18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) reaches only firearms that have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Wallace · filed 1989-12-27(g)

We therefore hold that section 922(g) reaches only those firearms that traveled in interstate or foreign commerce and is thus constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be proved by evidence that the firearm crossed state lines before it was seized from the defendant.

United States v. Fromal · filed 1990-03-09(g)(1)

We find that this evidence would support a finding by a reasonable jury that the gun in question had moved in interstate commerce prior to its seizure from defendant’s car, and that defendant’s remark about knowing there was a gun in his car, along with the defendant’s felony conviction, was sufficient to prove the elements of the offense charged.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Buggs · filed 1990-05-18(g)(1)

Proof that a weapon has previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite commerce element for the purposes of section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by evidence that the type of gun possessed is not manufactured in the state where it was found.

United States v. Morris · filed 1990-05-31(g)(1)

In addition, the government produced evidence that no guns are manufactured in Montana, except certain handmade black powder weapons. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient that the gun must have traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(5) covers an illegal alien’s possession of a firearm transported in interstate commerce; a court may infer interstate transportation when the state has no firearms manufacturers.

United States v. Ramirez · filed 1990-08-17(g)(5)

He states that there was no evidence indicating the place of manufacture of the handgun found in his home, and therefore the court could not find that the weapon was transported in interstate commerce. The district court properly took judicial notice of the fact that New York has no firearms manufacturers and could conclude that the handgun came from interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a convicted felon's possession of a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 1990-10-03(g)(1)

An essential element of the offense for which Rodriguez was convicted in count 3 was that the firearm he possessed when arrested was “in or affecting commerce.” ... The commerce element of the provisions involved in this case, like that of other statutes barring the possession of firearms by convicted felons, is satisfied by proof that “the firearm [had] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce nexus is satisfied for a later possessor when a firearm was transported to the state by a serviceman.

United States v. Walter M. Wolak, Jr. · filed 1991-01-18(g)(1)

Even if we were to conjecture that the firearm possessed by Wolak had been brought back from Manila by a serviceman, that transportation would still satisfy the interstate commerce nexus of the offense as to anyone who later possessed the weapon in Michigan other than the military person who transported it.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Fish · filed 1991-03-12(g)(1)

Therefore, the government’s evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of possession is sufficient to prove an interstate commerce nexus in defendant’s case.

Section 922(g)(1) uses different commerce language for possession and receipt to describe how commerce connects to each act, not to require different types of commerce.

United States v. Shelton · filed 1991-07-19(g)(1)

Finally, the grammatical difference between “possession in or affecting commerce” and “receipt in interstate or foreign commerce” does not, in this statute, distinguish between types of commerce. Rather, the language in each phrase most accurately describes how commerce would be connected with the particular illegal conduct. We reject Shelton’s proffered construction of § 922(g).

The interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1) may be established through expert testimony about a firearm’s manufacturer and place of manufacture.

United States v. Dunn · filed 1991-07-22(g)(1)

The Ninth Circuit allows expert testimony regarding the identity of the manufacturer to establish that a gun travelled in interstate commerce before the defendant received it. ... Under Gann, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to testify that Harrington and Richardson, the gun’s manufacturer, was located in Massachusetts before it went out of business in 1985.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element may be established through expert testimony about a firearm’s manufacturer and place of manufacture.

United States v. Dunn · filed 1991-10-01(g)(1)

The Ninth Circuit allows expert testimony regarding the identity of the manufacturer to establish that a gun travelled in interstate commerce before the defendant received it. ... Under Gann, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to testify that Harrington and Richardson, the gun’s manufacturer, was located in Massachusetts before it went out of business in 1985.

Sections 922(g)(1) and (n) require that the firearm have traveled in interstate commerce; testimony linking its rifling pattern to guns made outside the state can support that element even if the gun was not recovered.

United States v. Apolonia Galvan, A/K/A Paula Galvan · filed 1991-12-18(g)(1), (n)

Both 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (n) require that the weapon involved have “been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” ... The jury had ample evidence on which it could find that the weapon had been transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)’s commerce element covers both interstate and foreign commerce.

United States v. Alvarez · filed 1992-03-31(g)

The “in or affecting commerce” language of § 922(g) reflects a Congressional intent to cover both interstate and foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) covers intrastate receipt of a firearm that previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Willie Legrand, Jr., United States of America v. Willie Legrand, Jr. · filed 1992-09-21(g)(1)

Even an intrastate transaction is covered as long as the firearm has previously moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement can be satisfied by evidence that a firearm manufactured in Germany ended up in Illinois.

United States v. Clark · filed 1992-09-29(g)(1)

Even going beyond the focus of the parties in this case, we note that the evidence that the Luger was manufactured in Germany and ended up in the inland state of Illinois indicates that the firearm travelled in interstate commerce and thus the government received no unfair advantage by the inclusion of "foreign commerce" in the jury instruction.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the firearm possessed by a convicted felon previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Butler · filed 1992-12-04(g)

In order to convict on the federal charges, the government also had to prove ... that it had previously travelled in interstate or foreign commerce (Count II).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Carter · filed 1992-12-10(g)(1)

So, too, it is eminently clear that § 922(g)(1) prohibits a previously convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied by possession of a firearm in a state other than the state where it was manufactured; the defendant need not have personally transported it across state lines.

United States v. Leffler · filed 1993-01-25(g)(1)

The fact that Leffler may not have personally transported the firearms in question across state lines is no defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(g)(1). The nexus between possession and commerce is satisfied by proof of possession in a state other than the state of manufacture.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce at any time.

United States v. Fitzhugh · filed 1993-02-09(g)(1)

We conclude, in accord with our colleagues in other circuits, that a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm having a past connection to interstate commerce violates § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce element was supported by evidence that the gun was manufactured in California, sold to a convicted felon in Texas, and used in a crime in interstate commerce.

United States v. Paul Dana Williams, A/K/A Paul William Dana · filed 1993-08-05(g)(1)

Since evidence was presented that the gun was manufactured in California, was sold to Williams (a convicted felon) in Texas and used to commit a crime in interstate commerce, there was sufficient evidence supporting the conviction on counts two and three.

Section 922(k) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm with an obliterated serial number and that the firearm crossed a state line at some point after manufacture.

United States v. Washington · filed 1993-09-20(k)

To prove a violation of section 922(k), the Government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm on or about the date in question; (2) that the serial number of that firearm was obliterated; and (3) that the firearm travelled in interstate commerce. For this latter element, it is sufficient for the Government to prove that the firearm had at some point since the time of its manufacture, travelled across a state line.

Section 922(j) covers a stolen firearm that traveled in interstate commerce before or after it was stolen.

United States v. Hardin · filed 1993-11-09(j)

In United States v. Honaker, --- F.3d ---- (6th Cir.1993), the court examined the statutory provision in its amended form, as well as the legislative history of the amendment, and concluded that there is "no doubt that Congress intended [section] 922(j) to apply to firearms that have travelled in interstate commerce, both prior to or after being stolen." Id. at ---- (emphasis added). Accordingly, Honaker forecloses the defendant's claims of error based on West.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of covered machineguns without requiring proof of an interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Hunter · filed 1994-01-24(o)

Section 922(o) bars the possession of certain machineguns, period. As Defendants have pointed out, every other provision of § 922 has interstate commerce as an element of the crime. The Court, therefore, cannot conclude that the absence of this element in § 922(o) was merely a drafting oversight.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce; testimony that handguns are not currently manufactured in the state of possession does not, by itself, prove that an unidentified gun did so.

United States v. Jones · filed 1994-02-09(g)(1)

Because the only evidence that the gun traveled in interstate commerce is the arbitrary inference that any gun found in New York must have been made outside New York, we are forced to vacate the conviction on the § 922(g)(1) count and instruct the district court to dismiss that count of the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) require proof that the firearms moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hollon · filed 1994-02-11(g)(1), (g)(3)

Relevant to this issue are counts 1 and 6, which charged defendant with possession of firearms by a felon and with receipt of firearms by a controlled substance user, respectively. An element common to both of these crimes is that the firearms move in interstate commerce.

Section 922(j) permits prosecution when a firearm moved in interstate or foreign commerce before it was stolen.

United States v. Brooks · filed 1994-03-29(j)

Defendant’s arguments notwithstanding, it is clear that Congress intended the amendment to expand federal jurisdiction to permit prosecution where the firearms moved in interstate or foreign commerce before being stolen, as alleged in Count II.

Section 922(g)(3)’s interstate commerce element can be established by testimony from a witness who personally knows that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed and is available for cross-examination.

United States v. Vincent · filed 1994-03-31(g)(3)

The government may satisfy its burden of establishing that the firearm was manufactured outside the state in which the possession occurred by presenting the testimony of a witness who, through personal experience, knows the place of manufacture of the firearm and by making the witness available for cross-examination.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be established by evidence that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Coleman · filed 1994-04-12(g)(1)

The requisite interstate commerce nexus can be established, however, merely by evidence that the gun was manufactured outside the state in which it was possessed (which everyone in this case agrees is Wisconsin).

Section 922(n) requires the government to prove that the firearm moved through interstate commerce.

United States v. Hollie · filed 1994-05-16(n)

Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(n), see n. 3, the United States must prove that the firearm in question moved through interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by testimony that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Ingram · filed 1994-07-15(g)(1)

We join these circuits and hold that testimony that a firearm was manufactured out of the state of possession is sufficient to meet the interstate commerce element of Section 922(g).

Evidence that a firearm’s manufacturer did not make firearms in the state where the gun was found can establish interstate travel under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Bowling · filed 1994-08-05(g)(1)

That evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, ... is sufficient to establish that the revolver had traveled in interstate commerce and thus to sustain Mr. Bowling’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires the jury to find that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, but the firearm need not be the exhibit introduced at trial.

United States v. Zukinta · filed 1994-11-01(g)

Further, the district court only told the jury that the firearm used need not have been the one introduced by the government in exhibit 3. However, the district court never told the jury that it need not find that the firearm used by defendant need not have travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when ammunition possessed by a convicted felon previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Sanders · filed 1994-11-07(g)(1)

We accordingly reject Sanders’ contention that the link to interstate commerce in this case was too attenuated to satisfy § 922(g)(1), and affirm the judgment of conviction from which he appeals.

Section 922(j) covers receipt of a stolen firearm that traveled in interstate commerce before or after it was stolen.

United States v. Andrews · filed 1994-12-29(j)

We agree with the district court that the legislative history of the 1990 amendment to Sec. 922(j) demonstrates the clear intent of the Congress and the Administration to expand jurisdiction to include interstate travel before or after theft.

Under the 1990 version of § 922(j), a firearm had to travel in interstate commerce after it was stolen for its receipt to be prohibited.

United States v. Cruz · filed 1995-03-20(j)

Therefore, we hold that as the statute is ambiguous, and the legislative history is inconclusive, § 922(j) as amended in 1990 applies only to receipt of a firearm which has travelled in interstate commerce as a stolen firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

Krese v. United States · filed 1995-05-05(g)(1)

Krese's first claim is without merit as the government established that the shotgun that Krese possessed affected interstate commerce by establishing that it had been manufactured outside of Michigan, see United States v. Fish, 928 F.2d 185, 186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991), and that Krese possessed the shotgun after October 22, 1968, the effective date of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied by sufficient evidence that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Maxwell · filed 1995-07-05(g)(1)

Based on the evidence before the jury at trial viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the weapon was an Israeli-made Uzi that traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(j) applies to stolen firearms that traveled in interstate commerce either before or after they were stolen.

United States v. Alford · filed 1995-07-13(j)

We agree with the Sixth Circuit that the legislative history indicates Congress intended section 922(j), as amended, to apply to firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce, either before or after being stolen.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when the recovered ammunition’s brand is identified as coming from outside the state.

United States v. Bumpass · filed 1995-07-28(g)(1)

While there was ample evidence that Bumpass also possessed a firearm, he was charged with possessing ammunition because the ammunition was recovered and the brand was identified as coming from outside the state, thus satisfying the commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a past connection between the firearm and interstate commerce, which is sufficient under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Hanna · filed 1995-08-09(g)(1)

Section 922(g)’s requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922’s interstate-commerce element may be supported by a reasonable inference that firearms delivered in New Jersey came from New York.

United States v. Giampa · filed 1995-08-17

It was, however, a fair inference for the jury to make that the firearms, which were delivered to Sabol in New Jersey, came from New York.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce requirement includes commerce in cartridge components, even when the assembled cartridges were manufactured and possessed within one state.

United States v. Ivory Mosby, Also Known as Rafiz Zareef Muhaymin · filed 1995-09-08(g)(1)

Given the linguistic structure of § 922(g)(1), the fact that the disjunctive “or” is used in § 921(a)(17) does not mean that cartridge components are excluded from the definition of the relevant commerce under § 922(g)(1). The unmodified term “commerce” as used in § 922(g)(1) means exactly what it says — commerce of any type — and the district court misconstrued § 922(g)(1) when it limited “commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Farris · filed 1995-10-05(g)(1)

In this case, defendant stipulated that all the firearms, the ammunition, and the firearm silencer described in the indictment had been manufactured outside the state of Ohio and had traveled in interstate commerce prior to the dates of the offenses. Thus, there can be no question that the firearms and the ammunition had a past connection to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an interstate commerce connection for a convicted person's firearm transportation or possession, bringing it within Congress's commerce power.

United States v. Medina · filed 1995-10-16(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is a statute that requires evidence of shipping or transporting in interstate commerce of a weapon or possession in or affecting commerce by a person who has committed a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year. There is no doubt that this particular statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) falls in the last category since an element of shipping “in interstate or foreign commerce” of the firearm is required or possession of a firearm “in or affecting commerce” is required.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm was in interstate commerce at some time; the defendant need not have transported it personally.

United States v. Shelton · filed 1995-11-28(g)

To satisfy the interstate commerce element of section 922(g), it is sufficient that there exists “the minimal nexus that the firearm[s] have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove that ammunition possessed by a felon was involved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Chin · filed 1995-12-22(g)

Special Agent Annunziato’s testimony, viewed in conjunction with the rationale espoused in Jones, indicates the inadequacy of the government’s proof concerning the interstate commerce element of Count Two. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count Two, made pursuant to Rule 29(c), is granted.

Section 922(u) contains an interstate commerce nexus as an element of the offense.

United States v. Eric v. Miller · filed 1996-01-19(u)

Like section 922(g), the plain language of section 922(u) contains an interstate-commerce nexus as an essential element of the offense and thus ensures that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce element is satisfied by evidence that a firearm was manufactured outside the state and traveled into it.

United States v. Fields · filed 1996-01-09(g)(1)

This testimony is sufficient to satisfy the commerce element of Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) satisfies the Commerce Clause when the firearm has been in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Depenbrock · filed 1996-03-19(g)(1)

We are bound by the holding in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995), to the proposition that "[s]ection 922(g)'s requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1462 n. 2.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when the firearm has crossed state lines at some time.

United States v. Lloyd G. Shorty, Also Known as Lloyd Dotson · filed 1996-03-01(g)(1)

As we reaffirmed in Bell, "the mere movement of a weapon, at some time, across state lines satisfie[s] the commerce element of § 922(g)(1)." Id. (citing United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989)). We conclude that the commerce element of § 922(g) was satisfied in Shorty's case.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at any time before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Bates · filed 1996-03-05(g)(1)

"To satisfy the interstate commerce element of section 922(g), it is sufficient that there exists 'the minimal nexus that the firearm[s] have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.'"

Section 922(u)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm crosses state lines, regardless of whether it was transported for a commercial purpose.

United States v. Snow · filed 1996-04-22(u)

The above language shows that whether the firearm in question was transported for commercial or personal reasons is irrelevant; simply by crossing state lines the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) applies constitutionally when the firearm has previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bates · filed 1996-04-11(g)(1)

As such, we find the application of section 922(g)(1) to Bates’s conduct eminently constitutional.

Section 922 reaches an intrastate firearm transaction when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services v. Berg · filed 1996-04-09

The federal statute’s prohibitions upon commerce in firearms, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 922, have consistently been interpreted as reaching any transaction whereby the firearms at some time had “a past connection to interstate commerce.” ... Therefore, under the cases cited above, the transaction was clearly encompassed by the federal statute and by the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm that previously travelled in interstate commerce, without proof that the possession itself affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Bradford · filed 1996-04-29(g)(1)

We refuse to extend the Lopez holding to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because we are convinced that the Congressional Act preventing felons from possessing firearms that had travelled in interstate commerce is a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Bradford stipulated that the firearm found in Brown’s car had travelled in interstate commerce; his stipulation was fatal to his case, for even after Lopez, his concession renders a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) constitutional pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a felon's possession of firearms manufactured in another state because their interstate movement supplies the required commerce connection.

United States v. Hayes · filed 1996-05-16(g)(1)

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) may be based on either of these two categories of federal commerce power. ... Here, the government demonstrated that the guns were products of interstate commerce by proving that they had been manufactured in a different state. This was more than sufficient to establish the federal government's power to regulate the guns in question.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the firearm was in interstate commerce at some time, a jurisdictional element that sustains the provision under the Commerce Clause.

McGiff v. United States · filed 1996-05-17(g)

Section 922(g) does not violate the Commerce Clause because it contains a jurisdictional element specifically requiring the prosecution to prove that, at some time, the firearm at issue was in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Chesney · filed 1996-06-14(g)(1)

Chesney's stipulation that the gun had been transported in interstate commerce was sufficient to meet § 922(g)(1)'s "in or affecting commerce" requirement. The fact that Chesney possessed a gun that previously had moved in interstate commerce provides a sufficient nexus between Chesney's conduct and interstate commerce to allow Congress to regulate Chesney's conduct pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Chesney.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Mandujano · filed 1996-06-07(g)(1)

In contrast, § 922(g)(1) contains an explicit requirement that a nexus to interstate commerce be established.10 This jurisdictional element is satisfied if the government proves that the firearm in possession had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when the firearm possessed by a convicted felon previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Rawls · filed 1996-06-17(g)(1)

The "in or affecting commerce" element can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce; proof that the firearm crossed state lines at some time is sufficient.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dung Manh NGUYEN, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-07-09(g)

In order to satisfy the element that the firearm had been, at some time, in interstate commerce, the government need only prove a minimal nexus between the gun and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) covers possession within one state of a firearm manufactured outside that state and transported in interstate commerce.

Paydon v. United States · filed 1996-07-25(g)(1)

Paydon's claim that the possession of his firearm occurred solely in Vermont is equally without merit, as the gun was manufactured outside of Vermont and thereafter travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires only that the firearm have traveled in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Abu Ashonte Ali, A/K/A Marty Boldin, A/K/A Marty Boldwin · filed 1996-07-30(g)

The Court held that there was "no indication that Congress intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce." Id. at 575. Because in the present case, the government offered such proof, Ali's argument fails.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce, even if the defendant’s own conduct had only a minimal effect on commerce.

United States v. Farnsworth · filed 1996-08-06(g)(1)

“Section 922(g)’s requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause,” Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400 (citation omitted), and the de minimis effect of Farnsworth’s own actions on interstate commerce does not invalidate his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm had at some time been in interstate commerce.

United States v. Meadows · filed 1996-08-16(g)(1)

This contention lacks merit. We recently held that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1) is satisfied by the fact that the firearm "had at some time been in interstate commerce." Id., at 8241.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element encompasses foreign commerce when an indictment alleges interstate commerce.

United States v. Garcia · filed 1996-08-26(g)(1)

We agree and hold that by referencing interstate commerce in the indictment, the concept of foreign commerce was included as well. Therefore, there was no impermissible constructive amendment of the indictment by the district court.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element requires only a minimal nexus, which evidence that the firearm was manufactured out of state can establish.

United States v. Blais · filed 1996-08-28(g)(1)

Blais also argues that the district court should have allowed his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the government’s sole evidence on the element of “affecting interstate commerce” was the out-of-state manufacture of the handgun. Having already rejected his arguments about Lopez’s alteration of the Scarborough standard of minimal nexus, we conclude that the evidence proffered by the government was sufficient to meet its required showing of minimal nexus with interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s “in or affecting commerce” requirement is met by a stipulation that the firearm was transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Walls · filed 1996-10-23(g)(1)

Moreover, as to the issue raised by the court at oral argument regarding the legal sufficiency of the defendant's stipulation that the firearm had been "transported in interstate commerce," we find Sixth Circuit precedent for holding that such a stipulation meets the "in or affecting commerce" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm crossed state lines at any time, even long before the felon possessed it.

United States v. Lewis · filed 1996-11-06(g)(1)

A single journey across state lines, however remote from the defendant’s possession, is enough to establish the constitutionally minimal tie of a given weapon to interstate commerce, and to bring the defendant’s possession of the gun within a framework of regulation whose connection to interstate commerce is more apparent.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a connection to interstate commerce, which is satisfied when the firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Davis · filed 1996-11-12(g)(1)

Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, the statute in question in this case, § 922(g), does contain such a jurisdic- tional element because it applies only to firearms having "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 4347.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, not proof that firearm possession had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. David Lynwood Bowden, Jr. · filed 1996-10-28(g)(1)

Bowden's remaining arguments are that § 922(g) requires proof that possession of the firearm had a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce, and that the jury instructions were flawed for not including that requirement. In United States v. Blais, No. 95-1093, slip op. at 8 (1st Cir. August 28, 1996), we rejected precisely the arguments that Bowden makes here "about Lopez 's alteration of the Scarborough standard of minimal nexus."

Section 922(g) applies only to firearm possession connected to interstate commerce.

United States v. Lummie Sanders · filed 1996-12-06(g)

Here, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) incorporates an express jurisdictional element — it applies only to firearms “in or affecting commerce” — that operates to limit its reach to firearm possessions that have an affect on interstate commerce. Thus, § 922(g) clearly does not share the defect which prompted the Court to invalidate § 922(q).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed ammunition that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Kizeart · filed 1996-12-13(g)(1)

The essential elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as alleged in this case, are that a convicted felon transported ammunition in interstate commerce and possessed that ammunition.

The interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1) and (g)(5) is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm traveled across state lines.

United States v. Tejeda-Larios · filed 1997-01-17(g)(1), (g)(5)

We find that the evidence, considered favorably to the government, permitted a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm in Tejeda-Larios' possession travelled in interstate commerce. The "interstate commerce" element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (g)(5) is therefore satisfied, and the district court correctly denied Tejeda-Larios' motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a felon possesses a firearm in a state other than the state where it was manufactured.

United States v. Zimmerman · filed 1997-02-11(g)(1)

Our court has held that the interstate commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is satisfied by evidence that a felon possessed a firearm in a state other than the state where it was manufactured. See United States v. Fish, 928 F.2d 185, 186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). Thus, the stipulation shows that there was a sufficient factual basis for Zimmerman's guilty plea.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a convicted felon possesses a firearm that had been shipped in interstate commerce.

United States v. Santiago · filed 1997-01-30(g)(1)

Because the record reflects that Santiago, a convicted felon, possessed a firearm that had been shipped in interstate commerce, his conviction under § 922(g)(1) is valid.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce; Lopez did not increase that burden of proof.

United States v. Williams · filed 1997-02-13(g)(1)

The argument he makes was rejected in United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir.1996) (proof of minimal nexus to interstate commerce still sufficient for § 922(g) conviction after Lopez ); see also United States v. Lewis, 100 F.3d 49, 50-53 (7th Cir.1996) (same). Consequently, we find that the district court did not err in refusing Williams' requested jury instruction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional when the firearm has a minimal nexus to interstate commerce; proof of a substantial effect is unnecessary.

United States v. Chisholm · filed 1997-02-18(g)(1)

In McAllister, we rejected the defendant's argument that he could not be convicted under the statute prohibiting felons from possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), without proof that his possession "substantially" affected interstate commerce. ... In McAllister, however, we ruled that so long as the weapon in question had a "minimal nexus" to interstate commerce, the Constitution is satisfied. McAllister, 77 F.3d at 389-90. ... Assuming, arguendo, that Chisholm is correct, we nonetheless are bound by the McAllister panel's decision, as Chisholm was convicted under the exact statute at issue in McAllister, and the opinion remains binding precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) covers possession of a gun that previously moved in interstate commerce, and its interstate commerce requirement satisfies the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Trzaska · filed 1997-05-01(g)(1)

However, section 922(g)(1) “applies to a possession of a gun that previously moved in interstate commerce.” ... Because Trzaska stipulated that the firearms and ammunition at issue in this case had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce, Trzaska has waived this argument.

Section 922(g)’s interstate travel requirement is met when the principal parts of a readily assembled destructive device have moved across state lines.

United States v. Charles Paul Hickman Verna · filed 1997-05-14(g)

At least where, as here, the principal parts of a combination of parts from which a destructive device concededly can be assembled have moved in interstate commerce, then the “combination” of parts is one which has traveled in interstate commerce and the interstate travel element of section 922(g) is met.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be proved through circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed at least one firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Michael Lamont Bourgeois, A/k/a, Lil Mike · filed 1997-06-06(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bourgeois possessed in his full pillowcase either more than ten firearms or one of the 83 firearms that had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) gives fair warning that a felon may not possess a firearm that was imported into the state.

United States v. Gonzales · filed 1997-06-13(g)(1)

The statute gives “fair warning” that being a felon in possession of a weapon that had been imported into a state constitutes criminal conduct.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was made abroad and imported into another state.

United States v. Richardson · filed 1997-06-23(g)(1)

Richardson also contends that the government failed to prove that the weapon traveled in interstate commerce as required by the indict- ment and by § 924(g). However, a prosecution witness testified that Glocks are made in Austria and exclusively imported in Smyrna, Georgia. Such transportation satisfies the commerce element in § 924(g).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm crossed a state line at some time.

United States v. Horsman · filed 1997-06-13(g)(1)

To prove that the firearm Horsman had possessed had been in or had affected interstate commerce, the government only had to prove that "there exists the minimal nexus that the firearm[ has] been, at some time, in interstate commerce." Bates, 77 F.3d at 1104 (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the government proved this beyond a reasonable doubt both through expert testimony and through the firearm itself, which had its place of manufacture--"Springfield, Massachusetts"--clearly inscribed on it.

Section 922(a)(6) does not require the government to prove that the specific firearm traveled in commerce.

United States v. Troutt · filed 1997-07-10(a)(6)

Troutt pleaded guilty to count 1, which charged him with violation 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). This subsection does not expressly require the government to prove the specific firearm in question traveled in commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be satisfied when the component parts of a destructive device traveled in interstate commerce, even if the assembled device did not.

United States v. Gresham · filed 1997-07-16(g)(1)

Although we have not previously addressed this precise issue, our holding that the jurisdictional nexus of § 922(g)(1) may be satisfied by proof that the component parts of the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, rather than the firearm itself, comports with the construction of this statute endorsed by two of our sister circuits.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed in another.

United States v. Crump · filed 1997-07-23(g)(1)

In actuality, there was testimony that the shotgun used to murder Jones in West Virginia had been manufactured in Massachusetts, and, thus, that it had traveled in interstate commerce; such evidence is sufficient to establish the commerce element of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement can be satisfied by proof that a destructive device’s component parts traveled in interstate commerce, even if the assembled device did not.

United States v. Gresham · filed 1997-08-13(g)(1)

Although we have not previously addressed this precise issue, our holding that the jurisdictional nexus of § 922(g)(1) may be satisfied by proof that the component parts of the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, rather than the firearm itself, comports with the construction of this statute endorsed by two of our sister circuits.

A firearm manufactured outside the state where a felon possessed it has a sufficient interstate nexus for liability under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Merritt · filed 1997-08-21(g)(1)

Merritt stipulated that the handgun found in his possession was manufactured outside of Wisconsin, and this fact established a sufficient interstate nexus to find him liable under § 922(g)(1).

A constitutional challenge to a § 922(g)(1) conviction based on an asserted lack of an interstate-commerce nexus is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Sanders · filed 1997-10-28(g)(1)

Curtis Glynn Sanders appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that his conviction is unconstitutional for lack of a nexus with interstate commerce. We have reviewed the record and his brief and find that his argument is precluded by this court’s decision in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a nexus to interstate commerce, which is satisfied when the firearm possessed by a felon has traveled in interstate commerce.

Neff v. United States · filed 1997-11-19(g)(1)

Section § 922(g)(1), by contrast, survives because it does contain "an explicit requirement that a nexus to interstate commerce be established." Id. Neff admitted that he possessed a weapon that had traveled in interstate commerce. This admission establishes the requisite nexus to interstate commerce to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearms moved in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed them.

United States v. Graves · filed 1997-12-05(g)(1)

The three weapons had already moved in interstate commerce prior to coming into the hands of the ATF and any such past connection to interstate commerce was sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Redmond · filed 1997-12-15(g)

We find that the inscription on the gun, combined with the testimony of the ATF agent, constitutes sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection to interstate commerce; the government need not prove that possession substantially affected commerce.

United States v. Bunn · filed 1998-01-15(g)(1)

The "in or affecting commerce" requirement of § 922(g) satisfies the jurisdic- tional element that the statute at issue in Lopez lacked and meets the minimal nexus required for the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce; the firearm’s prior movement between states suffices.

United States v. Wood · filed 1998-06-12(g)(1)

Wood argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce; that the indictment in this case is fatally defective because of its failure to allege a substantial effect on interstate commerce; and that there is an insufficient factual ... basis for conviction under the statute because the mere movement of a firearm from one state to another, at some undetermined time in the past, does not constitute a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This argument lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled from one state to another.

United States v. Palomo · filed 1998-10-19(g)(1)

Under the analyses used in Parker, Miles, and Hebert, the instruction, which equated the movement of the firearm from one State to another with the interstate commerce element, did not violate Gaudin.

Section 922(j) applies to trafficking in stolen firearms that traveled in interstate commerce before they were stolen.

United States v. Sanders · filed 1999-01-21(j)

In sum, then, we conclude that S922(j), as amended in 1990, was intended by Congress to apply to cases like this one where the stolen firearms traveled in interstate commerce only prior to their theft.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a de minimis showing that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Palozie · filed 1999-01-29(g)(1)

We conclude that in order to satisfy the interstate commerce element of § 922(g), the prosecution need only make the de minimis showing that the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(j) prohibits possessing a stolen firearm that is moving in or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Luna · filed 1999-02-03(j)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to Luna.

Section 922(g)(9) requires the government to prove that a firearm possessed by a domestic violence misdemeanant was possessed in or affecting commerce.

Fraternal Order of Police v. United States · filed 1999-04-16(g)(9)

We join all the numbered circuits2 in rejecting this argument because s 922(g)(9) con- tains a "jurisdictional element": in any prosecution under the provision for possession, the government must prove that the defendant possessed the firearm "in or affecting commerce."

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the ammunition traveled in interstate or foreign commerce to sustain a felon-in-possession-of-ammunition conviction.

United States v. Carolina · filed 1999-04-27(g)(1)

Carolina's conviction and sentence on the ammunition charge, however, must be vacated. There was no stipulation nor evidence presented at trial that the ammunition traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, an element of the offense.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the firearm travelled in interstate commerce to establish the firearm possession violation at issue.

United States v. Leblanc · filed 1999-05-21(g)

Because of the reference to section 922(g), the government would have to prove that the firearm travelled in interstate commerce in order to show that LeBlanc violated this condition.

Section 922(g)(9) covers possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor if the firearm has crossed state lines at least once, even when the person possesses it only within one state for official duties.

Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1999-07-09(g)(9)

The possibility that a particular individual might possess his gun solely within one state and for official purposes is irrelevant. So long as that gun has moved across state lines at least once, it is subject to the exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority.

Section 922(g)(8)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearms or ammunition moved in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Visnich · filed 1999-08-19(g)(8)

So long as the weapons in Defendant’s possession were moved in interstate commerce at some time, the minimal nexus between his possession and interstate commerce can be established. The government does not need to prove anything more than mere movement of the firearms and ammunition in interstate commerce to meet its burden of proof on the jurisdictional element of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Jennings · filed 1999-12-16(g)(1)

Jennings argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce; ... This argument lacks merit.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the ammunition’s shells traveled interstate, even when the indictment describes complete rounds.

United States v. Danielson · filed 1999-12-22(g)

We reject Danielson’s claim that the District Court permitted a constructive amendment by allowing the government to proceed on the theory that the shells, rather than the entire rounds, had traveled in interstate commerce. The essential element of the offense charged was that Dan-ielson possessed ammunition that had traveled in interstate commerce, not the precise nature of that ammunition. Whether the government proved that shells or entire rounds had so traveled, there is no doubt that Danielson had notice of the “core of criminality” to be proven at trial and that he was convicted of the offense charged in the indictment.

A gun manufactured in one state and used in another satisfies § 922(g)'s interstate commerce element.

United States v. Nathan · filed 2000-01-19(g)

And we have further held that the fact that a gun is manufactured in one state and used in another is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce element of section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in a different state from the one in which the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Corey · filed 2000-03-28(g)(1)

Accordingly, the "interstate nexus" element was met provided the government demonstrated that Corey possessed the shotgun in a state other than the one in which it was manufactured.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when firearms or ammunition moved in interstate commerce before the prohibited person possessed them.

United States v. 47 Mm Cannon · filed 2000-05-04(g)(1)

The caselaw does not require the firearms and ammunition to have moved in interstate commerce after coming into Boles’ possession. The fact that the firearms and ammunition moved in interstate commerce in reaching Boles is sufficient in this regard.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm travels across state lines to the state where the defendant possesses it.

United States v. Reynolds · filed 2000-06-20(g)(1)

Moreover, the government has shown that the 12-gauge shotgun was manufactured in Connecticut and then traveled across state lines to Florida, where Reyonlds possessed it. This movement is sufficient to show the required nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that a firearm manufactured abroad reached Texas, even without an ATF trace report.

United States v. Walder · filed 2000-09-14(g)(1)

The evidence is sufficient to prove that the firearm was “in or affected interstate commerce” for purposes of § 922(g)(1), regardless of whether the ATF trace summary is admissible.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a connection between a felon’s firearm or ammunition possession and interstate commerce.

United States v. Carnes · filed 2000-09-19(g)(1)

Therefore, because the jury was properly instructed, and then proceeded to find, that Defendant could be convicted under § 922(g)(1) only if his possession of a firearm and ammunition had some connection to interstate commerce, Defendant’s prosecution and conviction for violating § 922(g)(1) did not exceed.the jurisdiction of the federal government or its courts.

Section 922(g)(9) requires an interstate commerce connection, which is satisfied when the possessed firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2001-01-10(g)(9)

The answer is clear and simple: Section 922(g)(9) expressly requires a nexus with interstate commerce. In the present case, it is not disputed that the firearm which Mr. Lewis possessed had traveled in interstate commerce. This specific interstate-commerce connection suffices to validate the statute.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce nexus is jurisdictional, so a state felon-in-possession offense need not have a commerce element to qualify as an aggravated felony.

United States v. Castillo-Rivera · filed 2001-03-26(g)(1)

We hold that the commerce nexus requirement of § 922(g) “is merely a jurisdictional basis”; therefore, we conclude that Castillo’s prior conviction under CPC § 12021(a) constitutes an aggravated felony, as an offense described in § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(9) requires the firearm to have traveled in interstate commerce, an element that supports Congress’s authority to prohibit its possession by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

United States v. Costigan · filed 2001-03-26(g)(9)

Section 922(g)(9) is subject to an interstate jurisdictional requirement in that the firearm must have traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(9) requires the firearm to have traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Costigan · filed 2001-05-21(g)(9)

Section 922(g)(9) is subject to an interstate jurisdictional requirement in that the firearm must have traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm crossed state lines at any time.

United States v. King · filed 2001-05-18(g)(1)

King is mistaken in arguing that it is necessary for the government to charge or prove that he traveled across state lines with the pistol, acquired it from someone engaged in commerce, or used the pistol to rob or threaten a person engaged in commerce. There need only be a showing of a “minimal nexus” between the firearm and interstate commerce; “the mere movement of a weapon, at some time, across state lines” satisfies the commerce element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires only that the firearm have moved in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Ohman · filed 2001-06-27(g)(1)

As we have previously explained, the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), “requirefs] only ‘the minimal [jurisdictional] nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce.’ ” ... Nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence undermines that holding.

Section 922(g) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, which a firearm manufactured in another state can supply.

United States v. Dupree · filed 2001-07-25(g)

However, § 922(g) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390, and by brandishing a firearm that was manufactured in California and found in his car, Dupree’s actions satisfy this test.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection to interstate commerce: the firearm must have traveled in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Brunson · filed 2001-08-03(g)(1)

We have previously rejected Brunson’s contention that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires a more substantial nexus to commerce than the one presented here.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Tran · filed 2001-08-23(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the firearm’s only interstate commerce connection is its past interstate travel.

United States v. Alonzo · filed 2001-08-23(g)(1)

He argues that the factual basis of his guilty plea was insufficient to support his conviction because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) operates unconstitutionally where the only interstate commerce nexus is the mere fact that the firearm possessed had a past connection to interstate travel. ... We hold that United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996) is controlling, and, therefore, the district court committed no error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection to interstate commerce, which is satisfied when the ammunition possessed previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sales · filed 2001-08-31(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce. United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1997). This element is satisfied because the ammunition and explosives possessed by Sales previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Compean · filed 2001-08-31(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to show that the defendant possessed a firearm in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Davis · filed 2001-09-10(g)(1)

The government was required to show only that Mr. Davis possessed a firearm “in or affecting commerce . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by evidence that the firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Morrison · filed 2001-09-11(g)(1)

It was the jury’s responsibility to resolve any conflicts in the testimony, United States v. Biedler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997), and the above evidence, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to find that the rifle traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Singletary · filed 2001-10-02(g)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that the proof in this case that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element, and therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the firearm possessed came from outside the state.

United States v. Brewer · filed 2001-10-02(g)(1)

Evidence showed that a black revolver kept in Brewer’s home had been made in Brazil. ... But evidence need not exclude every possibility of innocence in order to support a conviction. A reasonable jury could (and did) conclude that Brewer possessed a firearm that came from outside Illinois.

Section 922(u)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the stolen firearm traveled from one state to another at any time.

United States v. Aranda · filed 2001-11-14(u)

A mere showing that the weapon in question traveled at some time from one state to another is enough to demonstrate the jurisdictional element.

Section 922(g)(9)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm moved in interstate commerce at any time.

United States v. Smith · filed 2001-12-18(g)(9)

It has long been held that the government need only prove that the firearm in question moved in interstate commerce at any time to meet its burden of proving that it was used in or affected commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when the indictment alleges that the firearms were transported in and affected commerce and the defendant pleads guilty to that charge.

United States v. Hagen · filed 2002-01-04(g)(1)

We reject Hagen’s other arguments because, even assuming he has not waived these arguments through his plea agreement, ... (3) the indictment charged him with possession of firearms that had been transported in and affected commerce, and he pleaded guilty to that charge, see Mack v. United States, 853 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed; the defendant need not have transported it personally.

United States v. Sianis · filed 2002-01-07(g)(1)

Sianis's involvement in how the firearm came into Nebraska is irrelevant to our inquiry. Sianis admits that the firearm at issue was manufactured outside of Nebraska. His admission is enough to satisfy § 922(g).

Section 922(j) does not require a stolen firearm to have crossed state lines after it was stolen; interstate travel before the theft satisfies its commerce element.

United States v. Redd · filed 2002-02-05(j)

Contrary to Redd’s contention, the government need not show that the firearm was stolen prior to its transport in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)’s interstate nexus element may be established through expert testimony about where ammunition was manufactured.

United States v. Floyd · filed 2002-02-13(g)

The law in this circuit, however, clearly allows the interstate nexus element of § 922(g) to be established by expert testimony.

Section 922(g)(8) requires the government to prove that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Bunnell · filed 2002-02-15(g)(8)

Further, the government still had to prove that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce under the statute, and the government's expert permissibly used the gun in explaining how this requirement had been satisfied.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by stipulated evidence that the firearm traveled between states; a substantial effect on interstate commerce is not required.

United States v. Cosby · filed 2002-02-25(g)

he recognizes that this court has recently found Morrison and Jones distinguishable from §922(g) cases. See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that Morrison and Jones are distinguishable from Section 922(g) cases “because a plain jurisdictional element exists in § 922(g), and [as here] there is stipulated evidence to show that the gun traveled in interstate commerce).” Cosby concedes that Daugherty forecloses this issue on appeal; he raises it only to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review. As this court is bound by its prior decision in Daugherty, this appeal is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2002-02-25(g)(1)

In fact, “[t]his court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question,” based on “the mere fact that the ammunition [or firearm] traveled through interstate commerce in the past.” ... Accordingly, Johnson’s argument based on Lopez lacks merit.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and later possessed in another.

United States v. Swift · filed 2002-04-09(g)

We affirm the holding of the district court that the parties’ stipulation was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)'s commerce element requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce, satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Cornish · filed 2002-04-10(g)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce. ... This element is satisfied because the firearm possessed by Cornish previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)'s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in another state, even if the defendant possessed it entirely within one state.

United States v. Cavazos · filed 2002-04-12(g)

In the present case, Cavazos stipulated that the firearm was manufactured in California. Thus, there is a sufficient interstate commerce nexus to support Cavazos's conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce; a firearm’s prior interstate travel satisfies that element.

United States v. Ramirez · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element requires only a minimal nexus, which is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Dennis · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Salinas · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) reaches a felon's firearm possession when the firearm traveled through interstate commerce in the past.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

In fact, “[t]his court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question,” based on “the mere fact that the ammunition [or firearm] traveled through interstate commerce in the past.” United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999). ... Accordingly, Rodriguez’s argument based on Lopez lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(8) survives an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge when the firearms were manufactured out of state and therefore traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gill · filed 2002-04-22(g)(8)

In this case, Gill concedes the possession of five firearms and that the five firearms in question were manufactured outside the state of Oregon and therefore traveled in interstate commerce at some time. His as-applied challenge, therefore, fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element requires proof only that the firearm crossed state lines at some time before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Blocker · filed 2002-04-22(g)(1)

These cases reaffirm that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, see Davis, 242 F.3d at 1163, and that the government must prove only that the firearm possessed by the defendant was transported in interstate commerce at some time, ... see Rousseau, 257 F.3d at 933.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Franklin · filed 2002-04-26(g)(1)

The Government further established that both guns had been manufactured outside of the State of Pennsylvania. Numerous courts have established that under § 922(g), proof of a gun’s manufacture outside of the state in which it was possessed is sufficient to support the factual finding that the firearm was “in our affecting commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) and (9) require proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, which evidence of manufacture outside the state can establish.

United States v. Pedersen · filed 2002-04-30(g)(1), (g)(9)

On this basis the government expert opined that the gun had been manufactured outside of Alaska, and this evidence was sufficient to establish that the gun had been transported into Alaska.