18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession when the defendant’s prior convictions were not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2011-12-15(g)(1)

Because Lewis was not subject to a sentence exceeding one year for these predicate convictions, and therefore had no prior felony convictions, the conduct that formed the basis for his federal conviction, possessing a firearm, did not violate § 922(g)(1).

A North Carolina breaking or entering conviction punishable by more than one year in prison qualifies as a prior conviction under § 922(g)(1), even if the sentence was suspended.

United States v. Harris · filed 2011-12-15(g)(1)

Accordingly, either of the 1992 breaking or entering convictions, for which Harris was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment, suspended, qualifies as a proper predicate for the § 922(g) charge, and Simmons does not alter this conclusion.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person from possessing guns when a conviction on a guilty plea independently qualifies as a felony conviction.

United States v. Ligon · filed 2011-12-13(g)(1)

Ligon’s conviction on his guilty plea provides an independent basis upon which 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) now prohibits him from possessing guns.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; a conviction for which the defendant could have received at most ten months does not qualify.

United States v. Stanley · filed 2011-10-06(g)(1)

In light of Simmons, we conclude that Stanley does not have a predicate felony conviction necessary to support his § 922(g) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a predicate conviction punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; when the record does not establish whether a prior conviction qualifies, the court may remand for that determination.

United States v. Terrell Miller · filed 2011-10-03(g)(1)

Because we cannot determine on the record before us whether, in light of Simmons, Miller’s North Carolina conviction is a felony or a misdemeanor, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the district court for the court to make such determination in the first instance.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Surrell Duff · filed 2011-09-30(g)(1)

A felony, for purposes of both § 922 and § 841, is defined as a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. ... After review of the materials submitted on appeal, we are satisfied that Duff’s § 922(g) conviction is unsupported by a predicate prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison to support a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Ford · filed 2011-09-27(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Ford’s prior North Carolina state conviction was not punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

A prior conviction punishable by no more than one year of imprisonment cannot support a charge under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Smith · filed 2011-09-27(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Smith’s prior offenses specified in the § 922(g)(1) charge were punishable by not more than ten months’ imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, based on the sentence available to the particular defendant.

United States v. Ross · filed 2011-09-28(g)(1)

Because Simmons directs the conclusion that Ross was never convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration, he cannot be convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; a conviction that was not so punishable does not qualify.

United States v. Stephon Hooker · filed 2011-09-30(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Neither of Hooker’s prior North Carolina state convictions was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for which the defendant could have received more than one year in prison.

United States v. Farris · filed 2011-09-30(g)(1)

Because Simmons directs the conclusion that Farris was never convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration, he cannot be convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; a conviction without that possible punishment cannot serve as the predicate.

United States v. Harper · filed 2011-09-30(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Harper’s prior North Carolina state conviction was not punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1) applies only when the defendant’s prior conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Tyran Brace · filed 2011-09-30(g)(1)

Thus, because Brace’s underlying conviction was not punishable by a term exceeding one year, Brace’s conduct — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose prior conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Austin · filed 2011-10-04(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Austin’s prior North Carolina state conviction was not punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922(g) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior conviction that was not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment for the defendant.

United States v. Williams · filed 2011-10-06(g)

Thus, because Williams’s underlying North Carolina convictions were not punishable by a term exceeding one year, Williams’s conduct — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g), and he was not properly sentenced as a career offender under the Guidelines.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; an offense for which the defendant could receive no more than eight months does not qualify.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2011-09-02(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. As to the prior drug offense specified in the § 922(g)(1) charge, Thomas was punishable by no more than eight months’ imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession by a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; a North Carolina conviction qualifies only if that defendant was eligible for such a sentence.

United States v. Parrish · filed 2011-09-13(g)(1)

Because Simmons directs the conclusion that Parrish was never convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year of incarceration, he cannot be convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; a North Carolina conviction does not qualify when the defendant was ineligible for such a sentence.

United States v. Tywon Walker · filed 2011-09-19(g)(1)

Thus, under Simmons, their North Carolina convictions were not for crimes punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment and could not support their federal indictments.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison for the particular defendant.

United States v. Cofield · filed 2011-09-22(g)(1)

Thus, under Simmons, Cofield’s predicate North Carolina conviction was not for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison and thus cannot support his federal indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony conviction requirement can be satisfied by an Oklahoma deferred sentence when Oklahoma law treats the guilty plea as a conviction for a later criminal offense.

United States v. Hutchinson · filed 2011-09-02(g)(1)

The question of what constitutes a conviction within the meaning of § 922(g)(1) is controlled by the law of Oklahoma. ... Thus, under Oklahoma law a deferred sentence pursuant to § 2-410 constitutes a conviction if a subsequent conviction occurs during the probationary period.

Section 922(g)(1) counts a state felony resolved by a nolo contendere plea as a predicate conviction when state law treats the plea like a guilty plea.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2010-11-16(g)(1)

Sec- tion 922(g)(1) requires only that the defendant was “convict- ed” of a previous felony, as defined by the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. California law treats a plea of nolo contendere as equivalent to a guilty plea. Thus, Anderson’s nolo contendere pleas resulted in convictions, and either conviction was sufficient to qualify as a predicate fel- ony.

Section 922(g) requires proof of a prior felony conviction; whether that element is satisfied is a question of proof, not jurisdiction.

United States v. Parker · filed 2010-10-04(g)

Defendant’s real argument is that the facts do not support the existence of one of the essential elements of the government’s § 922(g) charge — a previous felony conviction. But this is a question of proof; not of jurisdiction.

A state conviction qualifies as a felony predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the record establishes that it was for an offense punishable by more than one year, despite a conflicting subsection citation in the conviction report.

United States v. Smith · filed 2010-09-30(g)(1)

Therefore, we conclude that Smith’s criminal history included a felony conviction under Alabama Code § 13A-11-72(a), for which he served a sentence in excess of one year. Thus, the district court correctly determined that this predicate offense constituted a felony and, therefore, supported Smith’s conviction under § 922(g)(1).

A defendant who stipulates to convicted-felon status cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on that element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Oaks · filed 2010-05-26(g)(1)

One of the elements of the offense requires the government to prove, and the jury to find, that the defendant was a convicted felon. ... Because he stipulated to being a convicted felon, he cannot now argue the evidence was insufficient to prove that element.

Under § 922(g)(1), a Utah felony guilty plea counts as a prior conviction before sentencing.

United States v. Butler · filed 2010-04-30(g)(1)

We therefore hold that In’s equation of a conviction with a guilty verdict or plea extends, as a matter of Utah law, to the context of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a court to describe a qualifying prior conviction as a felony in jury instructions, even when the defendant has stipulated to that conviction.

United States v. Bosket · filed 2009-12-15(g)(1)

We find no plain error. As we have observed, the term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is commonly referred to as a “felony.”

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a defendant’s stipulation to felony status precludes the government from offering additional evidence of the predicate conviction in its case-in-chief.

United States v. Ware · filed 2007-04-18(g)(1)

Although Ware’s stipulation that he was a felon precluded evidence of his predicate felony conviction, see United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 831 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 189), the prosecution did not, in its case-in-chief, offer any additional evidence on that conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison, and a defendant cannot challenge the validity of that conviction as a defense to the firearms charge.

United States v. Corle · filed 2007-04-11(g)(1)

We explained that, pursuant to the statute, an individual who has a predicate conviction must challenge that conviction before possessing a firearm, as he “cannot collaterally attack his predicate conviction in defense of his prosecution under § ... 922(g)(1).” Id. at 159. We are thus precluded from reviewing, twenty-six years after the fact, the validity of Corle’s 1981 conviction and our review is limited to determining whether, under Pennsylvania law, that conviction satisfies the definition of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). We hold that it does.

A prior North Carolina conviction qualifies as a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1) if any defendant convicted of that offense could receive a sentence exceeding one year.

United States v. Botello · filed 2007-03-05(g)(1)

Thus, because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of possession with ... intent to distribute marijuana in North Carolina, Botello’s prior conviction was properly considered a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1).

A qualifying prior conviction can support a § 922(g)(1) charge even if a different proposed predicate conviction cannot.

United States v. Frazier · filed 2007-03-02(g)(1)

Frazier asserts that his 1988 Colorado conviction cannot serve as the predicate offense. Assuming arguendo that he is correct, he has another prior conviction for a crime of violence, his 1983 conviction for burglary of a habitation in Texas. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Frazier’s motion.

For § 922(g)(1), the statutory maximum sentence for a prior state conviction controls when state sentencing guidelines specify no different maximum.

United States v. Stiles · filed 2006-11-13(g)(1)

As no part of the state’s statutory scheme establishing the state sentencing guidelines specified a different maximum sentence for second-degree robbery, the maximum established in section 9A.20.021 controls.

Section 922(g) does not permit a defendant to collaterally attack the predicate felony conviction during a firearms prosecution; the defendant must challenge it in another forum.

United States v. Williams · filed 2006-04-03(g)

Therefore, we do not bar Defendant from attacking the predicate felony conviction, but he must attempt this in another forum and not through collateral review when being prosecuted for possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a state felony conviction survives a deferred sentence and dismissal, and the person’s civil rights have not been substantially restored.

United States v. Valerio · filed 2006-03-28(g)(1)

The district court correctly held that Val-erio cannot prevail under this provision because he was indeed convicted under New Mexico law, and his conviction was never expunged or otherwise invalidated for purposes of the federal statute.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment; a Kansas conviction whose maximum sentence was less than one year when it became final does not qualify.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2006-03-17(g)(1)

Accordingly, because Thomas does not have a qualifying prior conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), his conviction under that provision must be overturned.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a state felony as a qualifying prior conviction when it is punishable by more than one year, even if the defendant received misdemeanor-level punishment.

United States v. Battin · filed 2006-03-20(g)(1)

While Defendant was punished to a term of 180 days confinement, the crime for which he was convicted was punishable “for any term of not more than two years or less than 180 days.”

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felony conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment even if state law permits the person to possess firearms.

United States v. Nix · filed 2006-02-09(g)(1)

The only limitation on predicate convictions contained in § 922(g)(1) itself is that they must be “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and it is that condition which § 921(a)(20) provides “shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.”

Section 922(g)(1) applies to New Jersey fourth-degree convictions punishable by up to 18 months in prison.

Zaborowski v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2006-02-09(g)(1)

Thus, Zaborowski’s two New Jersey convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year in prison disqualify him under Section 6109(e)(l)(viii) of the Uniform Firearms Act and Section 922(g)(1) of the Gun Control Act.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only one qualifying prior conviction for a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Martin · filed 2006-01-26(g)(1)

One is enough to trigger § 922(g)(1), and Martin expressly admits to the Southern District conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prior-conviction element may be proved by circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the conviction record.

United States v. Stockett, Joseph · filed 2005-12-12(g)(1)

Stockett’s prior conviction need not be shown through direct evidence; the cumulative effect of persuasive circumstantial evidence can prove the fact of a prior conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit a defendant to challenge an existing predicate conviction as a defense to a firearm possession prosecution.

United States v. Leuschen · filed 2005-01-21(g)(1)

We hold that Lewis precludes a defendant’s collateral attack on a prior conviction in defense of a prosecution under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the defendant’s felony conviction at the time of firearm possession; later invalidation of that conviction does not undo the violation.

United States v. Settle · filed 2005-01-11(g)(1)

It is undisputed that Settle had a state court felony conviction for aggravated assault on July 4, 2002, the date on which the police cited him for unlawful possession of a firearm. Therefore, the fact that the Shelby County Criminal Court subsequently invalidated that conviction is irrelevant.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony requirement is satisfied by a California conviction that the state court has not reclassified as a misdemeanor.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2004-12-02(g)(1)

Thus, we find no error in the district court’s determination that Robinson had a prior felony conviction within the meaning of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a Tennessee guilty plea followed by judicial diversion as a prior conviction when no judgment of guilt has been entered.

United States v. Mynatt · filed 2004-11-05(g)(1)

Based upon the foregoing case law, the Court finds that defendant Mynatt’s plea of guilty to the charge of Aggravated Assault on August 6, 2002, and subsequent judicial diversion is not a prior conviction under the law of the State of Tennessee for purposes of the charge of being a felon in possession under Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a person has a felony conviction at the time they possess a firearm, even if a state court later vacates that conviction nunc pro tunc.

United States v. Padilla · filed 2004-11-02(g)(1)

Thus, the only relevant circumstance for present purposes is Pádilla’s status as a convicted felon at the time he possessed a firearm. The state court’s later order, nunc pro tunc or not, has no effect on that status.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a Connecticut conviction based on an Alford plea as a qualifying felony predicate if it was on the record when the person possessed the firearm.

Burrell v. United States · filed 2004-09-14(g)(1)

We affirm the district court’s conclusion that a Connecticut judgment pursuant to an Alford plea can qualify as a predicate felony conviction for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats an outstanding state felony conviction as a predicate even if its constitutional validity is challenged or state law would bar its use in a later state prosecution.

United States v. Marks · filed 2004-08-23(g)(1)

The focus of the inquiry under §§ 921(a)(20) and 922(g)(1) is whether someone has been convicted of a felony under state law, not whether that conviction is constitutionally valid, nor whether it may be used as a predicate conviction for subsequent state prosecutions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior offense punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.

United States v. Tankersley · filed 2004-07-13(g)(1)

The statute does not require that the defendant must have actually served the one year in prison. All it requires is that the offense be punishable by incarceration for over one year.

A military conviction can satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s prior-conviction requirement.

United States v. Copeland · filed 2004-06-24(g)(1)

Further, military convictions are “convictions” within the meaning of Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) makes a prior felony conviction an element of the felon-in-possession offense.

United States v. Hall, Dennis · filed 2004-06-14(g)(1)

In such prosecutions, mentioning the defendant’s previous conviction to the jury can hardly be considered ‘‘gratuitous’’; the conviction is an element of the offense, as the district court instructed the jury in this case.

A Virginia juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Christopher Walters, United States of America v. Deon Montieal Crudup, United States of America v. Dean · filed 2004-02-20(g)(1)

Consequently, a juvenile adjudication cannot be the underlying conviction which subjects a person to penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to have been convicted of a felony when he possesses the firearm.

United States v. Hall · filed 2004-02-12(g)(1)

When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could have found that at the time Hall possessed the firearm, at 7:30 p.m., on May 1, 2002, he already had been convicted of a felony offense.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the defendant’s felon status when charged with unlawful firearm possession, even if the predicate conviction is later vacated.

United States v. Wallace, Willie T. · filed 2002-02-11(g)(1)

These cases reinforce the straightforward principle that the only relevant question is the defendant’s status at the time he was charged with unlawfully possess- ing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to decide whether the defendant has a prior felony conviction.

Beamon v. United States · filed 2002-02-07(g)(1)

The prior felony conviction is an element of the crime which must be submitted to the jury.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Almaraz · filed 2002-01-31(g)(1)

Moreover, the fact that Almaraz had a prior felony conviction was an essential element of the section 922(g) offense with which he was charged and which thus had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for an offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Finley · filed 2001-12-21(g)(1)

Finley also claims that the government failed to present sufficient facts to prove that he had been convicted previously of an offense punishable by a term exceeding one year, which is an element of the offense. ... We hold that there was no clear error that affected Finley’s substantial rights.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element can be proved by an original conviction order even when the order was later amended to reflect earned probation.

United States v. Longino · filed 2001-11-02(g)(1)

That testimony did not negate the value of the original order as evidence that Longino had been convicted of a felony offense.

A felony conviction punishable by more than one year can satisfy § 922(g)(1) even if it occurred fifteen years before the firearm offense.

United States v. Reynolds · filed 2001-04-19(g)(1)

The Government correctly argues that defendant’s fifteen year-old conviction, punishable by an indeterminate term of custody between one and three years satisfies 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(4).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a predicate felony conviction is in effect at the time of firearm possession, even if that conviction is later vacated.

United States v. Snyder · filed 2000-12-21(g)(1)

Therefore, under Lewis, Snyder's belated success in vacating his 1992 stalking conviction bears no relevance to his conviction under § 922(g)(1).

A defendant who stipulates to the prior conviction and interstate commerce elements of § 922(g)(1) waives the right to challenge the lack of evidence on those elements, even if the stipulations are not read to the jury.

United States v. Harrison, Davon M. · filed 2000-02-22(g)(1)

We conclude that defendant's stipulation to the interstate commerce and prior conviction elements of a s 922(g) charge waived his right to contest the government's failure to intro- duce any evidence on those stipulations, including a failure to read those stipulations to the jury.

Section 922(g)(1) uses whether an offense is punishable by more than one year in prison to determine whether it qualifies, regardless of the state's classification of the crime.

In re: Jackson v. · filed 1999-12-30(g)(1)

In fact, the statute itself defines a qualifying offense as one “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). South Carolina’s classification statute is irrelevant to Jackson’s federal conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) treats an Illinois first-offender guilty plea as a qualifying conviction while probation is pending; a later dismissal does not undo firearm possession during that period.

United States v. Lloyd · filed 1999-07-19(g)(1)

This, however, does not undermine our holding that for purposes of § 922(g)(1), Lloyd had been convicted, because, as we have already observed, § 570/410 recognizes that in some situations a defendant’s guilty plea is considered a conviction, while in others it is not.

A defendant's stipulation to prior felony status relieves the government of presenting evidence of that element of a felon-in-possession charge, including the stipulation itself.

United States v. Hardin · filed 1998-04-20(g)(1)

We hold, however, that Hardin waived his right to have the government produce evidence of his felon status, including the stipulation itself.

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit a defendant to defeat a felon-in-possession conviction by collaterally attacking a prior counseled felony guilty plea on Boykin grounds.

United States v. Elliott · filed 1998-04-17(g)(1)

In challenging Ms convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Elliott contends he has no valid underlying felony conviction for the purposes of § 922(g)(1). Elliott argues his counseled guilty plea to an earlier Arkansas felony charge is constitutionally infirm because the trial judge failed to comply with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The holdings of the United States Supreme Court, however, foreclose Elliott’s collateral attack on Ms earlier plea-based conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when the prior crime was punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the person served no prison time.

United States v. Scarberry · filed 1998-03-19(g)(1)

Thus, to fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1), the conviction need only make the person eligible for incarceration in excess of one year. There is no requirement in the statute, either express or implied, that the person actually serve a term in excess of one year.

An accepted guilty plea counts as a prior conviction under § 922(g)(1) even before sentencing.

United States v. Sample · filed 1998-02-12(g)(1)

We find, however, that Mr. Sample&s guilty plea, which was accepted by the district court, constitutes a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

A stipulation to prior felony status needs a clarifying instruction to satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s predicate-conviction element.

United States v. Daniel · filed 1998-01-22(g)(1)

We acknowledge that the stipulation offered by Defendant was insufficient without more. An instruction would have been necessary to clarify that Defendant’s stipulation satisfied the predicate offense element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats an accepted guilty plea as a prior conviction when the plea precedes the firearm offense, even if final judgment comes later.

United States v. Kahoe · filed 1998-01-15(g)(1)

We thus find that Kahoe's prior guilty plea, which was entered and accepted before his commission of the instant offense, constituted a prior conviction for purposes of § 922(g).

A state offense classified as a misdemeanor and punishable by no more than two years in prison cannot serve as a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Payne · filed 1998-01-20(g)(1)

The term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” does not include “any State offense classified by the laws of the state as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” ... Therefore, that conviction could not serve as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

For a § 922(g)(1) charge, admitting evidence of the nature of prior felonies after the defendant offers to stipulate to felon status is subject to harmless-error review.

United States v. Cunningham · filed 1998-01-13(g)(1)

Old Chief held that a district court abuses its discretion when it rejects a defendant’s offer to stipulate his status as a felon under a Section 922(g)(1) offense and instead admits the full record of a prior judgment of conviction, if evidence concerning the name or nature of the prior conviction increases the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations. ... The issue we must decide, therefore, is whether the error was harmless. ... It is our opinion that the Old Chief error was harmless.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior state felony punishable by more than one year in prison as a qualifying predicate offense.

Yanovitch v. United States · filed 1997-12-29(g)(1)

Therefore, this Court concludes that Yanovitch’s July 18,1992 conviction for possession of a firearm was a felony in Massachusetts and that it qualifies as “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for the purposes of serving as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1).

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, refusing a stipulation to felony status is an abuse of discretion when the unfair prejudice from naming the prior offense substantially outweighs the details’ probative value, unless the conviction is admissible for another purpose.

United States v. Crawford · filed 1997-12-17(g)(1)

When the defendant in a § 922(g)(1) case offers to stipulate to his status as a felon, “evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries the risk of unfair prejudice.” Old Chief, 117 S.Ct. at 652. Where such a risk substantially outweighs the probative value of the details of the prior conviction, it is an abuse of discretion not to accept an admission in a stipulation.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, admitting evidence of a prior felony despite the defendant’s offer to stipulate to felon status can be harmless error.

United States v. Paul W. Moore, Ii, Also Known as Antoine Petroye Roberts · filed 1997-12-16(g)(1)

We conclude that Moore is not entitled to relief because any error in refusing to accept Moore’s stipulation was harmless given the substantial evidence of Moore’s guilt.

A prior felony burglary conviction can serve as the predicate felony for a § 922(g)(1) firearm-possession conviction.

United States v. Jaramillo · filed 1997-11-14(g)(1)

The 1973 conviction did not factor into the determination of the appellant’s sentence. Rather, that conviction appropriately served as the predicate felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), providing the factual support for the defendant’s plea of guilty.

A Florida nolo contendere plea without an adjudication of guilt is not a predicate felony conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Willis · filed 1997-02-28(g)(1)

Thus, a nolo contendere plea is not a conviction under Florida law. Because Willis had not been "convicted" of a felony under Florida law, section 922(g)(1) is inapplicable, and the district court erred by refusing to dismiss count two of Willis's indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a federal guilty plea accepted and adjudicated before sentencing as a prior conviction for its ban on firearm possession by convicted felons.

United States v. Kahoe · filed 1995-11-01(g)(1)

For the reasons that follow, this Court holds that Defendant Joseph Osborne Kahoe’s plea of guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), given in and accepted by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, prior to sentencing, constitutes a federal conviction supporting a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) looks to whether a prior conviction was punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of the sentence actually served.

United States v. Hale · filed 1995-10-30(g)(1)

The relevant period of time for our purposes is the length of sentence that could be imposed, and not the one year that Hale was actually imprisoned. The instant federal statute refers to underlying convictions "punishable " by imprisonment longer than one year, and not to convictions punished by such imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a prior felony to serve as a predicate when the defendant remains ineligible to possess firearms under state law.

United States v. Lonnie L. Martin · filed 1995-10-06(g)(1)

Martin was thus ineligible to possess firearms under Missouri law and we therefore find the evidence sufficient to support his convictions. For the same reason, the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury on the elements of the offenses with which Martin was charged.

Section 922(g) treats a guilty jury verdict as a conviction even before the court enters a formal judgment.

United States v. Faison · filed 1995-08-11(g)

We conclude that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for the purposes of section 922(g) whether or not the court enters a formal judgment adjudicating the defendant guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to disprove the expungement exception when the defendant offers no evidence that the prior conviction was expunged.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1995-07-07(g)(1)

The indictment put Jackson on notice that the 1972 Texas felony assault conviction would be used as the prior conviction element of the § 922(g)(1) charge against him. He did not proffer any evidence to bring that conviction within the expungement exception of § 921(a)(20). Accordingly, the government had no obligation to prove that that exception was inapplicable.

A prior conviction under § 922(g) and a pending indictment under § 922(n) are offense elements that must be presented to the jury.

United States v. Charles W. Cannon, A/K/A Karriem W. Muhammed · filed 1995-06-14(g), (n)

Hence, the prior conviction and pending indictment both constituted elements of the offenses appellant was charged with committing. See 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(g) & 922(n).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to decide whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a qualifying prior felony conviction when he possessed the firearm, even if he stipulated to the conviction.

United States v. Milton · filed 1995-04-19(g)(1)

We, therefore, hold that, in a felon-in possession case such as this, the district court must instruct the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant possessed the firearm he had a qualifying previous felony conviction, that is a prior conviction for an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior conviction element remains for the jury to consider when the defendant offers to concede that element and the government objects.

United States v. Gilliam · filed 1993-06-02(g)(1)

Here, Gilliam offered to stipulate not just to the fact of the prior conviction, but the prior conviction element of the crime. Where there was an objection by the government, the district court was correct to reject this proposed stipulation, instead utilizing a strongly worded and quite proper curative instruction to prevent the jury from speculating on the nature of Gilliam's prior conviction.

A stipulation to a qualifying prior conviction satisfies § 922(g)(1)’s prior-conviction element and relieves the government of proving that the defendant’s civil rights and right to possess a firearm were not restored.

United States v. Clark · filed 1993-05-13(g)(1)

Clark’s argument fails to recognize that the lack of a restoration of civil rights and the right to possess a firearm is not an element of the offense stated in § 922(g). It is simply a component of the definition of the element that-the accused have “been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.” In this case proof of the entire element was waived by stipulation, relieving the government of its burden.

Section 922(g)(1) covers convictions by general courts-martial for crimes punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. MacDonald · filed 1993-05-05(g)(1)

We hold that a general, court-martial is a “court” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and a conviction, such as MacDonald’s, for which an individual is punishable for a term exceeding one year, amounts to a “crime” for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant had been convicted of a felony before the charged firearm possession.

United States v. Brokaw · filed 1993-03-11(g)(1)

We agree with the district court that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The district court based its finding of sufficient evidence not only on the joint stipulation, but also on the indictment and the presen-tence investigation report, each of which contained the dates of appellant’s prior convictions and established that at the time of the charged offense appellant had been convicted of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element may be proved beyond a reasonable doubt through corroborated admissions and a conviction judgment.

United States v. Dockins · filed 1993-03-12(g)(1)

Without considering Exhibit 5a, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dockins had a prior felony conviction.

A court may deny a request to present the firearm possession and prior felony elements of a § 922(g)(1) charge separately to the jury.

United States v. Birdsong · filed 1993-02-04(g)(1)

We specifically adopt the reasoning of the First Circuit in Collamore and hold that the District Court did not err by failing to grant the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial on the elements of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a state misdemeanor punishable by more than two years of imprisonment as a qualifying prior conviction when the person lost no civil rights that could later be restored.

United States v. Nazzaro · filed 1993-01-28(g)(1)

Bound as we are by prior panel decisions so closely on point, Fournier v. Best Western Treasure Island Resort, 962 F.2d 126, 127 (1st. Cir. 1992), we find, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), that appellant's prior misdemeanors are "crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."

For a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g), the Government must prove a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Garey · filed 1993-01-25(g)

Section 922(g) requires the Government to prove that the Defendant has been convicted of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior conviction for an offense punishable by more than one year of incarceration.

United States v. Grundy · filed 1993-02-03(g)(1)

Although the reference to Grundy's prior conviction for "armed robbery" was inaccurate, it is apparent, from the context, that this reference was directed, not toward the §§ 2113(a) or (d) charges, or toward the § 924(c) charge, but toward the felon-in-possession charge, which requires, as an element of the offense, proof of a prior conviction of an offense punishable by more than one year's incarceration.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element may be omitted from jury instructions when the defendant stipulates to it and the risk of prejudice far outweighs its probative value.

United States v. Orena · filed 1992-12-10(g)(1)

For reasons of both sound statutory interpretation and constitutional policy, a defendant who is willing to stipulate to the felony-conviction element of the crime is, in circumstances where prejudice far outweighs probative value, entitled to an instruction that ensures that the jury will not learn of his criminal record.

Section 922(g) does not let a defendant with multiple prior convictions choose which felony the government uses to establish his prior conviction.

United States v. St. Martin · filed 1992-12-04(g)

Nothing in § 922(g) indicates that a defendant with multiple prior convictions may dictate which felony the government must use to establish his or her prior conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a district court to admit evidence of more than one prior felony conviction when the defendant refuses to stipulate to being a convicted felon.

United States v. Lloyd · filed 1992-12-15(g)(1)

We hold a district court may, in its discretion, allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of more than one felony conviction if the defendant refuses to stipulate.

A prior felony conviction for a § 922(g)(1) charge can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt through corroborated admissions and other evidence.

U.S. v. Dockins · filed 1993-03-10(g)(1)

Dockins argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted ... felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and knowingly making false statements during the purchase of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). ... Without considering Exhibit 5a, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dockins had a prior felony conviction.

A stipulation that a prior felony falls within § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20) can establish both the prior conviction and that the defendant’s civil rights were not restored.

United States v. Reedy · filed 1993-04-05(g)(1)

Instead, the government justifiably relied on the stipulation not only as proof that Reedy had been convicted of a prior felony, but also as proof of the Essick element: that Reedy’s civil rights had not been restored for that felony.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the government may introduce more than one prior felony conviction at trial.

United States v. Tyler · filed 1993-04-13(g)(1)

In United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990), this court permitted the introduction of six previous felony convictions against a defendant charged with violating § 922(g). ... Given this circuit's holding in Ford, as well as the fact that defendant cites no relevant case law in support of his position, we affirm the district court's admission of two prior convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of one prior felony conviction, though the government may present evidence of multiple convictions.

United States v. Washington · filed 1993-06-15(g)(1)

One element of § 922(g)(1) requires the government to establish that the defendant is a previously convicted felon. To prove this element, the government may put forth evidence of multiple felony convictions even though proof of one is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction; a Missouri guilty plea followed by a suspended imposition of sentence does not satisfy that requirement.

United States v. Solomon · filed 1993-07-20(g)(1)

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the indictment is DISMISSED for the reasons set out in the United States Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. ... Therefore, under the stipulated facts, in the application of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), the government cannot prove the first essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), i.e. that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony, see page 1222 above, and the indictment should be dismissed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of one prior felony conviction, but the government may prove multiple convictions when felon status is at issue.

United States v. Leonard Carter, Jr. · filed 1993-09-27(g)(1)

This argument fails. When “felon” status is at issue, “it is not error to allow the government to prove multiple convictions even though proof of only one conviction is required.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, but the government need not prove that the defendant committed a specific felony named in the indictment.

United States v. Edward Lopez, Jr., AKA Edward Junior-Lopez · filed 1993-10-06(g)(1)

Although the government is required to prove that the defendant has been convicted of a felony, it is not required to prove that he has been convicted of a specific felony.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the jury to find one prior felony conviction to establish the prior conviction element of felon in possession.

United States v. Breitkreutz · filed 1993-10-29(g)(1)

The jury had to find only one felony to satisfy section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a qualifying prior conviction, but evidence about the nature of that crime is inadmissible unless its additional relevance survives Rule 403 balancing.

United States v. Tavares · filed 1994-04-12(g)(1)

We therefore do not announce a per se rule of exclusion. Even in such unusual circumstances, however, evidence beyond the fact of the prior conviction is inadmissible absent adequate trial court findings that its noncumulative relevance is sufficiently compelling to survive the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to allege multiple prior felonies as predicates for a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Grant Goddard, Jr. · filed 1994-05-11(g)(1)

Goddard argues the district court further erred by allowing the government to allege that he had committed five prior felonies that could serve as predicates for his felon-in-possession charge. ... We decline to do so and, instead, reaffirm our well-settled law on the matter.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a qualifying prior conviction, but the type of offense is irrelevant to establishing that element; absent special circumstances, the government may not introduce it when the defendant offers to stipulate to a qualifying conviction.

United States v. Melvin · filed 1994-04-22(g)(1)

Tavares compels us to find that the court abused its discretion when it permitted the Government to reject the defendants’ proffered generic stipulation, and instead introduce a stipulation which ... specified the nature of each defendant’s prior felony.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felony conviction that predates the statute to serve as the predicate for firearm possession after the statute took effect.

United States v. Richard Alan Brady, Frank Pontillo, Also Known as Franky Steel, Robert Montano, Michael Dematteo and Jo · filed 1994-05-13(g)(1)

Therefore, the Ex Post Facto clause was not violated by the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of § 922(g).

For a § 922(g) charge, the government may prove a prior conviction with a judgment bearing the accused’s name if the judgment is admitted without objection.

United States v. Frank v. Okiyama · filed 1994-05-19(g)

Finally, we must decline Okiyama's invitation to overrule our decision in Pasterchik v. United States, 400 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969), which provides that the government may establish proof of a prior conviction by admission without objection of a judgment bearing the same name as that of the accused.

A defendant who claims a prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate under § 922(g)(1) must challenge its admissibility with specificity.

United States v. Grove Lawrence Flower · filed 1994-07-07(g)(1)

Thus, if a defendant believes that one of the prior convictions that the government seeks to use as a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not meet the legal definitional requirements of § 921(a)(20), it will be up to the defendant to challenge the admissibility of such conviction. Any such challenge must be made with specificity.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction when the defendant does not stipulate to it, but the nature of that conviction is not an element of the offense.

United States v. Button Jack Rhodes · filed 1994-08-17(g)(1)

The nature of the conviction is not an element of Section 922(g)(1). See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) (requiring only a conviction without specifying type); Poore, 594 F.2d at 41 (decided under prior version of statute). However, when a defendant does not stipulate the fact of his prior conviction, the Government must prove it because it is an element of the offense.

A stipulation to a prior felony conviction can satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s requirement of a prior crime punishable by more than one year.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 1994-09-21(g)(1)

The defense and the court clearly intended “felony” to mean a “crime punishable by more than one year.” Consequently, we hold Hernandez’s stipulation to a prior felony was sufficient evidence to fulfill that element of § 922(g)(1).

Under § 922(g), a stipulation to a prior felony does not remove the status element from the jury’s consideration, but details of the predicate offense add no probative value to that element.

United States v. Palmer · filed 1994-10-27(g)

After a stipulation of the fact of a predicate conviction for the felon in possession of a firearm offense, the legal question of status is still a relevant issue; however, the predicate crime is significant only to demonstrate status, and the issue of status does not depend upon the probative value of the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior-felony element can be proved by testimony from an officer who witnessed the defendant plead guilty and be convicted of a felony.

United States v. Rudolph · filed 1994-10-27(g)(1)

In addition, Whitty testified that he was present in court when, as a result of that investigation, Rudolph pled guilty and was convicted of felony possession of less than twenty-five grams of heroin. We believe that this testimony constitutes ample evidence for the jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Rudolph had been previously convicted of a felony. Consequently, Rudolph's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm does not amount to plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, so an indictment may identify the particular felony.

United States v. Ailsworth · filed 1994-11-18(g)(1)

In other cases in which a defendant has been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), this court has not stricken such references. As the government notes, proof that the defendant has been convicted of a felony is a necessary element of the government’s case.

Section 922(g)(1) can support a conviction when the defendant's prior felonies were valid at the time he possessed firearms, even if some were later set aside.

Woody v. United States · filed 1994-12-21(g)(1)

At the time Woody was arrested for possession of firearms, all four of his prior felonies were still valid. Thus, even the two convictions that he subsequently had set aside are sufficient to uphold his conviction.

Section 922(g) requires the defendant's prior felony conviction to be presented to the jury; an offer to stipulate does not let the defendant keep that fact from the jury.

United States v. Henderson · filed 1995-03-21(g)

Similarly, we have consistently held that the government cannot be required to accept a defendant's offer to stipulate an element of the charged offense and is entitled to prove every element of the crime. ... In this case, defendant's offer was not merely to stipulate as to his status as a convicted felon; he wanted to keep the fact of his prior conviction from the jury all together. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Tavares. Accordingly, defendant's argument relating to his offered "stipulation" is meritless.

Section 922(g)(1) places no age limit on felony convictions used to support a felon in possession charge.

United States v. Terry Hudson (93-5955) and Randal McPherson (93-5956) · filed 1995-06-27(g)(1)

In contrast to the ten-year rule of Fed. R. Ev. 609(b), the felon in possession of a firearm statute, Sec. 922(g), places no age limit on the felonies which may be used to support a felon in possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, but does not require proof of the nature of that crime.

United States v. Jones · filed 1995-10-10(g)(1)

Second, the government did not need to establish the nature of Jones’ prior felony to meet its burden of proof. The prosecutor erroneously informed the district court that the government was required under § 922(g) to prove the nature of the prior felony that formed the predicate for count six of the indictment. The statute requires only that the government prove that the defendant “has been convicted ... of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s prior felony element can be proved by a stipulation limited to the existence of the conviction.

United States v. Burnett · filed 1995-12-26(g)(1)

It thus met Gilliam 's requirement that the proof offered on the prior felony conviction element of Section 922(g)(1) be limited to the existence of the conviction itself.

In a § 922(g) prosecution, the government may prove prior felony convictions even when the defendant offers to stipulate to felony status.

United States v. Hofmann · filed 1996-04-04(g)

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it gave Hofmann the choice of stipulating to his prior felonies, or allowing the government to prove them.

Section 922(g)(1) applies only when the defendant has a qualifying felony conviction; Section 921(a)(20)(B) determines whether a conviction qualifies.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Hirsch HORODNER, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-08-05(g)(1)

Section 921(a)(20)(B) does not make section 922(g)(1) inapplicable to some defendants; it makes some felony convictions not cognizable for purposes of section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, but the government need not prove the nature of that felony.

United States v. Myles · filed 1996-09-27(g)(1)

In contrast, a failure to identify the predicate felony does not prejudice the Government because section 922(g)(1) does not require it to establish the nature of a defendant's prior felony in order to meet its burden of proof.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a prior felony conviction when charging a felon with possession of a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Henry · filed 1996-09-30(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) criminalizes possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon. To make its ease, it is incumbent on the Government to prove that Defendant had a prior felony conviction. Under these circumstances, the Government must introduce evidence showing Defendant’s prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person convicted of mail fraud because mail fraud does not qualify for the exception for offenses relating to the regulation of business.

Dreher v. United States, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms · filed 1996-09-30(g)(1)

The Gun Control Act applies to anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Therefore, this Court finds that the Gun Control Act applies to Dreher as a convicted felon, and that the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, but the government need not prove the nature of that felony.

United States v. Hough · filed 1996-10-24(g)(1)

The prior conviction is an essential element of the crime and, as such, the Government has the duty and right to prove it. Of course, it would not be necessary or proper for the Government to prove the nature of the prior felony.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to prove the felonies alleged in a felon-in-possession prosecution without accepting the defendant's stipulation.

United States v. Daniel · filed 1996-12-10(g)(1)

It is settled law in this circuit that the government is entitled to prove the felonies it has alleged in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution and is not required to accept the defendant's stipulation.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prior conviction element is satisfied by prior robbery convictions.

United States v. Cornish · filed 1997-01-03(g)(1)

Here, there is no doubt that Cornish was convicted of robbery on three prior occasions. These satisfy the prior conviction element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior-conviction element requires a qualifying conviction; the name or nature of the prior offense does not matter beyond whether it qualifies.

Old Chief v. United States · filed 1997-01-07(g)(1)

Congress, however, has made it plain that distinctions among generic felonies do not count for this purpose; the fact of the qualifying conviction is alone what matters under the statute.

When a defendant offers to stipulate to prior felony status under § 922(g)(1), admitting conviction records to prove that status is an abuse of discretion if the records add no evidentiary value and pose a substantial risk of unfair prejudice.

United States v. Blake · filed 1997-02-26(g)(1)

The Court finds that the evidentiary value of the official record offered to show Blake’s prior felony convictions was not cognizably different than that of an admission, and according to Old Chief as Blake had offered to stipulate to his status as a felon, admitting the record of conviction into evidence was an abuse of discretion.

Refusing a defendant’s offer to stipulate to the prior-conviction element of a felon-in-possession offense can be harmless error when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the jury is instructed against using prior convictions as evidence of criminal propensity.

Redding v. United States · filed 1997-02-03(g)(1)

Nevertheless, we conclude that Redding is not entitled to relief because any error in refusing to accept Redding’s stipulation was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the District Court's jury instruction not to consider the prior convictions as evidence of a general tendency to commit crimes.

A certified copy of a conviction is sufficient to prove a prior felony conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. John L. Carraway, John H. Bond · filed 1997-03-05(g)(1)

But that argument is foreclosed by ample precedent finding certified copies of convictions to be sufficient for purposes of section 922(g)(1) and similar statutes.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a court abuses its discretion by admitting prejudicial evidence about the nature of a prior felony when the defendant offers to stipulate to the prior-conviction element.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Robert HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-03-31(g)(1)

Because the defendant offered to stipulate to the existence of the second element of § 922(g), the district court abused its discretion when it rejected the stipulation and admitted evidence of the nature of Hernandez’ prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) looks to the maximum possible sentence for a prior conviction, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.

United States v. Arnold · filed 1997-05-12(g)(1)

Appellant attempts to rewrite 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by converting the word “punishable” into “punished.” What matters is not the actual sentence which the appellant received, but the maximum possible sentence.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after its effective date even when the domestic violence misdemeanor conviction occurred earlier.

National Ass'n of Government Employees, Inc. v. Barrett · filed 1997-07-02(g)(9)

Finding defendants’ argument and the Brady opinion persuasive, the court holds that because § 922(g)(9) does not criminalize conduct that occurred prior to its effective date, it is not retrospective and thus not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s reference to a conviction in any court includes convictions by a general court-martial.

United States v. Martinez · filed 1997-08-20(g)(1)

Looking to section 922(g)(1), we find nothing that defines or limits the term "court," only a requirement that a conviction have been "in any court" in the course of prohibiting possession of firearms by a felon. Certainly "any court" includes a military court, the adjective "any" expanding the term "court" to include "one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind"; "one that is selected without restriction or limitation of choice"; or "all."

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior felony element is sufficiently established by a felony conviction on a counseled guilty plea resulting in a three-year sentence.

United States v. Cardell Larry, Also Known as Larry Cardell · filed 1997-11-24(g)(1)

The evidence was also sufficient to establish Larry’s underlying felony conviction. The record shows Larry was convicted of a Georgia felony on a counseled plea of guilty and sentenced to three years’ confinement.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a stipulation that the defendant had “one or more felony offenses” is not unfairly prejudicial when it avoids misleading the jury about his criminal history.

United States v. Einfeldt · filed 1998-03-06(g)(1)

Before trial, Einfeldt offered to stipulate that he is a convicted felon for purposes of § 922(g)(1). ... The district court agreed to order the government to stipulate, provided the stipulation said that Einfeldt had been convicted of “one or more felony offenses” to avoid misleading the jury into believing he had only one prior conviction. ... The touchstone of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is unfair prejudice, and there was nothing unfair about the court’s form of stipulation.

When a prior conviction is offered only to prove § 922(g)(1)’s felony element, a court abuses its discretion by rejecting a stipulation and admitting the conviction record if the similar offense creates a risk of unfair prejudice.

United States v. Climmie Jones, Jr. · filed 1998-11-06(g)(1)

As Jones’s prior conviction was for a drug offense similar’ to those charged in the underlying action, and the purpose of its introduction was only to prove the prior-conviction element of § 922(g)(1), the district court clearly abused its discretion in rejecting Jones’s offer of stipulation.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Labor · filed 1998-12-04(g)(1)

What constitutes a “conviction” for the purposes of this statute is determined in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which the underlying proceedings were held. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B) (Para.2). ... The record shows that the Defendant pled guilty to one felony violation of Vt.Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 4230(a) and one felony violation of Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 13 § 1404, each of which carried a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year. Therefore, having pled guilty, he has been convicted within the meaning of the statute.