18 U.S.C. § 922

Eyewitness testimony that the defendant handled and fired a gun can establish the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Carr · filed 2006-01-13(g)(1)

Here, the only disputed element is possession, which is established by the eyewitness testimony of Robinson, Sandra Carr, and Tiesha Carr.* We conclude that substantial evidence supports Carr’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by an officer’s unrefuted testimony that the defendant handed him a firearm.

United States v. O'Dell · filed 2006-01-25(g)(1)

Because the parties stipulated to two of the three elements of the underlying offense, the only issue was whether O’Dell actually possessed a firearm. Fairfax County Detective Kenneth Larson testified unequivocally that, on January 9, 2004, O’Dell did possess a .22 caliber pistol, which he personally gave to Detective Larson. Detective Larson’s testimony stands unrefuted.

Section 922(g) does not require exclusive possession; another person’s possession of the firearm does not by itself absolve the defendant.

United States v. Cato · filed 2005-12-23(g)

The requested jury instruction was misleading because the driver was not on trial and a finding that he possessed the gun would not have absolved Cato of guilt.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant had dominion and control over the firearms.

United States v. Alamo · filed 2005-12-20(g)

After reviewing the record, particularly Ruiz’s testimony, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Alamo had dominion and control over the drugs and the guns that were found during the execution of the search warrant. Accordingly, Alamo’s conviction on Counts 1, 10, 11, and 13 should not be disturbed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm, but does not require ownership of it.

United States v. Stallings, Brett A. · filed 2005-12-16(g)(1)

Stallings’s argument that he did not own the gun is also without merit because ownership is not an element of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The statute is a possession statute, not an ownership statute.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Neely · filed 2005-12-22(g)(1)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must show (1) the defendant had a prior felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

A defendant’s admissions of firearm possession can support the possession element of a § 922(g) conviction.

United States v. McGhee · filed 2005-12-06(g)

Moreover, he made statements admitting possession of two firearms as well as ownership of eight thousand dollars found in the heating vent at his house. ... Given the standard of review, the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict that he was distributing marijuana in a conspiracy with Manuel, and that he possessed firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt on this record.

United States v. Arnold · filed 2005-11-23(g)(1)

In sum, we hold that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the possession element of § 922(g) proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is supported by evidence that the defendant received the firearms from a seller.

United States v. Smith · filed 2005-11-03(g)(1)

We find that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict that Smith possessed the firearms. Employees of Cumberland Pawn Shop identified Smith as the person to whom they sold the firearms, and the employees testified that they gave him the firearms at the time of sale.

Substantial evidence of possession supports a § 922(g)(1) conviction.

United States v. Brown · filed 2005-10-27(g)(1)

We find the evidence is more than substantial to show Brown possessed the firearm.

A defendant’s statements acknowledging firearms in his home can establish knowledge of their presence under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Hull · filed 2005-11-10(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Hull’s statements demonstrate his knowledge that those three firearms were in the home and contradict Hull’s argument that he did not know the firearms were in the residence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Adkins · filed 2005-11-10(g)(1)

The second element, knowing possession, may be sustained by evidence of “either actual or constructive possession.”

Sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm in a vehicle supports the possession element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. O'Shea · filed 2005-10-20(g)(1)

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that O'Shea possessed the firearm in the SUV.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element was established by sufficient evidence that the defendant actually possessed a firearm on each charged date.

United States v. McLean · filed 2005-10-12(g)(1)

Here, the government’s evidence was sufficient to show that McLean actually possessed a firearm on each date charged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person with a prior felony conviction possessed a firearm or ammunition that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Brown · filed 2005-01-14(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that a defendant who has a previous felony conviction possessed a firearm or ammunition that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require firearm possession to occur during a violent crime for an armed career criminal enhancement to apply.

United States v. Allen · filed 2004-11-09(g)(1)

First, neither ... § 922(g)(1) nor § 924(e)(1) states that enhancement is appropriate only when the possession occurs in connection with the commission of a violent crime.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from knowingly possessing firearms regardless of their purpose for possessing them.

United States v. Riley, Chrisopher · filed 2004-08-03(g)(1)

Section 922(g), however, sweeps more broadly than Riley admits, drawing the criminal line at possession, not purpose.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a felon, possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Merritt, Brent · filed 2004-03-22(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) Merritt was a felon; (b) he “possessed” the seventy-four firearms on or about January 23, 2001; and (c) the firearms ... traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition in or affecting commerce and had a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison.

United States v. Hudson · filed 2003-04-22(g)

Thus, § 922(g) requires proof that the defendant possesses a firearm or ammunition “in or affecting commerce,” an element which is not present in § 2923.12(A). In addition, § 922(g) requires proof that the defendant has been convicted of an offense which carries a term of incarceration exceeding one year, while § 2923.12(A) does not.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year, knowing possession of a firearm, and possession in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Lucas · filed 2003-04-03(g)(1)

The elements of a § 922(g)(1) violation are that: (1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affected commerce, because the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of possession, an effect on commerce, and a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Parks · filed 2002-03-04(g)(1)

To be convicted of possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government was required to prove: 1) Parks possessed a firearm and ammunition; 2) the firearm and ammunition affected commerce; and 3) Parks previously was convicted of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction for knowing possession of either a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Van Tieu · filed 2002-02-06(g)(1)

A violation of § 922(g)(1) occurs if Defendant knowingly possessed “any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

For a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g), the government must prove a prior felony, possession of the gun, and the gun’s interstate travel.

United States v. DeWilliams · filed 2001-12-12(g)

To obtain a guilty verdict on a charge of violating § 922(g), the government must prove: (1) defendant was a felon; (2) the gun traveled in interstate commerce, and (3) defendant possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and the firearm’s travel in or effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Bennett · filed 2001-10-30(g)(1)

As to both count one and count three, the first element was met by stipulation, the second was admitted in the defendant’s confession and corroborated by further witness testimony, and the third was the subject of uncontested testimony. The defendant’s insufficiency claim thus fails.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by people with prior felony convictions, whether those felonies were violent or nonviolent.

United States v. D'Amario · filed 2001-02-13(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1), which prohibits previously convicted felons from possessing a firearm, makes no such distinction between defendants convicted of violent versus nonviolent felonies.

Section 922(g)(1) targets firearm possession by convicted felons regardless of their reason for possessing the firearms.

United States v. Cutright · filed 2000-11-06(g)(1)

Thus, Cutright’s possession of three firearms was precisely the harm sought to be prevented by § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Woolfolk · filed 1999-12-10(g)(1)

In order to secure a conviction under section 922(g)(1), the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

A prior felony conviction is an element the government must prove to establish a felon-in-possession offense under § 922(g)(1).

Stead v. United States · filed 1999-09-16(g)(1)

Count IV of the superseding indictment charged Stead with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To convict Stead of the offense as charged, the government was required to prove, in its case in chief, that Stead had been convicted in 1989 and 1992 of felonies in California state court.

Section 922(g)(1) makes a prior felony conviction an element of the felon-in-possession offense.

United States v. Fredderick Baldwin, AKA Frank Keith · filed 1999-07-28(g)(1)

For example, § 922(g)(1) explicitly treats a single prior felony conviction as an element of the felon-in-possession offense.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm by a convicted felon but does not require specific intent.

United States v. Jones · filed 1998-06-17(g)(1)

Possession alone is sufficient. The crime does not require any specific intent.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction, knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition, and a connection between the firearm or ammunition and interstate commerce.

United States v. Bradley · filed 1998-05-13(g)(1)

To keep this in focus, we note that Bradley was charged with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): the first count alleged his knowing possession of a firearm, and the second, his knowing possession of ammunition. The jury, which found Bradley guilty on both counts, was therefore obligated to find: 1) he had a prior felony conviction; 2) he knowingly possessed the firearm and the ammunition described in the indictment; and 3) the firearm and ammunition he knowingly possessed had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, subsequent firearm possession, and a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. William Dennis Echols, Also Known as William D. Harris, Also Known as Larry D. Jones · filed 1998-05-21(g)

To support the conviction, the government had the burden of proving: (1) that Echols had previously been convicted of a felony; (2) that he thereafter possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a convicted felon, voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm, and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce at some point.

United States v. Joseph Randall Hobbs, Jr., United States of America v. Joseph Randall Hobbs, Jr. · filed 1998-02-18(g)(1)

To show a § 922(g)(1) violation, the government must prove three elements: (i) that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense; (ii) that he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (iii) that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some point.

Section 922(g)(1) bars a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, either actually or constructively.

United States v. Wacker · filed 1995-09-01(g)(1)

Finally, Wacker is a convicted felon as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), thus precluding her possession of a handgun, either actually or constructively.

When a defendant stipulates to a prior felony conviction, § 922(g)(1) still requires proof that he knowingly possessed a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Lowery · filed 1995-03-31(g)(1)

Had Lowery been allowed to stipulate to being a convicted felon, the jury would have then only had to find that he (1) had knowingly possessed a firearm that (2) had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a qualifying prior conviction and possession of a firearm or ammunition that has moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Kelly · filed 1993-04-22(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) the government need only prove that the defendant has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year, and that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit a person who is not a convicted felon from owning firearms.

United States v. Thompson · filed 1993-03-30(g)(1)

Secondly, Harris cannot be a “participant” in the offense as she apparently is not a convicted felon; even if she owned 100 Budischowski pistols she could not violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, possession of a firearm, and a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Easterling · filed 1993-02-16(g)(1)

To prove Easterling's guilt on each count, the government was required to show that Easterling had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that he possessed a firearm, and that the firearm had a nexus to interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a single count to charge transportation and possession as alternative ways of committing the same offense; proof of either is sufficient.

United States v. Wiley · filed 1992-12-03(g)(1)

18 U.S;C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to ship, transport, receive, or possess a firearm in interstate commerce. Each is an alternative way to violate the statute; each is subject to the same punishment, The indictment charged two of these methods: transportation and possession of the Excam pistol found in Wiley’s luggage. The jury was instructed that it had to find only one in order to convict. The firearm count charged Wiley with only one offense.

Section 922(g)(1) lists alternative ways for a convicted felon to commit one firearm offense; an indictment may charge more than one method in a single count.

U.S. v. Wiley · filed 1992-11-23(g)(1)

§ 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to ship, transport, receive, or possess a firearm in interstate commerce. Each is an alternative way to violate the statute; each is subject to the same punishment.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm in or affecting commerce, so an indictment for conduct after the 1986 amendment need not allege that the felon shipped or transported it.

United States v. Merritt · filed 1989-08-25(g)(1)

On May 19, 1986, Section 922(g) was amended to prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm “in or affecting commerce.” That amendment became effective on November 15, 1986. The conduct on which the charge in Count two was based occurred on December 23, 1986, over thirty days after the amendment became effective. The indictment is, therefore, valid.

A prior felony remains a predicate for § 922(g)(1) when the state restores other civil rights but does not restore the right to possess firearms.

United States v. Erwin · filed 1989-10-24(g)(1)

Since Illinois has not restored that right to Defendant, his “civil rights” have not been restored within the meaning of § 921(a)(20), and so his motion for judgment of acquittal on that basis must be denied.

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit a defendant to collaterally attack the predicate felony conviction in the firearms prosecution.

United States v. Tinsley · filed 1989-11-09(g)(1)

A firearms prosecution does not subject the predicate felony to collateral attack.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; the government may introduce multiple convictions even when the defendant offers to stipulate.

United States v. Jordan · filed 1990-01-04(g)(1)

The government does not have to stipulate to proof of prior convictions. ... The government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jordan had prior felony convictions, and the introduction of 8 of 23 of those to do so was not error.

Section 922(g)(1) defines a single firearm possession offense for convicted felons; additional prior convictions affect sentencing rather than the elements of that offense.

United States v. McGatha · filed 1990-01-16(g)(1)

As revised, the statutory scheme clearly makes possession of weapons by all convicted felons a single offense, with additional convictions relevant only for sentencing.

Section 922(g)(1) defines the felon-in-possession offense; qualifying prior convictions under Section 924(e) affect the sentence, not the elements of that offense.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1990-04-18(g)(1)

All the elements of that offense are contained in Sec. 922(g)(1). As this court has held, Sec. 924(e) affects only the sentence, and is not a substantive element of the crime of possessing a firearm as a felon.

Evidence that a convicted felon handled a gun, placed it in a car’s glove box, and held the key can support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Williams · filed 1990-03-05(g)(1)

At the service station he saw Williams remove a gun from his waistband, put it in a black pouch, and place the pouch in the glove box area of the car. ... During his search of the subjects, he found the key to the glove box on Williams. A search of the glove box produced a black pouch containing a loaded .38 caliber revolver. ... We are satisfied that on the evidence presented a reasonable fact-finder could have found Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g) bars convicted felons from possessing firearms, so seized firearms cannot be returned to them.

United States v. Hughes Anderson Bagley, Jr. · filed 1990-03-14(g)

As a convicted felon, Bagley cannot lawfully possess the weapons. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person whose felony conviction remains effective because the convicting state has not restored his civil rights.

United States v. Breckenridge · filed 1990-03-30(g)(1)

Breckenridge failed obtain a “restoration of civil rights” under New Jersey law and his conviction in New Jersey of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” subjects him to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce; the court held that knowledge was not an element.

United States v. Carver · filed 1990-05-07(g)(1)

However, knowledge is not an element of the crime. ... The government was thus required to prove only that Carver was a convicted felon who possessed weapons that had travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a felon to use, attempt to use, or threaten to use the firearm.

United States v. Nichols · filed 1990-06-14(g)(1)

It is not an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that the felon use, attempt to use, or threaten to use the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm, that the firearm moved in or affected interstate commerce, and that the defendant had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Hope · filed 1990-06-27(g)(1)

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must have shown: (1) that Hope possessed a firearm; (2) that the firearm moved in or affected interstate commerce; and (3) that Hope had a prior felony conviction.

A restored felon's conviction can support a § 922(g)(1) charge when state law expressly prohibits the firearm possession alleged, even if the restoration certificate does not state that prohibition.

United States v. Eabie McLean A/K/A Erbie McLean · filed 1990-06-04(g)(1)

Clearly, North Carolina intends to restore to ex-convicts their general citizenship rights but limit their firearms privileges. We therefore hold that the Felony Firearms Act “expressly provides” the circumstances under which a “person may not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The facts alleged here — that McLean was carrying a handgun within five years of his release from prison — fall squarely within the express provisions of the Act.

Section 922(g)(1) permits the government to prove a defendant’s prior felony convictions at trial even when the defendant offers to stipulate to them.

United States v. Whitfield · filed 1990-07-03(g)(1)

Whitfield also argues he was prejudiced at trial because the government refused Whitfield’s offer to stipulate that “he had been convicted of [felony] crimes.” This argument is foreclosed by our well-established rule that “the government is not required to accept a defendant’s stipulation to [] prior felony conviction[s] in lieu of proof of [those] conviction[s].”

Section 922(g) makes a felon's possession of a firearm a continuing offense that begins when the felon obtains possession.

United States v. Barnes · filed 1990-08-13(g)

In our case, we have both a completed and an ongoing crime involved, since the offense of felon in possession is complete once the felon actually obtains possession of a firearm, but continues as long as it remains in his possession.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year from possessing a firearm, subject to the civil-rights-restoration exception.

United States v. Gomez · filed 1990-08-08(g)(1)

Because Idaho has no such express provision in its code, we must overturn Gomez’s conviction. Idaho restored Gomez’s civil rights without expressly restricting his right to possess firearms. We cannot say that at the time of his arrest he stood “convicted” of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year within the meaning of section 922(g).

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, including through constructive possession.

United States v. Leon McAnderson Roosevelt Hawkins, Jeff Fort, Alan Knox and Reico Cranshaw · filed 1990-09-28(g)

Possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive. ... “[cjonstructive possession exists when a person does not have actual ... possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.” ... (construing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm, including through constructive possession shown by power and intent to exercise dominion or control.

United States v. Grant · filed 1990-08-30(g)(1)

"Constructive possession exists when a defendant exercises, or has the power to exercise, dominion and control over an item." ... "We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion."

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gordon · filed 1990-08-31(g)

In order to obtain a conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Government must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following elements of the crime: 1) that Defendant was a convicted felon; that is, that he was previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year; 2) that he was knowingly in possession of a firearm; and 3) that said firearm had travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is sufficiently charged when an indictment identifies the firearm and alleges that it was shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. James Poole, Sr. · filed 1991-04-04(g)(1)

Because the indictment specifically identified the firearm and alleged that it had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce, the indictment was sufficient to place Poole on notice of the charge against him.

Prior convictions used to enhance a sentence are not elements of a § 922(g) offense and need not be decided by a jury.

United States v. Smith · filed 1991-04-24(g)

It is unnecessary for the jury to make any determination regarding prior convictions for enhancement purposes since this is not an element of an offense under section 922(g).

Section 922(a)(6) requires proof that the buyer knowingly made a false statement or presented false identification intended or likely to deceive a firearms dealer about a fact material to the lawfulness of the sale.

United States v. Julette Outlaw · filed 1991-08-19(a)(6)

For the government to prevail in its case against Ms. Outlaw, there were four elements which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) that on or about August 18, 1989, Ms. Outlaw made a written statement, as evidenced by the Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service Form 4473, or furnished or exhibited identification that she was a resident of the State of Maryland; 2) that the statement about her residence was false or Ms. Outlaw exhibited a false or fictitious or misrepresented identification card regarding such information; 3) that Ms. Outlaw knew such statements or identifications to be false; and 4) that Ms. Outlaw's statements were intended or likely to deceive the dealer concerning any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale of the firearm.

Section 922(g) does not permit lawful possession under Illinois law as a defense to a federal felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Craig Andrew Mitran, Also Known As, Andy Craig · filed 1991-07-10(g)

Lawful possession of weapons under Illinois law is a meritless defense to a conviction under Sec. 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior felony conviction, later firearm possession, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 1991-08-12(g)(1)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant had been convicted of a felony, i.e., a crime punishable by one or more years in prison; (2) the defendant thereafter possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a felon; possession may be actual or constructive, exclusive or joint.

United States v. Jones · filed 1991-09-17(g)(1)

There is no merit to Jones’s assignment of error to the district court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on count 3. A stipulation established both Jones’s status as a felon, who is prohibited from possessing a gun, and the transportation of the gun in interstate commerce. Thus, the only element of the crime remaining for the jury’s consideration was whether Jones knowingly possessed the gun. The district court properly explained to the jury actual and constructive possession and exclusive and joint possession.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the accused possessed a firearm and was a felon at the time of possession.

United States v. Koonce · filed 1991-09-23(g)

The key elements under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), charged in the Utah proceeding, are (1) that the accused possessed a firearm, and (2) that the accused was a felon when he possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require actual or threatened force as an element of the offense.

United States v. Lewis · filed 1991-10-15(g)(1)

Subsection (i) clearly cannot be met in this case. Defendant’s offense is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as follows: ... This offense contains no element of actual or threatened force.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove the defendant’s prior felony conviction.

United States v. Michael Hines, United States of America v. James M. Hall, Jr. · filed 1991-08-23(g)(1)

While in the ordinary course of most criminal trials revelations of the defendant’s parole status might provoke a mistrial because it would inform the jury that the defendant had a prior criminal history, ... the government was required to prove that the defendant had a prior criminal history as an element of the offense charged in this case.

Section 922(g) creates the offense of firearm possession by a felon but provides no penalty; the applicable penalty comes from Section 924.

United States v. Miles · filed 1991-11-14(g)

For although § 922 creates the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, it creates absolutely no penalties for committing the offense. Thus, to determine the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for violations of § 922, as § 3559 directs, one must examine § 924.

Section 922(g) requires an indictment to allege a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, but the indictment need not describe the nature of that conviction.

United States v. Moses Carter, Jr. · filed 1991-10-29(g)

In Poore, this Court quoted with approval language which states that an indictment may properly charge that the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Id. at 42 (quoting United States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975)). Carter's indictment charged his prior convictions in this manner and is thus consistent with Poore. The language set forth an essential element of the charge and was properly included within the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) allows New Jersey third-degree convictions to serve as predicates even when state law presumes against imprisoning first-time offenders.

United States v. Minnick · filed 1991-11-14(g)(1)

The New Jersey offenses here serve that purpose, regardless of the presumption of no-imprisonment for some offenders. ... Minnick’s convictions, therefore, may stand as predicates to the § 922(g) charge.

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a Florida nolo contendere plea with adjudication withheld as a qualifying felony conviction.

United States v. Lester · filed 1991-12-12(g)(1)

Since we find the language in Garrón, the most recent Florida Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue, to be sufficiently broad and unequivocal to fairly extend to the federal firearms context, and since we agree with the Thompson Court’s conclusion, we follow Thompson in concluding that, under Florida state law, a nolo plea with a withhold of adjudication is not a conviction for purposes of Section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for an offense punishable by more than one year in prison; the offense need not be labeled a felony.

United States v. Johnny Dockery, A/K/A Lynden Dockery, United States of America v. Johnny Dockery, A/K/A Lynden Dockery · filed 1992-01-24(g)(1)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the critical fact is Dockery's prior conviction of an offense "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” § 922(g)(1), not that the prior conviction was a felony.

A prior felony drug conviction can satisfy § 922(g)'s felony requirement even when another conviction offered as a felony proves to be a misdemeanor.

United States v. Owens · filed 1992-02-20(g)

The jury already had before it evidence of Owens's prior felony drug conviction and that prior felony alone was sufficient to support the firearms charges under §§ 922(g) and 924(c).

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm; using a firearm under § 924(c) establishes possession under § 922(g).

United States v. Mukes · filed 1992-01-10(g)

On the basis of what has already been said, finally, the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) must be upheld; it is undisputed that the defendant had previously been convicted of a series of felonies, and if he "used" a firearm under § 924(c), he "possessed" the firearm under § 922(g).

Under § 922(g)(1), constructive possession of a firearm may be established through circumstantial evidence and may be joint rather than exclusive.

United States v. Roderick L. Garrett, United States of America v. Joe Louis Williams · filed 1992-04-09(g)(1)

These same guidelines are equally controlling when viewing the firearm charges. ... Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of guilt. ... This evidence could reasonably be viewed as establishing a nexus between Garrett and the contraband and thus could support this jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm that has travelled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Hatcher · filed 1992-06-22(g)(1)

The crime of a felon in possession of a firearm requires that a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year possess a firearm that had travelled in or affected interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment returned by the grand jury was constitutionally sufficient because it clearly set forth the elements of the offense and enabled Hatcher to prepare his defense.

Section 922(g)(1) makes a prior felony conviction an element of a felon-in-possession charge, and the government may present proof of that element without bifurcating the trial.

United States v. Nguyen · filed 1992-05-22(g)(1)

The Government is entitled to offer proof on an element of the crime. ... The nature of the prior felony conviction, armed robbery, was not admitted into evidence, but only the fact that Nguyen had a prior felony conviction was introduced into evidence. Moreover, strong limiting instructions were given during trial, at the time the evidence was introduced and again when the jury was charged, with respect to the introduction of a prior criminal conviction. Accordingly, the motion for bifurcation was denied.

Section 922(g) cannot use an unfair trade practice conviction excluded by § 921(a)(20) as the underlying felony.

United States v. McLemore · filed 1992-05-29(g)

Therefore Mr. McLemore’s 1988 conviction cannot serve as the underlying felony for an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) crime.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a finding of guilt followed by probation without a judgment of guilt under Michigan law as a prior conviction while the probation remains incomplete.

United States of America, (90-1096 91-1503), (91-1505) v. Robert Hawkins, (90-1096 91-1503), (91-1505) · filed 1992-06-08(g)(1)

By its terms, M.C.L. § 333.7411 only applies when an individual “pleads guilty to or is found guilty of” specified statutes banning drug possession and use. As this constitutes a conviction under the rule derived from Preuss, Funk, and M.C.L. § 769.1(1), the evidence that defendant had been put on probation pursuant to section 333.7411 was sufficient to sustain the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

An indictment charging a § 922(g)(1) offense gives adequate notice when it specifies the offense elements, despite an erroneous citation to a penalty provision.

United States v. William Kimmons, Howard Small, United States of America v. Bruce Lee Berta · filed 1992-07-08(g)(1)

However, in the same count, the indictment also charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment not only specified the elements of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but also specified the convictions that established Small's eligibility for the potential life sentence carried under that section. The government concedes that it incorrectly included 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(B) in Count VII, but notes that the reference is merely surplusage given that the district court disregarded it and properly applied § 924(e)(1) pursuant to § 922(g)(1). We agree.

Section 922(g) makes a prior felony conviction an element of the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

United States v. Nururdin · filed 1992-07-10(g)

Moreover, because defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, evidence of prior felony convictions was properly admitted because it is an element of the offense.

Section 922(g) does not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force as an element of the offense.

United States v. Glenn · filed 1992-08-28(g)

The statute under which defendant was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, nor is it one of those offenses explicitly listed in § 4B1.2 (l)(ii).

Section 922(g) requires proof of a prior felony conviction in a felon-in-possession charge; the government may introduce evidence of that conviction to prove the element.

United States v. Eddie Fryer · filed 1992-09-02(g)

Evidence of Fryer’s earlier conviction was an essential element of the crime charged in count seven. ... We hold that it did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to read to the jury Fryer’s prior conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) makes a prior felony conviction an element through the defendant’s status as a convicted felon, not through the conduct underlying that conviction.

United States v. Alessandroni · filed 1992-12-23(g)(1)

But it is not the conduct of committing a prior felony that is an element of § 922(g)(1); rather, it is the status of being a convicted felon that is an element of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person with a prior felony conviction from possessing a firearm; proof of the conviction and admitted ownership of the firearm supported this conviction.

United States v. Hamlin · filed 1993-02-17(g)(1)

There cannot be much doubt concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Hamlin’s conviction on count 8: That count charged him with possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The evidence indicated that Hamlin indeed had a prior felony drug conviction and, as stated, he admitted ownership of the weapon found on the floor of the back seat. That is sufficient evidence to support his conviction on count 8.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person with a qualifying felony conviction even if state law permits possession, unless the person's civil rights have been restored.

U.S. v. Thomas · filed 1993-05-11(g)(1)

The isolated right to possess firearms, in the absence of restoration of such core civil rights as well, does not immunize convicted felons from § 922(g) guilt.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior felony conviction, firearm possession, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Flores · filed 1993-07-09(g)(1)

To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) the firearm had travelled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm or ammunition, and an interstate commerce connection.

United States v. Zachary Crusader Robinson · filed 1993-06-08(g)(1)

The three elements necessary to prove defendant's guilt under § 922(g)(1) are first, that defendant had a prior felony conviction; second, that defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition; and, third, that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) requires a prior felony conviction, a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce, and possession of that firearm.

United States v. Linwood · filed 1993-08-02(g)

As to the first offense, felon in possession of a firearm, there was prrof of each of the required elements. The parties agreed Linwood had a prior felony conviction, no one disputed that the gun travelled in interstate commerce, and the jury believed the officer's testimony that Linwood possessed the gun, which he found in the defendant's waistband.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession by a convicted felon; evidence that someone else owned the gun does not negate possession.

United States v. Corbin · filed 1993-09-20(g)(1)

In addition, the Quintal affidavit is immaterial to the only disputed issue of the case-whether Corbin possessed the firearm. Even if Quintal's affidavit is true, it has no bearing on whether Corbin was in possession of a firearm while a convicted felon. ... No matter who might have owned the gun, Corbin never denied that he knew the gun was in the car he was driving.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of felony status, interstate transportation of the firearm, and actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Windbush · filed 1993-10-15(g)(1)

Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires proof of the defendant's status as a felon, the transportation of the firearm in interstate commerce, and the defendant's actual or constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)’s firearm element was supported by testimony identifying a working shotgun and by the shotgun’s admission into evidence.

United States v. Munoz · filed 1994-02-18(g)

The government's witness testified that he purchased and received a "shotgun" from Munoz and that Munoz then informed him that it worked; the shotgun itself was identified by the witness and introduced in evidence; and the prosecution and defense stipulated before the jury that "the firearm alleged in the indictment was in and affecting interstate commerce"; there was no evidence that the shotgun was not designed to (or would not or could not readily be converted to) expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. We hold that the evidence was sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing firearm possession by a convicted felon and a connection to interstate commerce; a firearm manufactured outside the state of possession satisfies the commerce element.

United States v. Gary Odom (92-5822/5823/5827) Leonard Johnson (92-5824) Terrance Bulger (92-5825) · filed 1994-03-01(g)(1)

In case No. 92-5827, Odom appeals his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), which proscribe the unlawful and knowing possession of a firearm in or affecting commerce. ... The jury instruction required the jury to determine that Odom possessed the firearm knowingly, meaning voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident. This instruction, whether viewed in isolation or in combination with the constructive possession instruction, left no room for the jury to be confused regarding the knowledge element of the offenses. The firearm was not manufactured in Tennessee, and therefore had travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon's keeping an inherited firearm in his home under his immediate occupancy and control as actual possession.

United States v. Davis · filed 1994-04-21(g)(1)

But Davis ignores the fact that he accepted the shotgun from his father's estate and kept the shotgun in his closet in his house. By keeping the weapon in his immediate occupancy and control, the convicted felon was in actual possession of the weapon in violation of federal law.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm, without proof that the firearm was connected to a violent crime.

United States v. Braden · filed 1994-06-08(g)

There is nothing in the statute or the Sentencing Guidelines that requires the government to show that a defendant possessed a gun in relation to a violent crime. Section 922(g) only requires the government to prove that the defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

Wilson v. United States · filed 1994-06-23(g)(1)

Wilson was properly convicted under federal law, as a felon in possession of a firearm because he was convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

A felon receives a firearm under § 922(g) by regaining possession of it after imprisonment, even if he possessed it before.

United States v. Solomon · filed 1994-08-10(g)

Even if he possessed the guns before his term of imprisonment, his taking repossession after serving his time constituted "receipt."

Under § 922(g), a felon who regains possession of a firearm after imprisonment has received it.

United States v. David James Solomon, A/K/A Davis James Cormier · filed 1994-09-08(g)

Even if he possessed the guns before his term of imprisonment, his taking repossession after serving his time constituted “receipt.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s receipt offense requires proof that the defendant received the firearm after becoming a convicted felon.

United States v. Bruney · filed 1994-10-12(g)(1)

After reviewing the transcript and the essential elements of the offense, the Court finds that the government did not present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant received the firearm after November 18, 1992, the date he was convicted of a felony. Accordingly, the government did not prove that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time he received the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year; the commerce element is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled in foreign or interstate commerce.

United States v. Nairobi Ray · filed 1994-11-15(g)(1)

The essential elements of the 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) offense are that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) previously having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (3) the firearm then being in or affecting commerce. ... As to that element, the Government had only to prove that the firearm had travelled in foreign or interstate commerce at some time in the past.

Section 922(g) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when a co-conspirator's possession of the firearm is attributable to the defendant under Pinkerton and the prior-felony and interstate-commerce elements are proved.

United States v. Bobby O. Foster, Jr. · filed 1994-12-28(g)

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient as well to support Foster's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). Again, the weapon is attributable to Foster through the Pinkerton doctrine. Evidence was introduced at trial of Foster's prior felony conviction with a sentence of four years imprisonment. There was additional testimony that the weapon was manufactured in New York and would have to travel in interstate commerce to reach North Carolina. Therefore, sufficient evidence of each element of the offense was before the jury, and Foster's challenge to this conviction lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony conviction as an element of the firearm possession offense.

United States v. Orena · filed 1995-01-31(g)(1)

An element of the earlier charge of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was a prior conviction for a felony.

Section 922(g) makes a felon's knowing, constructive possession of a firearm a felony when the interstate commerce element is met.

United States v. Branson · filed 1995-03-23(g)

The possession of a firearm by a felon is a felony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). ... Here, the district court found that Branson, a convicted felon, knew the revolver was in the storage locker and had exclusive control of the locker. The court took judicial notice of the fact that only Rugers were manufactured in Arizona, therefore, the interstate commerce element was met. Because the facts showed that Branson's constructive possession of the revolver in the storage locker constituted a felony, the district court did not err by classifying Branson's conduct as a Grade B violation.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, and ammunition alone can support probable cause for an arrest under the section.

United States v. Knox · filed 1995-12-07(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) makes unlawful the possession of both firearms and ammunition by convicted felons. The ammunition alone would constitute probable cause for an arrest of Mr. Knox under Sec. 922(g), which justified the follow up request to search the trunk of his car.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Marroquirn · filed 1995-12-28(g)

To sustain a conviction, the government must establish the following elements: "1) that Defendant was a convicted felon ...; 2) that he was knowingly in possession of a firearm; and 3) that said firearm had traveled in interstate commerce." United States v. Gordon, 744 F.Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.Mich.1990), aff'd. 940 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.1991). "Possession may be either actual or constructive and it need not be exclusive but may be joint." United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.1973), cert. denied 94 S.Ct. 54 (1973) (interpreting "possess" within meaning of version of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d), prohibiting possession of unregistered firearm, then in effect). "Actual possession exists when a tangible object is in the immediate possession or control of the party." Id. Constructive possession, on the other hand, "exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others." Id; and United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 373 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 265 (1991). The duration of the possession is immaterial. United States v. Sanders, 462 F.2d 122, 124 (6th Cir.1972); and Gordon, 744 F.Supp. at 151.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Leon Adam Ward, Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-01-18(g)

Although the government had to establish the gun had travelled in interstate commerce, which in this case required that a rational juror could find it to be an authentic Harrington and Richardson, manufactured in Gardner, Massachusetts, the government easily met this test. Special Agent Sullivan's testimony that: (a) he believed that the handgun was a Harrington and Richardson that travelled from Massachusetts; (b) counterfeit handguns are extremely rare; and (c) counterfeiting such a handgun requires expensive machinery, all could lead a reasonable juror to accept the authenticity, and thus the interstate nature, of the weapon.

Section 922(g) bars a felon from possessing a firearm, and a prior conviction must be expunged before possession for the felon to possess lawfully.

United States v. Lee · filed 1996-01-24(g)

Section 922(g) is simple: felons may not possess firearms. In order for a felon lawfully to possess a firearm, the prior conviction must be expunged before he possesses the weapon. At the time Lee possessed the shotgun in 1994, his conviction had not been expunged and he satisfied all the elements of § 922(g).

Section 922(g) permits a federal charge to be based on an adequate prior weapons conviction.

Minnick v. USA · filed 1996-02-21(g)

Since the New Jersey weapons charge was an adeguate predicate upon which the section 922(g) federal charge could be formed, petitioner is "plainly" not entitled to relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Veasey · filed 1995-12-21(g)

He claims that the facts presented at trial do not support the verdicts and that the government failed to prove Veasey's knowledge of the gun, an essential element of these crimes. The district court did not err in denying Veasey's motion for judgment of acquittal. ... In the evidence most favorable to the prosecution, Veasey picked up the revolver in the apartment and placed in into the car. Therefore, he possessed it. Veasey's convictions are based on ample evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of the prior felony element by stipulation without disclosing the crime’s nature to the jury.

United States v. Wacker · filed 1995-12-26(g)(1)

Today we hold that where a defendant offers to stipulate as to the existence of a prior felony conviction, the trial judge should permit that stipulation to go to the jury as proof of the status element of section 922(g)(1), or provide an alternate procedure whereby the jury is advised of the fact of the former felony, but not its nature or substance.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element was supported by evidence that the firearm was seen in the defendant’s hand.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lomondo Mark SCOTT, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-01-10(g)(1)

The firearm was seen in his hand. ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the drugs and firearms were possessed by Scott. We affirm the district court’s decision to deny Scott’s Fed.R.Crim. P.Rule 29 motion.

A § 922(g)(1) trial need not be bifurcated to separate the prior felony element from firearm possession.

United States v. Dean · filed 1996-02-08(g)(1)

The reasoning of the foregoing circuits is persuasive. We hold that the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to bifurcate the trial.

Section 922(g) continues to prohibit convicted felons from possessing firearms despite the suspension of relief under § 925(c).

United States v. McGill · filed 1996-01-22(g)

We are satisfied that McGill's argument that Congress intended to suspend § 922 is meritless.

Section 922(g) bars a convicted felon from possessing a firearm unless the person's civil rights, including firearm rights, have been fully restored.

Wagner v. United States · filed 1996-02-07(g)

Even if Wagner was in possession of the handgun in his dwelling, and even if Indiana allowed him to possess a handgun in his dwelling, Wagner was subject to prosecution under § 922(g) for possession of a firearm while a convicted felon, since his right to carry firearms had not been fully restored.

Section 922(g) permits a possession conviction without proof that the defendant had exclusive control over the vehicle containing the firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 1996-02-09(g)

This argument fails, however, because the government was not required to prove that Smith had exclusive control over the car.

The facial and as applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) showed no plain error on the record reviewed.

United States v. Murray · filed 1996-02-26(g)(1)

Ronald Murray appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. We have reviewed the record and find no plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Moore · filed 1996-03-20(g)(1)

The evidence in this case was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict on the firearm count. The elements of the offense are (1) possession, (2) by a convicted felon, (3) of a firearm, (4) in or affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) requires a prior felony conviction, a firearm affecting interstate commerce, and knowing possession of the firearm.

United States v. Miller · filed 1996-04-23(g)

The elements of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm are a prior conviction for a felony, that the firearm in question somehow affected interstate commerce, and that the felon knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits both actual and constructive possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; the indictment need not specify the type of possession or how it will be proved.

Wilson v. United States · filed 1996-07-15(g)(1)

Both actual and constructive possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is illegal and it does not matter whether the government proves possession through direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Gill, 58 F.3d 334, 336-37 (7th Cir.1995). Thus, neither the type of possession nor the evidence by which the government planned to prove possession at trial was an essential element of the crime that had to be set out in the indictment.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon's actual or constructive possession of a firearm, regardless of who owns it.

Brayman v. Shepherd · filed 1996-09-04(g)

These undisputed facts provided the officers with probable cause to believe that the firearms were the object of a crime, because either actual or constructive possession of a firearm by a felon is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Because ownership is not an element of these crimes, a dispute over ownership does not create a question of material fact to prevent application of the plain view doctrine.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons whose civil rights have not been restored from possessing firearms or ammunition that moved through interstate commerce.

Barry v. State · filed 1996-10-17(g)(1)

Thus, federal law forbids Barry from possessing any firearm or ammunition that has moved through interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a convicted felon to knowingly possess a firearm connected with interstate commerce.

United States v. Stokes · filed 1996-11-18(g)(1)

Defendant is charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The elements of this offense are: (1) the accused is a convicted felon; (2) who knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) which was connected with interstate commerce. The state conviction and the federal charge do not result in multiple punishment because the crimes require proof of different essential elements.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing ammunition.

United States v. Ivory Mosby, Also Known as Rafiq Zareef Muhaymin · filed 1996-12-06(g)(1)

To convict Mosby of being a felon in possession of ammunition, the government had the burden of proving that Mosby was a previously convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm, and possession requires more than mere presence near the firearm.

United States v. Holmes · filed 1996-12-09(g)(1)

Rather, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), "possession" is the essential element of the offense, and pursuant to the law of this circuit, "possession" means more than the mere presence of a firearm in the vicinity of a felon.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.

United States v. Griffin · filed 1996-12-09(g)(1)

However, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to support a finding of Griffin's constructive possession for the purposes of § 922(g)(1). Constructive possession may be established when the evidence demonstrates that the defendant knowingly had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed the firearm and does not require specific intent.

United States v. Jobson · filed 1996-12-10(g)(1)

Although the government is required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to prove defendant’s knowledge of the firearm, United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir.1996), prior bad acts are not admissible to prove defendant’s knowledge unless defendant places his mental state at issue or his knowledge of the firearm is not inferable from proof of possession itself. ... Defendant’s intent was also not in issue because the gun possession charge does not require proof of specific intent.