Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121

Section 36-4-121(d) permits a court to award the family home to either spouse and requires special consideration for a spouse with physical custody of the children.

Engstrom v. Engstrom · filed 2002-03-21(d)

We also note that section (d) of the same statute reads, “The court may award the family home and household effects, or the right to live therein and use the household effects for a reasonable period, to either party, but shall give special consideration to a spouse having physical custody of a child or children of the marriage.” It thus appears equitable to us that Ms. Engstrom should receive the marital home.

Section 36-4-121(a)(3) permits a court to award the marital home to one spouse and require payment of the other spouse’s share of its equity within 120 days.

Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick v. Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. · filed 2010-01-28(a)(3)

In our view, it was well within the trial court’s discretion to effectuate the distribution of the parties’ largest marital asset by awarding the home to Husband while ordering that Wife receive her share of the equity within 120 days.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider statutory factors when dividing marital property; contributions to a marital home do not necessarily require unequal shares of its equity.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2010-09-28(c)

We have examined the division of property in light of the statutory factors and find no abuse of discretion. This marriage lasted fifteen years and the house was built soon after the parties married. The house is no doubt marital property, including everything “pitched in” by both spouses and their parents.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for an equitable division based on the circumstances of the case; marital debts need not be divided in the same proportion as marital assets.

Mondelli v. Howard · filed 1989-09-29(c)

We decline to adopt such a mechanical approach to the distribution of marital estates. Standardized formulas are ill-suited for property divisions. These divisions must be equitable, not equal or uniform from one case to the next. Whether a particular distribution is fair depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case viewed in light of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c). Simply requiring that parties' debt obligations equal the value of the assets received is no substitute for the equitable balancing process traditionally followed by our courts.

When spouses acquire real property as joint tenants, the purchasing spouse is presumed to have made a gift to the marital estate, but may rebut that presumption.

Kincaid v. Kincaid · filed 1995-05-12(a)(1)

When spouses acquire real property as joint tenants, a rebuttable presumption exists that the purchasing spouse made a gift to the marital estate. ... From our review of the record, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that Husband failed to rebut this presumption.

Section 36-4-121(c)'s factors inform the equitable division of marital debt, along with who incurred the debt, its purpose, who benefited, and who can better assume it.

Mansfield v. Deborah Ann Wills Mansfield · filed 1995-11-03(c)

In addition to the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (1991), trial courts dividing debt should consider (1) the party who incurred the debt, (2) the purpose of the debt, (3) the party or parties who benefitted from the debt, and (4) the party better able to assume the debt.

Section 36-4-121 permits a court to consider the parties’ needs and ability to pay when dividing marital assets and debts.

Blankenship v. Blankenship · filed 2001-04-23

While we agree with Husband that the debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service is marital debt, upon a consideration of the factors enumerated in T.C.A. § 36-4-121, we find that the trial court’s division of the marital estate meets the criteria referred to by the King Court. Wife is in need of the marital home and the larger vehicle as she has custody of the four minor children. The tax debt was incurred while Husband was the sole bread winner for the parties and their children, therefore, he is responsible for taxes on his income earned during the marriage. In addition, Husband has the ability to pay the debt, while Wife would be required draw from funds awarded for her support and the support of the children in repaying the debt. In the division of assets and debts, the trial court is affirmed.

A debt incurred after an order declaring the parties divorced may be marital debt if the divorce case remains pending.

Russell v. Russell · filed 2002-01-14(b)(1)(A)

We agree with the trial court that the loan is a marital debt; although an order had already been entered declaring the parties divorced when Wife procured the loan, the case was still pending before the trial court.

Section 36-4-121(c) permits an unequal division of marital debt after considering the spouses’ contributions and their ability to acquire assets in the future.

Goldberg v. Goldberg · filed 2003-01-16(c)

Applying the statutory requirements and caselaw to this situation, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it divided the marital property and marital debt. In this case, during the parties’ twenty-year marriage, Wife primarily raised the parties’ children while Husband built his career and enhanced his earning capacity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5). Moreover, Husband’s income is at least four times greater than Wife’s; thus, his ability to acquire capital assets in the future is much greater than that of Wife. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(2) and (4).

Debts incurred by either spouse during the marriage, up to the final divorce hearing, are marital debts.

Alford v. Pamela Ward Alford · filed 2003-11-06(b)(1)(A)

We take this opportunity to define “marital debt” consistent with the definition of “marital property” in Tennessee. “Marital property” is defined by statute as “all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing a complaint for divorce....” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) (2001). We now hold that “marital debts” are all debts incurred by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing.

Marital debt must be allocated equitably; debt associated with a valueless asset need not be assigned entirely to the spouse awarded that asset.

Edenfield v. Kara Leigh Cooper Edenfield · filed 2005-10-31(a)(1)

We hold that an equitable distribution of property and allocation of debts requires that the $50,000 debt incurred for the purchase of the one-half interest in First Choice be allocated equally between the parties.

Section 36-4-121 requires an equitable division of marital debt that accounts for the spouses’ relative earning capacities and economic circumstances.

Widener v. Widener · filed 2011-08-12(c)

The factors to be considered by the trial court when dividing the marital estate are set forth in § 36-4-121(c) of the Tennessee Code. ... In light of the equities between the parties, including their relative earning capacities and Ms. Widener’s economic disadvantage relative to Mr. Widener, we find the assignment of debt in this case to be unsupported by the record.

Section 36-4-121(c)(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s ability to acquire future assets, including the effect of continuing liability for debt on property awarded to the other spouse.

Mobley v. Caffa-Mobley · filed 2012-11-30(c)(4)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(4) requires the court to consider “the relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets” in its division and distribution of marital property. ... Therefore, based upon the record before us, we have determined that a reasonable time frame should be established by which Wife is required to satisfy the indebtedness on the Miami, Florida property for which Husband is jointly and severally liable, either by selling the property and paying the entire indebtedness or by refinancing in a manner by which Husband shall be fully released from any liability on the indebtedness.

Debts incurred during marriage remain marital debts for equitable distribution even if one spouse later receives a bankruptcy discharge.

Strickland v. Strickland · filed 2012-12-21

Whether or not Mother is liable for these debts does not change the fact that these were marital debts when they were incurred; thus, the trial court correctly considered them as marital debts in making an equitable distribution of the marital estate.

Debts incurred during the marriage are marital debts subject to equitable distribution; debts incurred before marriage are excluded.

Yattoni-Prestwood v. Prestwood · filed 2012-08-29(b)(1)(A)

Because the loan was not a debt incurred by either party during the marriage, it is not included within the definition of “marital debt.” It follows that the Intermont loan is not subject to distribution as a part of the division of the marital estate; rather, the loan is a pre-marriage obligation of Husband and Wife.

Equitable division of a marital estate includes allocating marital debt as well as dividing marital property.

Rogin v. Rogin · filed 2013-07-10

The division of the marital estate includes both the division of the marital property and the allocation of the marital debt.

Marital debt is subject to equitable division, and its definition corresponds to the statutory definition of marital property.

Luplow v. Luplow · filed 2014-06-19(b)(1)(A)

Although marital debt is not defined by statute, it is subject to equitable division in the same manner as marital property and its definition corresponds with that of marital property provided in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

Section 36-4-121(c) permits assigning business debts to the spouse awarded the associated assets when the statutory factors and evidence support that division.

Street v. Ed Street · filed 2017-03-29(c)

We hold that the trial court’s division of marital property is consistent with the statutory factors of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and is supported by the preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121 gives trial courts broad discretion to allocate marital debt and does not require a forced sale when the spouse awarded a home cannot refinance its mortgage.

Ingram v. Ingram · filed 2018-06-07(c)

Thus, given the trial court’s “broad discretion over allocating the responsibility for paying marital debts[,]” we conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to force a sale of the marital home after Wife could not refinance the mortgage.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires courts to consider the relevant factors when equitably dividing the marital estate, including marital debt.

Poole v. Kinslow · filed 2019-11-05(c)

We will defer to the trial court’s decision “unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” ... Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot say the trial court’s allocation was in error.

Section 36-4-121 requires a court dividing the marital estate to account for marital debt, either in the value of an asset or in the allocation of debt.

Bates v. Bates · filed 2020-07-09(c)

Thus, the additional $935,000 in shareholder receivables debt needed to be taken into account when the trial court divided the marital estate by either subtracting it from Mr. Womack’s $3,463,000 valuation of the Company or including it with the marital debt.

A spouse’s inability to refinance a marital home does not, by itself, make an otherwise equitable division of marital property inequitable under § 36-4-121(c).

Brown v. Brown · filed 2018-10-25(c)

Similarly, in the case at bar, the evidence preponderated in favor of the trial court’s finding that Wife would be unable to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence in order to place the debt solely in her name due to her lack of employment history. This fact alone does not, however, render the trial court’s distribution of marital property inequitable considering the parties’ circumstances. Having thoroughly reviewed the trial court’s overall distribution of marital property in its entirety, we determine that the distribution was equitable, including the trial court’s award of the marital residence to Wife. The trial court properly considered the factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121, and the court’s findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) permits a court to equitably divide marital debt on a party’s request, including after a supplemental decree that has not resolved the debt.

Davis v. Samantha Jean (Davis) Hofer · filed 2022-07-19(a)(1)

Here, based on the reservation clause found in the decree of divorce and the evidentiary hearing held by the court, the record shows that just such a request was made. And that request was not satisfied by the supplemental decree or any prior order of the court. So the court did not err in classifying and assigning debt after entry of the supplemental decree.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) includes only unpaid divorce attorney fees and expenses in marital debt.

Perks v. Elizabeth Mundy (Perkins) Sloane · filed 2025-04-14(b)(1)(B)

This section now includes within the definition of marital debt, “unpaid attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the [divorce] proceedings through the date of the final hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). It is apparent from the record that the trial court divided the total amount of attorney’s fees and expenses Wife had incurred, not solely the fees that remained unpaid. Therefore, the cited statute did not provide the trial court with the authority to divide the fees in this manner.

A debt incurred for a corporation’s benefit and paid by it can be classified as nonmarital debt.

ELLIS v. MELISA JANE GODFREY ELLIS · filed 2026-06-05

Based on this record, the $718,561.63 debt is not marital; rather, it was incurred for the benefit of QMS and is paid on by QMS. As found by the trial court, the debt belongs to “QMS and/or Wedgecorp and Mr. Triplett.” The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s classification of $718,561.63 of the Campus Loan as non-marital debt. We affirm the trial court on this issue.

Separate property titled jointly in both spouses’ names is presumed to be a gift to the marital estate, unless evidence shows an intent to keep it separate.

Barnhill v. Barnhill · filed 1991-07-17(b)(2)

By assuming title in joint tenancy, there exists a rebuttable presumption the Husband made a gift to the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(b)(2) includes gifts between spouses as separate property when intent, delivery, and acceptance establish a completed gift.

Hanover v. Hanover · filed 1989-03-14(b)(2)

The statute does not exclude spousal gifts from the definition. The matter to be determined where there are interspousal gifts is whether a gift actually occurred. Each case must stand on its own facts. A completed gift requires an intention to make a gift, delivery, and acceptance.

Section 36-4-121 treats property as marital property for divorce division; that classification does not establish that spouses jointly own it.

Spence v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 1994-08-22(b)(1)(D)

Therefore, property acquired by spouses during marriage does not automatically become marital property simply because it was acquired during marriage; the parties must first request the court to divide the property as part of formal divorce proceedings.

Section 36-4-121 classifies property as marital for division upon divorce; that classification alone creates no property interest in a spouse’s separately owned assets.

Blair v. Hohenberg (In Re Hohenberg) · filed 1994-08-30(b)(1)(D)

“Marital property” within the meaning of Tennessee’s statute is not a preexisting property interest, and the concept has no real meaning outside of the realm of marital dissolution. The existence of the term “marital property” and its concepts do not grant the bankruptcy court any authority to divest “marital property” out of one spouse and place it into the bankruptcy estate.

Property acquired in exchange for separate property remains separate property, even if acquired during the marriage.

David Swett, Sr. v. Grace Z. Aleman Swett · filed 1999-06-15(b)(2)(B)

Separate property includes property acquired in exchange for separate property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B). Therefore, any real property acquired in exchange for income from the restaurant is separate property. The trial court correctly excluded the real property at 2725 Clifton Avenue from the marital estate.

Property owned before marriage is separate property; treating it as marital property requires evidence before it can be included in the marital estate.

Moore v. Moore · filed 1999-12-10(b)(2)(A)

While it is reasonable to surmise that the china, silver and crystal were treated as marital property during the marriage, there was no evidence to that effect. In view of the limited evidence in the record below, we must hold the trial court erred in finding that this particular property was marital property.

Property a spouse owned before marriage is separate property; unproven appreciation from later improvements does not make it marital property.

James Nelson s. Victoria Nelson · filed 2001-08-30(b)(2)(A)

Separate property is defined, in pertinent part, as “[a]ll real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A). ... Because the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings and because of the deference we must give the Trial Court’s assessments of credibility, we affirm the Trial Court’s determination that the real property was Husband’s separate property.

Property acquired before marriage is separate property, and the other spouse’s signature on its sale deed alone gives that spouse no interest in the property or sale proceeds.

Gray v. Gray · filed 2003-07-31(b)(2)

Further, Mr. Gray acquired the Deal Avenue duplex long before he established a relationship with Ms. Gray, and thus it must be considered to be his separate property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2). The fact that the buyer required the wife’s signature on the deed before purchasing it did not give her any interest in it or right to the proceeds from its sale.

Section 36-4-121 treats an IRA funded with premarital assets as separate property when its appreciation is market driven and neither spouse contributes to it during the marriage.

Hoback v. Hoback · filed 2004-04-05(b)(1)(B)

All funds used to purchase the Wal-mart stock IRA were pre-marital money. ... The appreciation in value of the Wal-mart sock has been entirely market driven. ... The trial court did not err in awarding the IRA to the wife as her separate property.

Property acquired before marriage is separate property.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2004-06-14(b)(2)(A)

We agree with Mr. Miller that savings bonds acquired prior to the parties’ marriage are his separate property under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A).

Separate property is not subject to division in a divorce and must be awarded to its owner.

Christopher Grey Cummings v. Pepper Lynne Werner Cummings · filed 2004-10-15(a)(1)

Ms. Cummings is correct, of course, in asserting that separate property is not subject to division or distribution. ... However, since these are the wife’s separate property, not the child’s, they should have been awarded to her as her separate property, and she is entitled to regain possession of these items immediately if she wishes.

Separate property may become marital property through transmutation when a spouse’s conduct creates a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate.

Miracle Kaa Nichols v. James Virgil Nichols, Jr. · filed 2005-11-07(b)

Husband failed to rebut the presumption of a gift to Wife, and, therefore to the marital estate. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that the Farm is marital property, and we, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s finding that the Farm is marital property.

Separate property may become marital property when its owner's treatment of it shows an intent to give it to the marital estate; that presumed gift can be rebutted.

Ferguson v. Ferguson · filed 2008-02-13(b)(1)(A)

Husband’s testimony evidences an intent to treat the boat and the trailer as marital property which is further supported by the exclusion of these items from Husband’s own exhibit of claimed separate property. Husband presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that he made gifts of the Corvette, the boat, and the trailer to the marital estate.

Separate funds used for a marital home become marital property through transmutation when the spouses’ conduct shows an intent to treat them as marital property and the contributing spouse does not show a contrary intent.

Gleaves v. Gleaves · filed 2008-11-13(b)(1)

Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s classification of the $88,000 as Husband’s separate property and find that it was transmuted into marital property.

Property gifted to one spouse may become marital property through transmutation when the spouses use it as their marital home and the other spouse helps maintain and improve it.

Hagler v. Hagler · filed 2009-03-31

The property was deeded to the husband by his parents, and both parties admitted that it was a gift. As such, it would be considered the husband’s separate property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-121. ... In this case, the property was never titled jointly, but the evidence supports the Trial Court’s conclusion that this property should be treated as marital. The evidence demonstrated that the parties used this property as the marital residence, and the wife contributed both her time and her earnings to the maintenance and improvement of the property.

Section 36-4-121 treats separate property as marital property when the spouses’ conduct shows an intent to make it marital property.

Deborah Miller Gentile v. Gentile · filed 2010-07-19(b)(1)(A)

The method relevant herein is transmutation, which takes place when the parties treat separate property in such a way as to reflect an intention that it become marital property. ... Given the circumstances described above, we cannot find that the trial court erred by finding that the home was marital property and awarding Mr. Gentile his contributions toward its purchase.

Separate property placed in both spouses’ names may become marital property when the owner fails to rebut the presumption of a gift to the marital estate.

Ghorashi-Bajestani v. Bajestani · filed 2010-08-24(b)

Husband failed to rebut the presumption that by putting Wife’s name on the accounts he was making a gift to the marital estate. We find no error in the Trial Court’s classification that this property, which had been Husband’s pre-marital separate property, was transmuted into marital property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(2) treats settlements for claims arising before marriage and awards for future medical expenses and pain and suffering as separate property.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2010-11-09(b)(2)

Because Husband’s entitlement to those monetary settlements arose prior to the marriage, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A)1 and constitute awards for future medical expenses and pain and suffering, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(E), the trial court properly classified and awarded such property to Husband.

Placing separate property in a joint account creates a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate that evidence of contrary intent can overcome.

Ingraham v. Ingraham · filed 2010-12-08(b)

The Trial Court obviously found Husband to be more credible with regard to this issue, and the Trial Court clearly found that Husband had rebutted the presumption that Husband was making a gift to the marital estate of the Exxon stock by placing it into a joint account. The evidence does not preponderate against this finding.

Property acquired before marriage is separate property.

Malmquist v. Malmquist · filed 2011-03-25(b)(2)(A)

All real and personal property acquired prior to a marriage is separate property.

A premarital residence can become marital property through transmutation when the spouses intend it to be marital property and treat it as such.

Liner v. Robert Clifford Liner, Jr. · filed 2011-04-13(b)(2)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A) provides a definition of separate property, which includes “[a]ll real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage.” ... Separate property can become marital property by virtue of transmutation “if there is evidence that the parties intended for it to be marital property and treated it as such.” ... Given Wife’s financial and non-financial contributions to the ongoing maintenance and management of the property, as well as the use of her credit to improve the property, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to classify the residence as marital property.

A spouse’s premarital home can become marital property through transmutation when the spouses’ treatment of it shows an intent to hold it as marital property.

Hayes v. Hayes · filed 2012-10-18(b)(1)(A)

We hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the High Plains home became marital property and should have been included in the parties’ marital estate for purposes of the trial court’s division of property.

A premarital contribution that becomes marital property through transmutation is subject to equitable division.

McDaniel v. McDaniel · filed 2013-01-30(a)(1)

Wife’s pre-marital contribution became part of the marital estate, the division of which was within the Trial Court’s sound discretion. The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding of transmutation or its division of the marital property as being equitable.

Purchasing jointly titled property with separate funds creates a rebuttable presumption that the property is marital property.

Phipps v. Phipps · filed 2015-01-27(b)(1)

While the retroactive VA benefits were awarded for Husband’s service prior to the marriage, Husband used the funds to purchase a joint certificate of deposit with Wife, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption that the certificate of deposit was marital property.

Property owned before marriage or inherited during marriage remains separate unless the spouses treat it in a way that shows an intent to make it marital property.

Griffith v. Griffith · filed 2015-04-14(b)(2)

Further, this Business was not treated by the parties in such a way as to evince an intention that it become marital property. Husband never conceded that it was jointly owned or should be considered a marital asset. As such, there was no gift to the marital estate, and the Business remained Husband‟s separate property. The trial court therefore erred in determining that the Business was transmuted to marital property based on the evidence presented.

Jointly titling inherited property raises a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate; evidence of an estate planning purpose can rebut it.

Douglas v. Douglas · filed 2016-08-08(b)(2)(D)

The joint titling of the Account raises a presumption that Wife intended for the property to be a gift to the marital estate. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Wife has rebutted the presumption that she intended for the funds in the Account to become marital property.

Premarital property can become marital property through transmutation when substantial marital income is used to pay its debt and improve it, creating a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate.

Givens v. Givens · filed 2017-09-29(b)(2)(A)

The preponderance of evidence in the record on appeal shows that Husband transmutted Taggart into marital property when he expended these significant amounts of marital income on paying off and remodeling Taggart. Thus, a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate was created, and that presumption was not rebutted.

Joint ownership of a marital residence creates a rebuttable presumption that the property is marital, even if one spouse owned it separately before marriage.

Carter v. Browne · filed 2019-02-04(b)(2)

Consequently, we have repeatedly held that joint ownership of a marital residence gives rise to a presumption that the property is marital rather than separate, even where the property was one spouses’ separate property prior to the marriage.

Depositing distributions from a separately owned asset into a joint account does not, by itself, turn the underlying asset into marital property.

Long v. Long · filed 2019-08-23(b)

Although we ultimately concluded in Telfer that other factors militated in favor of concluding that the disputed property was marital, the above quotes from Telfer and Luttrell support the position that simply depositing income from a separately-owned asset into a joint account does not, in and of itself, transmute the corpus of the asset into marital property.

Premarital property treated by the spouses as their marital residence may transmute into marital property subject to equitable division.

Keeble v. Keeble · filed 2020-06-03(b)

Although Husband purchased the Dairy Lane Property prior to the marriage, the parties treated the property as their marital residence. Under the foregoing authority, this resulted in transmutation of the Dairy Lane Property from Husband’s separate property into the parties’ marital property.

Premarital property can become marital property when a spouse retitles it jointly, creating a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate.

England v. Amber Leigh Lowry · filed 2020-07-29(b)(2)(A)

Wife has failed to rebut the presumption that she made a gift of the Louisville property to the marital estate. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the Louisville property as marital property.

A spouse may rebut the presumption that separate property became marital property through transmutation by showing that a transfer into joint title was made without an intent to give it to the marital estate.

Harper v. Harper · filed 2018-10-24(b)(2)

Following our review of the record, we conclude that the substantive findings of the trial court are supported therein, and that Wife properly rebutted the presumption of a gift to the marital estate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the three tracts of land as Wife’s separate property.

Property received by one spouse as a gift is separate property, but it can become marital property through transmutation.

Binkley v. Binkley · filed 2020-10-22(b)(2)(D)

As a gift to Wife, 713 Greenwood is her separate property under section 36-4-121(b)(2)(D). ... Like in Anderson, we conclude that the property at 713 Greenwood began as separate property but became marital property by transmutation.

A spouse’s name in a billboard marketing agreement does not make the agreement marital property when the agreement also identifies the corporation as owner and the spouse has no ownership interest in the billboards.

Malcolm D. Myers as of the Estate of Charles Price Boone v. Dawna Divine Boone · filed 2022-06-08(b)(1)

Wife’s name being listed as an owner of the billboards in a contract with a third party, wherein the contract also identified St. Charles Place, Inc. as the owner, does not transmute the Billboard Marketing Agreements into marital property.

Substantial contribution includes a spouse’s work as a homemaker, wage earner, parent, or family financial manager when determining whether property became marital property.

Parker v. Kenton Stone Parker · filed 2024-01-09(b)(1)(D)

The term “substantial contribution” is defined to include, but is not limited to “the direct or indirect contribution of a spouse as homemaker, wage earner, parent or family financial manager, together with such other factors as the court having jurisdiction thereof may determine.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(D). In the matter before us, Wife provided physical labor in the remodeling of the home.

A spouse’s separate home may become marital property when the spouses’ treatment of it shows an intent to make it marital property.

Hudson v. Hudson · filed 2024-12-13(b)

The parties treated the property as their marital home and engaged in several improvements to the property during the marriage. From our review, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the Highway 149 East property was transmuted into marital property based on how the parties treated that property.

Separate property may become marital property through transmutation when the spouses’ treatment of it shows an intent to share it.

Beverly Jean Cullins Pickett v. Pickett · filed 2025-11-13(a)

First, we agree with Husband that the parties’ respective interests in the house were initially their separate property. Both Husband and Wife acquired said interests in the Shady Grove house prior to the marriage. Nonetheless, like the trial court, we are unpersuaded by Husband’s assertion that the home did not transmute into marital property.

Jointly titling a home bought with one spouse’s separate funds creates a rebuttable presumption that the spouse gave those funds to the marital estate.

Eldridge v. Eldridge · filed 2002-05-21(b)(1)

We hold that the trial court erred by classifying a portion of the equity in the home as Husband’s separate property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) permits an inchoate right to future revestment of property to be included in the marital estate.

Hohenberg v. Hohenberg (In Re Hohenberg) · filed 1992-07-10(b)(1)(A)

According to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), the marital estate is comprised of property owned when the divorce complaint is filed and also includes “any property to which a right was acquired up to the date of the final divorce hearing.” ... Neither the divorce complaint filing nor the final divorce hearing had occurred when the inchoate right to revestment was created; and therefore, the inchoate right to revestment may be included in the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires a court to classify property before dividing it because only marital property is subject to division.

McClellan v. McClellan · filed 1993-10-13(a)

T.C.A § 36-4-121(a) provides for the division of marital property only. Thus, it is incumbent upon the trial court to first classify the couple’s property.

Assets of a law practice created or acquired during the marriage, including accounts receivable, are marital property.

Jahn v. Jahn · filed 1996-05-24(b)(1)(A)

Since these accounts and the other assets were created or acquired during the marriage, they are marital assets. See T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

A law practice may be marital property, but its professional good will is excluded from the marital estate.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1985-09-11(b)(1)

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a law practice may be a marital asset but that the value placed on it does not include the professional good will of the firm.

Retirement benefits earned during marriage are marital property even if the other spouse did not directly contribute to their preservation or appreciation.

Batson v. Batson · filed 1988-09-30(b)(1)

The pension provision is not modified by the “substantial contribution” requirement preceding it. Therefore, pension benefits earned by a spouse during the marriage are marital property even though the other spouse did not contribute directly to their preservation or appreciation.

Section 36-4-121 includes pension rights accrued during marriage in marital property and permits their division through periodic payments.

Towner v. Towner · filed 1993-07-06(b)(1)(B)

Mr. Towner’s pension was accumulated during the marriage and is, therefore, marital property. The definition of marital property subject to division between the parties contemplates property rights to be distributed in the form of periodic payments.

Section 36-4-121 treats pension rights earned during marriage as marital property but excludes anticipated, unvested Social Security benefits.

Reymann v. Reymann · filed 1995-12-08(b)(1)(B)

The pension rights of a spouse earned during the marriage are to be considered as marital property. 5 U.S.C.S. §8341(h)(1); T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(B). ... Anticipated social security benefits are not a part of the martial estate because it was not vested as required by T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(B).

Section 36-4-121 treats nonvested pension rights accrued during marriage as marital property subject to equitable division.

Kendrick v. Kendrick · filed 1994-11-16(b)(1)

Since the General Assembly has not addressed the status of nonvested pension interests directly, we must resort to the rules of construction and to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121’s legislative history. Both the statute’s language and its legislative history support the conclusion that the General Assembly has not prevented the courts from distributing nonvested pension rights accrued during the marriage as marital property.

Section 36-4-121 excludes property conveyed before a divorce complaint is filed from marital property unless the conveyance was fraudulent and made in anticipation of filing.

Denton v. Denton · filed 1995-02-06(b)(1)(A)

Property no longer owned when the complaint is filed does not constitute marital property within the meaning of the statute except in the case of a fraudulent conveyance in anticipation of a complaint for divorce being filed.

Section 36-4-121 treats an accrued contractual right to termination benefits as marital property even when the benefit is not vested.

Ray v. Ray · filed 1995-09-20(b)(1)(A)

But, marital property is no longer defined in terms of vested rights. Instead, it is defined as “all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both during the course of the marriage_” Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(l)(A). ... Therefore, we are persuaded that the State Farm contract had a substantial value and was properly considered as a part of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121 includes a vested right to future royalties earned during marriage in marital property, but excludes royalties attributable to future work.

Shasta Mead Morey v. Morey · filed 1995-12-15(b)(1)(A)

Any part of future royalty payments attributable to such future efforts of defendant should not be included in the marital estate; but that part of the future royalties attributable to his efforts during the marriage are included in the marital estate and divided as such.

Salary earned during marriage is marital property, even when deposited into a spouse’s separate retirement account.

Wilson v. Moore · filed 1996-05-03(b)(1)(A)

Since Mr. Wilson’s salary earned during the marriage was marital property, Mr. Wilson could not place it beyond Ms. Moore’s reach simply by directing that it be deposited into his separate accounts.

Section 36-4-121 treats unvested retirement benefits accrued during marriage as marital property and includes increased equity in separate real property when the other spouse substantially contributes to the increase.

Cohen v. Cohen · filed 1996-09-16(b)(1)

We, therefore, conclude that marital property includes retirement benefits, both vested and unvested which accrue during the marriage. ... Consequently, an increase in the equity in real property, which accrues during the marriage, is marital property subject to division upon divorce, notwithstanding the fact that the real property was separate property, if the non-owner spouse substantially contributes to the increase in value.

Property given to one spouse is separate property, while rights to a crop acquired through labor during marriage are marital property.

Green v. Green · filed 1997-01-23(b)

Because the Husband’s parents gratuitously conveyed the tract of land to him alone, the conveyance was a gift and is the separate property of the Husband. ... Because the Husband acquired rights to the planted corn by virtue of his labors during the course of the parties’ marriage, the planted corn is marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(2) permits a court to order the sale of marital property and divide the proceeds when necessary for an equitable division.

Dunnehew v. Dunnehew · filed 1997-06-09(a)(2)

Section 36-4-121(a)(2) empowers the trial court to order the sale of marital property and the proceeds therefrom divided between the parties “where deemed necessary.” ... We cannot agree that the decision reached by the trial court renders an inequitable result in light of all relevant factors.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) requires the parties’ child’s bedroom furniture to be included in the marital estate despite testimony that it was the child’s separate property.

Watters v. Watters · filed 1997-06-24(b)(1)(A)

Husband contends that the trial court failed to properly include within the marital estate certain bedroom furniture, valued at $1,760, which Wife testified was their son’s separate property. As Wife’s award of custody and the marital home is unchallenged, these items clearly should remain with Wife. We find that, properly, they should have been included within the marital estate; however, we hold such error harmless considering the overall distribution of assets.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contribution to acquiring, preserving, appreciating, or dissipating it.

Terrell v. Terrell · filed 1997-09-18(c)(5)

In distributing the parties’ marital property, the trial court was required to consider, among other factors, the “contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation or dissipation” of the property. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (1991). In making its distribution in this case, the trial court specifically found that the Husband had dissipated and wasted thousands of dollars in marital assets by gambling. After carefully reviewing the testimony, we conclude that the evidence supports this finding.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1) requires property to be owned by one or both spouses at the time of divorce to qualify as marital property.

Cheatham v. Cheatham · filed 1997-11-25(b)(1)

As a general matter, property must be owned by one or both spouses at the time of the divorce in order to be considered marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) requires a court to consider all pertinent factors, including the factors it lists, when dividing marital property.

Emma Smith v. Smith · filed 1998-01-14(c)

The trial court is required to consider all pertinent factors in making the division of marital property including those factors set out in T.C.A. § 36-4-121(c) (1996). It appears from the record before us that these factors were not considered in the division of the marital property made by the trial court.

Property deeded to both spouses during marriage is marital property, even when conveyed by one spouse’s family.

Hoover v. Hoover · filed 1998-03-06(b)

Since the property in question was acquired by deed to both parties during their marriage, it is considered marital property.

Property conveyed to others before the divorce complaint and no longer owned by either spouse is not marital property subject to distribution.

Fuller v. Eligo Fuller · filed 1998-05-13(b)(1)(A)

After a careful review of the record, we find that the property and mobile home on Reeves Road was not marital property and, therefore, not subject to distribution by the trial court. The fact of the matter is that husband and wife conveyed this property to their three daughters on July 19, 1979, by warranty deed. As such, husband and wife were no longer owners of this property.

Income earned during marriage remains marital property when deposited into a spouse’s separate account.

McManamay v. McManamay · filed 1997-12-10(b)(1)(A)

It follows that income deposited into a separate account during the marriage must be treated as marital property subject to distribution in an equitable fashion.

Section 36-4-121 guides equitable division of marital property; funds spent before the divorce hearing were unavailable for distribution in this case.

Demontbreun v. Demontbreun · filed 1997-12-12(c)

In light of the proof of Mr. Demontbreun’s economic difficulties, we have concluded that the weight of the circumstantial evidence is that Mr. Demontbreun spent these funds between the separation and the divorce hearing and, thus, that they were not available for distribution as part of the marital estate.

Stock dividends on premarital shares may be marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to preserving or appreciating the stock, including as a wage earner or family financial manager.

Marcus v. Marcus · filed 1998-01-28(b)(1)(C)

Overall, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Husband contributed to the “preservation or appreciation” of the stock or the classification of the stock dividends as marital property. Thus, the trial court did not err in classifying these stock dividends as marital property.

Section 36-4-121(c) calls for consideration of factors including the length of the marriage, the parties’ ages and earning capacities, and their contributions to the marriage when dividing marital property.

Butler v. Melody Butler · filed 1999-06-22(c)

The trial court’s division of the marital property is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121.

Section 36-4-121 treats retained life estates in property acquired during the marriage as marital property subject to valuation and equitable division under these circumstances.

Scarbrough v. Scarbrough · filed 1999-12-14

Under the circumstances, the life estates owned by Husband should be considered marital property, a value placed thereon, and equitably divided.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) makes each party’s contribution to the dissipation of marital property a factor in dividing marital property.

Dorothy West Harmon v. Harmon · filed 2000-03-02(c)(5)

Wife points to nothing in the record supporting her assertion that the trial court failed to consider her allegations regarding Husband’s violation of the injunction and his dissipation of assets. After reviewing the record, and giving great weight to the trial court’s division of marital property, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in awarding 45% of the assets at issue to Wife.

An unvested employment bonus earned largely during marriage is marital property, while stock options contingent on future work and uncertain in value are not.

Brandon v. Brandon · filed 1999-04-29(b)(1)(B)

Though it is not a retirement account, we believe the bonus should be considered marital property, and we also believe that it would be equitable to divide it between the parties. ... We do not believe unvested property that is so contingent and so speculative should be considered marital property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) does not permit a court to divide spent investment funds as marital property when neither spouse owns them at the filing of the divorce complaint.

George Weatherby Sickler, III v. Sickler · filed 1999-05-05(b)(1)(A)

However, we do not find any basis for the trial court's allocation of one-half the "loss of marital funds invested to date" to each party. It is undisputed that, at the time of trial, Stealth had provided no income. Thus, the money invested is gone. It is not, in the words of the code, "owned by either or both spouses as of the date of the filing of the complaint for divorce." Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A)(1996).

Property acquired during marriage and treated by both spouses as marital property is classified as marital property when no evidence rebuts that presumption.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2000-08-30(b)(1)

Since the Eaton Street property, the one-quarter interest in LADS, the interest in OB Development, and the Park Avenue property were acquired during the marriage, and were treated by both parties as marital property, we find that these properties should all be classified in the same manner. We see no evidence in the record to rebut the presumption that all of these assets acquired during the marriage should be classified as marital property.

Section 36-4-121 does not authorize a partial distribution of marital property before an evidentiary hearing and final divorce decree.

Korthoff v. Korthoff · filed 2001-07-18

However, we know of no authority that allows a trial court to make a partial distribution of marital property prior to conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine all the issues presented in a divorce action and entering a final decree.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) permits division of marital property only, so the court must classify property as marital or separate before dividing it.

Flora Mae Melton v. Melton · filed 2001-12-05(a)(1)

The distinction between the two categories of property is important because only marital property is divided between the parties. T.C.A. 36-4-121(a)(1). A party’s separate property is not to be divided.

Property purchased during the marriage with marital assets is marital property under § 36-4-121(b)(1).

Turney v. Turney · filed 2002-01-23(b)(1)

Since the Ohio real property and Wife’s Saturn were purchased during the marriage with assets from marital property, they are properly characterized as marital property.

Funds acquired by a spouse during marriage and controlled by that spouse when the divorce complaint is filed are marital property, even if held in accounts intended for children.

Fritz v. Fritz · filed 2002-04-16(b)(1)(A)

We conclude the funds in the savings accounts are marital property of the parties, and the Trial Court erred in concluding these funds were the separate property of Wife’s two daughters.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) does not support charging a spouse with dissipation absent evidence that the spouse affirmatively acted to deprive the other spouse of a share of the marital estate.

Haas v. Haas · filed 2002-07-18(c)(5)

The record in this matter does not support the conclusion that Ms. Haas took any affirmative action to deprive Mr. Haas of his share of the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121 permits a trial court to order property sold, but the court must consider whether selling all property produces an equitable division.

Rose Marie Harper Britt v. Britt · filed 2003-10-15

Although under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121 it is within the discretion of the trial court to order the sale of property, we do not believe this case calls for the sale of all property, both real and personal.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) excludes property that neither spouse owned when the divorce complaint was filed from marital property subject to division.

Flannary v. Flannary · filed 2003-12-16(b)(1)(A)

Thus, it appears from the record that the property was not owned by either of the parties as of the date the complaint for divorce was filed. Accordingly, this property does not fit within the definition of “marital property” and should not have been divided as part of the marital estate.

Property acquired by either spouse during marriage is marital property without proof that the other spouse contributed to its acquisition.

Powell v. Patsy Powell · filed 2003-01-21(b)(1)(A)

This section does not require any contribution by the spouse, merely that the property be acquired during the marriage.

Property acquired during the marriage is marital property without requiring a contribution by the other spouse.

Powell v. Powell · filed 2003-04-07(b)(1)(A)

This section does not require any contribution by the spouse, merely that the property be acquired during the marriage.

Property acquired in exchange for premarital property is separate property and is not subject to division as marital property.

Tate v. Tate · filed 2003-08-25(b)(2)(B)

Both properties were “swapped” for the other and, accordingly, are rightfully viewed as “[p]roperty acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage[,]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B)(Supp. 2001). As such, neither property should have been included in the marital estate and subjected to division.

When marital and separate funds become inextricably commingled, the entire account is marital property.

Hirt v. Hirt · filed 2005-02-08(b)

Given all of these factors, we believe the Trial Court had no choice but to declare the entire IRA as marital property because Husband inextricably commingled marital property with his separate property.

Businesses formed during the marriage and owned by the spouses fall within the section’s definition of marital property.

Cantrell v. Cantrell · filed 2005-03-28(b)(1)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) defines marital property as “all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing a complaint for divorce. . . .” ... Arrowhead Survey and Blue Moon were both founded during the marriage and both parties contributed in a variety of capacities to “his” and “her” company. Moreover, Blue Moon was a corporation and the shares of stock were issued to Husband and Wife.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) permits courts to consider dissipation when dividing marital property, but spending marital funds on a struggling business is not dissipation without evidence of an intent to deplete the marital estate.

Altman v. Altman · filed 2005-04-07(c)(5)

Because Mr. Altman failed to present any evidence that Ms. Altman started or operated her business for the purpose of depleting the marital estate, the trial court erred by characterizing Ms. Altman’s management of the business as “dissipation” for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5).

Section 36-4-121(a) allows division of marital property upon divorce, and a court’s classification of property as marital or separate may be inferred from its disposition of the property.

Sonya Renee Vaden Ausley v. Dempsey Renea Ausley, Jr. · filed 2005-09-08(a)

As a result, it is of primary importance for trial courts to classify property as either separate or marital because Tennessee statutes only allow for a division of marital property upon the dissolution of a marriage. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(2001); Brock v. Brock, 941 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Although courts should expressly classify property before a final division, such classification may be inferred in certain instances.

Section 36-4-121(b) does not require a minimum contribution by either spouse for property acquired during the marriage to be marital property.

Clark v. Jennifer Dawn Clark · filed 2005-09-13(b)

Second, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-4-121(b) does not require a minimum contribution by a spouse for an asset to be deemed marital property.

Property acquired by one spouse during the marriage is presumed marital property even when titled in that spouse’s name alone.

Runions v. Runions · filed 2006-05-19(b)(1)(A)

The fact that only Mr. Runions’ name is listed on the Trustee’s Deed is not dispositive on the question of separate versus marital property because T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(A) makes no distinction between property purchased by either one spouse alone or by both together. We have reviewed the record, and we find no evidence to rebut the presumption that the Weakley County Property became marital property when purchased in 2001.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) allows a court to consider a spouse’s dissipation of funds missing before the divorce filing when dividing the remaining marital property.

Risa Stock v. Stock · filed 2006-12-28(c)(5)

Although the $240,000 missing from the safety deposit box was not a marital asset subject to division, the trial court specifically found that Wife was responsible for the money’s disappearance, and that fact is to be considered in the distribution of the remaining marital property.

Section 36-4-121 permits a savings account to be classified as marital property when the evidence does not establish how much of it came from the sale of separate property.

McDaniel v. McDaniel · filed 2008-12-18(b)(1)(A)

Under these circumstances, we find that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s implicit finding that most of the monies in the savings account should be deemed marital property, and the resulting award to Wife of $2,000.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1) treats property acquired, or a right to purchase it obtained, before the final divorce hearing as marital property.

Lofton v. Lofton · filed 2008-12-30(b)(1)

In light of these definitions, we conclude that the trial court correctly classified the Woodbrook Circle House as marital property because Mr. Lofton purchased (or at least acquired a right to purchase) this property prior to the final hearing held in this case.

A house purchased, or subject to an acquired right to purchase, before the final divorce hearing is marital property.

Lofton v. Lofton · filed 2009-01-20(b)(1)(A)

In light of these definitions, we conclude that the trial court correctly classified the Woodbrook Circle House as marital property because Mr. Lofton purchased (or at least acquired a right to purchase) this property prior to the final hearing held in this ease.

In dividing marital property, a court assesses alleged dissipation under the Ward factors; support paid to the other spouse does not determine whether expenditures were dissipation.

Watson v. Watson · filed 2009-08-06(c)(5)

This conclusion is based on the trial court’s application of the Ward factors, not the fact that Husband provided support to Wife in excess of the amounts allegedly dissipated. ... On this basis, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Husband’s expenditures did not constitute dissipation.

Section 36-4-121 requires each property interest to be classified as either marital or separate property; a single interest cannot be classified as partly both.

Fox v. Fox · filed 2006-09-01

Such a mixed classification is inconsistent with the fact that Tennessee is a dual property state in which each property interest owned by the parties at the time of divorce must be classified as either marital property or separate property. Thus, the court erred by classifying the Carol Lane and Buffalo Valley Road properties as partially marital property and partially separate property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(E) limits its definition of marital property to dividing assets upon divorce or legal separation.

In Re Garbett · filed 2009-08-14(b)(1)(E)

While agreeing with the end result that the 50/50 Refund Rule applies, the court does not rely on Tennessee's division of marital property statute, which expressly provides that ”[p]rop-erty shall be considered marital property as defined by this subsection (b) for the sole purpose of dividing assets upon divorce or legal separation and for no other purpose[.]” Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(l)(E).

Marital property includes property owned when the divorce complaint was filed or acquired before the final divorce hearing.

Larsen-Ball v. Ball · filed 2010-01-14(b)(1)(A)

Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that marital property includes all property owned as of the date of filing of the complaint for divorce or acquired up to the date of the final divorce hearing.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital property unless the spouse claiming it as separate property rebuts that presumption.

Joanne Alice Brown Stagner v. Stagner · filed 2010-09-23(b)(1)(A)

Therefore, on this record, we must affirm the trial court’s finding that Husband did not sufficiently rebut the presumption that the $168,177 check received by him from his parents during the marriage constituted marital property.

Property fraudulently conveyed in anticipation of a divorce filing remains marital property.

Phillips v. Rountree · filed 2012-03-07(b)(1)(A)

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), if the transfers at issue were fraudulent conveyances, the property should still be considered marital property. ... Given the trial court’s finding that Husband lacked credibility, the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s decision to exclude the two vehicles at issue from the category of marital property.

Joint bank accounts owned by spouses can qualify as marital property and be allocated in a marital dissolution agreement.

In Re: Estate of Danny Keith Ellis · filed 2013-03-20(b)(1)(A)

The joint accounts at issue in the present case meet the definition of marital property, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), and were appropriately included in the provisions of the Marital Dissolution Agreement.

A business partnership between spouses may be classified as a marital asset and distributed in their divorce.

Baggett v. Baggett · filed 2013-08-26(b)(1)(A)

As should be readily evident, A&F, as a partnership between Husband and Wife, is properly classified as a marital asset.

Property acquired by the final divorce hearing may be marital property even if a spouse spends it during the divorce.

Scarbrough v. Scarbrough · filed 2012-06-04(b)(1)(A)

We reject Wife’s assertion that the trial court could not credit to her, as marital property, worker’s compensation benefits received and spent by her during the parties’ separation. The statutory definition of “marital property” does not compel the limitation that Wife suggests.

Section 36-4-121(a) requires a court to classify property as marital or separate before dividing the marital estate.

Green v. Green · filed 2012-06-25(a)

Classification of property is a threshold determination that must be made before property is divided, and because separate property would not be considered part of the marital estate subject to equitable division, the court erred in failing to classify the property.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) treats a residence acquired during a pending divorce, before the final divorce hearing, as marital property.

Hill v. Kimberly Dawn Hill · filed 2012-10-05(b)(1)(A)

The residence at issue falls squarely within the definition of marital property.

Property purchased during marriage with marital earnings is marital property unless it was intended to be one spouse’s separate property.

Gorbet v. Gorbet · filed 2012-10-11(b)(1)(A)

By the same token, property purchased during the marriage with marital earnings is marital property, absent evidence that the property was intended to be the separate property of one spouse.

Section 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) treats a spouse’s one-half interest in a home purchased during the marriage and titled with a third party as marital property subject to division.

McNabb v. McNabb · filed 2015-08-20(b)(1)(A)

We conclude that based on this proof, the trial court properly found that Husband held a one-half ownership interest in the property and that such one-half interest was marital property.

Section 36-4-121 permits a court to order an auction of marital property and set a reserve price to help ensure a sale at fair market value.

Elizabeth Ann Morrow Granoff v. Granoff · filed 2016-03-16(a)(3)

The trial court may order the sale of the marital property by public auction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(a)(3). ... Given the failure of either party to secure the sale of the Property in the almost ten years since the entry of the final judgment of divorce and the unique nature of the Property, we uphold the trial court‟s setting of the reserve price as indicative of the fair market value.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital property subject to division.

Watt v. Watt · filed 2016-04-27(b)(1)(A)

The undisputed testimony is that the cabinet was acquired during the marriage, and accordingly it is presumed to be marital property subject to division.

A nonprofit corporation cannot be classified or distributed as a marital asset.

Lubell v. Lubell · filed 2015-11-12

The trial court did not err in determining that Partners‟ status as a nonprofit corporation prohibited its classification or distribution as a marital asset.

Income earned during the marriage is marital property, so attorney’s fees paid from that income are paid from marital funds.

Talley v. Talley · filed 2017-05-01(b)(1)(A)

Although the parties stipulated that Wife had paid the majority of the $23,300 total payment from “her income,” these payments were made during the marriage and were therefore made from marital funds.

Property a spouse does not own is not marital property subject to division, even if the spouse presents it as a gift.

Hindiyeh v. Waleed Fawzi Abed · filed 2018-04-25(b)(1)(A)

We find that the Cadillac was not marital property subject to division in the first place.

Property acquired during the marriage and owned by either spouse when the divorce complaint is filed is marital property.

Parker v. Parker · filed 2019-04-09(b)(1)(A)

“Marital property” is defined as all real and personal property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage that was owned by either or both spouses as of the date when the complaint for divorce was filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). ... Based on the evidence in the record together with the trial court’s finding that Husband was not credible, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the fifth wheel camper as marital property.

Property acquired during marriage is presumed marital, and the spouse claiming it is separate must prove that by a preponderance of the evidence.

Climer v. Climer · filed 2020-01-29(b)(1)(A)

The spouse asserting that an asset acquired during the marriage is separate property bears the burden of proving that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Husband failed to do so in this case. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s classification of a one-half interest in the Gum Flat property as marital property.

Section 36-4-121 requires courts to classify property as marital or separate before equitably dividing the marital estate.

Cathy Gwen Agee Swafford v. Danny Earl Swafford, Sr. · filed 2018-03-21

It is well settled that a trial court must identify all assets of the parties in divorce proceedings as either separate or marital property prior to equitably distributing the marital property.

Section 36-4-121 requires a court to classify property as marital or separate before equitably dividing the marital estate.

Bolt v. Bolt · filed 2018-10-30

Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s classification of the real property is unclear, which precludes our review of whether the trial court erred by awarding the value of the real property to Wife in its judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s division of the marital estate and remand for a proper classification of the real property at issue prior to the trial court’s equitably dividing the marital estate.

Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property.

Smith v. Barbara Diane (Fuston) Smith · filed 2021-09-07(b)(1)(A)

All property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A); Owens, 241 S.W.3d at 485. Because Husband purchased these properties during the marriage, they are presumed to be marital property.

Property acquired during marriage is marital property when it does not qualify as separate property.

Griffith-Ball v. Ball · filed 2022-05-13(b)(1)(A)

Husband acquired it during the marriage, and it does not otherwise satisfy any definition of separate property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A), (b)(2).

Property owned by a spouse’s separate corporation is not marital property merely because the corporation acquired it during the marriage.

Ellis v. Melisa Jane Godfrey Ellis · filed 2022-08-29(b)(1)(A)

QMS is a corporate entity separate from Wedgecorp. It is not owned by Husband and consequently cannot be classified as marital property.

Section 36-4-121(a)(1) limits division to marital property, so courts must classify property before dividing the marital estate.

Averwater v. Averwater · filed 2023-12-28(a)(1)

Only marital property is subject to division. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (Supp. 2022); Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tenn. 2009). So a court must classify each of the parties’ property interests as either separate or marital property before dividing the marital estate.

Section 36-4-121(c)(5) permits a court dividing marital property to account for a spouse’s dissipation of a marital business interest when the spouse uses company funds to satisfy a personal judgment and thereby reduces the interest’s value.

Barton v. Barton · filed 2024-01-10(c)(5)

By expending these proceeds to satisfy a personal judgment against him, he effectually diminished the value of his ownership interest to benefit himself personally. We accordingly conclude that there was no need for the Trial Court to pierce the corporate veil in finding that Husband had dissipated the marital asset of his ... 100% ownership interest in Vanquish Worldwide, and affirm the Trial Court’s finding of dissipation.

Section 36-4-121 permits a court to consider a spouse’s conduct and testimony when determining whether an LLC interest belongs to the marital estate.

Sexton v. Sexton · filed 2024-01-30(b)(1)(A)

Rather, the Trial Court concluded that Husband’s actions, as evidenced by Husband’s own testimony, sufficiently proved that Husband was the sole owner of Furious Properties, LLC. Husband has offered insufficient evidence in the record to preponderate against this finding. We discern no error in the Trial Court’s analysis and accordingly affirm its finding that Husband owned the entire interest in Furious Properties, LLC.

Whether funds used to maintain and renovate separately owned property are marital or separate affects the property’s classification under § 36-4-121.

Hurst v. Jeffri Hurst (Now Wutz) · filed 2025-04-10(b)(4)(C)

Because there is no dispute that all of the maintenance and renovation of the property was funded by the monies in these accounts, whether those monies were marital or separate property impacts the classification of the farm as a whole.

A nonowner spouse must prove the separate property's premarital value and a contribution to its preservation and appreciation before its increase in value can be divided as marital property.

Cutsinger v. Cutsinger · filed 1995-10-14(b)(1)(B)

In order to prove such an increase in the value of separate property, a nonowner spouse must present evidence that proves the value of the separate asset prior to the marriage. ... T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) clearly requires that the nonowner spouse show a contribution to both the appreciation and preservation of a separate asset during the course of the parties' marriage in order for the increase in value of that asset to be treated as marital property.

Income and appreciation from separately owned stock remain separate property when the other spouse did not substantially contribute to its preservation or appreciation.

Crews v. Crews · filed 1987-09-18(b)(1)

At marriage, plaintiff owned certain shares of Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company. During the marriage, plaintiff used part of the cash dividends for household expenses, and deposited the remainder in a separate, personal, bank account. During the marriage, the value of the stock increased materially. There is no evidence that defendant in any way contributed to the preservation or appreciation of the value of the stock. Therefore, the stock and all profits and increments attributable thereto were the separate property of plaintiff. T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(2).

When both spouses substantially contribute to preserving and appreciating separate property, its entire increase in value during marriage is marital property, including gains caused by inflation.

Ellis v. Ellis · filed 1988-04-11(b)(1)

In our opinion, the Court of Appeals in so concluding, erred since the statute, T.C.A. § 36-4-121(b)(l) clearly states that “any increase in value during the marriage” of such property shall be included as marital property subject to division. The word “any” is all inclusive and does not allow an exception based on inflation, as held by the Court of Appeals. ... The only condition imposed in the statute for treating any increase in value during the marriage as marital property is the provision, “if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.”

Substantial contributions to separate property may be indirect and need not be tied to the property itself; they can include contributions that enable its owner to retain it during the marriage.

Mahaffey v. Mahaffey · filed 1989-05-12(b)(1)

Likewise, the contributions need not be directly related to the specific property involved. They are substantial if they enabled the spouse who owns the property to retain it during the marriage. Thus, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(l) provides that a substantial contribution can include “the direct or indirect contribution of a spouse as homemaker, wage earner, parent, or family financial manager, together with such other factors as the court having jurisdiction thereof may determine.”

An increase in the value of one spouse’s separate property is marital property when the other spouse substantially contributes to its preservation and appreciation, including through indirect contributions.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1994-12-07(b)(1)(B)

We agree with these assertions as far as they go; however, we find that the increase in the value of Mr. Brown’s interest in Brown’s Concrete during the marriage was marital property.

A spouse’s homemaking can be a substantial contribution that makes appreciation of the other spouse’s separate property subject to equitable division.

Nancy K. Wheeler Poyner v. Poyner · filed 1995-11-09(b)(1)(C)

However, there is evidence in the record that Wife was a homemaker during most of the marriage, and that she performed the majority of the household chores, such as cooking and cleaning. These acts are sufficient under existing law to constitute a "substantial contribution."

Section 36-4-121 treats an increase in the value of separate property during marriage as marital property only if each spouse substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Harrison v. Harrison · filed 1995-12-18(b)(1)(B)

The statute does not permit the conclusion that any increase in value during marriage constitutes marital property. The increase in value constitutes marital property only when the spouse has substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

An increase in the value of separate property during marriage is marital property when both spouses substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.

Flengas v. Flengas · filed 1996-03-10(b)(1)(B)

Howe ve r , T. C. A. 36- 4- 1 2 1 ( b ) ( 1) ( B) pr ovi de s t ha t " a ny i nc r e a s e i n va l ue dur i ng t he ma r r i a g e , of pr ope r t y de t e r mi ne d t o be s e pa r a t e pr ope r t y" i s ma r i t a l pr ope r t y s o l ong a s e a c h pa r t y t o t he ma r r i a ge " s u b s t a nt i a l l y c ont r i but e d t o i t s pr e s e r va t i on a nd a ppr e c i a t i o n . "