18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment.

BURKS v. United States · filed 2020-10-20(g)(1)

Rather, the government must prove that the defendant knew that he had a prior conviction which was punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon; undisputed prior prison sentences exceeding one year will ordinarily defeat plain-error relief when that element was omitted.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-10-26(g)(1)

We conclude that such evidence will ordinarily preclude a defendant from satisfying the fourth prong of plain-error review when challenging the district court’s failure to require the ... government to prove that the defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status when possessing a firearm; omitting that element from an indictment is plain error, though relief still depends on plain-error review.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-10-28(g)(1)

The government concedes, and we agree, that the omission of the knowledge of felon status element from the indictment satisfies the first two prongs of plain error analysis—under Rehaif, it is clear that this omission was an error and the error is plain.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) can survive a challenge to an indictment that allegedly omitted knowledge of felon status when overwhelming evidence shows the defendant knew that status.

Simmons v. United States · filed 2020-10-30(g)(1)

Since its decision in Balde, the Second Circuit has repeatedly held that overwhelming evidence of a defendant’s prohibited status under § 922(g) forecloses that defendant’s ability to demonstrate that allegedly “defective” wording in the relevant instrument, whether indictment, jury instruction, or guilty plea, constitutes plain error. ... On these facts, Defendant cannot show that his conviction on the allegedly deficient indictment seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know her status, but does not require her to know that the status prohibits possession of ammunition.

Monzon-Ramirez v. United States · filed 2020-11-02(g)

The R&R correctly found, consistent with Benamor, that Rhaif did not add an element to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) requiring proof that the defendant, in addition to knowing of her status, must also know that her status is one of the prohibited categories.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status; a prior felon-in-possession conviction can support that inference.

United States v. Denver Lee · filed 2020-11-03(g)(1)

Lee also had been previously convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, which is enough for a jury to infer that Lee knew of his prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to a prohibited category, including felony status.

Shipley v. United States · filed 2020-11-03(g)(1)

Similarly, under Rehaif, the Government need only prove that the Defendant knew he was a member of one of the nine categories of individuals prohibited from receiving, shipping, transporting, or possessing firearms and ammunition, including being a convicted felon.

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know of his prohibited status; when the defendant did not object to omission of that element at trial, the omission is reviewed for plain error.

United States v. Darius King · filed 2020-11-06(g)

Like Johnson, King did not object at trial to the district court’s omission of the knowledge-of-status element of the offense. Plain-error review therefore applies. And, as in Johnson, King’s uncontroverted presentence report shows that he pleaded guilty to two felonies and served sentences of greater than one year for each. Thus, King cannot prevail on plain-error review.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status; prior felony convictions and prison terms can establish that knowledge.

Thompson v. United States · filed 2020-11-16(g)(1)

As previously discussed, the record demonstrates that Petitioner was well aware of his prohibited status by way of his numerous prior felony convictions and wiping off the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm, but not that he knew possession was illegal.

King, Perry v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2020-11-03(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the government needs to prove that the defendant knew that he was a felon. The government does not need to prove that the defendant knew that it was a crime to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the law barred him from possessing a firearm.

Santiago v. United States · filed 2020-11-09(g)(1)

The Government did not need to prove that Santiago knew about the existence of the law prohibiting felons from possessing a firearm, because ignorance of the law is no excuse. Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. 2198. Instead, Rehaif requires that the Government prove only that Santiago knew of his status as a felon. Id.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a person possessing a firearm to know that a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

SERRANO v. ORTIZ · filed 2020-11-13(g)(1)

Therefore, a reasonable and properly instructed juror would likely conclude Petitioner knew at the time he possessed a firearm in February 2012 that he had previously been convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon, but does not require proof that he knew the law prohibited felons from possessing firearms.

United States v. Beasley · filed 2020-11-09(g)(1)

Beasley provides no jurisprudential support for his argument that Rehaif requires proof that he knew that the law prohibited his possession of a firearm. Moreover, when we have addressed Rehaif, we have never extended the decision beyond requiring that the Government prove “both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200; see, e.g., United States v. Lavalais, 960 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 20, 2020) (No. 20-5489); United States v. Huntsberry, 956 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2020).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felon status, but does not require him to know that felons are prohibited from possessing firearms.

Farley v. Werlich · filed 2020-11-16(g)(1)

Rehaif does not require the Government to prove that it knew felons were prohibited from possessing firearms, merely that a person knew they were part of a class of persons designated in Section 922(g), including felons.

An indictment charging a § 922(g) offense must allege that the defendant knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing a firearm.

Carlyle v. United States · filed 2020-11-23(g)(1)

Accordingly, an indictment charging a § 922(g) offense is defective if it fails to allege the knowledge-of-status element.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew of the domestic violence misdemeanor conviction that barred him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Arnold · filed 2020-11-25(g)(9)

This evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Arnold had the requisite knowledge under Rehaif for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a convicted felon; an omitted knowledge finding may be reviewed for plain error when first raised on appeal.

United States v. Hearns · filed 2020-11-27(g)(1)

No plain error resulted from the indictment’s failure to allege and the district court’s failure to find the knowledge element of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as established in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019) (holding that the government “must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Abundis v. United States · filed 2020-11-30(g)(1)

Thus, the Court finds that the government was only required to prove that Abundis knew of his prohibited status, not that Abundis knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; the person need not believe he is a felon.

Ultsch v. United States · filed 2020-11-30(g)(1)

But the relevant question is not whether petitioner believed he was a felon, but rather whether he knew he “had been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Tignor · filed 2020-12-01(g)(1)

Of course, if the current case had gone to trial, it wouldn’t have been enough for the government to prove knowledge of a felony conviction; the government would also have needed to prove knowledge that the conviction entailed “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(9) requires a defendant to know of the prior misdemeanor conviction, the conduct required for that conviction, and the domestic relationship with the victim.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-12-02(g)(9)

As we explain below, we conclude that a person knows he is a domestic-violence misdemeanant, for Rehaif purposes, if he knows all the following: (1) that he was convicted of a misdemeanor crime, (2) that to be convicted of that crime, he must have engaged in at least “the slightest offensive touching,” United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 163 (2014) (internal citations omitted), and (3) that the victim of his misdemeanor crime was, as relevant here, his wife.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Virgen-Bautista v. United States · filed 2020-12-02(g)(1)

The Court finds that the government was only required to prove that Virgen-Bautista knew of his prohibited status, not that Virgen-Bautista knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of their prohibited status, but not that they knew the status barred them from possessing a firearm.

Feehan-Jones v. United States · filed 2020-12-02(g)(1)

The Court finds that the government was only required to prove that Feehan-Jones knew of his prohibited status, not that Feehan-Jones knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, but does not require proof that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Williams v. United States · filed 2020-12-02(g)(1)

Third, the government is not required to demonstrate Williams knew he was barred from possessing a firearm.

A § 922(g) knowledge-of-status challenge fails when the defendant stipulated to his prior felony conviction and undisputed prior prison sentences establish his awareness of that status.

Pridgette v. United States · filed 2020-12-03(g)

These cases foreclose Pridgette’s argument. To begin, Pridgette’s stipulation ends the inquiry under Benamor. Regardless of any stipulation, however, the uncontroverted evidence of Pridgette’s prior sentences conclusively undercuts Pridgette’s argument as well.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Stout v. United States · filed 2020-12-03(g)(1)

The Court finds that the government was only required to prove that Stout knew of his prohibited status, not that Stout knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had a prior felony conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Feaster · filed 2020-12-01(g)(1)

When the district court instructed the jury, it did not explain that the jury, to return a guilty verdict, had to find that Feaster knew he possessed a firearm and also knew at the time of his possession that he had been convicted of a felony punishable by a year or more of incarceration.

Knowledge of prohibited status is an element of a § 922(g)(1) offense.

United States v. Nasir · filed 2020-12-01(g)(1)

Rehaif declares knowledge of status to be an element of a § 922(g) offense, and that cannot be ignored.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he committed the firearm offense.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2020-12-04(g)(1)

Nor is Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), of any help to him, because there was evidence that he knew at the time he committed the crime that he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

Baustamante v. United States · filed 2020-12-07(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the indictment is defective because it lacks an allegation that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status when possessing a firearm; an unpreserved error in a guilty plea concerning that element does not warrant reversal without prejudice.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 2020-12-02(g)(1)

In sum, the district court’s failure to assess the factual sufficiency of Mitchell’s knowledge of his felon status, while plainly erroneous, neither affected Mitchell’s substantial rights nor resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a defendant to know that possessing a firearm was unlawful.

Summers v. United States · filed 2020-12-04(g)(1)

The law simply does not require that Petitioner knew his possession of a firearm was unlawful.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Hill · filed 2020-12-10(g)(1)

As in Nasir, the Government here, following our pre-Rehaif precedent, put forward no evidence that Hill knew he was a felon prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant knew of the prior conviction that barred him from possessing a firearm.

Brown v. United States · filed 2020-12-11(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the superseding indictment in this case is defective because it lacks an allegation that Brown knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know of her felon status when she possesses a firearm.

United States v. English · filed 2020-12-16(g)

The lower court erred by failing to address English’s knowledge of her status as a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew his prohibited status, but a mistaken belief that felons may lawfully possess firearms does not excuse possession.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2020-12-18(g)(1)

While Rehaif makes clear that the government must prove that a defendant knew he was in the category of persons prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms, Rehaif did not alter the “well-known maxim that ‘ignorance of the law’ (or a ‘mistake of law’) is no excuse.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, but an indictment’s omission of that element does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2020-12-22(g)(1)

First, the indictment’s omission of the element that defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a defendant knew of his unlawful immigration status when he possessed a firearm; admissions of that status can establish the required knowledge.

Vazquez-Flores v. United States · filed 2020-12-22(g)(5)(A)

These three admissions demonstrate that Petitioner knew, “by uncontroverted evidence,” of his unlawful status at prosecution. ... Requiring the Government to prove the additional Rehaif element, therefore, would not have altered Petitioner’s ultimate conviction, sentence, or willingness to plea.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a convicted felon; a stipulation to felony status can support a finding of that knowledge.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2020-12-23(g)(1)

The district court denied the motion, finding that any flaw in the indictment was ultimately harmless, that the evidence at trial (particularly Robinson’s stipulation) was sufficient to prove that Robinson knew he was a convicted felon, and that the error in the jury instruction was not plain error. ... After carefully reviewing the law, the parties’ arguments, and the record evidence, we conclude that the district court correctly assessed the evidence at trial and correctly applied the law to this evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; the indictment and jury instructions must include the knowledge-of-status element.

United States v. Garrison · filed 2020-12-29(g)(1)

Therefore, both the indictment and jury instructions now must include that a defendant charged under § 922(g) knew of his prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status; repeated prison terms exceeding one year can establish that knowledge.

Clay v. United States · filed 2021-01-20(g)(1)

Because Clay spent more than a year in prison on at least five separate occasions, his criminal history would have undoubtedly provided sufficient evidence to prove Clay knew his status as felon at the time he committed this federal offense.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Grate v. Barnes · filed 2021-01-20(g)

The magistrate judge cited Sixth Circuit precedent that reads Rehaif to require the government to establish only that “defendant knew of his prohibited status, not [that] a defendant knew that he was specifically prohibited from possessing a firearm.” ... the court adopts the Report (ECF No. 35) and incorporates it herein.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Irizarry v. Bragg · filed 2021-01-22(g)(1)

Therefore, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Petitioner could not show he was unaware of his status as a convicted felon at the time of the underlying offense and, as such, cannot establish any error under Rehaif. See 139 S. Ct. at 2194 (requiring the government prove only that the defendant knew of his prohibited status under § 922(g), not that he knew he was specifically prohibited from possessing a firearm).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a felon, but not that he knew felons were barred from possessing firearms.

Mitchell v. United States · filed 2021-01-25(g)(1)

Finally, Mitchell argues that Rehaif requires the government to prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted felon but also that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. Notwithstanding the fact that Mitchell admitted to the court that he knew he was barred from possessing a firearm, Mitchell’s legal argument is also without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of their prohibited status when possessing a firearm; an admission in a guilty plea can establish that knowledge.

McCloud v. United States · filed 2021-02-01(g)(1)

Petitioner repeatedly and clearly admitted to violating § 922(g), including that he knew of his prohibited status at the time of his firearm possession, which relieved the Government of its burden of proof.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of the disqualifying felony conviction, but not that the defendant knew firearm possession was forbidden.

Hill v. United States · filed 2021-02-01(g)(1)

So the government “must prove ... only that [Hill] knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he belonged to one of the ... prohibited status groups enumerated in § 922(g).”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Cooper v. United States · filed 2021-02-01(g)(1)

Rehaif does not require that a § 924(g) defendant know that he was barred from possessing a firearm; it clarifies that the government must demonstrate that a defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Beale v. United States · filed 2021-02-01(g)(1)

Rehaif does not require that a § 924(g) defendant know that he was barred from possessing a firearm; it clarifies that the government must demonstrate that a defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to a class barred from possessing firearms, but not that he knew firearm possession was unlawful.

Simon v. United States · filed 2021-02-01(g)(1)

So the government “must prove only that [Simon] knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he belonged to one of the prohibited status groups enumerated in § 922(g).”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year, but does not require proof that the defendant knew firearm possession was prohibited.

United States v. Victor Brown, Jr. · filed 2021-01-19(g)(1)

But Rehaif does not require knowledge of the criminal prohibition of § 922(g); instead “the Government must prove that a defendant knew both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status (that he was a felon . . .)[.]” Id. at 2194 (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, but not that he knew felons were barred from possessing firearms.

United States v. Stewart · filed 2021-01-19(g)(1)

It is not an element that the defendant knew he was barred from possessing a firearm—only that he knew he was a member of the relevant group.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

CHIN v. WATSON · filed 2021-01-26(g)(1)

In other words, under Rehaif, the government's burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Chin knew, at the time of the offense, he had "been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Chin has not presented any evidence that he did not know of his status as a felon at the time of the offense. To the contrary, the Court has no doubt that Chin was aware of his status as a felon at the time he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; prior sentences exceeding one year can establish that knowledge on plain error review.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2021-01-22(g)(1)

Here, the presentence report contains “overwhelming and uncontroverted” evidence that Johnson knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year” at the time he allegedly possessed a firearm, foreclosing any real probability of an acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; a stipulation to a prior felony alone does not establish that knowledge.

United States v. Philippe · filed 2021-02-03(g)(1)

Thus, the stipulation did not include any details about the nature of Philippe’s prior offense, the duration of his sentence, the time he served, or his knowledge of whether he had a felony conviction. As such, no properly instructed jury would have been able to accept this stipulation alone as sufficient evidence of Philippe’s knowledge.

Section 922(g) continues to prohibit firearm possession by a felon who knew of his prohibited status after Rehaif.

Lewis v. Dobbs · filed 2021-02-03(g)

Thus, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner’s conduct continued to be criminal following Rehaif, and under this line of reasoning, Petitioner again fails to meet the second prong of the In re Jones test.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Crawford v. Dobbs · filed 2021-02-04(g)(1)

Therefore, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Petitioner could not show he was unaware of his status as a convicted felon at the time of the underlying offense and, as such, cannot establish any error under Rehaif. See 139 S. Ct. at 2194 (requiring the government prove only that the defendant knew of his prohibited status under § 922(g), not that he knew he was specifically prohibited from possessing a firearm).

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know of his prohibited status; admitting six prior felony convictions can satisfy that requirement.

Williamson v. United States · filed 2021-02-08(g)

But the omission in the plea agreement did not prejudice Williamson because he admitted that he was convicted of six felonies between 1992 and 2014, thus satisfying the requirement that he knew of his status as a felon.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew possessing a firearm was prohibited.

Sylvester v. United States · filed 2021-02-09(g)

Under Rehaif, the government must only establish that Sylvester knew of his “relevant status” (that he is a convicted felon), not that he knew that he was specifically prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know, when possessing a firearm, that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

McCreary v. United States · filed 2021-02-11(g)(1)

Thus, the Defendant “knew” that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—one of the “relevant categor[ies] of persons barred from possessing a firearm” under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed ammunition.

HINKLE v. United States · filed 2021-02-11(g)(1)

In other words, under Rehaif, the government's burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinkle knew, at the time of the offense, he had "been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Here, Hinkle pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1) and admitted to all the elements of the offense, including his status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status when possessing a firearm; an error in accepting a guilty plea does not warrant relief when the record shows that knowledge and no reasonable probability the defendant would have declined to plead guilty.

United States v. White · filed 2021-02-02(g)(1)

Because the record establishes that White had knowledge of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm, there is no reasonable probability that he would have refused to enter the plea absent the district court’s error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status; omitting that requirement from jury instructions is error, but overwhelming evidence of that knowledge can defeat a plain-error challenge.

United States v. Edelman · filed 2021-02-08(g)(1)

Counsel further proposes challenging Edelman’s conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon because the indictment did not allege that he knew he was a felon, nor did the jury instructions require a finding that he knew his status. ... The omission in the jury instructions was plain and erroneous. ... But the jury heard “overwhelming evidence” that Edelman knew his status.

A guilty plea under § 922(g)(1) survives plain-error review despite omission of the knowledge-of-felon-status element when the defendant cannot show a reasonable probability that knowing of the element would have led him to trial.

United States v. Nebinger · filed 2021-02-11(g)(1)

As we did in Williams and Dowthard, we conclude here that Nebinger was not prejudiced by the Rehaif error. There is no reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial if he ... had known that the government would need to prove his knowledge of his status. The district court thus did not plainly err by accepting his guilty plea, and his conviction stands.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Carter v. United States · filed 2021-02-08(g)(1)

Finally, Carter argues that Rehaif requires the government to prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted felon but also that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. Notwithstanding the fact that Carter admitted to the court that he knew he was barred from possessing a firearm, Carter’s legal argument is also without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Farmer · filed 2021-02-16(g)(1)

He has therefore failed to carry his burden of showing it is reasonably probable that he would not have pled guilty to the illegal possession charge under section 922(g)(1) had the district court told him the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the scienter-of-status element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know he is a felon, but does not require him to know that possessing a firearm is prohibited.

Farley v. Bennettsville · filed 2021-02-22(g)(1)

As noted above, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, Rehaif requires the government prove only a criminal defendant knew of his prohibited status, not that he knew he was specifically prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

COVINGTON v. United States · filed 2021-02-23(g)(1)

In other words, under Rehaif, the United States' burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Covington knew, at the time of the offense, he had "been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 2020).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Bryner v. United States · filed 2021-02-25(g)(1)

For those charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Rehaif requires the government to prove that the criminal defendant knew that he or she possessed a firearm, and knew that he or she had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as someone previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Pettway · filed 2021-02-26(g)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to show that Pettway was on notice of his status as a person who was convicted of a felony punishable by a sentence exceeding one year. This error affected Pettway's substantial rights, as well as the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. Finding plain error, we therefore vacate the judgment of conviction as to Count 5 and remand for the district court to consider the issue in light of the recent caselaw.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

Sanchez v. United States · filed 2021-03-02(g)(1)

Rehaif’s mens rea requirement was therefore satisfied in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit firearm possession by felons and requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed the firearm.

DUELL v. United States · filed 2021-03-08(g)(1)

Felon in possession remains a crime after Rehaif, albeit with an additional element of proof. Following Rehaif, to convict a defendant under § 922(g), the Government “must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon, not that he knew possessing a firearm was unlawful.

United States v. Austin · filed 2021-03-12(g)(1)

Rather, Rehaif imposes a scienter of status requirement: it would require the government to prove Austin knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but does not require proof that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Gray v. United States · filed 2021-03-17(g)(1)

Finally, Gray argues that Rehaif requires the government to prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted felon but also that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. Notwithstanding the fact that Gray admitted to the court that he knew he was barred from possessing a firearm, Gray’s legal argument is also without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of a prior conviction punishable by more than a year in prison, but does not require knowledge that possessing a firearm is illegal.

Jackson v. United States · filed 2021-03-19(g)(1)

Jackson’s Rehaif argument fails because Rehaif does not require a defendant to know specifically that it is illegal for him to possess a firearm; it requires only knowledge that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by incarceration of more than a year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of firearm possession and felon status, but not knowledge that felons are prohibited from possessing firearms.

Leach v. United States · filed 2021-03-25(g)(1)

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires that a defendant know that he possessed a firearm and know of the status that prevents him from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(5) requires proof that the defendant knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Perez-Perez · filed 2021-03-29(g)(5)

Thus, the government had to prove that Perez knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States at the time of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status, but does not require proof that he knew felons were barred from possessing firearms.

Ohm v. United States · filed 2021-03-29(g)(1)

Finally, Ohm argues that Rehaif requires the government to ... prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted felon but also ... that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. ... Ohm’s legal argument ... is also without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but does not require proof that he knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Waters v. United States · filed 2021-04-05(g)(1)

Finally, Waters argues that Rehaif requires the government to ... prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted felon but also that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. ... Notwithstanding the fact that Waters admitted to the court that he ... knew he was barred from possessing a firearm, Waters’ legal argument is also without merit.

Section 922(g)’s Rehaif knowledge requirement does not apply, according to the court, when the conviction carries an enhanced penalty under § 924(e)(1) rather than a penalty under § 924(a)(2).

White v. United States · filed 2021-04-16(g)

Such a claim fails, however, because Rehaif applies to individuals prosecuted “under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2),” and White was not.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of the prior conviction that bars firearm possession, but does not require knowledge of the firearm prohibition.

Varner v. White · filed 2021-04-16(g)(1)

A reasonable and properly instructed juror would likely conclude Petitioner knew at the time he possessed a firearm in September 2010 that he had previously been convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year in prison.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had the status that barred him from possessing it.

United States v. Hammond · filed 2021-04-26(g)

The government concedes, and we agree, that the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury on the elements of the § 922(g) offense in light of Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when possessing a firearm; an unpreserved omission of that element does not warrant reversal without a showing of a miscarriage of justice.

United States v. Door · filed 2021-04-28(g)(1)

Beginning with Door’s § 922(g) conviction, Door cannot show that our refusal to correct the district court’s error would result in a miscarriage of justice. ... Having served more than a year in prison, Door cannot (and does not attempt to) argue that a jury would find that he was unaware of his status as a person previously convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was unlawful.

Brown v. United States · filed 2021-05-10(g)(1)

Contrary to Brown’s reading, missing in Rehaif is “any notion that, in felon-in-possession cases, the government is also required to prove that the defendant ... knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, which goes to the heart of the ‘ignorance of the law’ maxim.” United States v. Reynolds, No. 2:16-cv-00296-JAD-PAL, 2020 WL ... 5235316, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2020) (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a felon-in-possession defendant to know that he possessed a firearm and that he had a qualifying felony conviction.

Britt v. United States · filed 2021-05-11(g)(1)

For those charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Rehaif requires the government to prove that the criminal defendant knew that he or she possessed a firearm, and knew that he or she had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. ... Defendant, then, admitted to every element of a § 922(g) offense even as the statute was interpreted in Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his status as a convicted felon when he possesses a firearm.

Rose v. United States · filed 2021-05-21(g)(1)

The record thus conclusively demonstrates that Petitioner was well aware of his prohibited status when he committed the § 922(g) offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing firearms.

Weatherspoon v. United States · filed 2021-05-24(g)(1)

Finally, Weatherspoon argues that Rehaif requires’ the ... government to prove not only that he knew that he was a convicted ... felon but also that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms. ... Weatherspoon’s legal argument is also without merit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge element may be established by prior felony convictions, acknowledgment of those convictions, and a prison term exceeding one year.

Minney v. USA · filed 2021-05-21(g)(1)

Given his prior convictions, one of which was for a state offense of possession of a firearm as a felon, his acknowledgment of those convictions, and his term of incarceration in excess of one year for one of those convictions, the Court is satisfied that Minney knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearms in the instant case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Darling v. United States · filed 2021-05-24(g)(1)

There can be no question that Darling knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm knew of his felony status; prior convictions, admissions, and time served can establish that knowledge.

Hammack v. Werlich · filed 2021-05-25(g)(1)

Given his prior convictions, his acknowledgment of those convictions, and his term of incarceration in excess of one year for two of those convictions, the Court is satisfied that Hammack knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearms in the instant case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status; a conviction need not be set aside for a missing instruction when the record establishes that knowledge.

Evans v. Rivers · filed 2021-05-27(g)(1)

Given his multiple periods of incarceration, including for a previous conviction of being a felon in possession, plus his stipulation at trial that he was a felon, there can be no serious question that Mr. Evans knew he was a felon at the time he committed the underlying offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had a prohibited status when he possessed it.

Kisto v. United States · filed 2021-06-02(g)(1)

Finally, she found that Movant’s claim fails on the merits because “the record in Movant’s case establishes that the Government would have been able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Movant knew at the time he possessed the shotgun he used in relation to the burglary charge to which he pleaded guilty that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment for a term of greater than a year.” ... IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Fine’s R&R (Doc. 20) is accepted and adopted as the order of this Court.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know he is a felon when he possesses a firearm; prior felony sentences and a trial stipulation can establish that knowledge.

Mickling, Sr. v. Hudson · filed 2021-06-02(g)(1)

In addition, given his criminal record, the sentences he originally received for his prior drug and felony menacing convictions that each greatly exceeded one year, his return to custody after going AWOL from the halfway house, combined with his stipulation at trial that he was a felon, and his own attorney’s argument to jurors that he was guilty of Count I, there can be no serious question that Mr. Mickling knew he was a felon at the time he committed the underlying offense.

Under § 922(g)(1), voluntary intoxication does not negate knowledge of felony status.

United States v. Washington · filed 2021-06-02(g)(1)

Washington says that he lacked knowledge of his status at the time he committed the offenses because he was under the influence of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. But Washington's argument is foreclosed by controlling law: voluntary intoxication does not negate knowledge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

Alvalle v. United States · filed 2021-06-15(g)(1)

Accordingly, the record provides ample evidence that Alvalle had the requisite knowledge of his status when he unlawfully possessed the firearm at issue in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of the prior felony conviction, but not knowledge that the conviction prohibits firearm possession.

United States v. Moody · filed 2021-06-22(g)(1)

There is no basis in the Court’s reasoning to extend the typical scienter requirement beyond these elements to the knowledge that possession of a firearm is prohibited.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm.

Perez-Lopez v. United States · filed 2021-06-16(g)(1)

Finally, as discussed above, a challenge to his prior conviction under Rehaif would also fail on the merits because Perez-Lopez was aware he was a felon at the time he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was prohibited.

Speed v. True · filed 2021-06-16(g)(1)

The Government did not need to prove that Speed specifically knew that he was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. Rather, Rehaif required the Government to prove that Speed knew that he was a felon at the time he possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Brown · filed 2021-06-24(g)(1)

For the reasons stated in a summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion, we hold that (1) the challenged rulings of the District Court at trial were not an abuse of discretion, and (2) although it was clearly erroneous not to require the government to prove that Brown knew of his status as a felon, that error does not warrant reversal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status, which a prior ten-year prison term can support.

Finch v. Hemingway · filed 2021-06-25(g)(1)

Petitioner had previously served a ten-year prison term, an experience he was unlikely to have forgotten. It follows that Petitioner knew that he had been convicted of an offense that was punishable by more than a year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

CAMERON v. United States · filed 2021-06-28(g)(1)

Because of this admission, it would be difficult for Mr. Cameron to assert that he did not know of his status as a convicted felon and argue that the United States could not establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew of his felony status when he possessed it.

Cartman v. Finley · filed 2021-06-30(g)(1)

Rather, under Rehaif, the government must prove that a defendant knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had one of the statuses described in Section 922(g), such as a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Willis · filed 2021-07-01(g)(1)

In light of Rehaif, it was plain error to not present to the grand and petit juries the question whether Willis knew that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing firearms—i.e., that he knew that he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that a defendant knew he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Kinney · filed 2021-06-24(g)(3)

That is, the government had to prove that Kinney knew he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance at the time that he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status, but not that he knew he could not possess a gun.

United States v. Leonard · filed 2021-07-08(g)

In a prosecution under § 922(g), the government must prove that a defendant knew of his status as a person barred from possessing a firearm, but it does not need to prove that the defendant knew he could not possess a gun.

Section 922(g) requires knowledge of one’s prohibited status, but ignorance of the federal firearm ban is not a defense.

Thigpen v. Sproul · filed 2021-07-14(g)

Petitioner’s remaining arguments, namely his claims that he was unaware his two felony offenses and marijuana use prohibited him from possessing a firearm and ammunition, are best construed as an ignorance-of-the-law defense, which is not supported by the Rehaif opinion.

A defendant raising an unpreserved challenge to a § 922(g)(1) conviction must show that any failure to prove knowledge that his civil rights had not been restored affected his substantial rights.

United States v. Jarnig · filed 2021-07-22(g)(1)

We review Jarnig’s challenge to his § 922(g) convictions, brought pursuant to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), for plain error. ... Jarnig has not carried his burden on plain error review to establish that any failure by the government to prove that he knew his rights had not been restored affected his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know of their prohibited status; a stipulation to a prior felony conviction is sufficient to establish that knowledge.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2021-07-26(g)(1)

Thompson stipulated at trial that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. A stipulation like this is “legally sufficient to establish [the defendant’s] knowledge” of his status as a felon and so is enough to “sustain the conviction,” even under the standard announced in Rehaif.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew he had been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year in prison.

SCHREANE v. WATSON · filed 2021-07-27(g)

Considering this evidence, Mr. Schreane cannot plausibly argue that he did not know at the time of the charged offense conduct that he had been convicted of an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Therefore, the Court agrees that Mr. Schreane cannot show that he suffered a miscarriage of justice since no reasonable jury could have concluded that the government failed to meet its burden of proving a violation of § 922(g) even after Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew, when possessing the firearm, that a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Deandre Cotton · filed 2021-07-28(g)(1)

In Cotton’s case, a jury would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew, at the time of his arrest, that he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Taken together, Cotton has not shown that the error affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Jami Walking Bull · filed 2021-08-10(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Walking Bull knew at the time he possessed a firearm that he was a prohibited person—i.e., that he was previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-felony-status requirement can be proved without an ATF 4473 Form.

Clark v. United States · filed 2021-08-16(g)(1)

For the reasons discussed above, particularly that the mens rea requirement of § 922(g) can be proven in multiple manners and not just through the ATF 4473 Form, Petitioner will not be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief even if this fact is more fully developed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

United States v. Everette · filed 2021-08-26(g)(1)

Here, the district court failed to ensure that Everette understood that, with respect to the § 922(g)(1) offenses, “the Government must prove both that [Everette] knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019).

For a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)(1), a defendant’s trial stipulation that he was a convicted felon satisfied the knowledge-of-status element.

Mingo v. Barnes · filed 2021-08-17(g)(1)

As a result of this stipulation, the magistrate judge reasoned, “all of the elements that are now required in a § 922(g) conviction post-Rehaif were actually presented to the jury at Petitioner’s trial, and that jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s conduct supported a conviction under § 922(g)(1).” ... After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case, the court agrees with the magistrate judge and adopts the Report (ECF No. 30) and incorporates it herein.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status; omitting that element from an indictment does not warrant relief unless the omission affects the defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. Levester Grayer · filed 2021-08-26(g)(1)

For the reasons explained by the district court and raised by the government on appeal, Defendant has not shown that his substantial rights were affected by his indictment’s failure to include the knowledge-of-status element for his felon-in-possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Slocum v. United States · filed 2021-08-20(g)(1)

Rehaif only recognized a knowledge of status element, which would require, in Slocum’s case, proof that he knew he was a convicted felon during the relevant times alleged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof or admission that the defendant knew he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

Turner v. United States · filed 2021-08-24(g)(1)

Thus, for defendants charged under § 922(g)(1), which applies to felons, the Government must prove, or the defendant must admit, “that he knew he had been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a prior felony conviction; a belief that rights were restored in one state does not defeat the charge when the defendant knew of another felony conviction for which rights were not restored.

Sorensen v. United States · filed 2021-08-24(g)(1)

The same rationale is true here—the record leaves no question that Sorensen knew he had previously been convicted of a felony in Arizona and that his civil rights in Arizona had not been restored—regardless of whether he believed his rights had been restored in South Dakota.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

Prutting v. Martinez · filed 2021-08-25(g)(1)

The Government need not prove, however, that the defendant knew the defendant’s status prohibited him or her from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, but not that he knew his status prohibited firearm possession.

Orozco v. United States · filed 2021-08-25(g)(1)

Following Rehaif, the entirety of the Government’s burden for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is to prove “(1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Woney · filed 2021-08-26(g)(1)

For a felon-in-possession charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must therefore prove that the defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prior felony conviction when he possessed the firearm.

Moore v. Warden FCI Edgefield · filed 2021-08-27(g)(1)

Thus, it is now clear that there is a fourth element to a felon in possession charge: at the time of the firearm possession, the defendant knew that he had a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed the firearm; an omitted instruction on that requirement does not warrant reversal on plain-error review unless it affected the trial’s outcome.

United States v. Wheeler · filed 2021-09-10(g)

Wheeler’s trial took place before the Supreme Court decided Rehaif, so the District Court did not instruct the jury that it needed to find that Wheeler knew of his status as a felon to convict him. Even assuming that the first two prongs of plain-error review are satisfied, Wheeler’s claim fails at the third prong because he has not shown that the error affected the outcome of his trial. ... Because the error that occurred in this case did not affect the outcome of the District Court’s proceedings, we conclude that the Rehaif error does not warrant vacating Wheeler’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prior felony conviction when he possessed the firearm.

Wood v. United States · filed 2021-09-13(g)(1)

But the knowledge-of-status requirement applies regardless of which status category the defendant falls into under subsection (g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Hoover · filed 2021-09-02(g)(1)

We agree that his trial was deficient under Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200, as the Government failed to prove that he knew he was a felon (meaning someone who was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison) at the time he possessed the firearm at issue.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status; on plain error review, an omitted instruction on that element warrants relief only if there is a reasonable probability that a correct instruction would have led to acquittal.

United States v. Parks · filed 2021-09-03(g)(1)

Thus, we easily conclude that Parks cannot meet his “burden of showing that, if the District Court had correctly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted.”

An unpreserved failure to advise a defendant of § 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-felon-status element does not warrant plain-error relief when the defendant admitted his felon status and offered no evidence that he was unaware of it.

United States v. McEachin · filed 2021-09-07(g)(1)

Considered within this framework, we conclude that McEachin’s Rehaif plain-error argument fails. Like Gary, McEachin admitted during his plea colloquy that he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed a firearm. Also like Gary, McEachin has not presented any evidence showing that he was then unaware of his felon status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status when possessing a firearm, but does not require knowledge that the law prohibits possession.

United States v. White · filed 2021-09-13(g)(1)

The Court did not hold that the government must also prove that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm based on his status. ... Moreover, the indictment and jury instructions properly mirrored the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and included the knowledge of status element, as required by Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194, 2200.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status; a stipulation that he served more than one year in prison for a prior felony can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Willis · filed 2021-09-20(g)(1)

In this case, it is undisputed that both defendants were sentenced to, and served, more than one year in prison for their prior felony convictions. Their stipulations to that fact conclusively prove that they knew of their status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm; a mistaken belief that the status no longer bars firearm possession does not defeat that requirement.

Hankerson v. United States · filed 2021-09-22(g)(1)

This claim similarly fails on the merits. ... Again, Petitioner here does not contend or show that he was unaware of his felony status when he possessed the firearm. Rather, he claims that he believed that his felony status did not preclude him from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

STOKES v. WATSON · filed 2021-09-27(g)(1)

In other words, under Rehaif, the government's burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Stokes knew, at the time of the offense, he had "been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a person knows he is a convicted felon and possesses a firearm.

Thomas v. United States · filed 2021-09-28(g)(1)

He stipulated to his status as a convicted felon at trial. ... During his plea colloquy, he acknowledged that he would be a convicted felon and lose the right to possess a firearm. ... And the jury found that he possessed the firearm. Accordingly, after a de novo review, I find that this claim is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm; an unpreserved error concerning that requirement warrants relief only if it affected the defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. Smith · filed 2021-09-29(g)(1)

Thus, given Smith’s decades-long criminal history, we discern no reasonable probability that a jury would have credited his conclusory claim that alcohol, drugs, and medication so clouded his memory that he forgot he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant knew of his felony status; omitting that allegation is a Rehaif error.

Hogan v. United States · filed 2021-10-04(g)(1)

Because the Indictment did not allege that Petitioner knew of his status as a felon, it contained a Rehaif error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that, when possessing the firearm, the defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Liggins v. United States · filed 2021-10-14(g)(1)

Specifically, according to Rehaif, in prosecutions under section 922(g)(1), the United States must prove, in addition to knowing possession, that at the time of that possession, the defendant knew he previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm; on plain-error review, a defendant challenging his conviction must show that he was unaware of his felon status.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2021-10-13(g)(1)

But on plain-error review the burden is reversed: the defendant must show that he was unaware that he was a felon when he possessed the gun. See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2097-98 (2021). Johnson has not even tried to make that showing here, so we reject his claim.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon when he possessed it.

Williams v. USP · filed 2021-10-15(g)(1)

Although Williams asserts that he was not properly advised of Section 922(g)’s mens rea requirement, the transcript of his plea colloquy indicates that he was aware of his prior felony convictions, (See Williams, No. 5:13-CR-17, Doc. 38 at 18, 24, 27), and Williams does not offer any argument or evidence to show that he would not have pled guilty if he had been properly advised of Section 922(g)’s mens rea requirement. Williams is accordingly not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was prohibited.

Stewart v. Finley · filed 2021-10-13(g)(1)

Importantly, the government was not required to prove that Stewart specifically knew that he was prohibited from possessing firearms. ... Rather, under Rehaif, the government must prove that a defendant knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had one of the statuses described in Section 922(g), such as a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm; omitting that element from the indictment and plea advice is plain error.

King v. United States · filed 2021-10-15(g)(1)

Count One of the Superseding Indictment did not allege the mens rea element that Petitioner knew he was a convicted felon. Additionally, neither the Plea Agreement nor the guilty plea colloquy referenced this mens rea requirement. ... There were Rehaif errors in the district court, and these errors are plain but not jurisdictional.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of the prior felony conviction when possessing a firearm, but not to know that the conviction bars firearm possession.

Higdon v. Finley · filed 2021-10-15(g)(1)

By its terms, the statute does not require the defendant to know that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm; it simply requires the defendant to knowingly possess a firearm and to know that he had previously been convicted of a felony at the time he did so.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of the felony conviction that bars firearm possession.

Duke v. United States · filed 2021-10-26(g)(1)

This Court agrees per Rehaif, but as discussed above, the record clearly reflects that Petitioner pled guilty to the necessary elements of both § 922(g)(1) and the Penalty Provision, including knowledge of his felony status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know that he possesses a firearm and that he has a qualifying felony conviction, but does not require him to know that the conviction bars firearm possession.

Richardson v. USP-Allenwood · filed 2021-10-29(g)(1)

By its terms, the statute does not require the defendant to know that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm; it simply requires the defendant to knowingly possess a firearm and to know that he had previously been convicted of a felony at the time he did so.

Prior felony convictions and imprisonment can provide circumstantial evidence that a defendant knew he was a felon under § 922(g).

Patterson v. Williams · filed 2021-11-09(g)

These prior convictions and imprisonment provide ample circumstantial evidence that Patterson knew he was a felon at the time of his arrest.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm knew he was a felon, but does not require proof that he knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

FARRELL v. WARDEN · filed 2021-11-08(g)(1)

Significantly, Rehaif does not require the United States to prove that Petitioner knew that he was not permitted to carry firearms; the United States must only prove that Petitioner knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

Lancaster v. United States · filed 2021-11-08(g)(1)

As the movant notes, Rehaif requires “the Government [to] prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge that the prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of whether the defendant served jail time.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2021-11-10(g)(1)

On its face, § 922(g) requires knowledge that an individual was convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was an unlawful user of drugs.

United States v. Lundy · filed 2021-11-09(g)(3)

And under Rehaif and § 922(g)(3), the Government must prove that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was an unlawful user of drugs.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew of his felony status when he possessed it.

United States v. Belton · filed 2021-11-16(g)(1)

Here, the district court failed to ensure prior to the entry of the guilty plea that Belton understood that “the Government must prove both that [Belton] knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Johnson, Shane v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2021-12-10(g)(1)

Accordingly, after Rehaif, the government need only prove that Johnson knew, at the time of the offense, he belonged to a group previously “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; prior prison terms exceeding a year can establish that knowledge.

HOFFMAN v. United States · filed 2021-11-23(g)(1)

Any claim that Plaintiff did not know he was a felon at the time of his possession of ammunition appears to be objectively meritless. He had at least two convictions that were punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment and served terms of incarceration in excess of 1 year before his possession of ammunition by a convicted felon charge here. As such, Defendant cannot show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of violating § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove that a defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Antoine · filed 2021-12-02(g)(1)

Because the court instructed the jury that the Government did not need to prove that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm, Antoine has established that an error occurred and that the error was plain. However, Antoine cannot establish that the error affected his substantial rights.