a firearm; omitting that element from the indictment and jury instructions is plain error.

United States v. Green · filed 2023-08-07(g)(1)

It was plain error for Green to be tried on an indictment, and convicted based on jury instructions, that omitted the prohibited status element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

Warrington v. United States · filed 2023-08-08(g)(1)

So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

A person who knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm cannot establish actual innocence of a § 922(g)(1) conviction by claiming ignorance of his felony status.

Shepherd v. United States · filed 2023-08-10(g)(1)

Upon review of the record, this Court finds no evidence likely to lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Shepherd lacked knowledge of his felon status at the time that he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon knew his status when he possessed a firearm.

Collins v. United States · filed 2023-08-28(g)(1)

To be convicted, a defendant ought to know he is a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, but not that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms.

United States v. Fishburne · filed 2023-09-06(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the government need only demonstrate that the defendant knew that he was a felon, not that he knew that he was barred from possessing firearms.

A defendant challenging a § 922(g) guilty plea for lack of notice of the knowledge-of-status element must show a reasonable probability that the notice would have changed the plea.

Robinson v. USA - 2255 · filed 2023-09-11(g)

Robinson has not provided evidence that demonstrates he was unaware of his felony status at the time he possessed the firearm. This is especially notable given that Robinson has previously sustained more than one felony conviction. Thus, he has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he been informed about the Government’s burden to prove the knowledge element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(5) requires proof that the defendant knew he was present in the United States illegally when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Jawher · filed 2023-11-01(g)(5)

Viewed in this light, the record adequately supports the guilty verdict and its implicit finding of subjective knowledge. Immigration authorities repeatedly informed Jawher that he lacked legal status. Moreover, the fact that he purposefully committed fraud in an effort to obtain legal status indicates an understanding that he lacked legal status. The district court permissibly concluded Jawher knew he was present illegally.

For a § 922(g)(1) conviction, a jury may infer that a defendant knew he was a felon from his prior felony convictions.

Adams v. Felipe Martinez, Jr. · filed 2024-02-28(g)(1)

The fact of his prior convictions is sufficient for a jury to infer that Adams knew that he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Peters · filed 2024-03-14(g)(1)

Therefore, the jury had ample evidence from which to find that Peters had knowledge not only of his felon status but also that his crime was punishable by imprisonment exceeding a year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a qualifying conviction, but does not require knowledge that the law bars felons from possessing firearms.

United States v. Redrick · filed 2024-03-13(g)(1)

But as Brown made clear, knowledge of the criminal prohibition on possessing a firearm as a convicted felon is not an element of the 922(g) offense. 845 F. App’x at 3. Instead, Rehaif simply requires that Redrick knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year.

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) alleges the knowledge-of-status element when it states that the defendant knew of a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2024-03-18(g)(1)

More fundamentally, Coleman’s challenge fails because the indictment included Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status element.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of the status barring firearm possession; that requirement applies retroactively on collateral review.

United States v. Hill · filed 2024-04-12(g)

By holding that the scienter requirement also applied to the prohibited status, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of § 922(g) and altered the range of conduct that the statute punishes by making previously unlawful conduct—knowingly possessing a firearm while being a felon without knowing you are a felon—lawful. This makes the new rule announced in Rehaif substantive and thus retroactive for collateral review purposes.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was unlawfully in the United States; it does not require proof that he knew possessing the firearm was unlawful.

Eddie (LNU) v. United States · filed 2024-04-17(g)(5)(A)

So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm, and signed guilty pleas identifying prior charges as felonies can support that finding.

United States v. Davis · filed 2024-04-12(g)(1)

Based on those signed guilty pleas, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis had knowledge of his status as a felon when he possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm is illegal because of their felon status.

Vaughn v. United States · filed 2024-04-25(g)(1)

As previously discussed, there is no requirement that the defendant must know that their status as a felon makes it ... a crime to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know of the prior felony conviction and firearm possession, but not that the conviction makes possession illegal.

Crain v. United States · filed 2024-04-30(g)

There is no additional element that Mr. Crain must have understood that his prior felony conviction made possessing a firearm illegal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person possessing a firearm to know of their felon status, but does not require them to know that felons are barred from possessing firearms.

Morris v. United States · filed 2024-04-25(g)(1)

Second, Movant does not have a valid Rehaif claim. Rehaif applies where the accused was not aware of his status as a felon at the time he possessed the firearm. But Movant admits in his motion that he knew he was a felon; his claim is that he did not know that felons could not possess firearm. This is an ignorance of law defense, but “Rehaif did not alter the well-known maxim that ‘ignorance of the law’ (or a ‘mistake of law’) is no excuse.” United States v. Robinson, 982 F.3d 1181, 1187 (8th Cir. 2020).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew felons were prohibited from possessing firearms.

Doctor v. United States · filed 2024-04-26(g)(1)

However, Rehaif requires the government to prove “that a defendant knew of his status as a person barred from possessing a firearm, . . . not . . . that the defendant knew he could not possess a gun.” United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1145 n.5 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200). And Doctor has never disputed his felon status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; it does not require proof that he knew possessing the firearm was unlawful.

SEALED v. United States · filed 2024-05-15(g)(1)

Rehaif does not stand for the proposition that the government must prove the defendant knew his possession of the firearm was unlawful. Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge that the prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of the sentence imposed.

United States v. Berry · filed 2024-05-16(g)(1)

To be subject to ... criminal liability under § 922(g)(1), one must be aware of the potential statutory penalty for the predicate crime—not the actual sentence imposed. The statute does not require that the individual must have received such a sentence. It includes those who receive probationary sentences or sentences that are later abated.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to a class prohibited from possessing firearms; omitting that requirement from jury instructions can warrant reversal.

United States v. Davis · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1)

And as had been the situation in so many cases brought before Rehaif was decided, the jury here was not specifically instructed that the Government had to come forward with proof that those defendants charged with a § 922(g)(1) offense knew that they fell within a class prohibited from possessing firearms. ... We therefore reverse Davis’ § 922(g)(1) convictions (Counts 16 and 30).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited felon status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Randy Banks · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1)

Davis has shown even more clearly “that, but for the Rehaif error in the jury instructions, there is a reasonable probability that a jury would have acquitted him” of the § 922(g)(1) counts.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited felon status; omitting that element from jury instructions can require reversal when there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1)

Given Barronette’s conclusion, Davis has shown even more clearly “that, but for the Rehaif error in the jury instructions, there is a reasonable probability that a jury would have acquitted him” of the § 922(g)(1) counts.

A § 922(g)(1) indictment and jury instructions must include the defendant’s knowledge of his prohibited status.

United States v. Green · filed 2024-07-02(g)(1)

It was plain error for Green to be tried on an indictment, and convicted based on jury instructions, that omitted the prohibited status element.