18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied when a firearm possessed within a state was manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Omowale · filed 2002-06-20(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Omowale’s claim is indeed foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm manufactured outside the state is possessed within the state.

United States v. White · filed 2002-06-20(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... White's claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be established by evidence that the firearms a felon possessed had been transported from another state.

United States v. Flaharty · filed 2002-07-02(g)(1)

Given the testimony of Hamilton that Grimes bought guns from Johnson in New York, and the testimony of Hale that the guns Johnson sold in New York had been transported from the Virginia-Tennessee area, it was plainly inferable that the guns Grimes possessed had traveled in and affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a restricted person knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Dority · filed 2002-07-03(g)(1)

“A conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires the Government to prove (1) knowing possession; (2) by a restricted person; (3) of any firearm or ammunition that has traveled in or affected interstate commerce.” ... Dority’s argument challenges only the third element, which was satisfied by direct testimony at trial.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Alfonzo Coward · filed 2002-07-03(g)(1)

In Singletary, we examined this precise issue in detail and held that “proof ... that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element” of the statute. ... In light of the binding effect we give to precedential opinions of panels of this court, we reject Coward’s challenge to § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled between states at any point in the past.

United States v. Keys · filed 2002-07-31(g)(1)

To establish the “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government need prove only that a firearm has traveled interstate at some point in the past.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was possessed in one state and manufactured in another.

United States v. Dunn · filed 2002-08-12(g)(1)

Because the evidence offered against Dunn indicated that the firearm he possessed in Texas was not manufactured in Texas, Dunn’s conviction is supported by the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the possessed firearm was manufactured in a different state or country.

United States v. Kerr · filed 2002-08-14(g)(1)

As conceded by Kerr, this court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges under Lopez to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) convictions, concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by the possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country. ... Consequently, Kerr’s argument regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Price · filed 2002-08-21(g)(1)

Even after Lopez, the “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only that the firearm possessed by the defendant previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional, and proof that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed satisfies its interstate commerce element.

United States v. Cage · filed 2002-08-23(g)(1)

Cage’s claims are indeed foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 & n.12 (holding that “constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question” and that evidence that a weapon was manufactured outside of the state in which it was possessed is sufficient to support a conviction) (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1113 (2002); United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing instruction that required proof that ammunition had an “explicit connection or substantial effect on” interstate commerce).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is met when a firearm possessed within a state was manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Turk · filed 2002-08-21(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Turk’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce nexus is satisfied when a firearm possessed in one state was manufactured in another.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2002-08-23(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his possession in Texas of a firearm manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Richardson’s claim is indeed foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm possessed within one state was manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Speer · filed 2002-08-23(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Speer's claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously crossed state lines, even if the defendant’s possession was entirely intrastate.

United States v. Lemons · filed 2002-09-12(g)(1)

Because 922(g) itself contains a jurisdictional element, and because the Supreme Court in Bass and Scarborough suggested that prior movement of the firearm in interstate commerce would suffice to meet that element, we have, in the wake of Lopez, repeatedly rejected Commerce Clause challenges to application of the felon-in-possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by evidence that the firearm and ammunition were shipped into the state.

United States v. Davis · filed 2002-09-16(g)(1)

The stipulated facts adopted by the district court established that both the firearm and the ammunition were shipped into California. Thus, the evidence adequately supported Davis’ conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element requires only a minimal nexus, which a firearm's prior interstate travel satisfies.

United States v. Hubert · filed 2002-09-09(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, but does not require that the defendant used it in interstate commerce.

United States v. Brooks · filed 2002-09-27(g)(1)

Second, Brooks suggests that the government must prove not only that the gun traveled in interstate commerce but also that he used the weapon in interstate commex'ce. Brooks concedes that we rejected this precise argument in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001). We cannot, as a panel of the Court, revisit the issue here. Under Singletary, therefore, Brooks’s argument fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bush · filed 2002-10-04(g)(1)

If the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce, § 922(g)(1)’s “in or affecting [interstate] commerce” element is satisfied.

Section 922(g) covers possession of a firearm that previously traveled across state lines, even when the possession itself was intrastate.

United States v. Evans · filed 2002-10-28(g)

Evans first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the firearm at issue traveled in interstate ... commerce, because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) cannot be constitutionally construed to cover the intrastate possession of a handgun merely because it traveled across state lines at some point in the past. This issue is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1113 (2002).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled across state lines, even if the defendant possessed it entirely within one state.

United States v. Crisp · filed 2002-11-01(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly held that evidence that a firearm has traveled interstate at some point in the past is sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g), even if the defendant possessed the firearm entirely intrastate.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon's firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Cherry · filed 2002-11-01(g)(1)

He argues, relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require that there be a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. ... As noted by Cherry, his arguments are foreclosed by the cases cited above. His conviction is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm was “in or affecting commerce.”

United States v. Lindsey · filed 2002-10-22(g)(1)

Lindsay’s argument that the evidence fails to establish that the firearm found in the field was “in or affecting commerce” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm previously crossed a state or foreign boundary, even if the defendant possessed it only within one state.

United States v. Russell · filed 2002-10-31(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a foreign country, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Russell’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) covers intrastate possession of a firearm that previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Stearns · filed 2002-10-31(g)(1)

Stearns also contends, in light of the reasoning set forth in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) can no longer constitutionally be construed to cover the intrastate possession of a handgun merely due to the fact that it traveled across state lines at some point in the past. Stearns argues that such a construction would be applicable to 99% of all firearms in existence. His argument is foreclosed by this court’s holding in Daugherty, 264 F.3d at 518.

A challenge to proof of § 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element fails when foreclosed by Singletary.

United States v. Wallace · filed 2002-10-25(g)(1)

However, Wallace acknowledges that this argument is without merit and is rejected pursuant to our holding in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d. Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the possessed firearm was manufactured in another state or country.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2002-10-29(g)(1)

This court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) convictions, concluding that the interstate commerce element is satisfied by the possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in another state or country.

United States v. Strong · filed 2002-10-29(g)(1)

This court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) convictions based on Lopez and Jones, concluding that the interstate commerce element is satisfied by the possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm possessed previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sampson · filed 2002-10-31(g)(1)

This element is satisfied because the firearm possessed by Sampson previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is constitutional.

United States v. White · filed 2002-11-01(g)(1)

First, the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not open to question regarding the jurisdictional interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g)(8) requires a connection between the firearm or ammunition and interstate or foreign commerce.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Randee Lee Bayles, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 2002-11-15(g)(8)

Like § 922(g)(8), these other subsections establish as a jurisdictional element the shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving of firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Bonner · filed 2002-12-13(g)(1)

He argues, relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require that there be a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. ... As noted by Bonner, his arguments are foreclosed by the cases cited above.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ezell · filed 2002-12-12(g)(1)

Under controlling Tenth Circuit precedent, the Government need only establish the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Solomon · filed 2002-12-13(g)(1)

Because the factual basis indicated that the firearm Solomon possessed was not manufactured in Texas, Solomon’s conviction was supported by the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon’s gun possession actually or substantially affected interstate commerce when the gun had traveled across state lines.

United States v. Brown · filed 2003-01-06(g)(1)

In Dorris, after thoroughly reviewing Morrison and Jones, we explicitly rejected an argument substantially similar to Mr. Brown’s and held that the government has no duty to prove that the gun possession had any actual or substantial effect on interstate commerce. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Brown’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Fields · filed 2003-01-28(g)(1)

Fields argues that the felon in possession of a firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional because it does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. His argument is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002).

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof that firearm or ammunition possession was either in commerce or affecting commerce, even when the indictment alleges both.

Hawkins v. Nash · filed 2003-01-24(g)(1)

To the extent that Hawkins asserts that the wording of the indictment (alleging that Hawkins possessed firearms and ammunition “in and affecting commerce”) required the Government to establish both that he possessed firearms and ammunition “in commerce” and that he possessed firearms and ammunition “affecting commerce,” his claim fails.

Section 922(g)(8)’s commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm traveled across state lines.

United States v. Randall Cope and Terry Wayne Cope · filed 2003-01-28(g)(8)

Although the government could not identify which particular gun was used in the shooting, its theory was that Terry traveled with a gun from his home in Tennessee to Jackson’s home in Kentucky in order to carry out the shooting. The jury accepted the government’s argument, which is sufficient to satisfy the “in-or-affecting-commeree” element.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce nexus can be established by showing that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Rogers · filed 2003-01-31(g)(1)

Because the Government may establish the commerce ... nexus by showing the firearm was manufactured in another state and the factual basis adopted by the district court included a statement that the firearm was manufactured in California, Rogers has shown no error, plain or otherwise.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Rivera · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional because it does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. ... Rivera correctly acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent. See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). His conviction is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Miller · filed 2003-02-07(g)(1)

This testimony is sufficient to establish the interstate nexus of the instant offense. This court has held that “proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state in which the possession occurred is sufficient to support a finding that the possession was in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Jones, 583 F.2d 1387, 1393 (6th Cir.1976).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the evidence permits a jury to infer that the defendant carried a firearm across a state line.

United States v. Carlton Victor Smith Thomas Albert Nichols John Herbert Crisp · filed 2003-02-18(g)(1)

Although circumstantial, this evidence is sufficient for a juror to reasonably infer that sometime between the invasion of the Bailey’s home and the conclusion of the bank robbery, Nichols crossed the state line with a firearm. As such, the interstate nexus element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) are satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by possession within a state of firearms manufactured outside that state.

United States v. Lavan · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea, which showed his intrastate possession of firearms manufactured outside the state, was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Lavan’s claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) reaches a convicted felon’s intrastate possession of a firearm that previously crossed state lines without requiring a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. McNeal · filed 2003-02-20(g)(1)

McNeal further contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) can no longer constitutionally be construed to cover the intrastate possession of a handgun merely due to the fact that it traveled across state lines at some point in the past. ... As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied when firearms possessed in Texas were manufactured outside Texas.

United States v. Givens · filed 2003-02-24(g)(1)

Givens also argues that the fact that his firearms were not manufactured in Texas and therefore traveled in and affected interstate commerce was legally insufficient to support the interstate commerce nexus required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This claim is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002).

A guilty plea to a § 922(g)(1) indictment alleging that the firearms were transported in interstate commerce defeats a challenge to that element on appeal.

United States v. Hunter · filed 2003-02-11(g)(1)

As to the challenge to his conviction, the felon-in possession indictment to which Hunter pleaded guilty stated that all of the firearms had been transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the felon to have transported the firearm across state lines.

United States v. Weems · filed 2003-03-06(g)(1)

We do not view the Supreme Court's decision in Jones, 529 U.S. at 848, as altering this precedent to require that the felon be the one who transported the firearm in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Wilkerson · filed 2003-03-14(g)(1)

Further, the firearm was manufactured in Japan, imported to California, sold to a firearms dealer in Maryland, and ultimately found in Virginia, so it clearly moved in interstate commerce. Our review of the record convinces us that the evidence was sufficient as to each of these elements.

Section 922(j)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the stolen firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Pritchett · filed 2003-04-09(j)

Thereby, the government established at least a minimal nexus with interstate commerce sufficient to permit the indictment and conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) to stand.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce requirement is jurisdictional and satisfies equal protection.

United States v. Manuel · filed 2003-05-15(g)(1)

The interstate commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is jurisdictional in nature, which satisfies the Equal Protection Clause.

Section 922(g)’s commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Quarles · filed 2003-05-27(g)

(2) proof that a firearm traveled at some point in its life in interstate commerce is not sufficient to show that the firearm was possessed "in or affecting commerce" under Section 922(g), and (3) the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it must find that the firearm’s possession had to affect commerce in a non-trivial way. ... Based on the law of this circuit, we hold to be without merit those last three issues under our holdings in Nathan and Gallimore.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon’s firearm possession to substantially affect interstate commerce; the firearm’s interstate shipment satisfies the commerce requirement.

United States v. Loney · filed 2003-06-06(g)(1)

Finally, given that § 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial connection to interstate commerce, and given that Defendant stipulated to the fact that his rifle was shipped and transported in interstate commerce — namely, from China, to California, to Massachusetts, to Ohio — we find wholly without merit Defendant’s last argument that the Government lacked sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant’s possession of the rifle “substantially” affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(9)'s interstate commerce element does not require a present and substantial connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Rice · filed 2003-06-04(g)(9)

As he did in the district court, Rice argues that, to support the inter- state commerce element of § 922, the Government must prove a pres- ent and substantial connection between the firearm and interstate commerce. We have rejected this claim.

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally covers a felon's intrastate possession of a firearm that previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Hunt · filed 2003-06-24(g)(1)

Hunt further contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) can no longer constitutionally be construed to cover the intrastate possession of a handgun merely due to the fact that it traveled across state lines at some point in the past. ... As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) is supported by evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Green · filed 2003-06-24(g)(1)

Because the factual basis indicated that the firearm Green possessed was not manufactured in Texas, Green’s conviction was supported by the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a firearm’s interstate travel to have occurred recently before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Smith · filed 2003-06-30(g)(1)

Because the statute contains no “recency” requirement and because Smith admitted to all the elements of the crime in the stipulations, the district court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Jacobs · filed 2003-07-22(g)(1)

We have reviewed the record and conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the 9mm handgun recovered by police had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Washington · filed 2003-07-24(g)(1)

For a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that: (1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. ... We agree that the evidence the government presented was sufficient to support Washington’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm traveled between states at some point before the felon possessed it.

United States v. Trevino · filed 2003-08-04(g)(1)

Evidence that a firearm has traveled interstate at some point in the past is thus sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), even if the defendant possessed the firearm entirely intrastate.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2003-08-19(g)(1)

In this circuit, the constitutionally permissible proof under § 922(g) is that the firearm was, at some time, in interstate commerce.

The interstate commerce element can be established by showing that a firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Davis · filed 2003-08-13(g)(1)

The Government may establish the com- merce nexus by showing the firearm was manufactured in another state.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only that the firearm have been in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Loggins · filed 2003-08-18(g)(1)

We have held that the felon in possession statute, 18 U.S.G. § 922(g)(1), “require[s] only ‘the minimal [jurisdictional] nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.’ ” United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977)); see also United States v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76, 77 (9th Cir.1996).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon’s specific firearm possession to substantially affect interstate commerce; the firearm’s prior travel across state lines is sufficient.

United States v. Tillis · filed 2003-08-19(g)(1)

Tillis argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that his indictment was defective for failing to allege that his specific offense substantially affected interstate ... commerce and that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines at some unspecified point in the past. ... As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

A firearm manufactured outside the state where it was possessed provides evidence supporting the interstate commerce element of a § 922(g)(5)(A) conviction.

United States v. Flores-Barrera · filed 2003-08-19(g)(5)(A)

Because the factual basis indicated that the firearm Flores possessed was not manufactured in Texas, Flores’ conviction was supported by the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm possessed in one state was manufactured in another state or country.

United States v. Pena · filed 2003-08-19(g)(1)

Accordingly, Pena argues that the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, which established that the firearms he possessed in Texas were manufactured in another state or foreign country, was insufficient to establish the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... As he acknowledges, his argument is foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state.

United States v. Graham · filed 2003-08-25(g)(1)

Lastly, the third element, that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce, is met because the parties stipulated that the firearm was manufactured outside of the state.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied when the ammunition possessed in North Carolina was manufactured in Illinois.

United States v. Rorie · filed 2003-09-05(g)(1)

The fired shell casing and unfired rounds that were seized were all manufactured in Illinois. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to sustain Rorie’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in another state; the government need not prove a substantial effect on commerce.

United States v. Pham · filed 2003-10-15(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government need not make an “individualized showing of a substantial effect on commerce.” ... Mr. Pham concedes the government presented evidence the firearm he possessed in Kansas was manufactured in another state. ... Accordingly, we conclude the government presented sufficient evidence to support Mr. Pham’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the one where the felon possessed it.

United States v. Barrett · filed 2003-10-31(g)(1)

The fact that a firearm was manufactured in a state other than the one in which a felon possessed it establishes a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce for the purposes of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) applies when a firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it, and the court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the provision.

United States v. Harris · filed 2003-12-10(g)(1)

Harris also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines at some unspecified point in the past. ... As he acknowledges, they are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm possessed in one state was manufactured in another.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2003-12-10(g)(1)

Sanders argues that the evidence, which stipulated that the firearm he possessed in Texas was manufactured in California, was insufficient to establish the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and thus insufficient to support his conviction. ... As he acknowledges, his argument is foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)'s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm and ammunition were produced out of state and traveled across state lines.

United States v. Leathers · filed 2004-01-16(g)

In accordance with our prior decisions, inasmuch as Leathers's firearm and ammunition were produced out-of-state and traveled to Missouri through interstate commerce, the jurisdictional requirement of § 922(g) is satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by a jury’s reasonable inference from a firearm’s out-of-state manufacturer marking and its seizure in another state when no contrary argument is made to the jury.

United States v. Clay · filed 2004-01-07(g)(1)

Where there was neither an objection made nor a contrary argument made to the jury, we hold that under the facts and circumstances of this case, a jury could, by reviewing the inscription “Colt Manufacturing Company, Hartford, Ct.,” coupled with the evidence that the firearm was seized in Georgia, have “rationally inferred” beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm traveled in or at least affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm crossed state lines at some point before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Harris · filed 2004-01-08(g)(1)

He asserts that evidence showing that at some point the firearm traveled in interstate commerce does not satisfy the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... As he concedes, the arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied when the firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Baker · filed 2004-01-22(g)(1)

Essentially, in all of his arguments Baker takes issue with our holding in United States v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2002), that the interstate commerce nexus of section 922(g)-the statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon-is proven and satisfies the Constitution if the government proves that the gun crossed state lines sometime before the defendant possessed it. In this case the government charged in the indictment and proved at trial that the gun was manufactured in Massachusetts. The government also charged in the indictment and proved at trial that the gun was found in Baker’s possession in Wisconsin. A rational fact-finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun crossed state lines before or during Baker’s possession.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be established by evidence that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2004-02-02(g)(1)

We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to establish the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a defendant’s particular firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce; evidence that the firearm previously crossed state lines is sufficient.

United States v. Criston · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

Alternatively, Criston argues that (1) his indictment was defective for failing to allege that his specific offense substantially affected interstate commerce and (2) the factual basis for his conviction was insufficient because the evidence established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines at some unspecified point in the past. Criston raises his arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Guerra · filed 2004-02-17(g)(1)

Guerra argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the mere movement of a firearm from one state to another does not constitute a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce; and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. Guerra ... raises these arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearms were manufactured outside the state where they were possessed.

United States v. Williams · filed 2004-02-23(g)

Third, we find that the Government did establish the interstate commerce element of the crime. The evidence revealed that both weapons at issue were manufactured outside the state of possession.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon’s firearm possession to have had a recent effect on interstate commerce.

United v. Haire · filed 2004-03-02(g)(1)

First, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) does not require that Haire’s possession have a recent effect on interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm crossed state lines before the offense.

United States v. Colon-Osorio · filed 2004-03-03(g)(1)

Colón contends that, after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), mere evidence that the firearm crossed state lines prior to the alleged offense conduct is insufficient to meet 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'s "in or affecting commerce" requirement. A prior panel has rejected this argument, see United States v. Joost, 133 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1998), so we are not free to revisit the issue, see United States v. Mayes, 332 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2003).

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Sinclair · filed 2004-04-01(g)

To establish the requisite nexus to interstate commerce under § 922(g), the government needed to prove no more than that Sinclair’s gun had traveled across state lines, a point Sinclair concedes.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession in or affecting commerce, an element absent from the Virgin Islands firearm offense.

United States v. Towers · filed 2004-05-25(g)(1)

Likewise, the federal statute requires possession “in or affecting commerce,” see United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000), while the local statute does not.

Section 922(g)’s commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Geddes · filed 2004-06-02(g)

First, the government provided sufficient evidence to satisfy § 922(g)’s requirement that Geddes possessed his firearm “in or affecting commerce.” At trial, the government presented unrefuted evidence that Geddes’s pistol is manufactured only in Austria, and is imported into the U.S. exclusively through a distributor in Georgia. Geddes’s gun must have traveled in interstate commerce to reach New Jersey, and the government therefore fulfilled its burden of proof.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm traveled in interstate or foreign commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2004-06-18(g)(1)

One essential element for establishing this offense is proof that the firearm was at some point transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a firearm possessed by a felon crossed a state line, but not that it substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Miscellaneous Firear · filed 2004-07-21(g)(1)

Mrs. Fleischli also claims the district court erred when it rejected her argument that the statute making it illegal for felons to possess weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), requires proof that the firearms in question “substantially” affected interstate commerce. ... But we have repeatedly rejected this proposition; see Fleischli, 305 F.3d at 653; United States v. Mitchell, 299 F.3d 632, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2000); and Mrs. Fleischli offers no good reason why we should reconsider our earlier opinions.

Section 922(g) requires only a minimal nexus with interstate commerce, which is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured abroad and imported into the United States.

United States v. Santiago · filed 2004-09-16(g)

According to Gaines, “only a minimal nexus with interstate commerce is necessary under § 922(g).” Id. The government has amply demonstrated such a nexus in this case, as the trial evidence established that “the firearm at issue ... was manufactured in Spain and imported into the United States through New Jersey.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by evidence that the firearm crossed state lines at some point in the past.

United States v. Davis · filed 2004-10-21(g)(1)

Davis also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines at some unspecified point in the past. Davis raises these arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, they are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent. See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon possessed a gun in or affecting commerce, and an indictment tracking those elements need not allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Hill · filed 2004-12-10(g)(1)

The statute in question requires proof that Hill, a felon, possessed a gun “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The indictment tracks this language, and we fail to see how an indictment under § 922(g)(1) that tracks the statutory elements is defective.

A challenge to whether § 922(g)'s interstate commerce nexus is satisfied is nonjurisdictional and can be waived by a guilty plea and appeal waiver.

United States v. Shirley · filed 2004-12-16(g)

An argument that the interstate commerce nexus is not satisfied in a particular case, however, is not a jurisdictional challenge. ... It would thus be frivolous for Shirley to raise this argument because he waived it both by pleading guilty and by agreeing to an appeal waiver as part of his plea agreement.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that a firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Martin · filed 2005-01-13(g)

That expert testified that the firearm in this case came from Brazil, was imported into Georgia, and crossed state lines to arrive in Michigan. App. 1077-78. This expert testimony provides sufficient evidence that the firearm in question had a nexus with interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously crossed state lines; the government need not prove recent movement or an economic impact from the defendant’s conduct.

United States v. Younger · filed 2005-02-28(g)(1)

The evidence in this case was undisputed that defendant’s guns were manufactured in Massachusetts and found in California. Consequently, the district court’s jury instruction was proper and the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction on count two.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a one-time past connection between the firearm and interstate commerce; recent interstate movement or an actual economic impact is unnecessary.

United States v. Clydell Younger · filed 2005-03-01(g)(1)

Defendant’s argument that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) requires proof that the firearm either recently moved across state lines or that defendant’s conduct had an actual economic impact likewise lacks merit: “A one-time past connection to interstate commerce is sufficient under § 922(g)(1).”

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s receipt of a firearm that has previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2005-03-16(g)(1)

The evidence here established that the gun in question was manufactured in Brazil, and shipped to Pennsylvania from Maryland. Thus, it can hardly be disputed that, at some point, it was shipped or transported in both interstate and foreign commerce, as it was made in Brazil, imported into Maryland, and shipped to Pennsylvania.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm crossed a state line before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Rivera · filed 2005-04-06(g)

Defendant’s first argument is that the government’s evidence that the firearm crossed a state line, without more, is insufficient to establish that the firearm had been transported in interstate commerce. ... In light of United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977)), we agree with the Government and affirm Rivera’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to firearms that have moved in interstate commerce; the government need show no further interstate-commerce nexus.

United States v. Shivers · filed 2005-04-19(g)(1)

In short, the law of the circuit is that the limitation of § 922(g) to firearms that have moved in interstate commerce renders the statute constitutional, and that the government need show no further nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured out of state.

United States v. Guidry · filed 2005-04-06(g)(1)

The interstate commerce element of a § 922(g)(1) charge is satisfied where the government demonstrates that the firearm was manufactured out of state.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by evidence from which a jury may infer that the firearm crossed state lines; tracing its serial number is not required.

United States v. Hampton · filed 2005-04-19(g)

To establish the jurisdictional element of the crime under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that the firearm moved in interstate commerce at any time. ... Here, the expert witness’ testimony as to the expense, time, and effort involved in creating a knock-off of the gun were sufficient to allow the jury to infer that it traveled in interstate commerce. Contrary to Hampton’s assertion, Special Agent Williams was not required to use the serial number to trace the gun, although such proof may be the best evidence of movement in interstate commerce.

A firearm manufactured in another state satisfies § 922(g)’s interstate commerce nexus requirement.

United States v. Davis · filed 2005-04-26(g)

But we have repeatedly rejected this argument and held that the possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state establishes a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged possession of ammunition was in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Chambers · filed 2005-04-29(g)(1)

An essential element of a section 922(g)(1) possession of ammunition offense, which the government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction, is that the defendant’s charged possession of the ammunition was “in or affecting commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection to interstate commerce, satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Harris · filed 2005-05-02(g)(1)

Section 922(g) requires a minimal nexus to interstate commerce; that minimum nexus is satisfied when a defendant brandishes a firearm that was manufactured in another state.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled at some time in interstate commerce.

United States v. Wilkerson · filed 2005-06-09(g)(1)

Wilkerson contends that evidence that the gun was manufactured outside of Massachusetts in 1918 is insufficient to establish a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce under § 922(g). ... We likewise conclude that the evidence that a firearm has traveled at some time in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires a firearm to have a nexus with interstate commerce; proof that it was manufactured outside the state of possession suffices.

United States v. Howard · filed 2005-06-10(g)

An essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is that the firearm has a nexus with interstate commerce. The government must show that the firearm moved in or affected interstate commerce. ... Proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of possession will suffice.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sawyers · filed 2005-06-13(g)(1)

Therefore, because Sawyers similarly stipulated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce, the third element was proven and Sawyers’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

Section 922(g) may constitutionally reach possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2005-06-16(g)

However, we reject Taylor’s challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on its merits. ... Obviously, the gun could not have gone from Brazil to Maryland and Pennsylvania without traveling in interstate and foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Ramirez · filed 2005-06-20(g)(1)

Finally, Ramirez argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. He argues that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines at some point in the past. Ramirez raises these arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, they are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g) does not require the Government to prove that the defendant knew the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2005-06-22(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jerald Paul Edwards presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by ... United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1985), which held that the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearms possessed by a felon previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Stults · filed 2005-06-29(g)(1)

Defendant’s admission in the plea agreement satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisite of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), hence the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element can be established by showing that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Mason · filed 2005-07-13(g)

The Government may establish the interstate commerce nexus by showing that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce; its possession need not itself affect commerce.

United States v. Chase · filed 2005-07-29(g)(1)

Felton's interpretation is defeated by case law stating that a firearm's travel in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce; its possession need not have an actual impact on commerce.

United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Leo v. Felton Erica Chase, Appellants/cross-Appellees · filed 2005-07-29(g)(1)

Felton’s interpretation is defeated by case law stating that a firearm’s travel in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

Section 922(o) does not require proof of a jurisdictional connection to interstate commerce for a conviction.

United States v. Fisher · filed 2005-08-24(o)(1)

As stated above, however, § 922(o) contains no jurisdictional element and the prosecution need not put on evidence of a particular connection with interstate commerce in order to obtain a conviction.

A firearm’s previous travel in interstate commerce satisfies § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element.

United States v. Miller · filed 2005-09-29(g)(1)

Miller admits that, under our caselaw, the fact that the firearm previously had traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1). ... Because there is no error Miller’s claim fails at the first prong of the plain error test.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement is an element of the offense, not a limit on the district court’s jurisdiction.

United States v. Mullen · filed 2005-12-22(g)

Section 922(g)’s requirement that the gun involved in the offense have been shipped or transported in interstate commerce is merely an element of the crime.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands an as-applied constitutional challenge when the firearm’s out-of-state manufacture is the only evidence connecting it to interstate commerce.

United States v. Cain · filed 2005-12-29(g)(1)

Additionally, Cain contends 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him, because the only evidence connecting the firearm to interstate commerce was its manufacture out of state. As he concedes, our existing precedent forecloses his argument.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2006-01-18(g)(1)

Moreover, evidence similar to that presented in Wilson’s case is sufficient to maintain a conviction under § 922(g)(1). See id. at 518 & n.12 (discussing decisions in which firearms were possessed in Texas but manufactured elsewhere); see also United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “evidence that a firearm has traveled interstate at some point in the past is sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g), even if the defendant possessed the firearm entirely intrastate”).

Section 922(g) prohibits specified persons, including felons, from possessing firearms.

United States v. Ashcroft · filed 2006-02-10(g)

Since Maxwell was vacated, this Court has held that § 922(g) is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional without requiring proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and its interstate commerce element is satisfied by possession of a firearm manufactured in another state or country.

United States v. Cano · filed 2006-02-15(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... This court repeatedly has affirmed § 922(g)(1) convictions on evidence similar to that presented in the instant case. ... See id. at 518 & n.12 (concluding that § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by the defendant’s possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm or ammunition and does not require proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2006-02-24(g)(1)

We have repeatedly held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.” United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001)(quoting United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999)). Evidence that a weapon was manufactured in one state and possessed in another is sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g). Daugherty, 264 F.3d at 518; United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 973 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1996). Additionally, in United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1997), we rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment under § 922(g)(1) that was identical to the one raised by Rodriguez in this case.

Section 922(g) prohibits felons from possessing firearms and withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Mejia · filed 2006-02-24(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Tony Christopher Mejia raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Bunton · filed 2006-02-24(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Kevin Eugene Bunton raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element supplies the nexus required to sustain it under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Sidwell, Gerald L. · filed 2006-03-10(g)

Mr. Sidwell nevertheless asks us to re-examine our decisions upholding the constitution- ality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), contending that they are inconsis- tent with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). This argument also has been previously rejected, and we do not find a compelling reason to reconsider these rulings in this case.

Section 922(g) is constitutional because its jurisdictional element provides the required nexus with interstate commerce.

United States v. Sidwell · filed 2006-03-10(g)

We have rejected, on numerous occasions, Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g), noting that the “jurisdictional element of § 922(g) provides the required nexus with interstate commerce.”

Section 922(j)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a stolen firearm was manufactured outside the state and traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Laroche · filed 2006-03-13(j)

Because the Government presented evidence the firearms were manufactured outside of Georgia and traveled in interstate commerce at some point in the past, there was at least a minimal nexus with interstate commerce sufficient to permit the indictment and conviction under § 922(j).

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's possession of a firearm that previously traveled through interstate commerce, even if the felon did not carry it across state lines.

United States v. Kontsagh · filed 2006-04-18(g)(1)

Established precedent forecloses Kontsagh’s as-applied constitutional claim because it is clear that his firearm, at some earlier time, traveled through interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm traveled between states before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. George N. Reed, Jr. · filed 2006-05-16(g)(1)

Given our precedent, the interstate nexus requirement was satisfied here when the government produced evidence that the gun had been manufactured in Florida, sent to Texas, sold in Ohio, and was later possessed by Reed in Florida, and, thus, had traveled in interstate commerce. Under our undisturbed precedent, this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate the required nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed in another.

United States v. Gipson · filed 2006-05-25(g)(1)

Evidence that a weapon was manufactured in one state and possessed in another is sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by testimony that ordinary firearms are not manufactured in the state where the firearm was possessed.

United States v. Dobbs · filed 2006-05-31(g)

As to the question of whether the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, the testimony of the ATF agent that only rare, collectible guns are manufactured in Iowa suffices to prove that, if the object was a firearm, it was a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce nexus is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state of possession, even if the possession itself was intrastate.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2006-05-31(g)(1)

Finally, Jenkins contends that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutionally applied to his case because the facts demonstrate only intrastate possession of a firearm. However, the government offered evidence that the weapon possessed by Jenkins originated in Brazil. Manufacture outside Pennsylvania “provides the requisite nexus to, and proof that the firearm[] traveled in, interstate commerce,” United States v. Leuschen, 395 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2005), such that Jenkins’s challenge on this basis must fail.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Barrett · filed 2006-06-07(g)(1)

Because the district court’s instruction that the “in or affecting commerce” element could be proven by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in another state is consistent with the controlling law and the jury instruction did not obviate the Government’s burden of proving the element, we find Barrett’s challenge to the jury instruction without merit.

Section 922(g) does not require proof that a felon’s firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Wilkins · filed 2006-06-21(g)

Second, Wilkins contends that the felon-in-possession-of-a- firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it criminalizes the possession of firearms which do not substantially affect interstate commerce and that there was insufficient evidence to establish there was a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Wilkins correctly concedes that these arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm moved across state lines at some point.

United States v. Dix · filed 2006-06-20(g)(1)

Our precedents make clear that the government need only prove that the firearm in question had moved in interstate commerce at some point in order to satisfy the jurisdictional element that the gun be “in or affecting commerce,” as required by § 922(g).

Section 922(g)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm and ammunition were manufactured outside the state where they were possessed.

United States v. Castillias · filed 2006-06-30(g)

Castillias argues that his conviction under § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because there is insufficient evidence linking his possession of the firearm and ammunition in question to interstate commerce. As Castillias concedes that the firearm and ammunition he possessed were manufactured outside Hawai’i, his argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of ammunition to be in or affecting commerce; it does not require the defendant to have transported the ammunition across state lines.

United States v. Thomas, Randell D. · filed 2006-07-07(g)(1)

Section 922(g) does not require the government to prove Thomas was responsible for the interstate transportation of the ammunition he was found to possess. It requires, instead, a showing that the possession of the ammunition was “in or affecting commerce.”

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in another state and therefore must have traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Juarez · filed 2006-07-21(g)

In addition to the statute’s facial constitutionality, the evidence at trial provided a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. Juarez stipulated that the gun was manufactured in Ohio. It is undisputed that the gun must have traveled in interstate commerce at some time after its manufacture in order for Juarez to possess it in Illinois. On that basis, the district court properly invoked jurisdiction.

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a felon's firearm possession when the firearm has a minimal connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Rothacher · filed 2006-07-18(g)(1)

These nuances may one day become law, but currently the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit still broadly apply the Commerce Clause and continue to use the minimal nexus standard. ... These cases support the United States’ legal application of the federal felon in possession statute.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Mack · filed 2006-08-03(g)

Finally, there is no merit to Mack’s claim that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied. All the statute requires is that the government prove some “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce; proof that the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce is sufficient.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2006-08-04(g)(1)

This nexus need only be minimal; proof that the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in another state and crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Van Sach, Joseph · filed 2006-08-17(g)(1)

Moreover, the firearm that Van Sach sold to the CI satisfied the minimal nexus to interstate commerce ... that is required. ATF Special Agent Michael Walsh testified that the firearm in question was manufactured in Montana and, thus, it necessarily traveled in interstate commerce prior to Van Sach’s possession of it in Illinois. Therefore, Judge Castillo properly denied Van Sach’s constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(5)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured out of state.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2006-08-25(g)(5)

We have indeed held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question,” United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 318 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), and, additionally, that the Government need only establish that the firearm was manufactured out of state to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the ammunition was manufactured out of state.

United States v. Turner · filed 2006-10-03(g)(1)

The Government need only establish that ammunition was manufactured out of state to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and later recovered in another, even if its possession did not affect commerce at the time of arrest.

United States v. Paopao · filed 2006-10-10(g)(1)

In Hanna this court held that, to be constitutional, the government need only show a “ ‘minimal nexus that the firearm [had] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.’ ” ... On the other hand, in this case neither side disputes that Paopao’s gun was manufac- tured in Minnesota and the ammunition was made in Illinois, and both were recovered in Hawaii. In light of this distinction, we conclude that McCoy has no effect on the Hanna and Rousseau holdings and that the District Court’s denial of Pao- pao’s motion to dismiss was proper.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction when the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate commerce at some point, even if the defendant possessed it entirely within one state.

United States v. Jendrzey · filed 2006-10-25(g)(1)

Evidence that a firearm or ammunition has traveled in interstate commerce at some point in the past is sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g), even if the defendant possessed the firearm or ammunition entirely intrastate.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge when there is a sufficient showing that the gun traveled in a stream of interstate commerce.

United States v. Perreira · filed 2006-10-25(g)(1)

Finally, Perreira’s Commerce Clause argument fails because there was a sufficient showing the gun traveled in a stream of interstate commerce.

For an offense under § 922(g)(5), proof that the firearm was manufactured out of state satisfies the interstate commerce element.

United States v. Lugo-Vargas · filed 2006-10-25(g)(5)

and, additionally, that the Government need only establish that the firearm was manufactured out of state to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured out of state.

United States v. Solomon · filed 2006-10-25(g)(1)

We have indeed held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question,” United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and, additionally, that the Government need only establish that the firearm was manufactured out of state to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when ammunition has moved from one state to another; the defendant need not know of that movement.

United States v. Phillips · filed 2006-10-30(g)(1)

The court further advised the jury that “interstate commerce” included movement of ammunition from one state to another, and that Phillips need not have known of the movement of ammunition in interstate commerce. This instruction was an accurate statement of the law.

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce and requires proof of that interstate commerce element.

United States v. Groves, Daniel · filed 2006-11-22(g)(1)

We need not address the in-court identification because Groves prevails on his claim that the government failed to present sufficient evidence on the interstate commerce element of section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) requires an interstate nexus for a felon’s firearm possession offense, which an ATF agent may establish through expert testimony.

United States v. Cormier · filed 2006-11-17(g)

Thus, Cormier gives us no reason to depart from our conclusion in Corey that an ATF agent, using evidence reasonably relied upon by experts in that field, including publicly available records, may testify as to the interstate nexus element of a federal firearms offense.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm and ammunition were manufactured in other states and later possessed locally.

United States v. Paopao · filed 2006-11-21(g)

On the other hand, in this case neither side disputes that Paopao’s gun was manufac- tured in Minnesota and the ammunition was made in Illinois, and both were recovered in Hawaii. In light of this distinction, we conclude that McCoy has no effect on the Hanna and Rousseau holdings and that the District Court’s denial of Pao- pao’s motion to dismiss was proper.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Humphreys · filed 2006-11-21(g)(1)

Thus, there was no need for the jury to rely on any assumption in concluding that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, since “[t]he requisite interstate commerce nexus can be established ... merely by evidence that the gun was manufactured outside the state in which it was possessed.”