N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(4) does not treat a public school board as an education corporation or association, and § 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability when no Human Rights Law violation has been established.

Kelly G. v. Board of Education of Yonkers · filed 2012-10-10(4), (6)

The Board is not an “education corporation or association” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296 (4), since it is not a “private, nonsectarian entit[y] . . . exempt from taxation under RPTL article 4” (Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 19 NY3d 481, 490 [2012]). Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot impose liability on the Board ... for aiding and abetting a violation of the Human Rights Law pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6) where, as here, no violation of the Human Rights Law has been established (see Barbato v Bowden, 63 AD3d 1580, 1582 [2009]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 73 [2005]).

Section 296 applies to age discrimination by educational institutions in nonacademic employment matters.

Wander v. St. John's University · filed 2012-10-17

... the fact that an employer is an educational institution does not permit it to discriminate against its employees on the basis of age, or otherwise insulate it from liability for violations of the New York State Human Rights Law or the New York City Human Rights Law.

Section 296(4) does not cover public educational institutions as education corporations or associations.

Garcia v. City Univ. of N.Y. · filed 2016-02-23(4)

Defendants are public educational institutions (see Education Law § 6201 et seq.), and therefore are not “education corporation [s] or association[s]” under Executive Law § 296 (4) (see Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 19 NY3d 481 [2012]; Kelly G. v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 99 AD3d 756, 758 [2d Dept 2012]).

The NYSHRL can apply to a joint-employer relationship, with employer status assessed using factors including hiring, pay, firing, and control; disputed evidence on those factors precludes summary judgment.

Voltaire v. Home Services Systems, Inc. · filed 2011-09-30

The joint employer doctrine, on which plaintiff relies in this case, applies under both the FMLA and the local New York anti-discrimination statutes. ... In contrast, some district courts in this Circuit have identified factors to be used in determining whether two entities are “joint employers” for purposes of the NYSHRL. ... Accordingly, this Court will utilize these factors in determining whether HANAC and HSS are joint employers. ... In sum, it is unclear from the evidence adduced by the parties whether HANAC had power over the hiring and firing of HSS employees, had any role in the payment of salary or wages to HSS employees or had the power to control the conduct of HSS employees. Accordingly, there remains a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether HSS and HANAC were joint employers, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss HANAC from this action is denied.

Section 296(1)(a) protects an employee from adverse action because the employee is single, married, divorced, separated, or similarly situated in marital status, but it does not protect the employee from action based on the identity of the employee’s spouse.

Pibouin v. CA, Inc. · filed 2012-03-31(1)(a)

NYHRL prohibits discrimination in the workplace based on, inter alia, an individual’s “marital status.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). However, there is no protection afforded under NYHRL regarding one’s marriage to a particular person. The relevant provision relates to the employee’s “marital status” not his or her “marital relationships.” Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 512, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980). Therefore, under this provision, an employer is only prohibited from imposing an adverse employment action on an individual employee “because he or she is single, married, divorced, separated or the like,” but not because of the identity of the employee’s spouse. Id; see also Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 96 N.Y.2d 484, 490, 730 N.Y.S.2d 15, 754 N.E.2d 1099 (2001); Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733, 735, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428, 450 N,E.2d 234 (1983).

Section 296 prohibits employment decisions based on whether a person is married, single, divorced, or separated, but does not prohibit a rule against working under a spouse’s supervision.

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1980-12-18(1)(a)

Applied here, it means that the statute in effect says that employers may no longer decide whether to hire, fire, or promote someone because he or she is single, married, divorced, separated or the like. ... Hence, we hold that Ms. Dammann was not discriminated against on the basis of marital status within the intendment of section 296 of the Executive Law.

Section 296(1)(a) does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire someone because their spouse already works there under a consistently applied antinepotism policy.

Campbell Plastics, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1981-05-28(1)(a)

We hold that the determination of the appeal board must be annulled. Upon the present record, it is obvious that complainant was denied employment not because of her marital status, i.e., the fact that she was married at the time, but rather because of the additional fact that her husband was already in petitioner’s employ.

Section 296 permits a marital status discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when direct evidence of discriminatory intent meets the plaintiff’s burden and the employer disputes the statement.

Kipper v. Doron Precision Systems, Inc. · filed 1993-06-03

Such direct evidence of discriminatory intent was sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden (see, Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228), and the supervisor’s denial that he made the statement presents a question of credibility that cannot be resolved on a summary judgment motion (Capelin Assocs. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 NY2d 338, 341).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s marital status, but does not cover discrimination based on whom the individual married.

Cramer v. Newburgh Molded Products, Inc. · filed 1996-06-17(1)(a)

Furthermore, the assertion that the plaintiff Annette Cramer was terminated "because she was married to Joseph Cramer”, does not set forth a cognizable cause of action under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), which prohibits discrimination based upon an individual’s marital status rather than upon the fact that the individual is married to any particular partner (see, Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 NY2d 506, 511-513; Matter of Police Assn. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 126 AD2d 824).

Section 296(1)(a) protects against discrimination based on being married or unmarried, but does not protect a person merely because they live in a long-term domestic partnership.

Funderburke v. Uniondale Union Free School District No. 15 · filed 1997-05-21(1)(a)

Executive Law § 296 protects an individual from discrimination because of his/her status of being married or unmarried. It does not protect someone living in a long-term domestic partnership relationship.

Section 296(1)(a) does not treat a domestic partnership as a marital status.

Funderburke v. Uniondale Union Free School District No. 15 · filed 1998-06-29(1)(a)

We do not find that a domestic partnership is a “marital status” within the meaning of Executive Law § 296 (see, Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal ... Bd., 51 NY2d 506, 512).

Section 296 bars housing discrimination based on marital status.

Levin v. Yeshiva University · filed 2001-07-02

For this reason, the policy does not facially discriminate on the basis of marital status and the causes of action alleging such discrimination, as prohibited by both the State and City Human Rights Laws, were properly dismissed.

Section 296 protects employees from employment discrimination based on marital status.

Kay v. Banchik · filed 2026-06-09(1)(a)

In addition to being protected from gender-based discrimination, an employee is protected from discrimination based on marital status under both the City and State HRLs (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1][a]; Executive Law § 296[a]; see also Matter of McCabe v 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. , 43 NY3d 365, 372 [2024]).

Section 296(1) permits individual discrimination liability when the individual qualifies as an employer through an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out personnel decisions made by others.

Townsend v. BENJAMIN ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2012-05-09(1)

Under this provision, an individual is properly subject to liability for discrimination when that individual qualifies as an “employer.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). An individual qualifies as an “employer” when that individual has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the “power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” Patrowich v. Chem. Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11, 12 (1984) (per curiam). The jury instruction accurately reflects these principles. Because there was no dispute that Michelle Benjamin had an ownership interest in the company and the power to hire and fire employees, it was proper for the district court to instruct the jury that, as a matter of law, it must find Michelle Benjamin strictly liable upon a finding that Hugh Benjamin qualified as BEI’s alter ego.

Section 296 applies to an entity that functionally controls a worker’s employment, even when the worker’s compensation is paid through the worker’s own corporation.

Kology v. My Space NYC Corp. · filed 2016-04-11

These principles compel the conclusion that My Space was Kology’s employer (or, technically, joint employer) and therefore subject to liability under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating because of sex in discharge, compensation, or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; an employer includes someone with ownership interests or who does more than carry out others’ personnel decisions.

Brown v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 2021-03-25(1)(a)

First, the NYSHRL provides, in relevant part, that “[it] shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: . . . (a) [f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). An “employer” under this provision is someone who has “ownership interests in the [employer] or do[es] more than carry out personnel decisions of others.” Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 53 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (first alteration in original, second alteration added).

Section 296(1) permits individual liability only for an employer who owns the organization or can do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Santana v. Mount Vernon City School District/ Board of Education · filed 2021-09-30(1)

The NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: where the individual defendant is considered an “employer,” of the plaintiff, or where the individual defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), (6); ... An “employer” under Section 296(1) “has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... Here, Duffy has not plausibly alleged that any of the Individual Defendants are “employers” under the NYSHRL, as “Section 2554(2) of New York Education Law vests the Board of Education with the power to appoint a superintendent, principals, and teachers, among other employees and personnel.” ... “Defendants, as superintendent and principal within the District, do not have the power to hire or fire a teacher. Even though they have supervisory positions, and may advise the Board of Education in its personnel decisions of, that is not enough to hold them liable under § 296(1) . . . .”

Section 296(1) does not make ordinary employees individually liable as employers under the NYSHRL; individual employees are not employers for purposes of employment-discrimination claims.

Milner-Koonce v. Albany City School District · filed 2023-06-01(1)

Accordingly, under the “narrow meaning of employer under the [NYSHRL],” Bloomberg, L.P., 36 N.Y.3d at 458, Adams, McKenna, and Petrin cannot be held individually liable as employers. All three are employees of the School District under New York state law and therefore were not Plaintiff’s employer for the purposes of Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims.

For an employment discrimination complaint under § 296(1), the Division lacks jurisdiction over an entity that was not the complainant’s employer.

Central New York Centro, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1989-03-02(1)

The discrimination alleged in Goodin’s complaint relates to employment practices. Since the Authority was not Goodin’s employer, the Division lacks statutory jurisdiction to proceed against it. (See, Executive Law § 296 [1], [2].)

Section 296(1)(a) does not apply to an employer with fewer than four employees; principals generally do not count toward that threshold.

Germakian v. Kenny International Corp. · filed 1989-06-20(1)(a)

Executive Law § 296, which prohibits discriminatory practices based on disability is inapplicable here because of the number of persons employed by the defendant. Executive Law § 292 (5) states, "The term 'employer’ does not include any employer with fewer than four persons in his employ.” While plaintiff contends that defendant did employ at least four persons, this figure is reached only by including the principals Finbar Kenny and his wife as employees. While there may be instances where principals may be counted as employees for purposes of the Executive Law, generally speaking the section envisions a situation where the employer engages four persons other than himself or herself.

Section 296(1)(a) applies to employees, so it does not cover an attorney-client relationship.

Giaimo v. Smith · filed 1993-07-06(1)(a)

Here, since the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant was clearly that of attorney and client, and not employer and employee, Executive Law § 296 is inapplicable.

Section 296 does not support an employment discrimination claim against a defendant that no longer controls the position as the employer.

Cefalo v. New York Medical College · filed 1991-12-24

The evidence demonstrates that in 1986, defendant was not the "employer” who controlled the position in question. ... Due to the "roll-over”, the laboratory management position was transferred to the aegis of HHC. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has no discrimination claim against defendant.

Section 296(1)(a) applies to discrimination against employees, not independent contractors.

Sone v. Tsumura · filed 1995-12-07(1)(a)

The sexual discrimination claim by plaintiff Sone was properly dismissed since Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) only applies to discrimination against employees (see, Mehtani v New York Life Ins. Co., 145 AD2d 90, 93, Iv denied and dismissed 74 NY2d 835). None of the defendants were Sone’s employer.

Section 296(1)(a) does not support a sexual harassment claim against an employer with fewer than four employees.

DeStefano v. Kopelman · filed 1999-10-18(1)(a)

This action was brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a). ... Under the Executive Law the term “employer” excludes “any employer with fewer than four persons in his employ” (Executive Law § 292 [5]; see, Kern v City of Rochester, 254 AD2d 757; Germakian v Kenny Intl. Corp., 151 AD2d 342). At no time during the period in which the alleged harassing behavior occurred did the defendant employ four or more persons.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of sex in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Samide v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2003-01-03(1)(a)

Pursuant to New York State’s Human Rights Law, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer * * * because of the * * * sex * * * of any individual * * * to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). ... The court finds that this evidence, inter alia, sufficiently establishes that the Diocese is an employer of the plaintiff within the meaning of the Human Rights Law. Thus, the defendants’ attempt to dismiss the amended complaint against defendant Diocese on the ground that it is not the plaintiffs employer is rejected.

A Section 296 discrimination claim requires an employer with at least four employees; a subsidiary’s employees do not count toward its parent’s total when the entities do not qualify as a single employer.

Moraetis v. Evans · filed 2017-05-02

Accordingly, there is no issue of fact as to whether Spring Hill Farm, which employs six full-time employees, and the Foundation, which employs only two full-time employees, can be considered part of a single “employer” for the purposes of satisfying the minimum four-person-in-the-employ requirement set forth in the New York State and New York City Human Rights Law (Executive Law §§ 292 [5]; 296; Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-102 [5]; 8-107).

Section 296(1)(a) requires facts showing that a defendant controlled the plaintiff’s work to treat the defendant as an employer in a discrimination claim.

Sacchi v. Ribbon Worldwide LLC · filed 2026-02-25(1)(a)

Moreover, Paramount has established that there are no factual allegations to suggest that it exerted any such control over plaintiff's performance of his work such that it could be considered an employer within the meaning of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296 prohibits religious disparate-treatment employment discrimination, requiring discriminatory intent or motive for the job-related action; such claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Lewis ex rel. Estate of Lewis v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2014-03-31

Disparate treatment on the basis of religion is prohibited by Title VII and NYSHRL. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Such claims require that a plaintiff “establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive for taking a job-related action.” Ricci, 557 U.S. at 576, 129 S.Ct. 2658.

Section 296 employment-discrimination claims for disparate-treatment failure to promote are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Hernandez v. The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball · filed 2021-03-31

On summary judgment, disparate treatment failure-to-promote claims under both Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) are analyzed under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employer discrimination because of a protected characteristic in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and the court applies the same standards of proof to NYSHRL and Title VII discrimination claims.

Jemmott v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation · filed 2022-09-26(1)(a)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . for an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... This Court “typically treat[s] Title VII and [NYSHRL] discrimination claims as analytically identical, applying the same standards of proof to both claims.” ... Accordingly, because plaintiff’s claims of religious discrimination under Title VII fail, defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s NYSHRL discrimination claim.

Section 296(10)(a) requires an employer to make a bona fide effort to reasonably accommodate a sincerely held religious practice unless the accommodation would impose undue hardship; an accommodation requiring a healthcare employer to violate a binding vaccination rule is an undue hardship.

Algarin v. NYC Health + Hospitals Corporation · filed 2023-06-23(10)(a)

Section 296(10)(a) further provides that: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer . . . to impose upon a person as a condition of . . . retaining employment . . . any terms or conditions that would require such person to violate or forego a sincerely held practice of his or her religion, . . . unless, after engaging in a bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s or prospective employee’s sincerely held religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(10)(a). ... The Court agrees that granting Plaintiff a religious exemption from the mandatory vaccination requirement or permitting regular COVID testing in lieu of vaccination would cause Defendant an undue hardship because it would require Defendant to violate a state rule, Section 2.61. ... Therefore, exempting Plaintiff from the mandatory vaccination requirements of Section 2.61 would violate the state rule, which would necessarily create an undue hardship on H+H.

For NYSHRL discrimination claims accruing on or after October 11, 2019, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege that they were treated less well because of discriminatory intent.

Troeger v. JetBlue Airways Corporation · filed 2024-12-17

Those statutes impose a “less rigorous standard” on employment discrimination plaintiffs than does Title VII. See Reach v. Healthfirst, Inc., No. 23-CV-8085, 2024 WL 4493769, at *6 (Oct. 15, 2024). Under the NYCHRL, Troeger need only plausibly allege “differential treatment—that [he was] treated ‘less well’—because of discriminatory intent.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2013). And for claims that accrued on or after October 11, 2019—as these did—the same standard applies under NYSHRL. See Arazi v. Cohen Bros. Reality Corp., No. 20-CV-8837, 2022 WL 912940, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022).

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of the individual's creed.

Gahfi v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-28(1)(a)

Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL provide that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer” to discriminate against an individual because of her “creed.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a)(3).

At the pleading stage, a discrimination claim under the NYSHRL may proceed when the plaintiff plausibly alleges disparate treatment based on facts supporting a § 1981 claim.

Kiseleva v. Litman · filed 2024-10-31

Because “[t]he pleading standards are generally the same for . . . section 1981[ ] and NYSHRL claims,” Cardwell v. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, No. 1:19-CV-10256-GHW, 2020 WL 6274826, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2020), Kiseleva has stated a discrimination claim against Employer Defendants under the NYSHRL for the reasons discussed above, see also Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).

Section 296(1)(a) does not treat a seminary’s decision to admit female rabbinical candidates as religious discrimination against a professor merely because the decision conflicts with his religious convictions.

Faur v. Jewish Theological Seminary of America · filed 1989-01-09(1)(a)

With respect to the plaintiff’s claims of religious discrimination he has failed to demonstrate that the Seminary, by choosing to admit female rabbinical candidates, discriminated against him on the basis of his religious convictions (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a religious discrimination claim when employees allege they were terminated for opposing abortion with the strength of traditional religious conviction.

Larson v. Albany Medical Center · filed 1998-07-30(1)(a)

For their cause of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296, plaintiffs rely on the facts alleged in their amended complaint wherein they claim that their discharge was due to the letters sent to defendants in which they announced their moral stance against abortion. We deem this sufficient to state a cause of action under the statute. We conclude that plaintiffs have stated their moral belief with respect to abortions. This moral belief constitutes an expression held with the strength of traditional religious conviction (see, Welsh v United States, 398 US 333, 340). Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that they were terminated due to those beliefs.

Section 296 requires sufficient factual allegations to state a religious employment discrimination claim; conclusory assertions alone are insufficient.

Currid v. City of New York · filed 2025-08-20

Here, the plaintiff's conclusory assertions that the defendants discriminated against him based on religion were unsupported by sufficient factual allegations to state a cause of action under either the NYCHRL or the NYSHRL ( see Shahid v City of New York , 231 AD3d 888; Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. , 222 AD3d at 707-708; cf. Cagle v Weill Cornell Med. , 680 F Supp 3d 428, 434-437 [SD NY]).

Section 296 requires factual allegations supporting an employment discrimination claim based on religion; conclusory assertions are insufficient.

Farah v. City of New York · filed 2025-09-17

Here, the complaint's conclusory assertions that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff based on religion were unsupported by sufficient factual allegations to state a cause of action under either the NYCHRL or the NYSHRL ( see Shahid v City of New York , 231 AD3d 888, 888; Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. , 222 AD3d at 707-708).

Section 296(1)(a) allows an employment discrimination claim based on differential treatment; adverse employment action is not required.

Shibley v. City of New York · filed 2026-01-12(1)(a)

The court notes that adverse employment action is very much still a route to plead and prove employment discrimination, as such action can demonstrate differential treatment. The practical effect of the amendments is that adverse employment action is not the only way to plead and prove a claim for employment discrimination.

For pay-discrimination claims under § 296, the continuing-violation doctrine applies; claims against individual defendants are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Husser v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2015-09-30

Instead, it makes more sense, and is more faithful to controlling law, to continue to .construe the two laws similarly and therefore to construe a claim of pay discrimination to assert a continuing violation under both.

Section 296 discrimination claims have a three-year limitations period, tolled during the EEOC charge period, and discrete failures to hire are not continuing violations under the NYSHRL.

Taylor v. City of New York · filed 2016-09-13

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL statutes of limitations are three years. See Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir.2007). ... Factoring in this tolling period, any conduct prior to November 22, 2011 is time barred under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, which means that only Taylor’s claims that she was not hired as an apprentice construction laborer in June 2012, May 2013, and May 2014 are timely under the state and city statutes. As the continuing violations doctrine of the NYSHRL mirrors that of Title VII, the discrete acts of failing to hire Taylor for the apprentice construction laborer position cannot be considered a continuing violation under the NYSHRL. See Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F.Supp.2d 226, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013).

Section 296(1) prohibits disability discrimination in employment by an employer, labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice training programs.

Williams v. Rosenblatt Securities Inc. · filed 2015-10-07(1)

The NYHRL’s provisions protecting people with disabilities in the employment context also limit their scope to the discriminatory practice of a small group of covered entities. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1) (proscribing unlawful discriminatory practice by an employer, labor organization, employment .agency or any joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice training programs). The plaintiff has failed to allege why Jane St. would fall within the scope of the NYHRL’s prohibitions.

Section 296(1)(a) applies to public employers, including municipal civil service commissions, when they refuse to hire an applicant because of disability.

Ramos v. New York City Police Department · filed 1985-03-15(1)(a)

First, it fails to see how the provisions in the Human Rights Law that state that the law applies to “any employer” or “an employer” could be interpreted to exclude public employers (including civil service commissions) from the law’s scope.

Section 296(9) covers volunteer firemen, but Section 296 does not protect other unpaid volunteer positions that lack an employment relationship.

Sweeney v. Board of Education · filed 1985-07-08(9)

The protection of Executive Law § 296 does not extend to petitioner’s unpaid, voluntary relationship with respondent’s school which lacked "the mutually beneficial economic substance which is the touchstone of an employer/employee relationship” (State Div. of Human Rights v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 98 AD2d 958). While Executive Law § 296 (9) does expressly cover volunteer firemen, the Legislature’s failure to include other voluntary, unpaid positions evidences its intent not to extend the protection of the statute to all voluntary positions (cf. Matter of Alper v Gaffney, 73 AD2d 644; McKinney’s Uncons Laws of NY § 9122 [4] [b] [New York State Defense Emergency Act § 22; L 1951, ch 784, § 22 as amended]).

For § 296(1)(a) claims, the Division may determine employee status independently of an unemployment insurance finding.

Engel v. Calgon Corp. · filed 1986-02-06(1)(a)

In conclusion, since the issue of employment is an ultimate fact, the resolution of which is committed to the discretion of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and the Division of Human Rights under independent bodies of law, there is no identity of issue and the Board’s finding of employment does not automatically mandate a similar finding by the Division.

Section 296 does not authorize the Division of Human Rights to remedy wrongs outside its scope.

Flinker v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1999-10-07

To the extent that his claims are based on perceived wrongs not within the remedial ambit of Executive Law § 296, respondent agency was without jurisdiction to afford petitioner relief (see, State Off. of Drug Abuse Servs. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 48 NY2d 276, 285, n 4).

An attorney’s alleged decision to drop a client does not, by itself, state a claim under § 296.

Attallah v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP · filed 2019-01-30

The third cause of action, alleging discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296, was properly dismissed in light of the failure to state a cognizable legal theory against the defendant for a violation of this law arising from the defendant's alleged decision "to dump" the plaintiff as a client ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]).

Section 296 bars employment discrimination based on military status or disability, limits employer liability for an employee's discrimination to cases where the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved it, and prohibits retaliation for opposing or complaining about discrimination.

Gorman v. Covidien, LLC · filed 2015-11-19(1)(a), (6), (7)

Among other things, the NYSHRL makes it an “unlawful discriminatory prac*521tice” for “an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual’s ... military status [or] disability ,.. to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” ... Specifically, liability for an. employee’s discriminatory conduct may only be imputed to an employer under the NYSHRL if the employer “became,a.party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” ... “The NYSHRL allows for. individual liability under two theories: [i] if the defendant, has ‘an ownership, interest’ in the employer or has ‘the authority to hire and fire employees,’ Tomka v. Seiler Corp., *52266 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir.1995) (discussing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)), [or] [ii] if the defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).” ... In addition to creating liability for direct discrimination, the NYSHRL makes it unlawful for any person to retaliate against someone who has opposed or filed a complaint of discrimination.

Section 296 prohibits discriminatory employment practices based on protected characteristics and retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination.

Facci-Brahler v. Montgomery County · filed 2020-01-22

“Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown her disability was a motivating factor behind the hostile-work environment and termination she allegedly suffered. To successfully allege violations of the NYSHRL based upon disability discrimination, Plaintiff “must show that [] she suffers from a disability and that the disability engendered the behavior for which [] she was discriminated against in the terms, conditions, or privileges of [] her employment.” ... In sum, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination claims under the NYSHRL for failing to state a claim.

Section 296’s employment-discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework used for the parallel federal claims.

Fu v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. · filed 2020-03-25(1)(a), (7)

These claims are all subject to the familiar burden-shifting standard set forth in the McDonnell Douglas case. ... Accordingly, Defendant is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL race discrimination claims. ... Accordingly, Defendant is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADEA and NYSHRL age discrimination claims. ... Like her discrimination claims, Plaintiff’s Title VII, ADEA, and NYSHRL retaliation claims are governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. ... Accordingly, Defendant is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal and NYSHRL retaliation claims.

Section 296 prohibits race discrimination in hiring and employment terms and prohibits retaliation against people who oppose practices forbidden by the statute or participate in related proceedings.

Parks v. Buffalo City School District · filed 2020-04-30(1)(a), (f)

Similarly, the NY HRL provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer “to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment [an] individual or to discriminate against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” on account of race. ... Similarly, the NY HRL makes it unlawful for “any employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” ... Both statutes are governed by the standards applicable to Title VII retaliation claims.

Section 296 bars employers from refusing to hire or discriminating against an employee because of race and prohibits retaliation against a person who opposes practices forbidden by the statute.

Johnson v. L'Oreal USA · filed 2021-09-30

NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or discriminate against an employee because of his or her race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. ... Under New York law, it is illegal to “retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on listed protected characteristics, while § 296(7) protects employees who oppose unlawful practices or file discrimination complaints, although retaliation requires a causal connection to the adverse action.

Lopez v. White Plains Hospital · filed 2022-03-30(1), (7)

The NYSHRL echoes this prohibition and adds to it, prohibiting discrimination against an employee based on that employee’s “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). ... “The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she ‘has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . she has filed a complaint, testified[,] or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7)). ... The caselaw is clear that plaintiffs engage in protected activity when they file internal or external discrimination complaints against their employer. ... In sum, Plaintiff cannot show a causal nexus between her internal discrimination complaint and her termination. Plaintiff thus cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a public-accommodation operator from denying accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges because of race, and an employer is liable for an employee’s discriminatory act only if it encouraged, condoned, or approved it.

Upper Echelon Entertainment LLC v. The State of New York · filed 2023-05-30(2)(a)

NYSHRL section 296 makes it unlawful for “any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the race . . . of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a). ... An employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act under section 296 “unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” ... “Absent plausible allegations that the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved the behavior at issue, [a court] may not infer [that] such facts [] exist.”

Section 296(1) permits direct individual liability for an owner or supervisor with authority to hire and fire, while § 296(6) permits liability for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing discriminatory or retaliatory acts.

Brown v. Metropolitan Dental Associates, D.D.S. P.C. · filed 2023-08-10(1), (6)

There are two avenues to establishing individual liability for employment discrimination and retaliation under the NYSHRL. First, an individual may be held directly liable when he possesses “ownership interest” or is a “supervisor with the authority to hire and fire employees.” Malena, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 365-66; see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). Second, an individual may be held liable where he is found to “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce” the illicit discriminatory or retaliatory acts. See Xiang, 2322 WL 785055, at *14-15; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits sex-based discrimination in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and § 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing practices forbidden by the article.

Bethea v. Winfield Security Corporation · filed 2023-12-14(1)(a), (7)

Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer to discriminate against an individual “in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” based on sex. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Bethea, therefore, fails to plead facts plausibly suggesting that Winfield discriminated against her based on her pregnancy. Accordingly, Winfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to claims one and two of the complaint is GRANTED. ... The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she “has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... In all, Bethea plausibly pleads a claim for retaliation under Title VI and the NYSHRL, and Winfield’s motion for judgment on these claims is DENIED.

Section 296(1)(b) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee or prospective employee based on protected characteristics, while § 296(7) prohibits retaliation against individuals who file a complaint against their employer or prospective employer.

Harriram v. City University of New York · filed 2024-03-31(1)(b), (7)

The NYSHRL provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee or prospective employee because of her gender identity, race, national origin, or other protected class. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(b). The statute also proscribes an employer from “retaliat[ing] against” an employee because she has “filed a complaint” against that employer. Id. § 296(7). ... Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL also make it unlawful to retaliate against individuals who file a complaint against their employer or prospective employer. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(7). To the extent Harriram seeks to bring a retaliation claim against Defendant Barbera in her individual capacity under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, she states a plausible claim.

Section 296(3-a) prohibits employers from discriminating because of sex in hiring, discharge, compensation, or employment terms, and § 296(1)(e) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the article.

Herrera v. Boston Market Corporation · filed 2025-03-07(3-a) and (1)(e)

Similarly, the NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [f]or an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3-a). ... “[C]laims under the NYSHRL are analyzed identically to claims under . . . Title VII, [and] the outcome of an employment discrimination claim made pursuant to the NYSHRL is the same as it is under . . . Title VII.” ... Similarly, the NYSHRL provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice “[f]or any employer . . . to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e). ... “[T]he standard for evaluating retaliation claims are identical under Title VII and the NYSHRL.”

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits employment discrimination on listed protected grounds, and § 296(l)(f) prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination or participating in related proceedings.

Little v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. · filed 2002-04-22(l)(a), (l)(f)

New York’s Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”) makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer ... because of the age, race, creed, col- or, national origin, sex, disability, genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(l)(a). In this Circuit, courts analyze discrimination claims brought under Title VII and the NYHRL in the same manner. ... Under New York law, it is unlawful for any employer “to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any [unlawful discriminatory practice] or because he or she has filed a- complaint, testified or assisted in any.proceeding” relating to an unlawful discriminatory practice. N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(l)(f). .The primary purpose of these provisions- is to prohibit employers from retaliating against employees because they complain of prohibited workplace discrimination. ... 'To establish a prima facie case of retaliation a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the defendant was aware of plaintiffs participation in the protected activity; (3) the defendant took' an adverse employment action against plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. ... A retaliation claim follows the same burden shifting framework as a discrimination claim.

Section 296(1)(a) makes an employer responsible for sex discrimination in a promotion process conducted by a review board the employer appointed under its own procedure.

City of Schenectady v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1975-07-08(1)(a)

The proof justified the conclusion that the promotion selective process was influenced by unlawful sex discrimination, and the imputation of these considerations to the city is necessary if the Human Rights Law is to have meaning.

Section 296(2) makes an employer liable for an employee’s discrimination in a public accommodation only if the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved the act.

Totem Taxi, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1985-06-06(2)

Thus the employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.

Section 296 prohibits retaliation for reporting discriminatory conduct and limits employer liability where the employer did not approve, acquiesce in, or condone the conduct.

Ellis v. Child Development Support Corp. · filed 2004-03-08(7)

The appellant demonstrated that it did not approve of, acquiesce in, or condone any alleged discriminatory conduct (see Matter of State Div. of Human Rights [Greene] v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687; Matter of Totem Taxi v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 NY2d 300, 304 [1985]; Pascal v Amscan, Inc., 290 AD2d 426 [2002]; Escobar v Spartan Assemblies, 267 AD2d 272 [1999]). Further, Mitchell was not a high-level managerial employee whose conduct could be imputed to the appellant (see Pascal v Amscan, Inc., supra; cf. Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 54 [1996]). In addition, there is no evidence that the appellant retaliated against the plaintiff for reporting the incident (see Executive Law § 296 [7]).

Section 296 (1) (a) covers discrimination in employment terms and conditions based on sex or race, while section 296 (7) covers retaliation for complaints of discrimination.

Mitchell v. TAM Equities, Inc. · filed 2006-03-28

In the first instance, the plaintiff stated causes of action against Homebridge pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) to recover damages for discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment on the basis of her sex and race, and pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (7) to recover damages for its retaliation in responding to her complaints of discrimination.

Under § 296, a high-level managerial employee’s knowledge of workplace discrimination can be imputed to the employer.

Bianco v. Flushing Hospital Medical Center · filed 2010-12-14

Contrary to the hospital’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined, as a matter of law, that its medical director, Peter Barra, was a high-level managerial employee whose knowledge of discriminatory conduct in the workplace could be imputed to the hospital (see Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, 67 NY2d 369, 380-381 [1986]; Ellis v Child Dev. Support Corp., 5 AD3d 430 [2004]; Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 55 [1996]).

Section 296 permits employer liability when the employer knows of an employee's discriminatory conduct and acquiesces by failing to act.

Doe v. Clark · filed 2025-01-21

Here, construing the plaintiff's allegations in the second amended complaint as true, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Goodyear, though "Seymour," witnessed Clark's sexual misconduct toward the plaintiff and acquiesced in the alleged offensive behavior by failing to take any action ( see generally Bianco v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 54 AD3d at 305-306). Accordingly, that branch of the defendants' motion which is to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted against Goodyear must be denied.

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on perceived disability and retaliation for opposing that discrimination; allegations of both can state claims under the NYSHRL.

Nazath v. Our Lady of Consolation Nursing & Rehabilitative Care Ctr. · filed 2025-08-27(1)(a), (1)(e)

The NYSHRL, as relevant here, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived disability ( see Executive Law §§ 292[21][a], [c]; 296[1][a]; Matter of North Shore Univ. Hosp. v Rosa , 86 NY2d 413, 417-419; Scardace v Mid Is. Hosp., Inc. , 21 AD3d 363, 364) and retaliation for opposing such discrimination ( see Executive Law § 296[1][e]; Diluglio v Liberty Mut. Group, Inc. , 230 AD3d 643, 645). ... Here, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint sufficiently stated causes of action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of perceived disability ( see Executive Law § 292[21][c]; Duchemin v Village of E. Hampton , 222 AD3d 715, 716-717) and retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL ( see Executive Law § 296[1][e]; Kaplan v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene , 142 AD3d 1050, 1051-1052).

Section 296 permits employer liability for an employee's discriminatory acts when the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved them.

Doe v. Sweet Green, Inc. · filed 2026-03-03

Unlike the NYCHRL, the NYSHRL does not impose vicarious liability on an employer for an employee's discriminatory acts unless the employer became a party to the discrimination by encouraging, condoning. or approving it.

Encouraging a co-worker to bring a sexual harassment claim and relaying information about it can constitute protected opposition under § 296(1)(e).

Sorrentino v. Bohbot Entertainment & Media, Inc. · filed 1999-10-26(1)(e)

Plaintiffs actions of encouraging the co-employee to bring her sexual harassment claim to the company, and his subsequent statements relaying what he knew of the claims, constituted “opposition” to practices forbidden by both the State and City Human Rights Laws, and therefore were actions protected against retaliatory employment practices ... .

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL; opposition to conduct that is not statutorily prohibited is not protected activity.

Smith v. Johnson · filed 2016-01-11(7)

Smith’s amended claim of discriminatory retaliation based on union activities, like her initial pleading, fails to allege that those activities consisted of opposition to statutorily prohibited discrimination. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that Title VII prohibits retaliation based on “protected activity,” which “refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7) (prohibiting retaliation against anyone who “has opposed any practices forbidden” under NYSHRL); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7) (prohibiting retaliation against anyone who has “opposed any practice forbidden” under NYCHRL).

Section 296(7) protects opposition to statutorily prohibited discrimination and the commencement of a civil action alleging such discrimination.

Bouveng v. NYG Capital LLC · filed 2016-03-31(7)

Under both statutes, “protected activity” refers to, inter alia, (1) opposition to any statutorily prohibited discrimination, and (2) the commencement of a civil action alleging the commission of an act that would constitute statutorily prohibited discrimination.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits retaliation against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYHRL; a request for accommodation alone does not qualify as opposition.

Giblin v. Le Moyne College · filed 2021-03-01(1)(e)

Plaintiff’s NYHRL retaliation claim, however, is dismissed, because requesting an accommodation is not protected activity under the NYHRL. ... State courts have reasoned that under the NYHRL, requesting an accommodation does not constitute protected activity, because the statute prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e) (emphasis added), and requesting an accommodation does not amount to opposing an employer’s illegal conduct.

Section 296(1)(e) protects employees who oppose practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law or file complaints, testify, or assist in proceedings under it from retaliation.

Johnson v. City of New York · filed 2021-03-30(1)(e)

Therefore, because plaintiff assisted with the Vulcan Class Action by providing a deposition, and separately benefited from the lawsuit as a priority hire, plaintiff’s actions constitute protected conduct. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e), (3-a)(c), and (7) (each providing that “oppos[ing] any practices forbidden under this article or . . . fil[ing] a complaint, testif[ying] or assist[ing] in any proceeding under this article” constitute protected conduct).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on specified protected characteristics, so general health or safety complaints are not protected opposition under the NYSHRL.

Smalls v. Amazon, Inc. · filed 2022-02-07(1)(a)

Protesting racial discrimination is a protected activity for purposes of these statutes, because the anti-discrimination statutes in question prohibit racial discrimination. But lodging general grievances about health or safety is not a protected activity for purposes of these discrimination laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (listing statutorily prohibited categories of discrimination); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a) (NYSHRL); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a) (NYCHRL); see also Antonmarchi v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., No. 3-CV-7735 (LTS) (KNF), 2008 WL 4444609, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[R]etaliation for safety complaints is not an actionable protected activity”), aff’d, 514 F. App’x 33 (2d Cir. 2013).

Section 296(1) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL or participating in proceedings under it, but a request for reasonable accommodation alone is not protected activity.

Scarville v. Living Resources Corporation · filed 2022-09-21(1)

However, unlike the ADA, the NYSHRL does not include requests for reasonable accommodation as “protected activity.”

Section 296(7) bars an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing a practice forbidden by the NYSHRL; in the student-harassment context, the opposition must include the employer’s inadequate response, not merely the student’s conduct.

Small v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2023-01-05(7)

That conclusion starts with the laws themselves, which make unlawful retaliation for opposing any practice made illegal by the underlying statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate . . . against any individual . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.”); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (“It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.”); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because such person has . . . opposed any practice forbidden under this chapter.”). In accordance with the text of these statutes, employers may not retaliate against employees for opposing a hostile work environment or other conduct that, itself, is unlawful under these statutes. ... In the context of student-on-teacher harassment, those rules mean that for a teacher’s complaint to be a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim, the teacher must have complained not only about a student’s allegedly harassing behavior, but also about the school or supervisor’s response to it. ... Here, however, Small only alleges that he complained about A.B.’s behavior, not about the school’s (or Paul’s) response to it. ... Those complaints were not a protected activities for purposes of establishing a retaliation claim because, as explained, they do not represent opposition to an unlawful employment practice by an employer. ... So they cannot support Small’s retaliation claims.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing an unlawful discriminatory practice or cooperating in a discrimination investigation; a general complaint about management style without reference to discrimination is not protected activity.

Romano v. AC360 Media, LLC · filed 2023-01-20(7)

Title VII, the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL all declare that it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee has opposed an unlawful discriminatory practice or cooperated in an investigation of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(7). ... Under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, a key element of a retaliation claim is that the plaintiff must have engaged in a “protected activity” of which her employer was aware. ... The term ‘protected activity’ refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination. The scope of such activity is broad: When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in a form of employment discrimination, that communication virtually always constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity. Protected activity may include both formal and informal complaints, including complaints to management. ... Here, Plaintiff summarily asserts that her complaint to HR constituted a protected activity because she complained about DeNinno’s mistreatment of her in the workplace. However, there is no allegation that the HR complaint made any reference to discrimination—rather, Plaintiff states that she and “at least two other female employees” complained to HR about DeNinno’s “abusive and toxic” management style. (Compl. ¶ 16.) This general complaint about management style is insufficient to qualify as protected activity, and the retaliation claim must therefore be dismissed.

Section 296 requires a retaliation claimant to show a good-faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice violated anti-discrimination law; the complaint need not ultimately be meritorious.

Bovell v. City of Mount Vernon, New York · filed 2023-05-18

“Retaliation claims under the New York State Human Rights Law are generally governed by the same standards as federal claims under Title VII.” Id. at 25 n.8 (cleaned up). Accordingly, for purposes of the claims of retaliation under Title VII and the NYHRL, the veracity of Plaintiff’s complaints is not in issue—Plaintiff need only demonstrate that he had a reasonable belief that the MVPD was violating anti-discrimination laws.

Section 296(7) protects opposition to practices forbidden by the NYSHRL and participation in NYSHRL proceedings, but a request for religious accommodation alone is not protected activity.

Kinowski v. The Home for Elderly Women of Montgomery County, Inc. · filed 2023-07-31(7)

The NYSHRL prohibits retaliation “against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL] or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [the NYSHRL].” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). As Defendant argues, New York courts have held that requesting a religious accommodation is not protected activity under the NYSHRL because such a request does not involve opposing an unlawful employment practice or participating in a proceeding. See, e.g., Giblin v. LeMoyne Coll., No. 20-cv-477, 2021 WL 781363, at *15, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37235, at *42–43 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021) (“[R]equesting an accommodation is not protected activity under the NYHRL.” (citations omitted)); D’Amico v. City of New York, 73 N.Y.S.3d 540, 541 (1st Dep’t 2018) (same); McKenzie v. Meridian Cap. Grp., LLC, 829 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (2d Dep’t 2006) (concluding that accommodation request did not involve “opposition to a practice forbidden by” the NYSHRL). ... Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she engaged in protected activity for purposes of her NYSHRL retaliation claim, and that claim is dismissed.

Section 296(7) does not treat merely rejecting a harasser's sexual advances, without more, as protected activity for a retaliation claim.

Fay v. City of Newburgh · filed 2024-09-12(7)

This Court agrees with those courts that have held that “simply…declining a harasser's sexual advances” does not constitute a protected activity for the purpose of a retaliation claim. ... Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s resistance to Donat’s purported sexual advances, without more, is not enough to state a claim for a retaliation.

Section 296(7) bars retaliation for opposing practices forbidden under the NYSHRL; requesting a reasonable accommodation alone is not protected activity, while opposing or complaining about its denial may be.

Medina v. AAM15 Management LLC · filed 2024-09-26(7)

Given that a request for a reasonable accommodation itself is neither an opposition to a forbidden practice, nor a complaint in furtherance of a proceeding under the NYSHRL, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); see also id. § 296(1)(e), “courts have distinguished between requests for accommodation in the first instance, which[, again,] do not constitute protected activity, and complaints about or opposition to the denial of such requests, which may constitute protected activity[,]” Piligian, 2020 WL 6561663, at *11 (emphasis added); ... In light of the foregoing caselaw—and given that Plaintiff does not allege that she submitted her requests for reasonable accommodation “in opposition to a practice forbidden by the [NYSHRL,]” McKenzie, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 131—the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot rely on her requests for reasonable accommodations as protected activity in connection with her NYSHRL retaliation claim, unless she points to “persuasive evidence that the [New York Court of Appeals] would” disagree with the assorted Appellate Division decisions cited above, V.S., 595 F.3d at 432.

Section 296(7) protects opposition to practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law and complaints or participation in proceedings under it; a request for additional training is not protected activity unless it raises discrimination concerns.

John v. Brooklyn Eye Center · filed 2025-01-28(7)

The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she “has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... But a request for additional training plainly does not constitute a protected activity under Title VII and NYSHRL. ... There is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff’s request for more training raised an issue of disparate treatment due to her gender or pregnancy status to her employer. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are dismissed.

Section 296 prohibits retaliation against an individual who has opposed unlawful gender discrimination.

Mehta v. University of Rochester Medical Center · filed 2025-02-11

The NYSHRL “prohibit[s] retaliation against an individual who has opposed unlawful gender discrimination.”

Section 296(1)(e) protects participation in a formal Human Rights Law proceeding and support or aid in another person’s Human Rights Law complaint from retaliation.

Unotti v. American Broadcasting Companies · filed 2000-06-08(1)(e)

Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for retaliation under the State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]) since he did not allege that he had been retaliated against for participating in a formal Human Rights Law proceeding (see, Vasconcelos v Meese, 907 F2d 111, 113) and did not support or aid another’s prosecution of a Human Rights Law complaint (cf., Smith v Columbus Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 443 F Supp 61, 63).

Section 296 protects an employee's grievance alleging age discrimination as protected activity in a retaliation claim.

Davis v. School District of City of Niagara Falls · filed 2004-02-11(7)

Although plaintiff was engaging in a protected activity when he filed his grievance alleging age discrimination (see Executive Law § 296), defendants established as a matter of law that plaintiff was terminated because the School District eliminated the drafting program for economic reasons, not because of plaintiffs grievance, and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (see Pace v Ogden Servs. Corp., 257 AD2d 101, 104 [1999]).

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for opposing practices forbidden under Executive Law article 15 or filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in a related proceeding.

VanDeWater v. Canandaigua National Bank · filed 2010-02-11(1)(e)

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (e), an employer may not discharge an employee because he or she “has opposed any practices forbidden [under Executive Law article 15] or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding [under Executive Law article 15]” (see also 42 USC § 2000e-3 [a]).

Section 296(7) protects a person who objects to discriminatory remarks about housing applicants from retaliation.

Fletcher v. Dakota, Inc. · filed 2012-07-03(7)

Fletcher’s protest that the “Jewish mafia” comment and the general tenor of the discussion about the Jewish couple’s “ethnicity and religion” were inappropriate constitutes the kind of activity that is protected under the State HRL.

Section 296(7) requires protected activity for a retaliation claim based on a layoff.

Kim v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2013-06-06(7)

To the extent petitioner’s retaliation claim is premised upon being laid off, that claim fails because the activity for which petitioner alleges she was retaliated against was not a protected activity (see Executive Law § 296 [7]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]; Asabor v Archdiocese of N.Y., 102 AD3d 524, 528 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 296 retaliation claims require evidence that the employee engaged in protected activity and that the employer knew of it.

Cotterell v. State of New York · filed 2015-06-03

Here, in opposition to the defendants’ showing of their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the causes of action alleging retaliation, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he engaged in a protected activity or that the defendants were aware of any such complaint prior to September 2009, when the plaintiff sent an email specifically complaining of discrimination.

Section 296(1)(e) protects opposition to unlawful discrimination; grand jury testimony unrelated to such discrimination is not protected activity.

Clarson v. City of Long Beach · filed 2015-10-21(1)(e)

Here, the plaintiff’s testimony before the grand jury was unrelated to opposing or complaining about statutorily prohibited discrimination, and therefore, was not “protected activity” as contemplated by the statute (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 313; see Adeniran v State of New York, 106 AD3d at 844; Ruane-Wilkens v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 56 AD3d 648, 649 [2008]).

Section 296 protects an employee from retaliation for opposing or complaining about unlawful discrimination; a complaint unrelated to prohibited discriminatory practices is not protected activity.

Borawski v. Abulafia · filed 2016-06-08(7)

Here, the defendants met their initial burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that the complaint filed by the plaintiff with the SDHR did not relate to discriminatory practices prohibited under the Executive Law, and that she, therefore, had not engaged in a protected activity (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 313; Clarson v City of Long Beach, 132 AD3d at 800; Adeniran v State of New York, 106 AD3d at 845; Dodd v Middletown Lodge [Elks Club] No. 1097, 264 AD2d 706, 707-708 [1999]).

Section 296(7) permits a retaliation claim when complaints about discrimination are followed by adverse actions that the allegations causally link to those complaints.

Jeudy v. City of New York · filed 2016-09-15(7)

The complaint also states a cause of action for retaliation under both the State and City HRLs (see Executive Law § 296 [7]; Administrative Code § 8-107 [7]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]; Fletcher v Dakota, Inc., 99 AD3d 43, 51-52 [1st Dept 2012]). ... The allegations in the complaint establish that defendant’s concerted campaign of excessive scrutiny following plaintiff’s persistent applications for promotion and complaints about continual rejection was calculated to, and did, lead directly to plaintiff’s suspension and termination.

Section 296(1)(e) protects employees who oppose or complain about unlawful discrimination; general complaints about an employer’s treatment of employees do not qualify.

Brunache v. MV Transportation, Inc. · filed 2017-06-28(1)(e)

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the complaint does not state a cause of action to recover damages for retaliation in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (e).

Reporting alleged sexual harassment to immediate supervisors can be protected activity under § 296(7), presenting a triable issue in a retaliation claim.

Bilitch v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. · filed 2021-05-26(7)

Contrary to the appellants' contention, Shuman's disclosure of the incident to her immediate supervisors raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she was engaged in a protected activity ( see Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prod., Inc. , 151 AD3d 915, 920; see also McGuinness v Concentric Health Care LLC , 116 AD3d 527, 529).

Section 296 retaliation claims require protected activity; a complaint must identify discrimination based on a protected trait.

Hribovsek v. United Cerebral Palsy of N.Y. City · filed 2024-01-30

Plaintiff's retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL must also be dismissed. With respect to her employment at UCP, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she engaged in any [*3]protected activity ( see Kwong v City of New York , 204 AD3d 442, 445 [1st Dept 2022], lv dismissed 38 NY3d 1174 [2022]) because she never complained that she was discriminated against due to her race, national origin, or disability.

Section 296 protects complaints about discriminatory practices prohibited by the NYSHRL as activity for purposes of a retaliation claim.

Diluglio v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc. · filed 2024-08-21(1)(e), (7)

Here, the defendants met their burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation by establishing that the plaintiff's complaints about Austin did not relate to discriminatory practices prohibited under the NYSHRL, and that he therefore did not engage in a protected activity ( see Borawski v Abulafia , 140 AD3d at 818; see also Wimmer v Suffolk County Police Dept. , 176 F3d 125, 134-136 [2d Cir]; Kunzler v Canon, USA, Inc. , 257 F Supp 2d 574, 581-583 [ED NY]).

A request for a religious exemption or medical accommodation is not protected activity for a retaliation claim under § 296.

Banasik v. Mount Sinai Health Sys. · filed 2025-04-11

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant retaliated against him in response to his requests for religious exemption and medical accommodation is unavailing, as such requests are not a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim (see Witchard v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 103 AD3d 596, 596 [1st Dept 2013] [internal citations omitted]).

Section 296(7) does not treat a complaint unrelated to discriminatory practices prohibited by the NYSHRL as protected activity.

Castro v. City Univ. of N.Y. · filed 2025-05-28(7)

In addition, the defendant met its burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation ( see Executive Law § 296[7]) by establishing that the plaintiff's complaint about his superior did not relate to discriminatory practices prohibited under the NYSHRL and that the plaintiff therefore did not engage in a protected activity ( see Diluglio v Liberty Mut. Group, Inc. , 230 AD3d 643, 645-646).

A request for a reasonable accommodation does not constitute protected activity for a retaliation claim under Section 296.

Voltaire v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2026-06-17(1)(e)

Here, the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity, since a request for a reasonable accommodation does not constitute a protected activity under the NYSHRL ( see D'Amico v City of New York , 159 AD3d 558, 558-559; Jordan v City of New York , 2024 WL 4872186, *3, 2024 US Dist LEXIS 214421, *6-7 [SD NY Nov. 22, 2024, No. 23-cv-4962 (DLC)]), and the complaint contains no other allegations that the plaintiff otherwise opposed or complained about unlawful discrimination ( see Brunache v MV Transp., Inc. , 151 AD3d 1011, 1014).

A complaint about office size is not protected activity under § 296(7) when it does not relate to unlawful discrimination.

Griffith v. MetroPlus Health Plan, Inc. · filed 2026-06-24(7)

The plaintiff's complaint about the size of her office space did not relate to discriminatory practices prohibited under either the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL, and the plaintiff therefore did not engage in a protected activity ( see Castro v City Univ. of N.Y. , 238 AD3d at 1108-1109; Diluglio v Liberty Mut. Group, Inc. , 230 AD3d at 645).

Section 296(7) protects employees who reasonably oppose workplace sexual harassment, but a retaliation claim fails when their belief that they opposed unlawful harassment was not objectively reasonable.

Shkoza v. NYC Health and Hospital Corporation · filed 2024-03-13(7)

This Court, together with most courts in the Second Circuit, has held that resisting or opposing workplace sexual harassment, including by refusing to engage in unwanted sexual activity, constitutes activity protected by Title VII and the NYSHRL. ... Even if Shkoza held a good faith belief that she was experiencing sexual harassment, no reasonable juror would find such a belief reasonable in the context in which the touching occurred.

Section 296(16) bars covered entities from inquiring about an arrest or criminal accusation that was terminated in the individual's favor.

Nieblas-Love v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2016-02-26(16)

In his motion for summary judgment and opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant him summary judgment under New York Executive Law Section 296(16). (See Pl.’s Mem. 31-33; PL’s Opp’n 21). That statute prohibits “any person, agency, bureau, corporation or association ... to make any inquiry about ... any arrest or criminal accusation of [an] individual ... which was followed by a termination of that criminal action or proceeding in favor of such individual.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(16). Plaintiff failed to assert any claim under that statute in his Amended Complaint, and has not sought leave to amend his complaint to add such a claim. In any event, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any act was taken against him because of a criminal accusation that was resolved in his favor. (See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 43). For those reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is therefore denied and any claim under New York Executive Law Section 296(16) is dismissed.

Section 296(16) permits an employer to require verification of the disposition of criminal charges once the charges have been legally and properly discovered.

New York State Department of Mental Hygiene v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1984-10-29(16)

This is such a case, as the Legislature never intended employers to be foreclosed from requiring verification of the disposition of criminal charges once the existence of such charges has been legally and properly discovered (cf. Matter of Ostoyich v State of New York, 99 AD2d 839; Matter of Stewart v Civil Serv. Comm., 84 AD2d 491).

Section 296(16) does not prohibit termination based on the conduct underlying a dismissed arrest rather than the arrest itself.

Kenner v. Coughlin · filed 1984-11-07(16)

Inasmuch as petitioner’s termination was based on acts of recklessness involving a firearm, not on the mere fact of his arrest, there was no violation of the Executive Law or of CPL 160.60 (see Matter of Skyline Inn Corp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 44 NY2d 695).

Section 296(16) permits an employer to discharge a probationary employee who refuses to resolve a discrepancy between arrest information lawfully obtained before the provision took effect and a later background report.

MATTER OF NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE v. State Div. of Human Rights · filed 1985-10-24(16)

When Kings Park’s interviewers, in April 1976, asked complainant whether he had ever been arrested there was nothing unlawful about such an inquiry. (Such an inquiry would, of course, have been unlawful after September 1, 1976, pursuant to Executive Law § 296 [16].) Complainant informed them that the charge against him had been resolved by an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, but the results of the background investigation conducted by the Department of Civil Service suggested that complainant had lied to his prospective employer. In these narrow circumstances, when complainant refused to cooperate in eliminating the discrepancy between information lawfully obtained from him at the interview and facts learned in the background investigation report, Kings Park had reasonable and permissible grounds for terminating his probationary employment.

Section 296(16) prohibits an insurer from canceling coverage based on a license suspension flowing from criminal charges terminated in the insured’s favor when no statute authorizes the cancellation.

Brown v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 1986-03-25(16)

By acting upon the penalty, defendant has acted upon the underlying arrest and conviction. ... Such discrimination is so tied to the underlying arrest it cannot be considered independent of the arrest. ... Accordingly, the cancellation of April 10, 1984 was not authorized by section 3425 or other statute.

Section 296(16) bars using an arrest to support an employment disciplinary charge when the criminal charges were dismissed.

Olshan v. County of Dutchess · filed 1996-11-18(16)

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (16), the petitioner’s arrest may not be used as a ground to support charge two since the criminal charges against the petitioner were dismissed.

Section 296(16) prohibits an employer from inquiring about or acting adversely on an arrest after the charge has been dismissed, unless a statute specifically requires or permits it.

In re the Claim of Ruggiero · filed 1999-07-01(16)

We have not located any statute or rule which would override this State statutory prohibition, and the employer has not cited any precedents, statutes or regulations authorizing the inquiry which led to claimant’s dismissal.

Section 296(16) permits an agency to inquire about or act adversely on a sealed conviction when another statute specifically permits it.

Matter of Boyle v. NYS Dept. of Motor Vehs. · filed 2022-10-27(16)

Although petitioner is correct that respondent is not a qualified agency expressly permitted to access sealed records under Executive Law § 835 (9), respondent is "permitted by statute" to consider sealed convictions in reviewing an application for relicensure (Executive Law § 296 [16]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 510 [6], [11]; 1193 [2] [c]; cf. Matter of New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct v Rubenstein , 23 NY3d 570, 580 [2014]; Matter of State of New York v John S. , 23 NY3d 326, 341 [2014]; Del Terzo v Hospital for Special Surgery , 95 AD3d 551, 552 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 296(16) allows a police officer to plead arrest history discrimination when an employer allegedly uses sealed arrest records in a disciplinary proceeding that leads to constructive discharge.

Alegre v. City of New York · filed 2024-05-28(16)

He further alleges that the NYPD accessed his arrest records, which were sealed as a result of his plea agreement, in violation of CPL §§ 160.50, 160.55, and 160.60 and improperly utilized the records in a discriminatory fashion in his disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in his constructive discharge. These allegations are sufficient to plead a cause of action for arrest history discrimination.

Section 296(16) permits an employment discrimination claim based on alleged use of sealed records from dismissed criminal charges.

Holloway v. City of New York · filed 2024-06-27(16)

Likewise, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that the use of sealed records from Plaintiff's dismissed criminal case in the disciplinary proceedings contravenes New York State Executive Law § 296.

Section 296(16) permits an arrest history discrimination claim where an employer allegedly takes adverse employment action after an arrest was resolved in the employee’s favor and uses sealed arrest records.

Agwanhu v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-17(16)

As in Holloway, plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for arrest history discrimination. He has asserted that he is a member of protected class and that in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, the NYPD took an adverse employment action against him despite the resolution his arrest in his favor, using evidence under seal in violation of the CPL.

Section 296(16), together with § 297, provides a damages action against private actors who adversely use sealed arrest or prosecution records in licensing, housing, employment, credit, or insurance.

J. Doe 1 v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. · filed 2026-02-27(16)

Executive Law § 296 (16), together with § 297, provides a private right of action for damages against private actors who rely adversely on an individual's sealed arrest/prosecution-related records "in connection with the licensing, housing, employment, including volunteer positions, or providing of credit or insurance to such individual." (Executive Law § 296 [16]).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for a person who actually participates in or aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces a discriminatory act.

Kennedy v. New York · filed 2016-03-04(6)

“An individual can be liable under Section 296(6) so long as he ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.’ ” Edwards v. Jericho Union Free Sch. Dist., 904 F.Supp.2d 294, 304 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)); Allessi, 16 F.Supp.3d at 226 (“a state employee may be held liable in his or her individual capacity under N.Y. Executive Law § 296(6) for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or coercing a discriminatory act forbidden by NYSHRL”). Having found that Kennedy has not pled that Silver had “personal involvement” under her § 1983 claim, this Court finds that Kennedy’s NYSHRL claim fails on similar grounds.

Section 296(6) permits individuals who themselves commit discriminatory acts to be held liable under the NYSHRL.

Arnold v. Research Foundation for the State University of New York · filed 2016-10-20(6)

Since these proposed individual defendants committed the acts themselves, they *291can be held liable under the NYSHRL. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2004).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing discriminatory conduct, but a person cannot aid and abet her own discriminatory conduct and an underlying violation must exist.

Ireland v. Rochester Institute of Technology · filed 2019-10-25(6)

A person can also be individually liable for violating the NYSHRL if she aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces the discriminatory conduct. ... “Aiding and abetting is only a viable theory where an underlying violation has taken place.” ... It is worth noting that Slusser cannot be held individually liable as an aider and abettor of the sexual harassment alleged herein. An individual “may not be held liable . . . merely for aiding and abetting [her] own discriminatory conduct”; instead, she can only be liable “for assisting another party” in violating the NYSHRL. ... Ireland alleges only that Slusser participated in the sexually harassing conduct, and therefore Ireland cannot hold her liable as an aider and abettor in this regard.

Section 296 does not impose employer liability for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving the conduct.

Erno v. NYS Office of Information Technology · filed 2022-04-26

The standard for imputing liability to an employer is higher under the NYSHRL, however, and an employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act “unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” ... However, Plaintiff has not cleared the higher bar for potentially imputing liability to ITS under the NYSHRL because there is no evidence that ITS encouraged or approved of Lubin’s conduct. ... Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for a person who aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces discriminatory acts, including participation in a hostile work environment, subject to applicable immunity.

Dawson v. County of Westchester · filed 2004-12-29(6)

Consequently, under the standard set forth in Tomka, the allegations presented by plaintiffs are sufficient to satisfy a claim under N.Y. Exeo. L. § 296(6) against Banks to the extent of precluding summary judgment, but not against Pozzi and Miranda as they are immune from civil liability under New York’s common-law doctrine of qualified immunity. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted with respect to Pozzi and Miranda, but denied with respect to the County and Banks.

Section 296 requires an employer to have knowledge of and acquiesce in or condone discriminatory conduct for vicarious liability to apply.

Bianco v. Flushing Hospital Medical Center · filed 2008-08-05

Thus, where vicarious liability is claimed, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had knowledge of and acquiesced in or condoned the discriminatory conduct (see Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141 [2001]; Sormani v Orange County Community Coll., 240 AD2d 724, 725 [1997]; Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 54 [1996]; Goering v NYNEX Info. Resources Co., 209 AD2d 834 [1994]; Spoon v American Agriculturalist, 120 AD2d 857, 859 [1986]; see also Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Stoute, 36 AD3d 257 [2006]).

Section 296 requires an employer to have encouraged, condoned, or approved an employee’s discriminatory act before the employer can be held liable.

Doe v. State · filed 2011-11-09

The trial court also properly dismissed so much of the claim as sought to recover damages for sexual harassment in employment in violation of Executive Law § 296. “Under the Executive Law, ‘[a]n employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it’ ” (Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 887 [2010], quoting Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687 [1985]; see Beharry v Guzman, 33 AD3d 742, 743 [2006]). It is only after an employer knows or should have known of improper discriminatory conduct that it can “undertake or fail to undertake action which may be construed as condoning the improper conduct” (Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d at 887-888; see Bianco v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 54 AD3d 304, 305 [2008]).

Section 296(1)(a) makes an employer liable for an employee’s discriminatory act when the employer encourages, condones, or approves it after knowing or should have known of the conduct.

Janssen v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre · filed 2012-04-17(1)(a)

“Under the Executive Law, an employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it. It is only after an employer knows or should have known of improper discriminatory conduct that it can undertake or fail to undertake action which may be construed as condoning the improper conduct” (Doe v State of New York, 89 AD3d 787, 788 [2011] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

Employment discrimination claims under § 296 are not subject to notice of claim requirements.

Simpson v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1992-12-14

Employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296 are not subject to notice of claim provisions (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Public Authorities Law § 1212).

A claim under Executive Law § 296 against a school board is subject to Education Law § 3813’s notice-of-claim requirement.

Hoger v. Thomann · filed 1993-01-28

Initially, we note that the notice of claim requirement of Education Law § 3813 does apply to human rights actions brought, as here, pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (see, Mills v County of Monroe, 59 NY2d 307, cert denied 464 US 1018; Baker v Board of Educ., 127 AD2d 967).

An action under § 296 is not a tort claim subject to the General Municipal Law’s notice provisions, though a claim against a town may still require notice under Town Law § 67.

Scopelliti v. Town of New Castle · filed 1994-12-12

While the plaintiff correctly argues that an action brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296 is not a tort claim which falls within the notice provisions of the General Municipal Law (see, Alaimo v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 203 AD2d 501; Simpson v New York City Tr. Auth., 188 AD2d 522), nevertheless, his action must be dismissed.

Actions against municipalities for damages under Executive Law § 296 do not require a notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e.

Morrison v. New York City Police Department · filed 1995-04-13

Actions against a municipality to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices brought under Executive Law § 296 are not subject to the notice of claim requirement set down in General Municipal Law § 50-e for tort claims involving personal injury, wrongful death or property damage (Alaimo v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 203 AD2d 501; Simpson v New York City Tr. Auth., 188 AD2d 522).

An action under Executive Law § 296 is not a tort action and does not require a notice of claim to be served on the defendant.

Cervenka v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1995-06-26

Inasmuch as an action brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296 is not a tort action (see, Lane-Weber v Plainedge Union Free School Dist., 213 AD2d 515), the plaintiff was not required to serve a notice of claim on the defendant.

A claim for damages under Executive Law § 296 based on disability discrimination is not a tort claim and is not subject to the notice-of-claim requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e.

Polvino v. Island Group Administration, Inc. · filed 1999-09-13

...under Executive Law § 296 and 42 USC § 12101 et seq., based on alleged medical disability discrimination, are not tort claims and, therefore, are not governed by General Municipal Law § 50-e (see, Lane-Weber v Plainedge Union Free School Dist., 213 AD2d 515).

A claimant pursuing a Section 296 discrimination claim against a municipality before the New York State Division of Human Rights need not file a municipal notice of claim.

Freudenthal v. County of Nassau · filed 2001-06-04

We hold that it is unnecessary for a claimant to file a notice of claim with a municipality in connection with a claim pursuant to Executive Law § 296 alleging unlawful discriminatory practices where the claimant has elected to pursue redress with the administrative agency, the New York State Division of Human Rights, rather than through an action in a court of law.

Section 296 requires a timely notice of claim as a condition precedent when a plaintiff seeks private relief, damages, or reinstatement for employment discrimination.

Sangermano v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2002-01-22

Where a plaintiff seeks private relief, damages, or reinstatement for employment discrimination in violation of the Executive Law, the filing of a timely notice of claim is a condition precedent to suit (see, Mills v County of Monroe, 59 NY2d 307, cert denied 464 US 1018; Matter of Town of Brookhaven v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 282 AD2d 685; Hibbert v Suffolk County Dept. of Probation, 267 AD2d 205; Bidnick v Johnson, 253 AD2d 779; Doyle v Board of Educ. of Deer Park Union Free School Dist., 230 AD2d 820; Scopelliti v Town of New Castle, 210 AD2d 308; Hoger v Thomann, 189 AD2d 1048).

Section 296 employment discrimination claims seeking private relief against a school board require a timely notice of claim as a condition precedent to suit.

Cavanaugh v. Board of Education · filed 2002-07-01

The second and third causes of action alleged that the plaintiff was forced to resign as a result of the defendant’s refusal to reasonably accommodate her disability and age discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296, respectively. Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks private relief for employment discrimination in violation of the Executive Law, the timely filing of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to suit (see Education Law § 3813 [1]; Mills v County of Monroe, 59 NY2d 307, cert denied 464 US 1018; Sangermano v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Nassau County, 290 AD2d 498).

Section 296 covers employment discrimination claims based on age or gender, and a timely charge letter may substantially comply with the applicable notice of claim requirement.

Mendell v. Salamanca Housing Authority · filed 2004-11-19

We conclude that plaintiffs “charge letter” submitted to the New York State Division of Human Rights within the statutory time period “sufficiently informed [defendant] of the claim” and thereby “constitute^] substantial compliance” with the notice of claim requirement (Saranac Lake Cent. School Dist., 226 AD2d at 795-796 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 296 claims may proceed without a notice of claim in some circumstances, but a notice is required when the only right sought to be vindicated is private.

Yan Ping Xu v. New York City Department of Health · filed 2010-08-03

Petitioner is correct that a cause of action under section 296 does not, under certain circumstances, require as a condition precedent the filing of a notice of claim (see e.g. Picciano v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 290 AD2d 164, 169-174 [2001]; Sebastian v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 221 AD2d 294 [1995]; Mills v County of Monroe, 89 AD2d 776 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 307 [1983], cert denied 464 US 1018 [1983]). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals made clear in Mills that even a cause of action under the Executive Law will be subject to dismissal for failure to file a notice of claim if the only right sought to be vindicated is a private one (59 NY2d at 311-312).

A claim under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 must be dismissed when the claimant fails to serve a notice of claim complying with County Law § 52.

Sowich v. County of Oneida · filed 2011-12-28

Defendants seek to dismiss the sixth cause of action, alleging violations of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 290 et seq.) on the ground that plaintiff did not serve a notice of claim as required by section 52 of the County Law. ... In Mills v County of Monroe (59 NY2d 307, 308 [1983]), the Court held that a claim brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296 must be dismissed based upon the plaintiffs failure to serve a notice of claim in compliance with section 52 of the County Law. ... Although plaintiff did file a notice of claim, there are no allegations in the notice of claim concerning discrimination or violation of the Human Rights Law. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action is granted.

A claim for damages under § 296 against a county requires a timely notice of claim when it seeks to vindicate only the plaintiff’s individual interest.

Nostrom v. County of Suffolk · filed 2012-11-28

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the state-law cause of action because the plaintiff failed to serve a timely notice of claim (see Hibbert v Suffolk County Dept. of Probation, 267 AD2d 205, 205 [1999]). Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions, a notice of claim was required because, in the state-law cause of action, the plaintiff sought only to vindicate his individual interest, in the form of money damages, for an alleged invasion of his personal and/or property rights (see County Law § 52 [1]; General Municipal Law §§ 50-e, 50-i; Picciano v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 290 AD2d 164, 170 [2001]; Hibbert v Suffolk County Dept. of Probation, 267 AD2d at 205).

Section 296 discrimination claims against Mount Vernon are subject to the city charter's notice-of-claim requirement.

Fair v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2022-11-16

In contrast to General Municipal Law §§ 50-e(1) and 50-i(1), the Mount Vernon City Charter section 265 broadly requires the filing of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to a "civil action . . . of any name or nature whatsoever, . . . arising at law or in equity," which includes the plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to the NYSHRL ( see Executive Law § 296).

The NYSHRL does not waive New York State’s sovereign immunity, including immunity for its instrumentalities and employees sued in their official capacities.

James v. Cuny-John Jay College · filed 2020-04-20

the NYSHRL does not waive New York State’s sovereign immunity, or that of its instrumentalities or employees acting in their official capacities, and New York City would be without authority to do so.

A § 296 claim against SUNY in federal court is barred by sovereign immunity because New York did not consent and Congress did not abrogate that immunity.

Jennings v. Suny Health Science Center at Brooklyn (Downstate Medical Center) · filed 2016-08-19

Defendant has not consented. Second, Congress can abrogate a state’s immunity under authority granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows it to pass statutes enforcing that Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 5; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). But Congress has not passed any statutes abrogating New York’s immunity from the laws on which Plaintiff bases five of her six claims: 42 U.S.C. § 1981,1 New York State Executive Law,2 or New York City Human Rights Law.3 Therefore, to the extent Defendant’s motion seeks dismissal of those claims — namely, Counts One, Two, Three, Five, and Six — the motion is granted.

Section 296(15) prohibits denying employment because of a criminal conviction, but its liability scope—including whether it reaches only employers, how “employer” is defined, and whether § 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability—was unresolved.

Griffin v. Sirva Inc. · filed 2016-08-30(15), (6)

The question of who may be held liable under Section 296(15) is an unresolved question of New York State law. ... Because we conclude that New York law is unsettled with respect to these three questions, we conclude the law is too undeveloped “in this area to enable us to predict with confidence how the New York Court of Appeals would resolve these issues of New York State law presented on appeal.” ... Therefore, we certify to the New York State Court of Appeals these three questions concerning liability under NYSHRL Section 296(15).

Section 296(15) supports a finding of employment discrimination when substantial evidence shows an employer revoked an offer because it mistakenly believed the applicant had an undisclosed conviction.

Matter of Janitronics, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2025-06-18(15)

We conclude that there is substantial evidence to sustain the Commissioner's finding of unlawful employment discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (15). ... On this record, SDHR could reasonably find that such misperception was the case here, even if that is "not necessarily the most probable" inference to be drawn from the testimony ( Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam , 32 NY3d at 1046 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Vega [Postmates Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 35 NY3d 131, 136 [2020]).

Section 296(1)(a) requires enough factual allegations to plausibly show disparate treatment or disparate impact, and a failed underlying discrimination claim defeats a related aiding-and-abetting claim under § 296(6).

Motta v. Global Contact Services, Inc. · filed 2017-02-07(1)(a) and (6)

Purporting to act on behalf of a class, plaintiffs brought an action against defendant GCS for claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a), ... and against NYCTA and MTA for claims under the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6), ... . ... Plaintiffs therefore fail to allege plausibly disparate treatment or disparate impact under the NYSHRL or under the more liberal standard applicable to claims under the NYCHRL. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege plausibly a disparate treatment or disparate impact claim against GCS, plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claims against NYCTA and MTA must fail as well.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, discharging, or discriminating against an individual in compensation or employment terms because of race.

Pacheco v. United Medical Associates, P.C. · filed 2003-05-01(1)(a)

We observe initially that this claim is improperly denominated. ... Instead, plaintiff makes a “disparate treatment” claim, asserting that he was treated “ ‘less favorably than others because of [his] race’ ” ... Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice * * * [flor an employer or licensing agency, because of the * * * race * * * of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (emphasis added). ... Accordingly, plaintiff did not demonstrate that any adverse employment actions “occurred under circumstances raising the inference of unlawful discrimination” ... and Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiffs claims of disparate treatment at issue here.

Section 296 claims may proceed at the pleading stage when the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within New York, with related entities potentially treated as a single employer for coverage.

Downey v. Adloox Inc. · filed 2017-02-28

Defendants’ primary argument with respect to Downey’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims—that Adloox U.S. does not meet the employee-threshold requirements for coverage under those laws, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(5); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102[5] (Defs.’ Mem. 12-13; Defs.’ Reply 8)—fails for the same reasons. See, e.g., Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 156 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Our case law instructs us to apply the same four-factor inquiry to determine whether two or more entities constitute a ‘single employer’ under the New York Human Rights Law.”). Separately, Defendants contend that the claims must be dismissed because Downey is a Connecticut resident and the discriminatory acts did not take place in New York. (Defs.’ Mem. 13-14; Defs.’ Reply 8-9). That argument, however, depends on facts outside of the Complaint—most notably, on where Downey was when he received the termination email—and thus is premature. In any event, to establish claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, a plaintiff need only “plead and prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within” New York State and New York City. Hoffman v. Parade Publs., 15 N.Y.3d 285, 290, 907 N.Y.S.2d 145, 933 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 2010). Downey does so, as his claims are based in part on his treatment during his employment and he alleges, among other things, that he worked at least part-time out of the Adloox New York office, including scheduling and preparing for a major marketing exhibition in New York. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 33, 38-39, 60, 69). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Downey’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims is DENIED.

Standing to sue under § 296(2-a) is examined under the same standards as standing under the Fair Housing Act.

Ross v. Portchester Housing Authority · filed 2019-09-27(2-a)

This claim would alternatively be dismissed for the same reason as Plaintiff’s claims under the Fair Housing Act—namely, Plaintiff has not established his standing under N.Y. Exec. Law §296(2-a), which is examined under the same standards as the Fair Housing Act. Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 578, 588 (S.D.N.Y 2012).

Section 296's standards are treated as coextensive with or more liberal than the ADA standard, so a sufficiently pleaded ADA claim also sufficiently pleads a claim under the state statute.

Zelvin v. Circle of Drink, Inc. · filed 2024-02-26

The Complaint also sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief under New York State Human Right Law and New York City Human Rights Law. See N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301; N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq. Because the standards for evaluating claims arising under New York State and New York City law “are treated as coextensive or more liberal than the ADA standard, Plaintiff necessarily states a claim under” these state statutes when the ADA claim is sufficiently pleaded.

Section 296(2)(a) bars disability discrimination in public accommodations, while § 296(2)(c)(i) requires reasonable modifications or auxiliary aids unless an exception applies, including effective methods for making visual materials available under § 296(2)(d)(ii)(B).

Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC · filed 2017-08-01(2)(a), (2)(c)(i), (2)(d)(ii)(B)

Whether a website itself is a “place of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” of a retail store appears to be an issue of first impression under- the NYSHRL. ... New York’s broad reading of the term “place” and the presumption that the NYSHRL should be interpreted' consistently with the ADA suggests a finding that dickblick.com is a “place of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL. Through plaintiffs assertion that he is unable to use the website due to his disability, he has stated a claim that Blick has violated the NYSHRL. The defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion on this claim is denied.

Section 296(2)(a) does not require a marathon foot race to admit wheelchair participants.

New York Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1981-04-09(2)(a)

The petitioners were charged with an unlawful discriminatory practice (Executive Law, § 296, subd 2, par [a]) in refusing to permit disabled individuals in wheelchairs to participate in the 1978 New York City Marathon. ... Historically, a marathon is a foot race. Hence, the petitioners were not unlawfully discriminatory under the Human Rights Law by excluding wheelchairs from that sporting event.

Section 296(2)(a) does not entitle a patient to avoid infection control precautions based on reasonable medical judgment.

North Shore University Hospital v. Rosa · filed 1993-06-21(2)(a)

The only "privilege” denied to the complainant was the privilege of being treated without the precautions dictated by the clinic’s 1985 infectious disease protocol. We hold that where such a protocol is based on sound medical judgments which were reasonable when made, as part of a bona fide effort to protect both patients and staff, the complainant is entitled to no such "privilege”.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits dental offices that serve the public from denying treatment solely because a patient is HIV positive.

MATTER OF CAHILL v. Rosa · filed 1996-10-15(2)(a)

Dentists’ offices come within this definition of places of public accommodation because they provide services to the public. Though they may be conducted on private premises and by appointment, such places are generally open to all comers. ... In sum, the health care professions are generally in accord with the Human Rights Law with respect to the issue of treatment of HIV positive patients — such persons may not be denied treatment solely because they have that disability.