18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(9) still applies when a person’s civil rights were never taken away, because rights never lost cannot be restored.

United States v. Liefert · filed 2001-07-30(g)(9)

It is settled in this circuit that both events must have occurred if Liefert is to be removed from the reach of § 922. That is to say, if his rights were not taken away in the first place, they could not have been restored, and Liefert remained subject to § 922.

Section 922(g)(1) cannot use a set-aside felony as a predicate conviction when the discharge does not expressly prohibit firearm possession.

United States v. Laskie · filed 2001-08-06(g)(1)

Because that discharge does not expressly prohibit Defendant from possessing firearms, the prior felony may not serve as a predicate conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not count a state felony conviction after the state restores the person’s civil rights and any waiting period for firearm possession expires.

United States v. Osborne · filed 2001-08-21(g)(1)

Once that waiting period expires, the relevant state conviction ceases to count for purposes of sections 921(a)(20) and 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person who completed probation for a Texas felony when Texas law still restricts that person’s right to possess firearms.

United States v. Daugherty · filed 2001-08-28(g)(1)

Accordingly, Texas statutory law activated the “unless clause” in § 921(a)(20) and prevents Daugherty from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g) permits prosecution of a felon whose right to possess a firearm has not been restored under state law.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2001-09-20(g)

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly denied Jackson’s motion to dismiss the § 922(g) charge because his civil rights had not been restored to him. ... Nevertheless, Jackson’s argument is unavailing because he has not shown that his right to possess a firearm has been restored under state law.

Section 922(g)(1) does not count a prior felony conviction after the defendant’s civil rights have been restored, unless the restoration expressly restricts firearm rights.

United States v. Moes · filed 2001-10-26(g)(1)

A prior felony conviction under § 922(g) does not include a conviction for which the defendant’s civil rights have been restored, unless the restoration of civil rights expressly provides that he may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) can apply to a convicted felon despite a claim that Michigan law restored his civil rights.

United States v. Green · filed 2002-02-21(g)(1)

Defendant maintains that his civil rights had been restored by operation of Michigan law at the time the federal indictment was returned and, therefore, section 922(g) did not apply to him. ... Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed upon the reasoning employed by that court in its Opinion and Order filed June 14, 2001, and upon the authority of United States v. Ormsby.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person whose civil rights were restored after a Michigan felony while Michigan’s firearm restriction remains in effect.

Melton v. Hemingway · filed 2002-05-17(g)(1)

Because Melton possessed a firearm in November and December 1995, prior to the expiration of his five-year firearm restriction, he was subject to prosecution under § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(9) does not bar a Michigan domestic violence misdemeanant from possessing a firearm after successful completion of a probationary sentence.

United States v. Wegrzyn · filed 2002-10-03(g)(9)

As a result, in light of Congress’s deference to states’, treatment of the disabilities associated with criminal convictions, and Michigan’s own stripping of the right to vote from convicted misdemeanants, we are — reluctantly—forced to conclude that, upon successful completion of his probationary sentence, Ronald Wegrzyn is no longer considered ineligible to possess a firearm under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. ... § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm prohibition does not apply when a domestic violence misdemeanant’s lost civil rights have been restored.

United States v. Brown · filed 2002-10-31(g)(9)

Thus, the court concludes that Mr. Brown endured the loss of his right to serve on a jury during the course of his sentence, and regained that right upon its expiration. Consequently, he qualifies as a person whose civil rights have been restored, and is not subject to the disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g) applies to a felon whose civil rights have been restored when state law still restricts where the felon may possess a firearm.

United States v. Farmer · filed 2002-11-04(g)

This restriction, similar to that at issue in Caron, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) makes firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year unlawful, subject to the statutory rules on restoration of civil rights.

United States v. Neely · filed 2003-04-30(g)(1)

The lack of restoration of civil rights is not an element of the offense stated in § 922(g), but is a component of the element under § 922(g) that the accused was convicted in any court of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison. ... Thus, in every § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the court must determine whether the jurisdiction in which the predicate conviction occurred restores felons’ civil rights.

A felony remains a predicate conviction under § 922(g) when state law still bars firearm possession, even if a discharge certificate restores civil rights without an express firearm restriction.

Hood v. United States · filed 2003-09-11(g)

In short, following the precedent of this Circuit, Hood's 1986 conviction does constitute a conviction for purposes of the § 922(g) charge.

A restored felon's prior conviction still counts under § 922(g) if state law expressly restricts the felon's firearm rights.

United States v. Fredell · filed 2003-10-28(g)

Because Fredell was convicted of multiple felonies in Kentucky from 1981 to 1986, the restoration of his civil rights does not preclude Fredell from being charged with and convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2).

Relief from a Pennsylvania firearms disability under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(d) does not remove a federal firearms disability under § 922(g).

Pennsylvania State Police v. Paulshock · filed 2003-11-20(g)

Disability also arose pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Federal Act), 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922. The underlying issue in this appeal is whether the order in each of the two consolidated cases was sufficient to relieve firearm disability under the Federal Act. For the reasons set forth below, we find that such orders could not relieve the federal firearms disability, and therefore, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm when his civil rights have not been restored, even if state law permits possession at home.

United States v. Harris · filed 2004-06-01(g)(1)

However, because the statute does not confer an unrestricted right to possess firearms, and because ... Harris’ civil rights had not been restored at the time of his offense (and, apparently, still have not been restored), Harris is prohibited, under federal law, from firearms ownership.

Section 922(g)(1) cannot use a prior conviction as a predicate felony if the defendant's civil rights for that conviction have been restored.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2004-08-24(g)(1)

A previous conviction cannot serve as a predicate felony for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) if a defendant has had his civil rights restored as to the conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing any gun when restored civil rights still leave state restrictions on firearm possession, even if state law permits possession of the particular gun.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2004-09-27(g)(1)

While 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000) prevents federal prosecution for felon in possession of a firearm where the defendant has had his civil rights restored on the predicate felony, where, as here, the defendant was restricted by his felon status under state law from possessing firearms outside his home or busi- ness, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits him from possessing any guns, even those permitted under state law.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence if the person’s civil rights had not been restored at the time of possession; a later restoration does not undo the offense.

United States v. Kirchoff · filed 2004-10-20(g)(9)

At the time Kirchoff committed the 2002 federal firearms offense, he had not had his civil rights restored and therefore could not lawfully possess a firearm, which is what Congress intended.

A defendant invoking the restored-civil-rights exemption from Section 922(g)(1) must show that his civil rights were restored and that state law does not bar him from possessing firearms.

United States v. Hill · filed 2005-01-06(g)(1)

For Hill to find refuge in the Section 921(a)(20) exemption to Section 922(g)(1), he must establish both that he had his civil rights restored upon the completion of his sentence, and that he was not precluded for possessing firearms under New York law. In that he has established neither, his application to dismiss Count One of the indictment upon the ground that he is not a convicted felon is denied.

Section 922(g)’s felon status requirement is satisfied when the defendant stipulates that he had a felony conviction and his rights had not been restored.

United States v. Green · filed 2005-03-16(g)

Finally, Green argues in a supplemental pro se brief that he was not a convicted felon for purposes of § 922(g) because his rights had been restored following his past convictions. However, Green and the government entered into a signed stipulation that “prior to November 15, 2002, the defendant had been convicted of a felony offense, knew that he had been convicted of a felony, had not had his conviction expunged nor his rights restored, and that the Government could prove this beyond a reasonable doubt.” ... In light of this stipulation, Green’s argument is not well taken.

A state felony remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the state has not substantially restored the person's civil rights, including the right to bear arms.

United States v. Brown · filed 2005-05-09(g)(1)

As the legislature has chosen not to restore substantially a felon's right to bear arms, Brown's state convictions were proper predicates for section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession when a felon remains prohibited from carrying concealed weapons under state law, even if other firearm rights have been restored.

United States v. Kenny · filed 2005-07-08(g)(1)

Kenny’s three prior felony convictions, although decades old, would prevent him from possessing concealed weapons under Michigan law even if he were to qualify to have his civil right to possess firearms otherwise restored. Therefore, he is, and at the time charged in the superseding indictment was, ineligible under federal law to possess a firearm.

A state felony remains a conviction for purposes of § 922(g) until the state restores the person's firearm rights.

United States v. Allen · filed 2005-11-23(g)

According to federal law, Allen’s felony is still considered a conviction for purposes of section 922(g) until Michigan restores his firearms right.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person from possessing ammunition when a prior felony conviction remains a qualifying predicate because the restoration of civil rights expressly bars firearm possession.

United States v. Wilson, Lee A. · filed 2006-02-02(g)(1)

If the pardon, expungement, or restoration of rights provides that the convicted person may not possess firearms, the convic- tion remains a qualifying predicate for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a person as convicted when the person's civil rights have been restored and state law does not expressly prohibit firearm possession.

United States v. Simpson · filed 2006-03-27(g)(1)

We conclude that because Simpson had his civil rights restored and was not classified as a convicted felon under Arizona law, he was not a felon in possession for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

A prior conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) charge when the person's civil rights were restored without a firearm restriction, even if state law imposed one later.

United States v. Marin · filed 2006-05-04(g)(1)

Following Norman, the remaining question in this case is whether Massachusetts law “expressly provided” for a restriction on Marin’s right to possess firearms at the time his civil rights were restored. ... Marin’s previous state law convictions are therefore insufficient to sustain a federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit a restored felony conviction to serve as a predicate when the certificate restoring civil rights does not expressly prohibit firearm possession.

United States v. Chenowith · filed 2006-08-08(g)(1)

Because the certificate is the source of Chenowith’s civil-rights restoration, and because it does not expressly prohibit his possessing firearms, the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment.

For a § 922(g)(1) charge, the law of the jurisdiction where the prior conviction occurred determines whether restored civil rights remove that conviction as a predicate.

United States v. Jones · filed 2007-11-05(g)(1)

Georgia law, rather than Tennessee law, determines whether Jones’s 1971 conviction constitutes a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing ammunition when state law restores civil rights but still bars firearm possession.

United States v. Crampton · filed 2007-12-19(g)(1)

Now that we know from Caron that the federal law controls what Crampton could pos- sess, it does not matter that Oregon did not criminalize Cram- pton’s possession of ammunition. Federal law does.

Section 922(g)(9) continues to apply to a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction after relief under California Penal Code section 1203.4 because that relief does not expunge the conviction for federal purposes.

Jennings v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-19(g)(9)

In the present case, as in Andrino, although Jennings obtained relief under section 1203.4 by the 1999 State court order, that relief did not expunge his conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a felon remains ineligible for jury service and therefore has not had his civil rights restored.

United States v. Hill · filed 2008-05-27(g)(1)

First, the New York State statute providing for the general restoration of defendants’ civil rights did not preclude Hill’s prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Therefore, Hill is precluded from sitting on a jury and his civil rights have not been restored for section 921(a)(20) purposes.

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply when state law restores a person’s civil rights after a prior felony conviction without retaining a firearms restriction.

United States v. Zellars · filed 2009-06-17(g)(1)

We conclude that Zellars’s 1973 conviction was not for a crime of violence and that his civil rights were restored by operation of law when he completed his sentence and received a final release. Accordingly, it was error for the district court to deny Zellars’s motion to dismiss Count I, and his conviction on Count I must be reversed.

Section 922(g)(1) counts a prior felony conviction again if state law withdraws restored firearm rights before the person’s arrest.

United States v. Hairston · filed 2010-02-04(g)(1)

As a result, these convictions were once again available for purposes of sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e).

A defendant invoking the civil-rights-restoration exception to a § 922(g)(1) charge bears the burden of raising it and coming forward with evidence; the government need not prove the exception inapplicable.

United States v. Morris · filed 2010-07-28(g)(1)

And it was Morris’s burden to do so: the government was not required to prove the inapplicability of the section 921(a)(20) exceptions.

A prior conviction can count under § 922(g)(1) when state law later revokes the person's restored right to possess firearms.

United States v. Brady · filed 2011-07-13(g)(1)

Brady has not suggested in his appellate briefs that such a stripping of a restored right to possess firearms would not effectively revive a previously negated predicate conviction for purposes of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and we conclude that the 1980s convictions were available as predicate convictions for purposes of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a defendant’s civil rights have not been restored; the defendant must raise the issue and produce evidence of restoration.

United States v. Foster · filed 2011-07-21(g)(1)

Because the civil rights restoration exception in section 921(a)(20) is not an element of the offense described in section 922(g), Foster’s indictment on that charge was sufficient without alleging that Foster’s civil rights had never been restored, and the government had no obligation to present any evidence on the topic.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction when the person never lost civil rights and cannot claim the civil-rights-restored exception.

United States v. Bridges · filed 2012-04-16(g)(9)

Under the reasoning of Logan, which we are bound to follow, see Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 773 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005), Bridges does not qualify for an exception to the firearm restriction in § 922(g)(9), and the district court properly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar firearm possession when relief from a state firearms disability does not restore the person's civil rights.

Commonwealth v. Stiver · filed 2012-05-30(g)(1)

Absent such relief, the federal firearms disability under section 922(g) still applies.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar firearm possession by a person convicted of a felony when that person's right to seek and hold public office has not been restored.

Smith v. State of Tennessee · filed 2012-07-17(g)(1)

Without the restoration of the right to seek and hold public office, an individual convicted of a felony and sentenced to a penitentiary has not had his or her full civil rights restored. The result is that the individual is prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to both Tennessee and Federal law.

Section 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, and its civil-rights-restored exception does not apply when the person never lost those rights.

United States v. Bridges · filed 2012-09-25(g)(9)

Under the reasoning of Logan, which we are bound to follow, see Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 773 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005), Bridges does not qualify for an exception to the firearm restriction in § 922(g)(9), and the district court properly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment.

A defendant invoking restoration of civil rights as a defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge must offer evidence that the restoration removes criminal liability.

United States v. Miranda · filed 2012-11-08(g)(1)

Restoration of civil rights is an affirmative defense, and Miranda offered no evidence that his civil rights had been restored in a manner that would absolve him of criminal liability under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(9) permits a firearm possession indictment when a domestic violence conviction remains a qualifying predicate because the person’s restored civil rights still restrict firearm transportation.

United States v. Sanford · filed 2012-12-06(g)(9)

Applying the Caron analysis to the “transport” prong of § 921(a)(33), we hold that Sanford’s ineligibility for a concealed weapons permit triggers the “unless clause” and permits his indictment for firearm possession in violation of § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit firearm possession after a felony conviction when only the person’s voting rights have been restored.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2012-12-11(g)(1)

Under § 922(g)(1), a person with a prior felony conviction cannot legally possess a gun, unless he has had his “civil rights restored” as provided for in § 921(a)(20). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the restoration of only Thompson’s right to vote, and any attendant rights subsumed therein, is insufficient to satisfy § 921(a)(20).

Section 922(g)'s firearm restrictions remain in force after a Louisiana pardon for a federal conviction because restoration of civil rights is governed by the law of the convicting jurisdiction.

Drake v. United States · filed 2013-08-16(g)

His complaint seeks a declaration that he nevertheless has “the right to possess, ship, receive, and own firearms,” despite being a felon. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (prohibiting felons from shipping or transporting firearms in interstate commerce and receiving firearms transported in interstate or foreign commerce). ... His putative Louisiana pardon has no bearing on the federal restrictions placed on him as a result of his federal conviction.

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm disability can be removed through relief granted under Illinois’ FOID Card Act after review of public safety and the public interest.

Coram v. The State of Illinois · filed 2013-09-12(g)(9)

Application of that standard, via section 10(c) of Illinois’ FOID Card Act, removes the federal firearm disability and entitles Coram to a FOID card. Thus construed, there is no need to address the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9).

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) may rest on a felony from another jurisdiction even when civil rights have been restored for separate convictions.

United States v. Hester · filed 2014-01-23(g)(1)

But apart from those Illinois convictions, his conviction for violating § 922(g)(1) could be predicated on his Georgia conviction, which Hester does not contest. And a restoration of civil rights in one jurisdiction has no effect on convictions from other jurisdictions.

Section 922(g)(1) treats an earlier felony as a predicate conviction when a restoration of civil rights applies only to a later, separate conviction.

United States v. Boyce · filed 2014-02-13(g)(1)

A prior felony is not a predicate offense for a § 922(g)(1) violation if the defendant “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored” unless the “restoration of civil rights expressly provides” that the person may not possess firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). ... We find no clear error in the district court’s determination that his sentences did not terminate on the same date, and, following Burnett, we affirm the denial of Boyce’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession by a person whose civil rights have been restored under § 921(a)(20).

United States v. Reese · filed 2014-05-23(g)(1)

Overturned because someone (like himself) previously convicted of a felony may lawfully possess guns if he “has had civil rights restored.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). ... So it is we reverse Mr. Reese’s conviction and remand this matter to the district court with instructions to dismiss the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) charge against him.

A defendant claiming restored civil rights against a § 922(g)(1) charge bears the burden of proving restoration by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Zuniga · filed 2014-09-11(g)(1)

Pre-Alleyne, when a defendant claimed that his civil rights were restored, it was the defendant that bore the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that his civil rights were restored. Foster, 652 F.3d at 793. Zuniga argues that placing the burden on him does not sur- vive Alleyne, but as we previously stated, since Alleyne does not apply here, he bears the burden of showing that his civil rights were restored.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a prior felony conviction when the person's civil rights have not been sufficiently restored.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2015-01-15(g)(1)

First, the parties do not dispute that Texas law had not restored to Rodriguez the right to serve on juries or hold public office; thus, section 921(a)(20) is unavailing because his civil rights were not sufficiently restored.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession when the convicting state restores the person’s right to bear arms and the person retained the other civil rights at issue.

DuPont v. Nashua Police Department · filed 2015-02-20(g)(1)

We hold that Massachusetts thereby restored the petitioner’s civil rights within the meaning of § 921(a)(20). Accordingly, § 922(g)(1) does not prohibit the petitioner from possessing firearms.

Restoring a convicted felon’s right to vote alone does not remove the person from § 922(g)’s firearm prohibition.

United States v. Horton · filed 2015-07-02(g)

It is unlawful for anyone who has previously been convicted of a felony to possess firearms or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Convicted felons whose civil rights have been restored are excluded from this restriction. Id. § 921(a)(20). ... The restoration of a convicted felon’s right to vote, alone, is not sufficient to satisfy § 921(a)(20).

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar a federal felon from possessing firearms when only one relevant civil right has been restored under federal law.

Walker v. United States · filed 2015-09-01(g)(1)

Because Walker has had at most one of the Cassidy civil rights restored under federal law for purposes of § 921(a)(20), his felony conviction is not one “for which . . . [he] has had civil rights restored,” § 921(a)(20), and so the firearms prohibition of § 922(g) still applies to him.

A later state firearm restriction does not revive a prior felony conviction as a § 922(g)(1) predicate after civil rights were restored without such a restriction.

United States v. Burleson · filed 2016-03-08(g)(1)

Because Burleson did not have a qualifying predicate conviction on his record at the time of the charged offense, it was not illegal under § 922(g) for him to possess a firearm.

A felony conviction remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the person has not regained all core civil rights, including the right to serve on a jury.

United States v. Ward · filed 2016-05-02(g)(1)

If his civil rights had been restored, the Delaware drunk driving conviction would not be a predicate offense for the federal firearms charge. Because we find that Del. Code tit. 11, § 4347(i) did not restore Ward’s civil rights, we will affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a prior felony conviction to serve as a predicate when the discharge notice does not say that civil rights have been restored.

United States v. Hancock · filed 2016-12-28(g)(1)

The rule of Buchmeier is confined to situations in which the state provides a notice of the restoration of civil rights to a former inmate. ... The district court, therefore, did not err in considering his Colorado convictions as predicate offenses for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not disqualify a person whose civil rights were lost during probation and restored upon completing the sentence.

Pournaras v. People · filed 2018-11-13(g)(1)

Whether petitioner has had his civil rights restored so as not to be barred from owning a firearm under section 922 of the Federal Gun Control Act is an issue of statutory construction. ... By virtue of completing his sentence, petitioner had his civil rights restored within the meaning of the Gun Control Act. Id. Therefore, petitioner utilized an exception to remove himself from disqualification under federal law.

For a Colorado conviction, § 922(g)(1)'s firearm prohibition does not apply when completion of probation restores the person's civil rights under Colorado law.

Pournaras v. People · filed 2019-02-04(g)(1)

Whether petitioner has had his civil rights restored so as not to be barred from owning a firearm under section 922 of the federal Gun Control Act is an issue of statutory construction. ... By virtue of completing his sentence, petitioner had his civil rights restored within the meaning of the Gun Control Act. Id. Therefore, petitioner utilized an exception to remove himself from disqualification under federal law.

A prior felony remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the defendant has not had his civil rights restored under the law of the jurisdiction where he was convicted.

United States v. Griffith · filed 2019-06-24(g)(1)

Mr. Griffith relies on Colorado law regarding restoration of civil rights, but we look to the law of the jurisdiction where he was convicted—Wyoming. ... Mr. Griffith does not suggest that his civil rights were restored under Wyoming law or that he applied for the necessary certificate. Therefore, he has not demonstrated plain error in charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to Indiana felons whose civil rights have not been restored sufficiently to remove the federal firearms prohibition.

United States v. Chappell · filed 1997-05-07(g)(1)

In McKinley, this court found that Indiana does not restore the civil rights of its felons to the extent necessary to exempt state felons from federal prosecution under § 922(g). McKinley, 23 F.3d at 183. We used federal law to arrive at that determination. Id. Beecham does not hold that state law controls in determining whether or not a state has restored civil rights sufficient to avoid federal prosecution as a felon. In Lee, we expressly rejected the opportunity to reconsider McKinley and maintained that "Indiana does not automatically restore convicted felons' rights to carry guns." Lee, 72 F.3d at 57. In his attempt to convert a jurisdictional determination into a choice of law decision, Chappell has misconstrued and overextended the relevant holding in Beecham.

Section 922(g) is not precluded by a North Carolina law allowing a convicted felon to possess a firearm at home, because that law does not restore the felon's civil rights.

United States v. McLeod · filed 2007-04-25(g)

We have rejected McLeod’s second issue. See id. at 292- 93 (holding that North Carolina state statute permitting convicted felon to possess firearm in his home did not amount to restoration of defendant’s civil rights for purposes of precluding § 922(g) violation).

Section 922(g)(9)’s firearm prohibition does not apply when an Illinois court restores a person’s firearm rights through an individualized determination that qualifies as a restoration of civil rights under federal law.

Johnson v. Department of State Police · filed 2021-02-05(g)(9)

The Gun Control Act prohibits the shipping, transport, possession, and receipt of firearms and ammunition by any person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). ... We find that (1) the right to keep and bear arms is a “civil right,” (2) Illinois has a regulatory mechanism to restore those rights through an individualized determination, and (3) relief granted under section 10 of the FOID Card Act constitutes a sufficient restoration of civil rights as intended by section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, under section 10 of the FOID Card Act, granting Johnson relief would not be contrary to federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) still covers a prior felony when the person’s civil rights were restored but state law barred firearm possession at the time of restoration.

United States v. Knapp · filed 2021-06-01(g)(1)

Section 921(a)(20) provides that “[a]ny conviction . . . for which a person . . . has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of [§ 922(g)(1)], unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” ... While Knapp’s civil rights were substantially restored when he was released from prison in 2003, Colorado law at that time prohibited all firearm possession by convicted felons. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108(1) (2002). Thus, Knapp’s right to possess a firearm was not restored by Colorado law.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession after a qualifying conviction while the person's civil rights have not been restored.

State v. Priemazon · filed 2021-06-16(g)(1)

We agree with the State that federal law, specifically, § 922(g)(1), prohibits Defendant from possessing a firearm and, therefore, that the district court abused its discretion by providing that Defendant could possess one.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession after a conviction punishable by more than one year, but restoration of firearm rights under state law can remove that federal bar.

Evans v. Cook County State's Attorney · filed 2021-09-02(g)(1)

At that point, he would no longer have a qualifying conviction prohibiting his possession of firearms under federal law, so he could be granted relief from his firearm disability in a way that was not “contrary to federal law” under section 10(c)(4).

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar firearm possession based on qualifying convictions in one state when another state restores a person’s firearm rights.

Smith v. United States · filed 2021-11-09(g)(1)

Thus, as to § 922(g)(1), Smith’s qualifying Iowa convictions still prohibit him from possessing a firearm under federal law.

A state reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor does not remove the § 922(g)(1) firearm prohibition when state law requires a further step to restore firearm rights and the person has not taken it.

United States v. Gutierrez · filed 2022-01-18(g)(1)

Gutierrez is a “prohibited person” as a matter of law, and the district court properly denied dismissal of the felon-in- possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person from possessing a firearm when a qualifying felony conviction remains unrestored in the convicting jurisdiction.

Smith v. United States · filed 2023-03-23(g)(1)

Under federal law, Smith may not possess a firearm if he is a person “convicted in any court” of a qualifying crime. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). His prior Minnesota and Iowa felony convictions both qualify. Beecham teaches that, in evaluating whether rights have been restored, we look to the “law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” 511 U.S. at 371. Lowe held that “only the convicting jurisdiction can restore civil rights.” 50 F.3d at 607. Therefore, the district court properly held that “the restoration of civil rights in Minnesota applied only to Smith’s Minnesota convictions.” As the Iowa convictions have not been restored, under federal law they continue to bar him from possessing a firearm.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the court may decide as a matter of law whether restoration of civil rights removes a prior conviction as a qualifying predicate.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2023-05-02(g)(1)

Defendant thus provides a “basis for the motion . . . [to be] determined without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Accordingly, consistent with the approach taken by courts in this Circuit in similar cases, the Court proceeds to consider whether Defendant’s civil rights were restored under section 921(a)(20) as a matter of law.

Section 922(g)(1)'s federal firearm prohibition remains enforceable after a state court restores firearm rights under state law.

Newman v. Marion County Sheriff's Office · filed 2023-10-18(g)(1)

But that relief would not protect him from federal prosecu- tion for being a felon in possession of a firearm under sec- tion 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) does not require a sentence to run consecutively to a sentence for another offense.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2005-02-04(g)

Sentences under § 922(g), by contrast, can be concurrent, which avoids any problem.

Section 922(g) defines the prohibited possession offense but contains no penalty provisions.

United States v. Alvarez · filed 1990-09-27(g)

Section 922(g), however, contains no penalty provisions.

Section 922(o)'s machine gun ban prevents private purchasers from registering previously owned auto sears after 1986.

Roe v. Dettelbach · filed 2023-01-27(o)

As applied to auto sears, the Act prevents private purchasers from buying new auto sears or registering previously owned auto sears after 1986.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of machineguns obtained through fictitious police demonstration requests and then cut up for parts.

Armament Services Intl Inc v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-01-22(o)

Turning to § 922(o), ATF identified five machineguns that ASI acquired using falsified letters requesting the firearms for police department demonstrations and then unlawfully possessed from mid-2009 until ATF seized them in 2013. ... But here the demonstrations were fictitious from the outset and the weapons were cut up and sold for parts. That possession was unlawful.

Section 922(o)’s machine gun ban applies to an individual acting as trustee of an unincorporated trust.

Hollis v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-07(o)

Accordingly, the Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) prohibited Hollis, individually, and as trustee of the Hollis Trust, from possessing a machine gun, and Plaintiffs alternative request for declaratory and injunctive relief to the contrary is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 922(o)(1) does not require a conversion device to work if it was designed and intended to convert a weapon into a machine gun.

United States v. Kudalis · filed 2011-05-26(o)(1)

This argument lacks a footing in the text of the governing statutes. The statutes do not contain an operability element. ... The statutes require only that a device have been designed and intended to convert a weapon into a machine gun.

Section 922(o)'s machine gun possession ban does not implicitly repeal § 5861(d)'s registration requirement because a person can comply with both provisions by declining to possess prohibited machine guns.

United States v. Carmel · filed 2008-11-24(o)

Section 922(o) is reconcilable with § 5861(d): Carmel could have complied with both statutes simply by declining to possess sixty illegal machine guns.

Section 922(o) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the weapon had the characteristics of a machine gun.

United States v. Nieves-Castano · filed 2007-03-27(o)

Pertinently, the government's burden is to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the characteristics that brought the gun within the statutory definition, and not that she had knowledge that the gun was in fact considered a machine gun under federal law.

Section 922(o) applies to possession of a machine gun converted from a semiautomatic rifle with a kit bought out of state.

United States v. Burgert · filed 2004-11-15(o)

Because Burgert’s gun was not entirely homemade, Stewart’s narrow exception does not apply and we conclude that ... § 922(o) is not unconstitutional as applied to Burgert’s possession of a machine gun.

Section 922(o) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the guns he possessed were machineguns.

United States v. Whitlow, Gary T. · filed 2004-08-25(o)

The Government had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Whitlow knew that the guns he possessed were machineguns.

Section 922(o) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the guns he possessed were machineguns.

United States v. Whitlow · filed 2004-08-25(o)

The Government had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Whitlow knew that the guns he possessed were machineguns.

Section 922(o) supports a conviction for transferring machineguns when the evidence shows the defendant knew the guns were fully automatic before transferring them.

United States v. Pettee · filed 2004-06-15(o)

Other witnesses, including Miller’s sister and Pettee’s ex-wife, confirmed that Pettee knew the weapons were fully automatic machineguns before they were transferred. These examples are only part of the ample testimony elicited at trial establishing that Pettee transferred the guns to Miller in their fully automatic state.

Section 922(o) requires proof that the defendant knew the rifle was a machine gun; possession alone does not establish that knowledge when a rifle can be converted without an outward sign.

United States v. Nass · filed 2004-06-03(o)

Because an apparently innocent rifle can be converted into an illegal machine gun with no outward sign, scienter as to this crime may not be inferred merely from possession; the Government must prove that the defendant knew the rifle was a machine gun.

Section 922(o) covers a converted machine gun even when a missing pin can easily be added to make it fire automatically.

United States v. James Daychild, United States of America v. Patrick O. Neiss · filed 2004-02-17(o)

The statute making it unlawful to possess a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), does not require that the machine gun have a pin installed. ... The statute was specifically designed to reach a case where a converted machine gun is missing a part that can easily be added to make it functional. Thus, the gun satisfied the statutory definition.

Section 922(o) prohibits knowing possession of a machine gun, including a converted firearm that is not fully operational but is designed to fire automatically.

United States v. Dennis M. McGiffen and Wallace S. Weicherding · filed 2001-10-12(o)(1)

There was sufficient evidence that Weieherding knew that the modified AR-15 contained “a combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun” and that the modified AR-15, even if not fully operational, was now “designed to shoot” in fully-automatic mode and could readily be adjusted to do so. Given the broad statutory definition of machine gun, there was sufficient evidence to convict Weieherding under § 922(o).

Evidence that a defendant personally modified a semiautomatic weapon to fire automatically can support a conviction under § 922(o).

United States v. Whatley · filed 2001-01-02(o)

The evidence shows that Whatley purchased the PWA, Model Commando (AR-15), 5.56 mm, semi-automatic weapon at a gun show approximately eight years before his arrest and that he personally modified it so that it would function as a fully automatic weapon. We find this evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 922(o) does not exempt possession of a machine gun based on where it occurs or who is present.

United States v. Fleischli · filed 2000-10-20(o)

Section 922(o) makes it unlawful to possess a firearm; it does not matter where or in whose presence a person possesses it.

Section 922(o)(1) prohibits possession of a machinegun regardless of who owns it.

United States v. Jesus · filed 1999-10-05(o)(1)

There is nothing in the statute to suggest, however, that liability under section 922(o)(l) turns on actual ownership; rather, that section makes it unlawful to “transfer or possess” a machinegun.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of a machine gun; a person who knows the weapon is a machine gun need not also know whether it can fire automatically.

United States v. Aguilar-Espinosa · filed 1999-06-30(o)

That knowledge is not necessary if, as in the instant case, the owner knows that he possesses a machine gun qua machine gun, i.e., an “ordinary sense” machine gun — an object that inevitably implies regulation and restriction by the government.

Section 922(o)'s machine gun exceptions are affirmative defenses that the defendant must raise at trial, not elements of the offense.

United States v. Cserna · filed 1997-03-19(o)

Second, the exemptions to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) are not elements of the offense but affirmative defenses, which the defendant must raise at trial.

Section 922(o)'s governmental authority exception does not apply when the defendant did not know he was dealing with government officials.

United States v. Christian G. Nadal, United States of America v. Doris Nadal · filed 1995-08-17(o)

Christian's contention that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(o)(1) must be overturned because he was acting under the authority of an agent of the United States is frivolous. Christian had no knowledge that he was interacting with government officials at the time of the transactions, and thus he was not acting pursuant to governmental authority.

A single machinegun possession count under § 922(o) can be supported by possession of either of two machineguns.

United States v. Pike · filed 1995-04-20(o)

We find that any error with regard to this gun alone would fall short of plain error, because Pike was convicted on a single count, which can be supported by possession of either the M-1 or the Mac-11.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of machineguns made after May 19, 1986, and removes the tax basis for applying National Firearms Act registration requirements to them.

United States v. Rock Island Armory, Inc. · filed 1991-06-07(o)

However, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which became effective on May 19, 1986, prohibits possession of machineguns, and thereby repealed or rendered unconstitutional the portions of the National Firearms Act which provided for the raising of revenue from the making, possession, and transfer of machineguns made after such date.

Section 922(o) prohibits transferring or possessing a machinegun converted after May 19, 1986.

United States v. Dalton · filed 1992-03-26(o)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), however, it is unlawful to transfer or possess the firearm at issue in this case because the weapon was converted into a machinegun after the statute’s effective date of May 19, 1986.

Section 922(o)(2)(B) permits lawful possession and transfer of machineguns that were lawfully possessed before the 1986 ban took effect.

United States v. Ferguson · filed 1992-03-27(o)(2)(B)

Under section 922(o )(2)(B), certain ma-chineguns, namely, those that were lawfully possessed before enactment of the statute in 1986, may be legally possessed and transferred even today.

Section 922(o)(2)(B) exempts machineguns lawfully possessed and registered before May 19, 1986.

United States v. Staples · filed 1992-08-03(o)(2)(B)

Section 922(o )(2)(B) specifically exempts machineguns which were lawfully possessed (i.e., registered) prior to May 19, 1986. There is no dispute that machineguns could be registered prior to that date; thus, the reasoning in Dalton does not apply to the charge against Staples.

Section 922(o)'s exception for lawfully possessed pre-1986 machine guns applies only to subsection (o); it does not excuse registration.

United States v. Harvey · filed 1992-08-07(o)(2)(B)

The language of section 922(o)(2) expressly limits the applicability of the grandparent clause to "subsection" (o) of section 922.

Section 922(o) does not exempt machine guns from the National Firearms Act’s requirements.

United States v. Jones · filed 1992-09-18(o)

Here, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of the 1986 amendment of the Gun Control Act affirmatively expresses a congressional desire to except machine guns from the earlier established requirements of the National Firearms Act.

Section 922(o)'s exception for machine guns lawfully possessed before May 19, 1986 does not cover a gun that was never registered and was acquired in 1990.

United States v. O'Mara · filed 1993-08-20(o)(2)(B)

Unlike the defendant in Kurt, O’Mara was clearly subject to section 922(o). Indeed, the record establishes that the machine gun was not “lawfully possessed” before the enactment of section 922(o), regardless of when it was manufactured.

Section 922(o)(2)(A) permits machine gun possession by federal or state agents acting in an official capacity, but does not exempt private citizens under a general state firearms law.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Jesse Warner, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 1993-09-29(o)(2)(A)

Moreover, § 922(o )(2)(A) is properly read to permit only lawful possession of machine guns by federal or state agents acting in an official capacity.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of machineguns that were not lawfully possessed and registered before the 1986 Act took effect.

United States v. Ross · filed 1993-11-05(o)

The 1986 Act prohibited the possession of all machineguns that were not legally possessed (that is, registered) prior to the Act's effective date.

Section 922(o)'s machinegun ban does not prevent possession of a short-barreled shotgun that is properly registered.

United States v. Ridlehuber · filed 1993-12-29(o)

Thus, even if Dalton is correct as to the class of machineguns made illegal by § 922(o), the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Dalton does not encompass short-barreled shotguns, which can be possessed legally under federal law if registered.

Section 922(o)(1) covers knowing and intentional possession of a machine gun, including actual physical possession during an arranged exchange.

United States v. Tran · filed 1994-02-15(o)(1)

The record in this case establishes that Luu knowingly, intentionally, and actually possessed the machine gun.

Section 922(o)'s prohibition on post-1986 machineguns does not implicitly repeal the National Firearms Act's registration and tax provisions.

United States v. Ardoin · filed 1994-04-07(o)

We adopt the analysis of the Fourth Circuit. The NFA can be upheld on the preserved, but unused, power to tax or on the power to regulate interstate commerce. Since the provisions of the NFA can be reconciled with the FOPA, the doctrine of implicit repeal must be rejected.

Section 922(o) bars transfer of a receiver modified into a machinegun after May 19, 1986, even when it is combined with a lawfully possessed conversion kit.

F.J. Vollmer Company, Inc. v. Stephen E. Higgins, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms · filed 1994-05-17(o)

The Bureau’s reasoning is sound. Vollmer legally possessed the machinegun conversion kits and it therefore could legally transfer them even if it attached them to rifles made after May 19, 1986. But modified receivers falling within § 921(a)(23)’s definition of a “machinegun,” as these did, may not be transferred.

A conviction for possessing a machine gun under § 922(o) requires sufficient evidence that the weapon was a machine gun.

United States v. Forsyth · filed 1994-07-28(o)

Kendall Dean Forsyth was tried by jury and convicted on charges of possession of a sawed-off shotgun, a violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(c) (1988), and of possession of a machine gun, a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(o) (1988). ... Moreover, we are satisfied the government presented sufficient evidence that the weapons were in fact a sawed-off shotgun and a machine gun.

Section 922(a)(1)(A)’s restriction on unlicensed firearms dealing covers machinegun conversion kits because they qualify as firearms under Title 18.

United States v. Hunter · filed 1994-09-02(a)(1)(A)

The Court also believes (1) that Congress clearly intended that maehinegun conversion kits were to be subject to Title 18’s provisions on firearms when it amended the Gun Control Act in 1986 to include 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23), which, in turn, incorporates Title 26’s broad definition of machineguns, and (2) that this is the only reasonable reading of the statute.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of a machine gun that was not lawfully possessed before May 19, 1986.

William Lee HUNTER, AKA William Leigh Hunter, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee · filed 1996-01-12(o)

The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act makes it illegal for any person to possess a machine gun that was not lawfully possessed before the statute’s effective date of May 19,1986,18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and thus makes it impossible to comply with the National Firearms Act’s registration requirement with respect to machine guns not lawfully possessed before May 19,1986.

Section 922(o) makes possession or transfer of a machinegun unlawful, subject to specified exceptions that operate as affirmative defenses.

United States v. Just · filed 1996-02-05(o)

Moreover, we are not persuaded that non-registration of a machinegun is an element of a § 922(o) offense. ... The exceptions contained in part (2) of the subsection establish affirmative defenses to the defined offense. They are not elements of the offense that must be charged in the indictment.

Section 922(o) supersedes the registration offense in 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for machine guns made and possessed after May 19, 1986.

United States v. Gambill · filed 1996-01-02(o)

Section 922(o) has superseded and supplanted section 5861(d) with respect to machine guns made and possessed after May 19, 1986.

Section 922(o)(2)'s exceptions are affirmative defenses, not elements that must be charged in an indictment.

United States v. Just · filed 1996-03-12(o)(2)

The exceptions contained in part (2) of the subsection establish affirmative defenses to the defined offense. They are not elements of the offense that must be charged in the indictment.

Section 922(o) does not require a person who knowingly possesses machine gun conversion parts to intend to use them to make a machine gun.

United States v. Syverson · filed 1996-07-19(o)

Therefore, within the context of § 5845(b), the only referent for the adjectives “designed and intended” is the manufacturer of the parts, not the accused who is charged with the unlawful use of those parts. When § 922(o) interpolates the term “machine gun” from § 5845(b), it cannot change the referents for the phrase “designed and intended.”

Section 922(o)'s government agency exception does not shield a seller who unknowingly transfers machine guns to undercover agents in a sting operation.

United States v. Robbie Len Bascue, United States of America v. Ronald Norman Bascue · filed 1996-09-26(o)(2)(A)

Section 922(o)'s government agency exemption was not meant to exempt from criminal liability sellers of unlawful firearms caught in government sting operations. The district court's denial of defendants' motion for acquittal and jury instructions regarding legal impossibility was thus correct.

Section 922(o)(2)'s exceptions are affirmative defenses, not elements the government must prove.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C. Gene GRAVENMEIR, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-08-08(o)(2)

This claim is foreclosed by our decision that paragraph two sets forth an affirmative defense, rather than an element for the government to prove.

Section 922(o)'s exception for machineguns lawfully possessed before its effective date is an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish.

United States v. Gonzales · filed 1997-08-26(o)(2)(B)

The exception for lawfully possessed machineguns is an affirmative defense, however, not an element of the offense. Therefore, the government is under no duty to disprove this affirmative defense; on the contrary, the burden was on Gonzales, Jr., to establish this affirmative defense.

Section 922(o) requires knowing possession of a machine gun that fires more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.

United States v. Roger E.A. Taylor · filed 1997-09-25(o)

The elements of § 922(o) are knowing possession of a "weapon which shoots ... more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger."

Section 922(o)(1)’s ban on possessing a machinegun does not implicitly repeal the registration requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), because a person can comply with both statutes by declining to possess a machinegun.

United States v. Elliott · filed 1997-10-30(o)(1)

Elliott argues § 5861(d) was implicitly repealed by the later-enacted § 922(o)(1), which prohibits possession of a machinegun. Because Elliott can comply with both statutes by simply refusing to possess the machinegun, we agree with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that the statutes are reconcilable.

Section 922(o)(1) makes transfer or possession of a machinegun unlawful, subject to the subsection's exceptions, and remains compatible with § 5861(d).

United States v. Wolfe · filed 1999-01-13(o)(1)

This Court agrees with the reasoning articulated in the Elliott decision. The two statutes — Section 5861(d) and Section 922(o)(l)— are not irreconcilable. A person may easily comply with both by merely disposing of or refusing to purchase or possess the illicit machineguns. Defendant’s argument attempts to circumvent Congress’s intent, as expressed in Section 922(o), by creating the illusion of a contradiction where none exists.

Section 922(o)(1) permits a conviction for transferring a machine gun when the evidence shows the defendant knew the firearm was fully automatic.

United States v. Turns · filed 2001-08-22(o)(1)

Furthermore, the testimony of five witnesses that Turns had actual knowledge that the rifle was fully automatic before transferring it to the pawn shop is more than sufficient to support Turns’s conviction.

Section 922(o)(1) covers possession of a modified rifle that is designed to fire automatically even if it is not fully operational, when the defendant knows it has machine gun characteristics.

United States v. McGiffen, Dennis M. · filed 2001-09-21(o)(1)

There was sufficient evidence that Weicherding knew that the modified AR-15 contained "a combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun" and that the modified AR-15, even if not fully operational, was now "designed to shoot" in fully-automatic mode and could readily be adjusted to do so. Given the broad statutory definition of machine gun, there was sufficient evidence to convict Weicherding under sec. 922(o).

Section 922(o)(2)(A) does not allow a convicted felon to possess machine guns through a sham licensed corporation.

United States v. Fleischli · filed 2002-10-23(o)(2)(A)

In short, a convicted felon who could not have legitimately obtained a manufacturer’s or dealer’s license may not obtain access to machine guns by setting up a sham corporation.

Section 922(o)(1) covers weapons that can be restored to shoot automatically, conversion kits, and combinations of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 2003-01-08(o)(1)

The term “machinegun” encompasses not only weapons which shoot automatically, but also weapons that can be restored to shoot automatically, as well as conversion kits and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of machine guns not lawfully possessed before May 19, 1986; a person can comply with that ban and the National Firearms Act by refraining from possessing those guns.

United States v. Bournes · filed 2003-07-11(o)

The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, which amended the Gun Control Act of 1968, makes it illegal for any person to possess a machine gun that was not lawfully possessed before May 19, 1986. ... We hold that compliance with the relevant provisions of both the National Firearms Act and the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act is easily achieved: Bournes could have complied simply by electing not to possess the machine guns at issue in this case.

Section 922(o) covers possession of parts that can be assembled into a weapon designed to shoot automatically, even if the assembled weapon does not actually fire automatically.

United States v. Wonschik · filed 2004-01-06(o)

The jury convicted Mr. Wonschik of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which makes it unlawful “for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.” The related definition section refers to the definition of “machinegun” provided in § 5845(b) of the National Firearms Act. ... Thus, the phrase “a combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled” actually means “a combination of parts from which [any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger] can be assembled.”

Section 922(o) prohibits knowing possession of a machine gun, including a combination of parts from which one can be assembled.

United States v. Spencer · filed 2006-03-10(o)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), it is “unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.” In order to prove Spencer unlawfully possessed a machine gun, the government must show (1) Spencer possessed a machine gun, and (2) he did so “knowingly.”

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of machine guns manufactured after its effective date.

United States v. Lim · filed 2006-04-14(o)

Instead, we chose to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Jones. ... Jones held that 26 U.S.C. § 5861 and 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) are not irreconcilable because an individual can comply with both statutes simply by refusing to deal in machine guns manufactured after the effective date of section 922(o).

Section 922(o) may constitutionally prohibit possession of homemade machineguns because Congress could rationally conclude that such possession, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Stewart · filed 2006-06-30(o)

Section 922(o) can constitu- tionally be applied to Stewart’s possession of homemade machineguns.

Section 922(o) constitutionally applies to possession of homemade machineguns, even when the guns have not crossed state lines.

United States v. Robert Wilson Stewart, Jr. · filed 2006-06-30(o)

Section 922(o) can constitutionally be applied to Stewart’s possession of homemade ma-chineguns.

Section 922(o) requires a defendant to knowingly possess a machine gun and know that the gun is a machine gun.

United States v. Harwood · filed 2006-07-18(o)

The district court’s instructions emphasized that for a defendant to be found guilty under § 922(o) he must knowingly possess the machine gun and also know that the gun was a machine gun. ... There was no error.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of machine guns, and Heller does not make that prohibition unconstitutional.

United States v. Ross · filed 2009-04-27(o)

Ross next argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the possession of machine guns, is unconstitutional after District of Columbia v. Heller, --- U.S. ----, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). ... Nothing in Heller supports Ross’s challenge to the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the possession of a machine gun.

Section 922(o)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed or transferred a machinegun and knew the weapon had the characteristics that made it a machinegun.

United States v. Olofson · filed 2009-05-01(o)(1)

In order to convict a person of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(l), the government must prove that 1) the defendant possessed or transferred a machinegun 2) with knowledge that the weapon had the characteristics that bring it within the statutory definition of a machinegun.

Section 922(o)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun.

United States v. Delgado · filed 2010-01-20(o)(1)

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun.

Section 922(o) governs the transfer and possession of certain firearms and provides an exception for law enforcement officials; it does not govern registration.

United States v. Williams · filed 2011-01-05(o)

Section 922(o) criminalizes the transfer and possession of certain classes of firearms, for which law enforcement officials such as Williams are given an exception. It does not deal at all with registration.

Section 922(o)’s machinegun ban applies to pre-1981 auto sears; ATF Ruling 81-4 does not exempt them.

United States v. George Dodson, III · filed 2013-05-29(o)

Dodson should not be able to bootstrap the 1981 ruling into an exemption from the 1986 ban.

Section 922(o)(2)(A)’s exception for transfers to or by the United States does not exempt possession of a transferred machine gun.

Viriyapanthu v. Brandon · filed 2017-03-31(o)(2)(A)

Further, the portion of § 922(o)(2)(A) relating to “transfers to or by” the United States applies only to transfers, not to the machine guns so transferred.

Section 922(o) bars an amnesty period allowing owners to register newly prohibited machineguns.

Doe v. Trump · filed 2021-09-28(o)

And an amnesty period would clearly violate § 922(o)’s prohibition on machineguns.

Section 922(g) is a federal law of general applicability that applies in Indian country when the firearm has the required interstate connection.

United States v. Young · filed 1991-06-13(g)

Each of the three offenses of which Young was convicted were violations of federal laws of general applicability. See 18 U.S.C. § 111 (federal jurisdiction predicated on federal officer status of victim, not on Indian country boundaries); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (federal jurisdiction predicated upon interstate transportation or shipment of firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (federal jurisdiction predicated upon conviction of any other federal offense). Accordingly, the Major Crimes Act is in no way impugned by the charges lodged against Young.

Section 922(g) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms and prevents seized firearms from being returned to them.

United States v. Twenty-Two Various Firearms · filed 2002-03-27(g)

The district court properly determined that the firearms could not be returned to Warin because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms.

Section 922(g) bars a convicted felon from possessing firearms and therefore from claiming their return as lawfully possessed property.

United States v. Kelly · filed 1994-08-03(g)

Clearly, Kelly has no lawful entitlement to possess controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (illegal to possess controlled substances), or, as a previously convicted felon, firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (illegal for convicted felon to possess firearms).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has travelled in or affected interstate commerce, but does not prevent the felon from holding a property interest in it.

United States v. Blankenship · filed 1996-07-03(g)(1)

Although as a convicted felon 1 Blankenship is prohibited from possessing a firearm that has travelled in or affected interstate commerce, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he is not prohibited from holding a property interest in the firearms, see United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1987). Accordingly, the district court's order granting the government's motion to destroy the two seized firearms is reversed.

Section 922(d)(1) bars the return of firearms or ammunition to a person under indictment for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Taylor v. State · filed 2000-05-26(d)(1)

However, we agree that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) prevented the return to Taylor of the illegally seized items.

Section 922(g) bars felons from lawfully possessing firearms or ammunition, so a felon is not entitled to the return of seized firearms.

United States v. Miscellaneous Firearms, Silencers & Ammunition · filed 2014-05-29(g)

The district court properly granted the government’s motion for an order authorizing the destruction of other seized firearms, despite Dugan’s motion for return of property under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g), because Dugan, as a felon, was not entitled to return of the seized firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felons are not entitled to lawful possession of firearms or ammunition); United States v. Mills, ... 991 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1993) (district court’s denial of return of seized property is generally proper if defendant is not entitled to its lawful possession).

Section 922 can bar a convicted defendant from recovering seized guns or the proceeds of their sale.

United States v. Ashley · filed 1992-03-26

We conclude the district court properly ordered Ashley's money be applied to his restitution requirement, see Duncan, 918 F.2d at 654, and that Ashley was not entitled to the return of his guns or the proceeds of their sale. See 18 U.S.C. § 922; United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 343 (1990).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of at least one prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2023-01-23(g)(1)

To prove that Jackson was guilty of the underlying counts, the government needed to establish before the grand jury that Jackson had at least one prior conviction that was punishable by more than one year in prison.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, a stipulation to the prior conviction element bars the government from introducing the name, nature, or number of prior convictions in its case-in-chief, but does not categorically bar the terms “convicted felon,” “felon,” or “felony.”

United States v. White · filed 2018-05-09(g)(1)

The Government is precluded from introducing evidence of the name, nature, and number of Defendant's prior convictions in its case-in-chief, and the Court will give a limiting instruction regarding the jury's consideration of the fact of Defendant's prior conviction. However, subject to the limitations described herein, the Government is not precluded from using the terms "convicted felon" and "felon" to describe Defendant, nor is the Government limited in its use of the term "felony."

Section 922(g)(1) permits a Washington juvenile adjudication for an offense punishable by more than one year to serve as a predicate conviction when the defendant is charged as an adult.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2014-08-26(g)(1)

Under Washington law, we conclude that Mendez’s 2007 juvenile adjudication constitutes a “conviction” of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20), 922(g)(1). Accordingly, the district court properly denied his motion to dismiss the felon-in- possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession after a common law misdemeanor conviction if the offense could have carried more than two years in jail, regardless of the sentence imposed.

Schrader v. Holder · filed 2011-12-23(g)(1)

The actual term of the sentence given is not controlling; only the possibility of punishment of more than two years for a misdemeanor matters for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior state conviction if the defendant could not have received a sentence exceeding one year for that offense.

United States v. McHugh · filed 2011-12-20(g)(1)

Thus, because McHugh’s underlying state convictions were not punishable by a term exceeding one year, McHugh’s conduct that formed the basis for his federal conviction — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison based on the sentence the defendant could have received.

United States v. Jawaun Smith · filed 2012-01-04(g)(1)

Thus, because Smith’s underlying state conviction was not punishable by a term exceeding one year, Smith’s conduct that formed the basis for his federal conviction — possessing a firearm — did not violate § 922(g).