N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

An employer may be liable for sexual harassment under § 296(1)(a) if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action; disputed evidence of notice can preclude summary judgment.

Tidball v. Schenectady City School District · filed 2014-11-14(1)(a)

However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she has successfully raised triable issues of fact as to whether defendant should have known of Raucci’s harassing conduct, based on, among other things, the contradictory evidence as to whether Stricos and San Angelo received Raucci’s email regarding plaintiffs appointment as messenger, the inappropriate and suggestive nature of his mock letter to Stricos, and Raucci’s refusal to allow plaintiff to meet alone with Stricos (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 315 [2004]; Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141, 144, 146 [2001]; Goering v NYNEX Info. Resources Co., 209 AD2d at 835).

Section 296 does not impose employer liability for a coworker’s sexual harassment when the employer did not encourage, condone, or approve it and promptly investigated and remedied the complaint.

Croci v. Town of Haverstraw · filed 2017-01-11

Here, the Town made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it by establishing that it did not encourage, condone, or approve the alleged sexual harassment, and that, once it was aware of the plaintiff’s complaints, it took prompt action to investigate and remedy the situation (see Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141, 143 [2001]).

Section 296(3-a)(b) allows anyone age 18 or older to bring an age discrimination claim.

Shaffer v. Victory Van Lines, Inc. · filed 1999-10-25(3-a)(b)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the appellant is not barred from alleging age discrimination because he is under 30 years of age. New York State anti-age-discrimination laws apply to anyone 18 years of age or older (see, Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [b]).

Section 296 requires an age discrimination plaintiff to show protected class membership, active or constructive discharge, qualification for the position, and circumstances supporting an inference of age discrimination.

Terranova v. Liberty Lines Transit, Inc. · filed 2002-03-11(1)(a)

To support a prima facie case of age discrimination under Executive Law § 296, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was a member of the class protected by the statute, was actively or constructively discharged, was qualified to hold the position from which he or she was terminated, and that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629).

Section 296 requires an age discrimination plaintiff to show protected status, discharge, qualification, and circumstances suggesting age discrimination.

Roundtree v. School District of Niagara Falls · filed 2002-05-03

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), a plaintiff must show that he or she is a member of a protected class; that he or she was actively or constructively discharged from a position; that he or she was qualified to hold the position; and that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629).

Section 296(3-a)(a) protects all workers aged 18 and over from age discrimination.

Bohlke v. General Electric Co. · filed 2002-04-11(3-a)(a)

Here, however, plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims are brought under New York law (see, Executive Law § 290 et seq.), which has a protected class that includes all workers aged 18 and over (see, Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [a]).

Section 296 makes an employment dismissal actionable when age discrimination is the real reason for the decision.

Stephenson v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Local 100 · filed 2005-01-06

Even if it could be said that the Trustee unfairly credited the information implicating plaintiffs in the corruption (a point as to which we express no opinion), that would not render the dismissals actionable under the Human Rights Law.

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on age.

Considine v. Southampton Hospital · filed 2011-04-19

A defendant seeking summary judgment dismissing a cause of action alleging age discrimination must demonstrate “either that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot establish the elements of intentional discrimination, or that the plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the defendants for their challenged actions were pretextual” (Balsamo v Savin Corp., 61 AD3d 622, 623 [2009]; see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Michno v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 71 AD3d 746, 747 [2010]; Tardif v Town of Southold, 56 AD3d 755 [2008]).

Section 296 age-discrimination claims require facts showing protected-class membership, an adverse employment action, qualification for the position, and circumstances supporting an inference of age discrimination.

Godino v. Premier Salons, Ltd. · filed 2016-06-29

To state a cause of action alleging age discrimination under the New York Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), a plaintiff must plead facts that would tend to show (1) that he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) that he or she was actively or constructively discharged or suffered an adverse employment action, (3) that he or she was qualified to hold the position for which he or she was terminated or suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that the discharge or adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; Ehmann v Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., 90 AD3d 985, 985 [2011]; Balsamo v Savin Corp., 61 AD3d 622, 623 [2009]; Wiesen v New York Univ., 304 AD2d 459, 460 [2003]; Terranova v Liberty Lines Tr., 292 AD2d 441, 442 [2002]; Kassner v 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F3d 229, 238 [2d Cir 2007]).

An age discrimination plaintiff opposing summary judgment under § 296(1)(a) must raise a triable issue that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Grella v. St. Francis Hospital · filed 2017-04-26(1)(a)

In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding pretext for discrimination.

Section 296(1)(a) requires an age-discrimination claimant to show that an adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Matter of Kinach v. de Blasio · filed 2018-06-14(1)(a)

Petitioners failed to state a claim of age discrimination, under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107) and/or the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]). The alleged adverse action did not occur under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ( see e.g. Ferrante v American Lung Assn. , 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; Melman v Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 98 AD3d 107, 113 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of age.

Sedhom v. SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr. · filed 2022-01-18(1)(a)

Defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that there are no triable issues of fact that would support a claim for age discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a]) or the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]), since there is no indication that defendants' actions concerning plaintiff's employment at SUNY Downstate were motivated by plaintiff's age ( see Hamburg v New York Univ. School of Med. , 155 AD3d 66, 73 [1st Dept 2017]).

Section 296 prohibits age discrimination in employment, and a claimant must plead facts sufficiently connecting age-related remarks to termination to state such a claim.

Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Group, Inc. · filed 2022-12-06

In any event, even under the lenient notice pleading standard afforded to employment discrimination claims under state law, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege age discrimination under State HRL (Executive Law § 296) or City HRL (Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-101, 8-107) ( see e.g. Harrington v City of New York , 157 AD3d 582, 584 [1st Dept 2018]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment.

Ibrahim v. New York State Department of Health · filed 1984-01-26(1)(a)

Nevertheless, N.Y.Exec.Law § 296(l)(a) encompasses age discrimination among its prohibitions. Accordingly, that claim is also before the Court. I find that plaintiff has met his burden, though barely so, under Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e) by demonstrating that there exist material issues of fact with respect to his claim for age discrimination. Therefore, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are denied as to that claim.

Section 296 age discrimination claims can be barred by a release signed when employment ends.

Goode v. Drew Building Supply, Inc. · filed 1999-11-12

The causes of action alleging age discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 are barred by the release executed by plaintiff upon termination of his employment.

Section 296(1)(a) requires facts supporting a prima facie age or sex discrimination claim; alleging a workforce reduction that retained a younger man and a woman does not suffice on its own.

McCabe v. Consulate Gen. of Can. · filed 2019-03-07(1)(a)

The court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's causes of action alleging sex and age discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws, as plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for these causes of action (Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8—107[1][a]). Plaintiff sparingly alleges that he was terminated as part of a larger work force reduction while a younger man and woman were retained, which, standing alone, does not suffice to support either age or sex discrimination ( see Matter of Leka v New York City Law Dept. , 160 AD3d 497 [1st Dept 2018]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. , 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]).

A broad, unambiguous general release can bar an age discrimination claim under § 296.

Stone v. National Bank & Trust Company · filed 1992-12-17

The releases in question plainly and unambiguously release defendants from "all actions, causes of action, suits * * * claims, and demands whatsoever * * * [that plaintiff] ever had, now ha[s] or hereafter can, shall or may have for * * * any matter, cause or thing whatsoever”, which includes plaintiffs cause of action for age discrimination (see, Skluth v United Merchants & Mfrs., supra, at 106-107).

Employment discrimination claims under § 296(1)(a) may be subject to an agreement to arbitrate made before a dispute arises.

South Huntington Jewish Center, Inc. v. Heyman · filed 2001-04-23(1)(a)

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, we perceive no public policy reasons for not enforcing anticipatory agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims arising under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (cf., Fletcher v Kidder, Peabody & Co., 81 NY2d 623, cert denied 510 US 993; see, Matter of Ball, 236 AD2d 158).

A collective bargaining agreement does not waive an employee’s right to bring a Section 296 disability-discrimination claim in court unless the waiver is clear and unmistakable.

Ambrosino v. Village of Bronxville · filed 2009-01-20(1)(a)

Here, the CBA did not contain any provisions regarding the resolution of disputes involving employment discrimination, let alone any clear and unmistakable language waiving an employee’s right to a judicial forum for such claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, dismissing the first cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Section 296(5) prohibits discrimination based on age and familial status.

Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp. · filed 2001-10-29(5)

Executive Law § 296 (5) prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and familial status. Executive Law § 292 (26) states that “familial status” means a person who is pregnant or has a child or is in the process of obtaining legal custody of a child (e.g., adoption). Since none of the rejected purchasers had children at the time of the rejection, they apparently were not protected from discrimination on the basis of familial status. However, if plaintiff can prove that defendants rejected all relatively young applicants because it was anticipated that these people would have children, then she might have a viable claim for age discrimination under the Executive Law.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) protects familial status in housing, but family size itself is not a protected class.

Katz v. New York City Hous. Preserv. & Dev. · filed 2025-08-18(5)(a)(1)

Whereas the plain language of the statute indicates that family size is not a protected class under the NYSHRL, this court need look no further with respect to this issue.

A person claiming employment discrimination for not being hired generally must have first applied for the job.

Hettrick v. Stark · filed 2004-01-12

Generally, before a plaintiff can complain of discrimination in not being hired, he must have first applied for a job (see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 802 [1973]; Arendt v General Elec. Co., supra).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment decisions based on a person's medical condition when they constitute unlawful discrimination.

Bellamy v. City of New York · filed 2005-01-27(1)(a)

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs medical disqualification did not constitute unlawful discrimination in violation of the state Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) does not make a medical disqualification the basis for a discrimination claim.

Altieri v. City of New York Civil Service Commission · filed 2008-12-04(1)(a)

In view of the foregoing, petitioner’s medical disqualification cannot be the predicate of a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see Bellamy v City of New York, 14 AD3d 462 [2005]; O’Sullivan v City of New York, 38 AD3d 467, 469 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 804 [2007]).

Section 296 bars employment agencies from using discriminatory criteria to screen domestic service applicants, even though private households may use such criteria when hiring.

Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Spitzer · filed 2005-08-03

However, while an individual may choose to hire a domestic servant using whatever criteria he or she may desire, it is this court’s opinion that the privilege does not extend to an agent acting on behalf of a prospective employer; the privilege is personal to the employer.

Section 296 requires factual allegations sufficient to sustain a cause of action under the New York Human Rights Law.

Scarfone v. Village of Ossining · filed 2005-11-21

Similarly, the plaintiffs vague, conclusory assertions, unsupported by factual allegations, were insufficient to sustain a cause of action pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296; Vanscoy v Namic USA Corp., 234 AD2d 680, 682 [1996]; Gagliardi v Trapp, 221 AD2d 315, 316 [1995]).

Section 296(4) requires facts connecting the public entity’s conduct to the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice.

Planck v. Suny Board of Trustees · filed 2005-05-12(4)

Although the SUNY Board is statutorily obligated to oversee the adoption of certain policies which impact local community colleges (see generally Education Law §§ 6302-6306), plaintiff has failed to allege any facts which would suggest a connection between that obligation and SCCC’s alleged violation of the Human Rights Law—presumably Executive Law § 296 (4)—in this case. We conclude, therefore, that plaintiff failed to state a claim against the SUNY Board under the Human Rights Law and that Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiffs remaining claims against the SUNY Board for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (see Colombo v Schwartz, 15 AD3d 522, 523 [2005]).

Section 296 provides a cause of action for damages based on discrimination in the terms, privileges, and conditions of employment.

Clark v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2009-07-07

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was, in effect, for leave to replead so as to assert a cause of action to recover damages for discrimination in the terms, privileges, and conditions of employment in violation of Executive Law § 296. A motion for leave to replead, although now constituting little more than a “poor substitute” or “arcane alternative” to a motion for leave to amend a pleading under CPLR 3025 (b) (Janssen v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 59 AD3d 15, 19 [2008]), is still cognizable and is not expressly “constrained by any time limitation” (id.). Nonetheless, in the matter before us, the proposed complaint, as sought to be repleaded, is palpably insufficient and patently devoid of merit (see Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 226-227 [2008]; see also Barnum v New York City Tr. Auth., 62 AD3d 736 [2009]).

Section 296 claims for employment discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment do not survive dismissal when the complaint's allegations are conclusory and vague.

Polite v. Marquis Marriot Hotel · filed 2021-06-23

Here, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d at 87-88), the complaint fails to state causes of action to recover damages for employment discrimination, unlawful retaliation, or hostile work environment ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295). The allegations made in the complaint were conclusory and vague ( see Mira v Harder [Evans] , 177 AD3d 426, 426-427; DuBois v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr. , 29 AD3d 731, 732).

Section 296 requires a discrimination complaint to plead protected status, an adverse employment action, qualifications, and facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Cagino v. Levine · filed 2021-11-04

To state a cause of action for discrimination under the Human Rights Law ( see Executive Law § 296), "a plaintiff must plead facts that would tend to show (1) that he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) that he or she . . . suffered [*2]an adverse employment action, (3) that he or she was qualified to hold the position for which he or she . . . suffered [the] adverse employment action, and (4) that the . . . adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of . . . discrimination" ( Godino v Premier Salons, Ltd. , 140 AD3d 1118, 1119 [2016]; see Chiara v Town of New Castle , 126 AD3d 111, 119-120 [2015], lv dismissed 26 NY3d 945 [2015]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits an employment discrimination claim when the complaint alleges protected status, qualifications, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Grant v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. · filed 2024-04-09(1)(a)

Here, according all the facts alleged as true and giving them a liberal construction, plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that she was subjected to unequal treatment because of a protected characteristic, as she alleges she is a member of a protected class, she was qualified to hold her position, she was constructively terminated, and the adverse actions she suffered took place under circumstances where discrimination could be inferred.

A Section 296(4) school admissions complaint alleging disparate impact must plead facts about students denied admission by an identified screening mechanism or allege that a specific mechanism lacks predictive validity.

IntegrateNYC, Inc. v. State of New York · filed 2025-10-23(4)

Assuming, without deciding, that disparate educational outcomes alone could in some circumstances sustain such a claim, an issue we need not and do not reach today, plaintiff's complaint fails to include allegations by individual students who were denied admission to a particular school or school program by an identified screening mechanism that is alleged to have a disparate impact, or that a specific screening mechanism lacks validity in predicting the ability of students to thrive in the curriculum offered at any particular screened school.

A claim under Executive Law § 296 must allege statutorily prohibited discrimination; merely reasserting other allegations is insufficient.

Grauer v. Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist. · filed 2026-03-04

The complaint alleged a violation of the Human Rights Law ( see Executive Law § 296) but in support of that claim merely stated "I re-assert the statements set forth herein," which did not allege statutorily prohibited discrimination ( see Caracappa v Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist. , 232 AD3d at 578).

Section 296(2) permits an inference of discrimination at the pleading stage when a qualified Black woman is rejected in favor of a white male purchaser who lacks the professional qualification relevant to the sale.

Forrester v. 640 Park Ave. Corp. · filed 2026-05-05(2)

The complaint alleges that plaintiff is a black woman who was qualified to purchase the unit but was rejected in favor of a white male applicant who was not a medical professional, which is sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination against Tichenor (Executive Law § 296[2]; Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Caprarella, 82 AD3d 773, 774 [2d Dept 2011]).

Section 296 does not require a hearing when the Division of Human Rights dismisses a discrimination complaint after finding no probable cause.

Maltsev v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2006-07-18

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, a hearing was not required (see Executive Law § 296; Matter of Doin v Continental Ins. Co., 114 AD2d 724, 725 [1985]).

Section 296(5)(b)(2) protects people or groups from sex discrimination in commercial space terms, conditions, privileges, facilities, or services without requiring the discrimination to concern their own sex.

Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Bruno · filed 2007-07-11(5)(b)(2)

Executive Law § 296 (5) (b) (2) protects “any person” or “group of persons” from being discriminated against “because of . . . sex,” without any requirement that the discrimination be based on such person’s own sex.

A Section 296 disparate impact claim based on work assignments should not be dismissed on a claimed seniority defense when the employer’s adherence to that system is disputed and its operation has not been disclosed.

Siri v. Princeton Club · filed 2009-02-24

Plaintiffs have raised questions as to whether defendant is actually adhering to a seniority system, and accordingly, in the absence of any disclosure as to exactly how defendant’s seniority rules operate in practice, it was premature to grant defendant’s first motion.

Section 296 requires reasonable accommodations for employees known to be domestic violence victims, limited to the statute's exhaustive accommodation list, and recognizes related mental disabilities.

Hayes v. Hillside Family of Agencies · filed 2023-09-29(22)(c)(1)-(2), (6)

We further agree with defendant that the court erred in concluding that a question of fact exists whether defendant was required to accommodate plaintiff's status as a domestic violence victim under Executive Law § 296 (22). That provision states that it is "an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee who is known by the employer to be a victim of domestic violence" (§ 296 [22] [c] [1]) and provides an exhaustive list of accommodations ( see § 296 [22] [c] [2]). Even assuming, arguendo, that the provision applies retroactively to the time of plaintiff's termination, delaying a drug test or otherwise modifying the job policy to permit refusal of the drug test is not within the accommodations list. Moreover, to the extent the court determined that a question of fact exists whether plaintiff suffered from a mental disability resulting from domestic violence ( see § 296 [22] [c] [6]), such a condition was not alleged in the complaint nor is it supported in the record ( see generally Matter of Abram v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 71 AD3d 1471, 1473 [4th Dept 2010]).

Section 296 (5) (a) (1) is facially unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits refusing to rent housing because an applicant’s income includes Section 8 vouchers.

People v. Commons W., LLC · filed 2024-12-11(5)(a)(1)

Nonetheless, to eliminate any uncertainty, respondents' cross-motion is granted, and it is hereby once again adjudged and declared that Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (1) is facially unconstitutional to the extent that it makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to refuse to rent or lease housing accommodations to any person, or group of persons, because their source of income includes Section 8 vouchers.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) is facially unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits refusing to rent to people whose source of income includes Section 8 vouchers.

Matter of People of the State of N.Y. v. Commons West, LLC · filed 2026-03-05(5)(a)(1)

Based upon the foregoing, Supreme Court properly granted respondents' motion to dismiss the petition, denied petitioner's motion to renew, granted respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment and declared the source-of-income provision in Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (1) facially unconstitutional to the extent that it makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to refuse to rent or lease housing accommodations to any person, or group of persons, because their source of income includes Section 8 vouchers.

A counterclaim rarely supports a retaliation claim under § 296(7); the court rejected a claim where there was no evidence the counterclaims chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of her rights.

Yegoryan v. BB Med. & Dermatology P.C. · filed 2026-01-08(7)

Here, given that there is "no evidence . . . to indicate nor any reason to believe that the interposition of the counterclaim[s] in any way chilled plaintiff's exercise of her rights, her claim of retaliation should not be entertained" ( Klein v Town & Country Fine Jewelry Group , 283 AD2d at 369; see Arevalo v Burg , 129 AD3d at 417).

Section 296 allows the continuing violation doctrine to link an earlier pattern of unequal treatment to a timely termination without treating termination as categorically distinct.

Farmer v. Mizuho Sec. USA LLC · filed 2026-05-12

Thus, the State HRL should likewise be construed not to distinguish between discrete acts of discrimination and other forms of unequal treatment for purposes of the continuing violation doctrine (see Executive Law § 296[h], L 2019, ch 160, § 2; see also Syeed v Bloomberg L.P., 41 NY3d 446, 451 [2024]).

Section 296(2-a)(c) bars a cooperative board from penalizing a prospective purchaser for failing to volunteer information about a disability.

Hirschmann v. Hassapoyannes · filed 2007-06-11(2-a)(c)

Absent limited exceptions, the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Fair Housing Act prohibit making an inquiry regarding whether a person has a disability or inquiring as to the nature or severity of that disability. (24 CFR 100.202; ... see also Executive Law § 296 [2-a] [c].) If the Coop Board may not inquire about a disability, it should not be permitted to penalize a prospective purchaser for failing to volunteer information about that disability, as that would defeat the purpose and policy of the law.

Section 296’s categories of unlawful discriminatory practices do not cover alleged discrimination involving the postdeath treatment of a corpse.

Kellogg v. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner · filed 2004-09-15

Despite the fact that the term person includes “legal representatives,” this court does not believe that the statutory protections were meant to extend to a corpse. This is also apparent when one examines the enumerated categories defining discriminatory practices under either the City or State Human Rights Law, i.e., an unlawful discriminatory practice in employment; an unlawful discriminatory practice by a provider of public accommodation; an unlawful discriminatory practice with respect to the sale or rental of housing accommodations; or an unlawful discriminatory practice with respect to lending practices. None of them appear to apply to the present situation.