18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(5) covers an alien whose special immigrant juvenile status does not make the alien's presence lawful.

United States v. Granados-Alvarado · filed 2018-10-16(g)(5)

I conclude, therefore, that Granados-Alvarado's SIJ status does not place him outside the ambit of the federal alien-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).

A challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A) under the Second Amendment and equal protection principles did not establish plain error when raised for the first time on appeal.

United States v. Moreno-Alvarez · filed 2018-10-30(g)(5)(A)

Moreno-Alvarez also challenges the statute of conviction, arguing that it violates the Second Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process ... Clause with respect to his equal protection rights. ... Moreno-Alvarez fails to show plain error.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) is ambiguous about whether unlawful presence or unlawful immigration status triggers its firearm prohibition, so the rule of lenity bars prosecution of a DACA recipient whose presence is authorized.

United States v. Venegas-Vasquez · filed 2019-04-19(g)(5)(A)

The Court concludes that § 922(g)(5)(A) is grievously ambiguous regarding whether the phrase "illegally or unlawfully in the United States" refers to either presence or status. Because this element defines the conduct that constitutes a crime, under the rule of lenity Venegas-Vasquez may not be prosecuted for this offense.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) covers a noncitizen physically present in the United States who lacks lawful immigration status when possessing a firearm; supervised release under a removal order does not confer lawful status.

United States v. Balde · filed 2019-06-13(g)(5)(A)

We conclude instead that the “in the United States” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) requires only that a noncitizen be physically present within the United States. ... Permission to reside at liberty under supervised conditions rather than in immigration detention does not equate to a conferral of lawful status in the country, and therefore does not confer permission to possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits an alien from possessing a firearm while unlawfully in the United States, and a DACA grant does not change that status.

United States v. Lopez · filed 2019-07-10(g)(5)(A)

The Secretary’s grant of deferred action under DACA therefore did not—and could not—change Lopez’s status as an alien “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” for purposes of § 922(g)(5)(A).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) covers an alien who is unlawfully in the United States despite a pending application to adjust immigration status or authorization to work.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2020-03-09(g)(5)(A)

Thus, "he could permissibly be charged under [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(5)(A)," and as more pertinent here, he was a "prohibited person" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), which as noted earlier adopts the definitions in section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) bars people unlawfully in the United States from possessing firearms, whether or not they have been charged under the statute.

Alonso-Portillo v. Sheriff, Butler County · filed 2025-08-28(g)(5)(A)

Respondents correctly assert that possession of firearms by a person unlawfully in the United States is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). That is true whether Alonso-Portillo has been charged under that statute or not.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) permits a conviction when the defendant knows he is in the United States illegally and constructively possesses a firearm.

United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez · filed 2026-05-14(g)(5)(A)

Contrary to Ramirez’s arguments, there was ample evidence from which a jury could conclude that he knew he was in the United States illegally, and that he constructively possessed the firearm, which was visible and found in a vehicle of which he was the sole occupant.

Section 922(d)(5)(A) prohibits firearm sales to aliens unlawfully in the United States and does not bar requiring non-citizen buyers to provide an alien registration number on Form 4473.

Craghtten v. USA · filed 2026-06-17(d)(5)(A)

Form 4473’s alien-number requirement does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), which prohibits selling firearms to aliens illegally or unlawfully in the United States. Because non-citizens who are unlawfully in the United States are prohibited from purchasing a firearm under § 922(d)(5)(A), it is reasonable for non-citizens to be required to provide an alien registration number on Form 4473 to purchase a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Lockley · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1)

And as had been the situation in so many cases brought before Rehaif was decided, the jury here was not specifically instructed that the Government had to come forward with proof that those defendants charged with a § 922(g)(1) offense knew that they fell within a class prohibited from possessing firearms. ... We therefore reverse Davis’ § 922(g)(1) convictions (Counts 16 and 30).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his prohibited felon status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1)

And as had been the situation in so many cases brought before Rehaif was decided, the jury here was not specifically instructed that the Government had to come forward with proof that those defendants charged with a § 922(g)(1) offense knew that they fell within a class prohibited from possessing firearms. ... We therefore reverse Davis’ § 922(g)(1) convictions (Counts 16 and 30).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew his felony status, but does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Hodgkin v. United States · filed 2024-06-12(g)(1)

Rehaif does not stand for the proposition that the government must prove the defendant knew his possession of the firearm was unlawful. Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1), together with § 924(a)(2), requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon, but does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Armstrong v. United States · filed 2023-05-15(g)(1)

Rehaif does not stand for the proposition that the government must prove the defendant knew his possession of the firearm was unlawful. Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon, but not that he knew possession was unlawful.

RUZLOPEZ v. United States · filed 2023-05-15(g)(1)

Rehaif does not stand for the proposition that the government must prove the defendant knew his possession of the firearm was unlawful. Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; it does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Decker v. United States · filed 2023-05-16(g)(1)

Rehaif does not stand for the proposition that the government must prove the defendant knew his possession of the firearm was unlawful. Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison when he possessed the firearm.

STEWART v. United States · filed 2023-05-02(g)(1)

In other words, under Rehaif, the United States' burden includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Stewart knew, at the time of the offense, he had "been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 2020).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony conviction when he possessed the firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was prohibited.

Davis v. United States · filed 2023-04-18(g)(1)

But Rehaif does not require the Government to prove that Davis knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Under Rehaif, the Government must prove that Davis, at the time of the offense, knew that he was a convicted felon, i.e., that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term greater than one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Michell · filed 2023-04-14(g)(1)

Michell’s two DUI convictions, which occurred when he was an adult, unambiguously demonstrate that there is no “reasonable probability” that a jury would find that Michell did not know he had been convicted of a crime punishable ... by a year or more in prison at the time he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

Hunter v. United States · filed 2023-03-29(g)(1)

Hunter is correct that the Superseding Indictment does not specify as an element that he knew he was a felon. Likewise, the relevant jury instructions did not specify that he had to know he was a felon at the time he possessed the shotgun.

A defendant seeking relief for an unadvised § 922(g)(1) plea must show he would have disputed knowing his felony status.

United States v. Hardaway · filed 2023-04-04(g)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that Hardaway has not adequately shown that, if he had been correctly advised, “he would have presented evidence in the district court that he did not ... in fact know he was a felon when he possessed firearms.” United States v. Heyward, 42 F.4th 460, 466 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

DONALDSON v. ORTIZ · filed 2023-04-06(g)(1)

Rehaif does not require the United States to prove that Petitioner knew that he was not permitted to carry firearms; the United States must only prove that Petitioner knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status; an unpreserved challenge to a guilty plea based on omitted advice about that element requires a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

United States v. Mejia · filed 2023-03-24(g)(1)

Mejia does not argue that he did not know he was a felon, and we conclude that any attempt to do so would be unconvincing in light of his criminal history, which includes a felony possession of cocaine conviction for which Mejia was still on probation when he committed the instant offenses. Therefore, Mejia has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of these proceedings would have been different had the district court been aware of, and advised Mejia regarding, the knowledge-of-status element under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

Warrick v. United States · filed 2023-03-06(g)(1)

Rehaif requires the government prove as an element of the offense a defendant’s knowledge of his status as a felon or person prohibited from possessing a firearm. There is overwhelming evidence in the record before the Court that Petitioner was aware of his status as a felon before possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon, but does not require proof that he knew possession was unlawful.

Polk v. United States · filed 2023-03-01(g)(1)

Rehaif requires proof of the defendant’s felonious status, and not his knowledge of unlawful possession. So, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove that (1) the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that (2) he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm.

CARNEY v. United States · filed 2023-02-14(g)(1)

... in this matter Rehaif would require that Petitioner admit, or the Government prove, that Petitioner knew at the time he possessed the firearm that he had knowledge of status.

A prior felony conviction can support a finding that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Keeo Miller · filed 2023-01-11(g)(1)

Miller also stipulated that he had a 2008 felony conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. This evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Miller knew of his status as a felon when he possessed the gun in 2018.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status requirement does not warrant plain-error relief from a guilty plea when the defendant acknowledged a prior felony during the plea colloquy.

United States v. Livingston · filed 2023-01-13(g)(1)

In light of Livingston’s acknowledgement during his plea colloquy that he previously had been convicted of a felony, we find no plain Rehaif error in the magistrate judge’s acceptance of Livingston’s guilty plea.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was a felon.

United States v. Gallman · filed 2023-01-09(g)(1)

So in this case, the Government had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gallman knew he was a felon prohibited from carrying a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know his felony status when possessing a firearm; uncontested prior convictions can establish that knowledge.

Collins v. Ciolli · filed 2022-12-14(g)(1)

Given his history of criminal convictions, which he does not contest, it is implausible that Collins did not know he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm that led to his § 922(g) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know of his felon status when possessing a firearm; the sentence he actually served does not determine that knowledge.

GALE v. United States · filed 2022-12-20(g)(1)

But Mr. Gale’s actual sentence is of no import here—the relevant inquiry is whether he was aware of his status as a felon, and the record indisputably shows he was.

Section 922(g)(1) allows evidence of multiple prior convictions to prove that a defendant knew he was a felon when he does not stipulate to that knowledge.

United States v. LaSamuel Richardson, III · filed 2022-07-21(g)(1)

Richardson did not stipulate that he knew he was a felon, meaning the district court was permitted notwithstanding Old Chief to admit evidence about the prior convictions to prove that Richardson knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm or ammunition; a prior felon-in-possession conviction can support an inference of that knowledge.

Moore v. Streeval · filed 2022-07-08(g)(1)

Stated differently, Moore has failed to plausibly allege that he would not be convicted of violating § 922(g)(1) in light of Rehaif. ... Moore’s prior felon-in-possession conviction “in and of itself placed [him] on notice of his felon status.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; it does not require proof that he knew possession was prohibited.

Napoli v. Finley · filed 2022-07-08(g)(1)

However, Rehaif stands for the government only being required to “prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.” Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021) (citing Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2199-2200).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person knew of their felon status when they possessed a firearm.

McGee v. United States · filed 2022-07-12(g)(1)

Petitioner does not offer any evidence or raise any argument to the contrary, and thus he has failed to demonstrate that he did not have knowledge of his status as a felon at the time he possessed a firearm under 18 USC § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge that a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the person served less than a year.

United States v. Reynoso · filed 2022-07-01(g)(1)

But the clear language of § 922(g) covers anyone convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). The relevant inquiry is thus whether Reynoso knew that the maximum penalty for his crimes was more than one year of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(8) requires a defendant to know that he possesses a firearm and is subject to a protective order.

United States v. Hill · filed 2022-06-13(g)(8)

Turning first to Hill’s conviction, Hill’s written plea statement conceded all of the essential elements required to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Specifically, Hill conceded that, at the time of the offense, he knew (1) that he possessed a firearm, and (2) that he was subject to a protective order issued by an Oklahoma state court.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Battle · filed 2021-08-05(g)(1)

The instruction that the jury could convict Battle without finding that he knew his status was an actual error, and that error is obvious after Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year when possessing the firearm.

United States v. Roosevelt Coats, III · filed 2021-08-12(g)(1)

Translated: when a defendant is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1), the knowledge-of-status element requires proof that at the time he possessed the firearm he was aware he had a prior conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know he has a prior felony conviction.

Goins v. United States · filed 2021-08-12(g)(1)

Petitioner pled guilty to a revised factual basis (the revision was filed shortly after the Supreme Court decided Rehaif) which explicitly laid out the elements of Petitioner’s offense—including that the defendant knows he is a felon—as required by Rehaif: ... Because Defendant pled guilty to the correct elements (Docs. 26, 27), there is no Rehaif error in his conviction that could possibly warrant vacatur and his Rehaif claim is DENIED.

An unpreserved failure to instruct the jury that a defendant must know of his felony status does not warrant relief from a § 922(g)(1) conviction unless the error affected his substantial rights.

United States v. Caldwell · filed 2021-08-03(g)(1)

We also note that Caldwell had, on several occasions, served sentences longer than a year—including two stints of more than five years each in federal prison—making it virtually impossible to believe he did not know he had been convicted of crimes punishable by such sentences. Caldwell therefore has not demonstrated plain error with regard to his § 922(g) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon; a waiver and an admission of that knowledge can foreclose a challenge to the conviction.

United States v. Stinson · filed 2021-08-05(g)(1)

In Rehaif (decided after Stinson pleaded guilty but before his sentencing), the Court held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon. For two reasons, Stinson cannot plausibly mount an appeal based on Rehaif: First, he filed in the district court a waiver of “any rights he may have had under Rehaif to challenge the indictment, conviction, and sentence . . . .” Like counsel, we see no reason why that waiver would not be enforceable. Second, Stinson testified when pleading guilty that he possessed the firearm even though he knew that he was prohibited from doing so based on his prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm and knew he was a convicted felon, but does not require proof that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

United States v. Kasey · filed 2021-08-02(g)(1)

While the Government had to prove that Kasey knew he possessed the firearm charged in the indictment and knew that he was a convicted felon when he possessed it, the Government did not have to prove that he knew he was prohibited from possessing the firearm based on his status as a felon.

A § 922(g)(1) guilty plea survives an unpreserved omission of the knowledge-of-felon-status element when the defendant cannot show a reasonable probability that the omission changed his decision to plead guilty.

United States v. Dudley · filed 2021-07-22(g)(1)

Dudley also argues for the first time on appeal that, pursuant to Rehaif, his plea was not knowing and voluntary because both the indictment and the plea colloquy omitted a critical element of the crime—his knowledge that, at the time he possessed the firearm, he previously was convicted of a crime punishable by a year or more in prison. ... Accordingly, he cannot establish that the error affected his substantial rights for purposes of plain error review, and he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Section 922(g)(1) bars felons from possessing firearms and requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

Clark v. Entzel · filed 2021-07-27(g)(1)

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) is valid when the government proved that the defendant knew that “he possessed a firearm” and knew “he was a felon.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status; a stipulation that he served more than a year for a prior felony can establish that knowledge.

United States v. Willis · filed 2021-07-16(g)(1)

Their stipulations to that fact conclusively prove that they knew of their status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felony status when possessing a firearm; a prior felony sentence can establish that knowledge.

Westbrook v. United States · filed 2021-05-07(g)(1)

And Petitioner has not established that he is factually innocent of violating § 922(g). In fact, he has presented no evidence suggesting that he did not know he was a felon when he possessed the firearm leading to his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Folse · filed 2021-05-04(g)(1)

In the post-Rehaif world, the government also must prove that the defendant knew that he belonged to the relevant category of individuals barred from possessing a firearm at the time of the firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of the prior felony conviction, but not that the defendant knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Waters v. United States · filed 2021-05-03(g)(1)

Contrary to Waters’s reading, missing in Rehaif is “any notion that, in felon-in-possession cases, the government is also required to prove that the defendant knew he ... was prohibited from possessing a firearm, which goes to the heart of the ‘ignorance of the law’ maxim.”

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew of his misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, but not that he knew the conviction barred firearm possession.

United States v. Craine · filed 2021-04-30(g)(9)

Rather, as the district court properly concluded in Mr. Craine’s case, “the only knowledge required for conviction is that the defendant knew he (1) possessed a firearm and (2) had the relevant status under § 922(g) at the time of his possession.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Torres · filed 2021-04-27(g)(1)

To convict Torres under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to prove that Torres (1) knew that he possessed a firearm and (2) knew he was a person “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of their felony status when possessing a firearm.

United States v. McCoy · filed 2021-04-22(g)(1)

In light of Rehaif, it was error not to instruct that the government was required to prove defendants' knowledge of their status as convicted felons at the time of their firearm possession; and that error is plain, see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013) ("it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration for [t]he second part of the [four-part] Olano test [to be] satisfied" (other internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 97 (2d Cir. 2019).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of a felony conviction, not an understanding of its consequences.

United States v. Shelby · filed 2021-04-23(g)(1)

The court used “knowledge” as shorthand for knowledge or understanding of having been convicted of a felony, and “understanding” as shorthand for knowledge or understanding of the consequences of that conviction. That represents a correct framing of the law.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison when possessing ammunition.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2021-04-29(g)(1)

As applied here, this means that the government was required to prove not only that Mr. Wilson was in fact a convicted felon at the time that he possessed the ammunition, but also that he knew that he was a felon—that is, he knew that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status; a defendant’s stipulation that he knew he was a felon satisfies that requirement.

Prather v. United States · filed 2021-04-30(g)(1)

Further, Petitioner stipulated that he “stated he knew he was a felon and was not supposed to possess firearms,” in the offense conduct section of both the Plea Agreement and the PSR. [Crim. Docs. 13 and 21].

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status; omitting that element from jury instructions can be harmless if a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.

United States v. Todd · filed 2021-04-15(g)(1)

In light of Rehaif, it was error for the district court not to include a knowledge-of-status element in the jury instructions. But any error was harmless.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm.

Frazier v. United States · filed 2021-04-16(g)(1)

As such, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his conviction; there is no reasonable probability that his conviction would have been different because the Government could have easily satisfied the mens rea element that Petitioner knew of his status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm, but not that he knew firearm possession was prohibited.

Mueller v. White · filed 2021-04-16(g)(1)

Thus, while the Government’s burden includes proof that the defendant was aware of his “relevant status,” meaning knowledge that he was “a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like,”35 it does not include proof that the defendant specifically knew that he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

A defendant’s stipulation to a prior felony can establish that he knew his felon status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Brown · filed 2021-04-08(g)(1)

As Brown concedes, he stipulated to having been convicted previously of a felony offense. His stipulation alone establishes he knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Elysee · filed 2021-04-08(g)(1)

Therefore, Elysee correctly asserts that his indictment and conviction are subject to attack under Rehaif because it did not charge—and therefore the Government did not prove (or even argue) at trial—that he knew of his status as a felon when he possessed the firearm at issue.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm.

Riley v. Gomez · filed 2021-03-30(g)(1)

If the Government charged the Petitioner for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g) today, the Government would need to prove that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time of the offensive conduct.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felon status when he possessed the firearm; a stipulation to that status at trial can support the finding.

United States v. Glover · filed 2021-03-26(g)(1)

Assuming arguendo that de novo review applies,5 we hold that a reasonable jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis knew of his felon status at the time of the offense. At trial, Davis stipulated that he was a felon and a witness confirmed his status.

A charge under § 922(g)(1) must allege that the defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Carr v. United States · filed 2021-03-11(g)(1)

The Information did not allege that Carr knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Because that allegation was missing, under Rehaif the Information is defective.

A defendant’s stipulation to being a felon can provide sufficient evidence that he knew of his felon status under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Kieffer · filed 2021-03-19(g)(1)

Because Armstead stipulated to being a felon at trial, there was sufficient evidence to establish that he knew he was a felon under either standard of review.

Section 922(g)(1) permits knowledge of felon status to be inferred from prior felony convictions and imprisonment.

Draine v. United States · filed 2021-03-25(g)(1)

This is because Movant's knowledge of his felon status may be inferred from the fact that, prior to possessing the weapon underlying the instant conviction, movant was convicted of three separate state felony offenses. Movant had spent nearly two years in prison based on his previous felony convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment for felon in possession to allege that the defendant knew of his felony status.

Walton v. United States · filed 2021-03-11(g)(1)

The indictment against Walton did not allege that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. That missing allegation makes the indictment defective under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status, but not knowledge that firearm possession is barred.

Black v. United States · filed 2021-03-11(g)(1)

I reject Black’s argument ... that, under Rehaif, the government must also prove that the defendant knew that he was barred from possessing a firearm.

A charge under § 922(g)(1) must allege that the defendant knew he was a felon.

Newman v. United States · filed 2021-03-11(g)(1)

The Criminal Information is defective under Rehaif because it fails to allege that Newman knew he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status; omission of that element from the jury instructions does not warrant reversal on plain error review when the evidence shows the omission did not affect the verdict.

United States v. McMillan · filed 2021-03-12(g)(1)

Here, the Government marshaled documentary and testimonial evidence sufficient to establish that McMillan knew of his status. We are confident that with this evidence in the record, the jury would have voted to convict had it been instructed on the knowledge-of-status element.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge requirement is satisfied when a defendant admits the offense’s elements during a guilty plea.

Rodriguez v. United States · filed 2021-03-10(g)(1)

Rehaif’s mens rea requirement was therefore satisfied in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know, when possessing a firearm, that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Allison v. United States · filed 2021-03-09(g)(1)

Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that Allison would have declined to plead guilty had he known that a § 922(g) conviction required that he know he had been convicted of such a crime.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to allege that a defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon.

Lewis v. United States · filed 2021-03-09(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the indictment is defective because it lacks an allegation that Lewis knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce.

Smith v. United States · filed 2021-02-24(g)(1)

Following Rehaif, the entirety of the Government’s burden for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is to prove “(1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was a felon; (3) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(9), read with § 924(a)(2), requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew of his domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, but does not require proof that he knew the conviction barred firearm possession.

United States v. Benton · filed 2021-02-23(g)(9)

We reject Mr. Benton’s proposed interpretation of Rehaif and join our sibling circuits in holding that, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government need not prove that a defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a result of his status under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person knew of their felony status when they possessed a firearm.

MABERY v. WATSON · filed 2021-01-11(g)(1)

The Court agrees that Mabery cannot show that he suffered a miscarriage of justice since no reasonable jury could have concluded that the government failed to meet its burden of proving a violation of § 922(g)(1) even after Rehaif. ... Having spent more than a year in prison on several convictions, Mabery cannot genuinely argue now that he did not know he had been convicted of an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felon status, but not to know that felons are barred from possessing firearms.

Lackland v. United States · filed 2021-01-06(g)(1)

It does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew that being a felon prevents him from possessing a firearm. So even under Rehaif, Lackland did not have to know that felons could not possess firearms for the government to convict him of violating § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one; it does not require proof that he knew possession was prohibited.

United States v. Phyfier · filed 2021-01-05(g)(1)

As explained, Rehaif only required that the government show that a defendant “knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the ... relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Id. Thus, Phyfier’s attempt to show that he did not know that he was prohibited from possessing the firearm is inapposite under Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2020-12-23(g)(1)

Nothing in the Rehaif decision requires the showing that the defendant also knew that his status barred him from possessing a firearm; so, Jackson can demonstrate no plain error on this issue.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that, when the defendant possessed the firearm, he knew his prior offense was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Guzman-Merced · filed 2020-12-22(g)(1)

The district court's failure to explain the mens rea necessary to support a conviction under section 922(g)(1) during the plea colloquy calls into question whether Guzmán fully understood the nature of the charges against him, which is necessary for a plea to be knowing and voluntary.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

Clark v. United States · filed 2020-12-22(g)(1)

In the case of Movant's felon in possession charge, this means the government had to prove that he knew at the time he possessed the firearm that he “has been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also United States v. Caudle, 968 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 2020).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2020-12-29(g)(1)

The first two prongs of plain error review—an error that is plain—are satisfied because Mr. Sanchez was not advised that the government was required to prove he knew he was a felon at the time of the incident.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his status as a felon, but omitting that jury instruction is not reversible plain error when uncontroverted evidence establishes that knowledge.

United States v. Hurtado · filed 2020-12-21(g)(1)

Given this uncontroverted evidence, Mr. Hurtado cannot plausibly argue that a trier of fact might find that he was unaware of his status as a felon; thus, he cannot establish reversible plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew the status barred him from possessing firearms.

Muhammad v. Entzel · filed 2020-12-14(g)(1)

Accordingly, even after Rehaif, there is no requirement that the government prove that the defendant knew that belonging to the relevant category—here an individual with a prior felony conviction— meant that he could not possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a felon-in-possession indictment to allege that the defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Mills v. United States · filed 2020-12-14(g)(1)

Under Rehaif, the indictment is defective because it lacks an allegation that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status; omitting that element from the indictment and jury instructions does not warrant reversal on plain-error review unless the error affected substantial rights.

United States v. Veal · filed 2020-12-15(g)(1)

Mr. Veal is correct that the government was not asked to prove his knowledge of his felon status and that the jury instructions failed to properly inform the jury that his knowledge was an element of the offense, contrary to Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194. But because Mr. Veal stipulated at trial to being a felon, see D.E. 27, fled when a trooper attempted to pull him over, see D.E. 74 at 29–30, and had multiple prior felony convictions for which he served more than a year in prison, see D.E. 47 at ¶37, we conclude that his rights were not substantially affected by the plain error.

An indictment charging possession of a firearm by a felon under § 922(g)(1) is defective if it omits knowledge of felon status.

United States v. Jones · filed 2020-10-08(g)(1)

The indictments were erroneous because they did not include an element of the crime charged, knowledge of felon status.

A section 922(g)(1) indictment must allege that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Innocent · filed 2020-10-08(g)(1)

The indictments were erroneous because they did not include an element of the crime charged, knowledge of felon status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to find that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. James Everett, Jr. · filed 2020-10-09(g)(1)

As Rehaif was decided while his case was on direct appeal, Everett correctly argues the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury it needed to find Everett knew he belonged to the “relevant category” of felons when he possessed the handgun.

Proof of felony status under § 922(g)(1) may come from evidence other than ATF forms.

Rickett v. Werlich · filed 2020-09-28(g)(1)

Rehaifand cases applying it leave no doubt that a person’s status as a convicted felon may be proven by evidence other than what might appear on one of theseATFforms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person possessing a firearm knew of his felony status; prior convictions and imprisonment can establish that knowledge.

Hellems v. USA · filed 2020-09-30(g)(1)

Given his prior convictions, one of which was for a state offense of possession of a firearm as a felon, his evasive conduct before his arrest, and his multiple terms of incarceration in excess of one year, the Court is satisfied that Hellemsknew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the gun in the instant case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that, when possessing the firearm, the defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Isiah Price · filed 2020-09-23(g)(1)

Price is correct that his indictment is defective because it fails to set forth an essential element of a § 922(g)(1) offense: that at the time of possession he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know of a qualifying felony conviction when possessing the firearm.

United States v. Scott · filed 2020-09-23(g)(1)

Scott is correct that his indictment is defective because it fails to set forth an essential element of a § 922(g)(1) offense: that at the time of possession he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, but omission of that element does not warrant reversal on plain-error review without a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

United States v. Paul · filed 2020-09-08(g)(1)

And while we recognize in hindsight that the failure to require the government to prove that Paul knew that he was a convicted felon and the omission of the knowledge element from the indictment, the jury charge, and the verdict all constituted error under Rehaif, Paul cannot meet the plain-error standard for reversal because he cannot show any reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if the errors had not occurred.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an indictment to allege that the defendant knew of his felon status.

United States v. Qazi · filed 2020-09-17(g)(1)

Qazi’s indictment neither “track[ed] the language of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)” nor “set[] forth the elements of the offense,” because it did not allege that he had knowledge of his felon status.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his prior felony conviction when possessing a firearm; a prior prison term of more than a year can make claimed ignorance implausible.

United States v. Fleming · filed 2020-09-03(g)(1)

Fleming previously spent more than a year in prison on a three‐year sentence for an aggravated battery, so it is implausible that when he committed the current offense, he was unaware that he had a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than a year in prison.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Pulliam · filed 2020-09-03(g)(1)

The jury was not instructed that the government had to prove Pulliam knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm. After Rehaif, this missing jury instruc- tion amounts to a plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Cogburn · filed 2020-09-04(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under section 922(g), the government must prove that Cogburn knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the firearm. ... We find this evidence sufficient to prove the Rehaif element and thus see no error in the district court’s denial of Cogburn’s motion for acquittal as to his felon-in-possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Quinn Reed · filed 2020-09-09(g)(1)

In other words, a § 922(g) conviction does require proof that the defendant “knew he had the relevant status when he possessed” the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but does not require proof that he knew federal law barred him from possessing a firearm.

Woodard v. Warden, FCI Talladega · filed 2020-09-09(g)(1)

As the Sixth Circuit has made clear, however, “Rehaif did not graft onto § 922(g) an ignorance-of- the-law defense by which every defendant could escape conviction if he was unaware of this provision of the United States Code.” ... Rather, as pertinent here, Rehaif demands only that the Government prove that the defendant knew he was “previously . . . convicted of a felony.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires that a defendant know of his status as a convicted felon when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Ravell · filed 2020-09-11(g)(1)

Based on the whole record, whether there was a sufficient factual basis to support that Ravell knew of his status as a convicted felon is at least subject to reasonable dispute, and thus, there is no clear or obvious error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Arthurs · filed 2020-08-31(g)(1)

No dispute exists here that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the government bore the burden of demonstrating that Arthurs knew he “belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” ... This was an error of constitutional dimensions.

A guilty plea admitting the elements of a § 922(g)(1) offense can defeat a Rehaif challenge to the conviction.

Spruill v. Adams · filed 2020-02-05(g)(1)

This Court finds that the magistrate judge is correct in finding that the petitioner’s guilty plea admitted all the elements necessary for his conviction and that Rehaif is inapplicable to his petition.

Section 922(g), together with § 924(a)(2), requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

Barela v. United States · filed 2020-01-31(g)

Rehaif held that “in a prosecution under … § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Here, Barela pled guilty to the Indictment, which states he was a convicted felon who “knowingly possessed … a Colt … 45 caliber semiautomatic pistol.” (Docs. 13, 35). Rehaif’s mens rea requirement was therefore satisfied in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Bradley v. Terris · filed 2020-01-31(g)(1)

As applied here, the government would not have needed to prove that Petitioner knew he was unable to possess firearms, but instead only that he knew of his status of having a felony conviction—specifically, that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of a prior felony conviction when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Conley · filed 2020-02-05(g)(1)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must show that the defendant (1) had a previous felony conviction, (2) knew he had a prior felony conviction, (3) knowingly possessed a firearm, and (4) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

A defendant seeking to withdraw a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea because he was not told that knowledge of his felon status was an element must show that the error affected his decision to plead guilty.

United States v. Dowthard · filed 2020-01-23(g)(1)

Dowthard has the burden of showing that a misunder- standing of the elements of his offense affected his substantial rights, yet he does not even assert that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had properly understood the elements. Thus, he has failed to carry that burden.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a defendant knew he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Puri · filed 2020-01-15(g)(5)(A)

In this case, neither the indictment nor the jury charge included what the Supreme Court determined to be a “crucial element” of Puri’s offense: that he knew of his status when he possessed the firearm. Id. at 2197. Accordingly, we conclude that the indictment omitted an essential element of the charge and that the district court erred when it instructed the jury.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felony status, but not knowledge that firearm possession is prohibited.

Guardiola v. Entzel · filed 2020-01-07(g)(1)

The only argument that might exist utilizing Rehaif through § 2241 is that a person was unaware of his or her status, but this Petitioner clearly was and concedes that point. His argument must therefore fail.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know that a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Green · filed 2020-01-09(g)(1)

Both parties agree that plain error occurred when Green’s plea colloquy failed to establish that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2198. This satisfies the first two prongs of the test. However, Green cannot show that this error affected his substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing firearms; omitting that element from jury instructions is error.

United States v. Mancillas · filed 2020-01-07(g)(1)

In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that to obtain a conviction under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S. Ct. at 2200. The jury instructions at Mancillas’s trial did not include this element, so Mancillas can show that there was a “clear” or “obvious” error.

On plain error review, a defendant seeking to withdraw a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea because he was not informed of the knowledge-of-status element must show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if properly informed.

United States v. Williams · filed 2020-01-10(g)(1)

We conclude that he bears the burden of showing that his erroneous understanding of the elements of § 922(g) affected his substantial rights—his decision to plead guilty—before he may do so. He has failed to carry that burden, so we affirm the judgment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

United States v. Lockhart · filed 2020-01-10(g)(1)

At the time Lockhart entered his plea, no one in the courtroom, including Lockhart, his counsel, the government, or the magistrate judge, understood the essential elements of the Section 922(g) offense. ... The government concedes, and we agree, that the magistrate judge plainly erred in accepting Lockhart’s guilty plea based on this pre-Rehaif understanding of the law.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status, but not that he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Hunter v. Quintana · filed 2020-01-03(g)(1)

Contrary to his assumption, Rehaif does not hold that the Government was required to prove that he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowledge of felon status, but not knowledge that firearm possession is prohibited.

Dillon v. Warden · filed 2019-12-20(g)(1)

Contrary to his argument, Rehaif does not hold that the government was required to prove that he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm to sustain a conviction under Section 922(g)(1).

A defendant who pleaded guilty to a § 922(g)(1) charge and does not dispute knowing he possessed the firearm or was a felon cannot obtain relief under Rehaif.

Sadler v. United States · filed 2019-12-13(g)(1)

Petitioner does not contend that he did not know that he possessed the firearm or that he did not know that he was a felon, in any event. Rehaif simply does not apply.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed the firearm.

United States v. Marcum · filed 2019-12-11(g)(1)

The district court clearly erred under Rehaif by not instructing the jury that it had to find that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Marcum knew he was a felon at the time of the search.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he belonged to the category of convicted felons barred from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Ward · filed 2019-12-02(g)(1)

Because the plea colloquy did not establish that Ward knew he had been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the error was plain under Rehaif.

A knowing and voluntary guilty plea to a § 922(g)(1) charge admits that the defendant knew of his felony status, so the government need not prove that knowledge separately.

Allen v. United States · filed 2019-11-27(g)(1)

Petitioner’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea to violating § 922(g) admitted all the elements of that offense, including the knowledge of his status as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Fisher · filed 2019-12-04(g)(1)

Everything considered, we conclude that Fisher has no meritorious argument that his factual basis insufficiently established that he knew of his felon status when he possessed the charged firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm, but does not require proof that he knew possession was illegal.

Benson, Mandel v. Marske, Matthew · filed 2019-12-06(g)(1)

The government did not need to prove that petitioner specifically knew that he was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. Rather, as applied to this case, Rehaif required the government to prove that petitioner knew that he was a felon at the time he possessed a firearm.

A defendant who pleads guilty to a § 922(g)(1) charge cannot challenge the conviction solely because the government did not offer trial proof that he knew he possessed a firearm and was a felon.

Littlejohn v. United States · filed 2019-11-20(g)(1)

The holding in Rehaif does not apply to the facts of the instant case. There was no trial in Petitioner’s case; Petitioner pleaded guilty to the § 922(g) charge he now challenges. The burden of proof of the Government, therefore, is not relevant.

A stipulation that the defendant was a felon at the time of the charged offense establishes felon status for firearm possession on a date encompassed by the indictment.

United States v. Harris · filed 2003-09-24(g)(1)

The stipulation therefore conclusively establishes Harris's status as a felon for purposes of his unlawful possession of a firearm on October 9.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but not that he knew possession was illegal.

United States v. Junior Menteer · filed 2003-11-21(g)(1)

Menteer does not argue the text of § 922(g)(1) dictates a result different from that mandated by Bryan, and we see nothing in the text of the statute that would dictate a different result. Thus, all the government had to prove in this case was that Menteer knew he possessed a firearm; the government did not have to prove Menteer knew it was illegal to do so.

Section 922(g) measures felon status on the date of the firearm offense; a later state court amendment changing a predicate conviction to a misdemeanor does not undo that status.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2006-08-01(g)

We have consistently held that “[t]he defendant’s status on the date of the offense controls whether the felon in possession laws have been violated.” United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial on felon-in-possession charge where, after the federal trial, the state court ruled that the predicate conviction had been erroneously entered as a felony instead of a misdemeanor and amended its judgment accordingly).

Section 922(g) requires proof of felon status, and the government may use multiple prior felony convictions to prove that element when the defendant refuses to stipulate.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2009-11-27(g)

Jenkins refused to stipulate to his status as a felon; therefore, the government bore the burden at trial to show this element of the offense. Jenkins’s argument that the district court should have allowed evidence of only one prior conviction was rejected in Jones, where we allowed evidence of five prior felony convictions to prove the defendant’s status as a felon.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction requires the firearm possessor to qualify as a felon; uncertainty about that status warrants reconsideration of the conviction.

United States v. McGaha · filed 2011-10-14(g)(1)

Thus, it is unclear from the record whether McGaha was properly designated an armed career criminal or even whether he is guilty of the offense to which he pled guilty. Accordingly, we vacate the criminal judgment, grant McGaha’s unopposed motion to remand for resentencing, and remand to the district court for reconsideration of McGaha’s conviction and sentence in light of Simmons. ... To the extent that McGaha was convicted of aiding and abetting a § 922(g) offense, it is unclear from the record on appeal whether McGaha’s co-defendant qualified as a felon for purposes of § 922(g).

Section 922(g), read with §924(a)(2), requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to a category barred from possessing one.

Rehaif v. United States · filed 2019-06-21(g)

We conclude that in a prosecution under 18 U. S. C. §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the defendant to know he was a felon; a guilty plea has a sufficient factual basis when the record supports that knowledge.

United States v. Denson · filed 2019-08-08(g)(1)

Therefore, Denson has not shown any error because the record shows there were facts supporting his guilty plea, including his knowing he was a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm, and the person must know of that status.

United States v. Williams · filed 2019-09-04(g)(1)

It is unsurprising, then, that Williams knew and acknowledged at his change-of-plea hearing that he had “been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” prior to his possession of the firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (making it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm).

A guilty plea to violating § 922(g)(1) withstands a challenge to the knowledge requirement when the defendant admitted knowing firearm possession and a prior felony conviction.

Hughey v. United States · filed 2019-09-10(g)(1)

Here, however, movant pleaded guilty to the charged offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As part of his plea, movant signed a factual basis and stipulation admitting that on January 28, 2010 he knowingly possessed a firearm, a Marlin Ranger 103-13, .22 caliber rifle, and that, prior to possessing the rifle, he had been convicted of the felony offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in Liberty County, Texas on June 12, 2008. It was also stipulated that the Government could produce evidence that the firearm was a functional firearm and that the firearm had traveled in and affected interstate commerce. Further, at the plea hearing, movant admitted he signed the factual basis and stipulation, he understood the same, and that he signed it knowingly and voluntarily. Movant had no objection to the factual basis and stipulation, and he admitted to the court that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. Accordingly, movant’s new argument fails on the merits.