18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a qualifying felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Hills · filed 1996-12-17(g)(1)

Hills argues that his two prior Louisiana convictions were insufficient to be predicate felonies for purposes of § 922(g)(1). Contrary to Hills’ contention, his 1972 conviction did not result in an automatic pardon upon the completion of his sentence. See State v. Baxter, 357 So. 2d 271, ... 273 (La. 1978). Because the 1972 conviction was a proper predicate felony under § 922(g)(1), we do not address Hills’ contention concerning his 1994 Louisiana conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm affecting commerce by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison whose civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. Nesbitt · filed 1997-07-30(g)(1)

The essential elements of the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) offense are: (1) knowing possession of a firearm, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) by one who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, (4) whose civil rights have not been restored.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm in or affecting commerce by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison whose civil rights have not been restored.

United States v. Javage · filed 1997-10-20(g)(1)

The essential elements of the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) offense are: (1) knowing possession of a firearm, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) by one who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, (4) whose civil ... rights have not been restored.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm and had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Grimmond · filed 1998-03-06(g)

Grimmond was charged with, among other things, being a felon in possession. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West Supp. 1997). That offense has two elements: (1) possession of a firearm and (2) a prior felony conviction.

Section 922(g) makes a felon’s possession of ammunition a violation independent of any firearms charge.

United States v. Hawkins · filed 1998-05-21(g)

Appellant seems to overlook that he was charged and convicted under Count Two of the indictment for being a felon in possession of ammunition, in itself a violation of § 922(g), independent of the charges contained in Count One.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm; the firearm’s gauge is not an element of the offense.

United States v. Munoz · filed 1998-09-09(g)(1)

The felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), just requires the defendant to possess “a firearm” to violate it. ... So the divergence of the evidence from count II does not manifest a constructive amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm but does not make the firearm’s gauge an element of the offense.

United States v. Munoz · filed 1998-09-17(g)(1)

The felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), just requires the defendant to possess “a firearm” to violate it. ... As such, it fails to designate the gauge an essential element of the offense it defines.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm, a previous felony conviction, and possession in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Decaress Smith · filed 1998-11-09(g)

The three simple elements of the charged offense are (1) knowing possession of the firearm, (2) a previous felony conviction, and (3) the possession being in or affecting commerce.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from knowingly possessing a firearm, and constructive possession satisfies the statute.

United States v. Meeks · filed 1998-12-18(g)

In United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994), we reversed a § 922(g) conviction, stating the government must prove defendant knowingly possessed a firearm. Id. at 549. We noted actual or constructive possession satisfies the statute. Id. A person has constructive possession when he knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over the object and the premises where it is found. Id. (citations omitted). While the government may prove constructive possession by circumstantial evidence, it may be inferred if defendant has exclusive control of the premises. ... Here, there’s no question defendant had exclusive possession of the house where the rifle was found. We believe the evidence was sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Lloyd · filed 1998-12-22(g)(1)

Because Section 921(a)(20) requires this court to follow the definition of a “conviction” under state law, we find that Lloyd’s guilty plea is not a “conviction” for purposes of Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from possessing a firearm, unless section 921(a)(20) treats the conviction as no longer qualifying.

United States v. Bolton · filed 1999-01-12(g)(1)

If his rights had been restored under Michigan law, the Court must grant Bolton’s motion to dismiss the indictment. ... In this case, Bolton completed the sentence for his felony conviction for assault with the intent to rob in 1977. As a result, under Michigan law, Bolton no longer was prohibited from possessing a firearm in April of 1998, when the agents seized possession of the pistol and other firearms allegedly located in Bolton’s residence. Therefore, Count 1 and Count 2 of the indictment, charging violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), must be DISMISSED.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Davis · filed 1999-01-26(g)(1)

We further hold the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Davis’ felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Mr. Davis correctly asserts there is no direct evidence which places a gun in his hands. He further asserts the government failed to prove constructive possession because it showed no evidence of any connection between him and the guns seized from the vehicle found near where he was hiding prior to his arrest. We agree that in order to prove constructive possession when there is joint occupancy of a vehicle, the government must present direct or circumstantial evidence to show some connection or nexus individually linking the defendant to the contraband. See United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). There must be some evidence to support at least a plausible inference the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon. Id. at 549-50. We disagree, however, with Mr. Davis’ assessment of the evidence, and conclude the record here supports such an inference. ... Accordingly, we uphold the firearm conviction.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Tucker · filed 1999-02-23(g)

The indictment also charged Tucker with one count of ... being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). ... After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Tucker's conviction on each count listed above. ... There is evidence that Tucker participated in both credit union robberies (counts I and II), that he carried a firearm in the Duluth Teachers' Credit Union robbery (count III), and that he possessed a firearm and hid it in the basement after having been previously convicted of a felony (count IV). ... We conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support the verdicts.

Section 922(g) permits multiple felon-in-possession convictions to merge into one when the government presents no evidence that the defendant possessed more than one gun or acquired or stored them separately.

United States v. Richardson, Billy · filed 1999-02-26(g)

Relying on Cunningham, where we found that Richardson's codefendants' multiple felon-in-possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. s 922(g) merged into one because the government presented no evidence that they possessed more than one gun or that they acquired or stored them separately, Richardson urges us to reverse one of his two felon-in-possession convictions for the same reason. See 145 F.3d at 1398-99. The government concedes that Cunningham controls. We accordingly vacate one of Richardson's felon-in-possession convictions and remand for resentencing.

Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year to possess a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gilliam, Darron G. · filed 1999-02-26(g)

Because there was neither a stipulation nor other waiver by Gilliam, nor proof by introduction into evidence of the certified copy of his prior conviction, the government failed to present evidence on an element of the s 922(g) offense.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from knowingly possessing a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Tompkins · filed 1999-03-29(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from possessing a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, and a pardon restricting firearm rights leaves the conviction as a predicate.

United States v. Allen B. Richardson, Jr. · filed 1999-03-01(g)(1)

Therefore, Richardson’s prior state felony conviction constituted a “conviction” for the purposes of § 921(a)(20)(B), and thus a predicate felony for the purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year to possess a firearm shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Richardson · filed 1999-03-17(g)(1)

Under § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for anyone "who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess . . . any firearm . . . which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Section § 922(g)(1), however, is to be read in the light of § 921(a)(20)(B), which defines the phrase “conviction of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year” for the purposes of § 922(g)(1). ... Therefore, Richardson’s prior state felony conviction constituted a “conviction” for the purposes of § 921(a)(20)(B), and thus a predicate felony for the purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from knowingly possessing a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Ramos · filed 1999-03-09(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is the government’s burden to establish that (1) the defendant was previously convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing ammunition that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. De Leon · filed 1999-03-17(g)(1)

In order to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must prove that De Leon had been previously convicted of a felony, that he knowingly possessed the ammunition and that the ammunition traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) bars a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce.

Palma v. United States · filed 1999-04-21(g)

The Gun Control Act of 1968 makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Thus, as a convicted felon, Mr. Palma was barred as a matter of federal law from possessing any firearm.

Section 922(g) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, whether actually or constructively.

United States v. Felici · filed 2000-03-24(g)

Any firearm possession, actual or constructive, by a convicted felon is prohibited by law.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm, had a prior felony conviction, and possessed the firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Moore · filed 2000-03-27(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) the defendant had a prior felony conviction, and (3) the firearm was possessed in or affecting interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) does not require proof of the specific type of firearm the defendant possessed.

United States v. Belzel · filed 2000-04-11(g)

This argument is meritless because the type of firearm a defendant possesses is not an essential element to be proved for conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) is violated when a convicted felon takes possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state; what the person does afterward does not affect whether the violation occurred.

United States v. Hancock · filed 2000-05-05(g)(1)

However, once Hancock, a convicted felon, picked up from the ground a gun that was manufactured outside the Commonwealth, he violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Hancock’s actions after he possessed the gun are simply not material to the question of whether he violated the felon in possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Quintanilla, Armando · filed 2000-06-26(g)(1)

In order to secure a conviction under section 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; 2) the defendant was in possession of a firearm; and 3) the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of knowing actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Rowell · filed 2000-07-21(g)

A reasonable jury could have inferred from the evidence that Rowell knowingly had actual or constructive possession of firearms and was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offense.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a convicted felon from lawfully possessing a firearm, either actually or constructively.

United States v. Aston · filed 2000-08-15(g)(1)

The district court reasoned, and we agree, that Mr Aston, as a convicted felon, was not lawfully entitled to possess the firearm, either actually or constructively under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a felon to possess the firearm; a coconspirator’s possession cannot be attributed to the felon under Pinkerton.

United States v. Walls, Daisy E. · filed 2000-08-15(g)(1)

Because sec. 922(g)(1) defines the offense in terms of the status of the individual possessing the firearm, the vicarious liability provisions of Pinkerton are inappropriate for such an offense.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm, and substantial evidence of possession supports a conviction.

United States v. Whiteside · filed 2001-02-08(g)(1)

Ricky Lynn Whiteside appeals his criminal conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). Whiteside raises only one issue on appeal. He contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he was in possession of the firearm in question. Our review of the record discloses that the jury’s decision is based upon substantial evi- dence.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Hinds · filed 2001-05-15(g)(1)

Finally, Hinds contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). ... In the instant case, we have reviewed the briefs and materials submitted in the joint appendix and we find sufficient evidence to support Hinds’ conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Willson · filed 2001-05-17(g)(1)

As federal law prohibits possession of a firearm by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), we conclude the district court properly determined, without receiving evidence, that Mr. Willson was not entitled to the return of the rifle.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm and ammunition that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Cooper · filed 2001-07-18(g)

A felon-in-possession charge requires (1) the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce, (2) the defendant was a previously convicted felon, and (3) the defendant possessed the loaded firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. McDanniel · filed 2001-07-11(g)(1)

However, McDanniel’s plea-hearing statements that he possessed the firearm and ammunition described in the indictment, and that he had been convicted previously of a felony, established an adequate factual basis for his plea.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm; testimony that the defendant received a gun supported his conviction.

United States v. Rooks · filed 2001-08-16(g)(1)

Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convic- tion for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Alex Jackson and Brooks both testified that Spen- cer gave Williams the gun that was used to shoot Forde. Williams concedes that he is a convicted felon. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction on the felon in possession count.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a prior felony conviction, possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Martin · filed 2001-11-16(g)(1)

In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant (1) had a previous felony conviction, (2) possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Hardy · filed 2002-04-12(g)(1)

Three elements are required to prove an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): “(1) that the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony; (2) that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g) bars people with felony convictions from possessing firearms or ammunition regardless of their reason for possessing them.

United States v. Crawley · filed 2002-07-16(g)

A conviction under § 922(g) focuses' not on the defendant’s reason for possessing a firearm but on his status that bars him from possessing a firearm or ammunition. The purpose of the statute in keeping persons with felony convictions from possessing such weapons is served by the conviction and sentence here.

Section 922(g)(1) treats simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition as one unit of prosecution.

United States v. Greer · filed 2002-07-18(g)(1)

Congress did not intend the simultaneous possession of ammunition to stand as a distinct unit of prosecution from the ... possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Dockery · filed 2002-08-13(g)(1)

In order to convict under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove: “ ‘(1) that the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.’”

Section 922(g)(1) can apply to a passenger who causes a firearm to be transported in a vehicle.

United States v. Fleischli, Joseph · filed 2002-09-12(g)(1)

There is no support in the language of the statute or the case law for Fleischli’s distinction between a passenger and driver of the vehicle in which the firearm is transported.

A defendant’s admission that he was a convicted felon who possessed a specific firearm provides a factual basis for a guilty plea under § 922(g).

United States v. Booth · filed 2002-12-16(g)

A review of the record shows that Booth admitted to being a convicted felon who possessed a specific semi-automatic weapon on a specific date as alleged in the indictment, ... These admissions square with the statutory definitions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 21 U.S.C. § 841 and satisfy Rule 11(f).

Section 922(g)(1) requires that the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm at the time of the offense, intentionally possessed one, and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Parson · filed 2002-12-30(g)(1)

Thus, the essential elements of this offense are that the defendant was a prohib- ited person at the time of the offense, that he voluntarily and inten- tionally possessed a firearm and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some point.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession or receipt of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Hodges · filed 2003-01-09(g)(1)

To convict Hodges of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) Hodges had a prior felony conviction; 2) he possessed or received a firearm; and 3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) bars a convicted felon from possessing firearms or ammunition.

Dobson v. Stahla · filed 2003-01-17(g)

Under this precedent, Dob-son, as a convicted felon, was not entitled to possess firearms or ammunition, and he has cited to no authority that establishes otherwise.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a convicted felon who handles a firearm and carries it from a store.

United States v. Pierre · filed 2003-07-25(g)(1)

As to the possession of the Llama, it was certainly reasonable for the jury to conclude that Pierre possessed the Llama within the mean- ing of § 922(g)(1), based on the evidence that Pierre handled and examined the gun and carried it out of The Outpost on August 28, 1998.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing firearms and can prevent the return of seized firearms.

United States v. Harvey · filed 2003-08-13(g)(1)

In light of Mr. Harvey’s conviction and the evidence supporting that conviction, he has no legal right to possess the revolver, the AR-15 rifle, and the auto-sear.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons whose right to carry firearms has not been restored.

United States v. Williams · filed 2003-09-18(g)(1)

In relevant part, § 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons who have not had their right to carry firearms restored in some fashion.

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element requires neither intent to affect commerce nor proof of foreign commerce.

United States v. Payne · filed 2003-11-05(g)(1)

The statute requires neither intent on the part of the defendant nor a showing of “foreign commerce.”

Section 922(g) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Morris · filed 2003-11-19(g)

The crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm has three elements: (1) the defendant has a previous felony conviction; (2) the defendant possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s travel in or effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Jones · filed 2003-11-12(g)(1)

To convict a defendant under § 922(g)(1), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; (2) the defendant possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction and possession of a firearm with a nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Combs · filed 2003-12-30(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most ... favorable to the verdict, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Combs had been convicted of a felony and that he was in possession of a firearm that had a nexus with interstate commerce. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment challenge based on the absence of evidence that the firearm was in or substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2004-02-16(g)

Jackson argues that his prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) violated both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment because there was no evidence showing that the firearm was in or substantially affected interstate commerce. ... Accordingly, Jackson’s argument is indeed foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm regardless of how or why the felon obtained it.

United States v. Washington · filed 2004-05-25(g)(1)

Counsel points out, however, that Washington’s felon-in-possession charge was not based on how or why he obtained the weapon, but rather on the admitted fact that he possessed the gun as he fled from the scene, so the witness statements would have had no bearing on Washington’s guilt or innocence. ... Counsel concludes, and we agree, that this argument would therefore be frivolous.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits knowing firearm possession by a person with a prior felony conviction when there is an interstate nexus.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2004-07-29(g)(1)

Given the undisputed evidence of a prior felony conviction, knowing possession of a firearm, and interstate nexus, see United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 813 (8th Cir. 2001) (elements of felon-in-possession offense), there is no merit to Anderson’s contention that he had a right to carry a gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a qualifying felony conviction, knowing possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. A.J. Gant · filed 2005-03-10(g)(1)

As the district court correctly noted, in order to prove the offense charged, the government had to show that Gant: (1) had been convicted of a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year; and (2) knowingly possessed a firearm (3) that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

A conviction under § 922(g) based on aiding and abetting another person’s firearm possession cannot stand when that person was legally entitled to possess the firearm.

United States v. Levon · filed 2005-04-18(g)

Levon argues, and the government concedes, that his conviction under § 922(g) should be reversed. The conviction was predicated on Bruce’s status as a felon in possession, and it is now clear that Bruce was legally entitled to possess a firearm when his house was raided in May 2001.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, but the jury need not learn the length of the prior sentence.

United States v. Lewis, DeWayne · filed 2005-04-19(g)(1)

The jurors were bound to learn about this conviction— it was, after all, an element of the offense—but did not need to learn about the length of the sentence.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove knowing firearm possession, a prior felony conviction, and possession in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Serrano · filed 2005-05-03(g)(1)

With respect to the felon-in-possession charges, the government had the burden of proving: (1) Defendant knowingly possessed the sawed-off shotgun (count I) and 30.06 rifle (count III); (2) Defendant had been convicted of a felony offense before he possessed the shotgun and rifle; and (3) Defendant’s possession of the shotgun and rifle was in or affecting interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir. 2004).

When felony status and interstate travel are stipulated, § 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Leggett · filed 2005-05-09(g)(1)

Because Leggett stipulated that he was a convicted felon and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce, the government only needed to prove Leggett knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Townsend · filed 2005-05-24(g)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, even if Mr. Townsend’s confession is ignored, the record contains evidence that Mr. Townsend possessed the firearm. ... This is not at all a case where the evidence of a key element of the crime is so tenuous that his conviction is “shocking,” and therefore Mr. Townsend’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm is affirmed.

Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a person previously convicted of a qualifying felony to possess a firearm.

United States v. Austin · filed 2005-05-26(g)

Because we find no merit to Austin’s substantive challenges, we affirm his convictions under § 922(g). ... Austin argues that the evidence that he possessed an illegal firearm at the Corned Beef House was insufficient to sustain his § 922(g) conviction. We disagree. ... The government’s evidence, taken in its most favorable light, was clearly sufficient to sustain Austin’s conviction.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person with a prior felony conviction from knowingly possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Caraway · filed 2005-06-09(g)

In order for a defendant to be found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the government must prove: (1) that the defendant had a prior felony conviction; (2) that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, either actually or constructively; and (3) that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000); United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 655 (6th Cir. 2003).

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a felony to possess a firearm or ammunition that has traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Hughes · filed 2005-06-08(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .” To support a conviction, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “(1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant [knowingly] possessed a firearm or ammunition, and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) can be violated by even momentary firearm possession if the possession is knowing.

United States v. Mercado · filed 2005-06-16(g)(1)

Contrary to Mercado’s assertions, momentary or fleeting possession may constitute possession for purposes of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from knowingly and voluntarily possessing a firearm.

United States v. Hargrove · filed 2005-07-19(g)(1)

However, notwithstanding the availability of the necessity or justification defense in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the defense was not available in this case because, as we have just discussed, Hargrove failed to meet the threshold requirements for presenting such a defense. ... The government’s burden under § 922(g) is to prove only that the possession of a firearm by a felon was knowing and voluntary, not by mistake or accident.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in a felon-in-possession offense.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2005-07-19(g)

The government had the burden of proving knowing possession of a firearm. To do so and satisfy the mens rea element of this offense, it sought admission of evidence that Taylor had knowingly possessed a firearm at another point in time.

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a qualifying felony to possess a firearm or ammunition.

Thristino v. United States · filed 2005-07-25(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Su-perceding Indictment charged Thristino with (1) possessing a Federal brand .38 caliber bullet (2) after being convicted of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Simply put, the elements spelled out in the Superceding Indictment reflect precisely the statutory definition of the offense charged. Therefore, by finding Thristino guilty of being a felon-in-possession pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the jury must necessarily have concluded that the Government had demonstrated all the elements required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as charged in the Superceding Indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court finds Thristino’s claim that his right to a have every element of the offense established beyond a reasonable doubt was infringed to be baseless.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Coleman · filed 2005-08-04(g)(1)

Given the above-noted evidence and Coleman’s stipulations that he was a convicted felon at the time of his arrest and that the firearm in question had traveled in interstate commerce, there was sufficient evidence to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. McVay · filed 2005-07-27(g)

When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the record reflects that the evidence was more than sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find the element of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from knowingly possessing ammunition that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Crider · filed 2005-08-15(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction, the government must prove that: 1) Crider was convicted of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year; 2) he knowingly possessed ammunition; and 3) the possession was in or affected commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person with a prior felony conviction from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce; credited officer testimony can establish possession.

United States v. Brown · filed 2005-08-19(g)(1)

First, we find the evidence amply supports the jury’s verdict. ... Two officers testified that they saw a gun in Brown’s hand, and a third testified that although he could not see Brown’s hands, Brown had moved his hand over his head before showing his hands. The jury was free to credit the officers’ testimony over Brown’s testimony. ... Brown did not dispute that he had a prior felony conviction or that the gun had been transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from knowingly possessing a firearm that traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Ramirez-Noyola · filed 2005-08-22(g)(1)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must establish that “(1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had travelled [sic] in interstate or foreign commerce at some point during its existence.” United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the conviction.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm and is constitutional under the stated commerce clause challenges.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2005-08-26(g)

As Nelson concedes, we have consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g) against the challenges that Nelson raises on appeal.2 ... Accordingly, Nelson cannot establish any error and we AFFIRM his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that is in or affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2005-09-01(g)(1)

“To establish a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must prove . . . (1) that the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) that the defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm, and (3) that the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Brown · filed 2005-09-02(g)(1)

To convict Brown of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: “(1) [Brown] had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) [Brown] knowingly possessed a firearm; [and] (3) the firearm had been in or had affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004).

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year to possess a firearm, and the court held Badey’s predicate conviction met that felony condition.

United States v. Badey · filed 2005-08-26(g)(1)

Badey next maintains that his predicate state conviction — possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver marijuana in violation of North Carolina General Statute § 90-95(a)(1) — did not constitute a felony under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (providing that it is unlawful “for any person who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm). ... Because “a” defendant — one who, unlike Badey, qualified for the aggravating factors — could have received a sentence greater than twelve months under the relevant North Carolina statute at the time of Badey’s conviction, we are constrained to conclude that his predicate crime constituted a felony offense.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, including constructively.

United States v. Howell · filed 2005-09-15(g)

We agree with the conclusion that to do so would be a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was specifically designed to serve public policy and prevent convicted felons from having either constructive or actual possession of firearms. This statute was designed to work retroactively, and once an individual becomes a felon, he will be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 if found to be in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Griffin · filed 2005-09-19(g)

Shelton Lakie Griffin was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). ... We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Griffin, who stipulated that he was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection to interstate commerce; eyewitness testimony that a person held a gun can support the possession element.

United States v. Brown · filed 2005-09-30(g)(1)

First, we find the evidence amply supports the jury’s verdict. ... Two officers testified that they saw a gun in Brown’s hand, and a third testified that although he could not see Brown’s hands, Brown had moved his hand over his head before showing his hands. The jury was free to credit the officers’ testimony over Brown’s testimony. ... Brown did not dispute that he had a prior felony conviction or that the gun had been transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction, knowing actual or constructive possession of a firearm, and a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. John Joseph Coffee, Jr. · filed 2006-01-20(g)(1)

In order to sustain a conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, the government must prove: (1) that the defendant had a prior felony conviction; (2) that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, either actually or constructively; and (3) that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) covers possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony.

United States v. Bell · filed 2006-02-10(g)(1)

Bell’s first claim is that his prior North Carolina conviction of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, imposed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17, cannot form the predicate for his § 922(g) conviction because the former was not for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. ... Bell’s arguments in this regard are foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), is still viable after Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and reaffirming that “a prior North Carolina conviction was for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Council · filed 2006-02-23(g)(1)

Council challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and for using, ... carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. We have determined that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established Council’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to both counts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Thus, we AFFIRM Council’s conviction as to these counts.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and that the firearm affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2006-02-24(g)

To establish that a defendant violated § 922(g), the government must show ... “the defendant was (1) in knowing possession of a firearm, (2) a convicted felon, and (3) that the firearm affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g) is the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute and survives the Commerce Clause challenge described by the court.

United States v. Chavez · filed 2006-02-24(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Ejinio Gonzales Chavez raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Cropper · filed 2006-02-17(g)(1)

In order to establish constructive possession, the Government must establish that Cropper was aware of the existence of the items and that he exercised dominion and control over them. ... Viewing all of this evidence in toto, we conclude that the Government produced sufficient evidence that Cropper had constructive possession over the ammunition and the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a previously convicted felon from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 2006-02-28(g)(1)

Because § 924(c) requires possession of a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime, not just mere possession, and a violation of § 922(g) requires that the defendant be a previously convicted felon, punishment for a violation of both offenses does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year in prison from knowingly possessing a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Lowe · filed 2006-02-28(g)(1)

In order for a jury to convict a defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant has a prior conviction for a felony punishable by imprisonment of more than one year, the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a person previously convicted of a felony to possess a firearm that has traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2006-03-07(g)

Section § 922(g) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which is the criminal statute that formed the basis for Daniels’ arrest and conviction, reads in pertinent part as follows: ... The elements of this offense are “(1) that the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sherman · filed 2006-03-01(g)(1)

Numerous witnesses for the government testified that Sherman was in a bar in North Charleston on November 13, 2003, where he got into an altercation, knocked down another customer, and produced a gun when an employee of the bar approached him. ... The government presented testimony that the firearm had been manufactured in Austria and had traveled in interstate commerce. ... We conclude that the government’s evidence amply supports Sherman’s conviction.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Davis · filed 2006-03-02(g)

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Possession may be actual or constructive.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Jones · filed 2006-03-08(g)(1)

To convict a defendant of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had passed in interstate or foreign commerce. ... The government is not required to provide fingerprint evidence, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and a rational jury could weigh the testimony of the four law enforcement officials more heavily than the absence of fingerprint evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm, including constructive possession requiring both power and intent to control it.

United States v. Chapotin · filed 2006-03-09(g)(1)

“Possession, in the context of § 922(g)(1), requires that the defendant knowingly possess the firearm, . . . and may be proven either by showing that the defendant actually possessed the firearm, or by showing that he constructively possessed the firearm.” ... “Under these circumstances, there was insufficient evidence to support Chapotin’s felon-in-possession conviction. Accordingly, the trial judge should have granted Chapotin’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to that particular charge.” ... “Chapotin’s felon-in-possession conviction is REVERSED.”

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from knowingly possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Clay · filed 2006-04-14(g)(1)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must establish: (1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm or ammunition that is in or affects interstate commerce.

United States v. Poindexter · filed 2006-04-19(g)(1)

A defendant violates § 922(g)(1) when (1) she was a convicted felon; (2) she knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) such firearm or ammunition was in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established by circumstantial evidence that the defendant placed a firearm beneath a car.

United States v. Evans · filed 2006-05-08(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient under Gutierrez because two officers testified that they saw the sole occupant of the car swing his feet outside the passenger door, bend forward and duck down, at which point the occupant’s hands were out of sight; the same officers testified that they contemporaneously heard “what sounded like metal striking the ground”; the same officers identified the occupant of the vehicle as Nekolas Evans, the defendant; a firearm was recovered from under the car shortly after the occupant was seen bending forward and ducking down; and the firearm had scratches on it that could be consistent with the firearm being thrown across • pavement.

An admission that a firearm found in a car belonged to the defendant can sufficiently prove possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Walker · filed 2006-05-17(g)(1)

The arresting officer’s testimony that Walker stated that the firearm found in the automobile was his is sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

Eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence linking a firearm to the defendant can establish possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Sales · filed 2006-05-25(g)(1)

As this evidence, viewed in totality and in the light most favorable to the Government, establishes Sales possessed the particular .357 revolver at issue, we affirm the district court’s denial of Sales’ Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g) bars convicted felons from possessing firearms, preventing their return to a felon under Rule 41(g).

United States v. Rearick · filed 2006-05-31(g)

It appearing that Rearick is a convicted felon, he is not entitled under Rule 41(g) to the return of the weapons seized from his house. ... See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); United States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971, 977 (11th Cir. 2005) (“any firearm possession, actual or constructive, by a convicted felon is prohibited by law”); United States v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2000).

Possession under § 922(g)(1) is a different question from whether a person recently handled a gun, so the absence of fingerprints does not rule out possession.

United States v. Bell, Adrian · filed 2006-06-05(g)(1)

Whether a person’s fingerprints are found on an object, indicating that he recently handled it, is a different question than whether he is illegally in possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be supported by testimony that the defendant threw a handgun while fleeing police.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2006-06-15(g)(1)

Based on this trial testimony, a reasonable factfinder could have found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be supported by a defendant's testimony that he moved a firearm into his truck.

United States v. Westry · filed 2006-06-22(g)(1)

As to the only remaining element of the offense, possession of the firearm, Westry himself testified that he removed the firearm from someone else’s truck and put it in his own truck, where it was found when Westry was stopped by police officers. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find substantial evidence supports the verdict.

Section 922(g) does not require the defendant to own the firearm; possession is enough.

United States v. Baker, Malcolm · filed 2006-06-29(g)

In a prosecution for possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the ownership of the gun is not dispositive.

Section 922(g) does not require the defendant to own the firearm; possession is sufficient.

United States v. Baker · filed 2006-06-29(g)

In a prosecution for possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the ownership of the gun is not dispositive.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a person with a prior felony conviction, where the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Birk, Edward · filed 2006-07-11(g)(1)

In order to prove its case against Birk, the government needed to establish that: (1) on January 9, 2004, Birk knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) he had a prior felony ... conviction; and (3) the firearm possessed by Birk had traveled in interstate commerce prior to Birk’s possession of the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be supported by testimony linking the defendant to a gun recovered along his path during a police chase.

United States v. Rucker · filed 2006-07-14(g)(1)

Several pieces of testimony fatally undermine these points and lead us to conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the gun belonged to M r. Rucker.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by joint possession of a firearm.

United States v. Stevens, Jeffrey · filed 2006-07-17(g)(1)

There was ample evidence upon which the jury could find he possessed it, either solely or in conjunction with the others in the vehicle.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be satisfied by possession shared with others.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2006-07-17(g)(1)

There was ample evidence upon which the jury could find he possessed it, either solely or in conjunction with the others in the vehicle.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by testimony that the defendant repeatedly possessed the firearm and evidence that his fingerprint was on it.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2006-07-18(g)(1)

On the basis of this evidence, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis possessed the revolver. The evidence was therefore sufficient to sustain Lewis’s § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon's possession of a firearm even if he does not use it.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2006-07-20(g)(1)

Although Robinson did not engage in “unlawful use” of the firearm, the statute under which he was charged does not require any use. His possession alone was unlawful.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a felon’s knowing possession of a firearm even without an unlawful purpose.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2006-07-27(g)(1)

Congress designed § 922(g) to sweep broadly, and the statute draws the criminal line at possession rather than illicit purpose.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon’s firearm possession to be proved through eyewitness and circumstantial evidence, despite inconsistencies in testimony.

United States v. Rodriguez · filed 2006-08-02(g)(1)

Since the parties stipulated to the facts that the defendant was a felon and that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, the only question open at trial was whether Rodriguez had been in possession of the weapon. ... We are satisfied that from the evidence presented a rational jury could have found Rodriguez guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove a prior felony conviction, knowing firearm possession, and that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Drake, James A. · filed 2006-08-08(g)(1)

Instruction 17 explained the elements of the § 922 charge: To sustain the charge of felon in possession of a firearm as charged in the Indictment, the government must prove the following propositions: First: that prior to August 27, 2002, the Defendant had been convicted of a crime that was punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one (1) year; Second: that on or about August 27, 2002, the Defen- dant knowingly possessed a firearm, to wit: a Dan ... Wesson, .357 magnum revolver, serial number 92703; and Third: that the firearm possessed by the Defendant had traveled in or affected interstate commerce prior to defendant’s possession of it on that date. ... This instruction accurately describes the government’s burden in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, see United States v. Wallace, 280 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2002), and thus the question is simply whether Instruction 17 is undermined by Instruction 11.

Section 922(g)(1) supports a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence permits a rational juror to find that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Fair · filed 2006-08-14(g)(1)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could conclude Fair both possessed the recovered firearm and possessed with intent to distribute the large quantity of cocaine found outside Ms. Headen’s apartment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s movement in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Hartz · filed 2006-08-16(g)(1)

To convict Hartz under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the govern- ment had to prove: (1) that Hartz had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) that Hartz possessed a firearm; (3) that the firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com- merce.

Section 922(g) requires a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Armstead · filed 2006-11-06(g)

Here, there was ample evidence that defendant (1) had a prior felony conviction and (2) was in possession of a firearm that (3) had traveled in or affected interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from knowingly possessing a firearm that has been in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Wells · filed 2006-12-04(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime that was punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm has been in or has affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Thornton · filed 2006-12-11(g)(1)

With these standards in mind, we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. ... On this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Thornton constructively possessed the firearm.

Admission of felony status and possession of loaded firearms can support a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Conley · filed 2006-12-01(g)(1)

The district court did not err in determining that Conley was subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), because he was previously convicted of crimes punishable, under Oregon statute, “by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g) makes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon a crime.

United States v. Claytor · filed 2006-12-05(g)

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to prove that Claytor possessed with intent to distribute cocaine; possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possessed a firearm as a convicted felon. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Claytor’s motion for judgment of acquittal and first motion for a new trial.