Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

A parent’s criminally negligent homicide of a child living in the home constitutes severe child abuse and supports termination under subsection (g)(4).

On the Matter of James Lee Adams · filed 1998-10-16(g)(4)

N.A.A.’s conduct clearly amounts to severe child abuse under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(4), and thus the Department has proved by clear and convincing evidence that N.A.A. has engaged in conduct warranting termination of her parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(4).

A final prior court order finding severe child abuse is sufficient to establish subsection (g)(4), and the State need not prove the abuse again in the termination proceeding.

In the matter of S.MC. and J.L.C. · filed 1999-06-11(g)(4)

The existence of the prior court order finding the Chaphes committed severe child abuse suffices to establish grounds for termination of parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). The State is not required to prove severe child abuse again in the termination proceeding.

Section 36-1-113(g)(5) supports termination when a parent receives a sentence longer than two years for severe child abuse against the child, a sibling or half-sibling, or another child residing in the parent's home.

In Re: M.L.J. and R.R.J. · filed 2003-03-17(g)(5)

It is undisputed that Mr. Johnson was convicted of sexual battery of his step-daughter from a prior marriage, for which he received a sentence of more than two years.

Severe child abuse against another child residing in the parent's home can support termination under section 36-1-113(g)(4) even if the abuse occurred before the lifetime of the children who are the subjects of the termination petition.

In Re HEJ · filed 2003-06-19(g)(4)

We also reject the appellant’s argument that even if J.B. was guilty of abusing M.J. while she was still a minor, this still does not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), because the alleged child abuse did not occur during the lifetime of the twins. This is an attempt to read into the statute a limitation that is not supported by its text, or by any case of which we are aware.

A guilty plea to felony child abuse resulting in a sentence exceeding two years provides clear and convincing evidence for termination under subsection (g)(5).

In the Matter of: K.G. · filed 2004-05-10(g)(5)

Accordingly, this Court holds that Mother=s guilty plea to two felony charges of abuse and neglect of a child under six and three misdemeanor charges of child abuse and neglect provides clear and convincing evidence that Mother was “sentenced to more than two (2) years’ imprisonment for conduct against the [children] who [are] the subject of the petition, . . . which has been found under any prior order of a court or which is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5).

A parent knowingly fails to protect a child for subsection (g)(4) when the parent has actual knowledge, deliberately ignores, or recklessly disregards facts showing severe abuse occurred or was highly probable.

In Re: R.C.P. · filed 2004-07-13(g)(4)

A person’s conduct is “knowing,” and a person acts or fails to act “knowingly,” when he or she has actual knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances or when he or she is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of the information that has been presented to him or her. Persons act “knowingly” when they have specific reason to know the relevant facts and circumstances but deliberately ignore them.

Subsection (g)(4) is established by clear and convincing evidence when a prior court order found that the parent committed severe child abuse, including knowingly failing to protect the children.

IN THE MATTER OF N.P., W.N., AND C.N., Children Under the Age of 18 Years · filed 2004-12-23(g)(4)

Because Mother was found to have committed severe child abuse as defined in section 37-1-102 “under [a] prior order of a court,” in this case the ... Lauderdale County Juvenile Court, this ground for termination applies and is established by clear and convincing evidence.

Knowingly allowing a child to be present where methamphetamine is manufactured constitutes severe child abuse and establishes the subsection (g)(4) termination ground.

In the Matter of: E.H. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Harazak · filed 2005-01-26(g)(4)

As noted above, the definition of severe child abuse specifically includes allowing the child to be present where meth is being manufactured. Therefore, grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence.

A prior court order finding severe child abuse itself proves the subsection (g)(4) ground, and whether the abuse occurred is not relitigated at the termination hearing.

State v. David H. · filed 2006-03-21(g)(4)

The most serious consequence of a finding that a parent has committed severe child abuse is that such a finding, in and of itself, constitutes a ground for termination of parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4)(“the parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court.”) The ground itself is proved by a prior court order finding severe child abuse, and the issue of whether abuse occurred is not re-litigated at the termination hearing.

Severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4) may be established in the termination trial by specific, consistent child disclosures corroborated by the children’s testimony, independently of an earlier dependency-and-neglect record.

In Re Giorgianna H. · filed 2006-03-21(g)(4)

Their testimony is specific and consistent enough to discount any legitimate concern that it is the product of a child’s imagination or of inappropriate coaching by the Department or its contractors. Based on the therapist’s testimony regarding the children’s descriptions of the conduct of their parents and the children’s corroboration, we find that the trial court properly determined that David H. and Mary Ellen H. had committed severe child abuse warranting termination of their parental rights in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-l-113(g)(4).

Despite subsection (g)(5)'s initial reference to more than two years, its definition of “sentenced” clarifies that a sentence of at least two years for conduct constituting severe child abuse is sufficient.

In Re. Thomas P. · filed 2006-05-31(g)(5)

Turning to the statute at issue in the instant case, it is clear that the second sentence is clarifying the meaning of the first sentence by defining the word “sentenced.” That definition states that “sentenced” means a sentence of “two (2) or more years.” Reading this statute as a whole, as we are constrained to do, we find that a sentence of at least two years for conduct that constitutes severe child abuse is sufficient to prove the existence of grounds for termination of parental rights.

A final prior judicial finding that a parent committed severe child abuse, including knowingly failing to protect a child from such abuse, constitutes a termination ground under section 36-1-113(g)(4).

In Re: B.R.W. · filed 2008-07-21(g)(4)

The most serious consequence of a final judgment wherein it was found that the parent committed severe child abuse is that such a finding constitutes a ground for termination of parental rights.

Subsection (g)(4) permits termination for severe abuse of another child who resided in the parent's home, including a parent's knowing failure to protect that child from the other parent's abuse.

In the Matter OF Derrick B. · filed 2008-12-30(g)(4)

With respect to Mother, the trial court specifically found that she had knowingly failed to protect the Child from abuse by Father. In fact, the trial court found that Mother had actually lied to protect Father, all to the detriment of the Child and other children that had lived in the house. Thus, Mother knowingly failed to protect the Child from severe abuse. ... We affirm the trial court’s judgment finding DCS had proven, clearly and convincingly, that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4).

A prior judicial finding that prenatal drug use constituted severe child abuse establishes a termination ground under subsection (g)(4).

In Re Bac · filed 2009-11-24(g)(4)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4) establishes a ground for termination where a prior court order has found a parent to have committed severe child abuse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) (2005 & Supp. 2009). This Court in Cornelius affirmed a finding of severe child abuse based on Mother’s prenatal drug use. The Tennessee Supreme Court, as of the date of this opinion, has neither granted nor denied permission to appeal our decision in Cornelius. In the interim, we are content to rely on the reasoning set forth in Cornelius as well that of the recently authored opinion in In re Benjamin M., No. E2009-00209-COA-R3-JV, 2009 WL 3518165 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009) (thoroughly addressing the question of whether prenatal drug use may constitute severe child abuse). Having reviewed the record, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s decision on the ground of severe child abuse.

A finding of a substantial likelihood of harm is not equivalent to severe child abuse likely to cause great bodily harm or death under section 36-1-113(g)(4).

In Re Tristyn K. · filed 2010-07-22(g)(4)

A finding of “substantial likelihood of harm . . .” is not equivalent to the finding of abuse “likely to cause great bodily harm or death. . . .”

Severe child abuse includes knowingly exposing a child to or knowingly failing to protect a child from severe abuse, and subsection (g)(4) does not require proof that the child will face further abuse or neglect.

In Re: Aleksandree M. M. and Marie J.M. · filed 2010-09-27(g)(4)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), the statute upon which this case is based, does not impose a requirement that the court find that the child or children will be “subjected to further abuse or neglect.”

A final dependency-and-neglect judgment finding severe child abuse is res judicata in a later termination proceeding and establishes subsection (g)(4).

In Re Heaven L.F. · filed 2010-02-19(g)(4)

Mother and the Department were parties in the dependency and neglect action and the issue of whether Mother committed severe child abuse was fully litigated in that action. Therefore, the issue of whether Mother committed severe child abuse is res judica-ta and the trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated *440 pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4).

A parent commits severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect when she returns an injured child to the abuser's care and fails to obtain available medical treatment after learning of the abuse.

In Re: Caleb J.B.W. · filed 2010-07-14(g)(4)

Thus, the record supports the finding of the trial court of clear and convincing evidence that Mother violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) by knowingly failing to protect her son from Mr. Lee’s severe child abuse.

A conviction and sentence exceeding two years do not alone establish subsection (g)(5); a prior final order or the termination court must also find that the conduct underlying the conviction constituted severe child abuse.

In the matter of: Shyronne D. H. · filed 2011-07-07(g)(5)

A close reading of section 36-1-113(g)(5), however, reveals otherwise. That statute requires that the sentence of imprisonment be “for conduct against the child . . . that has been found under any prior order of a court or that is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(5). Thus, a criminal conviction for aggravated assault, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground for termination under section 36-1-113(g)(5). Rather, some court order, either by a prior court or the court hearing the termination petition, must find that the conduct underlying the conviction constituted severe child abuse as defined by section 37-1-102.

Severe child abuse of one child may support terminating the parent's rights to that child's sibling even when the sibling was not herself proven abused.

In Re Keara J. · filed 2012-01-13(g)(4)

we decline Mother’s request to reverse the termination of her rights to Sierra, which termination was based solely upon the abuse of Keara.

A prior final adjudicatory order finding that the parent committed severe child abuse clearly and convincingly establishes the severe-abuse termination ground.

In Re: Fridrich E.T.W. · filed 2012-03-21(g)(4)

The October 2009 adjudicatory order clearly and convincingly, in fact indisputably, establishes this termination ground.

For severe child abuse based on prenatal drug exposure, a parent acts knowingly through actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of relevant information.

In the Matter of: Joshua E.R., Jr. · filed 2012-05-15(g)(4)

Although “knowing” is not defined by the statute, we have opined that a parent acts “knowingly” when acting with actual knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances or when a parent acts with deliberate ignorance of or with reckless disregard of information that has been presented to him or her. ... We affirm termination of Mother’s parental rights based on severe child abuse.

Using uncorroborated prescription narcotics during pregnancy and causing a newborn to suffer opiate withdrawal requiring lengthy hospitalization establishes severe child abuse.

In Re: Ethin E.S. · filed 2012-05-31(g)(4)

Medical records confirmed that both Mother and Ethin tested positive for opiates at the time of Ethin’s birth and further noted Mother’s admitted use of Percocet and three to four packs of cigarettes per day while pregnant. ... The court heard evidence of Ethin’s lengthy hospitalization for treatment of his drug withdrawal symptoms resulting from his exposure to opiates. ... On our considered review, the evidence preponderates overwhelmingly in support of the trial court’s finding that Mother committed severe child abuse against Ethin. Mother’s rights were properly terminated on this ground.

Subsection (g)(5) is established when parents receive sentences exceeding two years for conduct against their children that the court finds constituted severe child abuse.

In Re: Sandra M. and David M. · filed 2012-08-07(g)(5)

Father was sentenced to two years and one month of imprisonment, and Mother was sentenced to two years and six months of imprisonment. The trial court properly held that parental termination had been established under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5).

A prior unappealed judicial finding that a parent committed severe child abuse establishes a termination ground under section 36-1-113(g)(4).

In The Matter Of Justice A.F. · filed 2012-09-24(g)(4)

In this case, the State relied upon the juvenile court’s prior finding of “severe abuse” as the ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights. This is specifically permitted in the statutes governing termination actions.

A final unappealed severe-child-abuse finding in the dependency proceeding establishes the termination ground and may not be relitigated at the termination hearing.

IN RE J.C.H., J.C.H., and J.C.H. · filed 2012-12-14(g)(4)

Thus, under this provision in the termination statutes, once the finding of severe child abuse in the dependency and neglect proceedings becomes final, “[t]he ground itself is proved by [the] prior court order finding severe child abuse, and the issue of whether abuse occurred is not re-litigated at the termination hearing.” ... Under the termination statutes, once this occurs, “one ground for termination of the parent’s parental rights is effectively established.”

A final, unappealed finding that parents severely abused a child's sibling or half-sibling establishes a termination ground under section 36-1-113(g)(4) without additional proof of abuse of the children at issue.

In Re: Eric J. P. · filed 2013-04-24(g)(4)

Severe child abuse of the sibling or half-sibling of a child does provide a ground for termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4).

A criminal conviction and sentence longer than two years do not alone establish subsection (g)(5); a prior court or the termination court must also find the underlying conduct constituted statutory severe child abuse.

In Re: Shyronne H. · filed 2013-04-30(g)(5)

[Mother’s] criminal conviction for aggravated assault, standing alone, is not a sufficient ground for termination under section 36-1-113(g)(5). Rather, some court order, either by a prior court or the court hearing the termination petition, must find that the conduct underlying the conviction constituted severe child abuse as defined by section 37-1-102.

Severe child abuse against children residing with a parent may support termination of that parent's rights to the children at issue.

In the Matter of Lakita E. P. and Michael A. P. · filed 2013-08-28(g)(4)

A father’s parental rights to his two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children, non-compliance with the permanency plan, and severe child abuse against children who resided with Father. ... Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A parent commits severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect children from conduct likely to cause serious harm.

In Re: Adriana L. · filed 2013-09-25(g)(4)

There is clear and convincing proof in the record from which to conclude that Mother knowingly failed to protect the children from conduct constituting severe child abuse within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(23)(A). We affirm the trial court’s holding.

A mother's guilty pleas to aggravated child abuse and voluntary manslaughter for shaking a half-sibling to death, followed by a twelve-year sentence, established the severe-child-abuse and qualifying-sentence termination grounds.

In Re: Jakaeha A. L. · filed 2013-06-18(g)(4), (g)(5)

The record in this matter established the grounds for termination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 36-1-113(g)(4) and (5).

An implicit finding that conduct meets the statutory definition of severe child abuse can support termination for both severe child abuse and a qualifying sentence for conduct deemed severe child abuse when the findings track the definition and the evidence is clear and convincing.

In Re J.F. · filed 2014-08-28(g)(4), (g)(5)

In our view, while the trial court’s findings were somewhat imprecisely stated, it is clear that the court made an implicit finding that Mother’s conduct meets the definition of “severe child abuse” for purposes of a parental termination proceeding. It follows that both severe child abuse and a two-year sentence for conduct deemed severe child abuse, as cited in the petition, were established as grounds for termination.

A final prior order adjudicating children victims of severe abuse by a parent supplies the severe-child-abuse ground for termination when the evidence does not undermine that finding.

In Re: Shameel S. · filed 2014-09-19(g)(4)

The Juvenile Court noted the prior order adjudicating the Children as victims of severe child abuse at the hands of Mother. The Juvenile Court also found that the Children were subject to “continuous physical punishment and intentional deprivation of food by the mother . . . .” The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against any of the findings of the Juvenile Court. We hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the ground of severe child abuse.

An unappealed severe-child-abuse finding from a dependency-and-neglect proceeding is final and bars the parent from relitigating severe abuse in a later termination proceeding.

In Re Austin A. · filed 2014-11-17(g)(4)

A court may apply “the doctrine of res judicata to prevent a parent from re-litigating whether she committed severe child abuse in a later termination of parental rights proceeding, when such a finding had been made in a previous dependency and neglect action.” In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). Thus, where a parent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of severe abuse in the prior suit and did not appeal, the finding of severe abuse is “a final decision, which the [parent] is barred from challenging.” State Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Tate, No. 01–A–01–9409–CV–00444, 1995 WL 138858, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1995). Because Mother did not appeal the trial court’s previous finding of severe child abuse, the order became a final order and res judicata.

An unappealed final finding of severe child abuse is res judicata and may support termination under subsection (g)(4) without relitigating the abuse finding.

In Re Serenity S. · filed 2014-11-24(g)(4)

Because Mother did not appeal the trial court's finding of severe child abuse within the time allowed by law, the order became a final order and the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that Mother has committed severe abuse for purposes of terminating her parental rights.

An unappealed adjudicatory order finding severe child abuse conclusively establishes the severe-abuse ground for termination.

In re J.R.C. · filed 2015-04-27(g)(4)

Mother did not appeal the November 2013 adjudicatory order. As the State correctly contends, the order is thus final, and the severe abuse finding is established as a matter of law. In short, grounds for termination were conclusively established by the adjudicatory order and its finding of severe child abuse.

Evidence that a parent severely abused the subject child’s sibling is relevant to terminating rights to the subject child under subsection (g)(4).

In re Makenzie L. · filed 2015-06-17(g)(4)

It was error for the trial court to refuse to allow witnesses to testify regarding abuse Ashton allegedly endured because such evidence was relevant to the question of whether the parents‘ rights to Makenzie could be terminated under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). Therefore, we must remand the case for a determination of whether the ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), applies in this case.

A medical examination is not required to prove severe child sexual abuse when consistent disclosures and other evidence clearly and convincingly establish the ground.

In re C.A.F. · filed 2015-07-29(g)(4)

We decline to hold that the lack of a medical examination somehow prevented the Juvenile Court from finding clear and convincing evidence as to the ground of severe child sexual abuse.

A prior severe-child-abuse adjudication supports termination under subsection (g)(4) as to both the abused child and that child's siblings or half-siblings.

In Re: A.C.S. · filed 2015-09-23(g)(4)

Not only does the adjudication of severe child abuse apply to the victim, but, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4), it also applies to any siblings and half-siblings of the victim. Because A.C.S. is E.C.R.S.‘s half-sibling, this ground applies to the termination of Mother‘s parental rights to A.C.S. as well.

A parent may commit severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4) by knowingly failing to protect the child even without actively committing or witnessing the abuse.

In re Americus C. · filed 2015-09-30(g)(4)

In this case, even ignoring the evidence and assuming for the sake of argument that Mother committed no abuse herself, we find the evidence clear and convincing that Mother committed severe abuse by her failure to protect Americus.

Final, unchallenged severe-abuse findings establish the severe-child-abuse termination ground under subsection (g)(4).

In Re Kaedince M. · filed 2015-10-19(g)(4)

The evidence in the record is clear and convincing that Mother’s pre-incarceration conduct constituted wanton disregard for the welfare of the Children, and the severe abuse findings against Mother are final and unchallenged. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence establishes the grounds of wanton disregard and severe abuse with respect to Mother.

Severe child abuse against children who reside in the parent’s home may establish the severe-abuse ground for terminating the parent’s rights to other children residing in that home.

In re Kyah H. · filed 2015-12-23(g)(4)

A careful and thorough review of the record on appeal reveals that the evidence, which is discussed more fully above, does not preponderate against these findings made by the Trial Court by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error in the Trial Court‟s determination that grounds were proven to terminate Father‟s parental rights to the Children for severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4).

Driving under the influence of non-prescribed medication with children in the vehicle may constitute severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4) when it exposes them to a substantial risk of bodily injury or death.

In re Addison E. · filed 2016-06-30(g)(4)

However, the court indicated as such when it found that Mother “committed severe abuse by operating a vehicle while she was under the influence of non-prescribed medication with the [C]hildren in the car, exposing the [C]hildren to substantial risk of bodily injury or death.” (Emphasis added.). Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports termination on this statutory ground.

Subsection (g)(4) imposes no temporal-proximity or other nexus requirement between a prior severe-abuse order involving a sibling and the child at issue in the later termination case.

In Re: I.E.A. · filed 2016-07-20(g)(4)

The plain language of the statute does not require that the prior order have any specific temporal proximity or nexus to the current child at issue or the proceedings currently being adjudicated.

An unappealed final dependency-and-neglect order finding severe child abuse is res judicata and establishes the severe-abuse ground without relitigating whether abuse occurred.

In re C.D. · filed 2016-08-30(g)(4)

“Once there has been a finding of severe child abuse in a final order, the doctrine of res judicata prevents parents from re-litigating the issue of whether they committed severe child abuse in a subsequent proceeding to terminate their parental rights.” In re Joshua C., No. E2016-00081-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 4069288, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed July 28, 2016) (citing In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); In re Matthew T., No. M2015-00486-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 1621076, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Apr. 20, 2016)). Accordingly, the trial court’s finding of severe child abuse in the dependency and neglect proceeding – being an unappealed from final order – is res judicata.

A final prior order finding that a parent severely abused a half-sibling establishes the severe-abuse ground for terminating rights to a later-born child, even if the parent did not appreciate the earlier finding’s consequences.

In Re: Zachariah G. · filed 2016-09-08(g)(4)

In the present case, the Child, born March 2014, is the half-sibling of the child found by prior order in November 2012 to have been severely abused by Mother. The November 2012 order from Montgomery County Juvenile Court was not appealed and is final. Neither of these key facts is in dispute. Mother argues instead that she did not appreciate the consequences of the finding of severe abuse, and that this put her at a great disadvantage in this termination case. Respectfully, this will not suffice. We find and hold, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of severe abuse by prior order has been proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence.

A qualifying sentence for severe abuse supports termination under subsection (g)(5) even while the criminal conviction remains on direct appeal.

In re Addison B. · filed 2016-11-30(g)(5)

“„Statutory grounds may be proved by evidence of conviction, and we find no basis for a requirement that a child remain ineligible for adoption and the possibility of a permanent home while her parent pursues reversal of the conviction.‟”

Taking sexually explicit photographs of a child and sending them to a known sex offender constitutes severe child abuse supporting termination under subsection (g)(4).

In Re: G.L. · filed 2016-12-28(g)(4)

Mother admitted to taking these photographs, and she admitted that the photographs were sexually explicit in nature. She pleaded guilty to federal charges for knowingly distributing child pornography. Her actions constitute especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and severe child abuse. We hold, as a matter of law, that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse.

Subsection (g)(4) permits the court hearing the termination petition to make the severe-abuse finding itself; a prior severe-abuse order is not required.

In Re Anna B. · filed 2017-02-01(g)(4)

By its plain language, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4) does not require that the finding of severe child abuse be made by a court other than the court hearing the petition to terminate. Rather, the statute provides avenues for a finding of severe child abuse.

A fully litigated, final severe-abuse order that was not appealed is res judicata and cannot be relitigated in a later subsection (g)(4) termination proceeding.

In Re: Delilah G. · filed 2017-02-22(g)(4)

Moreover, the record before us shows that the issue of severe abuse was fully litigated in the dependent and neglect action, thus the order entered December 17, 2014 is final and res judicata and cannot be relitigated in this proceeding.

A prior severe-abuse finding remains an established termination ground even when an earlier termination judgment was reversed because termination was not then in the child’s best interest.

In Re: Wesley P. · filed 2017-05-12(g)(4)

On appeal, although we reversed the termination of parental rights based on a finding that termination was not in the Child’s best interest at that time, this Court held that “clear and convincing evidence exists to establish a ground of severe abuse,” and that the judgment of the chancery court was “affirmed as to the finding that a ground exists” to terminate Mother’s and Fathers’ parental rights. Because Father was found to have committed severe abuse under a prior court order, this ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

A final severe-abuse adjudication is res judicata, independently establishes a termination ground, and relieves DCS of its obligation to make reasonable reunification efforts.

In Re Martese P. · filed 2017-05-24(g)(4)

Here, Mother was found to have committed severe child abuse in the juvenile court’s December 16, 2014 order, which is a final and non-appealable judgment. Therefore, under the doctrine of res judicata, Mother is precluded from re-litigating this issue. ... This finding not only established grounds for the termination of Mother’s parental rights, but also relieved DCS from its obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Martese. Accordingly, Mother’s argument regarding reunification is without merit.

A parent commits severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect children from abuse likely to cause serious injury or death.

In Re Demarkus T. · filed 2017-08-03(g)(4)

Mother also committed severe child abuse of her children by failing to protect them from Father’s abuse. Therefore, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4).

A prior criminal-court finding of severe child sexual abuse establishes subsection (g)(11), and the convicted parent's continued assertions of innocence do not defeat the ground.

In Re Hailey C. · filed 2017-09-28(g)(11)

His continued assertions of innocence have no bearing on whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to this statute. We affirm the trial court’s holding that grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(11).

A child's later healthy development does not diminish the severity of prenatal drug exposure for purposes of subsection (g)(4).

In Re Douglas H. · filed 2017-09-29(g)(4)

Tailor’s healthy development, however, “does not diminish the severity of the harm to which [she] was exposed.” In re M.J.J., 2005 WL 873305, at *8. We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding of severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence based on Mother’s prenatal drug use.

A parent knowingly fails to protect children from severe abuse when the children report the other parent’s drug use and the parent directs a child how to dispose of used needles.

In Re Alyssa W. · filed 2017-12-14(g)(4)

Father’s knowing disregard for Mother’s drug use around the children and his instruction to Alyssa as to how to dispose of the needles constitute severe child abuse against all the children, within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4). This is clear and convincing proof of Father’s knowing failure to protect the children from abuse and supports termination on this ground.

Driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle may constitute severe child abuse supporting termination under subsection (g)(4).

In Re: D.T. · filed 2018-05-24(g)(4)

We hold, as a matter of law, that the evidence found by the trial court amounts to clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of mother’s parental rights based on severe child abuse for driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle.

Severe child abuse by knowing failure to protect was established when the parent knew of serious physical injuries yet continued giving the abuser access to the children.

In Re: Jarrett P. · filed 2018-06-29(g)(4)

Mother admitted to entrusting F.P. with the Children’s care while she worked twelve-hour shifts and affirmed that he was permitted to bathe Kevin and Sophia. Based on our thorough review of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court was presented sufficient evidence that Mother had knowledge of the ongoing severe child abuse suffered by Jarrett and Kevin while they were in her custody.

Expert evidence that severe developmental and functional impairments resulted from early environmental neglect can establish severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4).

In Re Charles R. · filed 2018-07-25(g)(4)

Indeed, the findings of the Center and Dr. Freeman are compelling evidence of severe child abuse while in the care and custody of Parents due to, inter alia, Charles essentially being nonverbal, having to grunt or point to communicate, and the unrefuted testimony that his language delays severely impaired his ability to function in his environment and adversely affected his ability to learn contrasted with the fact there is clear and convincing evidence that Charles improved immensely after his removal.

A final prior adjudication of severe child abuse may establish the severe-child-abuse ground for termination through res judicata.

In Re: Gabriel C. · filed 2018-08-30(g)(4)

The judgment is clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of Mother’s rights on this ground.

Reckless disregard of known dangers that causes a child two severe burns in one week, coupled with failure to obtain appropriate medical treatment, supports termination for severe child abuse.

In Re: E.M. · filed 2018-09-27(g)(4)

The fact that the child was severely burned on two separate occasions within a one-week period strongly suggests that mother recklessly disregarded those known dangers. Moreover, mother also failed to alleviate the child’s ongoing pain by refusing to seek appropriate medical treatment. We hold as a matter of law that these facts clearly and convincingly support termination on the ground of severe child abuse.

Knowing exposure of a child to methamphetamine and marijuana that is likely to cause serious immediate or long-term injury supports termination for severe child abuse.

In Re: Mason C. · filed 2018-10-02(g)(4)

DCS has the burden to show that Mother’s use of illicit drugs around Mason was “likely to cause [him] serious bodily injury.” As discussed above, Mason’s hair follicle test undisputedly revealed that he had ingested or absorbed methamphetamine and marijuana. Dr. Jones testified in great detail that ingestion of these drugs could cause immediate and/or long term injury to Mason.

Subsection (g)(4) permits termination for severe child abuse based on prenatal controlled-substance exposure whether or not the child actually suffers harm.

In Re Colton B. · filed 2018-10-29(g)(4)

We continue to adhere to these holdings and reject Mother’s assertion that she did not commit severe child abuse by exposing Colton to prenatal drug use. “[P]renatal abuse of controlled substances constitutes severe child abuse, whether or not the child actually suffers harm.”

Subsection (g)(4) allows a termination court to rely on a prior final order finding severe child abuse without relitigating severe abuse.

In Re Savanna I. · filed 2018-11-26(g)(4)

It is well settled that a trial court may rely on a prior court order finding severe child abuse and is not required to re-litigate the issue of severe abuse at the trial to terminate parental rights.

Prenatal abuse of controlled substances constitutes severe child abuse even if the child does not actually suffer harm.

In Re: K.S. · filed 2019-08-02(g)(4)

This Court has repeatedly held that “prenatal abuse of controlled substances constitutes severe child abuse, whether or not the child actually suffers harm.”

A prior severe-child-abuse order becomes final and may establish subsection (g)(4) when the parent dismisses the appeal from that order.

In Re Janiyah J. · filed 2019-09-04(g)(4)

Accordingly, the order became a final order and may be relied upon pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4).

A later criminal acquittal would not undo a final severe-child-abuse adjudication establishing subsection (g)(4) because the civil and criminal proceedings use different burdens of proof.

In Re Deishun M. · filed 2019-11-18(g)(4)

Even if Mother were subsequently acquitted in a jury trial during the criminal proceedings, the acquittal would not affect the finality and res judicata provided to the Juvenile Court’s judgment which found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse against the Children.

For the severe-child-abuse ground, serious bodily injury is defined by section 39-15-402(c), not the general criminal-code definition in section 39-11-106(a)(34).

In Re Imerald W. · filed 2020-01-31(g)(4)

This definition of serious bodily injury, however, is inapplicable for purposes of terminating a parent’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Rather, in its definition of severe child abuse, Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(27) provides that serious bodily injury “shall have the same meaning given in § 39-15-402(c)[,]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(A)(ii), which, as noted above, provides that the applicable definition of serious bodily injury includes “injuries to the skin that involve severe bruising or the likelihood of permanent or protracted disfigurement, including those sustained by whipping children with objects.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402(c).

Later efforts to stop drug use or remove an abusive person do not defeat the severe-child-abuse ground when the proof establishes that the abuse occurred.

In Re Adalee H. · filed 2020-08-07(g)(4)

We conclude the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the finding that Father committed severe child abuse. While Father may have taken steps to stop his use of drugs and to remove his father from his life, the proof established that the abuse had taken place.

A final prior order finding that a parent severely abused any child is res judicata and can support termination as to a different child in a later proceeding.

In Re: Collwynn J. · filed 2020-12-11(g)(4)

Further, the plain language of section 36-1-113(g)(4) makes clear that a parent’s rights can be terminated when the parent “has been found to have committed severe child abuse . . . against any child.” (emphasis added). The import of the statute is clear, and it is not of consequence that the severe abuse finding as to Z.D. was made in a separate action; indeed, the statute suggests just the opposite in the sense that it is satisfied when “the parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child abuse . . . under any prior order of a court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) (emphasis added).

An unappealed prior order finding severe child abuse is res judicata and may establish the severe-abuse termination ground without relitigating the abuse.

In Re Jeremy C. · filed 2021-02-26(g)(4)

It is well settled that a trial court may rely on a prior court order finding severe child abuse and is not required to re-litigate the issue of severe abuse at the trial to terminate parental rights.

A prior severe-abuse order is not required because the court hearing the termination petition may itself find severe child abuse.

In Re Greyson D. · filed 2021-04-07(g)(4)

Even if we were not permitted to rely on this order, however, no prior order is strictly necessary, as this ground for termination may also be found by the court hearing the termination petition.

Prenatal methamphetamine use constitutes severe child abuse even when the child does not actually sustain harm.

In Re Alleigh B. · filed 2021-04-27(g)(4)

Because a child has “the right to begin life free from the impairment of drug addiction and other ill effects of prenatal drug use,” In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009), we have held that a mother’s prenatal drug use constitutes severe child abuse, even in instances where the child does not actually sustain harm, In re Shannon P., No. E2012-00445-COA-R3-PT, 2013 WL 3777174, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2013).

A parent commits severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4) by knowingly using methamphetamine around children and thereby exposing or failing to protect them from likely serious bodily injury or death.

In Re Sophia S. · filed 2021-07-30(g)(4)

We conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the finding that Mother committed severe child abuse. Mother’s admitted methamphetamine use with Father while the children were in the home falls within the definition of severe child abuse. She knowingly exposed and failed to protect her children from a substance that was likely to cause them serious bodily injury or result in death.

A final severe-abuse finding as to one child is res judicata and satisfies subsection (g)(4) for other children because the statute reaches severe abuse against any child.

In Re Trinity S. · filed 2021-08-09(g)(4)

Thus, the issue of whether Mother perpetrated severe child abuse against Oaklee is res judicata. Moreover, the juvenile court’s finding that Mother committed severe child abuse against Oaklee also satisfies termination of Mother’s parental rights to the other two children under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) because the statute explicitly provides that a parent’s rights may be terminated when the parent “ha[s] committed severe child abuse against any child.” (Emphasis added).

A final severe-abuse finding involving one child satisfies subsection (g)(4) as to the parent's rights to other children because the ground applies to abuse against any child.

In Re Sebashtian K. · filed 2021-11-02(g)(4)

The severe abuse finding also satisfies this ground for termination of both parents’ parental rights to Sebashtian. As the statute makes clear, a parent’s rights may be terminated when the parent “ha[s] committed severe child abuse against any child.”

A child need not be physically present during an active methamphetamine cook for the parent to have knowingly exposed the child to a structure where methamphetamine manufacture was occurring.

In Re Daniel G. · filed 2021-11-15(g)(4)

A lack of evidence that a child was physically present during the actual “cook” of methamphetamine does not preclude the court from finding a parent committed severe abuse if other evidence exists demonstrating that the child had been present in the home where the manufacturing of methamphetamine was occurring.

A final prior finding of severe child abuse against one child supports termination of the parent's rights to another child because subsection (g)(4) reaches abuse against any child.

In Re Charles B. · filed 2021-11-15(g)(4)

Finally, we note that, although only one of the Children was found to be the victim of severe child abuse, the statutory ground allows termination when a parent commits severe child abuse “against any child.”

Severe child abuse may be established circumstantially when children test positive for drugs and the evidence shows the parent either exposed them personally or knowingly allowed exposure in the home.

In Re Erin N. · filed 2022-02-14(g)(4)

These circumstances, considered together, demonstrate that Father either knowingly exposed the Children to drugs himself or allowed the Children to be exposed to drugs by Mother or D.C. ... We conclude that these combined circumstances served to undergird and establish the trial court’s finding of severe child abuse.

A parent commits severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect children from sexual assault and permitting renewed access to the abuser after learning of the abuse.

In Re Kailey A. · filed 2022-03-14(g)(4)

The evidence presented at trial supports the Juvenile Court’s finding that Mother knew about the sexual assault against the children, Kailey and Abigail, and that she had failed to protect the children from the abuse by Dave C. Therefore, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother severely abused Kailey and Abigail.

A valid prior order finding severe child abuse conclusively establishes subsection (g)(4), and the abuse issue may not be relitigated in the termination hearing.

In Re S.S. · filed 2022-04-19(g)(4)

However, when proceeding under the alternative second avenue under ground (g)(4), “the ground is proven by the prior order finding severe child abuse,” and “[t]he issue of whether abuse occurred may not be re- litigated at the termination hearing.”

A final severe-abuse finding from a dependency-and-neglect proceeding is res judicata and satisfies subsection (g)(4)'s prior-order language.

In Re Travionna W. · filed 2022-10-14(g)(4)

Moreover, the juvenile court’s severe-abuse finding in February 2018 satisfies the “under any prior order of a court” language in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4).

A prior severe-abuse order supports subsection (g)(4) only if it finds that the parent knowingly inflicted abuse or knowingly failed to protect the child.

In Re Dakari M. · filed 2024-03-26(g)(4)

But neither of these orders found that Mother knowingly exposed Sister to abuse or neglect or failed to protect her. ... These orders were an insufficient basis for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

A final severe-child-abuse adjudication is res judicata and cannot be collaterally attacked in a later termination proceeding.

In Re William C. · filed 2024-04-18(g)(4)

Therefore, the prior determination that Father committed severe child abuse is res judicata, ... and the trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination existed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4).

A prior severe-abuse order need not cite the precise definitional subsection when its factual findings establish that the child ingested an illegal substance and tested positive.

In Re Nash M. · filed 2024-11-21(g)(4)

This finding satisfies subsection (E), “[k]nowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8) years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that results in the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed to the child.”

The termination court may itself find severe child abuse under subsection (g)(4), so no prior severe-abuse adjudication is required.

In Re Caz H. · filed 2024-11-27(g)(4)

I.R.H., C.J.H., and C.L.H. were also found to be victims of severe abuse during the termination phase.

Subsection (g)(4) expressly permits the court hearing the termination petition to find severe child abuse, so a separate prior adjudication is unnecessary.

In Re Ezmaie F. · filed 2024-12-20(g)(4)

Their arguments fail because the statute explicitly provides that severe child abuse can be “found by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights,” as the trial court found in this case.

A final, unappealed juvenile-court severe-abuse finding is res judicata and cannot be relitigated in a later termination appeal.

In Re Sawyer B. · filed 2025-05-02(g)(4)

Mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s order, and it is final. In the appeal at bar, Mother attempts to re-litigate the juvenile court’s finding of severe child abuse against her. However, the issue of Mother’s perpetration of severe child abuse is res judicata. She may not re-litigate the issue in this Court.

A final prior court order finding that a parent committed severe child abuse establishes the severe-abuse ground and precludes relitigation in the termination proceeding.

In Re Justice W. · filed 2025-09-08(g)(4)

As is the case here, the ground of severe abuse by Mother was proved by a prior court order finding severe child abuse. As a result, the issue of whether severe abuse occurred may not be re-litigated in this termination action.

Circumstantial evidence may establish the severe-child-abuse ground and is not inferior to direct evidence.

IN RE ALEXANDER P. · filed 2025-09-10(g)(4)

We have rejected any suggestion that circumstantial evidence is inferior to or less probative than direct evidence. ... Thus, Mother's ... court should not have considered circumstantial evidence in determining ... severe child abuse in this case is unavailing.

A final, unappealed prior order finding severe child abuse establishes subsection (g)(4) by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Ava M. · filed 2026-01-15(g)(4)

The record before us clearly proves that Mother was “found to have committed severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under [a] prior order of a court,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). Further, it is undisputed that that order was not appealed. Thus, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding that the ground of severe child abuse has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

A final prior court finding that a parent committed severe child abuse can establish this ground for termination without relitigating the abuse.

In Re Dilmer S.M. · filed 2025-01-17(g)(4)

Because the severe abuse finding against Mother in the November 24, 2021, order satisfies the “under any prior order of a court” language in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4), we conclude the trial court properly determined that DCS proved this ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

Subsection (g)(4) supports termination for severe child abuse when clear and convincing evidence shows that a child tested positive for methamphetamine while in the parents’ care.

In Re Nation F. · filed 2024-01-25(g)(4)

It also is undisputed that Nation tested positive for methamphetamine while he was in the care and custody of Parents. Based on these undisputed facts, there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Parents’ rights on the ground of severe child abuse.

A prior juvenile court finding of severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect proceeding can establish the severe child abuse ground for termination through res judicata.

In Re Rinyah J. · filed 2025-05-19(g)(4)

A prior finding of severe child abuse by a juvenile court in dependency and neglect proceedings can be res judicata in later parental rights termination proceedings.

Section 36-1-113(g)(4) permits termination of parental rights based on severe child abuse, and a final order finding that abuse satisfies this ground.

State Dept.of Children's Services v. J.M.R.R. · filed 2000-01-19(g)(4)

Where a parent has committed severe child abuse, as defined in T.C.A. §37-1-102, a basis is established to terminate parental rights. T.C.A. §36-1-113(g)(4). In this case, the mother was determined to have committed severe child abuse against JWR under a now final Order entered by the Juvenile Court Referee. This found abuse satisfies the requirements of the Statute.

A parent’s sustained failure to comply with a plan of care, remain in contact with caseworkers, and separate from a suspected abuser constitutes substantial noncompliance supporting termination under subsection (g)(2).

In the matter of: Kristalena Kay Smith · filed 1999-02-11(g)(2)

The juvenile judge’s findings and conclusions track the statutory requirements. After reviewing the transcript of the July 29, 1997 hearing, we concur with the juvenile judge. The record shows that for more than three years Ms. Wylie showed a remarkable lack of concern for her children. She utterly failed to comply with her plan of care. For long periods of time she was out of touch with the state workers who were supposed to monitor her progress. She continued to live with the person suspected of abusing her infant son.

Token counseling and medication compliance immediately before a termination hearing do not overcome substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan when the parent has not addressed the plan's underlying issues.

In the matter of B.B. · filed 2000-06-20(g)(2)

Although she had begun taking her medications immediately before the termination hearing and was communicating occasionally with a psychologist, “[t]oken attendance [in counseling session and token maintenance of medication] without addressing the real issues present here [are] not sufficient to indicate compliance with the foster care plan.” Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Adams, No. 03A01-9403-CV-00114, 1994 WL 579911 at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1994) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). Based on the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had substantially failed to comply with the plan of care.

Substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) may persist despite a parent’s eventual housing when noncompliance continued through most of the children’s foster-care placement.

In Re: D.M.S., G.H.S., and T.M.S. · filed 2001-11-12(g)(2)

Even crediting Mother’s testimony regarding her eventual month-to-month lease of a residence in Milwaukee, the proof shows that for the vast majority of these children’s stay in foster care, Mother ... continued and remains in substantial noncompliance with the Plan. See In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546-47 (Tenn.2002).

Substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions are established when a parent makes only inconsistent efforts on a permanency plan and fails to remedy the unsafe home environment that led to removal.

Oliver Valentine · filed 2000-10-18(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)(i)

While Mother made inconsistent efforts to comply with the DCS permanency plans, she failed to obtain her GED or vocational training, and did not obtain the extra counseling required under the plans. Most importantly, Mother maintained her relationship with Father, indeed married him, and seemed unable to understand the impact of Father’s behavior on Oliver’s home environment. Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the parental rights of both Mother and Father.

Recent compliance with a permanency plan does not require the court to defer termination so the parent can have more time to prove that the improvement is permanent.

In the Matter of: A.W. & J.W. · filed 2002-10-30(g)(2)

As to the “too late” conclusion, we also concur. In State v. Pruitt, No. M2000-00416-COA- R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2000), we were confronted with a mother who refused to take her medication until two months before the trial. Although the medication helped her mental condition, the court held that nothing in the statutes or the common law required the court to defer a decision so that the mother could have more time to demonstrate that her improvement was permanent. The child in that case had spent the most recent year and a half in foster care. In all, he had spent over half of his life in and out of foster care. In this case the children stayed in foster care a little over two years before the court, on hearing the mother say another time that she would not take her medicine, directed DCS to file the termination petition. We think the court gave the mother an adequate chance to comply with the permanency plans.

Recent compliance with a permanency plan does not require the court to defer termination so the parent can have more time to prove that the improvement is permanent.

In Re AW · filed 2003-02-11(g)(2)

As to the "too late" conclusion, we also concur. In State v. Pruitt, No. M2000-00416-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 827957 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 27, 2000), we were confronted with a mother who refused to take her medication until two months before the trial. Although the medication helped her mental condition, the court held that nothing in the statutes or the common law required the court to defer a decision so that the mother could have more time to demonstrate that her improvement was permanent. The child in that case had spent the most recent year and a half in foster care. In all, he had spent over half *547 of his life in and out of foster care. In this case the children stayed in foster care a little over two years before the court, on hearing the mother say another time that she would not take her medicine, directed DCS to file the termination petition. We think the court gave the mother an adequate chance to comply with the permanency plans.

Last-minute employment and a newly scheduled therapy session may be too little and too late to overcome substantial noncompliance and persistent financial and emotional instability.

Department of Children's Srvcs v. B.L.K. & E.C.C. · filed 2003-05-20(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

Mother’s last minute ability to secure employment two days before the second day of trial began, as well as the scheduling of a therapy session in the near future is, quite simply, too little too late. These and other facts as previously set forth establish Mother’s substantial noncompliance with the terms of the Plan.

Last-minute efforts do not prevent clear and convincing proof of substantial plan noncompliance and persistent conditions after years of only minimal progress.

Dept of Children's Srvcs. v. A.W.S. & E.S. In Re: R.T.S. · filed 2003-12-17(g)(2), (g)(3)

Based on our review of the record, including the facts detailed above, we do not believe the Juvenile Court committed any reversal error in arriving at its conclusion that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to these two statutory grounds. Mother’s and Father’s last minute efforts cannot provide the basis for a conclusion that these statutory grounds have not been proven.

Refusal to acknowledge drug addiction or accept free inpatient and intensive outpatient treatment can establish substantial noncompliance and failure to remedy persistent conditions.

In Re: T.H. and J.H. · filed 2004-08-18(g)(2), (g)(3)

Specifically, but without going into detail, there was clear and convincing evidence that Mother refused to acknowledge her drug addiction and refused treatment even though the Department provided free in-patient and intensive out-patient treatment.

Continued domestic violence, failure to attend required therapy and substance-abuse counseling, and failure to maintain sobriety can establish substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions.

In Re: C.A.H. · filed 2004-08-18(g)(2), (g)(3)

Specifically, but without going into detail, there was clear and convincing evidence that the violent relationship with her companion continued, that Mother was not seeing her domestic therapist, that she failed to provide proof of attendance at domestic violence classes and alcohol and drug counseling, and that she failed to maintain sobriety.

Reformation begun after the termination petition may be too late to overcome substantial plan noncompliance and persistent conditions when earlier reunification efforts failed and the child bonded with foster parents.

In Re: A.R.G. · filed 2005-02-25(g)(2), (g)(3)

While Mother continued her drug-related lifestyle and did precious little to either follow her Permanency Plan or alter the conditions which led to the removal of her child, A.R.G. was bonding with her foster parents to such a degree that she hardly recognizes Mother. Efforts made by DCS to assist her during this time were fruitless, as she either could not or would not do what was necessary to sustain a meaningful relationship of parent and child. Her new-found reformation is simply, in the words of the guardian ad litem, “too little-too late”. In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d 541 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003); State v. Pruitt, No. M2000-00416-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 827957 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 27, 2000).

Subsection (g)(2) requires substantial compliance with the permanency plan’s statement of responsibilities—the actions assigned to the parent—not merely achievement of the plan’s desired outcomes.

In Re: Johnny E. K. · filed 2010-02-16(g)(2)

This Court has held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) does not require substantial compliance with a permanency plan’s desired outcomes, but rather, it requires substantial compliance with a plan’s statement of responsibilities i.e. the actions required to be taken by the parent.

A parent may be in substantial noncompliance despite completing some programs when she violates the plan's central duties to remain drug free and put herself in a position to care for the children.

In Re: Zachary G. · filed 2012-03-02(g)(2)

While we commend Mother for completing various programs relating to her addiction, she simply failed to comply with the most important aspects of the permanency plans, namely to remain drug free and put herself in a position where she could adequately care for the Children. ... Accordingly, we conclude that while Mother attempted to comply with some of the requirements enumerated in the permanency plans, the trial court’s finding that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Refusing substance-abuse treatment, continuing to live with a partner who beats the children and uses drugs, and failing drug screens are substantial noncompliance with corresponding permanency-plan duties.

In Re: Jacob R.R., Brady E.R., and Kacey C.R. · filed 2012-05-21(g)(2)

The record established the mother failed to comply with the permanency plans’ requirements in substantial ways. She refused to complete an alcohol and drug treatment program, based on her belief she did not have a drug or alcohol problem. She continued her relationship with a man, though he abused her and the children by hitting them with belts and other objects. ... The mother herself tested positive for marijuana and two other drugs while the children were making a home visit, thus she did not comply with the permanency’s plan that she test negative to drug screens.

Subsection (g)(2) requires substantial compliance with the action steps and responsibilities in a permanency plan, not achievement of the plan's desired outcomes.

In Re: Emily N.I. · filed 2012-05-30(g)(2)

We acknowledge that, as raised by Mother, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2) mandates “compliance with the actions required to be taken by the parent or parents,” not the desired outcomes contained within the plans. ... Thus, parents need only substantially complete the action steps and requirements contained in the permanency plan in order for the court to find the compliance substantial.

Extensive failure to perform central permanency-plan duties establishes substantial noncompliance even when nonsupport is not proven.

In Re: Joseph G. · filed 2013-07-31(g)(2)

In summary, the proof preponderates overwhelmingly in favor of the trial court’s finding that Mother and Father failed to comply substantially with the terms of the permanency plan. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in terminating the parents’ rights based on the ground of their substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.

Repeated failure to obtain stable housing and employment, address substance abuse, and follow successive permanency-plan responsibilities constitutes substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2).

In the Matter of: Justin K., Courtney K., Eva K. · filed 2013-03-27(g)(2)

Based on the evidence introduced at trial, we affirm the trial court’s finding that DCS has established J.M.K.’s noncompliance with the requirements of the second, third, and fourth permanency plans by clear and convincing evidence.

Brief recent sobriety does not overcome substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) when the parent repeatedly relapses and cannot maintain a sanitary, drug-free home.

In Re: Autumn R.W. · filed 2013-03-21(g)(2)

The evidence further establishes that Mother also failed to substantially comply with the Plans by continuing to use illegal substances throughout the removal period and permitting persons who use crack cocaine to reside in the home with her while the Children were in foster care. Mother either refused to take or failed numerous drug screens while the Children were in foster care. Her trial testimony reveals that she only made a serious effort to maintain sobriety after the filing of the petition for termination. Mother likewise clearly failed to follow through with mental health treatment and assessments, and failed to comply with the services offered to her by DCS. She related that she either “kicked out” the service providers or received letters from them that she was being dismissed from the programs for lack of compliance or attendance. The record reveals that DCS made reasonable efforts to offer services to help Mother comply with the Plans. She did not attempt to utilize the assistance until after the termination proceedings were instituted. Clear and convincing evidence supports the finding by the juvenile court that Mother failed to substantially comply with the Plans.

Noncompliance with a permanency plan supports termination under § 36-1-113(g)(2) only when the noncompliance is substantial.

In Re: David L. R. · filed 2013-12-06(g)(2)

A parent’s failure to comply with a parenting plan is a ground for termination of their parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). In order for noncompliance to justify the termination of parental rights, it must be “substantial.” In re S.H., No. M2007-01718-COA- R3-PT, 2008 WL 1901118, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008). The issue of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of a permanency plan is a question of law; therefore, it is reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness.

A parent substantially fails to comply with a permanency plan by continuing drug-related conduct, failing treatment and aftercare, and failing visitation, parenting, contact, and support obligations despite some post-petition treatment.

In Re Anya G. · filed 2014-08-27(g)(2)

Following the filing of the termination petition, Mother completed inpatient treatment through a different facility. Mother subsequently relapsed, however, and did not complete her aftercare program. Mother was released from that program because she stopped attending classes and presented a forged doctor’s excuse. Mother continued her relationship with T.B., regardless of the volatility of that relationship due to drug and domestic violence problems. Mother experienced ongoing legal issues, with new warrants having been filed against her during the course of the termination trial. By her testimony at trial, Mother admitted that she needed to “get herself together” before she could effectively parent the Child. Mother had also failed to visit the Child regularly, demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, maintain regular contact with DCS representatives, or pay more than token child support. We conclude that the evidence in this case preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans.

Completing some permanency-plan steps does not defeat substantial noncompliance when the parent fails to address the primary issue preventing reunification.

In Re Ayden J.C. · filed 2014-09-15(g)(2)

Mother completed some of the action steps contained in the plans, namely she completed a mental health assessment and followed the recommendations from that assessment, she received necessary medical care, and she completed an alcohol and drug assessment. However, she failed to regularly remit child support. More importantly, she failed to address the primary issue that prohibited her reunification with the Child, namely her alleged drug abuse. ... With these considerations in mind, we conclude that DCS made reasonable efforts to assist Mother and that while Mother attempted to comply with some of the requirements, the trial court’s finding that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Partial completion of assessments and drug screens does not prevent a finding of substantial noncompliance when the parent fails the plan’s most important requirements, including resolving legal problems and becoming able to care for the children.

In Re: Christopher J.B.,Jr. · filed 2014-10-09(g)(2)

However, she simply failed to comply with the most important aspects of the permanency plans, namely to resolve her legal issues and put herself in a position where she could adequately care for the Children. Mother also never remitted child support as required by the permanency plans. Accordingly, we conclude that while Mother attempted to comply with some of the requirements enumerated in the permanency plans, the court’s finding that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent’s admissions that he signed and understood a permanency plan but did not complete its central requirements can clearly and convincingly establish substantial noncompliance.

In Re Alexus F. · filed 2014-11-13(g)(2)

From the evidence in the record, and particularly in light of Father’s own testimony, which was corroborated by Ms. Ashay, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that Father was not in substantial compliance with the permanency plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Subsection (g)(2) supported termination where the parents continued substance abuse and domestic violence and failed to make the behavioral changes required by their permanency plan.

In Re: Paige A.F. · filed 2014-11-26(g)(2)

The evidence in the record on appeal, as discussed in detail above, does not preponderate against these findings made by the Juvenile Court by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error in the Juvenile Court’s finding that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g)(2).

Substantial compliance under subsection (g)(2) requires parents to complete and maintain the changes needed for a safe long-term return of the children, not merely check off permanency-plan tasks.

In Re V.L.J. · filed 2014-12-30(g)(2)

As we see it, the compliance required with a permanency plan is that which is necessary to overcome the reasons that children are removed from a parent and placed in foster care. Regaining custody requires parents to complete certain tasks and maintain compliance with the plan to the point that it is appropriate and safe to return the children to them. In our view, a permanency plan is not simply a list of tasks with boxes to be checked off before custody is automatically restored. Rather, it is an outline for doing the things that are necessary to achieve the goal of permanency in children’s lives. We think that where “return to parent” is the goal, parents must complete their responsibilities in a manner that demonstrates that they are willing and able to resume caring for their children in the long- term, not on a month-to-month basis.

Substantial noncompliance is established when a parent’s efforts are merely sporadic and the parent fails to complete the most important permanency-plan requirement.

In Re Agustine R. · filed 2015-03-17(g)(2)

This is not a case where Father diligently completed requirements to the best of his ability. Father’s attempts to comply were sporadic, at best. Moreover, he simply failed to complete the most important aspects of the permanency plans, to provide current proof that his home was safe for the Children. Ms. Davis attempted to assist Father to the best of her ability given the unique circumstances, but Father essentially disappeared prior to the termination proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that while Father attempted to comply with some of the requirements enumerated in the permanency plans, the court’s finding that Father was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, a second statutory ground existed for termination of Father’s parental rights.

A parent substantially fails to comply with a permanency plan when, despite understanding its requirements, the parent cannot acquire and demonstrate skills that are integral to remedying the conditions requiring foster care.

In Re: Eve C. · filed 2015-04-29(g)(2)

The evidence in the record clearly shows that Mother understood the requirements outlined in the permanency plans, as well as the Criteria & Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights, understood the consequences of her failure to comply, and made attempts to comply with some of the requirements. What is equally clear is that, as found by the court, Mother was not able to acquire and exhibit the skills to take care of Eve which were integral to the permanency plans. The evidence shows that, in the two years since Eve‟s birth, Mother failed to accomplish the objectives of the permanency plans, which were specifically directed toward addressing the conditions that led to Eve‟s placement in DCS custody and to address the necessity of providing for her medical needs. The evidence cited by Mother does not preponderate against the findings of the court; the entire evidence clearly and convincingly supports the court‟s holding that Mother was in substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans.

An incarcerated parent’s failure to complete permanency-plan requirements he was unable to perform does not establish substantial noncompliance when he maintained contact and DCS did not send requested releases.

In re Jamel H. · filed 2015-07-13(g)(2)

Father remained in contact with DCS but did not complete any other requirements. Ms. Williams conceded that she never sent Father any requests for release of information. Father was simply unable to complete the remainder of the requirements due to his incarceration. With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Father‟s parental rights to Breanna based upon his substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans.

Subsection (g)(2) authorizes termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes substantial noncompliance with the parent's permanency-plan responsibilities.

In Re Greg S. · filed 2015-10-19(g)(2)

Our careful review of the record leads us to conclude that the evidence for Father’s substantial noncompliance with his permanency plan responsibilities is indeed clear and convincing. We find and hold, as did the Juvenile Court, that the evidence is clear and convincing to establish the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.

A parent’s work and educational pursuits do not excuse substantial noncompliance when the parent prioritizes those pursuits over the permanency-plan obligations necessary to regain custody.

In re Phillip I.P., Jr. · filed 2016-02-19(g)(2)

Mother prioritized her personal work and educational goals over cooperating with DCS such that she could be reunited with the Children. Work and education are commendable, but they cannot supplant Mother’s other obligations with respect to doing what she was required to do to regain custody of the Children. Mother, at best, put these objectives at odds with her parental responsibilities with those responsibilities coming a distant second. Mother used her work and education as unconvincing excuses for her failure to meet her parental responsibilities.

Substantial noncompliance is established when a parent is discharged from required therapy, fails to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills after classes, denies the underlying abuse, and continues using drugs.

In re A'Leah M. · filed 2016-02-23(g)(2)

The evidence in the record on appeal, as discussed more fully above, shows that, among other things, Mother was discharged from therapy for noncompliance, that despite attending parenting classes Mother has failed to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, that Mother continues to deny abusing the Children, and that Mother continues to use marijuana. The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court‟s findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds were proven to terminate Mother‟s parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the Permanency Plan.

Failure to satisfy permanency-plan requirements addressing the parent’s central substance-abuse and mental-health issues can be substantial noncompliance even if evidence on other requirements is lacking.

In re Malaya B. · filed 2016-05-24(g)(2)

Although Mother argues that there were other requirements of the plan where DCS failed to offer clear and convincing proof of noncompliance, the evidence was clear and convincing that Mother failed to meet the requirements related to her substance abuse and mental health issues, and under these facts, her failure to meet those requirements qualified as substantial noncompliance.

Substantial noncompliance is established when a parent’s shortcomings on central permanency-plan requirements far outweigh his progress.

In re J.M.M. · filed 2016-05-25(g)(2)

In our view, when looking at the permanency plan requirements, Father’s shortcomings far outweigh his progress. Accordingly, we hold that, as a matter of law, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Father has not substantially complied with the permanency plan.

Prescribed Suboxone use does not violate a permanency plan requiring freedom from illegal drugs, although admitted marijuana use does.

In Re Anicia B. · filed 2016-06-16(g)(2)

Mother‟s permanency plans specified that she was to remain free of illegal drugs. There was no testimony or evidence that Mother‟s taking of Suboxone pursuant to a prescription was illegal. Mother did admit to using marijuana. That activity violates the permanency plan.

Under subsection (g)(2), numerous failures to satisfy important permanency-plan requirements may constitute substantial noncompliance despite completion of a parenting class.

In re S.D.D. · filed 2016-07-26(g)(2)

In our view, the numerous requirements of the permanency plans to which she clearly failed to adhere far outweigh her completion of parenting classes. Accordingly, we hold that, as a matter of law, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Mother has not substantially complied with the permanency plan.

A parent's belated permanency-plan progress after the termination petition is filed may be too little and too late to overcome nearly two years of inaction under subsection (g)(2).

In Re Daymien T. · filed 2016-07-27(g)(2)

Although Father made more progress on the requirements of the permanency plan after the filing of the termination petition, we conclude that Father largely failed to take any action for nearly two years after the child was removed from his custody, and his belated efforts were simply “too little, too late.”

Subsection (g)(2) was established where the trial court's supported factual findings clearly and convincingly showed substantial noncompliance with reasonable permanency-plan requirements related to foster-care conditions.

In re Linette B. · filed 2016-12-21(g)(2)

From the record, we conclude that the facts, as found by the trial court, are supported by the preponderance of the evidence and clearly and convincingly establish the elements necessary to terminate Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).

Failure to submit to random drug screens was not substantial noncompliance when the parent met most plan requirements and a later assessment recommended no treatment.

In Re Damien G.M. · filed 2017-05-03(g)(2)

In light of Father’s current alcohol and drug assessment, which recommended no further treatment, we cannot conclude that his failure to submit to random drug testing is substantial enough to warrant the grave consequences of termination of his parental rights at this point.

Substantial noncompliance may be established when parents fail central drug-treatment requirements of reasonable permanency plans.

In Re: Angel M. · filed 2017-07-31(g)(2)

The trial court held that the parents were in substantial noncompliance with three permanency plans, primarily for drug abuse and the failure to seek treatment, and subsequently terminated the parental rights of each. Both parents appeal. We affirm.

Completing some plan tasks after incarceration is too little and too late when the parent took no action for two years and still failed the central requirements concerning sobriety, housing, and lawful conduct.

In Re Aaralyn O. · filed 2018-01-18(g)(2)

Given Father’s failure to take action to complete any of the requirements of the plan in the first two years after the removal of the children and Father’s failure to complete the central requirements of the plans, we must conclude that Father’s steps towards compliance were “[t]oo little, too late.”

Incarceration is relevant to plan compliance but cannot alone become a de facto termination ground when plan requirements imposed after incarceration were impossible to satisfy.

In Re: Ke'Andre C. · filed 2018-01-29(g)(2)

Much like the case of In re Jonathan F., we believe that terminating Father’s parental rights in this case on the ground of substantial noncompliance with his permanency plan would be tantamount to terminating his parental rights solely based on his incarceration. Although Father’s incarceration is a serious variable to be considered in the context of several of the grounds alleged for the termination of his parental rights, it cannot stand alone as a de facto bar to Father’s right to parent. We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding of Father’s substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan as a ground for termination of his parental rights to Ke’Andre.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) supported termination when clear and convincing evidence established both parents' substantial noncompliance with their permanency plan.

In Re: Mack E. · filed 2018-02-09(g)(2)

The evidence in the record on appeal, as discussed more fully above, does not preponderate against these findings made by the Juvenile Court. We find no error in the Juvenile Court’s determination that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).

Substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) was not proven where the trial court used a confused standard, failed to credit completed steps, and DCS testified that the parent completed most required actions.

In Re: Isaiah B. · filed 2018-05-08(g)(2)

Under these circumstances, including the confusion regarding the proper standard, the trial court’s failure to credit Mother for any of the steps she did complete, and the testimony of a DCS worker that Mother completed “most” of the action steps required, we conclude that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Mother substantially failed to comply with the permanency plans at issue.

Substantial noncompliance is established when parents complete virtually none of the plan requirements addressing the central removal conditions despite signing notice that noncompliance could support termination.

In Re Damon B. · filed 2018-06-25(g)(2)

Parents signed the Criteria & Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights, which explained that failure to comply with the permanency plans was grounds for termination, but they accomplished virtually none of the plans’ requirements. Accordingly, we find clear and convincing evidence in the record which supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Parents failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans.

Partial completion does not defeat substantial noncompliance when major requirements remain unmet, and drug treatment begun ten months after the termination petition is too little and too late.

In Re: McKenzie O. · filed 2018-07-05(g)(2)

Although Mother complied with a few of the requirements of the permanency plan, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that she did not substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan.

Substantial noncompliance turns on the parent’s efforts to follow the permanency plan, and significant failures on requirements addressing the reasons for removal are not trivial or technical deviations.

In Re Briana H. · filed 2018-08-31(g)(2)

It should be noted that the focus of this determination is not the parent’s achievement of the plans desired outcomes, but rather the parent’s efforts to abide by the plan. In re Aiden R., No. E2015-01799-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 3564313, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016) (citing In re B.D., No. M2008-01174-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 528922, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2009)).

Substantial noncompliance is not established when a parent substantially performs the permanency-plan requirements and the remaining deviations are minor, predate the plan, or rest only on unresolved charges.

In Re Natascha B · filed 2018-10-23(g)(2)

The record supports a finding that Father failed to provide DCS proof of income. But Father’s failure was not substantial in light of the requirement’s importance to the overall plan. See In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548-49.

Subsection (g)(2) focuses on a parent’s effort to comply with a permanency plan, not whether the parent achieved the plan’s desired outcome.

In Re Morgan K. · filed 2018-10-31(g)(2)

Moreover, the focus of this ground is not whether the parent is able to achieve the goals of the permanency plan, i.e., sobriety, but whether the parent manifested an effort to abide by the plan.

Subsection (g)(2) does not support termination when the parent’s compliance with the important permanency-plan requirements is substantial overall.

In Re Camdon H. · filed 2018-11-21(g)(2)

Our review of the record reveals that Father’s compliance must be considered substantial when he completed the secondary assessments as required, resolved his legal issues, obtained employment and transportation, was remitting child support, and showed great improvement in his effort to combat his drug addiction.

Substantial noncompliance is established when a parent takes initial steps but deliberately fails to follow through on key permanency-plan requirements, including prescribed mental-health medication.

In Re Charlie-Lynn P. · filed 2019-06-27(g)(2)

While Mother took certain initial steps to meet her responsibilities under the permanency plans, she failed to follow through in key areas. Mother’s failure to complete the plans is not a result of a good faith effort on her part that fell short. Instead, as reflected in her testimony, she unilaterally decided to go her own way.

Early rehabilitation efforts and some passed drug tests do not defeat substantial noncompliance when the parent fails to comply with the plan’s most important requirements aimed at remedying substance abuse.

In Re C.M. · filed 2019-08-14(g)(2)

We acknowledge mother’s early efforts to seek rehabilitation. Mother also passed some drug tests. However, the trial court properly found that mother was substantially noncompliant. Most concerning is the degree to which mother failed to comply with the requirements aimed at remedying her substance abuse issues, the most important requirements of the permanency plan.

Recent progress on permanency-plan tasks does not amount to substantial compliance under subsection (g)(2) when it fails to demonstrate long-term willingness and ability to care for the children.

In Re Bryson B. · filed 2019-12-02(g)(2)

We determine that the progress made by Mother toward the permanency plans’ requirements, while commendable, does not rise to the level of substantial compliance. Mother did not demonstrate progress sufficient to “achieve the goal of permanency in [the Children’s] lives” or show that she was “willing and able to resume caring for [the Children] in the long-term.”

Intermittent proof of employment does not substantially comply with a permanency plan requiring stable income, housing, and transportation aimed at remedying the reasons for removal.

In Re Serenity S. · filed 2020-01-31(g)(2)

The fact that Mother “at various times” during the period that the Children were in protective custody demonstrated that she was employed does not remedy what the trial court found to be substantial noncompliance with the requirements of demonstrating stable income, safe and stable housing, and transportation. Mother asserts that at the time of trial, she “was working ‘diligently’ to secure stable housing, income and transportation when her parental rights were terminated.” Mother, however, presented no evidence at trial of having obtained stable housing, income, or transportation.

Substantial noncompliance requires more than imperfect compliance; DCS must show reasonable, removal-related plan requirements and substantial noncompliance measured by its degree and the importance of unmet requirements.

In Re Madux F. · filed 2020-04-16(g)(2)

Termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(2) “requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the permanency plan.” To succeed under Section 36-1-113(g)(2), DCS “must demonstrate first that the requirements of the permanency plan are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the parent’s custody in the first place.” Second, DCS must show that “the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met.”

Noncompliance with a permanency plan is substantial under subsection (g)(2) when crucial requirements remain unmet or are addressed too late for DCS to investigate the claimed compliance.

In Re Rahjada W. · filed 2020-06-03(g)(2)

For many of the permanency plan’s crucial requirements, Mother either did not comply, was untruthful, or waited until the morning of trial to offer written proof, which was not without its faults. When presented with new information on the morning of the hearing, it was impossible for DCS to investigate Mother’s new home or income. In light of these circumstances, we find Mother’s noncompliance to be substantial. See In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 656.