Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113

Repeatedly refusing or failing drug screens and not addressing substance abuse constitutes substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan under subsection (g)(2).

In Re Johnathan T. · filed 2020-06-18(g)(2)

The permanency plans required Mother to comply with and pass random drug screens. Mother refused to comply with drug screen requests four times while the Children were in DCS custody. Although Mother complied with drug screens on several occasions, she failed each drug screen except for two. Mother clearly had not addressed her substance abuse issues. The evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of fact made by the Juvenile Court concerning this statutory ground. We find and hold, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Substantial noncompliance requires reasonable plan terms related to the removal conditions, and the court must weigh both the degree of noncompliance and the importance of each unmet requirement.

In Re Kash F. · filed 2020-09-04(g)(2)

To assess a parent’s substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, the court must weigh “both the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to that particular requirement.” Id. Conversely, “[t]erms which are not reasonable and related are irrelevant, and substantial noncompliance with such terms is irrelevant.”

Substantial noncompliance focuses on the parent’s efforts to comply with reasonable, removal-related permanency-plan requirements, not whether the plan’s desired outcomes were achieved.

In Re Brantley O. · filed 2020-10-22(g)(2)

Next, we must determine whether Mother’s noncompliance was substantial in light of the importance of the requirements to the overall plan. See id. at 548-49. “Substantial noncompliance is a question of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Id. at 548. A “[t]rivial, minor, or technical” deviation from the permanency plan’s requirements does not qualify as substantial noncompliance. In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Our focus is on the parent’s efforts to comply with the plan, not the achievement of the plan’s desired outcomes. In re B.D., No. M2008-01174-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 528922, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2009).

Noncompliance is substantial when the parent’s criminal conduct, incarceration, minimal visitation, and history of ignoring prior plans seriously jeopardize completion of the tasks needed to regain custody.

In Re Brooklyn R. · filed 2020-11-13(g)(2)

We conclude that the proof establishes that Father’s failure to comply with the responsibilities identified in the permanency plan is substantial. He admitted to engaging in criminal activity after the birth of the Child, and his incarceration precluded him from securing legal means to support the Child and adequate housing. Moreover, before incarceration, he visited the Child a maximum of four times. His conduct after losing custody of the Child appears consistent with his failure to complete permanency plans for his other six children, which seriously jeopardizes any ability to complete any required tasks toward gaining custody of the Child in the future.

Subsection (g)(2) requires responsibilities to be completed in a manner demonstrating long-term ability to care for the children, rather than merely checking off tasks.

In Re Treymarion S. · filed 2020-12-30(g)(2)

Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the goals and responsibilities of the permanency plans. Mother did not establish a suitable home and did not demonstrate that she could appropriately parent the Children despite almost three years of assistance from DCS. In short, Mother had failed to “complete [her] responsibilities in a manner that demonstrate[d] that [she was] willing and able to resume caring for [the Children] in the long-term.” See In re V.L.J., No. E2013-02815-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 7418250, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014). We therefore determine that clear and convincing evidence supported this ground for termination as well.

Substantial noncompliance requires reasonable, removal-related plan terms and noncompliance measured by both its degree and the importance of the unmet requirement.

In Re Terry E. · filed 2021-08-06(g)(2)

Although the termination statute does not define what conduct constitutes substantial noncompliance, terminating parental rights under this ground “requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the permanency plan.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 656. The significance of the noncompliance “should be measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to that requirement.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548. “Terms which are not reasonable and related are irrelevant, and substantial noncompliance with such terms is irrelevant.” Id. at 548-49.

Subsection (g)(2) asks whether the parent was substantially noncompliant, not whether the parent substantially complied; applying the latter standard requires vacatur of that ground.

In Re Daylan D. · filed 2021-11-09(g)(2)

Father’s failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans is not, however, a ... ground for termination. Instead, only his substantial noncompliance constitutes a ground for termination.

Failure to satisfy a single permanency-plan requirement may be substantial noncompliance when that requirement is essential to addressing the parent's ability to care safely for the child.

In Re Markus E. · filed 2021-11-30(g)(2)

Although Mother met the majority of the permanency plan requirements, failure to meet one requirement can constitute substantial noncompliance. ... Here, the mental health assessment was essential to addressing concerns over Mother’s ability to care for Markus and to keep him safe.

Substantial noncompliance focuses on the parent's efforts to comply with a permanency plan, not whether the plan's desired outcomes were achieved.

In Re Zian L. · filed 2021-12-28(g)(2)

We also recognize that when analyzing this ground, “[o]ur concern is with the parent’s efforts to comply with the plan, not the achievement of the plan’s desired outcomes.” ... In other words, “ ‘outcome achievement is not the measure of compliance.’ ”

Efforts begun only after a termination petition may remain substantial noncompliance when important permanency-plan requirements were otherwise unmet and the belated efforts were too little, too late.

In Re Jayce D. · filed 2022-03-18(g)(2)

Mother did make some efforts to comply, but many of those came after the petition was filed. Unfortunately, as we have observed in similar cases, Mother’s efforts were “too little, too late.”

Subsection (g)(2) asks whether the parent’s noncompliance was substantial, not whether the parent substantially complied.

In Re Tristan H. · filed 2022-03-22(g)(2)

This is a concern, because as we have noted in previous decisions, “[t]he relevant issue is not Father’s substantial compliance with regard to the permanency plan. Instead, the appropriate standard is whether there has been ‘substantial noncompliance.’” In re K.W., No. M2021-00408-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 5783355, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2021).

Substantial noncompliance is established when the most important permanency-plan requirements remain largely unfulfilled despite completion of minor or late tasks.

In Re Andrew W. · filed 2022-04-29(g)(2)

We conclude that the evidence is clear and convincing that Mother failed to substantially comply with the most important requirements of the permanency plan. The proof revealed that Mother completed a psychological assessment in October 2019, obtained a driver’s license, and registered a vehicle shortly before trial. But, otherwise, the most important requirements of the plan went largely unfulfilled.

Failure to complete a drug-and-alcohol assessment is substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) when long-term drug abuse was the main cause of incarceration and removal, despite compliance with some other plan terms.

In Re Kylie H. · filed 2022-07-15(g)(2)

Although we would be remiss not to acknowledge that Mother did in fact comply with portions of the permanency plans, we find her failure to complete the alcohol and drug assessment to be highly significant considering her extensive history of drug abuse. The record on appeal makes it clear that Mother’s history of drug abuse is largely the main contributing factor that ultimately led to her incarceration prior to the termination proceedings. ... In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of Mother’s substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and we affirm the trial court in this regard.

Incarceration cannot operate as a de facto ground of substantial noncompliance when it prevented the parent from satisfying plan requirements and needed services were unavailable in jail.

In Re Melvin M. · filed 2022-11-28(g)(2)

We conclude that in this case, Father was unable to meet many of the requirements of the permanency plan because of his incarceration and the lack of services provided in the jails during COVID. See In re Ke’Andre C., No. M2017-01361-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 587966, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018); In re Jonathan F., 2015 WL 739638 at *13. To find that Father did not substantially comply would be tantamount to terminating his parental rights based solely on his incarceration.

Unlike abandonment, substantial noncompliance contains no bar against curing earlier inactivity through post-petition efforts, and improvements in compliance are construed in the parent's favor.

In Re Allison S. · filed 2024-05-08(g)(2)

However, unlike the ground of abandonment, there is no indication in the statute defining substantial noncompliance that efforts made after the filing of the petition do not remedy prior inactivity. ... Additionally, for this ground, “[i]mprovements in compliance are construed in favor of the parent.”

Substantial noncompliance is measured by the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the unmet requirement, not by counting completed permanency-plan tasks.

In Re Angel S. · filed 2024-05-10(g)(2)

Moving on to the question of whether Mother was in substantial noncompliance with these responsibilities, we note that, although Mother did comply with some of the responsibilities of the permanency plans in this case, our task “involves more than merely counting up the tasks in the plan to determine whether a certain number have been completed.”

Completing some permanency-plan tasks does not defeat substantial noncompliance when the parent fails to make the meaningful changes needed for safe return.

In Re Elijah G. · filed 2024-08-06(g)(2)

Although Father completed some tasks, he failed to accomplish two important plan requirements. By the time of trial, the child had been in foster care for almost two years. Yet Father never took the necessary steps to create a bond with the child. And he never obtained employment.

Substantial noncompliance is measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the unmet permanency-plan requirement.

In Re Ethan W. · filed 2024-10-29(g)(2)

In the context of the requirements of a permanency plan, the real worth and importance of noncompliance should be measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to that requirement.

Substantial noncompliance requires more than counting completed tasks and depends on the degree and importance of the unmet requirements.

In Re Daniel W. · filed 2024-12-04(g)(2)

When determining whether the noncompliance was substantial, the court must do more than “count[ ] up the tasks in the plan to determine whether a certain number have been completed.”

A trial court’s imprecise reference to lack of substantial compliance does not require vacatur when its analysis shows that it applied the statutory substantial-noncompliance standard.

In Re Quinton A. · filed 2025-04-29(g)(2)

Thus, while we encourage trial courts to hew closely to the language of the termination statute in their findings, we conclude that the trial court’s use of imprecise language is not a basis to vacate this ground.

Noncompliance is substantial under subsection (g)(2) when important permanency-plan requirements addressing the causes of removal remain unmet.

IN RE JAXEN F. · filed 2025-08-14(g)(2)

We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding there was clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s noncompliance with the permanency plans was substantial as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2).

The statutory ground requires substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, not merely a failure to substantially comply, and use of the latter standard requires vacatur when the order does not otherwise show that the correct standard was applied.

In Re Bradford H. · filed 2025-08-21(g)(2)

The statute calls for petitioners to show “substantial noncompliance” by parents, not a failure to substantially comply. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). ... Because the trial court applied an incorrect standard in its final order, we deem it prudent to vacate the trial court’s ruling as to section 36-1- ... 113(g)(2).

Failure to complete the most important permanency-plan task can constitute substantial noncompliance despite completion of some other tasks.

In Re Micah N. · filed 2025-09-05(g)(2)

Nonetheless, in light of the importance of Mother maintaining sobriety, her inability to comply with this task is dispositive as to this ground. Because it is undisputed that Mother is in substantial noncompliance with the single most important permanency task, DCS proved this ground by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent's efforts on some permanency-plan responsibilities do not prevent substantial noncompliance when the parent fails to satisfy the plan's most important requirements.

In Re Keigan S. · filed 2025-11-04(g)(2)

We recognize that Mother made some efforts to comply with the responsibilities outlined in the permanency plans. However, she has not complied with the most important responsibilities provided in the plans: to refrain from drug and alcohol use. Failure to comply with these responsibilities rendered her noncompliance with the permanency plan substantial.

A parent cannot substantially fail to comply with a permanency plan when no statutory permanency plan was ever created, and a no-contact order is not itself such a plan.

In Re Isabella P. · filed 2025-11-13(g)(2)

Upon review, we determine that Father cannot be found to have failed to substantially comply with a permanency plan when no such plan was formulated in the first instance. ... By statutory definition, the juvenile court order was not a permanency plan. Father cannot have failed to comply with a permanency plan that never existed.

Failure to satisfy even one permanency-plan requirement can constitute substantial noncompliance when that requirement is the plan’s most important requirement.

IN RE ALIZAH S. · filed 2025-11-19(g)(2)

Thus, we agree with the juvenile court’s finding that Mother failed to maintain her sobriety—the most important requirement of the permanency plans. See Dep’t of Child.’s Servs. v. Wright, No. M2008-01607-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 302292, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2009) (holding that a parent’s “fail[ure] to comply with the single most important requirement of the permanency plan” constituted substantial noncompliance); see also In re Defari R., No. E2022-00550-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5624728, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023) (holding that, despite meeting “all other permanency plan requirements, failure to meet one requirement can constitute substantial noncompliance”).

Although failure to provide a written lease may be minor, failure to prove that housing is safe, suitable, and dependable for the child constitutes substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.

In Re Bravon K. · filed 2026-06-03(g)(2)

While the failure to provide proof of a written lease may or may not be a minor failure to comply with the permanency plan, whether a parent has housing that is safe, suitable, and dependable for a child is not trivial. ... Father’s failure to provide proof of housing that was safe, suitable, and dependable for Bravon constitutes a substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.

Substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan need not be willful to support termination of parental rights.

In Re Joseph L. · filed 2012-06-25(g)(2)

She does not cite any authority, and we know of none, for the idea that a parent’s substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan must be willful to justify termination of parental rights on that basis.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination when a parent substantially fails to comply with the responsibilities in a permanency plan.

In Re: Dravyn L.D. · filed 2010-02-25(g)(2)

As relevant to our review, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g) provides as follows: ... (2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan or a plan of care pursuant to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4; ... The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan at the time of the hearing. The trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights on this ground.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination when a parent substantially fails to comply with reasonable permanency plan requirements tied to the conditions that caused removal.

In Re: Robert D. · filed 2014-01-17(g)(2)

Terminating parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the permanency plan. To succeed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2), the Department must demonstrate first that the requirements of the permanency plan are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the parent’s custody in the first place, and second that the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met. Trivial, minor, or technical deviations from a permanency plan’s requirements will not be deemed to amount to substantial noncompliance.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination of parental rights when a parent substantially fails to comply with the responsibilities in a permanency plan.

In Re: E.K. · filed 2014-01-28(g)(2)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights based on his failure to comply substantially with the terms of the parenting plan. There was clear and convincing evidence to support termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination when a parent substantially fails to comply with the responsibilities in a permanency plan.

In Re Gracie H. Y. · filed 2020-03-16(g)(2)

Mother made very little progress throughout the case toward the requirements on her permanency plan. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) requires clear and convincing proof of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; a finding that a parent did not substantially comply applies the wrong test.

In Re Jamarcus K. · filed 2022-08-30(g)(2)

We have previously explained, however, that the test for section 36-1- 113(g)(2) is not whether a parent has substantially complied with a permanency plan, but whether the party seeking termination has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is in substantial noncompliance with the plan. ... While the trial court improperly applied section 36-1- 113(g)(2) and that portion of its findings must be vacated, we decline to remand this case for reconsideration in light of other grounds for termination having been proven.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence of substantial noncompliance with a plan of care to support termination on that ground.

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services v. Viar · filed 1998-12-03(g)(2)

We think the evidence falls far short of the clear and convincing standard of showing that Tamra did not substantially conform to the plan of care.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) makes substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan a ground for terminating parental rights.

Dept. of Children's Scvs. v. M.A.D. · filed 2001-04-10(g)(2)

We agree with the Juvenile Court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights because of substantial noncompliance by Mother with the requirements of the Plan.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) allows termination for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan when clear and convincing evidence shows the parent made only minimal efforts to comply.

Dept. of Children Serv. v. Frazier · filed 2002-02-19(g)(2)

We believe the above evidence satisfies the “clear and convincing” requirement under the termination statute as to Ms. Frazier’s noncompliance with the permanency plan. Although Ms. Frazier was aware of the threat of termination of her parental rights to T.F., she took only minimal steps to attempt to comply with the permanency plan.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) allows substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan to support termination of parental rights, and foster parents may cite disregard of the plan in a termination petition.

Baral v. Bombard · filed 2002-06-05(g)(2)

T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(2) provides initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan or plan of care pursuant to the provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4. ... The Barals have appropriately referred to Bombard’s actions in disregard of the plan of care as support for their Petition to Terminate Parental Rights, or in the alternative for custody.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) requires substantial noncompliance with a plan of care; partial failure to complete two of six requirements did not meet that threshold.

State Dept of Children's Srvcs v. B.J.A.L. · filed 2002-08-23(g)(2)

We do not believe that the partial failure to complete two of the six requirements amounts to substantial noncompliance, and we therefore find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings with respect to this ground for termination.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) allows termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.

In the Matter of: R.L.H., A Child under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Darlene Medley Hall · filed 2003-02-03(g)(2)

We also find that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to demonstrate that there has been substantial noncompliance by Hall with respect to the permanency plan under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2).

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan when essential requirements remain unmet despite a parent's efforts.

M.L.J. v. Johnson · filed 2003-04-24(g)(2)

We further find that although the Johnsons have made efforts to comply with the parenting plan, some essential elements, including the therapy/counseling requirement, have not been fulfilled.

Substantial noncompliance with reasonable permanency plan responsibilities supports termination when proven by clear and convincing evidence.

State Department of Children's Services v. A.M.H. · filed 2006-03-06(g)(2)

We conclude that the responsibilities denoted in the permanency plan were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that necessitated foster care placement for Mother’s children. Clear and convincing evidence supports the findings by the trial court that Mother did not substantially comply with the requirements that she obtain assistance with her drug addiction, maintain appropriate, drug-free housing, complete parenting classes, and maintain financial stability and employment. Therefore, the trial court properly relied on this ground to terminate Mother’s parental rights under T.C.A. § 36 — T—113(g)(2).

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan when proved by clear and convincing evidence; completing some tasks does not suffice if the parent fails to develop the ability to care for the child.

In Re: H.A. (D.O.B. 10/08/98) & J.R.B., JR. (D.O.B. 11/24/99) State of TN, Department of Children Services v. Adair · filed 2006-10-05(g)(2)

Under all of these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the evidence established clearly and convincingly that Mother has not complied substantially with the requirements of the permanency plan, and that her parental rights may be terminated upon this ground.

When evaluating substantial noncompliance under § 36-1-113(g)(2) against multiple permanency plans, a court examines the requirements consistently present across the plans.

Tennessee Department of Children’s Services v. R.R. · filed 2006-11-29(g)(2)

When facing various permanency plans, this Court examines those requirements which are consistently present in the various plans.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2) permits termination for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan when parents fail to meet important requirements, including remaining drug-free.

In the Matter of: A.W.H. and N.N.H. · filed 2009-12-29(g)(2)

From our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that Mother and Father had not substantially complied with the terms of the permanency plans.

Section 36-1-113(g)(2)'s requirements for termination based on substantial noncompliance apply equally when a private party seeks termination.

In Re Kaleb N. F. - Amanda Kay D. N. and Waylon Ray N. v. Christy Shantae C. and Michael L. · filed 2013-03-12(g)(2)

We hold only that the statutory requirements for termination based on substantial noncompliance should not be watered down simply because the party seeking termination is a private party instead of DCS.

Substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) is a question of law measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the unmet requirement; noncompliance with requirements unrelated to remedying foster-care conditions is irrelevant.

In Re Valentine · filed 2002-07-19(g)(2)

Substantial noncompliance is a question of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Substantial noncomplianee is not defined in the termination statute. The statute is clear, however, that noncompliance is not enough to justify termination of parental rights; the noncompliance must be substantial. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “substantial” as “[o]f real worth and importance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1428 (6th ed.1990). In the context of the requirements of a permanency plan, the real worth and importance of noncompliance should be measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to that requirement. Terms which are not reasonable and related are irrelevant, and *549 substantial noncompliance with such terms is irrelevant.

Substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions are established when a parent remains without adequate housing or employment and continues using drugs years after removal, despite those being essential permanency-plan requirements.

In Re: T.L.R and A.W.R., the State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens Svcs v. Riley · filed 2003-03-04(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

In this case, the evidence establishing grounds for termination is not just clear and convincing, it is undisputed. Mother’s own testimony establishes that, after the children were taken from her custody in the fall of 1999, by February 2002, Mother still had not obtained adequate housing or employment. Moreover, in her testimony in November 2001, Mother conceded that she had used drugs as recently as the week prior to her testimony. Maintaining housing, obtaining employment and refraining from using drugs are clearly essential elements of the DCS permanency plan. Moreover, Mother’s failure to do so is obviously a condition which would cause the children to be subject to further neglect or abuse. We affirm the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination existed under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and (g)(3)(A).

Noncompliance with juvenile-court orders does not establish subsection (g)(2) unless the child had a written permanency plan meeting the statutory definition.

V.D. v. N.M.B. · filed 2004-07-26(g)(2)

There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that a permanency plan meeting the statutory definition has ever been put in place for M.S.B. The child was never placed in foster care or with an agency; his custody was never given to the Department of Children’s Services. It may be true, as the trial court indicates, that Mother failed to comply with the orders of the juvenile court regarding education and employment, but such orders do not constitute a permanency plan as defined by the statute, and non-compliance with those orders does not satisfy the specific statutory ground.

Subsection (g)(2) requires substantial noncompliance with reasonably related plan responsibilities, not merely failure to achieve desired outcomes, and the importance of the unmet requirement must be considered.

In Re B.D., R.M.T. & V.F.T. · filed 2009-03-02(g)(2)

Additionally, DCS must prove and a trial court must first find that the requirements of a permanency plan are “reasonably related to remedying the conditions which necessitate foster care placement,” Id. at § 37-2-403(a)(2)(c) . The court must also find that the parent’s noncompliance was substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met. ... We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the juvenile court’s finding that there was substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan by Mother.

Compliance with some permanency-plan tasks is not substantial compliance when the parent fails the most important requirements—sustained sobriety and training needed to care for medically fragile children.

In re J.C.D. · filed 2007-11-30(g)(2)

All of these factual findings are supported by the record. Although Mother does not contend that any of these find-*442mgs were erroneous, she maintains that she substantially complied with her permanency plans by participating in anger management training, attending parenting classes, and continuing her mental health treatment. We acknowledge, as did the juvenile court, that Mother satisfied some requirements of her permanency plans; however, we do not agree that this constituted “substantial” compliance. As we indicated in In re cited above, “the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met” must be considered in determining whether a parent’s noncompliance was “substantial.” It is quite evident from the record before us that the primary reason for Mother’s inability to properly care for her children was her ongoing drug dependency and thus, we agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that her failure to comply with her plans’ requirement that she lead a drug free lifestyle constitutes substantial noncompliance. Mother argues that “she was showing significant progress toward experiencing a drug free lifestyle,” “had been enrolled in the Serenity Shelter inpatient drug treatment program at the Knox Area Rescue Ministries for sixteen days,” and “had been clean and sober for almost thirty days at the time that her termination of parental rights trial was held.” While we hope that these most recent efforts by Mother to overcome her drug dependency problem lead to a permanent resolution of her problem, they are insufficient to overcome the facts of her previous multiple relapses, her failure to successfully complete various drug treatment programs during the year preceding termination, and her selling of drugs in a school zone within one month of trial.

Alcohol, drug, and parenting assessments and random drug screens are reasonable permanency-plan requirements when illegal drug use and domestic abuse created the risk necessitating foster care.

In Re Lmw · filed 2008-09-03(g)(2)

Here, the requirements in Father's permanency plan were related to the conditions which necessitated foster care placement. The record reveals that the children were at risk due to the illegal drug use and domestic abuse in the home. Accordingly, the requirements of alcohol, drug, and parenting assessments, as well as random drug screens, were reasonable because they were related to remedying these problems.

Committing a criminal offense while on parole can constitute substantial noncompliance with a permanency-plan requirement to refrain from illegal activity when the offense also prevents reunification.

In Re: Casen J. · filed 2010-05-12(g)(2)

Contrary to his insistence that DCS overstated the importance of his actions leading to the perjury charge and that his actions were the unfortunate result of “bad judgment, we find that the commission of a criminal offense while on parole was substantial non-compliance and, in addition, prevented the achievement of the goal of reunification.

Only substantial and relevant noncompliance with reasonable permanency-plan requirements related to the removal conditions supports termination; technical or unrelated failures do not.

In Re Austin H. · filed 2010-09-16(g)(2)

Of course, in order for a parent to be in jeopardy of losing parental rights, the noncompliance with requirements in a permanency plan must be substantial and relevant.

Substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) is measured in the context of the entire plan and its objectives, not by examining each requirement in isolation; merely technical noncompliance is insufficient.

In Re Deciandra M. · filed 2011-05-04(g)(2)

Giving due respect to Mother’s arguments, her compliance or noncompliance with the several requirements of the plans must be viewed in the context of the entire plan. The determination that each requirement was reasonable and related to remedying the circumstances which led to the children’s removal is the starting point to determine whether she was in substantial non-compliance with the plans. The trial court found, and we agree, that the requirements of the permanency plan were reasonable and related to addressing the conditions which led to the children’s removal. The primary goal of the permanency plan for each child was “return to parent” and the testimony was that each requirement of the plan was related to a specific area of concern or need presented. In addressing the issue of Mother’s compliance, therefore, we do not view each requirement in isolation, as suggested by Mother, but consider how compliance with each specific requirement achieved compliance with the overall objectives of the permanency plan. Mere technical noncompliance by itself is not sufficient to justify the termination of parental rights; in order for noncompliance to justify the termination of parental rights, it must be “substantial.” In re S.H., No. M2007-01718-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 1901118, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008) (no Tenn. R. App. P.11 application filed). Noncompliance with requirements in a permanency plan that are neither reasonable nor related to remedying the conditions that led to the removal of the child from the parent’s custody is not relevant for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). Id. (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548–49). In addition, the parent’s degree of noncompliance with a reasonable and related requirement must be assessed.

Subsection (g)(2) requires substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan’s statement of responsibilities, not merely failure to achieve desired outcomes; the responsibilities must be stated clearly enough to provide notice.

In The Matter Of Abigail F.K. · filed 2012-09-14(g)(2)

As we have noted in a previous case: “[T]he statute that sets out this ground for termination states that parental rights may be terminated where there is substantial noncompliance ‘with the statement of responsibilities’ in the permanency plan.” In re Askia K. B., 2011 WL 4634241, at *9 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2)) (emphasis in original). See also State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. P.M.T., No. E2006-00057-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 2644373, at *8; 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 608, at *23-24 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2006) (“Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) does not require substantial compliance with a permanency plan’s ‘[d]esired outcome[s],’ rather it requires substantial compliance with a plan’s statement of responsibilities”).

Completing a short-term twenty-eight-day rehabilitation program without detoxification does not substantially comply with a reasonable permanency-plan requirement for three-to-six months of inpatient treatment with detoxification.

In the Matter of: Jeffery B. and Anne B. · filed 2012-10-12(g)(2)

Moreover, we find that Mother’s completion of a short-term 28-day program, which did not include detoxification, did not substantially comply with the requirement that she complete long-term inpatient therapy with detoxification.

Substantial noncompliance was established where the mother had eighteen months to comply but, despite completing some plan requirements, relapsed into drug use and failed to achieve the plan's overriding goal of a safe, stable environment for her children.

In Re:Alyssa Y. · filed 2013-06-17(g)(2)

In the present action, Mother had eighteen months to substantially comply with the requirements of her permanency plan but failed to do so.

Substantial noncompliance requires more than failure to satisfy every detail: the unmet requirements must be reasonable, related to the removal conditions, and important in light of the degree of noncompliance.

In Re Garvin M. · filed 2014-05-09(g)(2)

Terminating parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the permanency plan. To succeed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2), the Department must demonstrate first that the requirements of the permanency plan are reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the parent’s custody in the first place, and second that the parent’s noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the particular requirement that has not been met.

Permanency-plan noncompliance is substantial when a parent violates almost every reasonable requirement directed to remedying the conditions preventing reunification.

In Re: Christopher K.W. · filed 2014-02-11(g)(2)

Thus, clear and convincing evidence shows that Father violated almost every requirement of the plans. Accordingly, the court properly terminated Father’s parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans.

Substantial noncompliance was established where the father made no effort to comply before the termination petition because he did not care, and the plan requirements were reasonable and related to the conditions that caused removal.

In Re: Ramon E.A v. · filed 2014-02-25(g)(2)

There was clear and convincing evidence of Father’s substantial noncompliance.

Substantial noncompliance was established where the mother completed early plan requirements but thereafter repeatedly used marijuana, avoided drug screens, and failed to obtain counseling or medical alternatives needed to supervise the child safely.

In Re D'Vante P. · filed 2014-05-05(g)(2)

We conclude that clear and convincing evidence exists to justify termination of Mother’s parental rights based upon the statutory ground of substantial noncompliance with the statements of responsibilities in the permanency plans.

A final termination decree may supply the required finding that permanency-plan terms were reasonable and related to remedying the conditions necessitating foster care even when the first plan’s ratification order is absent from the record.

In Re: J.C.B. · filed 2014-11-17(g)(2)

The court made this finding in conjunction with its finding that Mother “has not substantially complied with the provisions of the permanency plans and therefore her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).” The court also stated that, in the ratification order for the first permanency plan, it did find that it was reasonable and related to the conditions that made foster care a necessity. Therefore, Mother’s argument fails because the trial court made the necessary findings in regard to the first permanency plan.

Termination for substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) cannot rest solely on a caseworker's account of plan requirements; the permanency plan must be admitted and considered in evidence.

In Re Cloey R. · filed 2015-01-21(g)(2)

As explained in In re A.J.R., the trial court cannot rely upon a DCS case worker’s testimony regarding the requirements of the permanency plan when terminating parental rights upon this ground but must actually consider the permanency plan in evidence. In re A.J.R., 2006 WL 3421284 at *5. We therefore conclude that DCS failed to meet its burden of proof regarding its allegations that Father failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan.

DCS cannot prove substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan unless the plan is admitted into evidence and made part of the trial record.

In re M.P.H. · filed 2015-06-15(g)(2)

Simply put, our case law holds that DCS cannot meet its burden of proof with respect to allegations of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan where the plan is not introduced into evidence and made part of the record at trial.

Subsection (g)(2) measures compliance with responsibilities actually assigned to the parent, not items listed only as desired outcomes in a permanency plan.

In Re Abbigail C. · filed 2015-10-21(g)(2)

Although not pointed out by Father in his brief, we note that some of the requirements found to be contained in the Permanency Plan are not clearly delineated as responsibilities of Father. For example, although the trial court found that Father was required to “provide proof of safe and stable housing,” the Permanency Plan indicates that this was merely a “Desired Outcome[],” rather than an action step or responsibility to be undertaken by Father.

Due process bars termination under subsection (g)(2) for failure to complete newly added permanency-plan requirements when the parent was not given sufficient time to comply.

In Re: Bryson C. · filed 2016-07-18(g)(2)

The evidence in the record on appeal shows that new requirements were added to the Permanency Plan shortly before trial. The evidence shows that Mother was not given sufficient time to complete these newly added requirements, although she did make an effort to complete some of them. Because Mother was not given sufficient time to complete the newly-added requirements, terminating her parental rights for failure to complete these requirements would violate due process.

Substantial noncompliance concerns the actions required in the permanency plan’s statement of responsibilities, not merely its desired outcomes.

In re Tamera W. · filed 2016-11-09(g)(2)

“Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) does not require substantial compliance with a permanency plan‟s „[d]esired outcome[s],‟ rather, it requires substantial compliance with a plan‟s statement of responsibilities, i.e., the actions required to be taken by the parent or parents.”

Substantial noncompliance requires proof that the unmet permanency-plan requirements were reasonable and related to the conditions necessitating foster care.

In Re Jakob. · filed 2016-12-15(g)(2)

In conjunction with terminating a parent‟s parental rights under this ground, the court “must first find that the plan requirements are reasonable and related to conditions that necessitate foster care placement.”

A lengthy permanency plan can satisfy subsection (g)(2) when the parent signed it, acknowledged it was explained, and understood the material responsibilities.

In Re Kendall M. · filed 2018-05-29(g)(2)

We have not been cited to any testimony by Mother that she did not understand what was required of her relative to Kendall; to the contrary, she testified that she did understand that she was required to get drug treatment, to have a mental health evaluation, pay child support, and visit Kendall regularly.

A requirement that the parent was not ordered to perform may not be counted when assessing substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.

In Re Nicholas C. · filed 2019-07-15(g)(2)

According to Father’s testimony, he was not ordered to pay child support because of his disability. Therefore, we will not consider Father’s failure to pay child support in assessing his compliance with the permanency plan.

Substantial noncompliance cannot support termination as to children who were not subjects of a properly created permanency plan assigning the parent responsibilities for them.

In Re Michael W. · filed 2020-01-23(g)(2)

Where Mother had no stated responsibilities under a properly created permanency plan to Michael and Jada, we conclude that substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan cannot serve as a ground for termination as to the Children. The trial court’s ruling as to this ground for termination is therefore reversed.

A private petitioner cannot rely on substantial noncompliance when the child was never in DCS custody and the parent had no responsibilities under a properly created DCS permanency plan.

In Re Zaylee W. · filed 2020-04-09(g)(2)

Because Father had no stated responsibilities under a properly created permanency plan, we must conclude that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) may not serve as a ground for terminating Father’s parental rights. We, therefore, vacate the trial court’s ruling as to this ground.

DCS fails to carry its burden on substantial noncompliance when it does not introduce the permanency plans on which it relies to terminate parental rights.

In Re Dyllon M. · filed 2020-11-18(g)(2)

Without proof of Mother’s responsibilities under the plans, the trial court could not make valid findings concerning whether Mother “put in real effort to complete the requirements of the plan[s] in a meaningful way in order to place herself in a position to take responsibility for the [C]hildren.” In re C.S., Jr., et al., 2006 WL 2644371, at *10; see also D.W.J., 2005 WL 1528367, at *3 (“Without [all of] the plan[s] in evidence, the trial judge could not have properly made the required factual determinations regarding the plan[s].”); In re A.J.R., 2006 WL 3421284, at *4.

Substantial noncompliance cannot be established when the record contains only one of the multiple permanency plans on which termination was based.

IN RE JAXON N. · filed 2025-04-30(g)(2)

DCS concedes this ground, noting that Mother’s third permanency plan was the only permanency plan admitted into the record. DCS’s concession is appropriate. We therefore vacate the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan.

Last-minute efforts do not defeat termination under subsections (g)(2) and (g)(3)(A) when the parent still cannot care for the children or provide suitable housing.

Services v. D.G.S.L. · filed 2001-11-16(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

Mother’s last minute efforts to attempt to comply with the requirement of the Plan and remain drug free simply cannot form the basis for a conclusion that these statutory requirement have not been met. This is especially true since Mother admittedly still is not able to properly care for her children or provide them a suitable place to live.

DCS need not create a reunification permanency plan before seeking termination when it does not rely on noncompliance with such a plan as a ground.

State Children Serv. v. Grant · filed 2001-12-28(g)(2)

On appeal, Father argues that DCS was required to set up a permanency plan for E.G. with reunification as the goal before it can petition for termination of Father’s parental rights. However, DCS did not seek termination of Father’s parental rights based on an alleged failure to comply with a permanency plan. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

Failure to meet a permanency-plan housing requirement does not establish substantial noncompliance when DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to help the parent meet that requirement.

In the Matter of: D.D.V. · filed 2002-01-16(g)(2)

We have found that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to help her meet this requirement, so we cannot place the blame for this failure entirely upon her.

A parent substantially fails to comply with a permanency plan when she refuses to acknowledge abuse, undergo counseling, or support the children despite being advised of the plan.

Dept of Children's Services v. NFGWP, in re:KSG and AlW · filed 2002-06-25(g)(2)

The Trial Court found substantial non-compliance with the plan, and we agree. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The record shows that the mother did procure housing free of environmental hazards, but needed a larger apartment to accommodate the children. The evidence established the mother was never willing to admit that abuse happened, and would not take responsibility for failing to protect the children. The mother failed to undergo counseling and at one point an appointment was made with a psychologist for the mother, but she failed to keep the appointment and in general exhibited hostility and disregard for the plans. The mother failed to support the children, although she was drawing SSI benefits.

Partial compliance with a few permanency-plan requirements does not defeat substantial noncompliance when the parent failed most requirements and did not improve despite DCS’s reasonable efforts.

In Re: C.LaC. and D.L. · filed 2004-03-17(g)(2)

The foregoing establish that Mother failed to comply with the majority of the permanency plan requirements though she partially complied with a few of them. ... Based upon the foregoing, we therefore find there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the children’s mother failed to comply with the permanency plans.

Subsection (g)(2) requires substantial noncompliance with a specific, reasonable permanency-plan requirement related to the conditions necessitating foster care; mere technical noncompliance is insufficient.

Department of Children's Services v. C.L. & M.T. · filed 2003-08-29(g)(2)

In order for noncompliance to justify the termination of parental rights, it must be “substantial.” In other words, mere technical noncompliance alone is not sufficient to justify the termination of parental rights. Id. at 548. Noncompliance with requirements in a permanency plan that are neither reasonable nor related to remedying the conditions that led to the removal of the child from the parent’s custody is not relevant for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548-49. Additionally, the parent’s degree of noncompliance with a reasonable and related requirement must be assessed.

A parent’s utter failure to satisfy any of numerous permanency-plan obligations establishes substantial noncompliance despite a claim that the parent complied to the extent possible.

Dept.of Child.Services v. G.C. · filed 2003-12-12(g)(2)

If ever there has been a clear case of substantial noncompliance with the plan, this is it. Mother’s sole argument on appeal with respect to this issue is that she complied with the plan “to the extent that she was able and capable of doing so.” However, Mother’s utter failure to comply with any of the eleven responsibilities severely undercuts this argument. Accordingly, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings with respect to the allegations that Mother failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan.

For subsection (g)(2), the permanency-plan responsibilities must be reasonable and related to remedying the conditions requiring foster care, and substantiality is measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the importance of the unmet requirement.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Julie Ann Taylor and Brian K. Taylor, in the matter of S.A.T. a · filed 2004-04-29(g)(2)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) provides that termination of parental rights may be based upon “substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan.” In order to base termination upon this ground, the trial court must find, as an initial matter, that the responsibilities enumerated in the permanency plan “are reasonable and are related to remedying the conditions which necessitate foster care placement.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403(a)(2)(C)(2001). The trial court must then determine whether the noncompliance is substantial. In making this determination, the lower court must measure “the real worth and importance of noncompliance . . . by both the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to that requirement.”

Substantial noncompliance may be established despite compliance with some plan terms when the parent fails the most important requirement tied to the condition that caused removal.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. T.N.S.S. · filed 2004-12-30(g)(2)

Because the children were initially removed from Mother’s custody due to their repeated truancy, it is obvious that the permanency plan requirement related to education was of the utmost importance, and Mother utterly failed to comply with it. ... We cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans.

Minimal efforts and wasted treatment opportunities, without meaningful progress or a future plan, establish substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.

State of Tennessee, Department Children's Services v. Lilli Lowery, In the Matter of M.D.B. · filed 2005-01-10(g)(2)

The record establishes that the mother understood her responsibilities under the Plan, and had agreed to comply. However, her efforts at compliance were minimal and she wasted numerous opportunities, including the year long program which had been paid for by others, but she left this program after only 13 days. Essentially, the mother made no real progress in the 16 months that the child had been in custody, and at trial she demonstrated no plan for making progress in the future. Clear and convincing evidence established that the mother failed to substantially comply with the plan.

Completing parenting classes and similar formal tasks does not satisfy a permanency plan when the parent fails to learn from them, change behavior, and accomplish the plan’s ultimate safety and stability goals.

Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. C.D.W. · filed 2005-01-11(g)(2)

All of these requirements were in place to achieve one ultimate goal: for Mother to provide a safe and stable environment to properly raise her children. ... It makes no difference how many parenting classes are completed if the parent is incapable or unwilling to learn anything from the classes and adjust his or her behavior accordingly. While we believe Mother did complete many of the physical requirements of the plan by attending parenting classes and the like, she did not accomplish any of the goals of the plan.

A parent’s refusal to remain in an essential substance-abuse program that could enable reunification constitutes substantial noncompliance sufficient by itself to support termination.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES v. ABB · filed 2005-01-13(g)(2)

We conclude that the mother’s refusal to remain in the CADAS program whereby she could have regained custody of her children in a controlled environment, clearly supports the Trial Court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan, which standing alone, is an adequate basis to terminate the mother’s parental rights.

Partial failure to satisfy two of five permanency-plan goals is not substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) when those goals are not the principal obstacles to reunification; trivial, minor, or technical deviations are insufficient.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Dale Baruchman In the Matter of: B.B. (d/o/b 11/16/90) and H.B. · filed 2005-03-29(g)(2)

Partial failure to comply with two of the five goals set forth in the permanency plan, especially when the requirements relating to anger management and visitation are not the main obstacles to reunification, cannot amount to substantial noncompliance. State v. B.J.A.L., No. E2002-00292-COA-R3-JV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 674, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2002). “Terminating parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) requires more proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the permanency plan.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Trivial, minor, or technical deviations from a permanency plan’s requirements will not be deemed to amount to substantial noncompliance.”

Some effort toward parenting, anger-management, and substance-abuse requirements may prevent a finding of substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2), even though another termination ground is proved.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Hardin · filed 2005-05-26(g)(2)

From the record before us, we cannot conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that Kelley was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans to such an extent that his parental rights to T.H. should be terminated on that ground; however the trial court also terminated Kelley’s parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions. Since T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c) allows for termination of parental rights if any one of the grounds outlined in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g) is found by clear and convincing evidence, we will next address whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination on the ground of persistence of conditions.

Minimal and belated progress does not defeat substantial noncompliance or persistent conditions when the parent's circumstances remain materially unchanged and are unlikely to improve soon.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. AAB, In the Matter of : NAB, (7/27/99) · filed 2005-07-28(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

While she had made slight progress, the Trial Court found this was too little and too late. We agree with the Trial Court that there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that the mother failed to substantially comply with the parenting plan.

Substantial noncompliance is established when parents remain noncompliant with a third permanency plan despite DCS providing multiple internal and outside case managers to address addiction and behavioral problems.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES v. D.M.E. · filed 2005-12-12(g)(2)

Three permanency plans were formulated and the evidence is clear and convincing that both parents were in substantial non-compliance with the third plan at the time of trial. The parents had several case managers at their disposal, and DCS enlisted outside case managers to aid the parents in overcoming their addictions and behavioral problems. As the cases note, the statute does not require herculean efforts on the part of the DCS, as long as the DCS makes reasonable efforts. State Dept. Of Childrens’ Services v. Malone, 1998 WL 46461 (Tenn. Ct. App. Eastern Section filed Feb. 5, 1998). We affirm the Trial Court on this issue.

Only permanency-plan requirements reasonably related to remedying the conditions that caused removal may support substantial noncompliance; useful general goals unrelated to the removal condition do not qualify.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. T.M.B.K. · filed 2006-02-08(g)(2)

However, it does not appear that in this case all provisions of the permanency plan were reasonably related to remedying the violence in the home. The requirement for paying bills, participating in budget counseling, demonstrating the ability to prioritize, and availing herself of assistance with her learning disability, while certainly worthwhile goals and helpful to Mother, were, at least in this case, not directly related to preventing domestic violence in the home.

Only permanency-plan requirements reasonably related to remedying the conditions that caused removal may support substantial noncompliance; useful general goals unrelated to the removal condition do not qualify.

State, Department of Children's Services v. T.M.B.K. · filed 2006-02-08(g)(2)

However, it does not appear that in this case all provisions of the permanency plan were reasonably related to remedying the violence, in the home. The requirement for paying bills, participating in budget counseling, demonstrating the ability to prioritize, and availing herself of assistance with her learning disability, while certainly worthwhile goals and helpful to Mother, were, at least in this case, not directly related to preventing domestic violence in the home.

Some compliance with a permanency plan does not defeat substantial noncompliance when the parent deliberately ignores important requirements he considers unnecessary despite adequate time and assistance.

In Re: Ronald L.D. · filed 2012-01-25(g)(2)

Father simply chose to ignore the permanency plan requirements instead of remedying the conditions which led to the Child’s removal. Accordingly, we conclude that while Father attempted to comply with some of the requirements enumerated in the permanency plan, the trial court’s finding that Father was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Failure to complete the central requirements of a permanency plan after two years of reunification services constitutes substantial noncompliance.

In Re: Jacob A.G. · filed 2013-01-30(g)(2)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to comply substantially with the terms of the permanency plans. The trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s rights on this ground.

Substantial noncompliance under subsection (g)(2) is established when both parents fail important plan requirements despite reasonable assistance, even if they complete some tasks.

In Re Angel S. F. · filed 2013-03-18(g)(2)

Considering the entire record before us, the evidence clearly and convincingly established that both Father and Mother failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the permanency plans. Thus, the statutory ground of failure to substantially comply with a parenting plan as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2) has been established by the requisite proof. We therefore affirm the trial court’s finding that Father and Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan.

A parent's substantial noncompliance with assigned permanency-plan responsibilities is not excused under subsection (g)(2) merely by arguing that DCS failed to assist with completing particular tasks.

In Re C.J.B. · filed 2017-06-28(g)(2)

Father’s argument misses the mark. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) allows for termination when “[t]here has been substantial noncompliance by the parent . . . with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan[.]” (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the burden of substantial compliance is on the parent, not on DCS. Father’s argument that DCS failed to assist them in completing certain tasks does not excuse his noncompliance with the permanency plans.

Subsection (g)(2) does not require DCS to prove reasonable efforts to help the parent comply with a permanency plan.

In Re Gabriel B. · filed 2018-07-23(g)(2)

This ground for termination does not require DCS to use reasonable efforts to assist a parent in complying with the requirements of a permanency plan.

Proof that DCS made reasonable reunification efforts is not required to establish substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.

In Re J'Khari F. · filed 2019-01-31(g)(2)

Because DCS was not required to provide reasonable efforts in order to prove this ground, we will address Mother’s issue regarding reasonable efforts in the best interest analysis.

Proof that DCS made reasonable reunification efforts is not a prerequisite to termination for substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan.

In Re Brian W. · filed 2020-10-30(g)(2)

This ground for termination, however, does not require that the Department to “expend reasonable efforts to assist a parent in complying with the permanency plan requirements.” In re Skylar P., No. E2016-02023-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2684608, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017); see also In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015) (“[I]n a termination proceeding, the extent of [the Department’s] efforts to reunify the family is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis, but proof of reasonable efforts is not a precondition to termination of the parental rights of the respondent parent.”).

Substantial noncompliance does not require proof that DCS made reasonable efforts; those efforts belong in the best-interest analysis.

In Re Rome W. · filed 2024-12-03(g)(2)

A petitioner seeking to terminate a parent’s rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) need not put on proof of DCS’s reasonable efforts. ... The Department’s efforts, instead, are one of the factors to be considered in the best interest analysis.

Subsection (g)(8)(A)(vi) applies only when no legal parent-child relationship has been established; it cannot terminate the rights of a father adjudicated to be the legal parent before the termination proceeding.

Jones v. Pierce Garrett a/k/a Perry Garrett · filed 2002-12-30(g)(8)(A)(vi)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) (1996 & Supp. 1999) applies only to cases in which no legal relationship between the parent and child has been established. Because Garrett was adjudicated the legal parent of the child before the proceeding which resulted in the termination of his parental rights, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) is inapplicable. Therefore, the trial court erred when it terminated Garrett’s parental rights on the basis of this provision. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The special grounds in subsection (g)(9)(A) do not apply to a biological father who filed a parentage petition before the termination hearing and whose paternity was conclusively established by genetic testing.

In Re SM · filed 2004-01-15(g)(9)(A)

There are two reasons why Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9) does not apply to R.G.L. ... Under these facts, the grounds for termination in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) are inapplicable to R.G.L.

The 2003 amendment measuring non-legal-parent status at the filing of the termination or adoption petition may not be applied retroactively when the parent's right had vested under the 2001 statute.

In Re DAH · filed 2004-08-27(g)(9)(A)

Because the right of a legal parent to the care and custody of his or her child had vested under the 2001 statute, construed in Jones, we hold that the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) may not be retroactively applied to this case.

Under the 2001 version of section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), the additional non-legal-parent grounds do not apply to a person who established legal paternity before the termination proceeding.

In re D.A.H. · filed 2004-08-27(g)(9)(A)

Accordingly, we find Mid-South’s argument unpersuasive, and we also find that Jones prevents the application of section 36-l-113(g)(9)(A) to Cope because Cope established his paternity prior to the termination proceeding.

The 2003 expansion of subsection (g)(9)(A) cannot be applied retroactively to conduct occurring before the amendment because doing so would impair the biological father’s vested parental rights.

In RE: Adoption of S.M.F. · filed 2004-12-06(g)(9)(A)

Whether J.M.S.’s actions or inactions later provided a basis for terminating his parental rights must be determined using the legal standards in existence when the conduct at issue occurred rather than legal standards devised after the fact. Applying the grounds for termination in the 2003 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) to J.M.S.’s pre-2003 conduct would impair J.M.S.’s vested rights. In re D.A.H., 142 S.W.3d at 274 (declining to apply the 2003 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) retroactively). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to apply the amended version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) retroactively to deprive J.M.S. of his parental rights.

The less stringent grounds in subsection (g)(9) apply only to a person who is not a legal parent, and the Department bears the clear-and-convincing burden of proving that status.

In Re H.A.L. · filed 2005-04-25(g)(9)

We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the Department had proved by clear and convincing evidence that R.W.L. was not H.A.L.’s legal father. The Department bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that R.W.L. was not H.A.L.’s legal father. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1). After R.W.L. testified that he had taken steps to become H.A.L.’s legal parent, the burden of disproving his testimony shifted to the Department. However, the Department offered no proof that R.W.L. is not H.A.L.’s legal parent.15 Therefore, the juvenile court erred by terminating R.W.L.’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9).

DCS bears some responsibility to assist an alleged biological father in establishing paternity, and subsection (g)(9)(A)(vi) is not proved when he consents to testing and attempts to learn the requirements but receives no assistance.

State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens' Services v. Tina Temple · filed 2009-11-05(g)(9)(A)(vi)

We reject Father’s argument that his efforts to visit with or provide for the children remedied his failure to establish paternity. However, we agree with Father that DCS has not shown that it aided Father in establishing paternity as required by the permanency plans. In a recent decision, this Court found that “DCS has some responsibility to the biological father in establishing paternity pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi).” State, Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Williams, No. W2008-02001-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 2226116, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2009) (citing In re S.T.T., No. M2007-01609-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 162538 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2008)). In Williams, this Court found that the father “consented to a DNA test, had the test performed, and notified the court in writing that he wished to pursue his rights as the biological father of the child[,]” but that “not enough was done on DCS’ part to aid [the father,]” as the father testified that DCS never indicated that they would help him in establishing paternity. Id. From the record in this case, it is unclear whether Father or DCS initiated the genetic testing. However, it is clear that Father consented to the testing, and that he attempted to establish paternity by visiting the court to determine the requirements for doing so. Accordingly, we find under the unique facts of this case, that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that Father failed to establish paternity pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi).

A father has good cause or excuse for not paying prenatal, natal, postnatal, or child support when the mother rejects his efforts to assist and falsely tells him the pregnancy ended in miscarriage.

In Re: Anna S. · filed 2010-05-06(g)(9)(A)(i)-(ii)

Because Mother refused any contact with Father in the months before the Child was born and because Father had been informed that Mother had miscarried, he cannot be deemed to have failed “without good cause or excuse” to pay a reasonable share of Mother’s prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses.

DCS's reasonable-efforts obligation may apply to termination grounds concerning a non-legal biological or putative father, including reasonable assistance in establishing parentage through referrals and available evidence, but not providing counsel or funding counsel.

In Re Bernard T. · filed 2010-08-26(g)(9)

Accordingly, the Department’s obligation to use reasonable efforts to assist a parent in addressing the causes for the removal of the child may also apply to any of the grounds in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9) for terminating the rights of persons who are not the child’s legal parent but who are either the child’s biological parent or putative biological father.

A man married to the mother when the child is born is a legal father whose rights may be terminated only under the grounds applicable to legal parents, not the additional non-legal-parent grounds.

In Re: Caine D.J.S. · filed 2011-11-21(g)(1)-(8), (g)(10)

The only ground alleged in the Petition for terminating TH’s rights was abandonment for failure to visit, which, as we point out, could not be established at the time the Petition was filed. Accordingly, we vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on this issue and remand for further proceedings, since the Department has custody of the child.

Any one of subsection (g)(9)(A)'s additional grounds is sufficient to terminate the rights of a putative father.

In Re: Isaiah L.A. · filed 2012-12-20(g)(9)(A)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) relates to terminating the parental rights of putative fathers. Sufficient proof of any single ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights under (g)(9)(A).

The less exacting additional grounds in subsection (g)(9)(A) apply only when no legal parent-child relationship existed when the termination petition was filed.

In Re: Alexis M.M. · filed 2012-08-20(g)(9)(A)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) sets forth additional, “less exacting” grounds for terminating the rights of a person who is not a child’s legal parent or guardian at the time the termination petition is filed. Id. at * 6. Stated otherwise, the grounds in Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) apply only to cases in which there is no legally established relationship between a parent and a child. Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 839-840 (Tenn. 2000).

An alleged father’s professed desire to parent does not manifest ability and willingness to assume custody when his conduct shows otherwise.

In Re: Rebecca J.R.M. · filed 2013-12-12(g)(9)(A)(iv)

Although Father testified that he had a desire to raise the Child, Father’s actions belie his words. Ms. Daugherty met with Father and explained the Parenting Plan to him. Father was required under the Parenting Plan to take advantage of programs available to him in prison. Father testified that he signed up for the only available program, but that incurring disciplinary infractions would delay his acceptance into the program. Father’s disciplinary record shows that Father incurred multiple class A infractions and a number of class B and C infractions while in prison. Father’s disciplinary record introduced at trial showed infractions for actions such as possession of a cell phone, tampering with security equipment, destroying state property, fighting, possession of intoxicants, and possession of a deadly weapon, among other things. Father himself testified that he learned that the Child’s mother was pregnant with his child while he was “in jail, . . . on my way to prison . . . .” Thus, Father has known that he at least potentially was the Child’s father since the beginning of his current incarceration. The fact that Father is the Child’s biological father was confirmed by DNA testing prior to Ms. Daugherty meeting with Father in prison on June 14, 2011 to discuss the Parenting Plan. The record reveals that even after his meeting with Ms. Daugherty, Father continued to incur disciplinary infractions, some of which were class A infractions. Father’s actions simply do not manifest an ability and willingness to accept legal and physical custody of the Child, his current incarceration notwithstanding.

A man identified by the unrebutted evidence as the children's legal father remained subject to termination of his parental rights even though he asserted on appeal that he was neither their biological nor legal father.

In Re: Hannah W. · filed 2014-04-03(g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3)

The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father was the legal father of the Children at the time of the trial.

The additional grounds in subsection (g)(9)(A) apply only when no legal relationship between the parent and child had been established when the petition was filed.

In Re E.L.R. · filed 2014-12-01(g)(9)(A)

The grounds for termination under Section 36-1- 113(g)(9)(A) are “additional” to those set forth in Section 36-1-113(g)(1-8) and are applicable “only to cases in which no legal relationship between the parent and child has been established.”

Incarceration does not excuse failing to petition to establish paternity within thirty days of notice when the alleged father later takes that step while still incarcerated.

In Re Serenity L. · filed 2015-07-31(g)(9)(A)(vi)

Although Father argues that he was unable to establish paternity within thirty days because he was in jail, he admitted that he still was in jail when he finally took steps to file a petition to establish paternity nearly eight months later.

The 2016 amendment expressly applies subsection (g)(9)(A)’s additional grounds to a putative father.

In Re Jase P. · filed 2017-06-21(g)(9)(A)

Father is a putative father for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A).

A presumptive legal father is subject to the grounds applicable to legal parents rather than the distinct putative-father grounds.

In Re Mya H. · filed 2017-07-26(g)(9)

Rather, the substantive difference between a legal parent and a putative biological father in this situation generally only involves the grounds for termination that may be alleged.

The additional putative-father grounds can apply to a biological or alleged biological father who meets a section 36-1-117(c) criterion and was not a legal parent when the termination petition was filed.

In Re Hannah C. · filed 2018-01-24(g)(9)(A)

Currently, the language of the statute indicates that a “putative father” can be both a biological and an alleged biological father of a child if he meets one of the criteria set out in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-117(c) and is not a “legal parent” at the time the petition to terminate his parental rights is filed.

The March 23, 2016 amendment to subsection (g)(9)(A) operates prospectively, so the version in effect when the termination petition was filed governs.

In Re: Braxton M. · filed 2017-07-05(g)(9)(A)

The trial court in its memorandum opinion relied on the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) that became effective on March 23, 2016. See 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 636 § 5 (S.B. 2531). However, Maternal Grandparents filed the termination petition on April 15, 2015, prior to the effective date of the amendment. We determine that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the petition’s filing controls this action.

Subsection (g)(14) is established when the parent fails to manifest ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility and placement with the parent would pose substantial harm.

In Re: Neamiah R. · filed 2018-05-23(g)(14)

Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the Children and that placing the Children in Father’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the Children.

A putative father’s failure to establish paternity supports termination when he claimed biological parentage, knew he needed to establish paternity, and never filed anything to do so.

In Re: Jayla H. · filed 2019-01-14(g)(9)(A)(vi)

The evidence in the record on appeal shows that Father claimed to Mother and to the petitioners, Grandmother and Grandfather, that he was the Child’s biological father, at the latest, at the hearing wherein Grandmother and Grandfather were granted temporary custody of the Child. In fact, there is evidence showing that Father asserted that he was the Child’s biological father from the time of the Child’s birth. Despite this, Father never filed anything to establish paternity. Father admitted that he knew that he needed to do something to establish paternity of the Child, and also admitted that establishing paternity “should’ve been my first priority.”

The additional grounds in subsection (g)(9)(A) apply only to putative fathers and cannot support termination against a man already legally adjudicated to be the child's father.

In Re Brayla T. · filed 2020-09-14(g)(9)(A)

Moreover, our thorough review of the record demonstrates that Father had been legally adjudicated as the father of the Child by the August 10, 2011 juvenile court order. Because these putative father grounds are inapplicable to Father, we reverse the trial court’s order insofar as the court found clear and convincing evidence to support these two statutory grounds.

The additional putative-father grounds in subsection (g)(9) apply to a biological father whose DNA confirms paternity but who has neither a paternity order nor a voluntary acknowledgment establishing him as a legal parent.

In Re: Tiffany B. · filed 2021-02-11(g)(9)

Based on the foregoing definitions, Father is the putative, rather than the legal, father of the Child. ... Moreover, although Petitioners posit in their brief that Father is the legal parent of the Child because his paternity has been confirmed through DNA testing, section 36-1-102(29)(B) makes plain that such is not the case.

A putative father's informal acknowledgment and care of a child do not replace the statutory requirement to establish paternity by voluntary acknowledgment or court order after notice.

In Re Adaline D. · filed 2021-11-15(g)(9)(A)(vi)

We disagree. Courts are not at liberty to disregard the clear mandates of a statute. ... We thus find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Tyson failed to establish paternity of Lilah and, therefore, is not her legal father.

Failure to file a paternity petition within thirty days of notice under subsection (g)(9)(A)(vi) requires neither willfulness nor reasonable reunification efforts by DCS.

In Re Isaiah F. · filed 2024-04-24(g)(9)(A)(vi)

Foster Parents were not required to prove that Father’s conduct was willful. ... Nor does this ground “expressly require that DCS exert reasonable efforts to assist Father in establishing himself as a legal parent.”

A putative father's failure to file a paternity petition within thirty days after notice is not excused by DCS's failure to assist him.

In Re Nicholai L. · filed 2024-10-25(g)(9)(A)(v)

But this ground for termination does not “require that DCS exert reasonable efforts to assist Father in establishing himself as a legal parent.”

A putative father who knows of his possible paternity and later has definitive knowledge but never files a paternity petition satisfies the ground based on failure to petition within thirty days after notice.

IN RE NEYRA S. · filed 2025-09-22(g)(9)(v)

Father had notice of his alleged paternity of the Child by January 24, 2024, the date of the preliminary hearing after DCS filed a dependency and neglect petition. ... Despite having knowledge of his potential paternity by January 2024 and definitive knowledge of his paternity by April 2024, Father never filed a petition to establish paternity. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence supports the Juvenile Court’s finding of this ground for termination.

A stated willingness to assume custody is insufficient under subsection (g)(9)(A)(iv) when the parent lacks the ability to fulfill that willingness.

In Re: F.N.M. · filed 2016-04-11(g)(9)(A)(iv)

The trial court found that father “states that he has a willingness and a desire to [assume legal and physical custody of the child], but without the ability to fulfill his willingness and desire, such is a hollow representation.” The evidence supports the trial court‟s ruling. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court‟s decision to terminate father‟s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv).

Under the version then governing, subsection (g)(9)(A) could not terminate the rights of a person who was the child's biological parent when the petition was filed.

In re Tianna B. · filed 2016-07-06(g)(9)(A)

Because Father is the biological parent of Tianna, these statutes do not apply to him and could not be the basis for terminating his parental rights according to Bernard T. Thus, the trial court’s decision that Father’s parental rights could be terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) and § 36-1-117(c) conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ruling and must be reversed.

Subsection (g)(9)(iv) was not proven where an incarcerated putative father completed available classes and maintained contact but lacked notice or access concerning the Putative Father Registry.

In re A.B. · filed 2017-01-11(g)(9)(iv)

The evidence does not demonstrate that Father was aware of the Putative Father Registry or had access to the internet to register as Child 2’s putative father. We hold, as a matter of law, that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Father has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of Child 2.

The additional termination grounds in subsection (g)(9)(A) do not apply to a child’s biological mother because she is a legal parent.

In Re B.B. · filed 2017-02-28(g)(9)(A)

A biological mother is included in the definition of a child’s “legal parent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(28)(A)(i) (2014). Based upon the plain language of the statute, the grounds contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) do not apply to a child’s biological mother.

The putative-father ground for failure to make reasonable and consistent support payments is not established without proof of the father’s regular income.

In Re: Rilyn S. · filed 2019-03-12(g)(9)(A)(ii)

In light of the absence of proof of a regular income for Father, we do not find clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights on the ground of failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(9)(A)(ii).

Putative fathers are subject both to the generally applicable grounds in subsections (g)(1) through (8) and to subsection (g)(9)(A)'s additional grounds.

In Re: Katelyn R. · filed 2024-03-27(g)(9)(A)

Ultimately, we agree with the In re Jase P. court that Father’s parental rights may be terminated pursuant to statutory grounds found both at section 36-1-113(g)(1)-(8), as well as section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A).

Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) grounds cannot support termination of an adjudicated legal parent's rights.

In Matter of D.A.H. · filed 2003-02-18(g)(9)(A)

Because Mr. Cope has been adjudicated to be the legal father of D.A.H., under Jones v. Garrett, his parental rights cannot be terminated on any of the grounds found in T.C.A. § 36-1- 113(g)(9)(A).

A parent’s stipulation cannot satisfy subsection (c); the petitioner must still prove a termination ground and best interests by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Jaliyah S. · filed 2023-12-20(c)

Thus, the party seeking termination of parental rights is not relieved of its statutory burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence both the ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest simply because a parent does not oppose the termination.

Proof of a statutory termination ground does not end the inquiry; the court must separately determine whether termination is in the child’s best interest.

In Re Brookelyn W. · filed 2015-03-24(c)

A finding that grounds exist for termination, however, is not the end of the inquiry. ... Because the trial court did not reach the issue of whether termination was in the child’s best interest, this cause must be remanded back to the trial court for a determination of whether termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, which must be supported by appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The party seeking termination bears the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden under subsection (c)(1), and uncertainty about whether the statutory nonpayment period elapsed defeats termination.

Carr v. Moore · filed 1999-07-20(c)(1)

While Appellants may dispute the method used to calculate payments, it was their burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Moore failed to pay child support for the statutory period. See State v. Defriece, 937 S.W.2d 954, 961 (Tenn. App. 1996). "The clear and convincing standard imposes a heightened burden on those seeking to terminate the rights of a natural parent. To meet this standard, a party must go beyond the mere threshold of a preponderance of the evidence: Clear and convincing evidence eliminates any serious or substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. It should produce in the fact-finder's mind a firm belief or conviction with regard to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. App. 1995) (citations omitted)." Id. We agree with the trial court that the Appellants failed to meet their burden.

Both the statutory ground for termination and the child’s best interests must be established by clear and convincing evidence under subsection (c).

In re: The Adoption of female child, E.N.R. · filed 1999-09-29(c)

The wording of the statute indicates the legislature’s intent that the evidentiary requirements of both prongs of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (c) must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 36-1-113(c) requires both clear and convincing proof of at least one termination ground and a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In Re CWW · filed 2000-05-23(c)(1)-(2)

In order to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, the trial court must make two findings. The court first must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the asserted grounds for termination has been established. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1) (Supp. 1998). Once the court has made this finding, the court additionally must find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interests. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2) (Supp. 1998).

Under section 36-1-113(i), a parent's recent progress in treatment does not defeat a best-interest finding when the parent remains unable to provide the children a home or other support within a discernible time.

In re C.W.W. · filed 2000-05-23(i)

Nevertheless, by her own admission, the Mother was unable to provide a home for the children at the time of trial, and, except for her testimony that she had nineteen months remaining in the program, the Mother could provide no time frame for providing the children with a home or other support.

Clear and convincing evidence of substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions can support termination when the evidence also clearly and convincingly establishes that ending the parent-child relationship is in the children's best interests.

State Department of Children's Services v. RC · filed 2001-01-19(g)(2), (g)(3)(A)

The record before us contains clear and convincing evidence of grounds to terminate RC’s parental rights, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(2), (3)(A). There is also clear and convincing evidence that it is in the children’s best interest that the parent-child relationship be abolished.

Even clear and convincing proof of a statutory ground under section 36-1-113(g) cannot support termination unless the petitioner also establishes that termination is in the child's best interest.

In matter D.I.S. · filed 2001-01-25(c), (g)

Therefore, even where there is clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g) exists, the petitioner, CASA, must also establish that the termination of parental rights would be in the child’s best interest.

The existence of a statutory termination ground does not create a presumption that termination is warranted; section 36-1-113(c)(2) requires an individualized best-interest determination based on the particular facts.

Brown v. Mickey Joe Rogers · filed 2001-02-05(c)(2)

Because the law requires both grounds and a determination of best interest, it cannot be presumed that the existence of grounds necessarily leads to the conclusion that termination is warranted. Termination of a person’s constitutionally-protected rights to parent a child requires an individualized consideration based on the facts of a particular situation, including an individualized determination of a child’s best interest.

Termination may rest on clear evidence of abandonment, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance even without resolving whether the parents’ criminal convictions were admissible.

Dept. of Children's Svcs. v. S.S.S., J.S., and K.S. · filed 2001-05-24(g)(1)-(3)

Regardless of whether Mother’s or Father’s criminal convictions were properly admitted into evidence, there was ample evidence supporting the termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights based on other grounds. There was clear evidence presented at trial of abandonment, the fact that the children had been removed for six months and the conditions that led to removal persisted and were unlikely to be soon remedied, and substantial noncompliance with the children’s permanency plans.