Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121

Section 36-4-121 requires courts dividing property to consider a spouse’s contribution to preserving the other spouse’s separate property, even if that property did not appreciate during the marriage.

Wilder v. Wilder · filed 1992-07-21(c)(5)

The wife’s work in the husband’s law office, especially that work done on the Velsicol case, must have in some way aided in the preservation of the potential fee. It would indeed be inequitable, given the undisputed fact that the wife directly contributed to the preservation of this asset, to deny her at least a small portion of the Velsicol fee in the equitable division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) requires a spouse’s substantial contribution to an asset’s preservation and appreciation only when the asset would otherwise be separate property.

Wade v. Wade · filed 1994-12-05(b)(1)(B)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4 — 121(b)(1)(B) requires a finding that a spouse substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of an asset only if the asset would have otherwise been deemed separate property, not when the property is classified as marital by the court.

An increase in the value of separate property during marriage may be divided as marital property if both spouses substantially contributed to it, but the spouse seeking division must prove the increase.

Garfinkel v. Garfinkel · filed 1996-12-03(b)(1)(B)

However, no evidence was presented regarding the value of the property at the time the parties married in 1984. Consequently, the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to ascertain any increase in value during the marriage. As to the real property in Tennessee, the only evidence presented at trial indicated that the value of this property had decreased. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that Wife had not carried her burden of proving an increase in the value of Husband’s separate property. We affirm on this issue.

When a spouse substantially contributes to the appreciation of the other spouse’s separate property, any increase in its value during the marriage is marital property.

Wright-Miller v. Miller · filed 1998-08-05(b)(1)(B)

We read the plain language of the statute to define marital property to include “any” increase in value.

Appreciation of separate property during marriage is marital property if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Turner v. Turner · filed 1997-03-27(b)(1)(B)

Even if Mr. Turner’s efforts to keep the title to the house in his own name would support a conclusion that the house remained his separate property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) provides that the increase in value during the marriage of separate property will be considered marital property if each party contributed substantially to its preservation and appreciation.

Appreciation of separate property during marriage is marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Gentry v. Gentry · filed 1997-05-14(b)(1)(B)

Nevertheless, the value of its appreciation during the marriage is marital property subject to division under the foregoing code sections and case law. Plaintiff made a direct effort that substantially contributed to the appreciation and value of the stock.

An increase in the value of one spouse’s separate property is marital property when both spouses substantially contribute to its preservation and appreciation.

Yates v. Yates · filed 1997-12-04(b)(1)(B)

We first conclude that the trial court properly ruled that the increase in value of the Husband’s General Appliance stock was marital property. ... Any increase in value of the stock during the parties’ marriage, however, constituted marital property, provided each party substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the stock. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (1996).

An increase in separate property’s value is marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1999-02-19(b)(1)(B)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that all of the increase in value beyond the initial separate property interest of $35,000 is marital property.

Section 36-4-121 treats an increase in the value of separate property during marriage as marital property when both spouses substantially contribute to its preservation and appreciation.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 1998-09-02(b)(1)(A)

We are satisfied that the equity in the home was marital property and that the antenuptial agreement did not affect it. Marital property includes an increase in value of separate property during the marriage if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(l)(a). Dr. Oakley does not seriously dispute Mr. Wilson’s contribution to the preservation and appreciation of the equity in the home. The antenuptial agreement could only operate on the separate property owned at the time of the agreement. At that time Dr. Oakley owned, at most, a $1,000 equity in the house. Even though the agreement refers to property owned “partially or wholly” by the parties, that phrase in an antenuptial agreement cannot overcome the statutory definition of marital property.

An increase in the value of separate property during marriage is marital property if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Collins v. Willis · filed 1999-05-13(b)(1)(B)

It is clear, then, that Mr. Collins substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the parties’ home. Consequently, any increase in the value of the home that occurred during the marriage must be classified as marital property.

Appreciation of separate property, including reduction of its debt, is marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to it directly or indirectly.

Ann Marie Rutherford Keck v. Keck · filed 2000-04-18(b)(1)(C)

Appreciation in the value of a spouse’s separate property is marital property where the other spouse substantially contributes to that appreciation. ... Thus, under the statutory provisions, the increase in the value of the home, including reduction in debt, is marital property.

When a spouse substantially contributes to the preservation and appreciation of separate property, the entire increase in value during the marriage is marital property, including any increase attributable to inflation.

Denton v. Denton · filed 2000-05-25(b)(1)(B)

Under Ellis and Harrison, it matters not that inflationary factors also impacted the value of this property. Once the threshold condition is satisfied, the entirety of the increase in value is marital property.7 T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B).

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property only if each spouse substantially contributed to its appreciation; an increase unrelated to either spouse’s efforts remains separate property.

Mitts v. Mitts · filed 2000-08-16(b)(1)(B)

Neither party by his or her efforts, directly or indirectly, contributed to the increase in value of the underlying property as it is presently being used and for which it was purchased by the developer. As such, the trial court correctly classified the increase in value as Husband’s separate property.

Income from separate retirement accounts is marital property only if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Terry v. Donna Brazier Terry · filed 2000-09-20(b)(1)(B)

We must disagree with Mr. Terry's argument that he is entitled to part of the interest that has accrued in Ms. Terry's separate retirement accounts. He admitted that Ms. Terry had always managed the accounts herself, and during his testimony he could not state anything he had done to contribute to the appreciation of Ms. Terry's retirement accounts. The only explanation that he offered was that he had contributed his paycheck, and thus, Ms. Terry had not had to draw funds from the retirement accounts.

An increase in one account does not create divisible appreciation when the retirement funds from which it came declined in value overall.

Conlee v. Conlee · filed 2000-10-17(b)(1)(B)

While the individual Morgan Keegan account increased in value, the sum of the retirement funds had been depleted. The parties lived off of interest and withdrawals from the corpus of the Husband’s retirement funds. The total of Husband’s retirement funds had been depleted from the original $315,000.00 to approximately $247,000.00. As a result, there was no increase or appreciation from Husband’s retirement funds to divide.

An increase in the value of separate property during marriage is marital property only if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Stoner v. Stoner · filed 2000-11-21(b)(1)(B)

It is thus clear that Mrs. Stoner did not “substantially contribute” to the increase in Mr. Stoner’s pre- marital Legg Mason Value Trust account. Therefore, the increase in value of this account during the marriage is not marital property.

An increase in equity in separate real property remains separate when the other spouse makes no real or significant contribution to that increase.

Lewis v. Frances · filed 2001-03-07(b)(1)(B)

We are unable to find that Husband has demonstrated that he made any real or significant contributions, directly or indirectly, to the increase in net equity in Wife’s real property or that his actions allowed Wife to retain the property, increase its value through improvement, or increase its equity through debt reduction. Accordingly, we find that the increase in equity of Wife’s separate real property is also her separate property and not marital property.

Appreciation of separate investment property is marital property only if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Michael Dawn Frisbey v. Frisbey · filed 2001-03-28(b)(1)(B)

Based on the evidence presented, we see virtually no evidence of Wife’s substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of the investments that are Husband’s separate property. As such, the increase in value of Husband’s separate investment property during the marriage is not marital property.

When both spouses substantially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of a separate business, only its increase in value during the marriage is marital property.

Patsy Oakley v. Oakley · filed 2001-06-19(b)(1)(B)

The trial court was in error through its determination that the entire value of Oakley Framers was marital property. Only the appreciation of Oakley Framers during the marriage was marital property that could be properly divided by the court.

When a spouse substantially contributes to the appreciation of the other spouse’s separate property, the entire increase in value during the marriage is marital property, even if other factors also contributed.

Humphries v. Humphries · filed 2001-07-23(b)(1)(B)

Once it has been determined that a spouse has made a substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of the other spouse’s separate property, all of the increase in value during the marriage is considered marital property, even though other factors may have contributed to the increase.

Appreciation of a separate IRA is marital property only if a spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Bolinger v. Bolinger · filed 2002-08-19(b)(1)(B)

Appreciation in value of the IRAs during the marriage may be classified as marital property, however, if both parties “substantially contributed to [the IRAs’] preservation and appreciation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), 121(b)(2)(C). ... In the present case, based on Husband’s undisputed testimony that there have been no marital deposits to the IRAs, or the pension fund account prior to Husband’s rolling it over into the IRAs, we likewise find no evidence that Wife has substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the IRAs.

Appreciation of separate property during marriage is marital property when a spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation, but the underlying separate property remains separate.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 2002-08-22(b)(1)(B)

Although the fact that the Wife made substantial contributions to the preservation and appreciation of LCC means that the appreciation in LCC’s value during the marriage is marital property under T.C.A. 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), it does not serve to convert Husband’s separate property into marital property.

A spouse’s substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of separate property can make its increase in value divisible as marital property; repair costs alone do not measure that increase.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2002-11-12(b)(1)(B)

Where a spouse shows a substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of separate property, such as real estate, the increase will be subject to a division as marital property under Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(b)(1)(B). ... The Trial Court erred by calculating its award based upon the cost of maintenance and improvements.

Work performed as a corporate officer for the benefit of shareholders does not count as a spouse’s substantial contribution to the appreciation of the other spouse’s separate stock.

Sheila Faye Hagen McCall Barnett v. Ronald Edward Barnett, Sr. · filed 2001-07-18(b)(1)(C)

Any contribution made by Husband to the value of Wife’s shares was done in the performance of his duties as an officer of the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders and not as a spouse contributing to the increase in value. Thus, we do not consider these efforts on behalf of the corporation as a “substantial contribution” as contemplated by T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (b)(1)(C).

Appreciation of a premarital IRA is marital property only if a spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2002-08-28(b)(1)(B)

According to Langschmidt, the appreciation of the IRAs could only be classified as marital property if Ms. Smith substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of Dr. Smith’s IRAs. The record does not support such a conclusion.

Marital funds used to pay taxes on a separate investment account’s income can substantially contribute to its preservation and appreciation, making the increase in value marital property.

Schuett v. Egon Horst Schuett, Jr. · filed 2003-11-17(b)(1)(B)

We hold that the payment of such taxes, under the facts of this case, constitute a substantial contribution by each party to the preservation and appreciation of the PaineWebber account’s increase in value. It is undisputed that Husband’s marital income from his employment was used to pay all the taxes on the PaineWebber account’s capital gains and dividend income. Because the income used to pay the taxes was marital, this constitutes a contribution by both Husband and Wife.

An increase in separate property’s value during marriage is marital property when a spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Holley v. Sherri Lynn Hufford Holley · filed 2004-08-17(b)(1)(B)

If a spouse substantially contributes to the preservation and appreciation of separate property, an increase in value of that property during the marriage is considered marital property. See T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B).

Section 36-4-121 treats the full increase in value of a spouse’s separate property during marriage as marital property when the other spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Bacigalupo v. Mary Darlene Raines Blacknall Bacigalupo · filed 2004-10-04(b)(1)(B)

However, as we noted above, once a trial court determines that a non-owning spouse has made a substantial contribution to the preservation and appreciation of an owning spouse’s separate asset, the entire increase in value during the marriage must be considered marital property.

Appreciation of separate property is marital property when both spouses substantially contribute to it; work as a homemaker and caretaker can count as a substantial contribution.

Elsea v. Elsea · filed 2003-02-11(b)(1)(B)

The evidence supports the ruling that the wife contributed to the appreciation of the farm by building a home with the husband, maintaining the household, caring for the parties’ children and husband’s relatives, and generally by taking care of the home so that the husband could work and earn wages.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) allows the value of separate property on the date of marriage to serve as the starting point for measuring its increase in value during the marriage.

Cooke v. Cooke · filed 2003-06-17(b)(1)(B)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) speaks in terms of increase in value during the marriage. Thus, we can find no error in the trial court’s using the value of the house as of the date of the marriage as the beginning point for its determination of the increase in value during the marriage.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2003-09-30(b)(1)(B)

Upon reviewing the record, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Ms. Wilson’s involvement with the business substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the business making the increase in the business’s value marital property. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the business’s increase in value to be marital property.

Appreciation of separate property remains separate unless each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Hirschman v. Hirschman · filed 2003-10-17(b)(1)(B)

To briefly reiterate, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1) defines marital property to include any increase in value to the separate property of a party during the course of a marriage where both parties to the marriage contributed to the preservation and appreciation of the property. ... On the basis of this evidence, we are unable to conclude that the appreciation realized in Wife’s CMA account was the result of any substantial contribution from Husband.

Section 36-4-121 treats appreciation of separate property as marital property when each spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Myrtle Marie Stagner v. Stagner · filed 2004-02-27(b)(1)

Since marital funds were used over the 19 years of the marriage to preserve this asset and allow it to increase in value, we find Wife did make a substantial contribution to the appreciation of the farm. We hold that the appreciation in value of the Illinois farm is marital property.

A spouse’s homemaking may make appreciation of the other spouse’s separately owned residence marital property when those efforts meaningfully contribute to its preservation and appreciation.

Silvey v. Silvey · filed 2004-03-16(b)(1)(C)

We construe this language to mean that there must be some meaningful relationship between the actions of the non-owner spouse and the property in question in order for the increase in the value of such property to be categorized as marital property. And while a wife’s efforts as homemaker do not bear such a relationship to the appreciation in the value of financial accounts or rental property in another state, such efforts may be causally related to a post-marriage increase in value of a residence owned by the husband at the time of marriage.

A spouse seeking a share of the increase in value of the other spouse’s separate property must prove substantial contributions to its preservation and appreciation.

Donna Woods Hartman v. Hartman · filed 2004-12-30(b)(1)(B)

To justify an award to Wife for working 30 to 60 hours per week in the practice from 1992 to 1997, there must be evidence that such contributions “substantially contributed to . . . [the] preservation and appreciation” of Husband’s medical practice, Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and there must be evidence of the value of such contributions.

A spouse’s homemaking contribution can make appreciation of the other spouse’s separate property marital property when it enables that spouse to manage the property, including through agents.

Duke Bowers Clement v. Janet Leigh Traylor Clement · filed 2004-12-30(b)(1)(D)

What is important is that Mr. Clement was ultimately responsible for managing his own properties and Ms. Clement’s work as a homemaker allowed him to do just that. Given the length of the marriage, Ms. Clement’s substantial responsibilities as a homemaker, and the fact that several of these properties maintained their value, or appreciated in value, under the management of Mr. Clement or his agents, we conclude that the appreciation of several of Mr. Clement’s separate properties during his marriage to Ms. Clement should be considered marital property.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property only if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Robert C. deJaeger v. Jennifer deJaeger · filed 2005-09-12(b)(1)(B)

In light of the foregoing, we reverse the award of one-half the value of the real property to Wife. The evidence clearly preponderates in favor of a finding that the real property was Husband’s separate property and that Wife did not make a substantial contribution to the increase in its value.

An increase in the value of separate property during marriage is marital property if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Adams v. Adams · filed 2008-06-30(b)(1)(B)

In awarding the Atkins Street property, along with the debt associated with the property, to Wife, the trial court made an implicit finding that Husband did not substantially contribute to the increase in value of the property.

A spouse must prove that equity in the other spouse’s separate property increased during the marriage before that equity can be divided as marital property.

Fred Eugene Brooks, Sr. v. Mary Elizabeth Haimes Brooks · filed 2009-08-24(b)(1)(B)

Because the fair market value of Wife’s home allegedly declined during the marriage, the equity in the home did not necessarily increase as payments towards encumbrances were made. Therefore, we find that Husband failed to prove the equity “increase[d] in value during the marriage,” such that it became marital property subject to equitable division.

Income and appreciation of separate property are marital property if each spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Murdaugh v. Svetlana Nicolaevna Shketik (Murdaugh) · filed 2007-08-07(b)(1)(B)

Although the rental properties were Husband’s separate property, income from these properties, or any increase in their value during the short marriage, would have been properly classified as marital property subject to equitable division if Wife could demonstrate that she had substantially contributed to their preservation and appreciation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(b)(1)(B) (2005). However, it is clear that Wife did not make such a showing at the trial below.

An increase in separate property’s value is marital property only if both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Keyt v. Keyt · filed 2007-12-19(b)(1)(B)

Because we find that Husband’s employment with Service Transport did not “substantially contribute” to any preservation and appreciation in its stock value, we hold that any actual increase in the value of this stock remained the separate property of Husband.

An increase in separate property’s value during marriage is marital property if both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Marciante v. Perry · filed 2008-03-26(b)(1)(B)

However, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) provides that any increase in value during the marriage of property determined to be separate property is classified as marital property if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly classified the $80,000 increase in value of the LaCita condo and the $45,000 appreciation of the Jacksonville condo as marital property. We affirm the classification of this $125,000 as marital property. ... As such, the trial court erred in classifying this $5,000 as marital property subject to division.

Appreciation of a separately owned residence is marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation through homemaking.

Summer v. Summer · filed 2008-04-10(b)(1)(B)

An increase in value during the marriage of property determined to be separate property will be classified as marital property if “each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.” ... We find that the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that Ms. Summer made real and substantial contributions to the preservation and appreciation of the marital residence during the approximately fifteen years she worked as a homemaker.

Appreciation in a spouse’s separate property can become marital property when both spouses substantially contribute to its preservation and appreciation, including through the use of marital funds for farming expenses and property taxes.

Fickle v. Fickle · filed 2008-08-19(b)(1)(B)

The Tennessee Code provides that the income from and the appreciation in value of a spouse’s separate property can become marital property where both spouses have substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (2005). ... We cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s implicit conclusion that Wife made substantial contributions to the preservation and appreciation of the farm land.

Appreciation of separate property is marital property when both spouses substantially contribute to its preservation and appreciation.

Woodall v. Jethero Jackson Woodall, Jr. · filed 2008-08-20(b)(1)(B)

In this case, it is undisputed that Wife contributed to the preservation of the Jack Bond property. In his brief to this Court, Husband concedes that Wife “dealt with tenants, placed ads for vacancies, and helped Husband clean the two houses on the Jack Bond property.” Husband also acknowledges that the debt and property taxes on the property were paid from joint funds, as were the taxes on the income of the property. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination that the increase in the value of the Jack Bond property is properly classified as marital property.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property when the spouses substantially contribute to its preservation or appreciation.

Watson v. Watson · filed 2010-12-29(b)(1)(B)

It is sufficient in this case for us to say that we have reviewed the record and determined that even with the “new” evidence submitted in support of the post-trial motions, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to find that Wife substantially contributed to an increase in the value of the marital residence.

An increase in equity in a spouse’s separate residence is marital property only if both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Glover v. Celia Ann Clevenger Glover · filed 2010-07-30(b)(1)(B)

However, the accrual of equity, alone, is not enough to warrant an award to Wife, as the trial court suggests. As we stated above, the increased value, or in this case equity, in the marital residence may become marital property if both parties “substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (b)(1)(B).

A premarital home that declined in value during the marriage has no increase in value to classify as marital property.

Bates v. Bates · filed 2012-06-26(b)(1)(B)

Thus, there was no “increase in value” to assign as marital property in accordance with the applicable statute.

Appreciation of separate property is marital property only if the spouse claiming it proves an increase in value and a substantial contribution to that increase.

Sandford v. Kristine Elaine Sandford McKee · filed 2012-09-27(b)(1)(B)

Wife has the burden of proving not only that the 53 acres increased in value from the time she and Husband were married, but she must also show that she substantially contributed to the property’s appreciation.

Appreciation of separate property is marital property when both spouses substantially contribute to its preservation and growth, including by using marital funds to pay taxes on income retained by the property.

Melody Crunk Telfer v. Telfer · filed 2013-06-28(b)(1)(B)

Considering all of these circumstances, we must conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the parties made real and significant contributions to appreciation and preservation of both Young Leasing and CCP. Consequently, we must hold that the appreciation in value of both companies during the marriage is marital property.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property only when a spouse’s substantial contribution is linked to that increase; homemaking alone does not establish the link.

Huddleston v. Huddleston · filed 2013-07-30(b)(1)(B)

While the testimony supports a finding that Wife made contributions to the marriage as a homemaker, the evidence does not support a determination that her efforts contributed to the increase in the value of the property. The court made no determination as to the cause of the increase in value and there is no proof that the appreciation in value as testified to by Mr. Roberson was due to the efforts of either Husband or Wife. Consequently, the court erred in determining that the increase in value of three lots Husband owned prior to the marriage was marital property and we reverse that portion of the final order.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) permits appreciation of separate property to be treated as marital property when a spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Luttrell v. Luttrell · filed 2014-01-28(b)(1)(B)

Where one party substantially contributes to the preservation and appreciation of separate property, the amount of the appreciation may be considered marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). ... Even if Husband’s contributions did help preserve the investment accounts, substantial contributions to preservation and appreciation must be established before appreciation of the separate property can be considered marital property. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d at 746. We find no link between Husband’s actions and the appreciation of Wife’s investment accounts. Because we reject each of Husband’s arguments that the Trust assets or appreciation of the Trust assets should be considered marital property, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that they are Wife’s separate property.

Appreciation of a premarital IRA remains separate property when the other spouse’s contributions have no connection to its increase in value.

Ogle v. Duff · filed 2017-05-24(b)(1)(B)(i)

The record contains no evidence establishing a nexus between Wife’s marital contributions to household expenses and the appreciation in value of the Fidelity Primary IRA. Thus, we conclude Wife did not substantially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of Husband’s separate property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i) treats only the increase in value of separate property as marital property when the nonowner spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Vernell Lynn Carpenter Lewis v. Lewis · filed 2020-08-11(b)(1)(B)(i)

Thus, under the doctrine of transmutation, the entire asset may become marital property when the parties treated it as marital property, while under the statutory definition, only the increase in value resulting from the nonowner’s substantial contributions becomes marital property.

Appreciation of separate property is marital property only if the non-owning spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Spergl v. Spergl · filed 2019-05-16(b)(1)(B)(i)

Accordingly, for the appreciation in the shares’ value to become marital property, Wife needed to show that she substantially contributed to the stocks’ preservation and appreciation. The record before us fails to support such a conclusion.

An increase in separate property’s value is marital property only if the other spouse substantially contributed to both its preservation and its appreciation.

Anderson v. Anderson · filed 2019-08-16(b)(1)(B)(i)

Even if Wife’s financial contributions substantially contributed to the preservation of the properties, the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b) also required Wife show that she contributed to the properties’ appreciation.

An increase in the value of a separately owned vehicle resulting from restoration during the marriage may be divided as marital property.

Davis v. Richard E. Davis, Jr. · filed 2021-10-13(b)(1)(B)(i)

It thus appears that the trial court’s award of the Landcruiser was in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i), and we do not find error in its decision to divide the amount of the increased value of the vehicle resulting from restoration during the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c)(6) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the value of each spouse’s separate property.

Karen Elizabeth Phillips Lowe v. Lowe · filed 2023-12-14(c)(6)

These factors include the value of each parties’ separate property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6). ... Our holding with respect to the parties’ stipulations regarding the classification of the property in Erwin increases the value of Wife’s separate property and decreases the value of the marital estate. It also decreases Wife’s relative share of the marital estate. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the division of marital property in light of the statutory factors, including the value of the parties’ separate property.

Appreciation of separate property becomes marital property only if both spouses substantially contribute to its preservation and appreciation.

Katherine Poling Robeson v. Robeson · filed 2025-02-03(b)(2)(B)(i)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Wife failed to prove that both spouses, she and Husband, substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation of BCV as is required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B)(i).

An increase in separate property’s value during marriage is marital property if both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

MARY SUE GASTON LEE v. DANNY C. LEE · filed 2026-03-03(b)(1)(B)(i)

On remand, the trial court should determine the value of the Etowah House at the time of the parties’ marriage, hearing additional evidence if necessary, and consider whether any increase in that value by the time of the divorce was attributable to the contributions made by the parties during the marriage. If so, the amount of that increase should be equitably divided as a marital asset in the trial court’s overall distribution.

An increase in the value of separate property is marital property if both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation; the spouse claiming the increase must prove it occurred.

Campbell v. Campbell · filed 2008-07-31(b)(1)(B)

Due to a lack of a statement of the evidence, we have no way of knowing how much money was expended on the improvements to Husband’s home and shop, or if evidence was introduced at trial as to any increase in the value of Husband’s home and/or shop.

Pension benefits accrued during marriage are marital property even if the other spouse did not substantially contribute to their preservation or appreciation.

Sherry Denise Thearp Ervin v. Ervin · filed 1997-02-13(b)(1)(B)

The pension provision is not modified by the “substantial contribution” requirement preceding it. Therefore, pension benefits earned by a spouse during the marriage are marital property even though the other spouse did not contribute directly to their preservation or appreciation.

Retirement benefits that accrue during marriage are marital property, including gains attributable to a premarital balance.

Umstot v. Umstot · filed 1997-09-05(b)(1)(B)

We agree with the reasoning of the Franklin Court that the critical determination is whether the value “accrued” during the marriage. The statute is clear that “the value of vested pension, retirement or other fringe benefit rights accrued during the period of the marriage” is marital property. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (1996). In this case, all of Husband’s retirement plan, except $4,437.00, accrued during the marriage. The trial court correctly held that $154,106.00 of the retirement plan was marital property.

Section 36-4-121 limits division of pension benefits to those accrued during the marriage; benefits attributable to employment after divorce are excluded.

Gilliam v. Gilliam · filed 1997-04-18(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)

We know of no authority sanctioning a division of assets accumulated by a party after the divorce. We conclude that the trial court erred in making such a division.

Appreciation in a spouse’s individual retirement accounts during marriage is marital property even without a substantial contribution by the other spouse.

Mahler v. Mahler · filed 1997-04-18(b)(1)(B)

First, it overlooks that the $73,267 appreciation in the value of Mr. Mahler’s individual retirement accounts was marital property even without substantial contributions by Ms. Mahler.

Section 36-4-121 excludes retirement credits earned after divorce from marital property subject to division.

Cozart v. Cozart · filed 1999-08-27

Because such subsequent amounts will not have been earned during the parties’ marriage, they should not be considered marital property subject to division.

An interest in a retirement benefit plan is marital property subject to division, including value accrued during the marriage.

Catignani v. Catignani · filed 1999-10-28(a)(1)

An interest in a retirement benefit plan is marital property subject to division under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (1996).

Pension rights accruing during a marriage are marital property, even if the spouses lived apart.

Shorter v. Margaret Mae Shorter - Concurring · filed 1998-11-23(b)(1)(B)

We agree with the wife that all pe nsion rig hts accr uing du ring a m arriage are clas sified as marita l prope rty.

Under the statute as it existed at the time of this divorce, an IRA’s increase in value during marriage is marital property even if the other spouse did not substantially contribute to it.

Langschmidt v. Langschmidt · filed 2000-04-18(b)(1)(B)

Under these circumstances, we hold that Husband’s IRAs should be deemed “retirement” benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and the increase in value during the marriage should be considered marital property regardless of whether Wife substantially contributed to the preservation or appreciation of the IRAs.

Increases during marriage in the value of a spouse’s retirement accounts are marital property regardless of the other spouse’s contributions.

McKee v. McKee · filed 2000-05-23(b)(1)(B)

The trial court’s analysis regarding Mr. McKee’s Quick & Reilly IRA and GM 401k account is flawed because the court overlooked Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) which provides that the value of “pension, retirement or other fringe benefit rights accrued during the period of the marriage” is marital property regardless of the non-owning spouse’s contributions during the marriage. Accordingly, the $11,960 increase in the value of Mr. McKee’s Quick & Reilly IRA during the marriage should have been included in the marital estate.

Only retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are marital property subject to division.

Allen v. Allen · filed 2000-06-14(a)(1)

Marital property includes both vested and unvested retirement benefits which accrued during the marriage, and is subject to division under T.C.A. § 36-4-121 (a)(1). ... Therefore, we modify the trial court’s order to make only sixty-five percent of Husband’s military retirement marital property, subject to division.

Retirement benefits accumulated during a marriage remain marital property even if a spouse is receiving them when the divorce is heard.

Erwin v. Erwin · filed 2000-06-26(b)(1)(B)

The fact that Husband was drawing his retirement benefits at the time of the divorce hearing does not change his pension benefits from marital property to his separate property.

Pension and annuity rights accrued during marriage, including unvested rights and nondisability military retirement, are marital property subject to equitable division.

Fleming v. Fleming · filed 2000-08-28(b)(1)(B)

On remand, the trial court is directed to classify Wife’s annuity and 60% of Husband’s military retirement benefit as marital property and make an equitable division thereof.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) treats retirement benefits accrued during the marriage as marital property subject to equitable division.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2000-08-31(b)(1)(B)

Only the portion of retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable division.

Pension rights accrued during marriage are marital property even if the other spouse made no direct contribution to their increase in value.

Jarvis v. Jarvis · filed 2000-11-09(b)(1)(A)-(B)

Pension rights accrued during a marriage will be classified as marital property even though the non-employee spouse did not make direct contributions to the increase in the pension’s value.

Retirement benefits accrued during a marriage are marital property subject to equitable division, even if one spouse did not directly contribute to their increased value.

Lowe v. Lowe · filed 2001-03-26(b)(1)(B)

There is no dispute that the retirement benefits that accrued during the marriage constitute marital property. See T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (1996) (defining “marital property” to include “the value of vested and unvested pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued during the period of the marriage”). As marital property, Husband’s retirement benefits were subject to an equitable division, even though Wife did not directly contribute to the increase in their value.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) allows retirement benefits to be awarded as marital property.

Richard Norman Redman. v. Redman · filed 2000-07-06(b)(1)(B)

The fact that Husband now states that he intended Wife to have the retirement benefits only as child support, even if true, does not change the plain language of the agreed Final Decree which determined that his retirement benefits were marital property and awarded to Wife. T.C.A. § 36-4-121b(1)(B) provides for the award of retirement benefits as marital property.

A pension omitted from the marital property allocation should be divided equally when the parties stipulated to that division and the court intended an equal division.

Hopper v. Hopper · filed 2001-05-24(c)

The record reflects that the parties stipulated to an equal division of the pension. Except for the award of the pension death benefit to Wife, the trial court did not include the pension value in the asset allocation. Since it appears that the trial court attempted to make an equal division of the marital property, the pension should have been so divided.

The portion of a military pension accrued during the marriage is marital property, calculated through the final divorce hearing.

Kirchner v. Kirchner · filed 2001-06-05(b)(1)

In accordance with that definition, and using the date of the final divorce hearing for purposes of calculation, the court correctly found that 61 percent of Mr. Kirchner’s military pension should be considered marital property.

Retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable division.

Lee v. Lee · filed 2001-06-21

Accordingly, Wife is entitled to an equitable division of Husband’s retirement benefits. The parties were married on December 28, 1990, and the divorce hearing was held on November 16, 1999. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121-(1)(A), these dates are appropriate for the determination of marital property. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in its division of Husband’s retirement account.

Pension benefits accrued during marriage are marital property subject to equitable division even if they are unvested and contingent on future events.

Daniels v. Daniels · filed 2001-12-12(b)(1)(B)

We find that the TVA pension is a marital asset. Further, we find that it was not divided by the Trial Court in the November 21, 2000 order, and in the event the Trial Court did address it, the Trial Court erred in failing to award Ms. Daniels any portion of the pension.

Employer retirement plan benefits are marital property subject to equitable division.

Hardin v. Hardin · filed 2002-09-12(b)(1)(B)

The statutory definition of marital property is “virtually all inclusive”, and specifically includes retirement benefits.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) includes the value of vested pension benefits accrued during marriage in marital property.

Mary Louise Goodman Case v. Case · filed 2001-06-08(b)(1)(B)

Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), marital property includes “the value of vested pension, retirement or other fringe benefit rights accrued during the period of the marriage.” It is undisputed that Wife was vested in her employer’s pension plan, and that the value of the pension plan accrued during the parties’ marriage. Husband sought a continuance of the trial to present evidence on the value of the plan. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision must be reversed, and the cause remanded to determine the value of Wife’s pension.

A retirement account classified as marital property remains a property award even if the trial court calls it alimony in solido.

Bowser v. Bowser · filed 2002-03-20(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(B)

In their Tenn. Ct. App. R. 7 tabulations, both parties also list the account as marital property. That classification is correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(B). ... We will not disturb that award, but correct the nomenclature to reflect its true character as an award of marital property.

An IRA funded entirely with separate premarital earnings is separate property; its appreciation is subject to equitable distribution only if the other spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation.

Langschmidt v. Langschmidt · filed 2002-07-09(b)(1)(B)

We conclude that when an IRA is funded entirely with separate premarital earnings, the IRA is separate property. Appreciation on this separate property is subject to equitable distribution only if the other spouse “substantially contributes” to the preservation and appreciation of the IRA in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-^4 — 121(b)(1)(B).

Pension rights accrued during the marriage are marital property, including rights accrued during a legal separation before the final divorce.

Bilyeu v. Bilyeu · filed 2002-05-14(b)(1)(B)

The statute dealing with distribution of marital property expressly provides that marital property includes pension rights accrued during the period of the marriage, and there is no question that the husband’s entire pension accrued while these parties were married. ... We conclude the Trial Court erred in not treating the entire pension as marital property.

An employer profit-sharing plan acquired during marriage is a marital asset under § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

Carraher v. Carreher · filed 2001-12-04(b)(1)(A)

A profit-sharing plan is clearly within the definition of a marital asset.

A pension or retirement benefit accrued during the marriage is marital property that a court may divide by ordering its recipient to pay a share to the other spouse.

Wing v. Estate of James Wing · filed 2003-04-14

That is not to say that a pension or retirement benefit is not a part of the marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121. Therefore, where one of the parties to a divorce has a pension that accrued during the marriage, the courts are hard pressed to make an equitable division of the property where the other assets are limited. But one way to divide a pension is to order the recipient to pay part of it to the other spouse.

Retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are marital property; their classification depends on whether the accounts had value before the marriage.

Guinn v. Guinn · filed 2003-05-20(b)(1)(B)

While this may be the most equitable division, given the state of the record on appeal, this Court is unaware of whether or not such retirement accounts accrued only during the marriage or whether they held a value prior to the marriage. The answer to this question affects the classification of the accounts as "separate" or "marital" property, and, therefore, could result in a different distribution between the parties. For these reasons, we remand this portion of the trial court's property division for further findings consistent with this opinion.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) includes vested and unvested retirement rights accrued during marriage in marital property.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2003-09-16(b)(1)(B)

Marital property includes “the value of vested and unvested pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued during the period of the marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (2001) (emphasis added). However, there was no prayer for an award of one-half of Mr. Davis’ retirement contained in Ms. Davis’ complaint nor did she list the enumerated category of division of retirement as a contested issue in her statement of the contested and stipulated issues filed with the trial court. Further, there is no evidence in the record to indicate the worth, increase, and amount earned during the marriage. Therefore, this Court has no choice but to reverse the trial court’s award of one-half of Mr. Davis’ retirement with the State of Tennessee earned during the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(a)(2) gives trial courts discretion to divide marital property by awarding a spouse monthly pension payments instead of a present cash value award.

Beedle v. Beedle · filed 2004-01-27(a)(2)

In the face of overwhelming statutory authority vesting trial courts with broad discretion in valuation and distribution of the marital estate based on the equities of each case, and in the absence of a record showing an abuse of that discretion, this Court is constrained to affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

The marital portion of a pension must be valued and included in an equitable property division even if the pension is not subject to a QDRO.

Foxx v. Bolden · filed 2004-02-12(b)(1)(B)

Nevertheless, even assuming the Pension is not subject to a QDRO, this fact alone does not mean that no part of the Pension can constitute marital property or that it has no value.

Employment-related retirement benefits accrued during marriage are marital property, and appreciation may be classified as marital property when the evidence does not establish that it resulted solely from market performance.

Nash v. Nash · filed 2003-05-13(b)(1)(B)

However, the proof in the instant matter does not warrant a finding that the Fidelity Puritan Fund was funded solely with premarital assets in contrast to the accounts in Langschmidt. It is possible that contributions were made to the Fidelity Puritan Fund during the parties’ marriage. If so, such contributions represent “deferred compensation” “which would have increased the marital standard of living or would have been converted into other assets divisible at dissolution” and would constitute marital property under T.C.A. 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s classification of the appreciation of the fund during the parties’ re-marriage as marital property.

Stock options acquired during a marriage are marital property whether vested or unvested.

Kyle v. Mary Lou Climer Kyle · filed 2005-02-10(b)(1)(B)

Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121, stock options acquired during marriage—whether vested or unvested—constitute marital property: "Marital property" includes income from, and any increase in value during the marriage of, property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation, and the value of vested and unvested pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued during the period of the marriage.

Pension benefits earned before marriage are separate property and cannot be divided as marital property.

Dowden v. Feibus · filed 2006-01-18(b)(2)(A)

In an action for divorce, a Trial Court may “equitably divide, distribute or assign” only the marital property, not separate property. That portion of Husband’s federal pension earned prior to the marriage constitutes his separate property.

Employer-sponsored 401(k) accounts are retirement benefits; their net gains during marriage are marital property, including gains on premarital balances, while the premarital balances remain separate property.

Iris Kay Snodgrass v. Snodgrass · filed 2009-05-05(b)(1)(B)

That portion of a 401(k) account existing on the date of marriage remains separate property. Because, however, the account is a “retirement or other fringe benefit right[] relating to employment,” id. at (b)(1)(B), the entire net amount of income and appreciation that was experienced in Husband’s and Wife’s 401(k) accounts during their marriage is characterized as marital property, including that which accrued on the premarital balances.

The entire net increase in an employer-provided 401(k) account during marriage is marital property, including growth on its premarital balance.

Snodgrass v. Snodgrass · filed 2009-10-09(b)(1)(B)

That portion of a 401(k) account existing on the date of marriage remains separate property. Because, however, the account is a “retirement or other fringe benefit right[] relating to employment,” id. at (b)(1)(B), the entire net amount of income and appreciation that was experienced in Husband’s and Wife’s 401(k) accounts during their marriage is characterized as marital property, including that which accrued on the premarital balances.

Section 36-4-121 includes retirement benefits accrued during the marriage in marital property, so payments from those benefits may be a property distribution rather than alimony.

Cornwell v. Cornwell · filed 2011-09-27(b)(1)(B)

Our second reason for holding that the ordered payment is a division of property is, as Wife points out, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(2010) defines “marital property” to include “the value of vested and unvested pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement and other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued during the period of the marriage.” This is exactly the type of “property” that is the subject of this appeal.

Pension benefits earned during a marriage are marital property; benefits earned before the marriage are separate property.

Covington v. Covington · filed 2010-06-18(b)(1)(B)

We conclude that the portion of each party’s pension earned during the marriage was marital property.

An increase in pension benefits that accrues during marriage is marital property, regardless of the reason for the increase.

Nusbaum v. Nusbaum · filed 2012-01-05(b)(1)(B)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) provides, in pertinent part, that marital property includes “the value of vested and unvested pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued during the period of the marriage.” Pursuant to this provision, any increase in the value of pension benefits that accrues during the marriage, regardless of the reason for the increase, should be considered marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) permits a court to award one spouse an entire marital retirement account when the overall property division is equitable.

Downing v. Sherrie J. Downing · filed 2011-06-13(a)(1)

The trial court was therefore entitled to determine the proper disposition of the 401(k) pursuant to its authority under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) to equitably divide marital property. Depending on the equities of the situation, a court can divide the value of a retirement account between the parties or award the entire amount to one party or another.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) includes stock options accrued during marriage in marital property even when they have no current value, allowing a spouse to share in future exercise gains.

Malone v. Malone · filed 2011-07-26(b)(1)(B)

At the time of trial, Husband’s stock options were at an option price below the market price. However, there is adequate time prior to the expiration of the option period for them to recover their value and become a valuable marital asset. In Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn. 1996), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that vested and unvested retirement benefits accruing during the marriage constitute marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). To determine that because the stock options have no value now and to assume therefore they will have no future value is speculative and denies Wife the right to share in any future gains from an employment benefit which accrued during the marriage. Wife is entitled to the same percentage, i.e., forty percent, of the gains realized from any future exercise of those options.

Section 36-4-121 includes pension benefits received while a divorce is pending in the marital estate when they are used to preserve marital assets or pay marital liabilities.

Harrison v. Edwin B. Harrison, Jr. · filed 2017-05-22

Accordingly, Wife’s pension benefits paid during the pendency of the divorce proceedings were included in the total marital estate, having been used either to contribute to or preserve marital assets or to extinguish marital liabilities.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) treats increases in the value of an employment-related 401(k) during marriage as marital property, including appreciation of its premarital balance.

Belinda Bentley Wright v. Wright · filed 2020-03-06(b)(1)(B)

Under Snodgrass, Husband is not entitled to the appreciation on the $46,986.42 during the marriage; any increase in value in the 401(k) account after the marriage is marital property.

Section 36-4-121 includes retirement benefits accrued through employment during marriage as marital property that a court may divide.

Sample v. Sample · filed 2018-09-04(b)(1)(B)(ii)

Tennessee law authorizes state trial courts to divide all—or a portion—of a military retirement benefit. Specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 defines marital property to include “the value of vested and unvested pension benefits, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement, and other fringe benefits accrued as a result of employment during the marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(ii).

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(ii) includes a FERS Supplement accrued during marriage as marital property.

Parsons v. Parsons · filed 2019-12-12(b)(1)(B)(ii)

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Mr. Parsons’ FERS Supplement is a specialized retirement asset. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides that it is also “marital property.”

When neither party provides evidence of a pension’s present value, the court may divide marital property without including that value.

Pack v. Pack · filed 2019-04-30(c)

Because the parties failed to assign a present value to Wife’s pension, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to consider the present value of her pension in making an equitable division of the marital property.

Contributions to a retirement account made during the marriage, and appreciation attributable to those contributions, are marital property.

Erdman v. Erdman · filed 2019-12-10(b)(1)(B)(iii)

Indeed, any contributions made to the 401(k) after the 2013 withdrawal, and any appreciation attributable to these contributions, would be marital property.

Section 36-4-121 includes pension benefits accrued during marriage as marital property; a spouse’s share may be stated as a percentage to preserve the full value of the award.

Blakemore v. Blakemore · filed 2020-06-25(b)(1)(B)(i)

We agree with the court’s amendment insofar as it reflected her receipt of 1/2 of the 7/30 marital portion of the pension; however, we hold that the award should be maintained as a percentage to ensure Wife’s receipt of the full value of the award without need to return to the court for continued amendments.

A 401(k)’s premarital balance and its appreciation are separate property, while contributions from employment during the marriage and their appreciation are marital property.

Louise Helen Pack Dover v. Dover · filed 2020-12-08(b)(1)(B)(iii)

In light of the undisputed evidence that Husband’s 401(k) has a premarital component that remained his separate asset, the trial court’s decision to classify the entire 401(k) as a marital asset is an error of law that warrants reversal.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property, including the parties’ financial circumstances and earning capacities.

Grice v. Dawn Marie Grice · filed 2021-10-20(c)

In light of the statutory factors, including the relatively modest financial circumstances of each party, the length of the marriage, and each party’s employability and earning capacity, we cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings or that the trial court erred in its division of Husband’s military retirement.

Premarital employment-related retirement benefits and their appreciation are separate property, while contributions from employment during the marriage and their appreciation are marital property.

Cooke v. Cooke · filed 2022-12-27(b)(2)(B)(iii)

Accordingly, following the direction of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4- 121(b)(2)(B)(iii), trial courts should “utilize any reasonable method of accounting to attribute postmarital appreciation to the value of the premarital benefits” and should characterize the premarital value of an employment-related retirement benefit, “together with the appreciation of the value,” as separate property.

A premarital retirement account and its appreciation remain separate property when no contributions to the account were made during the marriage.

Richardson v. Richardson · filed 2020-12-14(b)(1)(B)(iii)

Because the evidence shows that there was no substantial contribution to the account during the marriage by either party or through Wife’s employment, the trial court did not err in ruling that the value of the 401k account remained Wife’s separate property.

Section 36-4-121 treats the value of a pension that accrues from employment during marriage as marital property.

Stark v. Stark · filed 2022-05-31(b)(1)(B)(i)

Under the Tennessee Code, the value of a pension that accrues from employment during a rnarriage is marital property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B)(i), and the parties agree that a portion of their respective pensions is marital property.

Premarital retirement benefits are separate property; the portion accrued during the marriage is marital property.

Mangum v. Mangum · filed 2022-11-07(b)(1)(B)(iii)

In its order, the Trial Court plainly counted as marital property and awarded to Wife the full $259,000 balance of her 401(k) rather than just the $127,000 increase as ... agreed to by the parties at trial and on appeal. The Trial Court thus did not distinguish between the premarital portion of Wife’s 401(k) and the marital portion. ... The Trial Court’s use of $259,000 rather than the agreed upon $127,000 resulted in a mathematical error by using the wrong number.

Section 36-4-121 includes pension benefits accrued during the marriage as marital property, but spouses may agree to divide additional benefits.

Walton v. Rebecca Guess Walton · filed 2024-10-30(b)(2)(B)(ii)

That would be true had Husband not voluntarily contracted to provide Wife with more than what she would have been entitled to under the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“‘Marital property’ includes the value of vested and unvested pension benefits, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement, and other fringe benefit rights accrued as a result of employment during the marriage[.]”).

Marital property includes vested and unvested retirement and pension benefits accrued through employment during the marriage.

Kaitlin Nicole Williams · filed 2026-03-26(b)(2)(B)(ii)

Under Tennessee Code Annotated, “‘[m]arital ... property’ includes the value of vested and unvested pension benefits, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement, and other fringe benefit rights accrued as a result of employment during the marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B)(ii).

Retirement benefits accrued during marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Remus v. Nunn · filed 2024-03-27(b)(2)(B)(ii)

Under Tennessee law, retirement benefits that accrued during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B)(ii); Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Tenn. 1996).

Withdrawals from a retirement account containing marital property must be considered when the account is divided in a divorce.

Vicki Marlene (Almonrode) Taylor v. Jack Elmer Taylor, Jr. · filed 2024-10-01(b)(1)(B)(iii)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121 is clear that withdrawals from a retirement account containing marital property must be considered in the distribution of the account incident to divorce.

Premarital pension benefits and appreciation attributable to them are separate property, and commingling does not change that classification.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 2025-05-28(b)(2)(B)(iii)

Under these statutory provisions, the portion of a spouse’s pension benefits accrued before marriage, along with the appreciation attributable to the pre-marital value, remain “separate property” not subject to distribution.

Military retirement benefits accrued during the marriage remain marital property through the service member’s retirement, even if the spouses informally separated earlier.

Prather v. Prather · filed 2025-12-23(b)(1)(B)(ii)

Husband retired during the marriage; therefore, the Trial Court should have used his retirement date, rather than the separation date, in classifying the retirement as marital property, excepting his military service from 1978 to the date of marriage in 1981.

Section 36-4-121 includes a state employee’s pension plan in marital property that may be awarded to the other spouse.

Malik v. Kafait U. Malik - Concurring · filed 1996-10-03(b)(1)(B)

T.C.A. Sec. 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) does not exclude a state employee’s pension plan from the definition of marital property. ... We agree with both the analysis and the conclusion of the Boyd decision.

Income earned during marriage is marital property, and commingling it with separate assets can make the entire account marital property.

Hofer v. Hofer · filed 1997-02-03(b)(1)(A)

This income earned by Husband as a direct result of his own efforts constituted m arital property as it was acquired during the m arriage, pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). Once Husband commingled these m arital assets with his separate assets, the entire account became a marital asset in our opinion.

Inherited funds can remain separate property after a temporary deposit in a joint account when the inheriting spouse did not intend to relinquish control.

Fendley v. Mart G. Fendley · filed 1997-07-02(b)(2)

The mere fact that the funds were placed for a time in a joint account does not require that they be considered marital property.

Property received by one spouse as a gift is separate property, regardless of when it was acquired.

Bryant v. Bryant · filed 1998-03-18(b)(2)(D)

A spouse's separate property includes property acquired "at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D). Accordingly, if the spouse can show that the property was a gift, the gift is his or her separate property, regardless of when it was acquired.

Property one spouse gives to the other during marriage is the recipient’s separate property.

Kinard v. Kinard · filed 1998-08-05(b)(2)(D)

Separate property cannot, by definition, be included in the marital estate, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) provides that property acquired by a spouse during a marriage by “gift, bequest, devise or descent” is separate property. Thus, gifts by one spouse to another that might otherwise be considered marital property should be classified as the recipient spouse’s separate property.

Property acquired during marriage as a gift, including a gift from one spouse to the other, is separate property and is excluded from the marital estate.

Kinard v. Kinard · filed 1998-08-24(b)(2)(D)

Separate property cannot, by definition, be included in the marital estate, and Tenn.Code Ann. § 36 — 4-121(b)(2)(D) provides that property acquired by a spouse during a marriage by “gift, bequest, devise or descent” is separate property. Thus, gifts by one spouse to another that might otherwise be considered marital property should be classified as the recipient spouse’s separate property.

Property given to one spouse is that spouse’s separate property regardless of when the gift was made.

Dunlap v. Dunlap · filed 1998-12-16(b)(2)(D)

A spouse’s separate property includes property acquired “at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) (1996) (emphasis added). Accordingly, if the spouse can show that the property was a gift, the gift is his or her separate property, regardless of when it was acquired.

Property received as a gift, including a gift from the other spouse, is separate property if the claimed gift is proved.

Fox v. Marcella Fox · filed 2000-04-10(b)(2)(D)

Thus, clearly gifts to one spouse are that person’s separate property. Even gifts from one spouse to the other become the separate property of the receiving spouse.

Property one spouse receives as a gift from the other is separate property, as are insurance proceeds for damage to that property.

Hampton-Hoover v. Hoover · filed 2000-06-20(b)(2)(D)

We find that the evidence establishes that Southern Thunder was a gift to the wife from the husband. Therefore, Southern Thunder was the wife’s separate property and any and all insurance proceeds received as a result of the wreck of Southern Thunder were her separate property.

A spouse’s gift of an interest in property proceeds to the other spouse makes that interest the recipient’s separate property.

Patty jane Farmer Jenkins v. Jenkins · filed 2000-06-27(b)(2)(D)

The fact that Wife is precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from asserting that the property belonged to her does not preclude a finding that, after the marriage, Husband gave his interest in the proceeds from the sale of the property to Wife as a gift, thereby making the proceeds Wife’s separate property. See T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) (1996).

A conveyance between spouses creates a rebuttable presumption of a gift, but a deed alone does not establish that the property became separate property.

Turner v. Turner · filed 2000-09-28(b)(2)(D)

Although a conveyance of property between spouses creates a rebuttable presumption of a gift, it is not conclusive evidence on the issue. ... Since the trial court apparently believed Husband’s testimony, this credibility determination effectively precludes us from finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s classification of the subject property as marital property.

A transfer of property between spouses may be a gift that makes the property separate rather than marital; the court must determine its classification before dividing it.

Pennington v. Pennington · filed 2000-10-18(b)(2)

The trial court failed to make a factual determination as to whether the office building was separate or marital property, and the record prevents us from conducting an independent review to ascertain the propriety of the trial court’s decision to distribute the office building to Ms. Pennington as marital property. Accordingly, this issue must be remanded for further fact finding.

Property deeded to both spouses during marriage is marital property when the spouse claiming it as a separate gift fails to prove it was given solely to that spouse.

Evans v. Evans · filed 2002-11-19(b)(2)(D)

We, therefore, conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the inclusion of Ms. Evans’ name on the deed was a mistake and that the property was a gift or bequest to Mr. Evans alone. Therefore, we hold that the property conveyed by Warranty Deed dated January 31, 1990 is marital property.

Property given to one spouse as a gift is separate property absent evidence that it was intended to become marital property.

Kahn v. Kahn · filed 2005-06-06(b)(2)(D)

The Summer property was in Husband’s name and given to Husband by his grandmother as a gift. There is no evidence that the Summer property was intended to be “marital property.”

Property acquired by gift is separate property and should not be divided as part of the marital estate.

Bargmann v. Bargmann · filed 2011-03-22(b)(2)(D)

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D), property acquired by gift is separate property and should not be divided. ... The pearls and wedding dress were Mother’s separate property not subject to division in the marital estate.

Property acquired by a spouse as a gift, including a gift from the other spouse, is separate property; the spouse claiming a gift must prove it.

Ogles v. Ogles · filed 2015-01-07(b)(2)(D)

“Separate property” includes “[p]roperty acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(D). Accordingly, “[a] gift from one spouse to another during the marriage is considered the donee spouse’s separate property.” ... Again, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s classification of these assets as marital property.

Property acquired before marriage may be classified as marital property when marital funds repay its purchase loan and improve it.

Moon v. Moon · filed 2016-04-21(b)(1)(A)

Based on Husband‟s testimony that he used marital funds to make payments on his credit cards; that he used his credit cards to get cash advances from which he repaid his brother for the loan to buy the boat; and that marital funds were used to improve the boat, we hold the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court‟s findings that the Master Craft boat was marital property.

An interest acquired during marriage in exchange for agreeing to work does not qualify as separate property acquired by gift.

Elizabeth Madeline Shelton Bewick v. Bewick · filed 2017-02-13(b)(2)(D)

In light of Husband‟s testimony, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to find that Husband‟s interest in the Indiana LLC was acquired by way of gift.

Property a spouse acquires by gift is separate property, including a gifted one-half interest in a residence.

Merkel v. Merkel · filed 2016-03-31(b)(2)(D)

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b), the one-half interest in the West Lake residence was properly classified as Wife‟s separate property, and the trial court correctly held that Husband had no interest in the property under the circumstances.

Gifts from one spouse to another during marriage can be the recipient’s separate property.

Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, III · filed 2018-04-25(b)(2)(D)

Gifts from one spouse to another during the marriage are not excluded from this definition.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed marital, but proof that it was a gift can rebut that presumption.

Tarver v. Tarver · filed 2019-03-13(b)(2)(D)

We must also begin with the presumption that property acquired by a spouse during the marriage is marital property. ... However, this presumption may be rebutted by showing that the property was acquired by gift.

Property acquired by a spouse as a gift is separate property, including jewelry given by the other spouse during the marriage.

Williams v. Lane Edward Williams · filed 2019-03-26(b)(2)(D)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(2)(D) provides that “[p]roperty acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent” is separate property. ... Having reviewed the evidence in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d), we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s classification of Wife’s jewelry as her separate property.

Separate funds become marital property when they are inextricably commingled with marital funds and cannot be traced.

Law v. Halbert Grant Law, Jr. · filed 2022-04-26(b)(1)(A)

Husband’s treatment of the Fidelity checking account raised a rebuttable presumption that the account was marital property. He did not rebut this presumption at trial, and the trial court erred in determining that it was Wife’s burden to show otherwise. Consequently, the Fidelity checking account was incorrectly classified as Husband’s separate property. It is a marital asset subject to division.

A gift to one spouse remains separate property when it can be traced into a later asset despite an initial deposit in a joint account.

NONA G. ROGERS v. MICHAEL L. ROGERS · filed 2025-08-08(b)(2)(D)

The evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s implicit finding that tracing applies to the $134,173.57 gift, and it was properly classified as Wife’s separate property.

Under § 36-4-121, disability income benefits that replace future earnings are not marital property subject to distribution, even when the premiums were paid with marital funds.

Gragg v. Gragg · filed 1998-10-22(b)(1)

For all of these reasons, we feel that the disability income payments in the instant case are not marital property subject to distribution.

Section 36-4-121 excludes disability benefits that replace future income from marital property, even when the premiums were paid with marital funds; any portion paid in lieu of retirement benefits is marital property.

Gragg v. Gragg · filed 2000-01-31(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)

After due consideration, we conclude that disability benefits from a private disability insurance policy acquired with marital funds during the marriage are not marital property subject to distribution upon divorce because the only purpose served by these benefits is income replacement.

Disability payments that replace wages lost during the marriage are marital property.

McCartney v. McCartney · filed 2021-08-13(b)(1)(C)

Therefore, because Husband’s disability payments replaced his lost wages during the marriage, they are considered marital property under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(C); see also Franklin, 2008 WL 1901113, at *19.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a reasonable real estate commission to be deducted from marital home equity when dividing property, but evidence must support the amount deducted.

F. G.Sutton v. J.W. Sutton · filed 2000-03-31(c)

In light of the wide discretion given the Trial Court in determining how to divide the marital estate in an equitable manner, we find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s decision to deduct from the parties’ equity in the marital home an amount equal to a reasonable real estate commission. ... However, we find no evidence in the record which would support a deduction from the value of the marital home of a real estate commission in the specific amount of $10,500. There is no evidence in the record as to what would constitute a reasonable real estate commission.

Section 36-4-121’s factors for dividing marital property do not apply to property owned by unmarried cohabitants.

Rivkin v. Postal · filed 2000-04-13

This case involves parties whose association is simply one of cohabitation rather than one of marriage. Accordingly, the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (Supp. 2000) and the other principles governing the division of marital property are inapplicable.