18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(4)’s firearm prohibition remains in effect when a person’s state restoration of rights does not satisfy federal relief requirements; the federal government need not treat the state decision as binding.

Roe 1 v. United States · filed 2021-03-24(g)(4)

Plaintiffs cite no authority for the novel proposition that the federal government must accept the results of state restoration hearings as binding under federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) does not bar firearm possession based on a felony conviction if Illinois restores the person’s civil rights through its firearm rights restoration process.

Cheatem v. Cook County State's Attorney's Office · filed 2020-09-29(g)(1)

He would then no longer have a qualifying “conviction” that prohibits his possession of firearms under federal law (id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1) (2018)), and he could be granted relief from his firearm prohibitions in such a way that “would not be contrary to federal law.”

Restoring firearm rights under Illinois’s FOID Act does not automatically remove the federal firearm disability for a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

Connour v. Grau · filed 2015-07-07(g)(9)

Because the trial court's restoration of plaintiff's right to a FOID card under section 10 of the FOID Act did not automatically remove plaintiff's federal firearm disability under the Gun Control Act, plaintiff had no clear right to have federal authorities informed—and the Department had no clear duty to inform federal authorities—that plaintiff's "rights have been restored to possess firearms and ammunition."

Section 922(g)(1) does not excuse firearm possession based on a felon’s mistaken belief that his right to possess firearms was restored.

United States v. Parks · filed 2011-08-04(g)(1)

Finally, Parks’ mistaken belief that his right to own a firearm had been restored is not a defense to a § 922(g) offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on convictions pardoned without an express warning that the person cannot possess firearms.

Gabrielle v. State, Department of Public Safety · filed 2007-05-18(g)(1)

Following this case law, Mr. Gabrielle is not subject to the prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) since he received a pardon for his convictions and his pardon did not contain an express warning that he cannot possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) can prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm even when state law permits that possession.

United States v. Fuentes · filed 2004-12-27(g)(1)

The fact that New Mexico law does not forbid possession of firearms by those convicted of felonies more than ten years ago does not preclude the federal government from doing so.

Section 922(g) bars a felon from possessing any firearms when state law restricts firearm possession in some circumstances, even if it permits possession in others.

United States v. Gibson · filed 2004-12-14(g)

But when, as here, a state restricts a felon from possessing firearms in certain situations (e.g., outside of his home or business), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits him from possessing any guns at all, even those permitted under state law.

A prior felony conviction does not support a § 922(g)(1) conviction if the convicting jurisdiction restored the person’s civil rights, unless that restoration expressly withheld firearm rights.

United States v. Lindsey · filed 2004-12-02(g)(1)

A prior felony conviction ... is not a predicate for a § 922(g)(1) offense, however, where the jurisdiction prosecuting the prior felony has restored a defendant’s civil rights “unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, [or] possess . . . firearms.” Id. § 921(a)(20).

Section 922(g)(1) counts a prior felony as a predicate conviction when a valid state firearms restriction prevents full restoration of the person’s firearm rights.

United States v. Farrow · filed 2004-04-15(g)(1)

We conclude that the retroactive application of section 14-415.1 to Farrow does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, and that, as a result, his drug conviction was properly counted as a predicate conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

An unqualified state court exemption can relieve a person of the firearm disability imposed by Section 922(g).

Pennsylvania State Police v. Grogan · filed 2002-01-18(g)

We conclude that the position advanced by the Commonwealth, i.e., that common pleas court cannot grant a Commonwealth citizen relief from the restrictions imposed by Section 922(g) of the Federal Gun Control Act, [5] is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a person’s state felony convictions still restrict firearm possession because the person has not applied to restore those rights.

United States v. Williams · filed 2001-01-17(g)(1)

Consequently, having failed to satisfy the requirement of M.C.L.A. § 750.224f(2)(b), he was prohibited from legally possessing firearms on September 23, 1996. ... Therefore, the government’s motion for reconsideration must be GRANTED and ... counts 4 and 6 of the superceding indictment charging him as a felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922 must be reinstated.

A state law allowing some felons to possess firearms after ten years does not erase a felony conviction for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Richardson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2000-10-20(g)(1)

It does not affirmatively grant Richardson the right to own a gun, in the absence of a broader pardon or return of civil rights, and does not eliminate Richardson’s conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession when the person's civil rights were restored without a firearms restriction, and § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exempts a person who qualifies for a state firearm license from the school-zone prohibition.

United States v. Wiley Block Tait · filed 2000-02-04

Therefore, we hold that Tait's civil rights were unreservedly restored to him by operation of Michigan law, and Tait was not subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Tait's civil rights were restored, without reservation; thus Tait is entitled to the same protections as any other person without state-imposed limitations on his civil rights—including the protections of the § 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exception.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing any firearm when state law still prohibits that person from possessing some firearms.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Lynn QUALLS, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1999-04-15(g)(1)

We recognize today Caron 's binding interpretation of the federal felon-in-possession statute, and apply to Qualls the all-or-nothing rule announced in Caron. ... Under Caron, Qualls could be convicted for possessing any one of the seven firearms for which he was indicted.

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit a conviction based on possession of a firearm that state law allowed a person who retained his civil rights to possess.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Lynn QUALLS, Defendants-Appellant · filed 1997-03-05(g)(1)

Under § 921(a)(20)(B), Qualls’ prior felony conviction is not cognizable for the purposes of § 922(g)(1) unless Qualls possessed firearms prohibited to him under California law.

A state’s restoration of civil rights does not remove a federal conviction as a predicate for the felon-in-possession prohibition.

United States v. Jones · filed 1993-05-24(g)(1)

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have recently held that a state’s restoration of rights scheme can negate even a prior federal conviction for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20). ... Our interpretation of the statute leads us to the opposite conclusion.

A Wisconsin discharge certificate restoring rights lost through conviction does not exclude prior convictions as predicates under § 922(g)(1) when it does not restore or specifically notify the person of a right to possess firearms.

Ziegenhagen v. United States · filed 1993-05-21(g)(1)

Therefore, the primary issue before this Court is whether Ziegenhagen's prior Wisconsin felony convictions qualify as predicate offenses for conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and sentence enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). ... This Court finds, as it did in Roehl, that prior Wisconsin state convictions did not cause Ziegenhagen to forfeit any state-created right relating to the possession or ownership of firearms. Moreover, the discharge certificate restoring Ziegenhagen's civil rights did not create such a right to possess firearms, nor did it specifically notify Ziegenhagen that he had such a right restored.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a Michigan felony conviction to serve as the predicate for a firearm possession charge; release from prison does not itself restore the person's full civil rights.

United States v. Elliot · filed 1993-02-08(g)(1)

In United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir.1992), we recently held that a Michigan felony conviction may serve as a predicate offense for a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for the possession of any firearm. We specifically rejected the argument made by Elliot that her full civil rights were restored upon her release from prison. Id. at 1479. Therefore, there was no reason for the district court to require a special verdict.

A prior felony conviction counts under § 922(g) when state law continues to recognize it despite a general restoration of civil rights.

Roehl v. United States · filed 1992-10-13(g)

Accordingly, each is also a predicate for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ... and for enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

A Michigan felony conviction remains a predicate for a § 922(g)(1) charge when the state has not fully restored the person's civil rights.

United States v. Gilliam · filed 1992-11-10(g)(1)

In Driscoll, we concluded that Michigan law does not fully restore a convicted felon's civil rights for purposes of section 921(a)(20) because a Michigan felon is restricted from serving on juries and from possessing certain types of firearms. Driscoll, 970 F.2d at 1481. Since the decision of one panel of this court binds all other panels and since Gilliam presents no other grounds to support the dismissal of the indictment, Driscoll requires us to reverse.

Under § 922(g)(1), a possible state-law restoration of a felon's right to possess a handgun in his dwelling does not exempt possession outside his dwelling.

United States v. Wagner · filed 1992-09-30(g)(1)

In determining who falls within the parameters of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), federal law looks to state law. Assuming Indiana does restore to convicted felons the limited right to possess handguns in their dwellings, the exception does not aid the defendant. Wagner was not in his dwelling when he possessed the handgun. Under Indiana law, and hence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Wagner falls within the category of convicted felons.

Section 922(g)(1) does not support a felon-in-possession prosecution based on a conviction excluded by the federal rule for restored civil rights, as the court applied binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Swanson · filed 1990-12-14(g)(1)

Nevertheless, because the Eleventh Circuit in Kolter seems to hold broadly that the United States in 1986 retroactively granted the right to Swanson to carry a pistol as a matter of federal criminal law, and because jeopardy has not yet attached in the instant case, the court will grant Swanson’s motion to dismiss the indictment strictly on the basis of Kolter, but simultaneously encourages the United States to appeal to the Eleventh Circuit and, if necessary, to the Supreme Court, not only to obtain clarification of the questions which were not addressed in Kolter and which infect this case, but to resolve the clear conflict which exists between the Sixth Circuit, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits on the one hand, and the Eleventh Circuit on the other.

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession while a felony conviction remains in effect; a later set-aside does not undo an earlier violation.

United States v. Davis · filed 1990-11-01(g)(1)

Because Davis’ state convictions had not yet been set aside at the time that he was found to be in possession of a firearm, his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) stands.

Section 922(h)(1) bars receipt of a firearm by a person whose civil rights were restored if state law still expressly prohibits that person from possessing the firearm.

United States v. Coffman · filed 1991-04-05(h)(1)

The court does not believe that the omission of this firearms restriction is fatal to Coffman’s prosecution for receipt of the revolver, since Kansas law expressly prohibited him from possessing such a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar firearm possession by a convicted felon whose hunting license, probation conditions, and alleged advice from a state judge did not restore his right to possess firearms.

United States v. Etheridge · filed 1991-04-30(g)(1)

Etheridge did not proceed under the Commonwealth statute or the federal statute to remove his disability, and his claims that the disability has been removed by the Virginia Parole Board, the purchase of a hunting license, or statements by a Virginia state court judge are unavailing.

A conviction set aside under state law remains a predicate for § 922(g)(1) when that law expressly continues to prohibit the person from possessing firearms.

United States v. Cox · filed 1991-05-24(g)(1)

But even if defendant’s 1978 California conviction was set aside in 1982, the conviction properly was treated as a predicate offense for § 922(g)(1) purposes. ... Under that section, a defendant whose sentence is set aside is expressly prohibited from owning or possessing firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that a prior conviction still counts after any restoration of firearm rights under state law.

United States v. Essick · filed 1991-06-03(g)(1)

Proof of a prior “conviction” encompasses more than proof of a discrete event in the defendant’s past; the government must show the continuing vitality of the conviction, a matter of proof that, under North Carolina law, necessarily implicates the five-year post-release period.

A civil-rights restoration certificate does not remove a prior felony from § 922(g)(1) when state law bars the person from possessing firearms at the time of the alleged offense.

United States v. Haynes · filed 1991-06-26(g)(1)

The Defendant argues that because the West Virginia Department of Corrections restored his “civil rights” by way of an official certificate of discharge on January 8, 1986, that his convictions identified in the indictment are not convictions contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). However, a careful review of the legislative intent, the statutory and judicial authority, reveals that the Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession when restoration of civil rights removes the prior conviction as a predicate under § 921(a)(20).

United States v. McBryde · filed 1991-07-12(g)(1)

Here, we are faced with such a situation, and we do reach that different result by holding that McBryde, unlike McLean, could not, by reason of § 921(a)(20), properly be indicted under § 922(g)(1). By virtue of § 921(a)(20), he could not, as a consequence of the restoration of his civil rights in 1985, any longer be considered “convicted” of the predicate crime which is an element of the offense defined in § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply when a felon's civil rights have been restored and state law restricts a different type of firearm from the one possessed.

United States v. Dahms · filed 1991-07-02(g)(1)

Whether § 922(g)(1) applies to a felon who possesses one type of firearm when state law restricts his right to have another type is an issue of first impression. We hold that it does not.

A restoration of civil rights does not remove § 922(g)(1)'s firearm prohibition when the law of the state of conviction still expressly bars the person from possessing a firearm.

United States v. James C. Bickett, Joseph Keith Bickett, and Marion Paul Elder · filed 1991-09-10(g)(1)

We uphold the district court's finding that James Bickett was a felon in possession of a firearm. ... Although no express restriction was contained in the governor's restoration of Bickett's civil rights, Kentucky Revised Statute § 527.040 expressly prohibited Bickett from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior felony when the person’s civil rights have been restored and state law imposes no firearm restrictions arising from that conviction.

United States v. Gilliam · filed 1991-11-21(g)(1)

In effect, there were no firearms restrictions at all placed upon defendant by the state at the time of the indicted offense. As there were no firearms restrictions placed upon defendant by the state, the “unless” clause of Section 921(a)(20) does not apply.

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit a firearm possession charge based on a conviction for which the state restored all civil rights without an express firearms restriction.

United States v. Swanson · filed 1991-11-22(g)(1)

In this case, a previously convicted felon cannot be indicted under section 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm, not because the district court or this court ignored congressional intent or the intent of the Alabama legislature and the Board, but because the state restored to him all civil rights, and the certificate restoring civil rights was not expressly limited in the manner contemplated and provided by Congress.

A Massachusetts firearm identification card does not restore civil rights, so prior felony convictions remain predicates for liability under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Nazzaro · filed 1991-10-30(g)(1)

The indictment in this case charges that on March 12, 1990, the defendant knowingly possessed five firearms after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Accordingly I rule that the defendant’s possession of an MFIC does not constitute the restoration of a civil right within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). On the basis of the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, I find the defendant GUILTY of the offense charged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession charge based on a prior conviction when the defendant’s civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. Butler · filed 1991-12-18(g)(1)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant’s motion be DENIED, the Court finding that defendant’s 1984 conviction ... can be used as a basis for charging him as a Felon in Possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit prosecution based on a conviction when the state restored the person's civil rights without restricting firearm possession at the time of restoration.

United States v. Stump · filed 1992-02-14(g)(1)

Upon consideration of the whole of state law, the Court believes that the Defendant is exempted from prosecution under § 922(g) since the State of West Virginia did not affirmatively restrict him from possessing a firearm, by virtue of its certificate restoring civil rights nor by virtue of any other state law codified at the time of his discharge from parole.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to apply to a person with a qualifying felony conviction when certain civil rights return automatically without further state action.

United States v. Hammonds · filed 1992-02-28(g)(1)

The legislative history of the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, of which Section 921(a)(20) is a part—from the initial introduction of the first House and Senate bills in the fall of 1979 by the FOPA’s coauthors and co-sponsors, Senator McClure and Representative Volkmer, to its eventual adoption in 1986—makes it clear that Congress never intended that an automatic restoration of certain benevolent rights, should, without more, be sufficient to except a prior convicted felon from the federal felon-in-possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a state conviction as a felony predicate when the person's civil rights have been restored and the state has not restricted firearm possession.

United States v. Ball · filed 1992-03-19(g)(1)

Section 921(a)(20) of Title 18 excepts from the felonies encompassed in section 922(g)(1) those state convictions for which an ex-felon has had his civil rights restored. Ball contends that his civil rights were restored by the State of West Virginia after his previous state court convictions and that, by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), these prior crimes were not felonies for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We agree and reverse his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) cannot use a prior felony as a predicate when the person’s civil rights were restored without a firearms restriction and state law imposed no such restriction at the time of restoration.

United States v. Haynes · filed 1992-04-06(g)(1)

Thus, since his restoration of civil rights contained no limiting language and since West Virginia law did not provide such a prohibition, we find that, under section 921(a)(20), the defendant’s prior conviction cannot serve as a predicate for conviction under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person with a prior felony conviction when state law still restricts that person's right to possess the firearm involved.

United States v. Merideth · filed 1992-05-06(g)(1)

At the time of his arrest, Michigan law expressly limited defendant's firearm privileges with respect to the type of firearm involved in this case. Therefore, at the time of his arrest on September 12, 1990, defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Consequently, defendant was subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A felony conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) charge after civil rights are restored unless state law at the time of restoration expressly prohibited firearm possession.

United States v. Darryl Rodney Cardwell, Jr. · filed 1992-06-23(g)(1)

Section 921(a)(20) states that section 922(g)(1) applies if the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights “expressly provides” that the defendant may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. ... Accordingly, we hold that in determining whether a restoration of civil rights expressly prohibits firearm possession, the district court must look to the whole of state law at the time of the restoration.

Section 922(g)(1) permits prosecution based on a Michigan felony conviction when state law still bars the person from obtaining a pistol license.

United States v. Brown · filed 1992-07-08(g)(1)

Thus, just as the Meredith court determined that Darrin Meredith could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), so too can the government prosecute Mr. Brown.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a prior felony conviction to serve as a predicate even if civil rights were restored, when state law still restricts the person’s firearm rights.

Lyons v. United States · filed 1992-07-14(g)(1)

Even if his civil rights were restored, Lyons’ prior conviction was properly considered a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) cannot use a felony conviction as its predicate if the defendant's civil rights have been restored and firearm possession has not been expressly restricted.

United States v. Kaplan · filed 1992-07-17(g)(1)

If the state restores civil rights, and does not restrict weapons possession, then that state's felons will not be subject to prosecution under the federal felon-in-possession statute.

A prior felony conviction remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the defendant's civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. Krese · filed 1992-07-17(g)(1)

In sum, because defendant's rights to vote and to serve as a juror were not restored at the time he was arrested in this case, his civil rights had not been restored. Thus, his 1980 Michigan conviction for breaking and entering had not been expunged and was properly used as the predicate offense for defendant's conviction of illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) can support a felon-in-possession conviction despite a defendant's claim that his civil rights were restored.

United States v. Hyder · filed 1992-08-04(g)(1)

The defendant, Clarence Hyder, appeals from his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... THE INDICTMENT FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT CHARGING APPELLANT WITH BEING A FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM FAILED TO ALLEGE AN OFFENSE UNDER FEDERAL LAW BECAUSE APPELLANT'S CIVIL RIGHTS HAD BEEN RESTORED. ... The Driscoll court was faced with the identical issue raised in this appeal and decided the issue in a manner contrary to defendant Hyder's assertions here. 2 We are bound by the Driscoll decision. 6 Accordingly, the conviction of the defendant is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession when the state of conviction has restored the person's right to bear arms.

Harris v. United States · filed 1992-06-29(g)(1)

Thus, if the state of conviction chooses to restore his right to bear arms, his later possession of a firearm is not a federal crime.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit a felon from possessing firearms unless the convicting state has restored the felon's full civil rights, including firearm privileges.

United States v. Driscoll · filed 1992-09-02(g)(1)

Thus, we hold that in cases involving 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), federal courts should examine state law solely for the purpose of determining whether the state has restored felons to their full civil rights, including allowing them to possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a convicted felon who possesses a firearm unless the felon's civil rights have been substantially restored under state law.

United States v. Grover W. Booth and John Thomas Lynch · filed 1992-09-08(g)(1)

The Commonwealth has not restored Lynch's civil rights. Therefore he was properly held subject to section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person convicted of a Michigan felony whose probation has ended but whose civil rights have not been restored because he remains ineligible for jury service.

United States v. T.J. Thompson · filed 1992-09-09(g)(1)

In this case, Thompson, was convicted of a felony in Michigan in 1979. He may not, therefore, serve on a jury in Michigan; thus he has not had his civil rights restored, and he is subject to prosecution under section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a civil rights restoration certificate clearly withholds firearm rights; the certificate need not use the statute’s exact words.

Hawthorne v. United States · filed 1992-10-02(g)(1)

We now turn to whether the exact language in the last clause of § 921(a)(20) is required in a restoration document in order to subject a convicted felon to prosecution under federal law. ... There is nothing ambiguous about this language, and no likelihood that Hawthorne was misled by it. The court will interpret the statute as requiring sufficient notice of a firearms restriction.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to apply to a felon whose civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. White · filed 1992-12-02(g)(1)

Thus, the Defendant must still be considered “convicted” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because his civil rights have not been restored.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose prior conviction remains effective because Michigan has not restored the civil rights needed for the § 921(a)(20) exclusion.

United States v. Tinker · filed 1992-12-15(g)(1)

"Michigan has [not] demonstrated sufficient trust in its convicted felons to exempt them from the prohibitions listed in § 922(g)(1)." Id. Due to "the state's refusal to vouch for" defendant's trustworthiness, he cannot claim "the protection of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)." Id. at 1481-82. Therefore, Count 2 of the indictment stated a valid charge against defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose prior felony conviction still counts because the convicting state has not restored the person's civil rights.

United States v. Cholak · filed 1993-01-07(g)(1)

Because a convicted felon's civil rights in Michigan are not restored upon release from prison, such a felon does not fall within the exemption of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), and is subject to prosecution under § 922(g)(1). Under this court's decision in Driscoll, defendant Cholak's civil rights have not been restored under Michigan law, and he is, therefore, prohibited from carrying a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a convicted felon whose civil rights have not been restored after the earlier conviction.

United States v. Rizzo · filed 1993-01-13(g)(1)

Here, appellant's civil rights have not been restored, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), by Michigan following his earlier conviction. Therefore, appellant comes within the prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and, under Driscoll, his conviction must be affirmed.

A prior conviction can support liability under § 922(g)(1) when the state has not substantially restored the person’s civil rights.

United States v. Meeks · filed 1993-02-23(g)(1)

Because we hold that Missouri did not substantially restore Meeks’ civil rights, we need not address the second part of the Dahms analysis. ... Although we find that Meeks could be liable under § 922(g)(1), we reverse his conviction because the trial court erred in finding that Meeks had waived his right to counsel.

A prior felony qualifies as a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the defendant’s civil rights have not been restored.

Thompson v. United States · filed 1993-03-10(g)(1)

A felony conviction is considered a predicate offense under sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e) if it qualifies as a conviction pursuant to section 921(a)(20): ... The district court correctly concluded that neither the state of the predicate conviction nor the state of residence restored Thompson’s civil rights.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person with a felony conviction whose rights have not been restored under state law.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 1993-04-16(g)(1)

Finally, defendant challenges his felon-in-possession conviction on the grounds that Michigan has restored his rights, and therefore he cannot be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We reject defendant's challenge to the felon-in-possession conviction because his rights had not been restored under Michigan law.

If South Dakota law governs restoration of civil rights, its statutes do not remove an out-of-state felony as a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Capito · filed 1993-05-06(g)(1)

Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that Capito was a resident of South Dakota at the time of his arrest and that South Dakota law determines the restoration of his civil rights, we hold that South Dakota has not restored Capito’s civil rights because its civil rights restoration statutes apply only to felons convicted in South Dakota state court.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a felon whose state permits firearm possession if the state has not restored essentially all of the felon’s core civil rights.

United States v. Thomas · filed 1993-06-08(g)(1)

The isolated right to possess firearms, in the absence of restoration of such core civil rights as well, does not immunize convicted felons from § 922(g) guilt.

A prior felony conviction can support a § 922(g)(1) charge when state law still bars the person from possessing a firearm despite a general restoration of civil rights.

United States v. Evans · filed 1993-06-08(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), any conviction for which the defendant has had his civil rights restored cannot serve as the basis for a § 922 offense, unless such restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms. Since Wis.Stat. § 941.29 prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, the defendant has not had his right to possess a firearm restored under Wisconsin law and his prior convictions may serve as the predicate offense necessary for his current conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit firearm possession when a state restores a felon's general civil rights but still requires separate relief before the person may possess firearms.

Schlairet v. United States · filed 1993-07-06(g)(1)

In cases involving convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the district court must examine state law to determine whether the state has restored felons to their full civil rights, including allowing them to possess firearms. United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1480 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1056 (1993). Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.13 provides that unless relieved from disability as provided by § 2923.14, a convicted felon cannot acquire a firearm. United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 550 n. 15 (6th Cir.1990). Relief as provided by § 2923.14 can be applied for to the court of common pleas in the county where the petitioner resides. However, petitioner has never made such motion for relief under § 2923.14. Summary dismissal was appropriate in the action.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession in a restored felon’s home when the restoration of civil rights permits that possession.

United States v. Randall Dwight Shoemaker, United States of America v. Larry Johnson Norman · filed 1993-08-05(g)(1)

Nor does it dispute that his restoration did not prohibit him from possessing firearms in his home. Thus, Shoemaker’s restoration did not “expressly provide that [he could] not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms” within the meaning of section .921(a)(20), and section 921(a)(20) exempted Shoemaker from the provisions of section 922(g)(1).

A prior felony remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when state law expressly prohibited firearm possession at the time the person’s civil rights were restored.

United States v. Varela · filed 1993-08-10(g)(1)

Since California law expressly prohibited Varela from possessing a firearm at the time he was discharged, we affirm Varela’s conviction under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a felon's civil rights have been restored but state law still prohibits the felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Maxey · filed 1993-08-17(g)(1)

Since the governor did not grant Maxey a "full pardon" under section 77, K.R.S. Sec. 527.040(1) prohibits Maxey from possessing a handgun. As Kentucky law restricts Maxey in this way, his conviction is still alive under Cassidy's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(20), and he is subject to prosecution under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when the state of conviction restores a felon’s civil rights but continues to prohibit that person from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Eaton · filed 1993-08-27(g)(1)

Using the two-step analysis outlined in Dahms, the court finds that while Eaton’s civil rights may have been substantially restored under North Dakota law, Eaton’s civil rights were also specifically restricted by North Dakota law to the extent of not having the right to possess a firearm until December 11, 1997.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when state law has not substantially restored a felon’s civil rights, including the right to serve on a jury.

United States v. Metzger · filed 1993-08-30(g)(1)

The district court correctly found these barriers to jury service to preclude a finding of the substantial restoration of civil rights necessary to satisfy § 921(a)(20) and to avoid a § 922(g) conviction.

A defendant may still count as a felon under § 922(g)(1) despite claiming that Michigan restored his civil rights.

United States v. Crumb · filed 1993-09-07(g)(1)

Defendant would be considered a felon for purposes of the federal statute. Our decisions in Gilliam and Driscoll foreclose defendant's arguments on this point. ... Defendant's argument that his 1973 and 1977 convictions should not have been included in considering whether he was punishable as an armed career criminal is premised upon the same argument he makes in issue II, i.e., that his civil rights were restored and therefore these prior convictions no longer can serve as a predicate for a felon in possession charge. As indicated, subsequent decisions of our court preclude these arguments.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when state law bars firearm possession at the time a felon’s civil rights are restored.

United States v. Huss · filed 1993-10-25(g)(1)

The Oregon law in effect at the time Huss’ civil rights were restored pi'ohibited felons from carrying all firearms. Therefore Huss was properly convicted under § 922(g)(1).

When restoration of civil rights, pardon, or expungement is discretionary, a defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must first produce evidence that it occurred; the government retains the ultimate burden of proving the offense.

United States v. Flower · filed 1993-11-24(g)(1)

Where the restoration of civil rights, pardon or expungement is discretionary, as it is in Utah, the ex-felon has the initial burden of bringing forth evidence that the foregoing discretion has been exercised on his or her behalf. This does not relieve thé government of the ultimate burden of proof as to the elements of the offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit firearm possession when a person's civil rights have not been restored sufficiently to exempt the prior felony conviction.

United States v. Samrick · filed 1993-12-09(g)(1)

The defendant's argument fails because Michigan law has not restored the defendant's civil rights to a degree that would exempt him from the prohibitions listed in Sec. 922(g)(1).

A restoration of civil rights that expressly withholds firearm possession does not exempt a person from § 922(g)(1) merely because the certificate omits the precise wording of § 921(a)(20).

James v. United States · filed 1994-01-13(g)(1)

Nonetheless, no statutory authority or case law supports the contention that the instrument evidencing the restoration of rights must use the precise language of § 921(a)(20) before it can exempt the defendant from prosecution under § 922(g)(1).

Restored civil rights remove a conviction from § 922(g)(1) when the law of the state of conviction does not expressly bar firearm possession; in those circumstances, answering “no” to the conviction question on ATF Form 4473 does not violate § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Sanders · filed 1994-02-24(g)(1), (a)(6)

I conclude that Colorado law does not expressly prohibit Mr. Sanders’ possession of a firearm. ... Therefore Count 1 of the indictment, charging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), must therefore be dismissed. ... I conclude, as I must, that because Mr. Sanders’ civil rights had been restored and it was not unlawful for him to receive or possess a firearm under Colorado law, he did not answer falsely when he responded “no” to question 8(b).

A Florida felony remains a prior conviction under § 922(g)(1) after the person serves the sentence unless the person's civil rights have actually been restored.

United States v. Harry H. Owens, A/K/A Bessellieu, Jamesea · filed 1994-02-15(g)(1)

Because Florida courts uniformly have held that the restoration of civil rights to a prisoner upon release from state custody is neither automatic nor pro forma, but is solely within the province of the governor’s discretionary function, and in view of Owens’s failure to provide this court with any evidence that such a restoration of rights has already occurred, Owens’s challenge to his conviction on this basis must fail.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a state conviction when the person's civil rights have been restored, even automatically, and state law does not prohibit that possession.

United States v. Hall · filed 1994-03-22(g)(1)

In sum, Hall did not have a predicate “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), as his civil rights had been “restored” and his possession of firearms did not violate state law. Thus, his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) should have been granted.

A later pardon of a predicate state felony does not undo a federal conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Rice v. United States, Department of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms · filed 1994-04-12(g)(1)

Plaintiff remains a convicted federal felon' under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) even though he received a subsequent pardon from Governor Casey for his prior state crimes.

Section 922(g) applies to a felon whose state restores voting rights but does not substantially restore other civil rights.

United States v. McKinley · filed 1994-04-27(g)

Indiana clearly does not substantially restore a convicted felon’s civil rights; thus, McKinley is a convicted felon in Indiana’s eyes and is eligible for prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) applies despite a limited state-law right to possess a handgun when the person's civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. Ashe · filed 1994-05-05(g)(1)

However, the limited restoration of Ashe's right to possess a gun in Texas is not tantamount to a restoration of civil rights within the meaning of the statute. ... Ashe does not contend that he enjoys any of these rights under Texas law, and his limited ability to possess a gun in Texas is irrelevant to the determination of whether his civil rights were restored within the meaning of section 921(a)(20).

For a § 922(g)(1) charge based on a Virginia felony conviction, the government need not prove that the defendant's civil rights have not been restored, and the indictment need not allege nonrestoration.

Almond v. United States · filed 1994-06-07(g)(1)

Accordingly, the court finds that, while a Virginia defendant may raise the issue of restored civil rights as a defense to an indictment under § 922(g), the government need not prove beyond reasonable doubt that a Virginia defendant has not had his civil rights restored. Consequently, a § 922(g) indictment based on prior felony convictions under Virginia law need not allege that the defendant has not yet been restored his civil rights.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm when that person's civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. Simpson · filed 1994-06-08(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) it is a federal crime for an ex-felon to possess a firearm. ... Simpson did not comply with the Nevada law for restoration of his civil rights. Without this compliance his civil rights remained unrestored by invoking the, procedure set out in § 176.227.

A prior state felony remains a predicate for § 922(g)(1) unless the convicting state restores the person’s civil rights; restoration by another state does not remove the firearm disability.

United States v. Eaton · filed 1994-07-26(g)(1)

For purposes of § 921(a)(20), only the convicting state jurisdiction can restore civil rights to a convicted felon and remove the disability of a predicate state offense.

Section 922(g) permits prosecution of Michigan felons despite the partial restoration of their civil rights, even when their prior convictions are more than ten years old.

Judge Jerome White v. United States · filed 1994-09-20(g)

This court has now confirmed that the civil rights of Michigan felons are not restored to an extent that would exclude them from prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). ... These decisions are determinative in White's case, even though he now argues that his prior felony convictions were over ten years old.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a felon’s general civil rights are restored but state law continues to prohibit firearm possession and the felon has not obtained the required order restoring that privilege.

United States v. Ray Herron, Jr. · filed 1994-10-13(g)(1)

Consequently he is not entitled to the exemption in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). ... Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the § 922(g)(1) charge.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felony conviction from before November 1986 to serve as a predicate offense despite a later restoration of civil rights, because the amended definition of conviction in § 921(a)(20) does not apply retroactively.

United States v. Kelly · filed 1994-09-22(g)(1)

Thus, where the underlying felony conviction which is the predicate offense for a § 922(g) prosecution occurred prior to November of 1986, “the Dickerson interpretation of the term ‘conviction’ controls ...” and the amended § 921(a)(20) does not apply.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon whose civil rights have been restored from possessing a sawed-off shotgun at home when state law still prohibits that weapon.

United States v. Walker · filed 1994-10-31(g)

Therefore, it is clear that North Carolina did not intend to restore to its ex-felons the right to possess such weapons within their own homes, in contravention of the general federal prohibition against felons possessing firearms. We find that the trial judge correctly denied Walker’s motion to dismiss Count Two of the indictment against him.

A section 922(g)(1) conviction cannot be avoided on the basis of restored civil rights when the right to serve on a jury remains lost.

Berger v. United States · filed 1994-11-09(g)(1)

Accordingly, a section 922(g) firearm conviction may not be avoided where the right to perform jury service has not been restored.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon whose civil rights have not been restored from possessing ammunition even if state law allows it.

United States v. Fisher · filed 1994-10-28(g)(1)

In other words, if the defendant has been convicted of a felony under state law and has not had his civil rights restored for that offense, then the defendant can properly be convicted for possession of ammunition under § 922(g)(1), regardless of whether that same possession is prohibited under the state’s law.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to bar firearm possession when a felon's civil rights have not been fully restored under state law.

United States v. Reiche · filed 1995-01-05(g)(1)

Defendant first contends his civil rights had been restored, that he was allowed to possess a shotgun under Michigan law, and is thus exempt from the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by convicted felons. We disagree. ... Thus, under Driscoll, defendant does not qualify for the Section 921(a)(20) exemption because his civil rights had not been fully restored on the date he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession by a person whose civil rights were restored by a certificate that does not expressly restrict firearms, even if state law separately restricts possession.

United States v. Herron · filed 1995-01-19(g)(1)

Herron might have violated Washington law by possessing a pistol, but even if he did, he did not violate the federal statute because his restoration document did not expressly prohibit him from carrying firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) permits prosecution of a convicted felon when a state's limited restoration of civil rights leaves restrictions on firearm possession in place.

United States v. Dupaquier · filed 1995-02-24(g)(1)

These limitations on the right of a convicted felon to possess firearms are required under the Thomas test to allow the United States to prosecute Dupaquier under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) treats a person whose civil rights have not been restored as a convicted felon.

United States v. Lawrence · filed 1995-03-13(g)

Because defendant's civil rights haven't been restored, he is still deemed a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g).

A person remains subject to § 922(g)(1) when a certificate restoring civil rights withholds firearm rights and state law still forbids handgun possession.

United States v. Berger · filed 1995-03-15(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) makes it a federal crime for a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment to possess a gun. ... In summary, Berger's certificate restoring civil rights stated that his right to carry firearms was not restored. Also, Washington law forbade Berger from carrying a handgun in spite of his restoration of civil rights. Consequently, the exception of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(20) does not apply to him.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit firearm possession based on a prior conviction when civil rights have been restored and state law does not prohibit possession.

United States v. Chapple · filed 1995-03-17(g)(1)

Accordingly, the court hereby ACCEPTS Judge Taylor’s Findings and Recommendation. ... The applicability of the prohibition with respect to possession of firearms under § 922(g)(1) being a matter for “each state to determine,” ... and it being apparent that, under the laws of the State of Ohio, defendant’s possession of the firearms in question was not prohibited, his conduct, as set forth in the indictment, is not violative of the provisions of § 922(g)(1), and the indictment against him must, accordingly, be dismissed.

A prior felony counts under § 922(g)(1) when the defendant’s state of residence restores civil rights but the jurisdiction of conviction does not.

United States v. Lowe · filed 1995-03-27(g)(1)

Following the Supreme Court’s decision and additional briefing in this case, it is evident that Minnesota cannot remove the disabilities imposed upon Lowe by his Illinois convictions, ... and, therefore, that Lowe’s conviction must stand for purposes of section 922.

A North Carolina felony conviction within five years of firearm possession can establish a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1) without separate proof that the defendant’s civil rights had not been restored.

United States v. Thomas · filed 1995-04-20(g)(1)

We reject the argument in this case because defendant’s underlying state felony conviction occurred within five years of the instant firearm offense, and under North Carolina law the defendant’s civil rights could not have been fully restored within this time frame. We hold accordingly that the government proved a violation of § 922(g)(1) despite the fact that it did not independently establish that defendant’s civil rights had not been restored at the time of his firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a person with a qualifying felony conviction whose civil rights were never taken away; retaining those rights does not qualify as a restoration that exempts the person from the firearms prohibition.

McGrath v. United States · filed 1995-08-01(g)(1)

Congress might have decided to exempt also those whose civil rights were never forfeited under state law. But it did not do so.

A prior felony remains a predicate for § 922(g) when state law has not restored the defendant's civil rights.

United States v. David Elijah Smith, A/K/A David Jones, A/K/A Michael Knight, A/K/A Jerry Lee Brown, A/K/A Miami Dave · filed 1995-08-04(g)

The predicate offense established at trial by the government was Smith's 1989 state conviction for "assault with a deadly weapon causing serious injury." Because state law prohibits the restoration of rights for at least five years following such a conviction, see N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 14-415.1(a) (Michie 1994), Smith's rights could not have been restored at the time he shot McGhee.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a convicted felon whose civil rights have not been substantially restored, even if state law permits him to possess the firearm.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gabriel Valdez ANDAVERDE, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1995-08-24(g)(1)

We affirm the district court’s ruling that prosecution of Andaverde under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, and that the statute applied to Andaverde as a convicted felon because his civil rights had not been substantially restored.

A defendant's stipulation that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm establishes that his civil rights had not been restored for § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Bartlett · filed 1995-09-08(g)(1)

The stipulation in this case is substantially similar to the one in Clark. Bartlett, therefore, has conceded that his civil rights had not been restored at the time of his arrest for illegal possession of a firearm by a felon. Thus, his challenge to his conviction fails.

A conviction for which civil rights were restored may support a § 922(g)(1) charge if the restoration expressly prohibits firearm possession.

Howard v. United States · filed 1995-09-08(g)(1)

Section 921(a)(20), referred to above, does state that prior convictions may not be counted as predicate offenses for purposes of § 922(g)(1) if civil rights have been restored. ... However, that same section goes on to state that convictions for which civil rights have been restored may count as predicate offenses for purposes of § 922(g)(1) if the “restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” § 921(a)(20).

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply when state law has restored a felon’s civil rights and ended the state’s firearm restriction.

United States v. Dupaquier · filed 1996-01-26(g)(1)

As we have found that the Louisiana Constitution restored essentially all of Dupaqier’s civil rights upon completion of his sentence on July 14,1980, and the statutory restriction on his right to possess firearms terminated on July 14,1990, we hold that Dupaquier was not a convicted felon within the meaning of sections 921(a)(20) and 922(g)(1) at the time of the alleged conduct on August 8, 1990.

For a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1), courts look to the whole of state law to determine whether a prior conviction still counts after restoration of civil rights.

United States v. Sorenson · filed 1996-04-01(g)(1)

Sorenson's efforts with this analytical approach are futile. We have previously held that in determining whether a felon was properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the court looks to the whole of state law to determine whether a defendant's civil rights have been restored within the meaning of § 921(a)(20). ... While Oregon Revised Statute § 137.281 states that "[t]he rights and privileges withdrawn by this section are restored automatically upon discharge or parole from imprisonment ...," section 166.270 prohibits the possession of "any pistol, revolver, or other firearms capable of being concealed upon the person....," by a person who has committed a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon conviction based on a prior state conviction when state law substantially restricts the person's firearm rights despite restoring other civil rights.

U.S. v. Estrella · filed 1996-04-04(g)(1)

Accordingly, the court finds that the defendant's civil rights never were restored from his June 2 7 , 1980, conviction, and that that state conviction is a proper basis for a federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; possible future restoration of firearm rights does not affect possession at the time.

United States v. Simon · filed 1996-04-17(g)(1)

Conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. It is irrelevant whether Simon might potentially have been able to legally possess a firearm in the near future. The only question is whether he knowingly possessed it at the time.

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply when a person’s civil rights are restored through a certificate and statute that do not expressly restrict firearm possession.

United States v. Bost · filed 1996-06-28(g)(1)

Because neither the certificate nor the statute contains any language expressly limiting his right to possess a firearm, we conclude that Bost is not subject to prosecution under section 922(g).

A prior felony remains a predicate for § 922(g)(1) when the convicting state has not substantially restored the person's civil rights.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John J. OMAN, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-08-05(g)(1)

We review de novo whether Oman’s rights have been restored such that the prior convictions may not be used as predicate offenses in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Following the framework in Meeks, we hold that Oman’s civil rights were not restored under section 921(a)(20).

Section 922(g) applies despite a restoration of civil rights when state law still prohibits the felon from possessing firearms.

United States v. Oliver N. Gill, Jr. · filed 1996-08-19(g)

In determining whether a felon was properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the court looks "to the whole of state law to determine whether the restoration of civil rights expressly prohibits firearm possession."

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a person's civil rights have been restored but state law expressly prohibits that person from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Summers · filed 1996-08-19(g)(1)

Summers correctly states that his rights were substantially restored under Or.Rev.Stat. § 137.281(5). Nevertheless, Or.Rev.Stat. § 166.270(1), expressly prohibits ex-felons from possessing any firearm, thereby subjecting him to conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a prior conviction still counts under § 921(a)(20); restoration of civil rights can remove a conviction from that definition.

United States v. Caron · filed 1996-09-12(g)(1)

By virtue of his federal convictions, therefore, Caron is ineligible to serve on a federal jury. This, in turn, means that his federal civil rights have not adequately been restored pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Accordingly, Caron is now and, more importantly, was at the time of the instant crime and indictment, a federally-defined felon.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a felon whom state law still bars from possessing firearms, even if his civil rights have been restored.

Thomas v. United States · filed 1996-10-11(g)(1)

In addition, it is clear under Rhode Island law that even if his civil rights had been restored, he would be forever barred from possession of a firearm and thus, subject to federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits prosecution of a felon whose civil rights have been restored only in part.

Taylor v. United States · filed 1996-10-21(g)(1)

However, convicted felons may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), despite a partial restoration of their rights.

Section 922(g) continues to treat a person as a convicted felon when Indiana has only partially restored his civil rights.

United States v. Robert E. Merriweather, A/K/A James Cooper · filed 1996-11-14(g)

Simply put, section 922(g), like Indiana, still views Merriweather as a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) still prohibits firearm possession when a felon has regained voting rights but has not had substantially all civil rights restored or obtained the certificate required by state law to possess firearms.

United States v. Sims · filed 1996-11-22(g)(1)

In contrast to the situation described in Thomas, Sims was not told that all or substantially all of his civil rights had been restored. Instead, he was told that “[t]he right of suffrage is hereby fully and completely restored to Roger Sims.” Furthermore, Mississippi specifically prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms without being granted a certificate of rehabilitation after a court has determined, inter alia, that the person is not “likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-5. The record does not indicate, and Sims does not allege, that he has ever even requested such a certificate. Thus, Sims’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was not erroneous, and his attorney was not deficient for failing to object on this basis.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from possessing a firearm, subject to the § 921(a)(20) exception for convictions followed by restoration of civil rights without an express firearms restriction.

United States v. Fowler · filed 1996-12-23(g)(1)

We are similarly convinced that the use of the present tense in the quoted portion of § 921(a)(20) clearly indicates that we are to consider only whether the law viewed at the time civil rights were restored “expressly provides” that the defendant may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. See United States v. Haynes, 961 F.2d 50, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting the same interpretation of § 921(a)(20)); United States v. Traxel, 914 F.2d 119, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). If the law did not so expressly provide, then it is irrelevant whether the defendant’s civil rights were subsequently limited. Because there was no such limiting provision in Colorado law applicable to Mr. Fowler at the time his civil rights were restored, we conclude that the government improperly relied upon his 1987 trespass conviction to support his § 922(g)(1) prosecution.

A conviction expunged after firearm possession remains a disqualifying conviction under § 922(g)(1) at the time of possession.

United States v. Julian · filed 1997-08-13(g)(1)

Applying these varied principles to the statute, we conclude that an expungement does not retroactively “erase” the illegality of firearm possession while the conviction was outstanding.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a felon from possessing a firearm when Indiana has not substantially restored the felon’s civil rights, even if Indiana permits the possession.

United States v. Thompson · filed 1997-09-23(g)(1)

We also made clear that although state law determines whether there is a predicate state-law conviction, once the conviction is established, federal law dictates that the convicted felon may not possess any firearm. ... McKinley and Lee doom his argument.

Restoration of civil rights does not prevent a § 922(g)(1) conviction when state law still prohibits possession of the charged firearm.

United States v. Sjogren · filed 1997-09-26(g)(1)

If the defendant's civil rights have been substantially restored under state law, including his right to carry the weapon for which he is charged, then he cannot be convicted under section 922(g). ... At the time Sjogren's civil rights were restored, Oregon law prohibited him from possessing the Jennings .22 pistol with which he was charged and convicted. ... Therefore, Sjogren was properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

A conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) charge if the person's civil rights were restored and state law did not expressly prohibit firearm possession at the time of restoration, even if state law imposed a later ban.

United States v. Norman · filed 1997-11-28(g)(1)

Therefore, notwithstanding any later limitation which may have been imposed, his 1976 conviction could not serve as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1), and the district court erred in refusing to dismiss.

Section 922(g) does not require the government to prove that a defendant’s civil rights have not been restored; certified judgments of prior felonies can establish the conviction requirement.

United States v. Fisher · filed 1998-03-06(g)

Lack of restoration of rights is not an element of the § 922(g) charge, which required the government to prove only that, at the time Fisher possessed firearms, he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than one year. The certified judgments of Fisher’s two prior felony convictions were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) did not prohibit Holmes from possessing ammunition after his civil rights were restored by operation of Oregon law when he was paroled.

United States v. Holmes · filed 1998-03-13(g)(1)

Holmes contends that his conviction for possession of ammunition is invalid because his civil rights were restored by operation of law when he was paroled on his underlying Oregon felony conviction, and the law did not prohibit his possession of ammunition. ... The government correctly concedes this issue. Accordingly, we reverse Holmes's conviction for possession of ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit a former felon from possessing a type of firearm that state law permits after restoring the person's civil rights.

United States v. Qualls · filed 1998-04-02(g)(1)

As did the panel, we hold that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Qualls could only be convicted for possessing concealable weapons as prohibited in Cal.Penal Code § 12001(a).

Section 922(g) does not exempt a felon whose right to possess a firearm has been only partially restored under Indiana law, including through a dwelling exception.

United States v. Maher · filed 1998-05-15(g)

A partial restoration of civil rights to a convicted felon, such as the dwelling exception, contradicts this circuit’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person with a qualifying felony conviction from possessing any firearm when restored civil rights remain subject to a state firearms restriction.

Caron v. United States · filed 1998-06-22(g)(1)

Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding petitioner to have any guns.

Section 922(g)(1) still applies when a felon’s restoration letter returns only limited civil rights, leaving the prior conviction as a qualifying predicate.

Rutledge v. United States · filed 1998-09-25(g)(1)

Rutledge was convicted of Count IV (felon in possession of a firearm) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... First, under Glaser, it is patently clear that the letter Rutledge received did not restore all his civil rights. Second, under Roehl, Rutledge’s letter is a mere recitation of the statutory scheme enacted in Illinois and is not an individualized determination. For the above reasons, this Court concludes that Count IV should stand.

A felony remains a predicate for § 922(g)(1) when civil rights were not restored; voting and jury privileges obtained through misrepresentation do not establish restoration.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joe Lowell McELYEA, Jr. Defendant-Appellant · filed 1998-10-16(g)(1)

However, where, as here, those rights were granted based on his misrepresentation, we will give them no weight.

In some North Carolina § 922(g) prosecutions, the Government must prove that the defendant's civil rights, including the right to possess a firearm, had not been restored when the prior felony conviction occurred more than five years before firearm possession; that burden does not apply when possession occurred about two years after the conviction.

United States v. Coleman · filed 1999-03-18(g)

Moving to his trial, Coleman next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of a violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g). ... In this case, Coleman was arrested for possession of a firearm approximately two years after his conviction for the predicate offense. Under North Carolina law, Coleman's civil rights could not ordinarily have been restored. Consequently, the Government did not bear "the burden of proving independently the addition fact that [Coleman's] civil rights had not been restored." Id. Coleman's suggestion that the Government was required to do so is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not support a felon-in-possession charge when the person’s civil rights have been restored and state law did not expressly restrict firearm possession.

United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Francisco Meza-Corrales, United States of America v. Ramon Lamark Bridges · filed 1999-07-16(g)(1)

Therefore, the district court should have dismissed the superseding indictment on the grounds that Bridges’s civil rights had been restored to him and his right to possess a firearm had not been expressly restricted to even the slightest degree under then-existing Arizona law.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession prosecution despite restored civil rights when state law still restricts the person’s firearm privileges.

United States v. Brown · filed 1999-09-22(g)(1)

Thus, in accordance with Caron and the relevant Sixth Circuit precedents, the Court looks to the whole of Michigan law, and finds that the restrictions imposed by Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.426(1) regarding concealed weapons and pistols in vehicles trigger the “unless” clause of § 921(a)(20). ... Having carefully reviewed these preee-dents, and having considered Michigan law and the facts of this case in light of this governing case law, the Court concludes that Defendant is subject to prosecution under Count II of the Indictment.

A prior felony does not satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s conviction element when the person’s civil rights were restored under the law of the convicting state before the firearms charge.

Hampton v. United States · filed 1999-10-12(g)(1)

Because his rights were so restored from the 1986 conviction, it appears that Petitioner plead guilty to a charge to which he was actually innocent because the Government could not satisfy all of the elements of the § 922(g) charge.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm prohibition remains in effect after a federal felony conviction unless civil rights are restored under federal law; state restoration does not suffice.

United States v. Rhynes · filed 1999-10-26(g)(1)

Therefore, in absence of restoration of W. Rhynes’ civil rights by the Secretary of the Treasury, his conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was proper.

Section 922(g)(1) does not bar firearm possession based on a prior conviction when the state restores the person's civil and firearm rights without an express restriction.

United States v. Fowler · filed 1999-12-17(g)(1)

In this case he cannot be convicted under § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm based on his 1972 second degree burglary conviction because the state restored to him all civil and political rights and the certificate was not expressly limited in the manner contemplated and provided by Congress.

Section 922(g)(9) does not cover a Michigan domestic violence misdemeanor when state law provides for loss and restoration of voting rights, even if the defendant was never jailed and never lost that right.

United States v. Wegrzyn · filed 2000-05-26(g)(9)

After conducting its own detailed analysis of the relationship between the Michigan statute and § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), the Court concludes that Michigan law excludes persons who commit misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from prosecution under § 922(g)(9).

A person remains subject to § 922(g)(1) after restoration of civil rights if state law has not restored that person’s firearm rights.

United States v. Green · filed 2000-06-14(g)(1)

Because Defendant’s rights with respect to firearms were never restored under Michigan law, Defendant remained a “convicted felon” subject to prosecution under § 922(g) on the dates charged in the indictment despite the restoration of his civil rights to vote, hold public office, and serve on a jury, and therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment is DENIED.

A later restoration of civil rights does not remove a prior conviction as a predicate under § 922(g)(1) if the defendant possessed the firearm before the restoration.

United States v. John "j.r." Morgan · filed 2000-06-16(g)(1)

Because the 1968 burglary conviction was a firearms disabling offense on the day that he possessed the firearm, the district court correctly concluded that Morgan’s post-indictment restoration of civil rights was immaterial to his charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a felon whose civil rights were restored if state law still restricts that person’s right to possess firearms.

Hervey v. United States · filed 2000-06-20(g)(1)

Michigan’s limited firearms restrictions are sufficient to trigger the ‘unless’ clause of § 921(a)(20) and render petitioner subject to prosecution under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) applies despite restoration of civil rights when state law still prohibits firearm possession for the prior felony.

Allen v. United States · filed 2000-06-21(g)

In the present case, by contrast, petitioner was convicted of cocaine possession in 1990 and was on probation until December 16, 1992. Count 14 arose from petitioner’s possession of a firearm on May 22, 1997, well inside of the five year prohibition set by Michigan law. Since petitioner was correctly charged with Count 14, being a felon in possession of a firearm, his claim that counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge and by allowing petitioner to plead guilty to said Count cannot stand.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a prior felony as a predicate conviction when the state’s restoration of civil rights expressly excludes firearm possession, even if it does not exclude ammunition possession.

Deroo v. United States · filed 2000-08-31(g)(1)

Therefore, under the plain language of the “unless clause” of section 921(a)(20), DeRoo’s restorations are insufficient to keep his convictions from counting as predicate convictions under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession charge after civil rights are restored if state law still prohibits the person from possessing firearms.

United States v. Wheeler · filed 2000-09-19(g)(1)

These alleged violations were within the 3-year and 5-year minimum prohibitions against firearms possession pursuant to Michigan law and, therefore, were properly charged to Defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing ammunition when restored civil rights remain subject to a state restriction on firearm possession.

United States v. Wheeler · filed 2000-10-10(g)(1)

In accordance with Caron and DeRoo, this Court concludes that because the restoration of Defendant’s civil rights under Michigan law provided that Defendant may not possess firearms for at least a 3-year period, Section 922(g) prohibited the possession of firearms and ammunition during that time, even though Defendant’s other civil rights were restored.

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply to a prior felony when the person's key civil rights have been restored under state law and the conviction no longer counts under § 921(a)(20).

United States v. Williams · filed 2000-11-09(g)(1)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), it is unlawful for a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship, transport, or possess a firearm. ... Accordingly, Defendant Williams was not a ‘convicted felon’ within the definition of § 921(a)(20) on September 23, 1996 and January 13, 1998 and counts 4 and 6 of the superceding indictment must be dismissed.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a person’s civil rights have not been fully restored after a felony conviction.

United States v. Carter · filed 2001-05-01(g)(1)

As his rights had not been fully restored, he was properly subject to prosecution under § 922(g)(1), and Carter’s counsel has failed to set forth any reason why Sixth Circuit precedent should not apply in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from possessing a firearm when the person remains a felon under § 921(a)(20).

United States v. Campbell · filed 2001-05-14(g)(1)

The federal felon-in-possession statute involves a two-part inquiry: (1) if a convicted felon’s civil rights have been restored under state law, he shall no longer be considered a felon for purposes of § 922(g), except (2) if, pursuant to the “unless clause” of § 921(a)(20), the felon remains prohibited from firearms possession. ... Therefore, if the law of the State of Michigan places a restriction on a felon’s right or privilege to possess firearms following a conviction, that person retains the status of a convicted felon and is subject to prosecution under § 922(g), notwithstanding any restoration of civil rights by the convicting jurisdiction.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing or receiving a firearm, subject to Section 921(a)(20)'s restoration of civil rights exception.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Viall · filed 2001-05-25(g)

Also, as noted above, Section 922(g) of the Gun Control Act prohibits any person who has been convicted “in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing or receiving a firearm. ... Pursuant to Section 921(a)(20) of the Gun Control Act, we must look to the law of New York to determine if Viall had a disqualifying “conviction” under Section 922(g) of the Gun Control Act. ... Thus, as Viall received a certificate of relief from disabilities from the Broome County Court of New York, his “convicting jurisdiction,” which certificate fully restored his civil rights, we cannot say that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in upholding Viall’s appeal.

A felony remains a predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1) when state law expressly bars the person from possessing firearms despite restoring other civil rights.

United States v. Ormsby · filed 2001-06-04(g)(1)

Since defendant was specifically prohibited by Michigan law from possessing firearms until his right to do so was restored pursuant to M.C.L. § 28.424, the “unless” clause applies and his felonious assault conviction was a proper predicate for the § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g) continues to apply to a prior felony conviction when state law has not restored the defendant’s right to possess a firearm, even if other civil rights have been restored.

United States v. Gauthier · filed 2001-06-11(g)

Therefore, Gauthier’s § 922(g) conviction was not plainly erroneous, as his right to possess a firearm had not been restored under state law.