18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Richardson · filed 1999-02-11(g)

We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits and hold that a conviction is "previous" to a § 922(g) offense only if the conviction occurred before the violation of § 922(g), not simply prior to conviction or sentencing for that violation.

Section 922(g) does not distinguish between people with one prior felony conviction and those with multiple prior felony convictions.

United States v. Hendrick · filed 1999-05-21(g)

The statute itself makes no distinction between a defendant with numerous felony convictions and a defendant with only a single felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony status element may be proved to the jury through a stipulation without disclosing details of the conviction.

United States v. Mora · filed 2000-02-24(g)(1)

Wacker controls in the instant case. There, we held that “where a defendant offers to stipulate as to the existence of a prior felony conviction, the trial judge should permit that stipulation to go to the jury as proof of the status element of section 922(g)(1)...” Id. at 1472. The district court properly permitted the jury to receive evidence of the fact of Mr. Mora’s felony status, without disclosing any details of the nature of the underlying felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of a defendant’s prior felony conviction even if that conviction is constitutionally deficient.

United States v. Steverson · filed 2000-09-07(g)(1)

As the government points out, proof of a defendant’s prior felony convictions is admissible for purposes of proving a § 922(g)(1) violation, even if the prior convictions are constitutionally deficient.

A state felony conviction can serve as a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the person’s civil rights were never lost but state law bars felons from possessing firearms.

United States v. Quinn · filed 2000-08-11(g)(1)

Standing alone, Quinn’s claim that his civil rights were not lost does not exclude him from the ambit of the federal statute; it applies as long as the state prohibits a felon from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a conviction received at age 17 as a predicate felony when state law convicted the person as an adult.

United States v. Fields · filed 2001-06-15(g)(1)

A magistrate judge conducted a hearing after which he recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied because, under Michigan law, Fields was convicted as an adult and state law is controlling for purposes of finding a predicate felony offense under § 922(g)(1). The district court overruled Fields’s objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s report, and denied the motion to dismiss. ... We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Fields’s motion to dismiss the indictment for the reason stated in its order denying the motion.

A conviction that has been set aside cannot establish the prior felony required by § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Benson · filed 2001-07-24(g)(1)

Because 18 U.S.C. § 921(20) prohibits the use of a conviction that has been set aside as proof of a prior felony conviction under § 922(g), the prosecution’s use of the burglary conviction violated a statutory rule.

Section 922(d)(1) allows a predicate felony conviction to be submitted to the jury when state law does not automatically restore civil rights and no change to the conviction is shown.

United States v. Parker · filed 2001-08-27(d)(1)

Under Maryland law, unlike North Carolina law applicable in Essick, there is no period after which a convicted felon’s civil rights are automatically restored. ... The condition showing Tracy Parker’s conviction and sentence is pre- sumed to continue unless shown to the contrary, which has not been shown.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a predicate felony conviction; a Texas order granting a new trial under the law then in effect removed that predicate.

United States v. Fix · filed 2001-08-29(g)(1)

In summary, because the state court grant- ed Fix a new trial,5 he stands in the shoes of one who was never convicted. Accordingly, he cannot be under disability or restriction in regard to the possession of firearms. There is no predicate offense, so the conviction of pos- session of a firearm by a felon cannot stand.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior federal conviction as sufficient to establish felon status when the defendant has not shown that his federal rights were restored.

United States v. Lang · filed 2002-09-06(g)(1)

Since the federal conviction alone is sufficient to trigger Lang’s status as a felon under § 922(g), we need not consider his status under Alabama or Michigan law.

An adult felony conviction can serve as the predicate for a § 922(g) felon-in-possession charge.

Hampton v. United States · filed 2002-09-18(g)

Hence, Hampton was not a minor at the time of his prior conviction, and the offense was not a misdemeanor. Therefore, the prior offense properly served as a predicate for the § 922(g) charge.

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat juvenile delinquency adjudications as predicate convictions when the state prosecuted the person as a juvenile.

United States v. Walters · filed 2002-10-04(g)(1)

Accordingly, Lender supports the conclusion that the three juvenile adjudications in 1996 do not count as predicate offenses for Section 922(g)(1) purposes.

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat Virginia juvenile delinquency adjudications as prior convictions that bar firearm possession.

United States v. Davis · filed 2002-12-19(g)(1)

Therefore, Davis, having previously been tried as a juvenile and adjudicated delinquent for offenses that could have been punished by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year had he been tried as an adult and convicted, has not been “convicted” of those crimes within the meaning of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior state conviction as punishable by more than one year when state law at the time allowed an upward departure beyond one year, even if the presumptive sentence was shorter.

United States v. Norris · filed 2003-02-19(g)(1)

Accordingly, even though the state-court judge did not depart from the guidelines in sentencing Mr. Norris, both of his convictions were nonetheless “punishable” by terms exceeding one year due to the possibility of a departure.

Under § 922(g)(1), a Virginia juvenile adjudication is not a predicate conviction because Virginia law distinguishes juvenile adjudications from criminal convictions.

United States v. Bugg · filed 2003-02-21(g)(1)

Since juvenile adjudications are distinct from criminal convictions under Virginia law, the Defendant has not been “convicted ... of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and, thus, was not a “prohibited person” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove felony status and permits evidence of a prior conviction when the defendant refuses to stipulate to that status.

United States v. Correia · filed 2003-03-18(g)(1)

Evidence of Defendant’s 1959 burglary conviction was admissible to prove his status as a felon, which is an element the government had to prove under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), because Defendant refused to stipulate to his status as a felon.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior conviction element can be satisfied by a California guilty plea even when sentencing was suspended and no judgment of conviction was entered.

United States v. Tankersley · filed 2003-06-05(g)(1)

Defendant Tankersley’s California criminal record supports a finding of “conviction” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Under California law, her guilty plea is a “conviction” for the purposes of any subsequent criminal charges which rely on a history of prior convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a Texas deferred adjudication that was dismissed and discharged without a conviction under Texas law.

United States v. Altieri · filed 2003-07-31(g)(1)

Thus, because Defendant does not have a prior conviction under Texas state law, he cannot be guilty of illegal possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A prior conviction qualifies under § 922(g)(1) when state law barred firearm possession at the time the person’s civil rights were restored, even if that bar was enacted after the conviction.

United States v. Petersen · filed 2003-08-11(g)(1)

Even under the circumstances of this case, however, I conclude that the plain language of section 921(a)(20) compels that, for purposes of determining whether defendant has a qualifying conviction, I must consider what rights were actually restored to him at the time of his completion of his sentence in 1998. ... The restoration of defendant’s civil rights in 1998, however, was limited by Colorado law then in effect which prohibited his possession of firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) measures a defendant’s felony status on the date of possession.

United States v. Olender · filed 2003-08-01(g)(1)

The defendant’s status on the date of the offense controls whether the felon in possession laws have been violated.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior California conviction as a qualifying offense if it remained a felony when the defendant possessed the firearm, even if a court later declared it a misdemeanor.

United States v. Boumelhem · filed 2003-08-12(g)(1)

Thus, neither § 17(b)(1), which requires a judgment, nor § 17(b)(3), which requires a classification by the court, applied to Boumelhem at the time he took the actions that would lead to his federal convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a jury’s guilty verdict as a predicate felony conviction at the time of firearm possession, even if the verdict is later set aside.

United States v. Bennett · filed 2003-09-30(g)(1)

Further, the Court concludes that a jury verdict, later set aside, nonetheless is sufficient to constitute a predicate “conviction” under federal firearms laws.

Section 922(g)(1) includes a residential burglary conviction punishable by more than one year in prison as a qualifying prior conviction.

United States v. Gutierrez · filed 2003-10-02(g)(1)

Plainly, the burglary conviction qualifies as a “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; a conviction record bearing a similar name alone is insufficient, even if the defendant offers no rebuttal.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2004-05-06(g)(1)

Without more, a court record showing a conviction of a similarly named person (especially an eighteen-year-old record) cannot conceivably furnish assurance beyond a reasonable doubt that it pertains to the present defendant. We reject the government’s proposed rule that sufficiency is satisfied as the result of the defendant’s failure to offer proof in rebuttal.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a qualifying prior conviction, and the government may present limited evidence of multiple felony convictions to prove that element when the defendant has not stipulated to felon status.

United States v. Peach · filed 2004-07-29(g)(1)

In order to establish the essential elements of the crime, the Government has the burden to prove that Peach possessed a firearm and that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year. ... Peach’s motion to exclude testimony or evidence relating to his four felony convictions is denied.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person named in a prior felony conviction; a matching name alone is insufficient.

United States v. Allen, David · filed 2004-09-09(g)(1)

Identity of name alone does not prove the identity of a person beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; a matching name and a later arrest on a warrant tied to the conviction are insufficient.

United States v. Allen · filed 2004-09-09(g)(1)

The fact that Allen was arrested on a warrant connected to an earlier felony judgment bearing his name permits a rational fact finder to conclude that the prior conviction is possibly his, but is insufficient to prove his status as a felon beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element may be established by stipulation when identifying the conviction would risk unfair prejudice.

United States v. Mayhew · filed 2004-09-27(g)(1)

Pursuant to Old Chief this Court is required to accept Defendant’s offer to stipulate to the prior conviction element of the § 922(g)(1) offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow a defendant to collaterally attack the prior felony conviction in the felon-in-possession proceeding.

United States v. Rod M. Sharpley · filed 2005-02-16(g)(1)

To the extent that Sharpley seeks to collaterally attack his prior conviction as part of the proceedings for his felon-in-possession conviction, this attack is wholly barred by Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980).

For a § 922(g)(1) charge, the court must accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to the prior conviction element when identifying the conviction would create unfair prejudice.

United States v. Mayhew · filed 2005-06-22(g)(1)

This Court, pursuant to Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), found that it was required to accept Defendant’s offer to stipulate to the prior conviction element of the felon in possession charge (§ 922(g)(1)).

Section 922(g)(1) makes a qualifying prior conviction an element of felon-in-possession, so evidence of that conviction can be used to prove the charged offense.

United States v. Holmes · filed 2005-07-07(g)(1)

One of the essential elements of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm is that the defendant has “been convicted [of] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The evidence of Mr. Holmes's prior felony convictions was thus not only admissible to shed light on his credibility as a witness, it was substantive evidence that he had committed the charged offense.

A stipulation to convicted felon status can provide sufficient evidence of the prior felony conviction required by § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Dunn · filed 2005-08-04(g)(1)

Dunn stipulated to his status as a convicted felon, and this stipulation was introduced as evidence at trial. Accordingly, the Government produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Dunn had been convicted of a felony.

A prior state conviction qualifies under § 922(g)(1) when the state criminal statute permits a sentence exceeding one year, even if sentencing guidelines capped the defendant’s possible sentence at one year.

United States v. Murillo · filed 2005-09-09(g)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the maximum sentence that makes a prior conviction under state law a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains, after Blakely, the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute, not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant for his commission of that crime according to the state’s sentencing guidelines.

For a § 922(g)(1) charge, a prior conviction bearing the defendant’s identical name can establish that he is the convicted felon when he offers no contrary evidence.

United States v. Boyd · filed 2006-04-24(g)(1)

Here, as the prior convictions were properly admitted, and Boyd offered no contradictory evidence, under existing circuit law the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior convictions were of the defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction; a defendant seeking to exclude evidence of the conviction must stipulate to that element.

United States v. Digsby · filed 2006-06-15(g)(1)

He was not entitled to prevent the government from proving the prior felony conviction element of the § 922(g)(1) violation without stipulating to that element.

Section 922(g) measures the status of a predicate felony conviction when the firearm is possessed; a stayed conditional habeas grant does not lift the weapons disability before its conditions take effect.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2006-08-10(g)

For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), we look to the status of the predicate conviction at the time the crime was committed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Adams · filed 2006-08-17(g)(1)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s reference to convictions in “any court” covers domestic courts, including Article III and military courts.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2006-08-21(g)(1)

But Thompson misreads the statute—it references “any court.” See id. § 922(g)(1) (making it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” to possess a weapon in or affecting interstate commerce). “[A]ny court,” as used in the statute, refers to domestic courts, see Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005), and includes Article III courts and military courts.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element can be proved with evidence of a defendant’s earlier guilty plea to a California cocaine possession charge.

United States v. Andaya-Penalosa · filed 2006-09-06(g)(1)

We find that the evidence was properly admitted to prove an element of the charged offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant is the person identified in the prior felony conviction records.

United States v. Rodriguez-Candelaria · filed 2007-04-06(g)

Both Defendants present the following arguments in attacking their convictions: ... (3) the evidence was insufficient to prove that they were convicted felons because the conviction packages received in evidence did not sufficiently identify them as the men who had been convicted. ... Having carefully considered the briefs and relevant parts of the record, and having the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that none of the Defendants’ arguments have merit.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a state conviction as a predicate felony when a sentence exceeding twelve months could be imposed for that offense.

United States v. Fields · filed 2007-06-06(g)(1)

Thus, because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of possession of cocaine in North Carolina, the district court properly considered Fields’ prior conviction as a predicate felony for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior conviction as a predicate felony when a sentence of more than twelve months could be imposed for that offense.

United States v. Hunter · filed 2007-07-10(g)(1)

Thus, because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of cruelty to animals in North Carolina, Hunter’s prior conviction was properly considered a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats Puerto Rican convictions as domestic convictions that can bar a person from possessing firearms.

United States v. Laboy-Torres · filed 2007-07-24(g)(1)

Thus, the court finds that Puerto Rican convictions can be reliably used to prevent dangerous individuals from owning firearms and are properly considered domestic for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove a prior felony conviction when the defendant does not stipulate to it.

United States v. Jones · filed 2007-08-17(g)(1)

We first note Jones did not offer to stipulate to a prior felony conviction. Thus, the Government was obligated to submit evidence establishing a prior conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a defendant’s prior felony conviction unless the defendant stipulates to felony status.

United States v. Jones · filed 2008-02-26(g)(1)

If a defendant does not stipulate to his status as a felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), then the government must put on evidence of his earlier felony convictions.

A defendant’s stipulation to a qualifying prior conviction establishes that element of a § 922(g)(1) offense.

United States v. Woods · filed 2008-03-26(g)(1)

In particular, Mark’s contention that it was not established that he had been “convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unpersuasive, given that he stipulated to that very element at trial.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a Kansas conviction as a qualifying prior offense when the defendant faced a maximum prison term exceeding one year, even if probation was the presumptive disposition.

United States v. Wattree · filed 2008-04-11(g)(1)

The focus under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), then, is on the maximum durational sentence to which this defendant, Mr. Wat-tree, was exposed. The relevant determinative sentence comes from the sentencing table that states terms of imprisonment, and the question turns on whether that durational presumptive sentence is in excess of one year. The presumptive disposition of either prison or probation is not controlling because the court had discretion to depart from that presumptive disposition without first submitting facts to a jury; the disposition itself does not affect the maximum sentence exposure of a particular defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior felony conviction as a predicate while it remains in effect, even if the conviction is alleged to be invalid.

United States v. Hardridge · filed 2008-04-14(g)(1)

This argument is meritless because it is settled that the infirmity of a prior felony conviction—so long as that conviction stands on the books—is immaterial to felon-in-possession liability under § 922(g)(1).

The defendant’s prior conviction satisfied § 922(g)(1)’s status element.

United States v. Webb · filed 2008-05-15(g)(1)

This meets § 922(g)(1)’s element regarding the status of the person possessing the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year; it does not use the term “felony.”

United States v. Keyes · filed 2008-05-29(g)(1)

The statute under which Mr. Keyes was convicted does not use the term felony, but simply prohibits possession of a firearm by a person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); see United States v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2003) (“What . . . matter[s] is that under the law of the jurisdiction where the proceedings were held, at the time of those proceedings, [the defendant] had committed an offense punishable by more than one year.”).

Section 922(g)(1) treats a nolo contendere plea as a felony conviction when the court adjudicated the defendant guilty under the law of the jurisdiction where the plea was entered.

United States v. Anton · filed 2008-10-30(g)(1)

As the district judge adjudicated Anton’s guilt in its 1989 order, Anton’s nolo contendre plea is a conviction under Florida law. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Anton was a convicted felon for the purposes of § 922(g).

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, reading an indictment that names the defendant’s prior felony to the jury is reversible error when the defendant offered to stipulate to felon status and the disclosure compromises the defense or the evidence of guilt is not strong.

United States v. Coleman, Chauncey · filed 2009-01-16(g)(1)

Under this court’s precedents, then, where proof of the defendant’s prior felon status is required, it is reversible error for the district court to read to the jury the unredacted indictment referring to the prior felony offense where the defense has offered to stipulate felon status and either a defense is compromised or the government’s evidence of guilt is not “strong.” ... Accordingly, the district court plainly erred in reading the unredacted indictment to the jury.

For a § 922(g) conviction, fingerprint evidence can establish that the defendant is the person named in records of prior felony convictions.

United States v. Laster · filed 2009-02-03(g)

Laster first argues that the government introduced insufficient evidence to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had previously been convicted of a felony. ... Three of the cards were associated with court records of prior felonies; a government witness testified that the fourth was associated with the defendant. ... On that basis (and other evidence as well) the jury was entitled to infer that the fingerprints on all four cards were Laster’s.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a defendant’s prior crime qualifies as a predicate conviction under § 921(a)(20).

United States v. Banks · filed 2009-02-02(g)(1)

Banks was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for “any person ... who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” But 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) excludes from the definition of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” certain crimes, including “antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade ... or ... any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” The government needed to prove, therefore, that Banks’s prior crimes triggered the conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm.

For a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1), the jury should not receive details of a prior felony conviction when the defendant stipulates to being a convicted felon.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2009-05-20(g)(1)

Because the defendant stipulated that he was a convicted felon, the details surrounding Anderson’s prior offense should not have been given to the jury.

Harp remains controlling when deciding whether a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year under § 922(g)(1); Rodriguez did not displace it.

United States v. White · filed 2010-01-25(g)(1)

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that our holding in Harp is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez.

Section 922(g)(1) counts a prior conviction as a predicate when the crime was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, even if the defendant received a shorter sentence.

United States v. Blackwood · filed 2010-03-02(g)(1)

Because the prior conviction at issue was clearly punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding one year, we conclude the district court did not err in considering it a predicate conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A Missouri felony conviction remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when Missouri continues to withhold substantial civil rights.

United States v. Akens · filed 2010-04-13(g)(1)

Under Brown, Akens’s Missouri conviction is a sufficient predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

McClinton v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2011-07-27(g)(1)

As a misdemeanor of the first degree is punishable by up to five years in prison, Applicant’s conviction for an M-l theft by receiving stolen property is clearly a prohibited offense preventing him from possessing a firearm.

A stipulated prior felony supports a § 922(g)(1) charge when there is no evidence of a rights-restoration letter that would exclude the conviction.

United State v. Parker · filed 2011-08-25(g)(1)

Thus, his Illinois felony offenses count as convictions under § 921(a)(20) and support the § 922(g)(1) charge.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element may be established by the defendant’s stipulation to a qualifying conviction.

United States v. Patton · filed 2011-10-06(g)(1)

Because the jury relied on this generic stipulation to find that he had committed a felony on May 20, 1998 and was therefore guilty of the particular § 922(g)(1) charge recited in the indictment, Patton was not convicted “on charges other than those made in the indictment against him.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying prior felony conviction; when the record does not establish whether a prior conviction qualifies under Simmons, the issue must be resolved on remand.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2011-10-11(g)(1)

In view of our holding in Simmons, we grant Wilson’s motion to vacate his conviction and remand the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we cannot determine from the current record whether, in light of Simmons, Wilson’s prior conviction would qualify as a felony under § 922(g)(1), we express no opinion on that issue and leave that determination, as well as the companion question whether the judgment should be reimposed or the indictment dismissed, for the district court on remand.

A prior conviction qualifies as a § 922(g)(1) predicate felony only if the defendant could have received a sentence exceeding one year for it.

United States v. Blackwood · filed 2011-10-11(g)(1)

Thus, under Simmons, Blackwood’s May 22, 2006 conviction should not have been a predicate felony for the § 922(g) conviction because it was not punishable by a sentence exceeding a year.

A prior conviction qualifies as a felony under § 922(g)(1) only if the defendant faced a possible prison term exceeding one year for that conviction.

United States v. Garmon · filed 2011-10-12(g)(1)

In view of our holding in Simmons, we agree with Garmon that his three prior state convictions, for which he faced a maximum of either six months (first two convictions) or eight months (third conviction), are not felonies as defined in § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a predicate conviction punishable by more than one year in prison for the particular defendant.

United States v. Isley · filed 2011-10-11(g)(1)

Thus, under Simmons, Isley’s predicate North Carolina conviction was not for a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and thus cannot support his federal indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior offense for which the defendant could actually have received more than one year of imprisonment, given his criminal history and other sentencing factors.

United States v. Champion · filed 2011-10-18(g)(1)

As Champion could not have received a term exceeding one year of imprisonment for his prior offense, he did not have a qualifying predicate offense for a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior state conviction if that defendant could not have received more than one year of imprisonment for it.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2011-10-11(g)(1)

Thus, because Wilson’s underlying state convictions were not punishable by a term exceeding one year, Wilson’s conduct that formed the basis for his federal conviction — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior offense for which the defendant could actually have received more than one year of imprisonment, given the defendant’s criminal history and other factors.

United States v. Perry · filed 2011-10-19(g)(1)

As Perry could not have received a term exceeding one year of imprisonment for his prior offenses, he did not have a qualifying predicate offense for a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for an offense for which the defendant could have received more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. White · filed 2011-10-20(g)(1)

As White could not have received a term exceeding one year of imprisonment for his prior offenses, he did not have a qualifying predicate offense for a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior conviction when the defendant could not have received more than one year of imprisonment for that offense.

United States v. Kebrae Brown · filed 2011-10-21(g)(1)

Thus, because neither of Brown’s underlying North Carolina convictions was punishable by a term exceeding one year, Brown’s conduct that formed the basis for his federal conviction — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; a conviction carrying a maximum of six months does not qualify.

United States v. Clayton Brown, Jr. · filed 2011-11-03(g)(1)

In view of our holding in Simmons, we conclude that Brown could not have been imprisoned for a term exceeding one year for his prior breaking and entering conviction. ... Because his prior conviction was not a felony, Brown can meet his burden to establish each of the plain error requirements. At the time of Brown’s guilty plea, a Simmons challenge to Brown’s predicate felony for the purposes of his § 922(g)(1) conviction would have been foreclosed by Harp.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; a North Carolina conviction does not qualify when the defendant could not have received a sentence that long.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2011-11-15(g)(1)

Therefore, Lewis lacks the predicate conviction required to confer guilt under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) does not prohibit firearm possession when the defendant’s prior conviction was not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Hartsfield · filed 2011-11-15(g)

Because Hartsfield was not subject to a sentence exceeding one year, his state conviction was not a felony conviction, and therefore, the conduct that formed the basis for his federal conviction, possessing a firearm, did not violate § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying prior felony conviction to support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

United States v. Eley · filed 2011-11-29(g)(1)

Because we cannot determine from the record before us whether, in light of Simmons, Eley’s § 922(g)(1) conviction is supported by a prior felony conviction, we vacate Eley’s § 922(g)(1) conviction and remand for the district to make that determination.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying felony conviction; on plain-error review, a stipulation naming a nonqualifying conviction did not invalidate the conviction where the indictment identified another qualifying felony.

United States v. Pegram · filed 2012-09-14(g)(1)

The indictment placed Pegram on notice that the Government might use either the 1994 or the 1998 offense, or both, to establish his status. The fact that the crime to which Pegram ultimately stipulated was not a felony under Simmons does not, on plain error review, destroy the validity of the stipulation when the 1994 crime does so qualify.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a prior felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant does not stipulate to one.

United States v. Bagby · filed 2012-10-17(g)(1)

Mr. Bagby’s refusal to stipulate to his past convictions, in connection with the ammunition charge, required the Government to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bagby had, in fact, previously been convicted of a felony, an essential element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove all three elements beyond a reasonable doubt, including the defendant’s prior felony conviction.

United States v. Mark Jenkins, Jr. · filed 2012-12-24(g)(1)

In accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions for a Section 922(g)(1) case, the district court instructed the jury that the government had to prove each of Section 922(g)(1)’s three elements beyond a reasonable doubt and then informed the jury that California Heath and Safety Code Section 11351.5 is a felony. Because no reasonable juror could have interpreted these instructions as requiring him to find that Jenkins had in fact been convicted under California Health and Safety Code Section 11351.5, the instructions comported with due process.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Davis · filed 2013-02-20(g)(1)

Because being a felon is an element of a felon-in-possession offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government was required under Count Seven to prove that Davis had at least one prior felony conviction.

When the defendant does not stipulate, § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one prior crime qualifies as a felony.

United States v. Diamond Blair · filed 2013-03-08(g)(1)

Accordingly, in the absence of a stipulation by Blair, the government needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of Blair’s prior crimes qualified as “a prior felony” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction; a stipulation does not prevent the jury from being told that the conviction exists, though its nature and substance may not be disclosed.

United States v. Prieto · filed 2014-05-06(g)(1)

Although the district court ruled that the government could not introduce evidence that Mr. Prieto’s prior felony conviction involved a gun, it did not preclude (nor could it have) the government from establishing one of the elements of the crime – a prior conviction.

A stipulation that the defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year is sufficient to establish § 922(g)(1)’s prior conviction element, even without expressly identifying the conviction as domestic.

United States v. Shorty · filed 2016-01-07(g)(1)

But the stipulation precisely tracks the language of § 922(g)(1), and we have held that a similar stipulation was sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

A North Carolina conviction carrying a 10- to 21-month sentence can qualify as a prior felony under § 922(g) even when nine months must be served on post-release supervision.

United States v. Yates · filed 2016-09-02(g)

In his opening brief on appeal, Yates argued that his North Carolina attempted common law robbery conviction was not punishable by a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year because the North Carolina Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011 required that 9 months of his 10- to 21-month sentence be served on post-release supervision. As Yates now concedes, his argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2014 (2016), which issued while Yates’ appeal was pending.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to introduce the names and nature of prior convictions to prove the prior-conviction element when the defendant refuses to stipulate.

United States v. Roman Hellems · filed 2017-08-04(g)(1)

When a defendant refuses to stipulate, the government may introduce the name and nature of the prior convictions to prove the prior-conviction element of the charge.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a stipulation to the prior felony element does not make Old Chief applicable when the government reveals only the number of prior convictions, without naming or describing them.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2018-01-23(g)(1)

However, unlike Old Chief, the Government in this case only elicited testimony about the number of Johnson’s prior convictions. Due to defense counsel’s timely objection, the Government failed to elicit any information regarding the “name or nature” of Johnson’s prior convictions. Old Chief is therefore inapposite.

Conviction records bearing a defendant’s name can establish the prior felony conviction element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Burton · filed 2018-05-04(g)(1)

This Court’s decision in Pasterchik v. United States, 400 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1968) forecloses Mr. Burton’s argument that conviction records bearing his name were insufficient to establish the prior felony conviction element of the felon in possession counts.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; a stipulation that was neither admitted nor read into the trial record does not establish that element.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2018-12-20(g)(1)

The Government and Sanchez stipulated that Sanchez had a prior conviction punishable by over a year of imprisonment, an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... In the absence of the stipulation here, insufficient evidence exists that would convince any rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez had been convicted of a crime punishable by over a year of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the particular offense underlying a stipulated felony conviction relevant to an element or defense.

United States v. Tucker · filed 2020-01-31(g)(1)

The parties had already stipulated that Tucker was a felon for purposes of the felon-in-possession charge. Thus, the excluded evidence would have done nothing more than inform the jury that Tucker’s prior conviction had been for aggravated burglary under Tennessee law. That fact was plainly irrelevant to any element or defense relating to the felon-in-possession charge or any other charge at trial.

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply when the defendant’s prior state convictions do not qualify as felonies.

Martinez v. United States · filed 2020-05-04(g)(1)

The elements of Section ... 922(g) therefore are not met and Movant is actually innocent of that charge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a felony conviction to precede the firearm possession.

United States v. Leviner · filed 1998-12-22(g)(1)

Section 922(g) does that, defining the elements of the offense' — possessing a gun after having been convicted of a felony or felonies of a certain kind. As such I find that countable convictions under § 2K2.1 are only those entered pi'ior to the firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, the firearm had been in or affected interstate commerce, and the defendant knew he was a convicted felon; matching records and fingerprints can establish the prior conviction.

United States v. Hill · filed 2022-04-21(g)(1)

To prove a defendant guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, the government must prove that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm; that the firearm had been in or affected interstate commerce; and that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon, that is, a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” See § 922(g)(1); United States v. Harris, 964 F.3d 718, 723-24 (8th Cir. 2020). ... In light of all the evidence linking Hill to the 1998 felony conviction, a reasonable jury could infer that Hill had provided law enforcement with a false social-security number and find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the same “Robert K. Hill” born on March 23, 1976 who was convicted of a felony in 1998.

When a defendant declines to stipulate to his felony convictions, § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove both a prior felony conviction and the defendant’s knowledge of his felon status.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2024-02-07(g)(1)

In this case, Richardson refused to enter an Old Chief stipulation. So the government had to prove that he both had a prior felony conviction—one “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—and knew he was a felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 811 (8th Cir. 2001).

A stipulation that a defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment satisfies § 922(g)(1)’s prior-conviction element.

United States v. Ducksworth · filed 2026-03-03(g)(1)

Ducksworth stipulated that he “was previously convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year.” Because this stipulation “uses the very language of the statute that defines that element of the offense[,]” see § 922(g)(1), Ducksworth “stipulated that the element is satisfied as a matter of law.” See Broadnax, 601 F.3d at 346.

Section 922(g)(1) permits an entrapment defense to a charge of firearm possession by a convicted felon.

United States v. Sistrunk · filed 2010-10-07(g)(1)

After a careful review of the authorities in this Court and our sister Courts, we find that the affirmative defense of entrapment applies to the offense of felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits an entrapment-by-estoppel defense based on a federal official’s misstatement of law, but advice from a state official does not support that defense.

United States v. Funches · filed 1998-02-24(g)(1)

We have recognized that this defense may apply to a section 922 offense—even though it is a strict-liability offense which ordinarily renders the defendant's state of mind irrelevant. ... The defense of entrapment-by-estoppel, when asserted as a defense to a federal crime, requires reliance on a misstatement by an official or agent of the federal government.

Section 922(g)(1) permits an entrapment-by-estoppel defense when the defendant relies on a misstatement by a federal official or agent; incorrect advice from a state official does not suffice.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elton Lee FUNCHES, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1998-02-24(g)(1)

We have recognized that this defense may apply to a section 922 offense— even though it is a striet-liability offense which ordinarily renders the defendant’s state of mind irrelevant. ... But the defense is not applicable where the state incorrectly advises the person and, then, the federal government prosecutes the person. ... The defense of entrapment-by-estoppel, when asserted as a defense to a federal crime, requires reliance on a misstatement by an official or agent of the federal government.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon's possession of a firearm; government persuasion to sell a firearm already possessed does not warrant an entrapment instruction.

United States v. Poole · filed 1993-01-19(g)

But there is no evidence that Poole acquired the weapon as a result of persuasion. His first meeting with Kenneth Morrow was recorded; during the recording Poole reveals that he owned, and at least constructively possessed, a shotgun that he later sold. The crime was possessing the weapon, and Poole committed that crime unbidden by the government. An entrapment instruction was unnecessary.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when police supply the firearm in a sting operation, absent entrapment or other police misconduct.

United States v. Kelly · filed 1995-03-03(g)

First, Kelly's firearmpossession conviction in no way violates the "public policy" behind section 922(g). In the absence of entrapment or other police misconduct, it is entirely appropriate for the government to obtain a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon where the firearm is supplied by the police in the course of a sting operation.

A defendant cannot defeat a § 922(g) conviction with the estoppel by entrapment argument foreclosed by controlling precedent.

United States v. Rice · filed 2003-12-22(g)

Finally, Rice seeks to assert the defense of estoppel by entrapment as to his conviction under § 922(g). However, as Rice recognizes, this argument is squarely foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.1991).

Section 922(g)(1) permits an entrapment-by-estoppel defense when the defendant relied on a federal official’s statement that the conduct was lawful.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2006-05-09(g)(1)

Nonetheless, entrapment-by-estoppel may be interposed as a defense to a charge of violating § 922. ... If this defense is asserted for the commission of a federal crime, the defendant must have relied upon a statement by an official or agent of the federal government.

Section 922(g)(5) does not allow an entrapment-by-estoppel defense based on permission to buy a firearm before the possessor’s immigration status changed to unlawful.

United States v. Deravin · filed 2007-06-18(g)(5)

Any information Deravin may have received from an authorized government official at the time he first acquired the Ruger could not provide an estoppel defense two years later after Deravin’s status changed from an alien who was in the United States legally to an alien who was here illegally. Nor can Deravin’s November 2003 purchases of the two additional guns support a defense of entrapment by estoppel with respect to the Ruger.

Section 922(d) bars selling a firearm to a person the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a convicted felon; the buyer’s repeated, express statements about prior felony convictions can establish that element.

United States v. Crawford · filed 2023-05-05(d)

A reasonable jury could have decided that Crawford knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the CI was a felon. The jury heard evidence that the CI repeatedly and expressly told Crawford that he had prior felony convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to have found this element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(d)(1) requires a person transferring a firearm to know or have reasonable cause to believe the recipient is a convicted felon; the same mental state applies to a conspiracy to violate the subsection.

United States v. Scarfo · filed 2022-07-15(d)(1)

That same mens rea (or guilty state of mind) – namely, “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe” that the recipient of the firearms is a convicted felon – also applies to cases, like this one, involving a conspiracy to violate § 922(d)(1).

For a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon.

United States v. Ath · filed 2022-07-26(g)

Because Ath admitted that he knew he had a qualifying prior conviction at the time of the offense, we find no plain error under Rehaif and the evidence adduced at trial was otherwise sufficient to convict Ath of this offense.

Section 922(d) prohibits knowingly supplying a firearm to a convicted felon, and circumstantial evidence can support a conviction.

United States v. Talley · filed 1999-10-18(d)

As to Count I — knowingly disposing of a firearm to a convicted felon — the circumstantial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, reveals that Marr was a convicted felon and that Talley knowingly supplied him with a .25 caliber pistol.

Section 922(d)(1) requires an aider and abettor of a firearm sale to know or have reasonable cause to believe the buyer is a convicted felon; the seller’s knowledge alone is insufficient.

United States v. Murray · filed 1993-04-01(d)(1)

The statute requires that the perpetrator either know or have reasonable cause to believe that the transferee was a previously convicted felon. ... The mental state of the principal alone, is insufficient to inculpate an aider and abettor.

Section 922(d)(1) requires an aider and abettor to know or have reasonable cause to believe the firearm buyer is a convicted felon; the seller's knowledge alone is insufficient.

U.S. v. Murray · filed 1993-04-02(d)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(1), it is the purchaser's status as a felon which makes the activity criminal. If the aider and abettor does not know this fact, it is difficult to say that he shared in the criminal intent of the principal.

Section 922(d)(1) permits a conviction for selling a firearm to a felon when the seller knew or had reasonable cause to believe the buyer had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Prescott · filed 2006-08-07(d)(1)

Because we conclude that the evidence presented at trial could have led a reasonable trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Prescott knew or had reasonable cause to believe that he was selling firearms to a convicted felon, his conviction is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(d)(1) requires the seller to know or have reasonable cause to believe that the firearm buyer was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Bokman · filed 2007-01-26(d)(1)

Even if Bokman did not “know” that the informant had been convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” based on the informant’s statement that he was a felon, § 922(d)(1) requires only that a defendant know or “hav[e] reasonable cause to believe” that the buyer has been convicted of such a crime. The statements made by the informant during the firearm transactions fully support the jury’s finding that Bokman had at least reasonable cause to believe that the informant had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year.

When a § 922(a)(6) charge concerns a prior felony conviction, the evidence must permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the conviction.

United States v. Sutton · filed 2008-02-11(a)(6)

Because a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime with which Sutton was charged, in particular his knowledge that he had been convicted of a felony, beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm Sutton’s conviction.

Section 922(d)(1) requires a seller to know or have reasonable cause to believe that the buyer is under indictment for, or has been convicted of, a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Lumpkin · filed 2017-01-27(d)(1)

A person convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) must have known or had reasonable cause to believe that the buyer was “under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Hessiani · filed 2019-09-30(g)(1)

The indictment and the jury instructions contained the same obvious error: They omitted the element that Hessiani knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year when he possessed a firearm.

Section 922(d)(1) requires the seller to know or have reasonable cause to believe that the firearm buyer is a convicted felon.

United States v. Chadwick · filed 2014-02-06(d)(1)

The court’s instructions as a whole adequately conveyed the governing law on the defendant’s required state of mind under the statute. Section 922(d) makes it a crime to “knowingly” sell a firearm to a convicted felon “when the seller or transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such a person is a convicted felon.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Berris · filed 2025-05-12(g)(1)

Understood as a whole, we are satisfied the government had proven each of the essential elements required to convict Mr. Berris under § 922(g)(1), including that he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison.

DACA status does not change an alien’s status as illegally or unlawfully in the United States under § 922(g)(5)(A).

United States v. Berreaza · filed 2020-01-09(g)(5)(A)

Our decision ... in Lopez forecloses Bernal Berreaza’s argument that he was not “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” at the time of his arrest based on his DACA status.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)’s “in the United States” element requires a noncitizen to be physically present within the country, regardless of whether the person formally entered under immigration law.

United States v. Balde · filed 2019-11-13(g)(5)(A)

We conclude instead that the “in the United States” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) requires only that a noncitizen be physically present within the United States.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) is ambiguous as applied to an alien with Special Immigrant Juvenile status, so the rule of lenity bars criminal liability on that basis.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2017-09-08(g)(5)(A)

A good argument can be made that Congress did not intend to insulate otherwise unlawfully present aliens with SIJ status from criminal prosecution under § 922(g)(5)(A). However, we are bound by our precedent in Orellana, which creates at least enough ambiguity that the rule of lenity should apply.

An alien with special immigrant juvenile status who is deemed paroled into the United States is outside § 922(g)(5)(A)’s prohibition on firearm possession by aliens illegally or unlawfully in the United States.

United States v. Santiago-Hernandez · filed 2015-06-15(g)(5)(A)

The most natural way to read this labyrinth of statutes and regulations together is to conclude that a person like Defendant who finds a pathway to parole status cannot violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) by possessing a firearm while on parole status.

Section 922(g)(5)’s prohibition on firearm possession by unlawfully present aliens withstands Second Amendment and equal protection challenges.

United States v. Huitron-Guizar · filed 2012-05-07(g)(5)

On this record, § 922(g)(5) withstands Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s Second Amendment and Equal Protection challenges.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) treats an alien released on immigration bond pending removal proceedings as unlawfully present.

United States v. Flores-Guerrero · filed 2005-11-28(g)(5)(A)

An immigration bond does not confer lawful status on an alien for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A).

Section 922(g)(5)’s unlawful-presence element can be supported by a defendant’s admission, immigration records, and testimony that his visa had expired.

United States v. Juan Greco-Trigo, Also Known as Juan Jose Trigo, Also Known as Juan Jose Greco · filed 1995-10-26(g)(5)

Taken together, Greco-Trigo's admission, the INS records check, and Agent Herco's testimony provided ample evidence for the jury to have concluded that Greco-Trigo was illegally in the United States.

Section 922(g)(5) prohibits firearm possession by an alien whose student status became unlawful after violating school transfer requirements, even if the alien later received employment authorization while seeking asylum.

United States v. Bazargan · filed 1993-05-11(g)(5)

Because the INS does not interpret the employment authorization to have any effect on the alien’s status with respect to anything other than his ability to engage in employment during the pendency of his case, we agree with the district court and the Immigration Judge that the employment authorization did not have the effect of converting Bazargan back into a legal alien.

Section 922(g)(5) covers an alien who entered the United States without inspection even if the INS released him pending a deportation hearing.

United States v. Rhaburn · filed 1993-08-10(g)(5)

Release pending hearing has no effect on the legality of an alien's presence in the United States. Rhaburn's presence is as lawful--or unlawful--as it would be if he remained in INS detention pending the outcome of his deportation hearing.

Section 922(g)(5) prohibits firearm possession by an alien whose approved visa petition has not yet authorized him to remain in the United States.

United States v. Revuelta · filed 2000-06-13(g)(5)

But the court must conclude, based on the legislative history, that Congress intended to set forth a bright-line rule: those individuals who were not yet legally in this country should not purchase firearms.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not prohibit firearm possession by a noncitizen lawfully present on bond while removal proceedings remain pending and no final removal order has issued.

United States v. Atandi · filed 2002-10-30(g)(5)(A)

Because he has been in the country lawfully on a bond during the pendency of the removal proceedings, the INS judge has not issued a final order or determined that Defendant should be removed, and Defendant has the right to become a lawful permanent resident because of an approved 1-130 petition, Defendant was lawfully present in the United States on May 25, 2002. Therefore, Defendant cannot be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) and Defendant was able to possess firearms on May 25, 2002.

An alien with a pending application for adjustment of status and no final deportation order was not illegally or unlawfully in the United States for purposes of § 922(g)(5)(A).

United States v. Salman · filed 2003-05-29(g)(5)(A)

In any event, even if Salman was untruthful in his application, the fact remains that he had an application for adjustment of status pending, and was not subject to a final order of deportation, at the time of the alleged offense. Consequently, under the previously-cited cases, Salman cannot be convicted of a § 922(g)(5) charge.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) bars firearm possession by an alien who has violated the conditions of a temporary visa, even without a removal order; approval of an I-130 petition does not lift that restriction.

United States v. Atandi · filed 2004-07-23(g)(5)(A)

Rather, we hold that an alien who is only permitted to remain in the United States for the duration of his or her status (as a student, for example) becomes “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” for purposes of § 922(g)(5)(A) upon commission of a status violation. ... We hold that an approved I-130 petition does not authorize an alien to stay in the United States, and therefore does not lift 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A)’s firearm restriction for aliens illegally or unlawfully present in this country.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) covers aliens who entered the United States illegally and later received temporary treatment benefits while applying for temporary protected status.

United States v. Flores · filed 2005-03-16(g)(5)(A)

We read the phrase “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” in § 922(g)(5)(A) to include those aliens, like Flores, who entered the country illegally and subsequently qualified for temporary treatment benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not clearly prohibit firearm possession by an alien granted temporary protected status, so the rule of lenity applies.

United States v. Orellana · filed 2005-04-06(g)(5)(A)

Given the ambiguity of section 922(g)(5)(A), the questionable interpretation and weight of the ATF regulation, and the absence of binding case law on point, we are constrained to apply the rule of lenity in this case.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) bars firearm possession by an alien whose unlawful status remains unchanged during removal proceedings, even if the alien is released on bond.

United States v. Bravo-Muzquiz · filed 2005-06-16(g)(5)(A)

The alien’s status is not changed while he is in the ... course of removal proceedings whether or not released from custody on bond.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) criminalizes possession of a firearm by an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, which requires entry into the country.

United States v. Lopez-Perera · filed 2006-02-21(g)(5)(A)

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not criminalize the possession of a firearm by an alien who “comes to the United States” or “brings a firearm to the United States,” but instead criminalizes the possession of a firearm by an alien who is “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Therefore, because Lopez-Perera had not entered the United States, he could not have been “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.”

Section 922(g)(5)(B) applies to aliens who remain in lawful nonimmigrant status; an expired nonimmigrant visa does not keep an alien within that provision.

United States v. Elrawy · filed 2006-04-26(g)(5)(B)

... only aliens who were admitted to the United States on a non-immigrant visa and maintain lawful “non-immigrant” status can be prosecuted under § 922(g)(5)(B).

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof of alienage, which a defendant may challenge with evidence of derivative U.S. citizenship.

United States v. Ortega-Ortega · filed 2006-08-16(g)(5)(A)

We reverse and remand Ortega’s convictions for Counts 1 and 4 because the district court erroneously precluded Ortega from presenting evidence of his father’s U.S. citizenship at trial. ... it is clear now that in prohibiting cross-examination of the government’s alienage witness and precluding reference to derivative citizenship in defense counsel’s closing argument, the district court deprived Ortega of his right to present evidence challenging an element of the offenses with which he was charged.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits an illegal alien from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Cuevas-Arrendondo · filed 2006-12-04(g)(5)(A)

Inside the bedroom, the officers found a 12-gauge shotgun, a .38-caliber revolver, and a safe containing Cuevas-Arrendondo’s billfold, birth certificate, and other identifying paperwork, as well as several bags holding more than 187 grams of methamphetamine and more than 80 grams of cocaine. The bagged drugs were weighted and packaged in a manner consistent with distribution. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the charged offenses.

An alien whose authorized stay has expired remains unlawfully in the United States for purposes of the firearm prohibition when a pending adjustment-of-status application does not prevent removal.

United States v. Latu · filed 2007-03-19(g)(5)(A)

However, absent a statute preventing Latu’s removability upon the filing of his application for adjustment of status, we can envision no interpretation that renders Latu’s presence anything other than “illegal[ ] or unlawful[ ].”

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that a firearm possessor is an alien unlawfully in the United States; the government may establish unlawful presence by showing a lack of authorization.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2008-01-24(g)(5)(A)

This finding was an essential element of Counts 8, 9 and 10, which charged the defendant with being an alien unlawfully in the United States in possession of a firearm or ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). ... The government may prove an alien was unlawfully in the United States by showing he was in this country without authorization. ... This evidence, when considered with the evidence that Mendez was born in Mexico, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Mendez was not lawfully present in the United States. The district court did not err and the evidence was sufficient to support Mendez’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Diaz · filed 2008-03-07(g)(5)(A)

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), the government must present at trial sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(5) prohibits an illegal alien from knowingly possessing a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Bustos · filed 2008-12-18(g)(5)

His admissions and stipulation are sufficient to meet the elements necessary for the crime charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) for being an illegal alien knowingly in possession a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) treats an alien subject to a departure control order as unlawfully present when the order does not change the alien’s immigration status.

United States v. Anaya-Acosta · filed 2011-01-03(g)(5)(A)

We disagree and hold that a departure control order does not affect the legal status of an alien’s pres- ence in the United States under § 922(g)(5)(A).

Section 922(g)(5)’s prohibition on firearm possession by illegal aliens survives Second and Fifth Amendment challenges.

United States v. Carpio-Leon · filed 2012-12-14(g)(5)

Concluding that § 922(g)(5) is constitutional, we affirm.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) prohibits an alien from possessing a firearm while unlawfully in the United States; applying to adjust status and receiving work authorization do not make that presence lawful.

United States v. Cavillo-Rojas · filed 2013-02-15(g)(5)(A)

But it is clear, as a number of other circuits have found, that the mere filing of an application for adjustment of status and receipt of an employment authorization card does not legalize the alien’s presence in the United States, and it is still a crime, under § 922(g)(5), for that individual to possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) covers an alien who overstays a visa while an application to adjust immigration status remains unapproved.

United States v. Abduladhim Al Sabahi · filed 2013-06-12(g)(5)(A)

Al Sabahi remained in the United States after his visa expired, and his request for adjustment of status has not been approved. Therefore, under these general principles, Al Sabahi was illegally or unlawfully in the United States at the time he possessed the firearms in question.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) applies when an alien was unlawfully in the United States at the time of firearm possession, even if removal proceedings were later reopened.

United States v. Lim · filed 2018-07-31(g)(5)(A)

The plain text of Section 922(g)(5) similarly does not suggest that it covers only aliens who are not later found to be legally present. Instead, the use of the present tense—“is illegally or unlawfully in the United States”—indicates a concern with the status of the alien at time of arrest.