18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, knew he possessed a firearm, and that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. King · filed 2007-05-30(g)

To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was in possession of the firearm; and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. ... Viewing the evidence most favorably to the Government, a juror reasonably may have found beyond a reasonable doubt that King possessed a firearm that was discovered in the box spring of his bed.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon’s possession of a firearm as continuing for as long as the felon possesses it.

United States v. McGee · filed 2007-07-11(g)(1)

We have stated that “the offense of felon in possession is complete once the felon actually obtains possession of a firearm, but continues as long as it remains in his possession.”

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gilbert · filed 2007-07-24(g)(1)

Defendant was, therefore, prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms that had been transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires possession of a firearm, but does not require ownership.

United States v. Triplett · filed 2008-02-05(g)

Yet under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), ownership is not a necessary element of the crime; possession is sufficient to violate the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) treats even brief possession of a firearm by a felon as sufficient for conviction.

United States v. Kirkland, Jeffrey D. · filed 2008-02-14(g)(1)

Yet we have held that even a brief possession of a firearm is sufficient to convict under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a constitutional challenge based on Lopez and Morrison under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Rylander · filed 2008-03-13(g)

Edward Anthony Rylander challenges his guilty plea conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He first argues that this court should reconsider its jurisprudence regarding the statute’s constitutionality in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Rylander’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon’s brief handling of a firearm as possession even if the firearm is unloaded or inoperable.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2008-04-01(g)(1)

Both Lane and Hendricks establish that merely holding a firearm for a brief period of time is sufficient to constitute possession within the meaning of section 922. This rule prevents felons from coming into contact with firearms, thus giving effect to one of the purposes of section 922. The district court’s refusal to add another requirement — that the firearm be loaded and operable — was consistent with this court’s case law and the purpose of section 922.

Section 922(g)(1) allows prosecution of a person convicted of a felony for possessing a firearm.

United States v. Mackey · filed 2008-04-21(g)(1)

Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e) specifically allow for the prosecution and enhanced punishment of persons such as Mackey who have been convicted of three violent felonies. Mackey’s arguments to the contrary are nonsensical and frivolous.

Admission of felony status and possession of loaded firearms can support a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Griham · filed 2008-05-21(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence to support Griham’s conviction for being a felon in possession because Griham admitted that he was a convicted felon and that he was armed with loaded firearms.

The evidence was sufficient to prove firearm and ammunition possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Jones · filed 2008-07-08(g)(1)

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient evidence to support Jones’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s travel in interstate commerce; possession may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Williams · filed 2008-08-08(g)(1)

In order to prove the felon-in-possession offense, the government must show that: Williams had a previous felony conviction; he possessed a firearm; and the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Possession can be actual or constructive. ... We think the government produced ample evidence to satisfy all three elements.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from receiving or possessing a firearm; a counterfeiting conviction qualifies.

Boniella v. Commonwealth · filed 2008-09-25(g)(1)

Boniella could not establish that he was entitled to “lawful” possession of the subject Taurus handgun because, under Section 922 of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922, Boniella was prohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, and evidence of possession of the firearm charged in the indictment can sustain a conviction.

United States v. Morrison · filed 2009-02-26(g)(1)

Defendant was convicted under Count Eight of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), to wit a Glock model 26 9mm semi-automatic pistol, bearing Serial Number DFC-566US. ... Notwithstanding protestations by defendant to the contrary, the evidence presented to the jury was more than sufficient to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of proof ... with respect to the specific weapon listed in Count Eight, particularly when viewed, as it must be, in the light most favorable to the government.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that affected or was in interstate commerce; officer testimony can establish possession without fingerprint evidence.

United States v. Cochran · filed 2009-06-02(g)(1)

Section § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a felon knowingly to possess a firearm that affected or was in interstate commerce. ... We conclude that there was ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found Cochran guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing either a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Grider · filed 2009-07-21(g)

In this case, however, Congress explicitly prohibits a felon from possessing either ammunition or a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and possession of either subjects a defendant to the same penalties, see generally 18 U.S.C. § 924(a).

When a § 922(g) felon-in-possession count is joined with other charges, bifurcation is preferred in the Third Circuit.

United States v. Scott · filed 2009-11-20(g)

In Count XV of the indictment, Scott is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... In this circuit, bifurcation is preferred when a felon in possession charge is joined with other charges. ... Consequently, Scott’s trial on Count XV will be bifurcated.

Section 922(g)(1) describes felon possession of a firearm; a conviction under California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1) is for an offense described in that subsection.

Abrego-Hernandez v. Holder · filed 2009-12-08(g)(1)

The agency accordingly did not err in concluding that Abrego-Hernandez’s conviction for violating California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1) was for an offense “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and therefore an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established through circumstantial evidence that a felon controlled a firearm.

United States v. Basley · filed 2009-12-18(g)(1)

Because we conclude a reasonable jury could infer that Basley knowingly possessed the Glock, we will also affirm Bas-ley’s conviction based on Count Eight, that he knowingly possessed a firearm as a felon.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by actual possession, sole control and occupancy of a place where a firearm is found, or joint occupancy plus evidence of access to and knowledge of the firearm.

United States v. Earnest Ross · filed 2010-02-23(g)(1)

Possession can be established by (1) actual, physical possession of the firearm, (2) sole control and occupancy of a place where a firearm is found, or (3) joint occupancy of a place where a firearm is found, combined with some evidence of the defendant’s access to and knowledge of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person with a prior felony possessed a gun that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Burton · filed 2010-07-23(g)(1)

For a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that after incurring a felony conviction the defendant possessed a gun that had traveled in or affected interstate commerce. ... As noted above, however, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and we would not disrupt the jury’s credibility determinations.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, intentionally and voluntarily possessed a firearm, and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Waldron · filed 2010-07-26(g)(1)

In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government had to demonstrate (1) that Waldron was a convicted felon at the time of the offense; (2) he possessed the firearm intentionally and voluntarily; and (3) the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element is satisfied when the evidence supports actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Cowling · filed 2011-08-08(g)(1)

Here, the evidence clearly supports Cowling’s conviction for felon in possession. First, police found a loaded revolver on the kitchen counter next to Cowling’s keys and cell phone. From this the jury may have reasonably inferred that Cowling placed the revolver on the counter. In addition, other firearms were found in a dresser in the master bedroom, in the dining room, and in a hallway next to a downstairs bathroom. Moreover, when officers seized the guns at issue, Cowling told them that the guns were his and he would get them back.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence of possession is sufficient and the prior felony and interstate travel of the firearms are established.

United States v. Zoch · filed 2012-11-05(g)(1)

The parties stipulated that Zoch had been convicted of one or more crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and that the firearms and ammunition in question traveled in interstate commerce prior to February 2010, when a warrant search of Zoch’s residence discovered the firearms and ammunition in Zoch’s bedroom and in other areas of his residence. This evidence, along with other testimony about Zoch’s handling of firearms for purposes such as hunting and target shooting, was sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2012-11-30(g)(1)

In this case, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government is sufficient to support a finding of possession for the purpose of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from possessing a firearm when the conviction remains effective under § 921(a)(20).

State of West Virginia v. Stewart · filed 2013-05-17(g)(1)

To determine whether the petitioner’s possession of a firearm would violate federal law, ... we examine two federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm, and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which provides the following limited exception to the prohibition: ... The central issue in this case is whether the petitioner fits within the limited exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). If he does not, then his possession of a firearm would violate federal law even if possession were lawful under state law. ... Consequently, the petitioner cannot claim the restoration of all his civil rights.

Officers’ testimony that each defendant held a handgun can prove possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Johnson · filed 2014-02-13(g)(1)

The testimony of the officers was sufficient to prove Johnson and Muldrow each had a handgun in his possession. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict both Johnson and Muldrow of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

A conviction under § 922(g)(1) can stand when the evidence proves possession of one firearm charged in the indictment.

United States v. Antwan Reed · filed 2014-03-10(g)(1)

As for the guns, even if there was not enough tying Reed to the guns in the basement or kitchen, there was enough in the record to tie him to the gun in the closet of the ... master bedroom, and only one gun was needed for the section 922(g)(1) conviction.

Evidence that a felon lived where ammunition was found and that it was not well hidden can support a finding of possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Marcellus Cheatham, III · filed 2015-02-10(g)(1)

Substantial evidence also supported the jury’s determination on the possession of ammunition count because Cheatham testified he was living in the house where the police recovered the ammunition, and the ammunition “w[as] not so well hidden, as to prohibit a reasonable fact finder from concluding that [the defendant] was aware of [its] presence.” United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2003).

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm possession after a serious federal felony conviction; rehabilitation and the age of the conviction do not lift the bar.

Tripodi v. Sessions · filed 2018-09-10(g)(1)

The parties do not dispute Mr. Tripodi's federal conspiracy conviction carried a maximum possible sentence of five years, and as a result, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) bars him from possessing a firearm. ... Mr. Tripodi alleges his felony conspiracy conviction is aged, for a non-violent offense, and he has since led a peaceful and productive life. These considerations, however, are irrelevant to our analysis.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce, so probation terms cannot authorize a court or probation officer to permit that possession.

Josh McBride v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-06-28(g)(1)

The no contact order also references 18 U.S.C. section 922(g). It appears, therefore, that the trial court is aware of the restrictions on convicted felons contained in federal law. Nonetheless, there is an obvious conflict in the trial court’s orders. ... We therefore remand this case for the trial court to modify the terms of McBride’s probation to remove the conditional language and unequivocally state that he is not permitted to have a firearm during his probation.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.

Evans v. Cook County State's Attorney · filed 2019-10-28(g)(1)

As we explained, the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act) makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year *** to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). ... His convictions, therefore, bring him within the federal prohibition.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm regardless of whether the firearm is used for practice or self-defense.

United States v. Mejia · filed 2019-10-29(g)(1)

His crime was committed when he possessed a firearm while being a felon, it does not matter whether he was using it for practice or self-defense.

Section 922(g) continues to cover firearm possession by a person who admitted a prior felony conviction and had served prison time for prior felonies, even after Rehaif.

Russaw v. Kellie · filed 2020-07-31(g)

Further, as Kellie has asserted, and Russaw failed to oppose, Russaw’s presentence report before the trial court indicated Russaw had served three years on the two prior felony offenses serving as the basis for his charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Thus, Russaw conduct as presented at his plea hearing, even with the change in law by Rehaif, remains criminal.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction to stand when robbery charges from the same date are dismissed, if the possession evidence is sufficient.

United States v. Willis Walter Hamblin, Gregory Jones · filed 1990-10-11(g)

The possession count, however, is not bound to any one of the four robberies charged in the indictment, and we cannot say as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision.

Evidence that a defendant lived where a firearm was found and that the firearm was his can support the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. McBrown · filed 1998-06-25(g)(1)

Roderick Reed challenges his convictions on counts 21-24 on grounds that there was insufficient proof that he lived at the Flamingo residence. A rational jury could find that Roderick Reed lived at the Flamingo residence, and that the drugs and firearm were his.

Section 922(g)'s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a felon threw a firearm from the vehicle he was driving.

United States v. Roberts · filed 1999-01-07(g)

The jury easily could have found that the gun that was found was thrown by Roberts. It takes little imagination, therefore, to conclude that he had “possessed” it in the vehicle.

Section 922(g) prevents a convicted felon from lawfully possessing firearms.

United States v. Behrens · filed 1996-10-04(g)

Furthermore, at the time Behrens brought his Rule 41(e) motion he was a convicted felon. Accordingly, he was not “entitled to lawful possession” of the weapons as required by Rule 41(e). See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) bars a felon from possessing firearms and ammunition, so a felon cannot recover those items through a motion for return of property.

United States v. Story · filed 2001-03-09(g)

Likewise, the two guns and ammunition (Item Nos. 1, 2, 12) seized cannot be lawfully owned by Story, a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Story is not entitled to their return under any factual scenario.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon and that the firearm had previously traveled in and affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Scott · filed 2005-05-26(g)

We also believe that the record supports the district court’s denial of Scott’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Scott stipulated at trial that he was a convicted felon, and that the rifle found in his vehicle had previously traveled in and affected interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence sufficiently proves firearm possession and interstate travel.

United States v. Culbreath · filed 2005-06-01(g)(1)

A jury convicted Ameer Naseer Culbreath of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(e)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (Count 1), and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2000) (Count 2). ... Culbreath contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 on Count 1 because the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the firearm and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. ... We have reviewed the trial testimony in the joint appendix, supplemental joint appendix, and government supplemental appendix and are convinced that the evidence was sufficient to convict Culbreath.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison and knowingly possessed a firearm that had been in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Jefferson · filed 2010-02-05(g)(1)

As to the firearm offenses, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support both convictions. See ... United States v. Davis, 449 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2006) (to obtain § 922(g)(1) conviction, government must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had previously been convicted of crime punishable by prison term exceeding one year, and knowingly possessed firearm which had been in or affected interstate commerce).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person with a qualifying felony conviction from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

Ryan v. Hughes-Ortiz · filed 2012-01-06(g)(1)

Section 889 of the Restatement thus supports the conclusion that, in light of Milot’s theft of the pistol and his violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the plaintiff’s claims against Hughes-Ortiz are barred.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to criminalize firearm possession by a convicted felon after Rehaif.

Willis v. Dobbs · filed 2021-01-25(g)(1)

Nevertheless, under both Fourth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit precedent, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon—the conduct to which Petitioner pled guilty and for which he was convicted—remains a criminal offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison and proof that the defendant knew of that status when possessing a firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2021-03-03(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, however, a rational jury could conclude that Johnson had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and that he had knowledge of that fact as required by Rehaif.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit firearm possession by a convicted felon after Rehaif.

Butler v. United States · filed 2021-03-31(g)(1)

District courts speaking to the second prong of Jones uniformly have found Rehaif did not change the substantive law because the conduct for which the defendant was convicted remains illegal. ... The court will follow her sister districts.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm; keeping a gun in a car one drives is evidence of control and possession.

United States v. Willie Hardy, Jr. · filed 2021-06-09(g)(1)

To begin, there was plenty of evidence to support Hardy’s conviction on Count 3 for possession of a gun by a felon. First, the parties stipulated that Hardy was a felon. And Hardy admitted he kept the Glock for eight months in a car he was driving and knew the gun’s caliber. This control is the essence of possession.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm after Rehaif.

Davis v. Streeval · filed 2021-09-27(g)(1)

Specifically, he cannot demonstrate that the conduct for which he was convicted is no longer a crime.

Section 922(g)(1) continues to prohibit felons from possessing firearms after Rehaif.

Schmutte v. Hudgins · filed 2022-01-21(g)(1)

The Court in Rehaif did not redefine the standards for felon status, possession, firearms or ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm even if it is unloaded or the felon does not intend to use it.

United States v. Price · filed 2022-03-09(g)(1)

A felon’s possession of a fire- arm violates § 922(g)(1) without regard to whether the gun is loaded or if the felon intends to use it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of his felony status, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Hester · filed 2022-06-08(g)(1)

The parties stipulated at trial that Hester was a felon and knew of his status as a felon before the date alleged in the relevant indictment, and the Government presented evidence that all three firearms had traveled in or affected interstate commerce. That Hester did not have a firearm on him when he was arrested, others had access to Mobile MechanicXX where the shotgun was found, and none of his co-defendants testified that he took or used a firearm for purchases or sales, among other facts Hester raises, do not demonstrate that no rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g) continues to prohibit firearm possession by a felon after Rehaif.

Sandlain v. Warden · filed 2022-09-27(g)

Sandlain cannot satisfy the second prong of the savings clause test because the conduct for which plaintiff was convicted is still illegal and being a felon in possession of a firearm is still a valid criminal offense.

Section 922(g)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains valid after Bruen.

Davis v. United States · filed 2023-01-24(g)

However, Bruen did nothing to change the prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons, which remains well-settled law.

Section 922(g)(1) allows knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition to be proved through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Kacey Hicks · filed 2023-04-05(g)(1)

Knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition can be actual or constructive. ... Based on this evidence, the district court correctly denied Hicks’s motion for acquittal on the felon-in-possession count.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Long · filed 2024-05-31(g)

The evidence also supports the jury’s conclusion that Long possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and that as a felon, he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm.

Britton v. United States · filed 2024-07-11(g)(1)

The law is clear under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that an individual convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” may not possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Dusty J. Cowan v. State of Alaska · filed 2024-10-25(g)(1)

Thus, although Cowan could possess a firearm for safety or subsistence hunting under Alaska law, Cowan may not possess a firearm under federal law, and so his argument is moot because his other conditions require him to comply with federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person with a qualifying felony conviction whose civil rights have not all been restored.

United States v. Warner · filed 2025-03-18(g)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that Warner is a “prohibited person” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and that the statute is constitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was a felon and knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Mays · filed 2025-07-08(g)(1)

In addition, to obtain a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, the Government had to show that Mays knew he was a felon and that he knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce. ... We therefore conclude that the Government provided sufficient evidence of Mays’s guilt of the offenses of conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms.

United States v. Six Firearms · filed 2021-09-24(g)(1)

Taken as true, the factual allegations in the complaint establish that the defendant property was used in a knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), Felon in Possession of a Firearm and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 922(g)(1), Aiding and Abetting a Felon in Possession of a Firearm. Christopher possessed the defendant property after having been convicted of felony manslaughter, and Graham aided and abetted his possession of multiple firearms, knowing he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits people convicted of a felony from possessing firearms, ammunition, and destructive devices, but does not prohibit possession of other dangerous weapons.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2022-03-11(g)(1)

Federal law prohibits persons who have been convicted of a felony from possessing firearms, ammunition, and destructive device. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (defining firearm to include “any destructive device”). However, to the extent this condition broadens the statutory restriction by prohibiting the possession of other dangerous weapons, it conflicts with the district court’s oral pronouncement and must be stricken in part.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon's possession of a firearm with a past connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Medina · filed 2016-10-20(g)(1)

In addition, we have held that “a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm having a past connection to interstate commerce violates § 922(g)(1),” Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d at 146, and have rejected attempts to deconstruct the ... language of § 922(g) as to differentiate among the activities that it prohibits in terms of various degrees of involvement in interstate commerce, see, e.g., Shelton, 937 F.2d at 143. The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond did not abrogate our holdings in these cases.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be established by testimony that the firearms or ammunition were manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed them.

United States v. Pericles · filed 2010-06-10(g)(1)

We conclude from the record that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the firearms and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce because the government presented testimony that they had been manufactured either in foreign countries or in states other than Florida, where Pericles was arrested.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, which can be shown by proving the firearm traveled across state lines.

United States v. Wright · filed 2010-05-26(g)(1)

However, § 922(g) only requires that the government prove some “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by “demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but not that he knew it had an interstate nexus.

United States v. Rose · filed 2009-11-06(g)(1)

Dancy remains good ... law in this circuit. See United States v. Schmidt, 487 F.3d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[C]onviction under § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew that he had received (or possessed or transported) a firearm but does not require proof that he knew that the firearm had an interstate nexus or that he was a felon.”).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce nexus is established when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2008-12-05(g)(1)

Jenkins stipulated that he was a felon, and evidence that the gun was manufactured outside of Illinois established a nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled across state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Brent · filed 2008-11-17(g)(1)

We have consistently held that, where the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm has traveled through interstate commerce before coming into the defendant’s possession, the interstate commerce nexus is satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Pitre · filed 2008-10-03(g)(1)

We have long held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s “in and affecting commerce” element is satisfied by proof that the firearm that a defendant possessed had previously traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only that the firearm have traveled in interstate commerce at some time, and that nexus satisfies the Commerce Clause.

United States v. McBee · filed 2008-10-07(g)(1)

McBee argues that Scarborough involved purely statutory interpretation; nevertheless, Scarborough clearly holds that a conviction under the felon-in-possession statute is justified if, as it did here, the firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce. ... We thus join the chorus of circuits reaffirming the precedential force of Scarborough and so AFFIRM the district court order.

Section 922(g)(5) requires an interstate or foreign commerce nexus between the firearm or ammunition and an alien’s conduct.

State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes · filed 2007-10-25(g)(5)

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), a “prohibited possessor” is not merely one who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States or, with exception, admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa. Rather, to be a prohibited possessor under § 922(g)(5), such persons must also either ship, transport, or receive a firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, possess a firearm or ammunition in commerce, or possess a firearm or ammunition in a manner that affects commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Slade · filed 2007-10-25(g)(1)

Slade additionally argues that the Government was required to prove that he knew the firearm in his possession was in or affecting interstate commerce and therefore, his indictment was fatally defective for failing to allege such knowledge on his part. He correctly concedes that this issue is foreclosed by United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), and seeks only to preserve it for further review.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Perkins · filed 2007-09-12(g)(1)

Further, he testified that the firearms were not manufactured in Tennessee. Based on this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that the firearms traveled in interstate commerce. Accordingly, we hold that the government presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden under 18 U.S.C. § 922 to show that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Lee · filed 2007-09-17(g)(1)

In order to violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a defendant must have a prior felony conviction, possess a firearm, and the firearm must have traveled in interstate commerce prior to the defendant’s possession of it.

A defendant’s stipulation that the firearm affected interstate commerce relieves the government of proving that element of a § 922(g)(1) charge.

United States v. Sweat · filed 2007-08-28(g)(1)

Sweat’s stipulation relieved the Government of any obligation to prove that element of Count Four.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element is satisfied by testimony that a firearm was manufactured in another state and traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Perry · filed 2007-09-06(g)(1)

Agent Gistinger’s testimony provided sufficient evidence that the gun Perry possessed was in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit a felon’s intrastate possession of a firearm that previously traveled across state or national borders.

United States v. Herrera · filed 2007-08-13(g)(1)

Herrera’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him is foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove an interstate commerce connection in a felon-in-possession prosecution.

United States v. Walker · filed 2007-05-02(g)(1)

To begin, we hold that the government satisfied its burden to prove the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element is satisfied when a firearm traveled in foreign commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Goode · filed 2007-04-16(g)(1)

Yet it is a certainty that the firearm had traveled in foreign ... comm erce, so that M r. Goode’s possession was “in or affecting comm erce,” as charged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by a manufacturer’s inscription showing that the firearm traveled between states.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2006-11-14(g)(1)

We similarly hold that a manufacturer’s inscription on a firearm can be sufficient evidence to prove that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled across state lines at some time in the past.

United States v. Reed · filed 2006-04-04(g)

We will not linger on this point inasmuch as our decision in Singletary in which we held that “proof . . . that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element,” 268 F.3d at 205, forecloses Reed’s constitutional challenge to section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is met when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, even if the defendant did not purchase it.

United States v. Carlisle · filed 2006-03-28(g)(1)

The government only has to demonstrate that the possessed firearm traveled in interstate commerce in order to establish that minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by evidence that a firearm or ammunition was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Lamb · filed 2006-01-13(g)(1)

The evidence that the firearm and the ammunition were manufactured outside of Florida, the items made their way to Florida, and Lamb possessed the firearm, containing the ammunition, in Florida, was sufficient under current precedent to establish the interstate commerce nexus.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce requirement can be established by evidence that a firearm was manufactured in another state and possessed in the state of prosecution.

United States v. Springer · filed 2006-01-18(g)

Since each of the firearms was stamped with a state other than Florida, and Polak’s expert opinion was that the guns were not restamped, when the guns were discovered and found by a jury to be in Springer’s possession in Florida, sufficient admissible evidence supported his conviction.

Section 922(g)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in a different state from the one where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Vasser · filed 2006-01-24(g)

Consequently, the interstate nexus element was met if the government demonstrated that Vasser possessed the firearm in a state other than the one in which it was manufactured.

Section 922(x)(2) does not make an interstate commerce nexus an element of the crime, so the government need not plead one in the charging instrument.

United States v. K.T.A. · filed 2005-12-15(x)(2)

Additionally, because § 922(x)(2) does not articulate interstate commerce as a specific element of the crime, the government is not required to plead such a nexus in the charging instrument.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal connection to interstate commerce; a firearm frame manufactured abroad and transported to the state where the firearm was assembled satisfies that requirement.

United States v. Gipson · filed 2005-12-23(g)(1)

As this court has explained, all the statute requires is that the government prove some “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce. ... Thus, testimony that the frame was manufactured in Austria and then transported to Georgia where it was assembled was sufficient to establish that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(x)(2)(A) does not require an information charging juvenile handgun possession to allege an interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Justin D. · filed 2005-12-06(x)(2)(A)

Accordingly, the information in this case alleged a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A) without the inclusion of an interstate commerce jurisdictional element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2005-11-23(g)(1)

To convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, “that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element was satisfied by Sheppard’s acknowledgment at his guilty plea hearing that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Sheppard · filed 2005-11-02(g)(1)

Sheppard also contends that insufficient evidence exists to support the base offense of possession of a firearm as a felon, arguing that the weapon he possessed did not affect interstate commerce; however, we find that he acknowledged that the weapon did affect interstate commerce during the guilty plea hearing.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce nexus is satisfied when a handgun manufactured abroad passes through one state before reaching another.

United States v. Artiaga · filed 2005-10-31(g)(1)

The court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because Artiaga’s handgun, which was manufactured in Germany and imported into Virginia before reaching California, had the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that a firearm was manufactured in a different state from where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Shambry · filed 2004-12-22(g)(1)

To the extent that both parties and the District Court agree that we have never addressed the precise issue of whether proof that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the state where the possession occurred is sufficient to establish that the possession was “in or affecting commerce” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), we conclude, like the overwhelming majority of our sister courts of appeals, that such proof meets the minimal nexus required to establish that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce element is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled interstate, even when the defendant possessed it entirely within one state.

United States v. Collins · filed 2004-11-17(g)(1)

In the instant case, testimony established that the firearm was manufactured in Switzerland and possessed in Texas. We have “repeatedly held that evidence that a firearm has traveled interstate at some point in the past is sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g), even if the defendant possessed the firearm entirely intrastate.”2 Therefore, Collins’s arguments are without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate or foreign commerce; a firearm’s prior travel across state or national borders satisfies its commerce element.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2004-10-21(g)(1)

Garcia contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because the statute does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate or foreign commerce. ... As he acknowledges, they are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce, which a jury may infer from evidence that it was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Smith · filed 2004-08-10(g)(1)

“Fact” means only that the jury could infer that the firearm had moved in interstate commerce if it credited the testimony that the firearm had been manufactured outside of Pennsylvania.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by a stipulation that the firearms previously traveled in interstate commerce, even when the date is unspecified.

United States v. Holt · filed 2004-08-17(g)(1)

Holt argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea was insufficient to support the interstate commerce element of the felon-in-possession offense because the parties stipulated only that the firearms had previously been shipped and transported in interstate commerce at some unspecified date. He acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent and states that he raises the claim to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. Holt's claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by a stipulation that the ammunition was shipped and transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Hardin · filed 2004-08-18(g)(1)

The stipulation is sufficient to support the jury’s finding on the interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element can be satisfied by evidence that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Stubbs · filed 2004-07-09(g)(1)

Here, as in Singletary, the guns in question were manufactured outside of Pennsylvania. Therefore, the jury could conclude that the guns traveled in interstate commerce to get here. Indeed, the jury could conclude nothing else.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a firearm to have recently moved in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2004-06-22(g)(1)

However, the plain text of § 922(g)(1) does not require, and we have never held, that a firearm must have recently moved in or recently affected interstate commerce in order to meet the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the possessed firearm was manufactured in a different state or country.

United States v. Salinas · filed 2004-04-20(g)(1)

This court repeatedly has affirmed § 922(g)(1) convictions on evidence similar to that presented in the instant case. See id. at 518 & n.12 (concluding that § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by the defendant’s possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country).

Evidence that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce connection for a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Perkins · filed 2004-03-31(g)(1)

Moreover, evidence that the firearm Perkins possessed was not manufactured in Texas is sufficient to maintain a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Intrastate possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state satisfies § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement.

United States v. Nagel · filed 2003-04-24(g)(1)

He argues that his intrastate possession of a firearm that was manufactured outside the state was insufficient to establish the nexus with interstate commerce required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Because this circuit’s precedent is still good law and one panel of this court cannot overrule another absent superceding Supreme Court or en banc authority, Nagel’s argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm traveled across state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Francheck · filed 2003-04-28(g)(1)

Therefore, we find that the interstate nexus requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is satisfied in this case because the parties stipulated that the firearm at issue traveled in interstate commerce at some point prior to Francheck’s possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in a different state or country.

United States v. Faniel · filed 2003-04-16(g)(1)

The interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is satisfied by the possession of a firearm that was manufactured in a different state or country.

Section 922(g)'s interstate-commerce element is satisfied when the firearm previously traveled across state lines.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2003-04-23(g)

Bailey argues that the factual basis offered in support of his guilty plea was insufficient to support the interstate-commerce element of his offense, because it showed nothing more than his gun traveled across state lines at some point in the past. ... He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by circuit ... precedent. ... The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2003-04-24(g)(1)

Because the factual basis indicated that the firearm Anderson possessed was not manufactured in Texas, Anderson’s conviction was supported by the evidence.

A defendant can waive a challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element because that element is not jurisdictional.

United States v. Harris · filed 2003-04-08(g)(1)

Finally, Ms. Harris contends that her conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon is invalid because the firearms did not affect interstate commerce. However, Ms. Harris has waived this issue. ... However, we have held that the failure to prove facts establishing the interstate commerce element of a federal offense is not jurisdictional.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce or knowledge that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2003-04-04(g)(1)

Thomas argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the mere movement of a firearm from one state to another does not constitute a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce; and (3) his indictment was fatally defective because it did not allege that he knew that the firearm he possessed was in or affecting interstate commerce. Thomas raises these arguments solely to preserve them for possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his arguments are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement does not require proof that the felon personally transported the firearm across state lines.

United States v. Weems · filed 2003-04-07(g)(1)

We reject the argument that Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000), overruled prior law and now requires that the interstate commerce nexus of § 922(g) be met by proof that it was the defendant who transported the weapon beyond state lines.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm possessed in one state was manufactured in another.

United States v. Abernathy · filed 2002-01-28(g)(1)

A Special Agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testified as an expert in firearm origin that the shotgun was manufactured in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts. This evidence satisfies § 922(g)(l)’s interstate commerce nexus.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when ammunition manufactured in one state is possessed in another.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2001-10-26(g)(1)

The Government’s allegation that the ammunition was manufactured in South Dakota and possessed by Nelson in Texas ... provided a sufficient factual basis for the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured in one state and recovered in another.

United States v. Carter · filed 2001-10-31(g)(1)

Proof that a firearm was manufactured in one state and recovered in another satisfies the interstate commerce element.

Section 922(g)(1) requires an interstate commerce nexus, which a defendant admits by pleading guilty to possession in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Dwyer · filed 2001-04-10(g)(1)

By admitting in his plea agreement that "[s]uch possession was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce," id. at 14, he admitted the interstate nexus element was satisfied.

Section 922(g)(1) reaches a felon’s possession of a firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce under binding precedent, even without a present commercial connection.

United States v. Coward · filed 2001-04-10(g)(1)

Simply phrased, Scarborough’s legal fiction is that the transport of a weapon in interstate commerce, however remote in the distant past, gives its present intrastate possession sufficient interstate aspect to fall within the ambit of the statute. ... As applied here, we must respect not only Scarborough, but also Gateward and Rodia. We therefore will deny Coward’s motion, in the expectation of a reversal.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce element requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Bland · filed 2001-03-20(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce nexus is jurisdictional, so a state felon in possession offense need not include that element to qualify as an aggravated felony.

United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose De Jesus Castillo-Rivera,defendant-Appellant · filed 2001-03-26(g)(1)

We hold that the commerce nexus requirement of S 922(g) "is merely a jurisdictional basis"; therefore, we conclude that Castillo's prior conviction under CPC S 12021(a) constitutes an aggravated felony, as an offense described in S 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm traveled across state lines at any time.

United States v. Salomon · filed 2001-01-18(g)(1)

He asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the Gov- ernment could prove interstate commerce nexus by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm in question had at any time traveled across state lines. We find no error in the court’s jury instructions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between a felon’s firearm possession and interstate commerce and is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Santiago · filed 2001-01-19(g)(1)

As we indirectly noted in Sorrentino, pre-Lopez case law makes clear that § 922(g) only requires a “minimal nexus” between possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and interstate commerce. ... We therefore reiterate that § 922(g), as interpreted prior to Lopez, is properly within Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was possessed and necessarily crossed state lines to get there.

Leopard v. United States · filed 2001-01-29(g)(1)

The testimony at trial established that the two firearms in question were manufactured outside of the State of Oklahoma and would they would have had to have traveled in interstate commerce to arrive in Oklahoma. This testimony is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce nexus of the statute.

Section 922(g)(8)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm moved in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Bayles · filed 2000-12-05(g)(8)

This court agrees, and finds that “[s]o long as the weapon[ ] in Defendant’s possession were moved in interstate commerce at some time, the minimal nexus between his possession and interstate commerce can be established.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between ammunition and interstate commerce.

United States v. Garza · filed 2000-10-17(g)(1)

The “in or affecting commerce” element of § 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal nexus between the shotgun shells and interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Graves · filed 1999-11-24(g)(1)

The evidence offered by the Government at trial was sufficient to prove that a firearm was “in or affected interstate commerce” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm crossed a state line before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Lawson · filed 1999-04-09(g)(1)

Previously, we have held that the required element that the firearm in question must have been possessed "in or affecting" interstate commerce is satisfied if the firearm was transported across a state line prior to the defendant's possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element can be proved by testimony that a firearm was manufactured outside the state where it was found.

United States v. Howard · filed 1998-08-06(g)(1)

An expert’s testimony that the firearm was manufactured outside the state in which it was found is sufficient to prove interstate nexus.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when a firearm enters the market in one state and the defendant possesses it in another.

United States v. Sampson · filed 1998-06-25(g)(1)

Sampson in fact concedes as much in his opening brief when he states that the gun entered the domestic market in Massachusetts. Because Sampson was arrested with the gun in Wisconsin, the interstate commerce element was established.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed by the defendant in another.

United States v. Roberts · filed 1998-04-02(g)(1)

Evidence that a firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed by the defendant in another state is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that an individual's firearm possession substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Cain · filed 1998-03-27(g)(1)

The government, therefore, does not need to prove that a specific individual's posses- sion of a firearm had a "substantial" impact on interstate commerce in order to convict a defendant under § 922.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element requires only that the firearm or ammunition was in interstate commerce at some time.

United States v. Moore · filed 1998-03-13(g)(1)

This contention lacks merit because the instruction regarding the jurisdictional element conveyed all that was required: that the firearm and ammunition "have been, at some time, in interstate commerce."

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a more exacting interstate-commerce jury instruction than proof that the gun had moved between states at some time.

United States v. Joost · filed 1998-01-09(g)(1)

Persuasive authority supports the district court’s refusal to give a more exacting charge.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm possessed by a convicted felon previously traveled through interstate commerce.

United States v. Hardeman · filed 1998-01-12(g)(1)

However, under the law of this Circuit, the “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. is satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon has previously traveled through interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that ammunition was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Heflin · filed 1997-12-10(g)(1)

The government must also prove that the ammunition possessed by the defendant traveled in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir.1995). This interstate nexus is satisfied by proof that the ammunition was manufactured outside the state in which the defendant possessed it.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied when the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the state where it was possessed.

United States v. Murphy · filed 1997-03-04(g)(1)

Accordingly, because the government proved that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than the one in which it was possessed, the government met its burden of proving a connection to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal interstate commerce nexus: the firearm must have been in or affected interstate or foreign commerce at some point.

United States v. Carter · filed 1995-10-24(g)(1)

A jury thus could legitimately convict Mr. Carter under Section 922(g) by finding that the semi-automatic rifle had at some point been in or affected interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at any time; an indictment may allege that prior travel.

United States v. Hubbard · filed 1995-08-24(g)(1)

The indictment’s reference to the weapon’s prior transport in interstate commerce was, we decided, an adequate means of alleging the “in or affecting commerce” element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a nexus with interstate commerce for the firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Rankin · filed 1995-07-28(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1), on the other hand, clearly is tied to interstate commerce, and Rankin’s bare-bones motion makes no showing that the sawed-off shotgun or the ammunition involved in his convictions lacks the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. To the contrary, the government’s evidence shows that the shotgun was manufactured in Ithaca, New York, and that the ammunition was manufactured in East Alton, Illinois. Rankin was arrested in possession of the shotgun and ammunition in St. Louis, Missouri. Rankin’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is without merit and is denied.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is satisfied by proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Edwards · filed 1995-07-26(g)(1)

I do not believe that the Court’s decision in Lopez effects any change in the government’s burden of proving that a defendant charged with a violation of § 922(g)(1) possessed a firearm “in and affecting interstate commerce.” ... Proof that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate or foreign commerce at some point in its history.

United States v. Williams · filed 1995-07-21(g)(1)

The interstate commerce requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) may be satisfied by showing that the firearm or ammunition traveled, at some point in its history, in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate-commerce element can be proved by evidence that a firearm was manufactured in another state.

United States v. Hicks · filed 1995-07-10(g)(1)

There was also proof that the pistol at issue was manufactured outside Tennessee, in Connecticut. Although the pistol was never recovered, the jury could reasonably infer the make of the weapon, its place of manufacture, and the fact that it had been transported in interstate commerce, in light of the evidence presented.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can be supported by evidence that the defendant possessed a real gun and a stipulation that there are no licensed gun manufacturers in the state where he possessed it.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 1993-05-05(g)(1)

The same evidence, combined with the parties’ stipulation that there are no licensed manufacturers of guns in Oklahoma, was sufficient to convict Defendant of Count IV.

Section 922(g)(1)'s commerce element is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Nixon · filed 1993-03-03(g)(1)

To establish that possession of firearms was "in or affecting commerce," the government need only prove that the weapons traveled in interstate commerce prior to possession by the defendant.

Section 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement is satisfied when the firearm crossed state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Leonard Petitjean, Jr. · filed 1989-09-05(g)(1)

He stipulated at trial that the .25 caliber Beretta found in his pants pocket was manufactured in Maryland and shipped to Indiana prior to coming to rest in Illinois. This clearly satisfied the interstate commerce requirement.

Section 922(g)’s “in or affecting commerce” language covers a firearm that has been in interstate commerce at some time and is not unconstitutionally vague on that ground.

United States v. Floyd Vance Conner, Jr. · filed 1989-11-01(g)

Conner contends section 922(g) is unconstitutionally vague. ... This argument is meritless. The challenged phrase clearly signals Congress’s intent “that the firearm [has] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.”