Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121

Section 36-4-121(c)’s factors for dividing marital property do not apply to the division of an unmarried couple’s business partnership assets.

Montgomery v. Montgomery · filed 2005-03-17(c)

It is important to note that the statutory factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) which are to be considered when dividing marital property do not apply in this case.

Section 36-4-121’s rules for dividing marital property do not apply when the marriage was void.

Falk v. Falk · filed 2005-01-21(b)

Because the parties were not validly married, the rules of equitable distribution in the context of section 36-4-121 do not apply.

A tax refund from salary earned during the marriage is marital property subject to equitable division.

Dempsey v. Dempsey · filed 2000-07-21(b)(1)(A)

As salary earned and refunded to the parties during the marriage, the tax refund is marital property and subject to equitable division. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows a court to consider dissipation when dividing marital property, but the identified postseparation living expenses did not amount to dissipation merely because another person lived with the spouse.

Witt v. Witt · filed 2000-07-28(c)(5)

We recognize that a party may be charged with dissipating the marital assets after the separation. ... In our opinion the expenditures identified in the record do not amount to a dissipation of marital assets, even if someone else is living with her.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts to consider dissipation of marital or separate property, including money gambled away, when dividing marital property.

Deneau v. Deneau · filed 2001-02-23(c)(5)

Although Wife attempts to characterize the trial court’s consideration of her gambling as awarding property based on "fault," we believe the gambling is properly characterized as "dissipation of the marital or separate property," which the trial court is required to consider.

A finding that a spouse dissipated marital property does not require proof of fraud.

Ward v. Ward · filed 2002-12-19(c)(5)

We do not find the dicta cited in Walker to be persuasive. Under Tennessee law, a finding of fraud is not a prerequisite to a court finding a party dissipated marital assets.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts dividing marital property equitably to consider each spouse’s contribution to its preservation or dissipation.

Earley v. Earley · filed 2003-05-21(c)(5)

Guidelines for the equitable division of marital property are set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (c) (Supp. 2002). Among the factors to be considered by the court in making an equitable division of marital property is the “contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role.”

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows courts to consider a spouse’s gambling losses and each spouse’s contributions when equitably dividing marital property.

Bryant v. Bryant · filed 2003-09-23(c)(5)

When the facts of this case – including Husband’s gambling – are considered in light of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c)(5), we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary function in dividing the marital assets.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) makes a party’s dissipation of marital assets a factor in dividing marital property.

Terry Baker Smithson v. James Alvin Smithson, Jr. · filed 2003-11-19(c)(5)

One of the factors to be considered by the court in dividing the parties’ property is one party’s dissipation of the martial assets. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(2001). ... Upon review of the record, and in light of the continual difficulty Wife and the trial court have had in obtaining a full accounting from Husband, the evidence does not preponderate against the determinations of the trial court. We affirm the division of property.

The party alleging dissipation of marital assets bears the initial burden of showing it when marital property is divided.

Wiltse v. Wiltse · filed 2004-08-24(c)(5)

Because dissipation of marital assets is a factor a trial court must consider when dividing the marital estate, we address this issue here. ... Therefore, the trial court did not err when it determined that the Appellee, who was the party alleging dissipation of marital assets, had the burden of showing such dissipation.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires a court to consider alleged dissipation of marital assets even when the spouse accused of dissipation provided the other spouse with support exceeding those expenditures.

Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. · filed 2005-02-16(c)(5)

In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court cites to no law to support the proposition that dissipation of marital assets will not be considered if the dissipating spouse provides support in excess of the alleged amount of dissipated assets. Likewise, this Court is unable to find any proposition in Tennessee jurisprudence to support such a ruling.

Dissipation is a factor in dividing marital property, but expenditures typical of the marriage may be found not to constitute dissipation.

Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. · filed 2009-05-27(c)(5)

On this basis, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Husband’s expenditures did not constitute dissipation.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) makes dissipation a factor in dividing marital property; an unsuccessful business loan is not dissipation without evidence that it was made to deplete the marital estate.

Larry Lynn Averitt, Sr. v. Averitt · filed 2009-07-24(c)(5)

As in Altman, Wife failed to present any evidence that Husband loaned Mr. Parrish the money for the purpose of depleting the marital estate. To the contrary, Husband testified that he intended to limit both his and Wife’s already-existing liability for any Company losses. Wife did not present any evidence to contradict Husband’s testimony. We find, therefore, that the trial court erred by characterizing Husband’s business decision as “dissipation.”

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts to consider dissipation of marital or separate property when equitably dividing marital property, including excessive personal spending secured by the marital home.

Deakins v. Deakins · filed 2009-09-30(c)(5)

The trial court did not err in characterizing Husband’s spending of the HELOC funds and the resulting encumbrance of the marital home as dissipation and considering this as one factor in its division of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) makes dissipation of marital or separate property relevant only when dividing marital property.

Broadbent v. Broadbent · filed 2006-10-19(c)(5)

Even if dissipation would be proper to consider, the parties have no marital property to divide. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(5) (2001), dissipation, whether of marital or separate property, must be considered only in the context of the division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) permits a court to consider dissipation of separate property and to impose a judgment when one spouse wrongfully spends the other spouse’s separate property.

Ann Claudia Short Bowers v. Bowers · filed 2012-05-17(c)(5)

Furthermore, we believe that his expenditure of the money despite Wife’s continued request for its return amounted to a dissipation of Wife’s separate property. ... Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing a judgment upon Husband for the money, less the amount that he was entitled from the division of the actual marital estate.

Wasteful use of marital funds to pursue a civil suit against a spouse can amount to dissipation when it does not benefit the marriage.

Beyer v. Beyer · filed 2013-04-05(c)(5)(B)

Such an atypical and wasteful expenditure of marital funds, made with the intent of filing a civil suit against a spouse, in no way benefitted the marriage and clearly amounted to dissipation.

Criminal defense expenses arising from a spouse’s intentional illegal conduct can count as dissipation of marital assets.

Lloyd v. Lloyd · filed 2014-04-24(c)(5)(B)

The evidence does not preponderate against the court’s determination that Husband dissipated $85,000.00 of marital funds. The $75,000.00 incurred in the defense of Husband’s criminal case was based on his illegal conduct that was intentional, purposeful and had produced no benefit to his family.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(B) defines dissipation as wasteful expenditures that reduce marital property and serve a purpose contrary to the marriage; financial strain is not required.

William Hunter Babcock v. Babcock · filed 2015-03-09(c)(5)(B)

Tennessee Code Annotated defines “dissipation” as: “wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation has been filed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(B). ... Instead, the trial court’s reasoning rests on whether the parties were placed in “financial strain,” which is not an element courts consider when making a determination of dissipation.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) makes each spouse’s dissipation of marital assets a factor in the equitable division of property.

Culver v. Culver · filed 2015-06-26(c)(5)

Initially, we note that the Trial Court found that both parties dissipated marital assets, and the evidence does not preponderate against this finding. Wife argues that the Trial Court somehow did not take into account Husband’s acts of dissipation when dividing the marital assets and liabilities. However, from the Trial Court’s order quoted above, it is apparent that the Trial Court did, in fact, take the spending behavior of both parties into consideration. Neither party was innocent in terms of dissipating marital assets.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) makes dissipation of marital assets one of several factors in dividing marital property.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2017-08-17(c)(5)(A)

Furthermore, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A), the extent to which a party may have dissipated marital assets is only one of multiple factors that a court takes into account when dividing marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows a court to consider a party’s dissipation of marital or separate property when equitably dividing the marital estate.

Holdsworth v. Holdsworth · filed 2015-06-03(c)(5)

A party‟s dissipation of marital or separate property is one of many factors a trial court may take into consideration in making an equitable division of a marital estate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5).

Dissipation of marital assets is weighed with the other factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Slocum v. Slocum · filed 2017-10-23(c)(5)

The court properly considered husband’s dissipation of marital assets as one factor in the context of weighing the totality of the circumstances and equities of the divorce.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts dividing marital property to consider dissipation, and an order adequately addresses the issue when it shows that the court considered the alleged spending.

Yuhasz v. Yuhasz · filed 2018-05-24(c)(5)

This section of the trial court’s memorandum shows that the court took the Wife’s allegations of dissipation of assets into account. We, therefore, reject Wife’s argument that the trial court failed to consider Husband’s dissipation of assets in its ruling on the division of marital assets.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) permits a court to consider dissipation when dividing marital property, but a parent's spending on a child's education does not constitute dissipation merely because the child is from a prior marriage and other education funds are available.

Julie C. W. v. Frank Mitchell W. Jr. · filed 2021-02-26(c)(5)

Moreover, we, like the Trial Court, find it somewhat problematic to classify a parent’s investment in his children’s education as wasteful, even if the offspring at issue are from a prior marriage and there are other funds available. We find no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in its decision that Husband’s expenditures on the higher education of his children from a prior marriage does not constitute dissipation.

Unnecessary attorney’s fees paid from marital assets may count as dissipation when a spouse’s misconduct and delays cause them.

Gergel v. Gergel · filed 2022-04-26(c)(5)

We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determinations that the $20,000.00 in funds withdrawn by Husband from the parties’ joint account and the $45,000.00 in attorney’s fees the court found to be caused by Husband’s misconduct and delays constituted marital assets dissipated by Husband to be considered in the equitable distribution of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) permits a court to consider a spouse’s use of marital assets for purposes that did not benefit the marital estate when dividing property.

Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, III · filed 2024-01-31(c)(5)(A)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) provides that a trial court’s division of marital property should consider “[t]he contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property.” As such, the trial court has the discretion, in fashioning its equitable division of the marital estate, to consider whether a party utilized marital assets prior to the division of the marital estate in a manner that did not benefit the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(B) treats wasteful expenditures that reduce property available for equitable division and serve a purpose contrary to the marriage as dissipation.

Snapp v. Snapp · filed 2024-06-28(c)(5)(B)

He acknowledged the restraining order but provided no records documenting the expenditures, nor was he able to offer any credible explanation for the whereabouts or the use of the funds. Accordingly, we find that the evidence of record does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court regarding dissipation of marital assets in this case.

Spending marital funds on necessary improvements before selling the marital home is not wasteful dissipation under subsection (c)(5)(B).

Anne Elise Littleton Jakobik v. Jakobik · filed 2025-04-14(c)(5)(B)

Husband’s use of marital funds to make those improvements cannot be characterized as “wasteful.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(B).

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires courts to include proven marital assets when dividing the marital estate.

Lee v. Lee · filed 2025-11-19(a)(1)

It was the court’s responsibility to “[e]quitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties.” ... Given this proof, we conclude that the court should have included them in its division of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) makes dissipation a factor in equitable distribution and permits assigning the full dissipated amount to one spouse when the overall division is equitable.

Ayers v. Ayers · filed 2025-12-22(c)(5)(A)

The trial court’s division of the marital assets, including the assignment of the dissipation, is consistent with the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) and is supported by the preponderance of the evidence.

The spouse alleging dissipation must make a prima facie showing of intentional, purposeful, and wasteful spending before the other spouse must justify the expenditures.

SWAFFORD v. CATHERINE LYDIA TRAIL SWAFFORD · filed 2026-01-23(c)(5)(B)

From our review of the trial court’s order in the present case, it is not apparent that the trial court applied the proper burden-shifting framework or the applicable standards for assessing whether Wife’s expenditures of funds in the Fidelity account amounted to dissipation. To the contrary, the trial court appears to have imposed the burden upon Wife in the absence of having determined an adequate prima facie showing was made by Husband.

Section 36-4-121 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property, but that discretion does not permit them to deny mandatory post-judgment interest.

Stinnett v. Stinnett · filed 2000-09-07

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121, relied on by the Trial Court, provides broad discretion for a trial court in making an equitable division and distribution of marital property in all actions for divorce or separate support and maintenance. In this case, the Trial Court attempted to avail itself of the broad discretion provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 to disregard the statutory directives of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-14-121 and 122. It is the Legislature which has determined that post-judgment interest is mandatory, and neither the Trial Court nor this Court is free to ignore this legitimate statutorily created mandate.

Section 36-4-121 treats an award from a spouse’s parent’s estate as separate property when it was not payment for services.

Moffitt v. Moffitt · filed 2000-09-18(b)(2)(D)

T.C.A. § 36-4-121 defines separate property as including “[p]roperty acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (b) (2) (D) (1996). ... With regard to the trial court’s classification of the award received from Wife’s father’s estate as separate property belonging to Wife, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Wife’s award from her father’s estate was not payment for services.

A bequest to one spouse alone is separate property and cannot be divided as marital property merely because both spouses helped the person who made the bequest.

Avery v. Avery · filed 2001-01-29(b)(2)(D)

In the case before us, the trial court only has authority to distribute marital property, and the applicable statute clearly defines a bequest to one party alone as that party’s separate property.

Property a spouse acquires during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent is separate property and cannot be included in the marital estate.

James Dortch, Sr. v. Dortch · filed 2001-07-17(b)(2)(D)

Separate property cannot, by definition, be included in the marital estate, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) provides that property acquired by a spouse during a marriage by “gift, bequest, devise or descent” is separate property.

Inherited property is separate property, but its treatment by the spouses can transmute it into marital property.

Pate v. Pate · filed 2006-07-18(b)(2)

According to the statutory definition, separate property includes “[p]roperty acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2) (2005). Separate property can become marital property through the parties’ treatment of the separate property under the doctrines of transmutation and commingling.

Section 36-4-121 excludes inherited property from the marital estate, including proceeds kept in the inheriting spouse’s separate account.

Jirjis v. Jirjis · filed 2014-05-01(b)(2)(D)

We hold that the money Father received as a bequest from his father remained Husband’s separate property, and, therefore, reverse the portion of the trial court’s order that included it in the division of marital property. The account is awarded to Husband as his separate property.

Inherited family business interests remain separate property when they have not been commingled or transmuted into marital property.

Berg v. Julie Ann Rutledge Berg · filed 2014-06-25(b)(2)(D)

The trial court rejected Wife’s argument and again questioned her credibility as a witness, ultimately classifying all of the Berg entities, family business interests inherited by Husband from his parents’ estates, as separate property, valued at $6,089,004. In doing so, the court found there was no evidence of commingling or transmutation and that any appreciation in value of these entities was Husband’s separate property. ... As we have previously disposed of both of these issues, the trial court’s classification of the parties’ property is affirmed.

Section 36-4-121 permits a court to classify joint savings used for moving and attorney’s fees during separation as separate property when the other spouse provides no support.

Cates v. Cates · filed 2000-09-18(a)

Wife testified that she took the funds from the parties’ joint savings account and utilized them to pay for expenses incident to her move and her attorney’s fees. Husband offered no support to Wife while they were separated, despite Wife’s requests and the undisputed fact that during their marriage he was the primary breadwinner. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s classification of the $12,000 as Wife’s separate property or the trial court’s distribution of marital property.

Property acquired during a marriage remains marital property even if the spouses were separated when it was acquired.

Matthews v. Matthews · filed 2010-04-28(b)(1)(A)

There is no exclusion from that definition for property acquired during the separation of the parties. Accordingly, the trial court correctly calculated the marital property portion of Husband’s pension.

Section 36-4-121 treats income earned through the filing of the final divorce decree as marital property subject to division.

Mayfield v. Mayfield · filed 2012-01-17(b)(1)

Specifically, we take issue with the court’s refusal to divide Wife’s post-separation income earned in 2008 and 2009. We believe this income was marital property subject to division. Indeed, any income earned until the filing of the final decree of divorce was subject to division and should have been considered in the court’s initial order dividing the marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) gives the court discretion to divide marital property equitably; permission to use marital assets during a divorce does not entitle a spouse to those assets in the final division.

Norman v. John Arthur Norman, IV · filed 2017-08-28(a)(1)

The mere fact that the trial court allowed the parties to use a portion of the marital assets while the divorce was pending does not create a right to those particular assets. The trial court retains the discretion to equitably divide the marital property “in proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). Based on the record as a whole, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to award Husband an additional $20,000 in the division of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts to consider each spouse’s contribution to acquiring marital property when dividing it equitably.

McGregor v. McGregor · filed 2000-09-26(c)(5)

Thus, Wife contributed the full amount of the purchase price for property that closed approximately six months before Wife filed for divorce. In light of this fact, and in light of T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5), we find that the trial court erred in dividing equally between the parties any net proceeds from the sale of the Brady Point property. We modify the trial court’s judgment so as to order that the proceeds remaining, if any, after the property has been sold and the debts have been paid, be awarded to Wife.

Workers’ compensation settlement funds are marital property to the extent they replace wages the injured spouse would have earned during the marriage.

Dudley v. Dudley · filed 2000-09-28(b)(1)

Because workers’ compensation payments, whether lump sum or periodic, are also income replacement, they should also be treated as income. If considered as an income substitute, the workers’ compensation settlement funds are marital property to the extent that they replaced wages that Mr. Dudley would have earned during the marriage had it not been for his work-related injury.

A spouse challenging the classification of a workers’ compensation award as marital property must present evidence that some portion replaces post-divorce wages.

Bilyeu v. Bilyeu · filed 2005-11-28(b)(1)(A)

Thus, before dividing a marital estate the trial court must classify property as either marital or separate property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b). ... We are unable to determine from the record whether the $141,642.10, or any portion thereof, replaces Husband’s post-divorce wages. Consequently, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding. We, therefore, affirm the classification of the workers’ compensation award as marital property.

Workers' compensation benefits replacing wages lost during the marriage are marital property.

Bochette v. Bochette · filed 2010-02-02(b)(1)(C)

Since the injury occurred during the marriage as did the time off from work and resulting lost wages, we affirm the Trial Court's finding that the award was marital property.

Section 36-4-121(g)(1) permits spouses to agree that one will purchase the other's interest in marital property.

Marcum v. Trippett · filed 2000-10-18(g)(1)

The parties made an agreement as to the purchase of the marital assets, which is countenanced by T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (g)(1)(1996).

Section 36-4-121 authorizes a divorce court to divide marital property, order its sale, and divide the proceeds.

Smith v. Sally Brittingham Smith and John Michael Charles Smith · filed 2008-09-24(a)(1), (3)

The Circuit Court was therefore authorized to “equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties” and “to effectuate its decree by divesting and reinvesting title to such property and, where deemed necessary, to order a sale of such property and to order the proceeds divided between the parties.” T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1), (3) (2005). Thus, upon the filing of Wife’s complaint, the Circuit Court gained jurisdiction over the marital estate, including the marital home.

Section 36-4-121(g)(1) allows a court to incorporate the parties’ property division agreement into a divorce decree without first classifying every asset as marital or separate.

Jones v. Jones · filed 2013-09-24(g)(1)

When a party requests that a trial court divide the marital estate in a contested divorce, the court must first classify all of the assets as marital or separate. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a). Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(g)(1), however, “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties regarding the division of property.”

Section 36-4-121(e)(5) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contributions and efforts; a difference in income alone does not make a division equitable.

Hutcheson v. Hutcheson · filed 2000-10-31(e)(5)

While the difference in income does not per se, make the trial court’s division of property equitable under the contribution provision, the effort each party made to contributing to the marriage must also be taken into account.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) directs courts to consider each spouse’s contributions to acquiring, preserving, or appreciating marital property when dividing it.

Coppage v. Coppage · filed 2001-02-16(c)(5)

Courts are directed to divide marital property in accordance with the statutory factors found in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) (Supp. 2000). ... We find that the trial court’s division of Dellwood is not inconsistent with the statutory factors or unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121 allows a court to consider each spouse’s contributions to assets when dividing marital property.

Mosley v. Mosley · filed 2001-12-11

This is appropriate under Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121, which allows the court to consider the parties’ contributions to the assets in making a property division.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a spouse’s contribution of separate funds to the acquisition of marital property to justify a larger share in an equitable division.

Deborah Lynn (Katz) Smith v. Steven White Smith · filed 2004-09-20(c)

Among the factors to be considered are those listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), including the duration of the marriage, the estate of each party at the time of the marriage, the contributions of each spouse to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, or dissipation of marital property, and “such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.” ... Applying those facts to the factors that must be considered in making an equitable division of property, we conclude that Wife’s share of the equity remaining in the house should be increased to more closely reflect her contribution to the house, the only significant marital asset.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) gives a homemaker’s contribution the same weight as a wage earner’s when each spouse has fulfilled that role.

Bates v. Bates · filed 2003-09-22(c)(5)

Since these two role are specifically given the same weight under T.C.A. § 36-4-121©)(5), we modify the Final Decree to award one-half of the appreciation in the Distillery Road Property to each party.

Section 36-4-121 treats salary contributed to a retirement plan during marriage as marital property without requiring a substantial contribution by the other spouse.

Bolick v. Bolick · filed 2004-11-29(b)(1)(A)

Appellant misapprehends the Trial Court’s ruling. The Trial Court ruled that the contributions made to the retirement plan from appellant’s salary were marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(A)(3)(1)(a). Clearly, the Trial Court did not rule that the wife was entitled to a share of any increase in the 401(k) fund during the marriage, but rather based his decision on the marital property paid into the 401(k) plan by the appellant.

A spouse’s contribution to acquiring marital property is a factor in equitable division, but it does not require repayment of the exact amount contributed.

Watson v. Watson · filed 2005-12-27(c)(5)

Equitable division of marital property does not necessarily equate to the strict repayment of each parties’ contribution.

A spouse’s contribution as a parent may be considered when equitably dividing marital property.

Stinson v. Stinson · filed 2004-10-25(c)(5)

Under TenmCode Ann. § 36-4-121, a party’s contribution to the marriage as parent is appropriately considered in making an equitable division of marital property.

In dividing marital property, a court may distinguish a spouse’s work caring for a child from a contribution as homemaker.

Caldwell v. Davina Kay Duke Caldwell · filed 2006-01-31(c)(5)

After a thorough review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s treatment of Mother as both homemaker and wage earner. The trial court acknowledged Father’s work in taking care of the child, and it pointed out the difference between being a homemaker and being a stay-at-home parent.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) makes a spouse’s contribution to acquiring marital property a factor in its equitable division.

Cantrell v. Cantrell · filed 2010-04-23(c)(5)

Due to her contribution to the acquisition of the marital real property, she is entitled to the lump sum of $20,500 without any contingencies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5).

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts to consider homemaking and parenting contributions when weighing a spouse’s wages in an equitable property division.

Dawn Lyn Tousignant Gordon v. Gordon · filed 2010-10-27(c)(5)

A counterbalancing part of that same statutory factor instructs us to consider the contributions of Wife as a “homemaker” and “parent.”

In dividing marital property, a court may consider that a substantial share of home equity came from a gift to one spouse, even after the gift became marital property.

Winkler v. Winkler · filed 2011-10-25(c)(5)(A)

We agree with Father’s insistence that the house is marital property. The $120,000 monetary gift from Mother’s friend was deposited into a joint account and then used to pay off the mortgage, and thus was transmuted. Nevertheless, the fact that such a large portion of the equity in the home came from a gift to Mother, while not determinative, may be considered.

A spouse is not entitled to an automatic dollar-for-dollar credit for premarital funds contributed to marital property, but those contributions may be considered in its equitable division.

Slagle v. Slagle · filed 2012-04-30(c)(7)

As in Brock, we conclude that Husband is not entitled to a $221,000 credit for pre-marital funds he spent to purchase the land and build the marital home. Certainly, however, such contributions, are properly considered by the trial court in its equitable division of the marital property existing at the time of the divorce.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires a spouse’s homemaker contribution to receive the same weight as the other spouse’s contribution as a wage earner when each fulfilled their role.

Marcella E. May v. May · filed 2011-11-29(c)(5)

We disagree with Husband’s assertion that factor five should be relied upon any more heavily than the other relevant factors. All relevant factors must be considered when making an equitable division of marital property. The record reveals that the Trial Court did consider all relevant factors. Furthermore, the evidence in the record on appeal does not support Husband’s assertion that the fifth factor weighs heavily in his favor. Rather, the evidence shows that Wife fulfilled her role as a homemaker and her contribution shall be given the same weight as Husband’s contribution.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) gives a spouse’s contribution as homemaker the same weight as a spouse’s contribution as wage earner if each fulfilled that role.

Nita v. Nita · filed 2014-01-31(c)(5)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A). Therefore, Husband’s suggestion that his status as the primary breadwinner should entitle him to a greater share of the marital estate than that of Wife, who was primarily a homemaker, is erroneous.

When weighing contributions to a marital home under subsection (c)(5)(A), a court may focus on the period the spouses lived there while considering the marriage as a whole.

ACKERMAN v. ACKERMAN · filed 2019-09-24(c)(5)(A)

The only substantial piece of marital property subject to division by the trial court was the marital home and, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A), the court must consider the parties’ contributions to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, and dissipation of the marital property, including certain non-economic contributions. Because the parties lived in the house during a period of a year and a half, the trial court did not err in focusing on that period in determining the weight to be afforded to the parties’ respective non-economic contributions. The trial court properly considered the entirety of the parties’ marriage in assessing the overall impact of the statutory factors.

Section 36-4-121 permits a spouse’s premarital down payment to be awarded as separate property before the remaining equity in a marital home is divided.

Kristin Edge Hunt-Carden v. Carden · filed 2020-03-03(a)(1)

We find that Husband should be awarded as his separate property the amount of his down payment on the Royal Mountain residence, $146,586.58. Upon the sale of the ... house, Wife is awarded one half of the remaining equity in the marital home after that payment, in addition to the award of one half of the marital interest in Husband’s retirement (as found by the trial court).

A court may account for one spouse’s greater contribution to an increase in marital property value when dividing that value.

Brown v. Charles Furman Phillips, Jr. · filed 2021-03-29(c)(5)

Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court erred in dividing the total increase in value in the marital property at a rate of 50/50. We modify the court’s award to reflect a division of 60/40 to account for Wife’s contribution to the increase in value without assistance from Husband, thereby reducing Husband’s award from $98,900 to $79,120.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows a court dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s failure to preserve a marital asset.

Kholghi v. Aliabadi · filed 2020-09-18(c)(5)

Given the trial court’s responsibility to consider Husband’s “preservation” or “depreciation” of marital assets, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5), we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s decision to recognize 75 percent of the shareholder loan balance as legitimate and 25 percent as illegitimate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) directs courts to consider each spouse’s contributions to property, including contributions as a homemaker, when dividing marital property.

Cooper v. Cooper · filed 2024-08-09(c)(5)(A)

The trial court’s decision to award Wife a $10,000 interest in the $25,000 increase in the home’s value was guided by the statutory factor which concerns: The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role[.] Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A).

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) permits a court to consider a spouse’s contribution of property to the marital estate when dividing that estate.

DORSEY v. DORSEY · filed 2026-03-03(c)(5)(A)

We find no evidence in the record that the court incorrectly considered Wife’s attachment to the real estate; rather, the trial court properly observed that Wife brought one parcel into the marriage while the other two parcels were gifted from her family, thus significantly contributing to the assets of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property and permits a court to account for a spouse’s bankruptcy when it shifts assigned joint debts to the other spouse before the division becomes final.

Mahan v. Mahan · filed 2000-11-15

When making a division of marital property, a court is to consider several factors in order to achieve an “equitable” division. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121. ... When the trial court revisited the order, it properly reexamined the property division in light of the changed circumstances, and attempted to, again, make an equitable distribution of the property. See Grissim, 637 S.W.2d at 875. The $7,000 equity in the home only partially offset the more than $27,000 in debts for which Wife suddenly became liable. We affirm the trial court’s award of the marital home to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(g)(1) permits a divorce court to incorporate the parties’ agreement on property division into its decree despite the general requirement of equitable division.

In Re Conservatorship Of John F. Ress · filed 2022-01-10(g)(1)

Section 36-4-121 requires the trial court to make an equitable division of marital property in a divorce action. However, the legislature provided the following caveat applicable in cases such as the one before us: Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties regarding the division of property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(g)(1). With all of the above considerations in mind, we hold that the trial court erred in its consideration of parol evidence and refusal to enforce the MDA as written.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires the court to equitably divide marital property before considering spousal support or maintenance.

Kennedy v. Kennedy · filed 2000-11-30(a)(1)

The fact that the division of Mr. Kennedy’s pension benefits occurred earlier than expected has no bearing on his spousal support obligation. It is only after the trial court equitably divides the marital property that the issue of support or maintenance can properly be considered. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (Supp. 2000).

When the parties do not agree on a division of marital property, subsection (c) requires the court to make factual determinations supported by evidence.

Castleman v. Castleman · filed 2000-12-21(c)

Similarly, distribution of marital property, in the absence of agreement by the parties, requires factual determinations by the court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). The record does not include any of the required findings or any evidence upon which we could review the award.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires the court to consider the relevant factors in dividing marital property and make specific findings that explain the division.

Mangum v. Mangum · filed 2019-04-24(c)

During the reconsideration of this case, the trial court is further directed to make specific fact findings as to the property issues pursuant to the factors listed in 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121 requires a court to classify and value the parties’ property and consider the subsection (c) factors when dividing the marital estate.

Artry v. Artry · filed 2022-09-22(c)

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s orders regarding the division of the marital estate and remand to the trial court with instructions to make the appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, including classification of the parties’ property, assignment of reasonable values, and consideration of the factors set out at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) does not make an alimony award a factor in dividing marital property.

Murdock v. Murdock · filed 2022-03-02(c)

In the first instance, the statutory factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) for the division of marital property do not include a factor concerning the award of alimony.

Property awarded to a spouse in a prior divorce is separate property that the spouse brings into a later marriage.

Eddie Joe Hurst, Sr. v. Sheila Gail Williams Hurst · filed 2001-04-30(b)(2)(A)

The property awarded to Ms. Hurst in MDA #1, more specifically, one-half of the Alcoa Retirement Plan, one hundred percent (100%) of the stock at Merrill Lynch, and and one-half of all sums received by husband from Alcoa Profit Sharing Program became the separate property of Ms. Hurst upon the execution of MDA #1.

Tax consequences are one factor in deciding whether a division of marital property is equitable.

Fulbright v. Fulbright · filed 2001-07-25(c)

While the tax consequences certainly are a factor to be considered in making an equitable distribution of property, it is but one factor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). ... Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Trial Court’s conclusion that the division of marital assets in this case was equitable notwithstanding any tax consequences was not error.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires a court dividing marital property to consider the tax consequences to each party.

Paula Ruth Sheffield Hartman v. Melvin Thomas Hartman, Jr. · filed 2004-08-17(c)

Th e r e f o r e , we hol d, ba s e d on our de novo r e vi e w of t he r e c or d, ... s i n c e t he r e f us a l wa s a f a i l ur e on t he Tr i a l Cour t ’ s pa r t t o ... c o n s i d e r t he t a x c ons e que nc e s of t he di vi s i on a s r e qui r e d by ... T. C. A. 36- 4- 121( c ) .

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) calls for consideration of tax consequences from a reasonably foreseeable sale of marital property; a speculative future sale need not affect the division.

Blevins v. Blevins · filed 2003-12-30(c)(9)

There is no evidence to suggest a sale of Village Drugs is in the foreseeable future, and the trial court did not order Husband to sell Village Drugs. Further, the uncontraverted testimony contained in the record reflects that the business will generate income from which only Husband will benefit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) provides that the trial court is to consider all "relevant" factors when dividing marital property. Based upon the foregoing, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s award of Village Drugs to Husband and the granting of a lien of $725,000 to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) requires courts to consider tax consequences when dividing marital property, but speculative future taxes do not require a reduction in an asset’s value.

Jekot v. Jekot · filed 2006-10-26(c)(9)

Included among these statutory factors was subsection 9 which, as noted above, required that the court consider “[t]he tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset.” ... Exactly when these assets will be subject to income taxation and the amount of taxes Husband will be required to pay are matters of speculation.

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) requires courts dividing marital property to consider tax consequences, but speculative future taxes need not be deducted from an asset’s value.

Jekot v. Jekot · filed 2007-01-03(c)(9)

We do not agree with Husband’s conclusion that the trial court failed to consider tax consequences and debts associated with assets awarded in this divorce. It does not follow from the mere fact that the trial court set forth a fair market value for each of the assets in controversy that the trial court failed to consider that those values would be diminished as a result of tax consequences or debts due. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court cited T.C.A. § 36 — 4—121(c) and thereby stated the factors it considered in dividing the parties’ property. Included among these statutory factors was subsection 9 which, as noted above, required that the court consider “[t]he tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset.”

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) calls for consideration of tax consequences in dividing marital property, but future income taxes alone did not establish an inequitable division where no additional tax consequences were proven.

Grant v. Grant · filed 2016-05-12(c)(9)

Husband also argues the trial court erred in not considering the tax consequences of the division. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(9). According to Husband, his portion of the marital estate is not as valuable as Wife’s because of his tax obligations. Since Husband does not intend to dispose of any of his assets in the near future, his only tax consequence from this division is future income tax liability. See Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (stating it would be pure speculation to attempt to estimate tax consequences in the absence of proof a spouse intends to sell a particular asset). Every spouse in a divorce must pay income taxes on post-divorce income. This record contains no proof of any additional tax consequences. We find no error in the trial court’s consideration of this factor.

Property purchased with a spouse’s premarital separate funds may remain separate property even when purchased during the marriage.

Goulet v. Heede · filed 2002-01-31(b)(2)

She purchased this property using her separate funds; it was thus “acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage.”

Property acquired in exchange for property owned before marriage is separate property.

Dawn Ann Davis (Goodwin) v. Daniel Pace Goodwin · filed 2010-12-23(b)(2)(B)

Thus, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B), Wife has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she acquired the Green Knoll property “in exchange for property acquired before the marriage.”

Property acquired during marriage in exchange for property acquired before marriage is separate property.

Tate v. Tate · filed 2024-03-25(b)(4)(B)

Husband closed on the Wade Springs property one day after the date of marriage, using funds from a loan with his separate property as collateral. Separate property is statutorily defined as: “[p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, the Wade Springs property was acquired in exchange for the Central Valley Road property that Husband owned prior to the marriage. Moreover, the Wade Springs property was separately titled in Husband’s name only. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the Wade Springs property was Husband’s separate property when it was acquired on the day following the parties’ marriage.

Anticipated Social Security benefits are excluded from the marital estate because they are not vested.

Gray v. Gray · filed 2002-05-14(b)(1)(B)

Anticipated social security benefits are not part of the marital estate because they are not vested as required by T.C.A. 36-4-121(b)(1)(B).

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property, including consideration of Social Security benefits; a spouse should not receive payments based on benefits the other spouse has delayed drawing while also receiving a share of the larger benefits later.

Morton v. Morton · filed 2005-08-15(c)

We believe it is inequitable to require Husband, as part of the overall property division, to give Wife a share of this property as if Husband was receiving his Social Security benefits now, but to also allow her the benefit of receiving a larger amount later because Husband delayed drawing his Social Security benefits to a later date.

Past Supplemental Security Income benefits are separate property because they are not a recovery for wages lost during the marriage.

Brewer v. Kenny Brewer, Sr. · filed 2009-09-03(b)(1)(C)

Based on the distinction between SSI and social security disability benefits, we cannot find that past SSI benefits are included within the phrase “recovery in . . . social security disability actions.” Moreover, even if we were to find that recovery of SSI benefits is a “similar action,” as contemplated by the statute, because SSI benefits are not remuneration for employment, we cannot find that past SSI benefits are “recovery . . . for . . . wages lost during the marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(1)(C). Accordingly, Wife’s SSI payment is her separate property.

Retirement benefits divided as marital property are excluded from child support income, but appreciation after the divorce may count as income.

Brianne Marie (Lane)Baker v. Baker · filed 2021-01-28(b)(1)(E)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(E), part of the provisions concerning the division of marital property, states that “assets distributed as marital property will not be considered as income for child support or alimony purposes, except to the extent the asset will create additional income after the division.” (Emphasis added). ... With respect to retirement benefits, the trial court properly declined to give Father credit for retirement benefits awarded to Mother as part of the property division. If the value of Father’s retirement benefits has significantly appreciated since the time of the divorce, Father may bring a petition to modify the child support award to reflect an increase in Mother’s gross income.

Assets distributed as marital property are excluded from income for child support purposes, except to the extent they create additional income after division.

Eldridge v. Eldridge · filed 2002-08-08(b)(1)(E)

Accordingly, if the trial court awards a portion of the accounts to Wife, the court cannot include income from Wife’s portion of the accounts when calculating Husband’s income for child support purposes.

Income from marital property is also marital property.

Joanne Wells v. Wells · filed 2010-03-15(b)(1)(B)

It is undisputed that the trailer home is a marital asset. Accordingly, any income received from it would also be a marital asset.

Assets distributed as marital property are excluded from income used to set child support or alimony, but additional income they generate after division may be counted.

Fuller v. Fuller · filed 2016-12-21(b)(1)(E)

We therefore vacate the alimony determination and remand to the trial court with instructions to determine Father‟s income without consideration of the amount of the trail income distributed as a marital asset. The trial court should consider, however, any additional income generated by this asset after the division.

Assets distributed as marital property are excluded from income used to calculate alimony, except for additional income they generate after division.

Fuller v. Fuller · filed 2019-07-10(b)(1)(E)

We hold that the Trial Court, in keeping with our instructions, properly excluded the trail income distributed as a marital asset in making its fresh determination of Husband’s income.

Section 36-4-121(a) authorizes a divorce court to divest and reinvest title to marital property through its decree.

Carter v. United States · filed 2002-05-21(a)

In light of these cases, the court finds that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a) makes Account No. 68901 “liable at law.”

Section 36-4-121 does not allow a court to divide property that disappeared before divorce when neither spouse is shown to have taken it.

Flannary v. Flannary · filed 2002-11-13

Since the money disappeared prior to the divorce, the Trial Court erred in dividing property which was “not there” as neither Husband nor Wife was able to show that the other had taken the money.

Section 36-4-121 permits missing gold to be divided as marital property when the court finds that it existed and that a spouse was responsible for its disappearance.

Dailey v. Violet L. Dailey · filed 2020-07-13(b)(1)(A)

Based on the foregoing, we find Husband’s argument in this regard to be without merit and that the Trial Court did not err by determining the missing gold was a marital asset subject to division as marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(3)(C) requires a court ordering a private sale of marital property to ensure that the property sells for fair market value.

Nancy Gail (Paulk) Doran v. Doran · filed 2003-10-14(a)(3)(C)

If the trial court declines to impose those provisions in a private sale, however, there is still the expectation that the court will exercise its discretion in such a way as to “ensure that such [marital] property is sold for its fair market value.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(3)(C). We find, in the present matter, that the lower court failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121(a)(3) permits courts to set procedures for selling marital property that ensure a fair market value; commercially reasonable marketing and a special master to resolve disagreements satisfy that requirement.

Kuhlo v. Kuhlo · filed 2016-06-23(a)(3)

In this case, we do not believe that the trial court has violated the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(3). Unlike the order in Doran, which required the parties to submit blind bids to purchase the property without regard to the fair market value, the trial court’s order in this case contains provisions which ensure that the property will be sold at a fair value.

Section 36-4-121(a)(3)'s rules for court-ordered sales do not apply when a court approves a sale by a spouse who already has authority to convey the property.

Elizabeth Ann Morrow Granoff v. Granoff · filed 2014-09-26(a)(3)

We find Doran to be factually distinguishable from this case. First, as Husband acknowledges, the trial court in the instant action did not order a private or public sale of the Property pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(a)(3). Second, the trial court in this case accepted the proposed purchase price of $925,000.00 as a reasonable value based upon expert testimony rather than accepting blind bids from the parties.

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) allows a court to consider reasonably foreseeable sale costs when dividing marital property, but does not support reducing a home's equity for a hypothetical sale.

Gaither v. Gaither · filed 2014-10-13(c)(9)

In the absence of ordering the home to be sold, however, the trial court had insufficient basis to reduce the equity value by the cost of selling the home.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) permits equitable division of marital property; a court need not separately address a business when there is no evidence that it has assets of value.

MaGill v. MaGill · filed 2004-08-31(a)(1)

Property may be equitably divided and distributed between the parties once it is properly classified as marital. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). ... In the absence of evidence of tangible assets or other assets of value, we find no error in the failure of the trial court to specifically address these two businesses which appear, essentially, to be nothing more than the person of Husband.

An LLC ownership interest acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital property.

Barton v. Barton · filed 2020-11-10(b)(1)(A)

Because Husband’s interest in Vanquish Worldwide was acquired during the marriage, it is presumed to be marital property.

An LLC ownership interest acquired during marriage is marital property that must be valued before equitable division.

Rasmussen v. Rasmussen · filed 2026-06-22(b)(2)(A)

In summary, we affirm the trial court’s classification of Husband’s ownership interest in the LLC as marital property. We vacate the remainder of the ruling regarding the business and remand for the trial court to value the ownership interest prior to equitable division of this asset and the remainder of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(10) requires courts to consider relevant evidence when valuing a closely held business or similar asset; omitting that factor was harmless where no business valuation was presented.

Jensen v. Jensen · filed 2024-09-04(c)(10)

Particularly considering Husband’s testimony during the March 2022 contempt hearing that he had been “forced to shut down [his] business” in February 2021, we determine the trial court’s omission of factor ten to have been harmless error.

Section 36-4-121(c)(10) allows courts valuing a closely held business to consider customary valuation methods even when a sale is not reasonably foreseeable, along with evidence-supported discounts and premiums.

Garrett v. Garrett · filed 2025-06-30(c)(10)

In valuing closely-held businesses, like the one at issue here, relevant evidence “includes valuation methods typically used with regard to such assets without regard to whether the sale of the asset is reasonably foreseeable.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(10) (Supp. 2024). Depending on the business, the valuation may take into consideration “a lack of marketability discount, a discount for lack of control, and a control premium, if any should be relevant and supported by the evidence.” Id.

Section 36-4-121(f)(1) permits a distributive award to achieve equity, but a court cannot substitute a trust that gives a spouse only an income interest when an outright distribution is warranted.

Guzman v. Alvarez · filed 2005-07-12(f)(1)

Section 36-4-121(f)(1) of the Tennessee Code authorizes the trial court to make a distributive award of money or other property to one spouse in order to facilitate a distribution of marital property or when the court determines that the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation, or profession would be contrary to law. ... Although there is case law which provides that a court may award a life estate as part of a property division, we have found no authority which allows the trial court to create a trust where Wife is only entitled to an income interest. ... Rather than awarding Wife a distributive award of money in the form of an income interest in a trust, we believe the trial court should have awarded Wife an outright distribution.

Section 36-4-121(e)(2) does not permit a lien on a spouse’s separate property to secure payment under a property division.

Kesterson v. Kesterson · filed 2006-01-04(e)(2)

Thus, we hold that courts may not use separate property of a spouse as security for payment pursuant to a property division.

A products liability settlement awarded jointly to both spouses can be marital property even if it does not specifically include lost wages.

Lane v. Wanda S. Lane · filed 2012-07-26(b)(1)(C)

We hold that the settlement check represented the amount sought by both parties and ultimately awarded to both parties in fulfillment of each of their products liability claims. Accordingly, we conclude that the products liability settlement was properly classified as marital property and reject Husband’s contention that the settlement check was not marital property because it did not specifically include recovery for lost wages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(C).

Personal injury recovery is marital property only to the extent it covers wages lost during the marriage, medical bills paid with marital property, or damage to marital property.

Metzinger v. Metzinger · filed 2014-04-22(b)(1)(C)

As set out above, recovery in personal injury can be classified as marital property only insofar as such recovery represents “wages lost during the marriage, reimbursement for medical bills incurred and paid with marital property, and property damage to marital property.” Tenn. Code Ann. 36- 4-121(b)(1)(C).

Section 36-4-121 treats personal injury proceeds for pain and suffering as separate property.

Henderson v. Henderson · filed 2014-09-23(b)(2)(E)

“Separate property,” in contrast, is defined to include pain and suffering awards. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(E). ... In the absence of evidence suggesting the settlement proceeds compensated Wife for lost wages during the parties’ marriage, and in light of Wife’s testimony about the pain and suffering she has experienced and continues to experience as a result of her fall, we conclude the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s classification of the McDonald’s settlement as Wife’s separate property.

Section 36-4-121 treats pain and suffering awards as separate property; a court may return those funds to a spouse by adjusting the division of marital home equity.

Cardle v. Cardle · filed 2017-05-17(b)(2)(E)

“Separate property” is defined in the “Divorce and Annulment” chapter of Title 36 of the Tennessee Code (titled “Domestic Relations”) to include, inter alia, “[p]ain and suffering awards, victim of crime compensation awards, future medical expenses, and future lost wages.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(E). ... We conclude the $10,000 constitutes Wife’s separate property and affirm the trial court’s decision to return that amount to Wife by deducting that amount from Husband’s portion of the equity in the marital home.

Property acquired during marriage with premarital property, or with income from premarital property, remains separate property.

Willocks v. Irene Ward Willocks · filed 2013-01-10(b)(2)(B), (C)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)B&C defines separate property as “property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage” or “income from and appreciation of property owned by a spouse before marriage except when characterized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1).” Accounts opened with funds from these sources remain separate property even though opened during the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows a court to consider a spouse’s contribution of separate property when equitably dividing marital property.

Hoggatt v. Hoggatt · filed 2014-05-12(c)(5)

In dividing the marital estate, the trial court considered Wife’s contributions to the “wealth of the marriage” and determined that she should be awarded a larger share of the equity in the marital home. The remaining assets were divided equally. The overall division, while not equal, was equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) permits a court to consider premarital separate property contributed during the marriage when dividing marital property.

Sharon Lynnette Howard v.Randall Lynn Howard · filed 2015-10-29(c)(5)(A)

In contrast to Husband‟s argument, our review of the trial court‟s judgment and the record as a whole reveals that the court considered monies that Wife had obtained through withdrawing her premarital separate funds or liquidating her premarital separate property as contributions to the marital estate, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A).

An increase in the value of separate property may be classified as marital property if the non-owner spouse proves that the property increased in value during the marriage due to both spouses’ substantial contributions.

Gentry v. Katherine Wise Gentry · filed 2017-12-28(b)

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if separate property does not become martial property through commingling, the court may classify the appreciation in a spouse’s separate property as marital property if the non-owner spouse proves that the asset increased in value during the marriage due to both spouses’ substantial contributions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b); Cutsinger, 917 S.W.2d at 241. Husband testified at length about the substantial contribution he made to SweetWise as an employee but he did not show that SweetWise increased in value as a result.

Separate property that becomes inextricably mingled with marital property is presumed to be a gift to the marital estate, unless that presumption is rebutted.

Darnell v. Darnell · filed 2019-08-12(b)

We find and hold that Wife’s savings account had become inextricably mingled with marital property. Thus, a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate was created, and that presumption was not rebutted by Wife.

A home owned before marriage can remain separate property despite refinancing during marriage when the spouses keep their finances separate and pay the mortgage with separate funds.

Rufsholm v. Rufsholm · filed 2018-08-30(b)(2)(A)

Here, the residence was owned by Husband prior to the marriage and was his separate property. While we agree with Wife that the refinancing of the residence tends to support a finding of transmutation or commingling, we, like the trial court, cannot ignore the way in which the Parties separated their finances. Husband established a separate account for his military retirement funds and paid all mortgage payments through that account. In turn, Wife remitted $100 or $200 on a weekly basis for general household expenses, when she was able. Wife admitted that she was not responsible for missed payments and had no knowledge of the particulars of the mortgage indebtedness. With these considerations in mind, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the residence as Husband’s separate property.

Appreciation of separate property may be classified as marital property if both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation; the trial court must make findings supporting that classification.

Amacher v. Amacher · filed 2021-01-27(b)(1)(B)

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the trial court’s finding that the appreciation in the value of the Country Club home is marital property; we remand for findings of fact with respect to whether both parties substantially contributed to the appreciated value and any other facts bearing on the resolution of the issue.

A spouse claiming that an asset acquired during marriage is separate property must prove its separate character by a preponderance of the evidence.

Mitchell v. Mitchell · filed 2022-08-02(b)(2)

Separate property is defined in part as “all real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage, including, but not limited to . . . property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2). ... Without an originating statement, we, like the trial court, are unable to classify the property as separate property as argued by Husband.

An increase in separate property’s value becomes marital property when each spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation; the contribution may be direct or indirect but must be linked to the increase.

Niemeyer v. Niemeyer · filed 2024-04-17(b)(1)(B)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 provides that “direct” and “indirect” “substantial contribution” to the appreciation of separately held property will render the increase marital property under the statute. ... The trial court properly determined that the gifted stock in the Portera Entities is Wife’s separate property, not marital property. The court appropriately exercised its discretion in finding that no substantial contribution had been made by Husband to the appreciation in value as found by Husband’s expert.

When dividing marital property, a court must thoroughly consider the value of each spouse’s separate property.

Mocny v. Mocny · filed 2024-07-03(c)(6)

In further connection with our remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the estate division, we also direct the trial court to be more thorough in its examination of the parties’ respective assets. Although the trial court did claim to consider the “value of the separate property of each party” as is appropriate when making an equitable division of marital property pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6), we observe from our review of the order that the trial court’s engagement with this subject was only in general terms, and the trial court’s order did not even mention certain assets the existence of which do not appear to be in dispute.8 For certain other items of separate property that were mentioned by the court, no value was assigned.9 Further specific consideration of the separate assets of the parties on remand will provide greater assurance that the actual total value of the parties’ separate property holdings have, in fact, been thoroughly and appropriately considered.

Appreciation of separate property is marital property if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation; without evidence that the property increased in value during the marriage, the court need not consider those contributions.

Treadwell v. Lamb · filed 2017-03-10(b)(1)(B)

If property determined to be separate property increases in value during the marriage, the appreciation will be classified as marital property “if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.” ... Because there was no evidence adduced at trial that the property increased in value during the marriage, we need not consider whether Wife‟s actions constituted a substantial contribution.

Property devised to a trust rather than a spouse is not the spouse’s separate property and cannot become marital property through transmutation.

Wheeler v. Wheeler · filed 2014-04-15(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(D)

According to the record, the condominium was devised to the Elizabeth B. Wheeler Children’s Trust, not to Wife, and it remains an asset of that trust. Because Wife did not inherit the condominium, it is not and never has been her separate property. Therefore, it could not transmute to marital property regardless of Husband’s efforts to maintain and improve the condominium.

Section 36-4-121(c)’s factors are not particularly helpful in deciding who should control a college account held solely for a child’s education.

Willenberg v. Willenberg · filed 2014-09-23(c)

Because the parties agree that the account is solely for their son’s college education, we do not consider the factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) particularly helpful in addressing this issue.

Section 36-4-121(e)(2) permits a lien on marital real property assigned to a party to secure payment of spousal support, including alimony in solido.

Stratienko v. Stratienko · filed 2017-03-31(e)(2)

Under appropriate circumstances, courts have placed a lien on the obligor spouse’s property to secure the payment of alimony in solido in lieu of requiring the maintenance of a life insurance policy. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(e)(2) (“The court may impose a lien upon the marital real property assigned to a party as security for the payment of spouse support . . . .”); ... We therefore modify the trial court’s judgment to impose a lien upon a portion of Husband’s assets in the amount of $540,000 in order to secure the alimony in solido award to Wife.

Section 36-4-121 treats property as marital property solely to divide assets upon divorce or legal separation, so that classification does not give a spouse an ownership interest in a proceeding outside divorce.

Ammons v. Longworth · filed 2019-11-14(b)(1)(E)

But, the determination that property is “marital property” is “for the sole purpose of dividing assets upon divorce or legal separation and for no other purpose.” ... The fact that Mrs. Longworth might claim an interest in the Wilnoty Drive property as “marital property” if she filed for divorce does not grant a court in a non-divorce proceeding any authority to divest the Wilnoty Drive property from Mr. Longworth.

Section 36-4-121 assigns classification of separate and marital property to the court adjudicating a divorce; it does not support a later conversion claim.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2022-07-27(a)(1)

It is the function of the court adjudicating a divorce to classify property as separate versus marital and to hear and assess evidence of the substantial contributions of a spouse to the preservation and appreciation of an asset that is the other spouse’s separate property. Id. § 36-4-121(a)(1). This is not a divorce action. It is a tort action, and Mr. Wilson’s attempts to invoke the domestic relations statutes to support his claim for conversion are misguided.

Section 36-4-121(i)(2) permits an attorney’s fee award without detailed time entries when the affidavit and the court’s observations support the award.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 2026-05-29(i)(2)

The trial court clearly delineated its reasoning as to why it found the award appropriate, relying upon information that was in the affidavit and its own observations of ... the proceedings. Accordingly, based upon the argument presented and the record before us, in the present case, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court with regard to the attorney’s fee award.

A homemaker’s contributions count when determining a spouse’s interest in marital property acquired with the other spouse’s earnings.

United States v. Henry · filed 1994-04-19(a)(2)(C), (c)(5)

The Court is guided in its determination of petitioner’s property interest in 101 Ewing Court by Tennessee law which “specifically recognizes the contribution of a homemaker to the accumulation of property from the earnings of the working spouse.” Harrington v. Harrington, 798 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tenn.App.1990); Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(2)(C), .(c)(5) (1991).