Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property; an approximately equal division may satisfy that requirement.

Buchanan v. Buchanan · filed 2018-09-26(c)

We conclude that the trial court fashioned a nearly equal distribution of marital assets, and the proof supports such a distribution when considering the applicable statutory factors. We accordingly decline to disturb or modify this equitable division.

Section 36-4-121 calls for an equitable distribution of marital property based on the relevant factors, including dissipation of marital assets.

Singla v. Singla · filed 2018-11-27

The Trial Court correctly considered the relevant factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 in light of the evidence presented to it as discussed fully above. The finding that Husband did not dissipate as much of the marital assets as found by the Trial Court does not change the analysis in any significant manner. We find no error in the Trial Court’s distribution of the marital assets as the distribution remains equitable even with our modification of the amount of martial assets that Husband dissipated.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division based on the relevant factors; a long marriage does not require equal shares when other factors support an unequal division.

Diffie v. Diffie · filed 2019-04-23(c)

In considering the relevant factors as the trial court obviously did, we find that the trial court’s division of the marital estate is consistent with the statutory factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and is supported by the evidence.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) allows a court to weigh each spouse’s contributions to the marital estate when making an equitable division that is unequal.

Flodin v. Tan Scott Flodin · filed 2019-06-26(c)(5)(A)

The 62/38 division of the marital estate reflects Wife’s overwhelming role in growing the parties’ assets in contrast with Husband’s chosen leisurely lifestyle from 2009 onward. Although not an equal division, we cannot say it was not an equitable division considering all relevant factors. We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property; appellate courts ordinarily defer to a division consistent with those factors and supported by the evidence.

Middendorf v. Middendorf · filed 2019-06-27(c)

Thus, appellate courts ordinarily defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably; an equitable division need not be equal.

Ruby Diane Barron v. Barron · filed 2019-11-20(c)

We agree with the trial court that the distribution must be equitable, but not necessarily equal. ... In light of the foregoing findings of fact made by the trial court, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the court’s conclusion to award wife a greater share of the marital assets. The court’s conclusion to award husband only 43% of the marital assets and wife 57% was in error and not equitable.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be equal.

Muse v. Robert Jolley, Jr. · filed 2020-07-30(a)(1)

To the extent Wife contends that the court was bound either by the facts or the law to make a 50/50 division of the marital estate, she is mistaken. The trial court is to divide the marital property in an equitable manner. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); Miller v. Miller, 81 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property based on the relevant statutory factors; a substantially equal division can be equitable when both spouses contributed to acquiring the assets.

Griffin v. Griffin · filed 2020-08-19(c)

Considering the statutory factors, a substantially equal division would be equitable. For instance, it was a marriage of long duration, the parties were close in age, and both made contributions to the acquisition of the assets during the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the relevant factors in light of the proof when dividing marital property equitably.

Lee v. Amber F. Lee · filed 2021-01-28(c)

The factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) guide the court’s decision. ... To reach an equitable division, the trial court must weigh the relevant factors in light of the proof at trial. ... Given these facts, we cannot say the court’s division of the life insurance policies rendered the overall division inequitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires consideration of statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably; a valuation error does not require changing a division that remains supported by those factors.

Cela v. Cela · filed 2021-07-30(c)

In light of the resulting monetary windfall to Wife from withheld mortgage payments and of her sole responsibility for reducing the marital estate to the tune of more than $150,000, which the trial court expressly considered, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s division of the marital estate is inconsistent with the statutory factors, lacks evidentiary support, or is inequitable, even considering the trial court’s miscalculation of the equity in the marital residence.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when dividing marital property and permits an equitable division that awards an entire asset to one spouse.

Carter v. Carter · filed 2021-12-10(c)

Here, the factors weigh in support of the court’s determination. ... Based on the statutory factors and the court’s broad discretion in such matters, we find no error in the court’s distribution of the 4.99 acres and the Block House.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property after considering the relevant factors; the division need not give each spouse an equal share of the assets and debts.

Robinson v. Robinson · filed 2022-06-29(c)

We begin our review by noting that, in dividing the marital estate, the trial judge stated that he had considered “T.C.A. § 36-4-121 and the applicable factors set therein.” ... Even more importantly, the trial court assigned approximately 82% of the couple’s marital debt to Wife while assigning only approximately 18% to Husband. ... Thus, given our standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate.

A claimed error involving an individual asset does not warrant changing the division of marital property without a showing that the overall division is inequitable.

Melanie Miller Hollis v. Charles Myers Hollis, Jr. · filed 2022-06-29(c)

There being no argument from Husband that the Trial Court’s final, overall division of the entire marital estate was inequitable, we decline Husband’s request to modify the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate as to any particular asset, alleged math errors notwithstanding.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a nearly equal division of marital property when the statutory factors and the spouses’ contributions over the marriage support it.

Etta Faye Beck Bombacino v. Anthony John Bombacino, Sr. · filed 2022-08-03(c)

Although Wife may have contributed slightly more to the marriage in the beginning, the trial court correctly concluded that the parties’ respective contributions over the life of the marriage were similar. See id. § 36-4-121(c)(5)-(7).

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the division is equitable under the statutory factors and supported by the evidence.

Burnett v. Burnett · filed 2022-12-07(c)

Under the particular facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining this division to be fair and equitable under the pertinent statutory factors.

Section 36-4-121(c)(12) allows courts to consider other equitable factors when dividing marital property, including whether an award would leave a spouse and child without transportation.

Amarino v. Amarino · filed 2024-02-14(c)(12)

Relevant here, factor twelve requires a court to consider “other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.” ... If the trial court had awarded Husband the 4-Runner, he would have possessed two cars, but Wife would have been without a mode of transportation for herself and the parties’ child. Given the foregoing circumstances, it was equitable for the trial court to award Wife the 4-Runner, and we affirm this award.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires the court to divide marital property equitably after valuing it.

Jorge Antonio Mata Campos v. Amanda Rosa Ruiz Zeledon · filed 2024-09-24(a)(1)

Once marital property has been valued, the trial court is to divide it in an equitable manner. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1).

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be an equal division.

Hatley v. Hatley · filed 2025-12-10(a)(1)(A)

Courts have emphasized that the statutes require an equitable division of marital property, not an equal division.

Section 36-4-121 requires courts to consider the statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property, including a spouse’s contributions as a homemaker and parent.

Harrington v. Harrington · filed 1990-06-13(c)

Considering the factors set forth in the statute, we are of the opinion that the trial judge failed to equitably divide the marital estate. ... Her contribution to the marriage as a homemaker and parent are also of substantial importance. ... We are of the opinion, therefore, that from the property awarded to Mr. Harrington by the trial judge, $50,000 of that amount should be awarded to Mrs. Harrington.

Section 36-4-121(c) provides factors that guide the equitable division of marital property, including a spouse’s contributions as a homemaker and parent.

Inman v. Inman · filed 1991-04-22(c)

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) provides the table of relevant factors for the Court to consider in making division of marital property. The Court is not limited to those factors but is to be guided by them. ... Utilizing the factors contained in the statute as a guide we believe that Mrs. Inman contributed considerably to the preservation and appreciation of the marital property as a homemaker and parent.

Section 36-4-121 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property equitably after considering the listed factors.

Storey v. Storey · filed 1992-01-17

This statute vests wide discretion in the trial judge to adjust and adjudicate the parties’ rights to and interests in marital property. ... In view of the above circumstances, however, we find no error in the trial court’s award of all of the marital property, valued at approximately $84,000, to the wife.

Section 36-4-121(b) requires courts to consider relevant factors, including each spouse’s health, earning capacity, liabilities, and financial needs, when equitably dividing marital property.

Kathy Gale (Phillips) Bennett v. Bennett · filed 1995-09-20(b)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b) obligates the trial court to consider all relevant factors in making an equitable division of marital property, and lists some of those factors, including "[t]he age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties." In light of these factors, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mrs. Bennett $20,000 as her share in the appreciation of Mr. Bennett's retirement accounts.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the relevant factors when dividing marital property; earning capacity is important but does not alone justify awarding nearly the entire estate to one spouse.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 1995-10-04(c)

Although earning capacity is certainly an important factor in evaluating whether a distribution is equitable, it is by no means dispositive. We cannot in good conscience rely solely upon that factor in divesting Husband of virtually the entire marital estate that he so prudently created and maintained.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires trial courts to consider its listed factors when dividing marital property.

Carolyn Louise Taylor Perkins v. John Bauman Perkins, Jr., - Concurring · filed 1995-11-15(c)

In making a division of marital property, the trial court is required to consider the factors set forth in T.C.A.§ 36-4-121(c) (1991).

Section 36-4-121(c) makes the duration of a short marriage an important factor in dividing marital property, but it does not outweigh all other relevant factors.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 1994-06-11(c)

The factors to be considered in dividing a marital estate are delineated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). Among these factors is the duration of the marriage, and this court has recognized that the duration of a marriage is an important consideration when the marriage has been relatively short. ... However, the duration of the marriage does not trump all the other factors that may be relevant in a particular case.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably; an equitable division need not be equal.

Ford v. Ford · filed 1996-11-19(c)

In divorce or separate maintenance cases our legislature has provided that the courts must equitably divide the marital property of the parties. ... An equitable division, however, is not necessarily an equal one.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not give each spouse equal value and depends on the relevant statutory factors.

Melton v. Melton · filed 1997-07-02(a)

The trial court’s distribution need not be equal to be equitable. It is not achieved by a mechanical application of the statutory factors, but rather by considering and weighing the most relevant factors in light of the unique facts of each case.

Section 36-4-121 requires courts to consider the marriage’s duration, the spouses’ age and health, their ability to acquire assets and income, and their economic circumstances when equitably dividing marital property.

Keisler v. Keisler · filed 1997-07-31

The Trial Court was required to take into account the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated, §36-4-121 in arriving at an equitable division of the real property. The factors relevant here include the duration of the marriage, the age and health of the wife, the relative ability of each party to acquire capital assets and income (the husband had a demonstrated earning capacity of approximately $40,000.00 a year), and the economic circumstances of the parties.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to assess the overall division of marital property in light of its factors when deciding whether the division is equitable.

Joni Smart Holt v. Jack Sanders Holt · filed 1997-12-05(c)

We have evaluated the overall effect of the trial court’s division of the marital estate in light of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and have determined that the division is equitable.

Section 36-4-121 permits an equal division of marital property when its relevant factors support that result; an equitable division need not be equal.

Hardin v. Hardin · filed 1998-05-19(c)

As in Williamson, after considering the relevant factors set forth in section 36-4-121, we conclude that the record supports the equal division of the marital home as achieved in the trial court’s judgment.

Section 36-4-121(c) recognizes a spouse’s care of the home and children as a contribution to property accumulated during the marriage.

Turnbo v. Turnbo · filed 1996-12-11(c)

Husband argues that the marital estate was accumulated through his efforts, but it was accumulated during the marriage when the wife was caring for home and children which justifies her interest in the accumulation. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) recognizes a spouse’s care of the home and children as a contribution that justifies a share of marital property.

Turnbo v. Turnbo · filed 1997-12-30(c)

Husband argues that the marital estate was accumulated through his efforts, but it was accumulated during the marriage when the wife was caring for home and children which justifies her interest in the accumulation. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c).

Premarital property no longer owned at divorce may count as a spouse’s contribution when dividing marital property, but does not create an automatic dollar-for-dollar credit.

Brock v. Brock · filed 1996-12-13(c)(5)

The appellant is not entitled to an automatic dollar-for-dollar credit against the marital estate for the value of property owned by him at the time of the marriage, but no longer owned by him at the time of the divorce. However, to the extent these interests were contributed by Husband to the wealth of the marriage, they are a proper matter to be considered in determining how the marital estate should be equitably divided.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the property division factors according to the circumstances of each case; no factor has greater weight as a matter of law.

Bookout v. Bookout · filed 1997-02-28(c)

It should be remembered that no one factor is stronger, as a matter of law than another. The weight to be given each statutory factor must be decided on a case by case basis.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property based on factors including the marriage’s duration and each party’s age, earning capacity, and needs.

Craft v. Craft · filed 1997-03-19(c)

Factors to be applied in determining what would constitute an equitable division of marital property are many, and include the duration of the marriage, the age of the parties, the earning capacity of each party, and the needs of each party. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). All of these factors would support a generous award to Mrs. Craft out of the assets of Craft Woodworks.

Section 36-4-121(c) factors govern the equitable division of marital property, but need not be reconsidered to decide when an agreed division is payable.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1997-07-31(c)

For the same reasons, the trial court did not have to consider the factors in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c). Those are the factors that the trial court considered in making the equitable division in the first place. They have no bearing on when the equitable division is payable.

Section 36-4-121(c)(4) permits an unequal division of marital property based on each party’s relative ability to acquire assets and income in the future.

Hausmann v. Hausmann · filed 1997-10-29(c)(4)

But we believe that such a division is equitable, in accordance with the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) for the division of marital property, especially factor (4) “the relative ability of each party for future acquisition of capital assets and income.”

Section 36-4-121(a) requires an equitable division of marital property without regard to fault; an equitable division need not be equal.

Hoffman v. Hoffman · filed 1998-04-29(a)

T.C.A. 36- 4-121(a) provides that marital property must be equitably divided without regard to fault. An equitable division is not necessarily an equal one. In light of the overall division of the marital property, we find that this division of the partnership interest is equitable and should stand.

Section 36-4-121(c)(1) requires courts to consider the duration of the marriage when dividing marital property; for a short marriage, the division should approximate the parties’ positions before marriage.

Johnson v. Edward Johnson, Sr. · filed 1997-05-20(c)(1)

In accordance with T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(1), trial courts consider the duration of the marriage when making an equitable division of marital property. In cases involving a marriage of relatively short duration, it is appropriate to divide the property in a way that, as nearly as possible, places the parties in the same position they would have been in had the marriage never taken place.

Section 36-4-121(c)(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each party’s ability to acquire future assets and income, making evidence of future economic status relevant.

Dellinger v. Dellinger · filed 1997-05-27(c)(4)

Indeed, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(4), the trial court is directed to consider the parties’ relative ability “for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.” The trial court appropriately ■ considered the parties’ future economic status as well as their financial positions at the time of trial. Consequently, Winfield’s testimony on this issue was relevant.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contribution to its acquisition, preservation, appreciation, or dissipation.

Sides v. Sides · filed 1997-10-14(c)(5)

In distributing the parties’ marital property, the trial court was required to consider, inter alia, the “contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation or dissipation” of the property. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (1996). Here, the trial court specifically found that the Wife had “depleted marital property through investment in her losing business.” Accordingly, the trial court properly considered this factor in awarding the Husband a greater share of the marital estate than the Wife.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property, but the division need not be mathematically equal.

Miller v. Miller · filed 1998-09-21

The division of the estate is not rendered inequitable simply because it is not mathematically equal.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts dividing marital property to consider factors including the length of the marriage, the parties’ earning capacity, and their contributions to the marriage.

Dix v. Carson · filed 1998-12-17(c)

The trial court’s equitable division of the real property is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c). The factors favoring the trial court’s allocation include the relatively short duration of the marriage, the fact that Wife is younger and likely has the higher earning capacity and has greater ability to acquire capital assets in the future, and the fact that most of the real property was owned by Husband before the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a court to consider inherited funds used to buy a marital home and the home’s family history when dividing marital property equitably.

Quinn v. Gregory M. Quinn - Concurring · filed 1999-03-25(c)

Under this factor and the catchall provision, “Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties” (Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(c)(10)), the trial court was able to factor in Husband’s use of inherited funds to purchase forty percent (40%) of the home, and the length of time the home has been in Husband’s family.

Section 36-4-121(c) sets out factors courts consider when equitably dividing marital property.

Johnny v. Dunaway, Lafollette, For · filed 1999-12-15(c)

Considering all the relevant factors enumerated in T.C.A. §36-4-121(c), we hold that the Trial Court’s distribution of marital property is equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the spouses’ circumstances, including their separate property, when equitably dividing marital property.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1999-12-30(c)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) requires the trial court to consider several factors in making an equitable division of marital property, including: ... The trial court’s award to Wife of a life interest in the marital home helps offset the trial court’s award of the $70,000 certificate of deposit to Husband as his separate property.

Section 36-4-121(c)(10) permits courts to consider the spouses’ property shares and child-support burdens when determining an equitable division of marital property.

Spicer v. Spicer · filed 2000-03-14(c)(10)

Taking into consideration the deference allowed the trial court's decision regarding division of property, the greater share of the personal property Husband received, and Wife's greater share of supporting the children, we affirm the trial court's award of the entirety of Wife's retirement account to Wife. We find that the trial court properly determined " the equities between the parties" when making the distribution of property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(10).

Section 36-4-121(c) permits courts to consider the condition and needed repairs of the marital residence when equitably dividing marital property.

Reel v. George C. Reel, Jr. · filed 2000-04-13(c)

However, in view of the long duration of the marriage, and the financial situations of both parties at the divorce, a more equitable distribution of the property should take into consideration the habitability and state of repair of the marital residence where Wife will presumably continue to live. Based upon the testimony at trial regarding the condition of the house and the repairs needed, the property distribution should recognize the $25,000 which Wife will need to spend to bring the house up to acceptable standards.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to weigh the equitable division factors in light of the parties’ credible evidence, rather than apply them mechanically.

Mundy v. Mundy · filed 2000-04-28(c)

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) (1996) sets forth the factors that a court should consider in arriving at an equitable division. These factors are not to be applied in a mechanical fashion; rather, a trial court, exercising its sound discretion, must carefully weigh each factor in light of the credible evidence presented by the parties.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider applicable statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Willis v. Willis · filed 2000-05-03(c)

Upon consideration of the factors set forth in section 36-4-121(c) that are applicable to the case at bar, we think that the final result of the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital property is equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c)(1) permits courts to consider the length of a marriage when dividing marital property; in a short marriage, an equitable division may largely restore the parties to their premarital positions.

Stafford v. Stafford · filed 1999-02-19(c)(1)

The marriage at bar, one of only seven years duration, falls in the same category as does the marriage in Batson. The husband brought a comparative pittance to the marital estate. Under the decree of the trial court he received, in property division, $42,000.00 of the money from marital assets that he had squandered at the gambling tables; which is more than twice his marital contribution. Wife received everything else.

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) requires courts to consider tax consequences when equitably dividing marital property.

Elam v. Elam · filed 1999-08-30(c)(9)

Additionally, forcing the sale of the property will result in harsh tax consequences due to the large capital gain which will arise from the sale. Tennessee Code Annotated §36-4-121(c) directs the court to consider tax consequences as one of the relevant factors in making an equitable division of marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(c)(9).

Section 36-4-121(c)(9) requires courts to consider tax consequences when dividing marital property.

Richard Pallmer Jahn, Jr. v. Jahn · filed 2000-02-04(c)(9)

While tax consequ ences are to be consid ered as a rele vant facto r in making an equ itable division of marital property, we con clude that the Trial Court took this into account.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows a court to consider a spouse’s dissipation of marital or separate property when dividing marital property equitably.

Hulshof v. Hulshof · filed 1999-09-29(c)(5)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(5) specifically authorizes the court to consider a party’s “dissipation of the marital or separate property” when fashioning an equitable distribution of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Russo v. Russo · filed 2000-07-13(c)

In determining what constitutes an equitable division of marital assets, the court will consider the factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider its listed factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Houston v. Houston · filed 2002-03-31(c)

To reiterate, a court must consider the standard factors set forth in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) in making an equitable distribution of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider factors including earning capacity and homemaking contributions when dividing marital property equitably.

Hall v. Hall · filed 2002-04-19(c)

The division of marital property in divorce cases is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121, which generally provides that the trial court is to divide the property equitably without regard to fault. ... Considering these factors, we find that the trial court did not err in distributing the marital assets as it did, giving a small proportionate advantage to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c) directs courts to consider the marriage’s duration, dissipation of marital assets, and the assets each spouse brought to the marriage when dividing marital property equitably.

Mitzi Gay Gregory Blair v. Blair · filed 2002-10-10(c)

The trial court specifically found that the marriage was of short duration and that Defendant wasted and dissipated most of the marital assets. The court also considered the assets each party brought to the marriage. We find no evidence that the distribution of the equity in the marital residence was not equitable.

A spouse’s ability to acquire future assets and income is a factor in the equitable division of marital property.

Duke v. Duke · filed 2003-01-14(c)(4)

Mr. Duke received his insurance agency, which the court valued at $200,000. When we consider that this business is generating at least $56,000 a year in net income during an economic downturn, we think that award is the most significant award of all the marital property. One of the factors to be considered is the ability of one party to acquire future assets and income. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(4). Therefore, we do not think the trial judge’s division of the marital property was inequitable.

Section 36-4-121 requires courts to consider multiple factors when dividing marital property equitably; one spouse’s greater contribution is only one factor.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2003-05-19

Next, husband argues the marital property was improperly divided, and that he should have received more of the marital property because he contributed more, but this is only one of the many factors which must be considered. Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121 details the factors which are to be considered in making an equitable division of property, which include the duration of the marriage; the age, health, earning capacity, and needs of the parties; the contribution of each party to the marital estate; the value of the separate property of each; and the value of any property brought into the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Farnsworth v. Sidney W. Farnsworth, Iii · filed 2003-10-17(c)

When a trial court divides the marital property of a former husband and wife, it must consider certain factors in making its division as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (2003).

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider each spouse’s estate at the time of marriage along with other relevant factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Raines v. Raines · filed 2003-11-03(c)

From our review of the record, the trial court gave due consideration to this factor, and considered numerous other pertinent facts as well in making the distribution of marital property in this case. Considering the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining to divide the parties’ assets equally. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (Supp. 2002).

Section 36-4-121(c) allows a court dividing marital property to consider relevant conduct, including a spouse’s unauthorized use of the other spouse’s signature stamp.

Simpkins v. Peaches G. Blank · filed 2003-12-30(c)

While it is true that the trial court did consider Simpkins’ unauthorized use of Blank’s signature stamp to sign the amended tax return, the letter for the address change, and the tax refund check, nothing in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (2003) precludes the trial court from considering such an act. That statute directs courts to consider all “relevant factors” and then proceeds to list those factors which are included.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the marriage’s duration and each party’s contributions when dividing marital property; a short marriage does not guarantee restoration of premarital finances.

Morgan v. Morgan · filed 2003-02-13(c)

Among the factors to be considered in distributing marital property are the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to marital and separate property, and the estate of each party at the time of the marriage. ... The “marriage of short duration” principle cannot be interpreted as entitling a party to leave a marriage in the same economic position he or she entered it. Where financial difficulties arise during the marriage, the marital estate may become so depleted that it simply is not possible to restore a party’s finances to its premarital level through distribution of that marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(1) makes the duration of the marriage a factor in equitable distribution; a short marriage can support awarding a marital asset entirely to the spouse who supplied its purchase funds.

Louise-Wright v. Wright · filed 2003-05-30(c)(1)

Duration of the marriage is a factor specifically mentioned in the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1). ... This is an unusually short marriage by anyone’s standard. Wife contributed $70,000 of her separate property to the down payment on the marital residence; Husband contributed nothing. ... It is clear, beyond any doubt, that equity requires that Wife be vested with the full ownership of the marital residence.

Section 36-4-121(c)(8) makes the parties’ economic circumstances a factor in dividing marital property, but a difference in earning capacity does not automatically require an unequal division.

Hopkins v. Hopkins · filed 2003-06-25(c)(8)

Synthia Hopkins notes that the relative economic circumstances of the parties at the time of the division of assets is also a factor to be considered. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(8). ... In sum, it appears to us that while Mr. Hopkins’ salary does place him at an advantage relative to his former wife, the differences between the economic circumstances of the parties are not so great as to render an equal division of the marital property inequitable.

Section 36-4-121(c)(2) requires consideration of financial liabilities and needs, but a property division cannot be used to enforce an unregistered foreign support order.

Jolly v. Lynette Jolly · filed 2004-03-19(c)(2)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(2) provides that trial courts shall consider the parties’ financial liabilities and financial needs in dividing the marital estate. We conclude, however, that the practical effect of the chancery court’s consideration of the arrearage, as well as the discovery-related sanction, was to improperly enforce parts of the Kansas court’s decree.

The financial-liabilities factor does not permit a court to reduce a spouse’s property share by amounts in an unregistered foreign decree when doing so enforces that decree.

Jolly v. Jolly · filed 2004-04-22(c)(2)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36 — 4—121(c)(2) provides that trial courts shall consider the parties’ financial liabilities and financial needs in dividing the marital estate. We conclude, however, that the practical effect of the chancery court’s consideration of the ar-rearage, as well as the discovery-related sanction, was to improperly enforce parts of the Kansas court’s decree.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when equitably distributing marital property.

Watkins v. William C. Watkins, Jr. · filed 2004-12-14(c)

After considering the Trial Court’s overall property distribution in light of the various factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), we are unable to conclude that the property distribution was inequitable or that the Trial Court otherwise abused its discretion when distributing the parties’ marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) lists factors trial courts consider when equitably dividing marital property.

Reed v. Reed · filed 2004-12-30(c)

In issuing its ruling from the bench, the trial court addressed each of the factors listed in section 36-4-121(c), applying those factors applicable to this case. In the divorce decree, the parties received a roughly equal division of the value of the marital estate. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s division of the marital property was in line with the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this issue.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts dividing marital property to consider factors including each spouse’s ability to acquire future assets and income.

Crowe v. Crowe · filed 2005-07-14(c)

Section 36-4-121(c) of the Tennessee Code states what a trial court must consider when equitably dividing marital property: ... The trial court noted, and this Court agrees, that Father is much more capable of obtaining future capital assets; he stipulated that his gross income is $20,000.00 per month. ... Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its division of the parties’ marital estate.

Section 36-4-121 requires courts dividing marital property to consider the relevant statutory factors without considering marital fault.

Hunt v. Hunt · filed 2006-06-28(a)(1), (c)

The proceedings below and the orders of the trial court make it clear that the trial court gave no consideration to these statutory factors, but decided the marital property issue solely on the cocaine addiction of Mr. Hunt. ... While an adequate record could possibly justify such draconian measures, the record before this Court does not justify the disparity and is patently inequitable, especially in view of the statutory mandate against consideration of marital fault in the distribution of marital property.

Section 36-4-121 considers only the period the parties were married, excluding their premarital relationship, when weighing the duration of the marriage in dividing property.

Alma Edna Smith v. Smith · filed 2005-07-20(c)(1)

We believe it abundantly clear that the intent of the Legislature in enacting this statute concerning the equitable division of marital property was that only the period of time the parties were married is the relevant time frame under the statute.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital property when the spouses’ contributions and economic circumstances support it.

Campbell v. Campbell · filed 2006-08-08(c)

Because, in our view, the division of property is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c), we affirm the division made by the trial court.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts dividing marital property to consider relevant factors, including the marriage’s duration, each spouse’s earning capacity, their contributions, and their separate property.

Oakes v. Oakes · filed 2007-03-26(c)

Our analysis of this case in the context of the most relevant statutory factors set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)— the duration of the marriage, the earning capacity of each party, the contributions of each party, and the separate property of each party — persuades us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the parties’ net marital assets.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property that weighs relevant factors, including a spouse's age, homemaking contributions, and expected Social Security benefits.

Owens v. Owens · filed 2007-04-19(c)

We have also determined that this modified division of the marital estate properly balances the factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), particularly Ms. Owens's age, her longtime status and contributions as a homemaker, and the difference between her and Mr. Owens's anticipated Social Security benefits.

The equitable division factors are considered in light of the facts of each case; the duration of the marriage does not automatically carry more weight than the other factors.

Woodward v. Woodward · filed 2007-05-11(c)

In accord, we have noted on prior occasion that while “the duration of the marriage” appears as the first factor in the statute, “this should not be interpreted to mean that this factor should always carry more weight than the others. The factors are not listed in order of importance, and each is to be considered in relation to the specific facts of each case.” Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100, 108 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Section 36-4-121(c) permits a disproportionate division of marital property when the spouses’ circumstances and the overall equities support it.

Farnham v. Farnham · filed 2009-12-29(c)

Turning to Section 36-4-121(c), we first consider that this was a lengthy marriage of nearly 18 years. ... In our view, the overall equities between the parties supports a disproportionate award of the marital property to Wife. In short, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires a court to consider all relevant statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

McHugh v. McHugh · filed 2010-04-16(c)

As required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (2005), a trial court shall consider all relevant statutory factors “in making an equitable distribution of marital property.”

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division of marital property based on factors including the spouses’ premarital assets and ability to acquire future assets.

Harden v. Harden · filed 2010-06-30(c)

Prior to this division, the trial court considered the factors provided in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121(c). ... Based on these findings, we find that the trial court’s division of marital assets, including the marital home, was equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) does not list voluntary payments made during divorce proceedings among the specific factors for dividing marital property.

Stolze v. Stolze · filed 2011-04-05(c)

Whether a spouse has made or accepted voluntary payments during the pendency of a proceeding is not one of the specific factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) to be taken into account by the trial court in making an equitable division of marital property and we presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the trial court properly considered all pertinent matters.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital property, which need not be an equal division.

Dilley v. Dilley · filed 2011-05-23(a)(1)

An “equitable” division of marital property is not the same as an “equal” division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c)'s factors can support a roughly equal division when both spouses contributed to a long marriage and have similar financial circumstances in retirement.

Pijan v. Pijan · filed 2012-01-13(c)

In light of the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c), the facts in the present case support, as equitable, a division of the marital property that is more or less equal.

Section 36-4-121 directs courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s earning capacity, age, education, health, and available Social Security benefits.

Rountree v. Rountree · filed 2012-02-01

Trial court’s are directed to consider a multitude of factors in the division of marital property, including the earning capacity of the parties, the relative age, education, and physical health of the parties, and the social security benefits available to either spouse.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider all relevant factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Alyson Leigh Amonette Eberting v. Eberting · filed 2012-02-27(c)

In essence, Wife is requesting this Court tweak the Trial Court’s distribution of the marital estate. We decline to do so. The Trial Court considered all the relevant factors in light of the evidence. A careful and thorough review of the record on appeal reveals no reversible error in the Trial Court’s overall distribution of the marital estate.

In dividing marital property after a long marriage, a court gives the parties’ premarital assets less weight.

Schroer v. Schroer · filed 2011-08-25(c)(7)

When the marriage is one of long duration, however, the pre-marital assets assume far less importance.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits courts to consider a spouse’s contributions throughout the marriage when dividing marital property equitably.

Hartline v. Hartline · filed 2014-01-13(c)

We further determine that in addition to other statutory factors, the trial court properly considered Wife’s contributions to the marriage, both before and after 2003, as well as her expenditure of funds in order to have money on which to live in the more recent years of the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Hudson v. Hudson · filed 2014-06-23(c)

We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the factors set forth under Section 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c)(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s relative ability to acquire capital assets in the future.

Dobbs v. Dobbs · filed 2012-08-07(c)(4)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(4) requires the court to consider “the relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets” in its division and distribution of marital property. We are concerned that failing to make any provision for Husband’s release from the debt encumbering the marital residence may be contrary to § 36-4-121(c)(4). As a consequence, we remand the case for the court to determine a reasonable time for Wife to secure Husband’s release from indebtedness and to amend the final decree accordingly.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider listed factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Franks v. Franks · filed 2015-01-02(c)

Trial courts have “wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property.” Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); however, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-121(c) directs the trial court to consider a list of factors when making equitable division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Kabiri v. Kabiri · filed 2015-10-16(c)

The record before us does not reflect any failure by the trial court to consider the relevant factors in distributing the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) makes each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition, preservation, and appreciation of property a factor in the equitable division of marital property.

Hardin v. Hensley-Hardin · filed 2015-12-18(c)(5)(A)

Contrary to the Parties‟ contentions, the record reflects that the factors of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) guided the distribution of the marital estate. Great weight was given to Wife‟s substantial contribution to the acquisition, preservation and appreciation of the Company in the form of her loan forgiveness and labor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A).

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider its listed factors when equitably dividing marital property; the parties’ tax treatment of interest cannot substitute for that analysis.

St. John-Parker v. Parker · filed 2016-05-17(c)

We, therefore, remand to give the trial court an opportunity to make a proper equitable determination concerning the division of the debentures, all of which have been determined to be marital property, upon consideration of the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121 requires consideration of the statutory factors when dividing marital property, with sufficient findings to permit review of whether the division is equitable.

Kirby v. Kirby · filed 2016-07-25(c)

In the absence of sufficient findings and conclusions regarding the valuation of all property at issue and the statutory factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121, we cannot determine whether each party was awarded an equitable portion of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c) allows a court to weigh the spouses’ future ability to acquire assets and the value of their separate property when equitably dividing marital property.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2016-12-29(c)

The court did not state the weight it assigned to any particular factor and, taken in context, we do not find that the court‟s reliance on factors (4) and (6) is in any way inappropriate;2 the findings are supported by the record, and the division is not the result of a misapplication of the factors.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the relevant statutory factors.

Cox v. Cox · filed 2017-12-20(c)

Here, other than the trial court’s announced intention to “equalize” the division, the court provided little or no explanation for its division. The court failed to identify the relevant statutory factors or explain how those factors impacted its decision.

Section 36-4-121(c)(11) allows a court dividing marital property to consider other factors needed to reach an equitable result.

Larsen v. Giannakoulias · filed 2018-10-26(c)(11)

The trial court may also consider “such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(11).

Section 36-4-121(c) allows the length of the marriage and dissipation of assets to support awarding one spouse a greater share of marital property.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2021-02-11(c)

And based on the factual findings made by the court, the court relied heavily on two statutory factors in making its property division: duration of the marriage and dissipation of assets. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(1), (5)(B). ... Given the facts, we cannot say the court’s division of the marital property was inequitable or an abuse of discretion. The timing of Husband’s property transfers, along with the length of the marriage, favored awarding a greater percentage of the marital assets to Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c) allows a court to consider a spouse’s separate assets and ability to earn income and acquire assets when dividing marital property equitably.

Long v. Long · filed 2021-09-27(c)

In response to Wife’s argument, we do not find that the trial court overemphasized Wife’s separate assets, especially when coupled with the trial court’s finding that she had the greater ability to earn future income and acquire future assets. We determine that the manner in which the trial court weighed the factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) was consistent with logic and reason and that the result to these parties was equitable.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an equal division of marital property when the statutory factors and evidence support it.

Owens v. Owens · filed 2021-11-24(c)

Based on the statutory factors and the trial court’s broad discretion, we find no error in the trial court’s distribution of marital property, which resulted in an award of 50% of the marital estate to each party.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires a court dividing marital property to analyze the applicable statutory factors and make findings that explain the division.

Jennifer Lynn Morgan Esposito v. Esposito · filed 2023-12-12(c)

In its final order, the trial court did not undertake an analysis of the statutory factors when distributing the marital estate. Although the court did make some findings of fact that corresponded to certain of the statutory factors, such as the court’s findings that “both parties [were] able bodied, employed and not in need of alimony,” the court’s order does not demonstrate a properly reasoned analysis of the applicable factors in this case.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires an equitable division of marital property based on a reasoned weighing of the relevant factors.

Julie C. W. v. Frank Mitchell W. Jr. · filed 2021-08-30(c)

The manner in which the Trial Court weighed the statutory factors found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) is consistent with neither logic or reason.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant factors when dividing marital property, with findings sufficient to show how they reached the division.

Kerley v. Kerley · filed 2024-07-17(c)

For these reasons, we vacate the trial court’s division of the parties’ accumulated marital assets and remand to the trial court with instructions to amend its final order to include written, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with § 36-4-121(c).

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant property distribution factors, but does not require a separate analysis of each factor when the findings show they were considered.

Leonard v. Kimberly Champion Leonard · filed 2024-10-02(c)

At the outset, we note that the trial court did not set forth a factor-by-factor analysis in the section of its final decree devoted to the distribution of marital property. However, upon review of the court’s order as a whole, including its factual findings and analysis related to spousal support, we conclude that the court did sufficiently consider the property distribution factors relied upon by Wife as well as other relevant factors.

A trial court may consider the statutory factors for dividing marital property without expressly addressing each one in its findings.

Cali v. Cali · filed 2025-12-03(c)

On appeal, Father alleges that the trial court failed to apply any of the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) to the facts of this case. We disagree. ... As to the final factor, the trial court clearly placed great weight on Father’s choice not to work and to instead incur a significant debt to pay for his living expenses and attorney’s fees.

Section 36-4-121 requires valuation of marital property and application of the statutory factors when distributing the marital estate.

Ewald v. Ewald · filed 2026-02-03(c)

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court as to the distribution of the marital estate and remand for valuation and distribution in accordance with the statutory factors as well as for findings that elucidate the trial court’s decision.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires a trial court to consider the statutory factors when dividing marital property.

Cowan v. Cowan · filed 2024-11-06(c)

Incident to the trial court’s disposition of the parties’ interest in all the cattle and its overall division of the marital estate, the trial court should consider the statutory factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) that, under its current order, are not addressed.

Section 36-4-121(c)(12) permits a court dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s care of grandchildren when that care bears on the equities between the parties.

Henry v. Henry · filed 2025-01-27(c)(12)

Under the circumstances of the present case, given the latitude afforded to the trial court under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(12), we cannot find fault in the trial court considering the role of the house in Wife’s care of the grandchildren.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contribution to preserving or dissipating marital or separate property.

Brenda Dianne Cook Rayfield v. Rayfield · filed 2014-05-06(c)(5)

As noted by Wife, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(5) provides that one of the factors the court shall consider in making an equitable division is “[t]he contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property.” Husband engaged in actions that dissipated the marital property available for equitable distribution during his involvement with Ms. Valentine. It further is undisputed that the IRS was taking action to collect the debt which put all of the assets at risk. The couple was denied an opportunity to resolve the debt with collection alternatives being offered because Husband would not cooperate by filling out the required Form 433A. But for the actions of Wife, there would be no marital property, as the parties would have lost everything that they had. In our view, the trial court properly determined that the award of $58,700 of the marital estate to Wife versus $23,700 awarded to Husband was a fair and equitable division.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) gives trial courts discretion to divide marital property before finding fault.

Bowman v. Bowman · filed 1991-10-18(a)(1)

Chapter 682, Public Acts of 1988 amended the language to provide that the trial court “may”, giving the trial court discretion to make a distribution prior to finding fault.

Section 36-4-121 permits a court to consider each spouse’s contribution when dividing marital property, but prohibits considering marital fault.

Koch v. Koch · filed 1993-10-15(c)(5)

We do not interpret the trial court’s statement as indicating that it considered fault on the part of the Wife as a factor in the division. To the contrary, it appears to this Court that the court’s comment concerned factor number five above. The court has wide discretion in making a division of marital property. It appears to this Court that the trial court properly considered the factors involved and did not in any sense of the word abuse its discretion in the property division made.

Marital property must be divided equitably without regard to fault.

Phyllis Ann Frazier Hamby v. Joseph Dewight Hamby and Anthony Hamby - Concurring · filed 1998-07-09(a)(1)

T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1) provides that marital property shall be divided equitably, witho ut regard to f ault.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) prohibits courts from considering marital fault when dividing marital property.

Wilkerson v. Wilkerson · filed 1998-07-16(a)(1)

It is well settled that a trial court may not consider fault in the division of marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires an equitable division of marital property without regard to fault.

Ray v. Ray · filed 1997-05-09(a)

There is no showing that the trial court incorrectly considered fault in the division of the marital assets. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and we find no error in the trial court’s division of the marital assets.

Section 36-4-121(a) makes marital fault irrelevant to equitable division of marital property and to enforcement of valid antenuptial agreements concerning property that may become marital property.

Perkinson v. Perkinson · filed 1990-12-31(a)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(a) provides that marital property shall be equitably divided “without regard to marital fault.” It follows that valid antenuptial agreements relating to marital property, or separate property an interest in which may become marital property, will be enforced without regard to marital fault.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires courts to divide marital property without regard to fault and prohibits using the division to punish a spouse’s misconduct.

Castelli v. Castelli · filed 1994-10-15(a)(1)

The Court, however, cannot consider fault when distributing the marital property or fashioning the distribution based on punishing a party’s conduct.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires equitable division of marital property without regard to fault.

Jennitia Jane Blanton Isbell v. Isbell · filed 1999-07-02(a)(1)

However, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(a)(1) provides that marital property should be divided equitably without regard to fault.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires marital property and debts to be divided without regard to fault.

Anthony Gale Wix v. Wix · filed 2001-03-07(a)(1)

A division of marital property and debts should be undertaken without regard to fault.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires marital property to be assigned without regard to fault, so a postnuptial agreement cannot make its division depend solely on a spouse’s fault.

Bratton v. Bratton · filed 2002-12-13(a)(1)

Yet, the Agreement preempts the court from equitably assigning the marital property without consideration of fault, and preempts the court from considering the issue of alimony, and essentially would award the wife one-half of the husband’s future income based solely upon fault. We hold these provisions are void as against public policy in this State within the context of the parties’ Agreement which predicates the benefits to the wife solely on husband’s fault.

Section 36-4-121(g)(2) allows an enforceable antenuptial agreement to govern property division even when the property would otherwise be marital.

Bryant v. Bryant · filed 2004-04-28(g)(2)

The statute continues: “Nothing in this section shall affect validity of an antenuptial agreement which is enforceable under § 36-3-501.” ... Under the terms of the Agreement in this case, it does not matter whether the property fits the statutory definition of separate property or marital property, or whether Wife contributed to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation of the property.

Subsection (g) allows spouses to agree before marriage on the division of property acquired during marriage and permits courts to incorporate that agreement into a divorce decree.

Swift v. Gale Joann (Ritchie) Swift · filed 2005-12-27(g)

Additionally, parties may agree prior to marriage on the division at divorce of property acquired during the marriage. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(g); Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d at 603. Courts are specifically authorized to incorporate such agreements on the division of property into a divorce decree. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(g).

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) prohibits courts from considering either spouse’s fault when dividing marital property.

Booker v. Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. · filed 2006-10-26(a)(1)

Fault of a party is not to be considered in dividing marital property. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a)(1).

Section 36-4-121(a)(1)(A) makes marital fault irrelevant to the classification and division of marital property.

Jones v. Jones · filed 2023-07-17(a)(1)(A)

The vast majority of this case involves the classification and division of marital property, an issue where fault is irrelevant. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(a)(1)(A). As such, Husband has failed to demonstrate any reversible error in the trial court’s decision to limit evidence of fault.

Section 36-4-121 leaves the valuation date to the trial court’s discretion, provided the date bears a relationship to the divorce proceeding and the nature of the property.

Wallace v. Wallace · filed 1987-04-22

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 provides no direction concerning when the value of marital property should be determined. ... Thus, we cannot perceive of any reason why this discretion should not extend to setting the date upon which the value of the marital property will be determined as long as the date chosen bears some relationship to the divorce proceeding and nature of the property itself.

Marital property must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date; older source data affects the weight of an expert’s trial date valuation, not its admissibility.

Wright v. Quillen · filed 1995-03-29(b)(1)(A)

As to the staleness claim, our statutes require that marital property should be valued “as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(l)(A). ... We think the expert’s testimony related to the value of Wright Travel as of the date of the trial. The objections to the reliability of the data on which he based his opinion go to the weight to be given his testimony and not to its admissibility.

Marital property must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date; the court used the bank accounts’ hearing-date balance.

Arp v. Arp · filed 1998-03-13(b)(1)(A)

Marital pro perty must be “ valued as o f a date as n ear as reaso nably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” T.C.A.§ 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). The value on the date of the divorce hearing should have been the value utilized by the Court, and that amount must be substituted in the Court’s judgment for “cash on hand”.

Marital property must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.

Roth v. Roth · filed 2001-03-20(b)(1)(A)

We agree with Dr. Roth that the trial court erroneously valued the parties’ joint account and Dr. Roth’s checking account. When trial courts value marital property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(b)(1)(A) requires them to value the property “as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.”

A marital home should be valued by its equity for property division; correcting its value does not upset a division that remains equitable.

Cain v. Cain · filed 2004-03-03(b)(1)(A)

Accordingly, this Court holds that the equity value of the home, $135,384.50, should have been used in the court’s distribution but such a modification from $124,484.21 to the equity value does not render the distribution of marital property inequitable.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) requires stock options accrued during the marriage to be valued as close as possible to the final divorce hearing; options accrued after the divorce decree are separate property.

Norman v. Melissa Dawn Norman · filed 2005-10-31(b)(1)(A)

The plain language of the statute provides that valuation of the vested and unvested stock options accrued during the marriage and distributed pursuant to the divorce decree are evaluated as close as possible to the final hearing date on the divorce.

Section 36-4-121 permits a court to account for dissipation when valuing and dividing marital property, including by using an earlier value for an affected asset.

Willie v. Melvin, III v. Anita Louise Johnson-Melvin · filed 2006-04-27(b)(1)

Although the decree entered by the trial court is innovative, it is nevertheless a straightforward attempt to address the dissipation in the simplest manner given the particular facts involved in this controversy. ... The record substantiates the trial court’s actions, and we cannot find an abuse of the trial court’s discretion which would warrant reversal.

Marital property should be valued as close to the final hearing as reasonably possible; debt reduction alone does not establish its value when fair market value is also relevant.

Lisa Bass Collins v. Stephen Butler Collins · filed 2009-09-29(b)(1)(A)

The trial court is instructed to value the property as close to the final hearing as reasonably possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). ... We find that the trial court erred in using only the amount of debt reduction during marriage to establish the marital value of these items. ... Therefore we reverse the trial court’s ... determination and remand to make a determination using the correct analysis of value, incorporating both evidence of fair market value of the property and debt reduction, where appropriate.

When spouses have not legally separated, marital property is valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing.

Bunch v. Bunch · filed 2008-06-30(b)(1)(A)

In the case now before us, Wife and Husband were not legally separated prior to trial. Therefore, the Trial Court correctly valued Husband’s 401k as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing.

Marital property must be valued as near as possible to the date of the order finally dividing it.

Janson Pope v. Sayuri Pope · filed 2010-10-28(b)(1)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) requires that “[a]ll marital property . . . be valued as of a date as near as possible to the date of entry of the order finally dividing the marital property.”

Marital property should be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing; a later reduction in a business’s tax lien alone does not establish a new business value.

Burton v. Mooneyham · filed 2012-03-28(b)(1)(A)

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), marital property should be valued “as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” ... In light of the expert’s testimony that his opinion of the value of Access was as of December 2008, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision, after the May 2011 hearing, to use the reduced lien amount as of May 2011 instead of the lien amount used in the expert’s original calculations. As the expert testified, the value as of the time of a reduced lien amount would depend upon the overall financial status of the company at that time. We, therefore, conclude that the proper net value for Husband’s business was $200,000.

Marital property must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date; a later pension payout does not require a new valuation.

Anthony v. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson · filed 2011-03-30(b)(1)(A)

Marital property is to be valued “as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). If Father’s pension fund was valued as of the date of its actual payout in September 2004, nearly three years after the divorce decree, it would, presumably, have included amounts attributable to Father’s post-divorce contributions. Therefore, Mother’s request for an amended valuation was properly denied.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) requires courts to value marital property before dividing it equitably; a valuation within the range supported by the evidence may be affirmed.

Tippens-Florea v. Florea · filed 2012-05-31(a)(1)

After classifying the parties’ property as either marital or separate, the trial court is charged with equitably dividing, distributing, or assigning the marital property in “proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). As part of its responsibility to divide the marital estate equitably, the trial court must determine the value of the property included. ... By accepting the value as testified to by Mr. Tippens, the trial court placed a value on the marital gun collection that was within the range of the values presented.

Marital property must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.

Ruiz v. Sheila Lea Ruiz · filed 2014-10-27(b)(1)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) requires that marital property be “valued as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” Husband’s 401(k) account should have been valued at the net amount of $164,277.30 instead of the $131,226 figure utilized by the trial court.

Marital assets must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.

Haltom v. Haltom · filed 2021-02-10(b)(1)(A)

The statute clearly states that marital assets are to be “valued as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). Thus, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

Section 36-4-121 requires the trial court to classify and value relevant property and consider the statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably.

Romey Green, III v. Kasandra Cherry Green · filed 2021-04-12

Therefore, upon remand, the trial court shall enter an order containing sufficient findings and conclusions regarding the classification and valuation of all relevant property, including the possessory interest in the marital home, along with its analysis of the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121(b)(2)(A)’s valuation date did not govern the division of sale proceeds in a later partition action when the parties’ marital dissolution agreement entitled a spouse to half the equity when the house sold.

Taylor Brocato (now Dunn) v. Young · filed 2024-01-02(b)(2)(A)

Wife contends that the trial court erred in valuing her half of the equity in the home as of the date of the parties’ divorce in 2019 pursuant to the Distribution of Marital Property Statute. She contends that this was error because the MDA expressly provides that she was entitled to fifty percent of any equity in the marital residence “when the house sells,” which did not occur until 2023. We agree. ... Accordingly, based on the unique facts of this case, the trial court’s decision concerning the value of Wife’s equity in the former marital residence is reversed, and this matter is remanded for the court to determine the amount of Wife’s equity in the former marital residence based on “half of what [was] made” when the former marital residence was sold in 2023.

Marital property must be valued as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing; a spouse who withholds updated financial information cannot then challenge the valuation for using older figures.

Byrd v. Valerie Finley Byrd v. Byrd Brothers, LLC · filed 2022-10-31(b)(1)(A)

Thus, marital property includes “any property to which a right was acquired up to the date of the final divorce hearing, and valued as of a date as near as reasonably possible to the final divorce hearing date[.]” ... The trial court complied with this directive. To the extent that Husband also contends that the trial court impermissibly utilized ... “outdated” information at the time of trial, we disagree. The trial court repeatedly emphasized that Husband’s failure to cooperate in providing information made valuing the assets more difficult. Husband cannot steadfastly refuse to produce information and then complain on appeal that the trial court failed to use the most recent figures.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) requires marital property to be valued as near as reasonably possible to the date the decree declares the parties divorced.

Duffer v. Duffer · filed 2024-03-08(b)(1)(A)

In the present case, the trial court entered a decree declaring the parties divorced on January 22, 2020. Thus, the marital residence should have been valued as near as possible to that date.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) requires marital property to be valued as near as possible to the divorce decree, without an exception for delay caused by a spouse’s criminal proceedings.

Cayson v. Cayson · filed 2024-10-24(b)(1)(A)

The statute uses mandatory language requiring the trial court to value the property as near as possible to the date of the divorce decree and does not include any exceptions.

Section 36-4-121(d) permits a court to award either spouse the right to live in the family home for a reasonable period, with special consideration for a spouse who has physical custody of a child.

Scarbrough v. Scarbrough · filed 1988-02-08(d)

Under the facts of this case it was certainly proper for the trial court to allow Wife to reside in the homeplace with Trina.

Section 36-4-121(d) calls for special consideration of the spouse with physical custody of the children when dividing the marital home.

Miglin v. Daniel Walter Miglin - Concurring · filed 1998-08-05(d)

First, the Legislature has instructed the courts that in dealing with the marital home “special consideration” should be given to the spouse having physical custody of the children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(d).

Section 36-4-121(d) allows a court to award the marital home to either spouse after considering the property distribution factors, with special consideration for the spouse who has physical custody of the children.

Brenda S. (Cunningham) Campbell v. Campbell · filed 1998-11-04(d)

By statute, the trial court is authorized to award the marital home to either party, after considering the relevant factors set forth in the property distribution statute and giving special consideration to the spouse having physical custody of any children of the marriage.

Section 36-4-121(d) requires special consideration for the party with custody of minor children when awarding the marital residence.

Siegel v. Siegel · filed 1999-03-05(d)

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(d) directs that “special consideration” be given to the party with custody of minor children when awarding the marital residence.

Section 36-4-121(d) requires special consideration for the spouse with physical custody of the children when awarding the family home.

McClure v. Stacy Dawn McClure · filed 2000-03-02(d)

We find that the circumstances in this case warrant according Husband, as the party with custody of the children, the special consideration required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(d), and that the trial court erred in ordering the marital home sold along with the parties’ other property.

Section 36-4-121(d) requires special consideration for the spouse with physical custody of the children when awarding the family home.

Terry v. Terry · filed 2000-06-29(d)

Our legislature requires the court to “give special consideration to a spouse having physical custody of a child or children of the marriage” when awarding the family home. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(d) (1996). We find no error in the trial court’s award of the marital residence to Mother.

Section 36-4-121(d) requires special consideration for the spouse with physical custody of a child of the marriage when awarding the family home.

Cupples v. Cupples · filed 2001-12-10(d)

We note that in dividing the marital estate, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(d) provides that courts "shall give special consideration to a spouse having physical custody of a child . . . of the marriage" when making an award of the family home. Certainly this was considered by the trial court when awarding the marital residence to Husband.