18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Hollingshed · filed 2019-10-03(g)(1)

These facts, combined with Hollingshed’s phone call to Doolin while in jail, indicate that Hollingshed knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” when he possessed the firearm in 2015.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that, when the defendant possessed the firearm, he knew his prior offense was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Burghardt · filed 2019-10-03(g)(1)

Based on the foregoing, Burghardt has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that it is reasonably probable that he would not have pled guilty had the district court told him that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew when he possessed the gun that he had previously been ... convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year in prison.

A knowing and voluntary guilty plea to a § 922(g)(1) charge defeats an actual-innocence claim based on Rehaif’s requirement to prove knowledge of prohibited status at trial.

Brewster v. United States · filed 2019-10-09(g)(1)

Rehaif does not apply to the Petitioner’s motion. The requirement of proof by the Government that a defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm was found in the context of a jury trial.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his status as a convicted felon.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2019-10-22(g)(1)

Nor do we see any merit in Johnson’s claim that the indictment was fatally defective because it did not contain an essential element of the § 922(g) offense, namely, that Johnson knew of his status as a convicted felon. Johnson waived this claim by pleading guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Reed · filed 2019-10-28(g)(1)

Rehaif made clear that the government must prove that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed a firearm or ammunition. 139 S. Ct. at 2194, 2200. The government concedes that plain error occurred when Reed’s indictment failed to allege that he knew he was a felon and when the jury was not instructed to find that Reed knew he was a felon. And, as Reed argues, error occurred when the government was not required to prove that Reed knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Webster v. Streeval · filed 2019-11-07(g)(1)

Second, contrary to Webster’s argument Rehaif does not hold that the government was required to prove that he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know, when possessing a firearm, that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Davies · filed 2019-11-08(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, he needed to know only that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at the time he possessed the firearms.

A knowing and voluntary guilty plea to violating § 922(g)(1) admits all elements of the offense, including knowledge of the defendant’s status as a convicted felon.

Rucker v. United States · filed 2019-11-18(g)(1)

Petitioner’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea to violating § 922(g) admitted all the elements of that offense, including the knowledge of his status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon.

Walker Jr. v. Quintana · filed 2019-11-25(g)(1)

On the other hand, Brewer’s second argument (i.e., that § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew that he was a convicted felon) is consistent with the holding of Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon.

United States v. Romero-Salgado · filed 2019-11-27(g)(1)

Finally, failing to instruct the jury that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires proof that Defendant knew he was a felon was also harmless since the record makes clear Defendant was aware of his felon status.

A defendant who pleads guilty to a Section 922(g)(1) charge and does not dispute knowing he possessed the firearm or was a felon cannot obtain relief under Rehaif.

Williams v. United States · filed 2019-12-03(g)(1)

Petitioner does not contend that he did not know that he possessed the firearm or that he did not know that he was a felon, in any event. Rehaif simply does not apply.

Section 922(g)(1) requires that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Harris · filed 2019-12-13(g)(1)

Finally, Harris argues that the factual basis for his § 922(g)(1) guilty plea was insufficient in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019), which established that such a conviction requires that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon at the time of his unlawful firearm possession. ... Accordingly, even after Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200, Harris has failed to establish that the district court ... clearly or obviously erred in accepting the factual basis for his guilty plea.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant knew of his felon status, but a guilty plea waives the omission as a nonjurisdictional defect.

United States v. Stokeling · filed 2020-01-06(g)(1)

Stokeling’s indictment was defective because it failed to allege that he knew he was a felon, but Stokeling waived that nonjurisdictional defect by pleading guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status when possessing a firearm, but not knowledge that firearm possession is prohibited.

Maxie v. Warden · filed 2020-01-07(g)(1)

Contrary to his assumption, Rehaif does not hold that the Government was required to prove that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to allege and prove that a defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Greer · filed 2020-01-08(g)(1)

And, as Greer argues, Rehaif made plain that error occurred when his indictment failed to allege that he knew he was a felon and when the government was not required to prove that Greer knew of his prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status as an element of the offense.

United States v. Garry Grace · filed 2020-01-16(g)(1)

Grace established an error in his indictment that Rehaif made plain. Rehaif made clear that a defendant’s knowledge of his status as a felon is an element of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

For a § 922(g)(1) conviction, the defendant must have known of his felony status when he possessed the firearm; the whole record may establish that knowledge on plain-error review.

United States v. Garian King · filed 2020-01-21(g)(1)

Although the factual resume and plea colloquy standing alone do not establish that King knew, when he committed his present offense, that he had been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, the record as a whole establishes that he had such knowledge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm; omitting that element from the indictment and plea colloquy is plain error.

United States v. John Willis Jones, Jr. · filed 2020-01-28(g)(1)

The failure of Jones’ indictment to allege Jones knew ... he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm and the failure of the court to require the knowledge element be admitted during the plea colloquy for a § 922(g)(1) charge constituted plain error.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Schmidt · filed 2020-02-06(g)

Although Schmidt did not argue below that the government was required to prove Schmidt knew he was a felon, under any standard of review there was overwhelming evidence that Schmidt knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearms at issue in this case. See United States v. Hessiani, 786 F. App’x 658, 661 (9th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, Schmidt has no claim to relief under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know his felon status when possessing a firearm, but does not require him to know that possession is illegal.

Navarro v. United States of America Do not docket in this case. File only in 6:16-cr-89-1. · filed 2020-02-11(g)(1)

Next, contrary to Movant’s assertions, Rehaif merely held that a defendant must be aware of his relevant status, not that his status made it illegal for him to possess a firearm under § 922(g).

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

Wade v. United States · filed 2020-02-13(g)

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) requires the Government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knowingly belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Here, the jury determined that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and the Parties stipulated to Wade being a felon, i.e. the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. See Dkt. 58 at 1; Dkt. 109; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Accordingly, Rehaif has no impact on Defendant’s case and thus is irrelevant for purposes of Defendant’s motion to reconsider.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Keith · filed 2020-02-21(g)(1)

Keith has not identified any reason to believe that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been told that the government would need to prove that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g) prohibits firearm possession by a person who knows he is a felon and knowingly possesses the firearm.

Allen v. Dobbs · filed 2020-02-25(g)

However, Allen pled guilty to having knowingly possessed a firearm and knowingly been a felon at the time of possession. Therefore, the government satisfied its burden of proof.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Perry v. Barnhart · filed 2020-02-11(g)(1)

Thus, while the government’s burden includes proof that the defendant was aware of his “relevant status,” meaning that he knew that he was “a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like,” Jd. at 2195-96, it does not include proof that the defendant specifically knew that he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know of his felony status; a guilty plea waives an indictment’s failure to allege that knowledge.

United States v. Caldwell · filed 2020-02-26(g)(1)

Caldwell’s indictment was defective because it failed to allege he knew he was a felon, but Caldwell waived that nonjurisdictional defect by pleading guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-02-26(g)(1)

Plain error occurred when the government was not required to prove and when the district court failed to instruct the jury to find that Johnson knew of his prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of the conviction that barred him from possessing a firearm, but omission of that proof does not warrant reversal on plain-error review when acquittal was not reasonably probable.

United States v. Welch · filed 2020-02-27(g)(1)

Welch has received and served several prison sentences longer than one year for felony convictions. It is not reasonably probable that, if the government had to prove Welch’s knowledge of a previous conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” he would have been acquitted.

Section 922(g)(1) requires that a defendant know of his status as a felon.

United States v. Garry Grace · filed 2020-03-02(g)(1)

Grace established an error in his indictment that Rehaif made plain. Rehaif made clear that a defendant’s knowledge of his status as a felon is an element of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felon status, and an admission of that status as part of a guilty plea satisfies that element.

Kinard v. United States · filed 2020-03-03(g)(1)

To the extent that Rehaif requires that a defendant know that he is a felon in order to be convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Petitioner admitted that element as a part of his plea.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status; an omitted instruction on that requirement does not warrant reversal on plain-error review when the defendant's admissions show that knowledge.

United States v. Heard · filed 2020-03-03(g)(1)

Heard cannot satisfy elements three and four of the plain-error test. At trial, he admitted he pled guilty to the felonies of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of firearms and served a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. “These facts . . . indicate that [Heard] knew he had been convicted of ‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.’” Id. at 416, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He thus cannot “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status requirement is not defeated by a defendant’s belief that his prior felony convictions were invalid.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2020-03-05(g)(1)

Daniels’ argument is not really that he was unaware of his years in prison at the time he possessed a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1). Instead, his argument is that he disagreed with his prior felony convictions, because he viewed himself as a sovereign citizen outside the jurisdiction of the American legal system. That is not a basis for relief under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

Alexander v. Entzel · filed 2020-03-05(g)(1)

Rehaif imposes an obligation on the prosecution to show a defendant knew he was a felon—Petitioner assuredly did—and does not otherwise bear upon whether a defendant knew he was forbidden from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

McDonald, Cedric v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2020-03-11(g)(1)

For those charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Rehaif means that the government must prove that the criminal defendant knew that he or she possessed and firearm, and knew that he or she had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status; an omitted instruction on that requirement does not warrant reversal when the error did not affect his substantial rights.

United States v. Warren · filed 2020-03-05(g)(1)

Pugh’s challenge fails, because sufficient evidence existed such that a reasonable jury could find that Pugh knew of his prohibited status, and because Pugh cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the instruction error.

An unpreserved error concerning knowledge of prohibited status under § 922(g) does not warrant reversal when the defendant cannot show that it affected his substantial rights.

United States v. Eddie Cox · filed 2020-03-06(g)

The Government concedes that the first two prongs of the plain error standard are satisfied. But we conclude that Cox cannot show the error affected his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status, but not to know that possessing ammunition as a felon is a crime.

Saenz v. United States of America Do not docket in this case. File only in 6:00cr09-01. · filed 2020-03-16(g)(1)

Second, Rehaif merely held that a defendant must be aware of his relevant status, not that his status made it illegal for him to possess ammunition under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of the felony status that barred firearm possession, but not that the defendant knew possession was prohibited.

Guerrero v. Quay · filed 2020-03-23(g)(1)

Contrary to Petitioner’s belief, the Government was not required to prove that Petitioner “specifically knew that he was prohibited from possessing firearms.”

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew his status barred him from possessing a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was prohibited.

Hughes v. Mackelburg · filed 2020-03-24(g)

Moreover, the government is not required to prove that Hughes knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Rather, the government is only required to prove that Hughes knew that he belonged to the “relevant category of persons.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year when possessing a firearm; a previously served 36-month sentence can show that knowledge.

United States v. Savannah Rolle · filed 2020-03-26(g)(1)

First, in his sentencing memorandum and at sentencing, Rolle admitted to having previously served a sentence of 36 months—which shows that, at the time he possessed the gun, he objectively and subjectively knew that he had been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew the facts establishing his prior felony conviction.

United States v. Hobbs · filed 2020-03-20(g)(1)

To establish a § 922(g)(1) violation after Rehaif, the government must show that Hobbs knew the facts underlying his status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew, when possessing the firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Mikelinich · filed 2020-03-27(g)(1)

That is, Mikelinich must show a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty if the government had been required to prove that he knew, at the time that he possessed the firearm in question, that he “ha[d] been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a disqualifying conviction; serving more than a year in prison for such a conviction makes a claim of ignorance implausible.

United States v. Harris · filed 2020-03-31(g)(1)

Harris has not argued, however, that he was unaware of his legal disability, and such an argument would not be plausible. A disqualifying conviction is one “punisha- ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (§922(g)(1)). Harris has at least two such convictions, and he actually served more than a year in prison for them.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm; omitting that element from an indictment does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

United States v. Moore · filed 2020-03-31(g)(1)

With respect to the indictment’s omission of the mens rea element for Appellants’ 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) charges, we conclude that this error did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. And the government’s failure to prove the now-requisite mens rea element did not constitute a plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

Troiano v. United States · filed 2020-03-31(g)(1)

The only issue raised by Petitioner as to Count 4 here is whether the Government proved that Petitioner Troiano knew he was a felon. There can be no dispute that Petitioner Troiano knew he was a felon, meaning he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, at the time he was alleged to have possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of his status as a person convicted of a felony.

United States v. MacK · filed 2020-04-02(g)(1)

As in Rehaif, and as the government concedes, the district court’s jury instructions in Mack’s case were clearly erroneous in their omission of the government’s obligation to prove Mack’s knowledge of his status as a former felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Nickens · filed 2020-04-09(g)(1)

But Nickens cannot show that the trial court’s error affected his substantial rights, so he is not entitled to relief. ... In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s knowledge of his status as a felon is an element of the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of firearm possession and felony status, but not knowledge that felons are prohibited from possessing firearms.

Troxell v. United States · filed 2020-04-09(g)(1)

To the extent Rehaif recognized a new statutory rule that might apply retroactively to cases on collateral review absent an appeal waiver, it doesn’t require the Government to prove that Mr. Troxell knew felons were prohibited from possessing firearms.

An omitted instruction requiring proof that the defendant knew of his felony status does not warrant plain-error relief when the record shows he knew of that status.

United States v. Kachina · filed 2020-04-16(g)

Turning first to Kachina’s challenges to his conviction under Rehaif, we conclude that Kachina has not established he is entitled to plain-error relief because evidence was introduced at Kachina’s trial that he had multiple convictions for which he had received sentences of more than one year in prison, and there was information in the revised presentence report—to which Kachina did not object—indicating that he had actually served multiple prison terms of well over one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Davis · filed 2020-04-20(g)(1)

Specifically, Rehaif made clear that the government must prove that a defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons—here, those with a prior felony conviction—that § 922(g) prohibits from possessing a firearm. Because the indictment did not allege, the government was not required to prove, and the jury was not instructed to find that Davis knew he was a felon, these were errors that are plain under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew of his felony status; a guilty plea admitting both satisfies that burden.

Clark v. Saad · filed 2020-04-22(g)(1)

As stated in the R&R, the Petitioner pled guilty to having knowingly possessed a firearm and knowingly been a felon at time of possession in violation of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). ECF No. 15 at 2. Therefore, the government satisfied its burden of proof for the underlying offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Goldsberry v. United States · filed 2020-04-30(g)(1)

The government is not required to prove that a defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm; it need only prove that a defendant knew that he belonged to the category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Willard Moss, Jr. · filed 2020-04-22(g)(9)

After Moss filed his opening brief, the Supreme Court issued Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), holding that, in order to convict a defendant of a § 922(g) offense, the Government “must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” Id. at 2194. ... During his direct testimony, Moss stated that he was well aware of his prohibited status because of his prior convictions. Accordingly, we find that Moss cannot show plain error.

For a felon-in-possession offense under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2020-04-22(g)(1)

Here, as Rehaif makes plain, the district court erred when it failed to advise Thomas during the plea colloquy that knowledge of his status as a felon at the time of his offense was an element of his §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) offense that the government must prove.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

Whitley v. United States · filed 2020-04-22(g)(1)

While it is undisputed with respect to Whitley’s § 922(g) conviction that Whitley previously had “been convicted in any court punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), see PSR ¶¶ 56, 59, 71, it is also undisputed that his indictment failed to allege, and that the jury was not instructed to find, as Rehaif now requires, that Whitley knew that fact.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm, but does not require proof that he knew the possession was unlawful.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-04-28(g)(1)

Even if this is the case, Rehaif only requires the government to prove that Johnson had knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, not that he knew that his firearm possession, as a convicted felon, was in fact unlawful.

A defendant’s stipulation to prior convictions can prove the knowledge of a qualifying prior conviction required for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Winn · filed 2020-05-01(g)(1)

We also reject Winn’s argument that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) because the government did not present evidence that Winn knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year at the time he possessed the firearm. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019). Any error in not adducing evidence on this element of the offense “did not affect [Winn]’s substantial rights” because Winn’s stipulation to his prior convictions “proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had the knowledge required by Rehaif.” United States v. Benamor, 937 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2019).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a defendant knew of his unlawful immigration status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Russell · filed 2020-05-04(g)(5)(A)

Finally, the district court’s error effectively precluded Russell from mounting any defense about his knowledge of his immigration status—a necessary element of a § 922(g)(5) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew of his prohibited status as a convicted felon.

United States v. Haynes · filed 2020-05-05(g)(1)

Because Haynes had previously been imprisoned for a term longer than one year, he fled the scene of his pat down, and he stipulated at trial that he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by a prison term of longer than one year, there was sufficient evidence that he knew of his prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

Lowe v. United States · filed 2020-05-06(g)(1)

This evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Lowe well knew at the time of the offense that he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing firearms.

Figueroa v. United States · filed 2020-05-06(g)(1)

In light of Rehaif, the jury was indisputably incorrectly instructed that the Government need not prove that Petitioner knew of his restricted status; nevertheless, the Court finds that sufficient evidence existed to establish Petitioner’s knowledge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Cropper · filed 2020-05-04(g)(1)

The Court in Rehaif made clear that in a prosecution under § 922 the government must prove that the defendant knew that he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. ... Cropper’s indictment did not allege, nor was the jury instructed that it had to find, that Cropper knew he was a convicted felon. Accordingly, Cropper has established plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm.

Delva v. United States · filed 2020-05-07(g)(1)

Like the defendant in Miller, Delva stipulated to being a felon, see ECF No. 214, at 1036, and his extensive prior criminal history removes any reasonable doubt that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm, see ECF No. 300, at 2 n.1 (describing a conviction punishable by five years in prison); ECF No. 255, at 11 (noting Delva’s criminal history score of eight); Presentence Report at 12-14 (listing over half a dozen convictions, including at least one other punishable by more than a year in prison).

A guilty plea to violating § 922(g)(1) is not reversible on plain-error review merely because the plea colloquy omits the defendant’s knowledge of felony status; the omission must affect the defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. McLellan · filed 2020-05-06(g)(1)

We thus hold that any error from the lack of a knowledge-of-status element in McLellan’s plea colloquy did not affect his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew of his prior felony status, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Oscar v. Warden of USP-Allenwood · filed 2020-05-06(g)(1)

Rather, under Rehaif, the government must prove that the defendant knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had one of the statuses described in Section 922(g), such as a prior felony conviction.

A defendant seeking plain error relief from a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea because he was not told that knowledge of felon status is an element must show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known.

United States v. Hicks · filed 2020-05-08(g)(1)

We see no reason why we should apply a different standard to Hicks’s claim that he was misadvised about § 922(g)(1)’s knowledge of felon status requirement.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of their felon status when possessing a firearm, but does not require proof that they knew possession was unlawful.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2020-05-12(g)(1)

But Rehaif does not require the Government to show that the defendant knew his possession was unlawful; it merely requires proof that “the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S. Ct. at 2194.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew both that he possessed the firearm or ammunition and that he belonged to a category barred from possessing it.

Faircloth v. United States · filed 2020-05-18(g)

The Supreme Court clarified in Rehaif that, “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” ... Under Rehaif, petitioner established plain errors in the Indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge requirement is satisfied when a person possessing ammunition knows they served prison sentences of more than one year for prior crimes.

Edwards v. FCI Berlin, Warden · filed 2020-05-12(g)(1)

Because Edwards knew when he possessed ammunition, as charged, that he had served prison sentences of more than one year for prior crimes, he had the requisite knowledge of his restricted status.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status, but an unpreserved jury instruction omitting that requirement does not warrant vacatur when the record shows the defendant knew he was a felon.

United States v. Smith · filed 2020-05-26(g)

In Miller, we rejected the argument that the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct that § 922(g) requires the government to prove knowledge of felon status. ... Thus, the erroneous instruction does not warrant vacatur of Smith’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm; omission of that element from a guilty plea does not warrant reversal on plain-error review without prejudice.

United States v. Lavalais · filed 2020-05-22(g)(1)

And the Government concedes that failure to inform Lavalais of the knowledge element as required in Rehaif is an obvious error. So the issue is whether Lavalais can satisfy both the third and fourth prongs of plain error review. He cannot.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his qualifying felony conviction, not that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Baker, Eddie v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2020-05-28(g)(1)

Placing this standard in Baker’s context, the government would be required to prove only that Baker knew he had “been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew, at the time of the offense, that he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

Geddes, Rahmad v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2020-05-29(g)(1)

Applying Rehaif statutory interpretation to Geddes’s case, the government’s burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Geddes knew, at the time of the offense, he had “been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1).

An unpreserved challenge to a felon-in-possession conviction based on knowledge of felony status fails when the record shows the defendant would have stipulated to that knowledge.

United States v. Sandford · filed 2020-05-29(g)(1)

Similarly, here, “rejecting [Sandford’s] argument will [not] seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” because, looking beyond the trial record, “we have no doubt that, had the Rehaif issue been foreseen by the district court, [Sandford] would have stipulated to knowledge of his felon status to prevent the jury from hearing evidence of his actual sentence.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. Omission of that element is plain error, but reversal requires a showing of prejudice.

United States v. Perez · filed 2020-06-01(g)(1)

Here, just as in Reed, Perez has not satisfied the plain error test. For starters, we recognize that plain error arose when the indictment did not allege the Rehaif element, when the jury was not required to find it beyond a reasonable doubt, and when the government was not required to prove that Perez knew he was a felon. Id. at 1021. Nevertheless, Perez cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had these errors not occurred. Id.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm, but not that he knew possession was illegal.

United States v. Jones · filed 2020-06-01(g)(1)

Next, Rehaif’s discussion of “the well‐known maxim that ‘ignorance of the law’ (or a ‘mistake of law’) is no excuse” makes doubly clear that § 922(g) requires knowledge only of status, not knowledge of the § 922(g) prohibition itself.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his convicted-felon status when he possessed the firearm; omission of that element from the indictment is a nonjurisdictional defect.

United States v. Hutchinson · filed 2020-06-01(g)(1)

We have concluded, however, that an indictment’s failure to allege the knowledge-of-status element or to cite to section 924(a)(2), constitutes a defect that is non- jurisdictional.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Trujillo · filed 2020-05-27(g)(1)

Rehaif changed the established law such that, now, to secure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must also prove that the defendant knew “he had the relevant status” as a felon when he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status, but omitting that element from an indictment is a nonjurisdictional defect waived by a guilty plea.

United States v. Griswold · filed 2020-05-27(g)(1)

Because Griswald’s arguments are limited to the indictment’s failure to charge knowledge under §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and that element is not jurisdictional, he waived those arguments by pleading guilty.

A § 922(g)(1) guilty plea need not be vacated for an omitted knowledge-of-felon-status element unless the defendant shows a reasonable probability that knowing of the element would have changed the plea.

United States v. Titus Bates · filed 2020-05-28(g)(1)

Had Bates known that the government needed to prove that he knew he was a felon, the probability is virtually zero that it would have changed his decision to plead guilty.

A guilty plea to a § 922(g)(1) charge must account for the defendant’s knowledge that he was a felon; failing to require an admission of that element is plain error.

USA v, Sabastion Pascal · filed 2020-06-01(g)(1)

For starters, we recognize that the district court’s failure to require Pascal to admit the knowledge element of his § 922(g)(1) charge in his plea colloquy constituted plain error under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2020-06-08(g)(1)

After sentencing, the Supreme Court decided that, to be convicted under § 922(g), the defendant must have known “he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). This requires that Coleman knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year when possessing a firearm.

Sumlin v. United States · filed 2020-06-18(g)(1)

Here, by contrast, the record not only lacks any indication that Sumlin lacked knowledge of his status as a felon barred from possessing a firearm but in fact confirms that he had such knowledge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status, which a jury may infer from a prior felony conviction absent evidence of ignorance.

United States v. Staggers · filed 2020-06-09(g)(1)

We conclude, however, that absent any evidence suggesting ignorance, a jury applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could infer that a defendant knew that he or she was a convicted felon from the mere existence of a felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof or admission that a defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Lacey v. United States · filed 2020-06-12(g)(1)

Thus, for defendants charged under § 922(g)(1), which applies to felons, the Government must prove, or the defendant must admit, “that he knew he had been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a prior felony conviction, but not knowledge that the conviction bars firearm possession.

Martinez-Armestica v. United States · filed 2020-06-23(g)(1)

That is, the language of the Court’s decision only requires that defendants know their status — in these cases, having a felony conviction –, not that defendants know that it was a crime to possess a firearm as a result of their prohibited status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Hollie · filed 2020-06-24(g)(1)

The Supreme Court recently confirmed that a defendant’s knowledge of his status prohibiting him under § 922 from possessing a firearm is an element of a § 922 offense. ... Hollie’s indictment did not allege that he knew he was a convicted felon. He therefore has established plain error.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew of the status that barred possession at the time.

Kelley v. United States · filed 2020-06-29(g)

Under Rehaif, the government must show both that he knowingly possessed a firearm and knew that he had the relevant status restricting his ability to possess a firearm at the time he possessed it to be convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ... In short, Rehaif does not provide Kelley any relief because Kelley admitted to all of the elements necessary for a binding, final judgment.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, but does not require proof that he knew possessing a firearm was illegal.

Capalbo v. Antonelli · filed 2020-06-29(g)

First, as explained by the magistrate judge, Rehaif, as viewed by the Eleventh Circuit, requires the government to establish that a defendant “knew of his prohibited status, not that a defendant knew that he was specifically prohibited from possessing a firearm.” (ECF No. 23 at 13 n.9).

On plain-error review of a § 922(g)(1) plea, a reasonably disputed factual basis for knowledge of felony status does not establish a clear or obvious error.

United States v. Fletcher · filed 2020-06-19(g)(1)

Although the plea documents and colloquy, standing alone, do not establish Fletcher’s knowledge at issue, the record in its entirety shows it is at least subject to reasonable dispute that there was a sufficient factual basis to support finding Fletcher had such knowledge. There is, therefore, no plain (clear or obvious) error.

Section 922(g) requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant charged as a felon in possession knew he was a convicted felon.

United States v. Fuentes · filed 2020-06-23(g)

To establish a violation under § 922(g), the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuentes knew that he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his status as a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-06-25(g)(1)

In light of the sentences imposed in his earlier cases, Johnson cannot plausibly argue that a jury (or judge, if he opted again for a bench trial) would find that he was unaware of his status as someone previously convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year in prison.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew his prior conviction was a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

United States v. Triggs · filed 2020-07-01(g)(9)

Applying these understandings here, it’s now clear that to convict Triggs at trial, the government had to prove that he knew he had been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of ... domestic violence” as that phrase is defined for purposes of § 922(g)(9) (though not that he knew he was barred from possessing firearms).

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew of the status that barred him from possessing a firearm; admissions and conviction history can establish that knowledge.

Robbins v. Werlich · filed 2020-07-02(g)

Thus, if the Rehaif standard had applied at the time of Robbins’s conviction, ample proof existed to show that he knew he was in the category of persons who were prohibited from possessing a firearm at the time of his offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Midkiff v. Warden Edgefield Federal Correctional Institution · filed 2020-07-06(g)(1)

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, explained that Rehaif requires the government to prove that Midkiff knew that he was a convicted felon, not that he knew it was against the law for him to have a firearm. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that Midkiff has failed to show that, following Rehaif, the conduct of which he was convicted is no longer criminal under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew he belonged to a category of people barred from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Harris · filed 2020-07-07(g)(1)

However, the Supreme Court recently added an additional element, requiring that the government prove the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). ... It was error for the district court not to instruct the jury on the element identified in Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of prohibited status when the defendant possesses a firearm.

United States v. Savannah Sifuentes · filed 2020-07-08(g)(1)

In light of the state court judgment reflecting Sifuentes’s conviction for a state felony, which stated that she was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment suspended for four years of community supervision and ... admonished in accordance with state law, it is reasonably disputable that Sifuentes was aware of her prohibited status at the time she possessed the instant firearm and thus reasonably disputable that the district court did not err in accepting Sifuentes’s guilty plea.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Vazquez · filed 2020-07-09(g)(1)

In view of Rehaif, the Government was required to prove that, at the moment he possessed the firearm, Vazquez knew that he “ha[d] been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew his prior conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Legrier · filed 2020-07-09(g)

The district court instructed the jury that “[t]he Government need not prove that the defendant knew that his conviction was punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,” which is incorrect under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know, when possessing a firearm, that he belongs to the class barred from possession because of a prior conviction punishable by more than a year in prison.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2020-07-09(g)(1)

So even though those crimes were still punishable with sentences of more than a year, thus making him a member of the § 922(g)(1) class, it is not clear that he knew of his membership, as is necessary under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Sanabria-Robreno · filed 2020-07-09(g)(1)

Here, the Government would have had to prove that Sanabria-Robreno knew at the time that he possessed the firearm that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed a firearm; circumstantial evidence can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Brandon · filed 2020-07-14(g)(1)

Here, circumstantial evidence shows that Brandon was aware of his prohibited status when he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know, at the time of the offense, that they had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Carroll · filed 2020-07-14(g)(1)

Although the factual resume and plea colloquy standing alone do not establish that Carroll knew, when he committed his present offense, that he had been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, the record as a whole establishes that he had such knowledge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; absent evidence of ignorance, a jury may infer knowledge of felon status from a felony conviction.

United States v. Kadeem Burden · filed 2020-07-02(g)(1)

Although that stipulation alone does not necessarily place the question entirely beyond debate, “absent any evidence suggesting ignorance, a jury applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could infer that [the] defendant[s] knew that [they were] convicted felon[s] from the mere existence of [their] felony conviction[s].” Staggers, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18085, at *20, 961 F.3d at ___ (emphasis added). Therefore, regardless of the standard of review, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 922(g) requires a defendant to know of his felon status when he possesses a firearm.

United States v. Vandergroen · filed 2020-07-07(g)

Rehaif clarified that an individual must know of his felon status at the time he possessed a firearm in order to be convicted of being a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... The district court’s failure to include the knowledge of status element satisfies the first two prongs of plain error review. ... Taken together, this evidence means Vandergroen cannot satisfy the fourth prong of plain error review.

Prior felony convictions and a stipulation to felon status can support an inference that a defendant knew of that status for a § 922(g)(1) charge.

Curruthers v. United States · filed 2020-07-10(g)(1)

At a minimum, stipulating to the fact that before the defendant was alleged to have possessed a firearm the defendant had been convicted of a felony allows the logical inference that the defendant had knowledge of the defendant’s status when the crime was committed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm, but does not require him to know that possession is prohibited.

United States v. Payne · filed 2020-07-08(g)(1)

These admonitions would have made Payne aware not only of his status, but also of the criminal prohibition against his possessing a firearm because of his sta- tus, more than is required to prove the Rehaif element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status. An omitted instruction on that element warrants plain error relief only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

United States v. Cortez Crumble · filed 2020-07-13(g)(1)

In that case, “the Supreme Court concluded that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” United States v. Davies, 942 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the relevant category is anyone “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 922(g)(1). ... The Government concedes that the first two elements of the plain error standard are satisfied but argues that Crumble cannot show the error affected his substantial rights. We agree given that Crumble was previously convicted for being a felon in possession of ammunition and served 60 months’ imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status, which a jury may infer from a stipulation to a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Raymore · filed 2020-07-13(g)(1)

And a jury could infer from Raymore’s stipulation to his prior felony conviction the requisite knowledge of his status for a § 922(g)(1) violation.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant knew of his felony status.

United States v. Cromer · filed 2020-07-14(g)(1)

Rehaif made clear that a defendant’s knowledge of his status as a felon is an element of § 922(g)(1). It was error not to allege that knowledge in the indictment.

A § 922(g)(9) conviction survives a Rehaif challenge on plain-error review when the defendant cannot show he would have maintained a not-guilty plea and his prior domestic violence conviction and treatment defeat the claimed error.

United States v. Valencia-Barragan · filed 2020-07-13(g)(9)

Valencia fails to meet this standard for two reasons. First, the record does not establish a reasonable probability that he would have persisted in a not guilty plea were it not for the alleged error. Second, Valencia cannot establish plain error in light of the fact that he was convicted of the relevant misdemeanor domestic violence offense in 2013, approximately five (5) years before possessing the firearm at issue in this case, and he completed a treatment program for domestic violence offenders following his conviction.

A conviction under § 922(g)(5)(A) requires knowledge of illegal alien status, but omitting that jury instruction was not plain error where the defendant had prior illegal-entry convictions and removals.

United States v. Perez-Arellanez · filed 2020-07-17(g)(5)(A)

Finally, the district court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury that it had to find that Perez- Arellanez knew he was an illegal alien to convict him of being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, see Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019), because, when Perez-Arellanez possessed the firearm at issue, he had been convicted of illegal entry twice and had been removed to Mexico three times.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Owens · filed 2020-07-15(g)(1)

In light of Rehaif, the government was required to prove that Owens knew when he possessed a gun that he previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm; prior prison sentences and a stipulation to felony status can establish that knowledge.

Smith v. Federal Correction Institution Ashland · filed 2020-07-15(g)(1)

Thus, to be entitled to relief in light of Rehaif, Smith must show that, had the Government been required to prove that he knew he was a felon at the time that he possessed the firearm, it is more likely than not that no reasonable jury would have convicted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Given Smith’s lengthy criminal history (including several prison sentences), plus his stipulation that he was a felon at the time of the conduct charged in the indictment, no reasonable juror could have concluded that Smith did not know that he was a felon when he possessed the firearms as charged in the Second Superseding Indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a felon-in-possession defendant to know both that they possessed the firearm and that they had previously been convicted of a felony.

United States v. Watson · filed 2020-07-17(g)(1)

After Rehaif, therefore, those charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm must know both that they possessed the firearm and that they had previously been convicted of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a convicted felon.

United States v. Luong · filed 2020-07-17(g)(1)

It was clear error, under Rehaif, for the jury to not have been instructed that knowledge of status was an element of count 3.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence when he possessed a firearm; a stipulation can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Brown · filed 2020-07-21(g)(9)

In this case, the relevant status is that of domestic violence misdemeanant. After closely considering Rehaif, we conclude that the binding stipulation contained sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction because it demonstrates Brown’s knowledge of his status.

Under § 922(g)(1), a jury may infer that a defendant knew of his prohibited status from a stipulation to a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Arthur Lee, Jr. · filed 2020-07-24(g)(1)

A rational jury could have inferred from the stipulation that Lee knew about his status as a person convicted of such an offense.

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(5)(A) require the government to prove that the defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon or an unlawful alien, respectively.

United States v. Jesus Eder Moreno Ornelas · filed 2020-07-31(g)(1), (g)(5)(A)

It is undisputed that the indictment did not charge the requisite knowledge of ... status, and that the district court erred by not requiring the government to prove Moreno’s knowledge of his statuses as a convicted felon and an unlawful alien.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know his felon status, but omission of that element from an indictment does not warrant reversal on plain-error review without a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty.

United States v. Burleson · filed 2020-07-23(g)(1)

The record fails to establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty had the indictment not omitted the knowledge-of-status element. Further, there is overwhelming evidence that Burleson knew of his felony status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a felon; on plain-error review, a felony stipulation can support an inference of that knowledge.

United States v. Rangel · filed 2020-08-04(g)(1)

A rational juror could infer that Rangel was aware of his status as a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed a firearm; an omitted instruction or indictment allegation does not warrant relief on plain error review without a showing of prejudice.

United States v. White · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the district court clearly erred. See Benamor, 937 F.3d at 1188. ... Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that White was unaware that he was a felon at the time he possessed the firearm and that, but for the district court’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

Guerrero v. Quay · filed 2020-07-23(g)(1)

Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s belief, the Government was not required to prove that Petitioner “specifically knew that he was prohibited from possessing firearms.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of the prior felony conviction when possessing the firearm.

United States v. Cooper · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

Because the plea colloquy did not establish that Cooper knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the error was plain under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Stacy · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

Because the plea colloquy did not establish that Stacy knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the error was plain under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, but not that he knew his status prohibited firearm possession.

Strouble v. United States · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

This is error. Following Rehaif, the entirety of the Government’s burden for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is to prove “(1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, but does not require proof that he knew felons were prohibited from possessing firearms.

Guillen v. United States · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

Defendant claims that Rehaif mandates that the Government must prove both that a defendant knew of his felony status and knew that this status prohibited him from possessing a firearm. This is error. Following Rehaif, the entirety of the Government’s burden for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is to prove “(1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon, but does not require proof that he knew his status prohibited firearm possession.

Bueno v. United States · filed 2020-08-05(g)(1)

Defendant claims that Rehaif mandates that the Government must prove both that a defendant knew of his felony status and knew that this status prohibited him from possessing a firearm. This is error. Following Rehaif, the entirety of the Government’s burden for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is to prove “(1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Douglas · filed 2020-08-14(g)(1)

Douglas has not identified any reason to believe that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been told that the government would need to prove that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed the firearm and knew he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

Jones v. United States · filed 2020-08-19(g)(1)

As a preliminary matter, Petitioner is correct that, following Rehaif, the Government must prove -- in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a restricted person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) -- not only that Petitioner knew he possessed the firearm, but also that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of individuals for whom such possession is unlawful.

A defendant’s criminal history can establish that he knew his status as a felon when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Caudle · filed 2020-08-07(g)(1)

This criminal history would undoubtedly have provided sufficient evidence to prove that Caudle knew his status as a § 922(g)(1) felon at the time he committed this offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status; prior felony convictions and prison terms can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Burke · filed 2020-08-07(g)(1)

Because Burke’s trial took place before the Supreme Court decided Rehaif, the law at the time did not require the government to prove that Burke knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. Nevertheless, upon review of the entire record, Burke cannot show that this error affected his substantial rights. The stipulation and the presentence investigation report establish that Burke had previously been convicted of five felonies, and Burke was sentenced to multiple years’ confinement for two of these convictions. Thus, the record clearly demonstrates that Burke knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm. On an unpreserved sufficiency challenge, a prior-felony stipulation and conduct involving the firearms can support an inference of that knowledge.

United States v. Lara · filed 2020-08-12(g)(1)

Thus, we agree with the government that the record was not so clearly insufficient that affirming the verdict would work a clear ... and gross injustice, given the inference that the jury could have drawn about Williams's knowledge of his status as a felon at the time of his possession of the firearms from the fact that it knew that he was a felon at that time and the testimony that it had heard about his requests that Hutchinson purchase the ammunition and store the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew, when possessing the firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. Knowing that firearm possession was prohibited for another reason does not establish that knowledge.

Moore v. United States · filed 2020-08-18(g)(1)

Thus, although petitioner may have known that he was not allowed to carry a gun as a condition of his bond or restriction under state law, this knowledge does not mean that he knew that he had been “convicted . . . of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” as required to implicate § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew of the status barring firearm possession; the petitioner’s prior felony convictions established that knowledge.

Oscar v. Warden of USP-Allenwood · filed 2020-08-24(g)

This Court, however, has already established that the sentencing court’s order makes it clear that the Government has more than met the burden of proving that Petitioner knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had one of the statuses described in Section 922(g), such as a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status, but not that he knew his status prohibited firearm possession.

Taylor v. Barnhart · filed 2020-08-26(g)(1)

Contrary to Taylor’s argument, Rehaif does not hold that the government was required to prove that he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge requirement concerns awareness of prohibited status; a belief in a right to possess a firearm does not establish ignorance of that status.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2020-08-31(g)(1)

But Rehaif did not create a “plausible ignorance defense.” ... Nor does Rehaif offer relief based on a “philosophical objection[]” to the law.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew her prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison; knowing it was a felony is insufficient.

United States v. Morales · filed 2020-09-03(g)(1)

Thus, it is not enough to show that Morales knew that she had been convicted of a felony—the evidence must show that Morales knew she had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

An omitted instruction on knowledge of felon status does not warrant plain error relief when the defendant offers no plausible basis for a more favorable retrial.

United States v. Moore · filed 2020-09-09(g)(1)

We conclude that Moore has not satisfied the fourth prong of the plain error standard, which requires her to “offer a plausible basis for concluding that an error-free retrial might end more favorably.”

An indictment’s failure to allege that the defendant knew of his prohibited status does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over a § 922(g)(1) charge.

United States v. Walker · filed 2020-09-11(g)(1)

We therefore conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction over Count Four, that Walker’s conviction on this count did not violate his due process rights, and that the erroneous related jury instructions did not amount to plain error requiring reversal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment.

SPARROW v. United States · filed 2020-09-22(g)(1)

§ 922(g)(1) criminalizes possession of firearms by “any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” ... Rather, the government must prove that the defendant knew that he had a prior conviction which was punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment.

A guilty plea under § 922(g)(1) remains valid despite an omitted knowledge-of-status advisement if there is no reasonable probability the defendant would have declined to plead guilty had he been properly informed.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2020-09-24(g)(1)

In sum, we conclude that, even if the district court had correctly explained the knowledge-of-status element under § 922(g) at the time of Bryant’s plea, there is no reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty to the superseding information, and thus, the error did not affect a substantial right.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of the prior conviction that barred firearm possession.

Clark v. United States · filed 2020-09-25(g)(1)

Although the Rehaif decision involved a defendant who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), its reasoning is equally applicable to a defendant like Clark who has been convicted under the related criminal prohibition set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Deandre Cotton · filed 2020-09-28(g)(1)

In Cotton’s case, a jury would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew, at the time of his arrest, that he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; prior prison terms can support proof of that knowledge.

MOORE v. United States · filed 2020-10-13(g)(1)

Instead, the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he or she had a prior conviction that was punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment. ... Further, these convictions support the assessment that the Government would have been able to prove the knowledge element beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, even under the terms of Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a person unlawfully in the United States knew of that status and knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Martinez-Guerra · filed 2020-10-15(g)(5)(A)

The record in its entirety, including the presentence report (PSR) and rearraignment transcript, and “fairly drawn inferences from the evidence” show that when he possessed the firearm involved in the offense, Martinez- Guerra knew of his status as an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States and that he knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant knew he was barred from possessing a firearm.

Acosta v. United States · filed 2020-10-16(g)(1)

I reject Acosta’s argument ... that, under Rehaif, the government must also prove that the defendant knew that he was barred from possessing a firearm.