18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Horne · filed 2006-11-22(g)

As Horne correctly recognizes, we have previously rejected this ... challenge and held that a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a convicted felon from possessing a firearm when the government shows a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Paopao · filed 2006-11-22(g)(1)

In Hanna this court held that, to be constitutional, the government need only show a “ ‘minimal nexus that the firearm [had] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.’ ” ... In light of this distinction, we conclude that McCoy has no effect on the Hanna and Rousseau holdings and that the District Court’s denial of Paopao’s motion to dismiss was proper.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms when a sufficient interstate commerce nexus exists.

United States v. Latu · filed 2006-11-30(g)(1)

Latu also argues on appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because the firearms were not in or affecting interstate commerce. ... Because Latu admitted to possession of firearms made outside, and brought into, Hawaii, a sufficient interstate commerce nexus was established. ... Therefore, the district court did not lack jurisdiction to sentence Latu for the firearms plea.

Section 922(g)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2007-01-31(g)

Similarly, Campbell’s stipulation that the charged firearms previously moved in interstate commerce satisfies the statutory requirement that his possession be “in or affecting commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by possession of firearms manufactured outside the state that traveled into it.

United States v. Carter · filed 2007-02-13(g)(1)

Further, the factual basis was sufficient as Carter admitted that he unlawfully possessed two shotguns that had been manufactured outside Texas and that had traveled in commerce to the Southern District of Texas.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that firearm possession substantially affected interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Whitehead · filed 2007-02-14(g)(1)

Whitehead contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate or foreign commerce. ... Whitehead raises these arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, they are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element does not require proof that the firearm substantially affected interstate commerce; proof that it crossed a state line before the defendant possessed it is sufficient.

United States v. Nance · filed 2007-04-06(g)

The jury was not required to find that the firearm had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Henry, 429 F.3d 603, 619-20 (6th Cir. 2005). Rather, the instruction given was sufficient to establish an interstate nexus. See id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nance’s request.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed in another.

United States v. Fields · filed 2007-04-20(g)(1)

This court has also held that evidence that a weapon was manufactured in one state and possessed in another is sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g). ... Accordingly, Fields’s arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Hill · filed 2007-05-18(g)(1)

As w e have explained before, the interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by proof the firearm possessed had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

A firearm manufactured out of state satisfies § 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element.

United States v. Msugar · filed 2007-06-07(g)(1)

Msugar also argues for the first time on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction under § 922(g)(1) because the only proof that the firearm was “in or affecting commerce” was the stipulated fact that it had been manufactured out of state. ... Msugar’s argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Bradley · filed 2007-07-24(g)(1)

During Mr. Bradley’s trial, the Government presented evidence that the grenade was manufactured in Japan and possessed by Mr. Bradley in Wyoming. This is sufficient evidence of the grenade’s nexus with interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) reaches a felon's possession of a firearm that crossed state lines at any earlier point.

United States v. McNeill · filed 2007-08-20(g)(1)

W e have repeatedly rejected similar challenges to § 922(g)(1) under “[t]he constitutional understanding implicit in Scarborough [v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977)] – that Congress may regulate any firearm that has ever traversed state lines.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires that the firearm have traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Lee, Eddie · filed 2007-09-17(g)(1)

In order to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a defendant must have a prior felony convic- tion, posses a firearm, and the firearm must have traveled in interstate commerce prior to the defendant’s possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1) satisfies the Commerce Clause when the firearm was manufactured out of state and previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Martin · filed 2007-09-20(g)(1)

Similarly, we have upheld § 922(g)(1) against as-applied constitutional challenges when, as in this case, the government demonstrated at trial that the firearm possessed by the defendant was manufactured out-of-state and thus traveled across state lines in the past. ... We thus find no error in the judgment below.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional despite not requiring proof that firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Santiago, Aris · filed 2007-10-11(g)(1)

Counsel and Santiago first consider arguing that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it does not require the government to prove that Santiago’s possession of a firearm substantially affected interstate commerce. This argument would be frivolous because we have repeatedly rejected it, holding that the “argument is clearly foreclosed by controlling precedent.”

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(j) may reach intrastate possession of a firearm that previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Lee-Clark · filed 2007-12-07(g)(1), (j)

Mr. Lee-Clark contends that 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(j)–the bases of Counts One and Two, respectively–exceed Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. ... In Patton, we applied the Supreme Court’s implicit holding in Scarborough “that Congress may regulate any firearm that has ever traversed state lines.” 451 F.3d at 634. ... Our prior decisions are controlling.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm is manufactured in one state and possessed in another.

United States v. Holloway · filed 2007-12-12(g)(1)

The fact that the firearm was manufactured in Virginia and found in Holloway’s possession in Kentucky establishes that it traveled in commerce.

Section 922(d)(1) does not require the government to prove that the firearm moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Haskins · filed 2007-12-26(d)(1)

By its terms, § 922(d) contains no requirement that the government prove the firearm moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed in another.

United States v. Perkins · filed 2008-01-07(g)(1)

Perkins’s assertion that there was no quantifiable evidence establishing that the firearms affected interstate commerce is foreclosed by our precedent to the effect that evidence that a weapon was manufactured in one state and possessed in another state is sufficient for the interstate commerce element to sustain a conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by showing that the firearm crossed a state line before or after the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Banks · filed 2008-01-09(g)(1)

At trial, the government had the burden of proving two elements: 1) that Banks possessed the firearm and 2) that the firearm crossed one or more state lines either before or after Banks came into possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and found in another.

United States v. Smiley · filed 2008-01-16(g)(1)

And an ATF agent testified that the firearm was manufactured in Arkansas and found in Alabama, which established the interstate nexus.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm moved across state lines at some time; a commercial transaction is not required.

United States v. Avila-Gonzalez · filed 2008-02-07(g)

It clarifies that the firearm must have “moved at some time from one state to another” as the requirement for satisfying § 922(g)’s interstate nexus element.

Section 922(k)’s interstate commerce element can be supported by circumstantial evidence of interstate travel and a firearm marking indicating manufacture in another state.

United States v. Wallace · filed 2008-02-12(k)

Based on the circumstantial evidence presented to the jury regard- ing Wallace’s whereabouts and Wallace’s admission at oral argument that the gun was engraved with the words "MFG:MIAMI, FL"8, we find no error in the jury’s decision.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm crossed state lines at any point before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Rice · filed 2008-04-01(g)(1)

Because the statute only requires proof that the firearms had moved across state lines at some point before the defendant’s possession, a threshold indisputably satisfied here, we conclude that the requisite tie to interstate commerce has been satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm crossed state lines at any point before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Rice, Julio · filed 2008-04-01(g)(1)

Following Scarborough, we have held on numerous occasions that as long as a firearm moved across state lines at some point prior to the defendant’s possession of it, the possession satisfies § 922(g)(1)’s “in or affecting commerce” requirement.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's possession of a firearm that crossed state lines at any time in the past.

United States v. Gordon · filed 2008-04-02(g)(1)

We disagree that the natural construction of § 922(g), which criminalizes possession of a firearm that has at any time in the past crossed state lines, creates any constitutional doubt.

Section 922(g)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2008-04-16(g)

The record in this case established that the gun in Edwards’ possession had traveled across state lines. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute is not open to question.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in another state and possessed in the state of prosecution.

United States v. Dixon · filed 2008-04-24(g)

Accordingly, proof that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than Kansas and was possessed by this defendant in Kansas will suffice to prove the interstate commerce element upon which this court’s subject matter jurisdiction is based. This motion is denied.

Section 922(g)’s interstate nexus requirement is satisfied when a firearm is purchased in one state, transported to another, and sold there.

United States v. Salley · filed 2008-05-12(g)

If the Government established that Mr. Salley possessed the Bushmaster firearm, the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Steinhagen purchased the firearm in New Hampshire, traveled to Maine, and sold it here. This is sufficient to satisfy the interstate nexus requirement.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce element is satisfied by a minimal nexus, including proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2008-05-13(g)(1)

The Government met its burden of proving the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce, as it demonstrated the requisite minimal nexus by showing that Stevens possessed the gun in Georgia, and the gun was manufactured in Israel.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce nexus is an element of the offense, not a limit on the court’s jurisdiction, and a guilty plea can waive a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence establishing that nexus.

United States v. Martin · filed 2008-05-23(g)(1)

Martin argues, however, that his conditional guilty plea did not waive his right to challenge on appeal the insufficiency of evidence establishing that the gun upon which his felon-in-possession charge was predicated traveled in, or affected, interstate commerce because this issue is a jurisdictional one. However, case law does not support Martin’s position. Although Martin is correct that his guilty plea did not waive jurisdictional defenses, his characterization of his challenge in this case as “jurisdictional” is wrong.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the firearm substantially affected interstate commerce or that the defendant knew of its interstate nexus.

United States v. Deleon · filed 2008-05-30(g)(1)

Deleon asserts that the district court plainly erred in finding an adequate factual basis to support his guilty plea to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm because the factual resume failed to show: (1) that his actions had a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce, and (2) that Deleon knew the firearms he possessed were in or affecting interstate commerce. Deleon contends ... that the interstate commerce requirement necessitates more than the movement of the firearm across state lines at some point in the past and that there must be evidence he knew of the interstate nexus. As Deleon concedes, however, each of these issues is foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g) applies when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce; that movement supplies a sufficient commerce nexus.

Holmes v. United States · filed 2008-06-18(g)

Testimony was presented at trial that the gun in question was manufactured in Florida and shipped in interstate commerce to Tennessee. ... The Government met its burden in this case and we reject Holmes’s challenge to § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between firearm possession and interstate commerce, such as the firearm having crossed state lines.

United States v. Estremera · filed 2008-07-03(g)(1)

Estremera’s claim conflicts with the controlling law in this Circuit, which has reaffirmed that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), when interpreted to require only a “minimal nexus” between the defendant’s possession of a firearm and interstate commerce, is constitutional and does not violate Lopez, Morrison, or Jones.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce nexus is satisfied if the firearm once traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Irish · filed 2008-07-31(g)(1)

Last, the required nexus between a firearm and commerce is established by showing that the firearm at one time traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of an interstate commerce connection for the firearm.

United States v. Vickers · filed 2008-08-12(g)(1)

Vickers’s other challenge to his conviction is that the Government failed to sustain its burden that the gun found on Vickers “affect[ed] interstate commerce” – an essential element of the statute Vickers was charged with violating. This court has held that evidence similar to what was presented in this case is sufficient to establish the “interstate commerce” element of Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by evidence that the firearm moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Blanchard, Marshall · filed 2008-09-08(g)(1)

But “movement in interstate commerce is all the Supreme Court ... requires under the statute,” United States v. Jackson, 479 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977)), and Blanchard does not dispute the evidence of interstate movement of the firearms presented at trial.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was found.

United States v. Vallejo · filed 2008-09-11(g)(1)

We also conclude that the district court did not err in denying Vallejo’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Vallejo’s contention that the fact a firearm was manufactured outside the state in which it was found is insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Commerce Clause is foreclosed by United States v. Latu, 479 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce, which law enforcement testimony can establish.

United States v. Louisuis · filed 2008-09-26(g)(1)

Testimony from a law enforcement official established the nexus between the firearms and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state of possession and traveled in interstate commerce.

Hilson v. United States · filed 2008-10-27(g)(1)

Accordingly, Mr. Hilson’s admission that the nine-millimeter Beretta that Officers recovered from him was “manufactured outside the State of Ohio and traveled in interstate commerce,” establishes this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm crossed state lines before the felon possessed it.

United States v. Perry · filed 2008-11-24(g)(1)

This argument fails, however, because Perry stipulated the firearm was manufactured outside the state of Minnesota and was transported across state lines prior to his possession of it. We have repeatedly held this is sufficient to satisfy § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a firearm crossed state lines in its presently assembled state.

United States v. Gomez · filed 2008-12-02(g)(1)

Nor did the district court err in declining to instruct the jury that the government had to prove that the pistol had been shipped in interstate commerce “in its presently assembled state.” The statutory definition of “firearm” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not include such language, and Gomez has not identified— nor have we found — a decision of this or any other circuit reading such language into the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, which is satisfied when a firearm has traveled across borders before the defendant possesses it.

United States v. Harris · filed 2008-12-29(g)(1)

Here, the government presented uncontradicted testimony that the rifle was made in Romania, imported into Vermont, and found in Harris’ truck in Florida. Similarly, Harris’ ammunition was manufactured in Illinois. Under Dupree, the government has proved a minimal but sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Cook · filed 2009-01-28(g)(1)

Cook argues that evidence that the firearms at issue had previously traveled in interstate commerce was insufficient to establish the interstate commerce element of the offense. Cook concedes that this argument is foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001).

Section 922(g)’s commerce requirement is satisfied if either the firearm or the ammunition has traveled across state lines.

United States v. Combs · filed 2009-02-11(g)

If either the firearm or the ammunition was "in or affecting ... commerce," that is sufficient to meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was made in another state.

United States v. Maclin · filed 2009-03-09(g)

Maclin does not dispute that he had a felony conviction before this case, and the government’s evidence that the gun was made in Maryland satisfies the commerce element of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by evidence that a firearm was made in one state and later possessed in another.

United States v. Vincent · filed 2009-03-13(g)(1)

Based on this testimony, the jury was free to conclude the weapon had crossed state lines by traveling between Florida and Maryland, and thus moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Smith · filed 2009-03-20(g)

His argument regarding the insufficiency of the evidence is also foreclosed by United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that § 922(g) requires only a “minimal nexus to interstate commerce” and finding as sufficient evidence the fact that the defendant had been arrested in Georgia but in possession of a gun manufactured in California).

Section 922(g) requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce; manufacture in one state and possession in another suffices.

United States v. Knight · filed 2009-03-25(g)

To be convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the firearm must have affected interstate commerce, and a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that a firearm was manufactured in another state and recovered in the state of possession.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2009-04-24(g)(1)

Finally, the requisite interstate commerce element of the offense was established by evidence the firearm and ammunition were manufactured in Ohio, Illinois, and Nebraska, and were recovered in North Carolina.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled across state lines; the government need not show that the defendant’s possession affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Urbano · filed 2009-04-29(g)(1)

This court’s precedent makes clear that § 922(g)(1) does not require an individual showing of an effect on interstate commerce so long as the firearm has traveled across state lines in the past.

Section 922(g) has an interstate commerce element; Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses the challenge to that element addressed in this opinion.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2009-05-18(g)

Garcia also argues that the factual basis for the interstate commerce element of § 922(g) was insufficient to support his guilty plea conviction and, alternatively, that § 922(g) is unconstitutional. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001).

Heller does not make the interstate commerce elements of § 922(g)(1) and (k) harder for the government to prove.

United States v. Grier · filed 2009-06-19(g)(1), (k)

Defendant’s contends that the District Court’s failure to explain to defendant the interstate commerce element of each crime amounted to error because the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), “makes the interstate commerce element [of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (k) ] more difficult for the Government to prove.” Appellant’s Br. 26. That proposition is belied by the Supreme Court’s explicit declaration — in Heller, no less — that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and other similar offenses, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-18 & n. 26.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Schmidt · filed 2009-07-02(g)(1)

Likewise, Schmidt’s possession of a shotgun manufactured in Belgium, and ammunition manufactured in Missouri and either Connecticut or Arkansas, is sufficient to satisfy § 922(g)(l)’s required nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate nexus element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in another state and transported to the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Smith · filed 2009-07-10(g)(1)

Smith asserts that evidence that the firearm was manufactured in a different state and then transported to Maryland was insufficient to establish the interstate nexus element of the charge against him. However, as Smith concedes, our precedent holds that such evidence is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce nexus is satisfied when the firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Morgan · filed 2009-07-13(g)(1)

Morgan stipulated that the firearm at issue was manufactured outside the state of Georgia and therefore crossed state lines prior to his possession. This established the constitutionally required nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured out of state.

United States v. Cantu · filed 2009-07-14(g)(1)

“The interstate commerce element of a § 922(g)(1) charge is satisfied where the [G]overnment demonstrates that the firearm was manufactured out of state.”

Section 922(g) does not require proof of a substantial nexus between the offense and interstate commerce to withstand a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Duncan · filed 2009-12-08(g)

We reject Duncan’s argument that section 922(g) is unconstitutional because the act fails to require proof of a substantial nexus between the offense and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by proof that a firearm’s frame crossed state lines.

United States v. Broadnax · filed 2010-01-26(g)(1)

The frame counts as a “firearm” under § 921(a)(3). Thus, evidence that the frame of the firearm was “in and affecting interstate commerce” because it was manufactured in Florida and ended up in Texas is factually and legally sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce if the firearm previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Allen · filed 2011-03-22(g)(1)

As he recognizes, the law in this circuit is “clear that § 922(g)(1) does not require an individual showing of an effect on interstate commerce so long as the firearm has traveled across state lines in the past.” Urbano, 563 F.3d at 1155. Therefore, we are bound to affirm the district court’s refusal to give Mr. Allen’s proffered jury instruction.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm and ammunition crossed state lines before the offense.

United States v. Mack · filed 2011-08-03(g)

Mack and the government stipulated that the firearm and ammunition he possessed crossed the state line prior to their recovery in Florida. Thus, the government showed the required interstate commerce nexus. Accordingly, § 922(g) is constitutional on its face and as applied to Mack.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a firearm traveled in interstate commerce after the statute took effect.

United States v. Knapper · filed 2011-09-27(g)(1)

Knapper contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) should be interpreted as requiring proof that the firearm at issue traveled in interstate commerce after the effective date of the statute.3 ... Thus, the Supreme Court does not require proof of travel in interstate commerce post-enactment.

A firearm’s prior travel in interstate commerce supplies the interstate commerce connection for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2011-10-17(g)(1)

Robinson’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) is also unavailing because the government introduced sufficient evidence to prove that the firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in a different state from where it was possessed.

United States v. Harris · filed 2012-01-27(g)

Here, the Government introduced evidence showing that the firearm at issue was manufactured in Vermont, and that Harris had possessed it in Pennsylvania. This plainly satisfies the interstate commerce requirement of section 922(g).

Section 922’s interstate commerce element requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce under the test that remains in force after Lopez.

United States v. Safeeullah · filed 2012-01-31

But Lopez did not overrule Scarborough, and we have continued to apply the minimal nexus test post-Lopez.

Section 922(g) may constitutionally be applied when the firearm possessed by the defendant traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Pritchard · filed 2012-02-24(g)

Here, Pritchard concedes that the Government presented evidence that the firearm at issue had traveled in interstate commerce and acknowledges that his argument is at odds with this Court’s binding precedent. Accordingly, we find the district court’s application of § 922(g) was not unconstitutional.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) does not require an indictment to allege an interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Ibarra · filed 2012-04-30(a)(1)(A)

In addition, the interstate commerce nexus is not an element required to be charged for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm had moved in interstate commerce, and a challenge to the section under Congress’s commerce power is foreclosed.

United States v. Bivins · filed 2012-11-01(g)

Finally, Bivins argues that there was no proof that he knew that the gun had moved in interstate commerce and that § 922(g) is a violation of Congress’s commerce power. As he concedes, these arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(n)’s interstate commerce nexus is sufficient to withstand facial and as-applied constitutional challenges based on the absence of a significant effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Acevedo-Gallegos · filed 2013-01-17(n)

Acevedo first claims the conviction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to him, because it does not require a significant effect on interstate commerce and, alternately, because no such effect has been shown here. ... The same reasoning applies here and renders Acevedo’s challenge unavailing.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a felon possesses a firearm that was manufactured outside the state of possession and thus traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2013-05-07(g)(1)

We also reject Thompson’s argument that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because -- as Thompson has stipulated -- the gun that Thompson possessed in Florida was manufactured outside of Florida and, thus, had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires proof of a sufficient connection between the charged offense and interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Bogle · filed 2013-05-23(g)

Although we address Bogle’s Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g) in the Opinion filed alongside this Summary Order, Bogle also argues that section 922(g) is not authorized by the Commerce Clause. We rejected this argument in United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2001), citing section 922(g)’s “express jurisdictional element requiring the government to provide evidence . . . of a sufficient nexus between the charged offense and interstate or foreign commerce.”

Section 922(h) does not require the prosecution to prove that the defendant transported a firearm in interstate commerce; receipt of a firearm previously shipped or transported in interstate commerce by anyone is sufficient.

United States v. Sherwood · filed 2013-08-02(h)

In Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976), the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) does not require the prosecution to prove that the defendant transported a firearm in interstate commerce. ... Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting Sherwood’s motion to dismiss Counts 33 and 34.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm possessed within a state was manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Moody · filed 2014-02-03(g)(1)

As it is undisputed that the firearm involved in this case was manufactured outside the state of Florida, the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) was satisfied, and the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Moody’s conduct.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. James Franklin Broomfield, Jr. · filed 2014-12-03(g)(1)

This minimal nexus is satisfied if the government demonstrates that the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce, as the government did here.

A firearm’s travel between D.C. and Virginia can satisfy § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element.

United States v. Reed · filed 2015-03-11(g)(1)

The natural result of that conclusion is that the firearms traveled in interstate commerce by going from D.C. to Virginia and back. ... As a result, a reasonable jury could convict Appellants under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm possessed in Puerto Rico was manufactured abroad.

United States v. Torres-Colon · filed 2015-06-12(g)(1)

Whether one describes possession of a firearm manufactured abroad as "in" or "affecting" commerce, the government provided sufficient evidence to prove the limited interstate nexus that § 922(g) requires.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied by markings showing that the firearm originated in another state.

United States v. Ellis · filed 2015-09-25(g)(1)

Markings showing that the gun originated in Connecticut satisfied the interstate-commerce requirement.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction does not require proof that the defendant’s firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Quintin Walker · filed 2015-11-13(g)(1)

“In order to preserve the issue for further review,” Walker also argues that his conviction under § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the government did not prove and was not required to prove that his possession of a firearm had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As he concedes, this argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearms and ammunition were manufactured outside the state where they were possessed.

United States v. Ernst · filed 2015-11-20(g)(1)

The record contains sufficient evidence to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Ernst stipulated that the firearms and ammunition at issue were manufactured outside of Oregon, which is sufficient to sustain his conviction under Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm and ammunition possessed in one state were manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Kirk · filed 2016-01-28(g)(1)

Here, the government produced evidence that the firearm and ammunition Kirk possessed in Florida were manufactured outside the state and therefore had necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. Given our undisturbed precedent, such evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the minimal nexus between the firearm and ammunition Kirk possessed and interstate commerce. Therefore, the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) was satisfied, and the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Kirk’s conduct.

Section 922(g) does not cover possession of the South Carolina-manufactured firearm identified by the court.

United States v. Marshall · filed 2016-03-11(g)

The Defendant’s possession of the FNP. 45 caliber firearm does not constitute a violation of Section 922(g) because it was manufactured in South Carolina.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied when ammunition contains a component manufactured in another state.

United States v. Hill · filed 2016-08-29(g)(1)

Accordingly, the government established the ammunition seized from Hill was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, and a Commerce Clause challenge to the provision is foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Price · filed 2017-08-01(g)(1)

He also correctly concedes that his arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and because it does not require proof of knowledge that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce are also foreclosed. ... The parties are correct that Martinez, Alcantar, and Rose foreclose Price’s arguments.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, which can be shown by proving that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Boatwright · filed 2017-11-01(g)(1)

We have held that “§ 922(g) only requires that the government prove some ‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by ‘demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce.’” Wright, 607 F.3d at 715 (quoting Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274). Boatwright concedes that the firearm and ammunition he possessed were manufactured outside of the state of Florida and therefore “traveled in interstate commerce.” See id. Accordingly, § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to his conduct and his guilty plea is valid.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge, and an indictment need not allege that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sealy · filed 2017-11-14(g)

Sealy also argues that his conviction under § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it regulates conduct that (1) falls outside of the Commerce Clause and (2) the indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to allege that he knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. As Sealy concedes, these arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145- 46 (5th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705-06 (5th Cir. 2009).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce requirement withstands a challenge based on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.

United States v. Hill · filed 2018-01-25(g)(1)

In fact, this court rejected that specific challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Alcantar. ... We are bound by this precedent, ... so Hill’s Sebelius challenge fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied by evidence that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Buchanan · filed 2018-04-27(g)(1)

Further, while Buchanan contends that this court’s construction of §922(g) is contrary to the plain language of the statute, we have held that evidence that “the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce” suffices to establish the interstate-commerce “nexus” required by § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a disqualifying conviction and proof that the firearm was involved in interstate or foreign commerce.

R.D. Navarro v. PSP · filed 2018-05-17(g)(1)

To be triggered, GCA Section 922(g) requires proof of two things: (1) a disqualifying conviction, and (2) that the firearm in question was involved in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal interstate-commerce nexus, which is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the offense occurred.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 2018-07-11(g)(1)

Proof that the firearm was manufactured outside of the state where the offense took place satisfies this burden. ... Here, the government proved at trial that the firearm was manufactured in California, and the offense took place in Florida. Thus, the statute was constitutional as applied to Mitchell, and his conviction must be affirmed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearm possessed by a felon traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Greer · filed 2019-02-20(g)(1)

The government proved that Greer’s firearm traveled in interstate commerce by introducing evidence that the weapon was manufactured in ... Connecticut, shipped to New York, and possessed by Greer in Florida. We reject Greer’s challenge to the constitutionality of section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm with a past connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Shederro Brooks · filed 2019-05-21(g)(1)

In United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1993), we rejected a similar challenge to the sufficiency of a factual basis, concluding that “a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm having a past connection to interstate commerce violates § 922(g)(1).” The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond did not address § 922(g)(1) or abrogate this holding.

On plain-error review, a § 922(n) guilty plea based on a firearm’s past interstate shipment does not show clear or obvious error merely because the record lacks proof that the defendant caused or knew of its interstate movement.

United States v. Gonzalez · filed 2019-07-03(n)

However, we may affirm the conviction without further briefing because, as Gonzalez concedes, no binding authority presently supports his reading of § 922(n) and § 924(a)(1)(D). ... Gonzalez thus fails to show that the district court committed clear or obvious error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires some proof that the firearm moved in interstate or foreign commerce before its prohibition applies.

Navarro, R. v. PA State Police, Aplt. · filed 2019-07-17(g)(1)

As the Commonwealth Court here properly found, the federal prohibition of Section 922(g) simply cannot apply absent some proof the firearm at issue moved in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection to interstate commerce, which the government can establish by showing that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Walker · filed 2019-10-30(g)(1)

Instead, “§ 922(g) only requires that the government prove some minimal nexus to interstate commerce,” and the government may meet its burden by showing that the particular firearm “traveled in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g) applies to a felon possessing a firearm that crossed state lines at some point.

Waldron v. United States · filed 2019-11-27(g)

As a felon allegedly in possession of a firearm that crossed state lines at some point, Mr. Waldron clearly falls within the purview of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside the state where the offense took place.

United States v. Ross · filed 2020-03-17(g)

Under § 922(g), the government need only prove a “minimal ... nexus” to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by demonstrating that the firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside of the state where the offense took place.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm traveled interstate before the felon possessed it.

United States v. Friel · filed 1993-08-17(g)(1)

We held that "possession of a gun that did travel interstate before the felon possessed it" satisfied Sec. 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) reaches only firearms that have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Trussell v. United States · filed 2021-04-21(g)

Section 922(g) reaches only those firearms that traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before or during the defendant’s possession.

United States v. Luke Burning Breast · filed 2021-08-11(g)(1)

The jury was properly instructed that the interstate commerce element of the offense is satisfied if the firearm was transported in interstate commerce “at some time during or before the defendant’s possession of it.”

Section 922(g) does not require proof that the defendant caused the firearm to cross state lines, that the crossing was a commercial transaction, or that it happened recently.

United States v. Salazar-Sanchez · filed 2022-02-22(g)

§ 922(g) should be construed to require proof that movement of the firearm across state lines was caused by the defendant’s conduct, proof that the firearm crossed state lines in a commercial transaction, or proof that the movement occurred in the recent past. ... The parties are correct that Salazar-Sanchez’s argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the defendant’s ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Goolsby · filed 2022-03-07(g)(1)

During his plea colloquy, Goolsby confirmed that his ammunition traveled in interstate commerce. That alone sinks his as-applied challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) remains valid against a Commerce Clause challenge and does not require recent interstate movement of the firearm or movement caused by the defendant.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2022-05-03(g)(1)

Also for the first time on appeal, Jenkins contends that § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause and, alternatively, that it should be construed to require either relatively recent movement of a firearm across state lines or movement in commerce as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct. ... As Jenkins correctly concedes, his arguments are foreclosed with respect to § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2524 (2021); United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), and the characterization of his robbery conviction as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), see United States v. Adair, 16 F.4th 469, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1215 (2022).

Section 922(g)(9) does not require recent interstate movement of the firearm or movement in commerce caused by the defendant’s conduct.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2022-06-21(g)(9)

He contends for the first time on appeal that § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause and, ... alternatively, that it should be construed to require either recent movement of a firearm across state lines or movement in commerce as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct. ... As Thomas concedes, his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g) does not require recent interstate movement of the firearm or movement in commerce caused by the defendant.

United States v. Dickenson · filed 2022-07-25(g)

He contends for the first time on appeal that Section 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause and, ... alternatively, that it should be construed to require either recent movement of a firearm across state lines or movement in commerce as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct. ... As Dickenson concedes, his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g) does not require recent interstate movement of a firearm or movement in commerce caused by the defendant’s conduct.

United States v. Reese · filed 2022-08-25(g)

Reese contends for the first time on appeal that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause and, ... alternatively, that it should be construed to require either recent movement of a firearm across state lines or movement in commerce as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct. As Reese concedes, however, his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(9) requires proof that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce when denying a firearm application based on a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction.

PSP v. N. Bell (OAG) · filed 2022-11-02(g)(9)

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Navarro II, and the decision of this Court in Madden, firearm application denials under either Section 6105(c) of the UFA or Section 922(g) of the FGCA require proof of interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gonzales · filed 2022-12-16(g)(1)

Scarborough held that the interstate-commerce-nexus requirement “was satisfied by proof that the firearm . . . possessed had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” 431 U.S. 563, 566–67 (1977). ... Because Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents answer these arguments, we affirm the § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Fraser · filed 2023-01-10(g)(1)

As Fraser correctly concedes, his arguments are foreclosed with respect to § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), and with respect to the characterization of his robbery convictions as crimes of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), see United States v. Adair, 16 F.4th 469, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1215 (2022).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require recent interstate movement of a firearm or movement caused by the defendant.

United States v. Bennett · filed 2023-10-18(g)(1)

Bennett contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and that ... § 922(g) should be construed to require either recent movement of a firearm across state lines or movement of a firearm across state lines in response to the defendant’s conduct. However, he correctly concedes that these arguments are foreclosed by Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), and United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013), and he merely raises these issues to preserve them for further review.

A defendant who admits that a firearm traveled in interstate commerce cannot establish plain error by arguing that § 922(g) requires a stronger interstate-commerce connection.

United States v. Overman · filed 2024-02-15(g)

Overman fails to make the requisite showing. He cites no binding authority for his arguments that satisfying § 922(g)’s interstate-commerce nexus requires more than a simple admission that the firearm in question travelled in interstate commerce—a fact he admitted in pleading guilty—or that § 922(g) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Day · filed 2024-02-23(g)(1)

Day first asserts: § 922(g)(1) requires more than a showing that the firearm he possessed traveled in interstate commerce; in the alternative, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. Day acknowledges our precedent forecloses his assertions.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2024-03-13(g)(1)

Here, circuit precedent forecloses his argument that past movement of a firearm in interstate commerce is insufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gipson · filed 2024-05-22(g)(1)

Circuit precedent forecloses his argument that past movement of a firearm in interstate commerce is insufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when ammunition crossed state lines at any point before possession.

United States v. Lee · filed 2024-08-12(g)(1)

It is sufficient to show that the contraband traveled in interstate commerce at some point in the past, even if the possession took place entirely in one state.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously crossed state lines, even if the possession itself did not involve interstate commerce.

United States v. Vaughn · filed 2024-10-30(g)(1)

If the weapon previously moved in interstate commerce, which it did here, the commerce clause has been satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Curry · filed 2025-01-13(g)(1)

In a similar vein, Curry stipulated to the firearm’s past movement in interstate commerce but argues that § 922(g)(1) requires more. This argument is similarly foreclosed by precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require more than a firearm’s past interstate travel to satisfy its interstate commerce requirement.

United States v. Mason · filed 2025-02-19(g)(1)

Mason also argues that the district court misinterpreted § 922(g)(1) because the statute requires more than mere past interstate travel at an indeterminate time. Alternatively, if this proposed interpretation is incorrect, Mason contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The parties correctly conclude that both arguments are also foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the firearm was in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2025-05-15(g)(1)

Importantly, in any federal case involving a felon-in-pos- session charge, the government must prove that the weapon was “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2025-06-10(g)(1)

Importantly, in any federal case involving a felon-in-pos- session charge, the government must prove that the weapon was “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government set forth that proof for the Glock only, informing the jury that Coleman had stipulated to the interstate com- merce nexus of the Glock.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied by a firearm's past interstate travel, even when the time of that travel is unspecified.

United States v. Turner · filed 2025-08-28(g)(1)

For the first time on appeal, Turner argues that the district court misinterpreted § 922(g) because the statute requires more than merely past interstate travel at an indeterminate time ... Turner correctly concedes that each argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it, even if it entered the state legally.

Wilkerson · filed 2025-12-02(g)(1)

The case law makes clear that the threshold for “in or affecting commerce” is a low bar to clear, and in this instant case, it is uncontested that the firearms crossed state lines. As such, the firearms “affected” interstate commerce and were properly charged under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) reaches possession of a firearm in or affecting commerce even if the firearm did not cross state lines.

Robert Jackson, III v. Garland · filed 2026-03-31(g)(1)

Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prohibits the possession of “any firearm” when such possession is “in or affecting commerce.” There is nothing in the statues that limits its scope to firearms transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the firearm to be operable.

People v. Bilfulco · filed 2022-07-20(g)(1)

As the People concede, the defendant should not have been adjudicated a second felony offender on the basis of a prior federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon (see 18 USC § 922[g][1]). ... Here, the defendant's predicate crime does not require as one of its elements that the firearm be operable (see United States v Rivera, 415 F3d 284, 286 [2d Cir]) and thus, does not constitute a felony in New York for the purpose of enhanced sentencing (see People v Longshore, 86 NY2d 851, 852; People v Cabassa, 188 AD3d 716, 717-718; People v Dyce, 186 AD3d 1241; People v Lawrence, 17 AD3d 697, 698-699).

Section 922(k) does not require proof that the firearm was operable.

People v. Dyce · filed 2020-09-02(k)

Here, the defendant's predicate crime does not require as one of its elements that the firearm be operable (see 18 USC § 922[k]; United States v Alston, 112 F3d 32, 33-34, 38 [1st Cir]; see also United States v Rivera, 415 F3d 284, 285-286 [2d Cir]) and, thus, does not constitute a felony in New York for the purpose of enhanced sentencing (see People v Longshore, 86 NY2d 851, 852; see also People v Gibson, 141 AD3d 1009, 1012-1013).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an operable gun when the weapon retains its design to fire a projectile.

United States v. Hardin · filed 2018-05-11(g)(1)

Given that Hardin never suggested that he had the type of evidence that could show that the .380 Cobra had been “fundamentally altered,” see Davis, 668 F.3d at 577, there was no basis for concluding that the pistol had changed from what Hardin conceded it was originally manufactured to be: “a gun, a weapon, for use to expel projectiles.” ... Thus, there was sufficient evidence to prove the second element of the felon-in-possession offense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the firearm was operable.

United States v. Harris · filed 2017-09-01(g)(1)

Finally, we conclude that Harris’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count 8 is without merit, as the government is not required to establish the operability of the firearm to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that the firearm was operable.

United States v. McNealy · filed 2014-12-17(g)(1)

As for McNealy’s argument that the government failed to prove that the gun at issue was operable, the government was not required to establish that a firearm was operable to prove a violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the firearm was operable.

United States v. Perry Cousins · filed 2012-07-31(g)(1)

Because the Government did not need to prove that the firearm was operable, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Cousins on Count 29.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a firearm is operable.

United States v. Burrell · filed 2007-05-24(g)(1)

The government need not show that the firearm is operable to sustain a conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a firearm possessed by a convicted felon was operable.

United States v. Adams · filed 1998-03-26(g)(1)

We join these circuits and hold that the government was not required to show that the firearm was operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) covers an inoperable gun if it remains designed to expel a projectile.

United States v. Ricardo Ruiz and Tyrone Michael Crawford · filed 1993-03-15(g)(1)

Crawford was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon that had been shipped in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... We disagree, because in our view the filing down of the gun's hammer did not change the fact that the gun was designed to expel a projectile, but rather it merely temporarily altered the gun's capability to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed.

Section 922(g)(1) covers an inoperable firearm, and a defendant’s belief that it cannot fire does not defeat a conviction.

United States v. Perez · filed 1990-03-21(g)(1)

Conviction under these statutes does not require that a defendant know his conduct violates the law; rather the defendant need only know that he possessed a firearm to have the requisite scienter. ... An inoperable firearm is nonetheless a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s firearm element can be proved by evidence that the weapon was capable of being fired; the government need not test-fire it.

United States v. Davis · filed 1990-04-23(g)(1)

First, the defendant argues that the government failed to prove the elements of the offense because the government firearms' expert at trial admitted that he had never test-fired the weapons in question. There is no merit to this argument as the statute only requires that the firearms be capable of being fired, and the expert's testimony supported that conclusion.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing an unloaded and inoperable firearm.

United States v. Bradley · filed 1990-08-27(g)(1)

Appellant raises the issue of whether evidence of possession of a firearm which was unloaded and arguably unable to function is sufficient to convict him under section 922(g)(1). Appellant apparently argues that as a matter of law dysfunctional firearms are not firearms under the statute. The statute, however, defines a firearm as "any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). See United States v. Pleasant, 469 F.2d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir.1972) ("Congress specifically stated that the statute applies to inoperable firearms as well"). Congress did not limit the definition to include only operable firearms, and we will not do so here. As a matter of law, therefore, even possession of an unloaded, inoperable firearm is in violation of the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the firearm was operable.

United States v. Knaub · filed 1996-04-01(g)(1)

The district court allowed Special Agent Lyon to discuss the proof required for conviction; specifically, he testified to the fact that whether the firearm was operable was not an element of the crime. ... While the instructions did not entirely cure the court's erroneous admission of testimony, the error was harmless because, when all is said and done, the statement was a correct explication of the law.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a firearm to be operable if it meets the definition in § 921(a)(3).

United States v. Smith · filed 1998-11-16(g)(1)

Finally, Smith asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g). ... Furthermore, there is no requirement that a firearm be operable in order to satisfy the def- inition of firearm under § 921(a)(3).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, even when the firearm is inoperable.

United States v. Shaw · filed 2003-05-10(g)(1)

Although the Second Circuit has apparently not yet decided this issue, every circuit which has addressed this issue has concluded that based on the language of the statute the Government need not show that a firearm is operable for purposes of § 922(g)(1). ... Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of an inoperable handgun is denied.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a firearm possessed by a convicted felon was operable.

State v. Crudup · filed 2004-02-04(g)(1)

Federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) have held that “Nothing in either § 922(g)(1) or § 921(a)(3) requires the government to show that the unlawfully possessed firearm is operable.” ... Hence, even without a finding that the firearm was operable, defendant violated a federal statute because, on September 30, 2001, he was a convicted felon possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a pistol with a broken firing pin when the pistol remains a firearm.

United States v. Butler · filed 2004-06-11(g)(1)

Hence, the weapon seized from Butler clearly constitutes a firearm, even though it had a broken firing pin.

Section 922(g)(1) covers possession of an inoperable firearm.

United States v. Ford · filed 2006-07-20(g)(1)

Although the firearm was inoperable, the firearm seized from Defendant satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a real gun designed to expel a projectile even if the gun is inoperable.

United States v. Ford · filed 2008-11-05(g)(1)

We have recognized that, in order to convict, "the gun must be real, but it 'need not be prove[d] to be loaded or operable.'" ... Ford's argument thus fails.

Section 922(g)(1) covers possession of a damaged gun that remains repairable and has not been redesigned for another use.

United States v. Dotson · filed 2013-04-04(g)(1)

The gun in this case, although in bad condition, neither was redesigned to be something other than a gun nor is so badly damaged that it can no longer be regarded as a weapon designed to fire bullets.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a firearm could actually fire to support a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Cooper · filed 2013-04-26(g)(1)

Under this definition, we have consistently held that inoperable firearms can support convictions equivalent to Cooper’s. ... Based on this evidence, we conclude that a rational jury could find that Cooper did in fact possess “firearms,” as defined by § 921(a)(3), and we reject Cooper’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on these counts.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a functional gun; a gun designed to expel a projectile or the frame of such a weapon qualifies.

United States v. Spence · filed 2013-07-09(g)(1)

As we have previously explained, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924 does not require that the gun be functional. Rather, it is sufficient that “the gun was ‘designed to’ expel a projectile, or that it was the ‘frame’ of such a weapon.” Reed, 114 F.3d at 1057.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a firearm was operable when recovered; testimony that it was loaded and the jury’s examination of the weapon can support a conviction.

United States v. Morris · filed 2013-08-08(g)(1)

Morris was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Specifically, he contends that the government failed to prove that the firearms in question were operable, or were capable of being readily restored. ... Here, both Michigan State Police troopers testified that the weapons were loaded when seized from Morris. Moreover, both weapons were admitted into evidence and examined by the jury. Thus, we find Morris’s argument to be without merit.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) does not require the government to prove that a firearm was operable.

United States v. Padilla · filed 2015-12-30(g)(5)(A)

Although the Government was not required to establish that the firearms were operable, it provided testimony supporting such a finding.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the firearm to be operable.

People v. Cabassa · filed 2020-11-04(g)(1)

Here, the defendant's predicate crime does not require as one of its elements that the firearm be operable (see 18 USC § 922[g][1]; People v Lawrence, 17 AD3d 697, 698-699) and, thus, does not constitute a felony in New York for the purpose of enhanced sentencing (see People v Longshore, 86 NY2d 851, 852).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a firearm to be operable if it was designed to expel a projectile.

United States v. Ramos · filed 2021-02-01(g)(1)

However, the Government was not required to present evidence that the firearm was operable because the gun need not be operable as long as it was designed to expel a projectile.

Section 922(k) does not require proof that a firearm was operable to support a conviction.

Davis · filed 2026-01-30(k)

Even assuming that Petitioner is alleging that the claimed failure to test fire was due to the firearm’s inability to function, as noted above, this is not a requirement for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).