N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(5)(b)(2) requires reasonable accommodation of a disabled renter's disability, but it does not require a housing authority to grant an accommodation that would violate its tenant-selection policy and conflicting federal obligations.

Williams v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2012-07-26(5)(b)(2)

Both the State of New York and the City of New York have proscribed race and disability discrimination in the provision of rental housing. Both jurisdictions require, in the case of disabled residents, the reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2-a), (5)(b)(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(5), (15). ... The sections of New York State and New York City law requiring provision of reasonable accommodations to disabled renters are substantially similar to the analogous provision of the FHA. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), with N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5)(b)(2), and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). ... Summary judgment is granted to the Authority on plaintiffs remaining claims: that is, his contentions that the Authority failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by allowing him to succeed to his mother’s lease. Even assuming, without deciding, that Williams’ request for a reasonable accommodation was properly presented to the Authority, see Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 578-79 (2d Cir.2003), it is undisputed that the Authority would have violated its own tenant selection policy — which was adopted pursuant to federal regulations and a federal consent decree — and federal law had it granted his request. Compare Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9, with Plaintiffs Local Rule 56.1 Counterstatement of Facts ¶ 9, Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, No. 10-CV-1070 (E.D.N.Y. May 25,, 2012), CM7ECF No. 37. Requiring such action from the Authority would be patently unreasonable. If the court concluded otherwise, the Authority would find itself whipsawed between the conflicting obligations of the federal consent decree and the requirements of the FHA and its state and city analogs.

Section 296 requires participation in an interactive process to sustain a failure-to-accommodate claim.

Noel v. BNY-Mellon Corp. · filed 2013-03-14

The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL also require participation in such an interactive process to sustain a failure to accommodate claim, see Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., 949 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (1st Dep’t 2012), and Noel is likewise unable to maintain a claim under these enactments.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) prohibits refusing or withholding housing because of disability, and § 296(18)(2) requires reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.

Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc. · filed 2014-07-18(5)(a)(1) and (18)(2)

New York's HRL, with exceptions not pertinent here, contains provisions prohibiting housing discrimination similar to those in the FHA: ... N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5)(a)(1). Claims under the FHA and HRL § 296 are "evaluated under the same framework." Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d at 47 n.4. ... The HRL likewise makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to make" such accommodations. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(18)(2). ... In order to prove a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff or a person who would live with the plaintiff had a handicap within the meaning of § 3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably should have been expected to know of the handicap; (3) that the accommodation was likely necessary to afford the handicapped person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation requested was reasonable; and (5) that the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee’s known disability unless doing so would impose an undue hardship; the employee must show that the employer refused a reasonable accommodation.

Noll v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 2015-05-21(3)(a)

The ADA and the NYSHRL require an employer to afford reasonable accommodation of an employee’s known disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); N.Y. Exec. L. 296(3)(a). To maintain a claim under either statute, an employee must show that: “(1) [he] is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, [the employee] could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F.3d 181, 184 n. 3 (2d Cir.2006) (“A claim of disability discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law ... is governed by the same legal standards as govern federal ADA claims.”).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits disability discrimination in any place of public accommodation.

Fantasia v. Montefiore New Rochelle · filed 2022-02-01(2)(a)

The NYSHRL prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in “any place of public accommodation.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a).

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's known disability unless doing so would impose an undue hardship, and the NYSHRL requires a good-faith interactive process when an employer knows or should know of an obvious disability, even without a specific request.

Krow v. Pinebridge Investments Holdings U.S. LLC · filed 2022-03-21(3)(a)

Under the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, an employer is required to afford reasonable accommodation of an employee’s known disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. ... Under the ADA, failure to engage in the interactive process does not form the basis of a disability discrimination claim in the absence of evidence that a reasonable accommodation was possible. ... However, under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, failure to engage in the interactive process itself violates the law. ... The NYSHRL has been interpreted to impose the same requirement on an employer.

Section 296(2)(a) bars places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability, and the NYSHRL is construed co-extensively with the Rehabilitation Act.

Nieves v. The Plaza Rehabilitation & Nursing Center · filed 2023-07-26(2)(a)

Under the NYSHRL, “any place of public accommodation” may not discriminate on the basis of a disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a). The NYSHRL “must be liberally-construed to accomplish the purposes of the statute,” such as “ensur[ing] that every person in [New York] . . . has an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life,” including but not limited to “the opportunity to obtain adequate health care . . . .” Cahill v. Rosa, 89 N.Y.2d 14, 20 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Section 296 requires a disability-accommodation plaintiff to show a disability, employer notice, ability to perform the essential job functions with reasonable accommodation, and the employer’s refusal to provide such accommodation.

Kane v. Advanced Care Staffing, LLC · filed 2023-09-06

To establish a prima facie case based on failure to accommodate a disability under NYHRL, a plaintiff must show that “(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of [the statute]; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a prima facie failure to accommodate claim under NYHRL and dismisses Plaintiff’s NYHRL failure to accommodate claim.

Under the NYSHRL, disability discrimination is unlawful, reasonable accommodation requires notice, ability to perform essential functions with accommodation, and refusal to accommodate, and retaliation protection covers complaints or accommodation requests without requiring an adverse action if conduct would deter protected activity.

Wright v. City of New York · filed 2024-08-27(1)(a), (3)(a), (1)(e)

The NYSHRL similarly states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ..., because of an individual’s … disability ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... To state a viable discrimination claim under the NYCHRL (and, for purposes of this motion, the post-amendment NYSHRL), a plaintiff need not allege that they suffered an adverse employment action or that “discriminatory animus was the but-for cause or even the primary motivation of their alleged mistreatment.” ... Rather, they must allege only that they have been “treated less well at least in part because of” their disability. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims under the ADA and the NYSHRL. ... Under the ADA and the NYSHRL, “discrimination” includes an employer’s failure to provide an employee with a reasonable accommodation for her disability. ... A plaintiff states a prima facie failure to accommodate claim by alleging that: “[i] [she] is a person with a disability under the meaning of the [relevant statute]; [ii] an employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; [iii] with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and [iv] the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims. ... Retaliation victims are provided with broader protection under the NYCHRL — and, for purposes of this motion, under the post-amendment NYSHRL — than their federal counterpart. ... The elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under the three statutes are identical, “except that the plaintiff need not prove any ‘adverse’ employment action; instead, [she] must prove that something happened that would be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.” ... “protected activity” includes formal or informal complaints, protesting, or opposing statutorily prohibited discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e) (stating a “protected activity,” as an element of a prima facie case for retaliation under the NYSHRL, refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination); ... Requesting reasonable accommodations for a disability may also constitute a protected activity. ... In sum, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged claims for retaliation. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s claims for same under the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.

Section 296 prohibits creed-based discharge and employment discrimination; in this context, it follows the reasonable-accommodation framework, so an employer need not grant a same-job vaccine exemption but must address alternative accommodations that could remove the employee from the mandate’s scope unless doing so would cause undue hardship.

Carrier v. Fairport Baptist Homes · filed 2024-12-16

Similarly, NYSHRL makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . ., because of an individual’s . . . creed . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. When an employee has a religious belief that conflicts with a requirement of employment, Title VII requires the employer to offer the aggrieved employee a reasonable accommodation unless it would cause an undue hardship. ... Claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law are analyzed under the same framework. ... “If a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case, then the employer is required to show that it offered [him] a reasonable accommodation or that doing so would cause undue hardship.” ... As the previous paragraph indicates, the relevant anti-discrimination statutes do not require an employer to offer, as an accommodation, to exempt the employee from the vaccination requirement while allowing him to remain in the same job. ... Applying the foregoing principles, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to partial dismissal of the Complaint, insofar as it is based on the denial of Plaintiff’s requested accommodation of being exempted from the Vaccine Mandate and allowed to remain in his same job. However, Defendant has not shown that it is entitled to dismissal of the Complaint insofar as it is based on the denial of Plaintiff’s alternative requests for accommodations that would have removed him from the Mandate’s definition of “personnel.”

Section 296(3)(a)–(b) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability unless doing so would impose an undue hardship; a plaintiff who does not engage in the accommodation process or provide requested medical documentation cannot establish that the employer refused a reasonable accommodation.

Ong v. Deloitte Consulting LLP · filed 2025-03-21(3)(a)–(b)

The ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL require an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); N.Y. Exec. L. 296(3)(a)–(b); N.Y. City Admin. Code §§ 8–107(1)(a), 8-102(18). ... In light of the undisputed facts, Ong cannot establish a prima facie case that Deloitte “refused” to offer her any reasonable accommodation. Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 118. Accordingly, even if Ong is entitled to extraterritorial statutory protection, Deloitte is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on Ong’s claims of disability discrimination under the ADA and NYSHRL.

Section 296(3)(a)'s duty to accommodate disability applies to employers, licensing agencies, employment agencies and labor organizations.

Edwards v. Board of Trustees of Colgate Rochester Divinity School/Bexley Hall/ Crozer Theological Seminary · filed 1998-10-02(3)(a)

Although plaintiff alleges that defendant violated a general duty to accommodate her disability pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (3) (a), that section applies to employers, licensing agencies, employment agencies and labor organizations and does not apply here.

Section 296 requires a housing discrimination complainant seeking a reasonable accommodation to show disability, qualification for tenancy, necessity of the accommodation, and that the accommodation can be made.

One Overlook Avenue Corp. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2004-06-01

To show that a violation of the Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, the complainant must demonstrate that her son was disabled, that he was otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of his disability it was necessary for him to keep the dog in order for him to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations can be made to allow him to keep the dog (see Crossroads Apts. Assoc. v LeBoo, 152 Misc 2d 830, 834-835 [1991]).

Section 296(3)(a) requires a disability discrimination claim to establish the applicable essential elements, including the employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodation.

Hayes v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc. · filed 2006-11-28(3)(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the trial court properly charged the jury on the essential elements of a claim of discrimination based on disability under the NYSHRL (see Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]), and the charge was consistent with New York Pattern Jury Instructions (see PJI 9:4.1 [2006]).

Section 296 bars employment discrimination based on disability and requires a disability discrimination complaint to allege that, with reasonable accommodations, the employee could perform the essential functions of the job.

Staskowski v. Nassau Community College · filed 2008-07-22

However, the plaintiff failed to set forth, in the complaint or her supporting affidavits, factual allegations sufficient to show that, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, she could perform the essential functions of her job (see McKenzie v Meridian Capital Group, LLC, 35 AD3d at 677). Thus, the Supreme Court properly concluded that she failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to Executive Law § 296.

Section 296 requires substantial evidence that a person with a disability needs a requested housing accommodation and was denied that accommodation.

105 Northgate Cooperative v. Donaldson · filed 2008-08-19

On the record presented, the complainant failed to demonstrate, through either medical or psychological expert testimony or evidence, that she required a dog in order to use and enjoy her apartment unit (see Matter of One Overlook Ave. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 8 AD3d 286, 287 [2004]), and failed to establish that, by requesting more information, the petitioners had denied her request for a reasonable accommodation.

Section 296(18)(2) makes it unlawful to refuse reasonable accommodations when necessary to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Lindsay Park Housing Corp. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2008-11-05[18][2]

The Human Rights Law provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to “refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford said person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling” (Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]). To establish a violation of the Human Rights Law for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, the complainant must establish a disability, the accommodation may be necessary in order for the complainant to use and enjoy his or her apartment, and the building owner refuses to make such an accommodation (see Matter of One Overlook Ave. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 8 AD3d 286 [2004]).

Section 296(3)(a) prohibits disability discrimination when an employer fails to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability.

Nande v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2008-12-16(3)(a)

Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs contentions, defendants did not fail to reasonably accommodate his disability in violation of Executive Law § 296 (3) (a) and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107 (15) (a).

Section 296(3)(a) requires reasonable accommodations for known employee disabilities, and section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden under article 15.

Horgan v. Whitaker · filed 2008-12-31(3)(a), (7)

To state a cognizable claim of employment discrimination due to a disability under the Executive Law, plaintiff had only to allege that he suffered from a disability and that his employer failed to meet its statutory duty to “provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee . . . in connection with a job or occupation sought or held” (Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]).

Section 296(2)(a) requires a disabled tenant seeking a reasonable accommodation to show disability, qualification for tenancy, necessity of the accommodation to use and enjoy the apartment, and that the accommodation can reasonably be made.

Kennedy Street Quad, Ltd. v. Nathanson · filed 2009-05-19(2)(a)

To establish that a violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15) occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, the complainants must demonstrate that they are disabled, that they are otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of their disability it is necessary for them to keep the dog in order for them to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow them to keep the dog (see Executive Law § 296 [2] [a]; Matter of One Overlook Ave. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 8 AD3d 286, 287 [2004]).

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to consider a disabled employee’s requested accommodation through an individualized process.

Phillips v. City of New York · filed 2009-07-28(3)(a)

A failure to consider the accommodation, therefore, is a violation of Executive Law § 296 (3) (a), since the “employer has the responsibility to investigate an employee’s request for accommodation and determine its feasibility” (Pimentel v Citibank, N.A., 29 AD3d 141, 149 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; cf. Parker v Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F3d 326, 338 [2d Cir 2000] [an ADA case in which the court ruled that “(a)t the very least ... an employee who proposes an accommodation while still on short-term leave ... triggers a responsibility on the employer’s part to investigate that request and determine its feasibility. An employer who fails to do so, and instead terminates the employee based on exhaustion of leave, has discriminated ‘because of disability within the meaning of the ADA”]).

Section 296(3)(a) treats failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee’s known disability as unlawful discrimination.

Miloscia v. B.R. Guest Holdings LLC · filed 2011-08-15(3)(a)

Failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee’s known disability is a form of discrimination under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) allows an employer to rebut a disability-discrimination claim by showing that the employee could not perform the job with a reasonable accommodation.

Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2012-07-10(1)(a)

HHC met its burden by establishing that at the time of termination, plaintiff was unable to perform the duties of his job because of his lung condition and that no reasonable accommodation was available.

A disabled employee’s demand for indefinite leave coupled with a threat of litigation can excuse the employer from further efforts to reach a reasonable accommodation through an interactive process.

Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A. · filed 2012-07-17(1)(a)

Hence, even assuming that an indefinite leave of absence might constitute a reasonable accommodation in a proper case, here, plaintiffs counsel’s demand that Intesa either grant indefinite leave or face litigation excused Intesa from further efforts to seek agreement with plaintiff on a reasonable accommodation.

Section 296 requires an employee claiming disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate to show that the employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation.

County of Erie v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2014-11-14

In order to succeed on his discrimination claim, Gallivan was required to demonstrate, among other things, that the County and the Sheriffs Office failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disability.

A housing accommodation for a disability requires evidence that the requested accommodation is necessary for the person to use and enjoy the apartment.

Matter of Delkap Mgt., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2016-11-30(2)(a)

Nonetheless, the complainant failed to present medical or psychological evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the dog was actually necessary in order for her to enjoy the apartment.

Section 296 employment discrimination claims require evidence that an employee could perform the job with reasonable accommodation or that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Halvatzis v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr. · filed 2018-07-05

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she could perform her duties in a reasonable manner with reasonable accommodation or that the reasons stated for her discharge were pretextual ( see Timashpolsky v State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn, 306 AD2d at 273).

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employee claiming disability discrimination to prove a reasonable accommodation that would enable performance of the position’s essential functions.

Gibbons v. State of New York · filed 2022-06-29(3)(a)

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the court properly charged the jury on the essential elements of a claim of discrimination based on disability under the State HRL ( see Executive Law § 296[3][a]). A good faith interactive process is not an independent element of the disability discrimination analysis under the State HRL, and an employer may not be held liable based solely on its failure to engage in an interactive process with an employee ( see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 22 NY3d 824, 838; Hayes v Estee Lauder Cos., Inc. , 34 AD3d 735, 737).

Section 296 requires an employer seeking summary judgment on a disability accommodation claim to show that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process assessing the employee’s needs and the requested accommodation.

Guarniero v. City of Yonkers · filed 2025-08-06

Consequently, contrary to the City's contention, to prevail on a summary judgment motion with respect to a claim pursuant to NYSHRL, the employer must show that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process that assessed the needs of the disabled individual and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested ( see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 22 NY3d at 837). ... Here, the City failed to establish, prima facie, that it engaged in a good-faith interactive process that assessed the needs of the plaintiff and the reasonableness of his requested accommodation ( see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 22 NY3d at 837-838).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination because of sexual orientation, while § 296(7) requires only conduct reasonably likely to deter protected activity and does not require a separate adverse-employment-action showing.

McConkey v. The Churchill School and Center · filed 2025-07-23(1)(a), (7)

Like Title VII, the NYSHRL makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sexual orientation . . . to discriminate against such individual . . . in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Following a set of 2019 amendments to the NYSHRL, “the standard for [NYSHRL] claims [is] closer to the standard of the NYCHRL.” ... “These laws are less demanding of plaintiffs than Title VII on discrimination claims.” ... Because McConkey has adequately pleaded discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under Title VII, his claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL “necessarily survive[].” ... The standard for retaliation under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL is the same as under Title VII, except that NYSHRL and NYCHRL do not require an “adverse employment action” in order to state a claim for retaliation. ... Rather, under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, the plaintiff need only plead that “something happened that was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.” ... Accordingly, McConkey’s claims for retaliation under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are likewise sufficiently plead.

Section 296(1)(h) permits an NYSHRL harassment claim without requiring the harassment to be severe or pervasive under the standard otherwise applied to harassment claims.

Garcia v. Westhampton Primary Care · filed 2025-09-10(1)(h)

Hostile work environment claims brought under the NYSHRL apply the same standard as those brought under Title VII, Banks, 81 F.4th at 261–62, with one notable exception: on October 11, 2019, the New York legislature amended N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 to remove the “severe or pervasive” requirement for discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) (creating a cause of action for harassment claims “regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims”); Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Secs., No. 19-cv-10042, 2021 WL 76410, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021). Since I have already found that the Second Amended Complaint states a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, I also find that it states a claim under the more permissive NYSHRL standard. See supra Discussion Section II.B.ii.

Section 296(4) bars an education corporation or association from permitting sex-based harassment of students, while § 296(6) does not support accessorial liability where no underlying NYSHRL violation by the employer is shown.

Romero v. City of New York · filed 2012-03-17(4), (6)

First, because SCI is not an “education corporation or association” according to the plain language of Executive Law § 296(4), the NYSHRL claim against SCI must be dismissed. In addition, “employee[s] cannot be found liable under section 296(4) because that section applies only to education corporations, which the employees obviously are not.” TC v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 777 F.Supp.2d 577, 604 (S.D.N.Y.2011). Accordingly, the NYSHRL claims against Investigator Jenkins and Mr. Benavides under Executive Law § 296(4) must also be dismissed. ... Second, Executive Law § 296(4) prohibits the NYCDOE from “permitting” discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to present any evidence that the NYCDOE somehow authorized, condoned, or acquiesced to Mr. Benavides’ allegedly discriminatory conduct toward Ms. Doe. ... Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of all defendants on plaintiffs’ claims under the NYSHRL pursuant to Executive Law § 296 as alleged in Count Five.

Section 296(1)(h) prohibits employer harassment because of sex, but harassment is not coextensive with sex discrimination and must retain an independent meaning.

Singh v. Meetup LLC · filed 2024-10-31(1)(h)

It is true, as Singh now informs the Court, that a section of the NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to subject an employee to “harassment because of . . . sex . . . regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims.” ... But the concept of “harassment” still must have some meaning. ... An important implication of the two separate statutory provisions for harassment and discrimination that Singh does not mention is that harassment (of any kind) under the NYSHRL cannot be coextensive with discrimination. ... This statutory interpretation cuts against Singh’s argument that sexual harassment and gender discrimination are identical under state law.

Section 296(1)(h) defines sexual harassment under the NYSHRL to include subjecting a person to inferior employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of sex, without requiring severe or pervasive conduct.

Ding, Ph.D. v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. · filed 2025-02-05(1)(h)

Here, New York has defined sexual harassment under its own law—the NYSHRL—to mean a person was subjected “to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of [sex].” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h).

Section 296(1)(h) makes harassment actionable without requiring severe or pervasive conduct, so long as it results in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Menos v. Uncle Nearest, Inc. · filed 2025-03-25(1)(h)

However, in 2019, the NYSHRL was amended to “eliminate the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be severe or pervasive to be actionable.” Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., No. 19-CV-10042 (KPF), 2021 WL 76410, at *3, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021); see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h). Since then, courts have interpreted the NYSHRL as applying a “more lenient standard of liability closer to the NYCHRL,” Singh, 2024 WL 3904799, at *7 (quotation marks omitted), that prohibits harassing conduct that results in “inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Maiurano, 2021 WL 76410, at *3, n.2 (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h)).

Section 296(1)(h) creates a harassment cause of action without requiring the conduct to be severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims.

Smith v. National Grid USA · filed 2025-04-30(1)(h)

On October 11, 2019, the New York legislature amended N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 to remove the “severe or pervasive” requirement for discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) (creating a cause of action for harassment claims “regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims”); Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Secs., No. 19-cv-10042, 2021 WL 76410, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021).

Section 296(1)(h) creates a harassment cause of action without the severe-or-pervasive requirement, but the amendment applies only to claims accruing on or after its October 11, 2019 effective date.

Black v. Verizon Communications, Inc. · filed 2025-03-22(1)(h)

On October 11, 2019, the New York legislature amended N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 to remove the “severe or pervasive” requirement for discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h) (creating a cause of action for harassment claims “regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims”); ... The amendment, however, only applies to NYSHRL claims that accrued before the amendment became effective on October 11, 2019. ... Therefore, I analyze Black’s NYSHRL claim under the pre-amendment standard.

An employer may be liable under Executive Law § 296 for an employee’s sexual harassment when it knows of the conduct and fails to take corrective action.

Spoon v. American Agriculturalist, Inc. · filed 1986-05-15

In our view, the divergent characterizations of these meetings serve to create an arguable issue of fact as to whether American, through Hoefer, was aware of Dunham’s purported sexual harassment of Spoon and yet failed to take corrective action.

Section 296(1)(a) is violated when an employer continues using a contractor to screen employees and applicants after learning of his sexual misconduct, absent proof of remedial action.

People v. Hamilton · filed 1986-12-19(1)(a)

In the absence of proof that Mesmer took any remedial action (cf. Matter of Totem Taxi v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 NY2d 300, rearg denied 65 NY2d 1054), it violated Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) by continuing to use Hamilton to screen its employees and prospective employees after it had notice of his improper conduct.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from using the terms of employment to coerce an employee into sexual activity because of the employee’s gender.

Thoreson v. Penthouse International, Ltd. · filed 1990-10-23(1)(a)

Any attempt by an employer to use the terms, conditions or privileges of employment to coerce an employee, targeted on the basis of gender, to agree to participate in sexual activity is a form of sex discrimination outlawed by State law.

Under § 296, offering to transfer a harassment complainant does not alone entitle an employer to summary judgment without evidence of discipline or other steps to prevent further harassment.

Goering v. NYNEX Information Resources Co. · filed 1994-11-17

In any event, in the absence of evidence that it took any disciplinary action against the employee who perpetrated the alleged harassment or other steps to alleviate the threat of further occurrences, a mere showing that defendant offered to transfer plaintiff to a different work location would not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law (see, New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v McCall, supra, at 954; cf., Matter of Totem Taxi v New York State Human Rights Bd., supra, at 305).

Section 296(1)(a) permits direct liability against a corporate employer for discrimination by a high-level managerial employee.

Father Belle Community Center v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-04-19(1)(a)

We take care to point out that we are not relying on the vicarious liability rule employed in the Federal cases; rather, we hold that the corporate employer may be held directly liable for acts of discrimination perpetrated by a high-level managerial employee.

Section 296 requires a sexual harassment claimant to show that the harassment was based on the claimant’s sex.

Yukoweic v. International Business Machines, Inc. · filed 1996-06-06(1)(a)

... we conclude, upon our review of the record, that plaintiff is unable to establish that this harassment was based upon his gender.

Section 296 requires proof that an employer acquiesced in or subsequently condoned discriminatory conduct to recover damages for employment sex discrimination.

Sormani v. Orange County Community College · filed 1997-06-30

Consequently, the plaintiff has no cause of action to recover damages for sex discrimination pursuant to Executive Law § 296, which requires proof that the employer acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct or subsequently condoned it (see, Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687).

Section 296(1)(a) permits hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims under federal sex discrimination standards.

Walsh v. Covenant House · filed 1997-11-18(1)(a)

Plaintiffs allegations that the individual defendant made both physical and verbal sexual advances toward her that were unwelcome and repelled, that she was told her job evaluation was tied to her willingness to accept the advances and that she was forced to resign because the corporate defendant did not provide a vehicle of redress state a viable cause of action for both hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]), which follows Federal standards under 42 USC § 2000e et seq. for sex discrimination claims (Olszewski v Bloomberg L.P., 1997 US Dist LEXIS 9654, *15, n 3 [SD NY, July 7, 1997, Patterson, J.]; see, Carrero v New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F2d 569, 578; Bridges v Eastman Kodak Co., 822 F Supp 1020, 1027-1028).

Section 296 prohibits sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment and discriminatory or retaliatory discharge based on protected status or conduct.

Vitale v. Rosina Food Products Inc. · filed 2001-06-08(1)(a), (1)(e)

In analyzing actions under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), New York courts have adopted principles which define actionable sexual harassment under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e et seq.; see, 42 USC § 2000e-2 [a] [1]; see generally, Espaillat v Breli Originals, 227 AD2d 266, 268; Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 49-50, lv denied 89 NY2d 809), but the principles under which liability is imposed upon employers under the Executive Law differ from Federal law (see, Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, supra, at 51-54).

Section 296 permits an employment sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment or quid pro quo sexual conduct.

Ortega v. Bisogno & Meyerson · filed 2003-12-15

A claim of sexual harassment may proceed on the theory that the discriminatory conduct was so pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment, to wit, a hostile work environment, or on the theory that unwelcome sexual advances or other sexual conduct was the quid pro quo for promotions and other employment conditions (see 29 CFR 1604.11 [a] [2]; Matter of Fella v County of Rockland, 297 AD2d 813 [2002]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, including a continual pattern of sexual harassment.

Kowalewski v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2006-02-03(1)(a)

We further conclude that the Commissioner’s determination that complainant was subjected to “a continual pattern of sexual harassment” is supported by substantial evidence (see generally Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Matter of Under the Elms v Tolbert, 1 AD3d 373, 374 [2003]; Matter of Kondracke v Blue, 277 AD2d 953, 954 [2000]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits sexual harassment in employment, including hostile work environment conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment.

Kapchek v. United Refining Co. · filed 2008-12-31(1)(a)

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for sexual harassment pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a). ... We therefore conclude that defendants’ own submissions raise a triable issue of fact whether the conduct of Azrie and Tuckey resulted in a hostile work environment, i.e., a workplace “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment” (Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141, 143 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 326-327 [2004]).

A sex discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a) survives summary judgment when the employer’s evidence leaves triable issues about whether a supervisor intimidated the employee into a sexual relationship and whether the conduct was unwelcome.

Overbeck v. Alpha Animal Health, P.C. · filed 2015-01-28(1)(a)

However, the evidence submitted by the defendants, which included a transcript of the plaintiffs deposition testimony, failed to eliminate all triable issues as to whether Cohen used his position to intimidate her into the relationship and as to whether the sexual conduct on his part was, in fact, “unwelcome.”

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for reporting sexual harassment; termination shortly after a report can support a finding that the employer's stated reason was pretextual.

Matter of Stellar Dental Mgt. LLC v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2018-06-15(7)

We further conclude that substantial evidence supports SDHR's determination that two of the complainants were subjected to unlawful retaliation. The record establishes that those complainants reported sexual harassment to management and were terminated from their employment shortly thereafter, thus supporting the determination that the legitimate reasons proffered for the terminations were pretextual ( see Executive Law § 296 [7]; cf. Pace v Ogden Servs. Corp. , 257 AD2d 101, 104-106 [3d Dept 1999]; see also La Marca-Pagano v Dr. Steven Phillips, P.C. , 129 AD3d 918, 921 [2d Dept 2015]; Matter of Law Offs. of Oliver Zhou, PLLC v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 128 AD3d 618, 619 [1st Dept 2015]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of protected characteristics, including sex.

Anderson v. Nassau County Department of Corrections · filed 2008-03-18(1)(a)

Moreover, as the plaintiffs New York State claims are analyzed according to the same standards as her Title VII claims, the Courts analysis regarding the merits of plaintiffs claims that she endured a hostile work environment, failure to promote, and retaliation apply with equal effect to her New York State Human Rights Law claims.

Section 296(1)(a) bars an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of the employee’s creed, and the court applied the post-amendment NYSHRL’s liberal pleading standard in assessing such a claim.

Acosta · filed 2025-09-05(1)(a)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice … [f]or an employer … because of an individual’s … creed … to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... The amendment provided that the NYSHRL was to be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 300. ... This Court has previously “assume[d]” for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “that the amended NYSHRL aligns with the NYCHRL,” Wright v. City of New York, No. 23 Civ. 3149 (KPF), 2024 WL 3952722, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024), and does so here. ... Even under the more liberal pleading requirements of the NYCHRL, which the Court also applies to Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim. ... For all of the reasons discussed in this section, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient under the Title VII standards; more than that, Plaintiff has failed to show that he was treated less well because of his religious beliefs, or that Related’s conduct toward him would deter a person from engaging in protected activity, and he therefore fails to state a claim for discrimination or retaliation under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

At summary judgment, a § 296(1) sex-discrimination claim is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Nambiar v. the Central Orthopedic Group, LLP · filed 2025-10-28(1)

At summary judgment, we apply the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to claims of sex discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII and the NYSHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of race, and courts evaluate such claims under the same analytical framework as Title VII claims.

Riley v. HSBC USA, INC. · filed 2011-03-17(1)(a)

Similarly, as relevant to this action, the NYHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on the individual’s race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). The standard applied by the court to evaluate race discrimination claims under the NYHRL is parallel to the analysis used in evaluating Title VII claims.

Section 296(15) protects only individuals convicted of crimes, while § 296(16) generally bars adverse action based on a favorably terminated arrest or accusation unless a statute specifically requires or permits it.

Smith v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2012-05-18(15), (16)

Section 296(15) is inapplicable to this case, since its protections only apply to individuals who have been convicted of crimes. ... She therefore cannot recover under Section 296(15). ... The critical issue in resolving the instant motion is whether Bank of America’s refusal to hire plaintiff is protected by the NYSHRL’s exception — i.e., whether the refusal to hire was “required or permitted by statute.” See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(16). ... It did not violate Section 296(16) by refusing to hire her in the absence of a waiver by the FDIC.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of age, race, or color.

Powell v. Delta Airlines · filed 2015-11-06(l)(a)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [f]or an employer” to discharge an individual or “discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” on the basis of age, race or color. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). ... Claims of age-based discrimination under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same standard as discrimination claims brought under the ADEA. ... Under the NYSHRL, individuals who are eighteen years of age or older are protected against age-based employment discrimination. ... Termination constitutes an adverse employment action under the NYSHRL. ... Plaintiff has therefore plausibly alleged that his age was the but-for cause of his termination and has stated a claim of age discrimination under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) protects employees from discrimination in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of military status.

Kassel v. City of Middletown · filed 2017-09-28(l)(a)

The New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) also protects employees from discrimination “in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” “because of’ an individual's military status. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a).

Section 296(1)(a) bars an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual because of sex, and § 296(1)(e) protects opposition to discriminatory practices, including an informal complaint to management.

Rice v. Volkswagen · filed 2018-08-13(1)(a), (1)(e)

Similarly, Section 296(1) of the NYHRL renders it unlawful "[f]or an employer ... because of the ... sex ... of any individual, to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Similarly, the NYHRL prohibits the discharge of employees in retaliation for their opposition to discriminatory practices. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in hiring or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race or color.

Brown v. Wetz · filed 2021-03-15(1)(a)

The NYSHRL provides that employers may not “refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” on the basis of a protected characteristic such as race or color. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating because of an employee’s sex or disability; the court applied the federal Title VII and ADA frameworks to the NYSHRL claims and found no actionable inference, while leaving the disability causation standard undecided.

Ragin v. Riverbay Corp. · filed 2021-09-07(1)(a)

Under the NYSHRL, employers may not discriminate “because of an individual’s . . . sex . . .” “to discharge from employment such individual.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... It is similarly unlawful for employers under New York state law to discriminate “because of an individual’s . . . disability.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Under either standard, Ragin is unable to demonstrate an inference of disability-based discrimination to support a finding of pretext.

An employment agency’s use of “Girls” in its name does not establish sex discrimination without evidence that it restricts employment to women or denies men employment opportunities.

Phillips v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1973-03-08(1)(d)

In upholding the dismissal of the complaint the Appeal Board unanimously stated: “ Nothing in the record shows that Kennedy Girls, Inc., although it bears the name ‘girls’, restricted its employment to females only, nor that this Appellant, or males, were denied opportunity for employment because of their sex. ... We believe it would be an infringement upon the Respondent’s rights as a corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of New York to require them to eliminate their name, or a part thereof, under the theory advanced by this Appellant.” We agree fully with the conclusions and findings of the Appeal Board and believe that the complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 296(1)(a) bars employers from discriminating because of sex, while § 296(1)(e) bars retaliation against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL; post-amendment retaliation claims are subject to a more lenient standard.

Edelman v. NYU Langone Health System · filed 2022-09-28(1)(a), (1)(e)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... In both its pre- and post-amendment forms, the NYSHRL makes it unlawful for “any employer . . . to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e). Plaintiff’s claim that she was fired in retaliation for protected activity under the NYSHRL accrued after that statute was amended to liberalize the standard for such claims. Because this claim is now subject to less stringent standards than Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, which survived summary judgment for the reasons discussed above, this claim also survives summary judgment.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation by any person against someone who opposes discrimination, including in contexts beyond employment, and does not require a separately actionable underlying discrimination violation if the opposition was based on a good-faith, reasonable belief that the conduct was unlawful.

Flaherty v. Dixon · filed 2023-02-16(7)

The scope of “protected activity” is also broader under state and local law. Retaliation claims can survive under those laws based on retaliation for complaints about discrimination by a non-employer and outside of the employment context. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7) (prohibiting retaliation by any person, not just employers, for opposing discriminatory conduct in a wide range of contexts besides employment, such as public accommodations); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7) (same). ... The NYSHRL and NYCHRL protect individuals from retaliation by any person in response to opposing discrimination in a wide array of contexts beyond employment, such as public accommodations. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). While the PSAC does not sufficiently allege discrimination on the basis of race or disability, as discussed above, a plaintiff need not allege independently actionable acts of discrimination to plead a viable retaliation claim. It is sufficient that the PSAC alleges that Plaintiff reasonably and in good faith believed that WFM employees were discriminating against her because of her race. See, e.g., La Porta v. Alacra, Inc., 38 N.Y.S.3d 20, 22 (1st Dep’t 2016) (“A plaintiff need not establish an underlying HRL violation in order to prevail on a retaliation claim, and, based on her allegations, it can be readily inferred that she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions violated the law.” (cleaned up)).

Section 296(1)(a) bars employers from discriminating against employees because of their membership in a protected class.

Uttarwar v. Lazard Asset Management LLC · filed 2024-03-22(1)(a)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL bar employers from discriminating against employees based on their membership in a protected class.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of race, sexual orientation, or disability.

Meckeler v. Cornell University · filed 2024-07-25(1)(a)

"The NYSHRL prohibits an employer from, inter alia, 'discharg[ing] from employment' or 'discriminat[ing] against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment' 'because of' an individual's race, sexual orientation, or disability." ... "Here, Plaintiff fails to assert non-conclusory facts supporting even a minimal, plausible inference that her sexual orientation played any role in any adverse employment action Plaintiff experienced (i.e., exclusion from meetings, loss of supervisory authority, failure to hire a manager, postponement of the re-branding project, discharge)."

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits gender discrimination, and § 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for complaining about discrimination.

Stickler v. IBM, Inc. · filed 2024-08-26(1)(a), (7)

It is unlawful to discriminate against an individual on the basis of gender. N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296 (1)(a).4 When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the NYSHRL utilizes a three-step burden-shifting test similar to the long-standing McDonnell Douglass framework. ... Plaintiff has failed to establish his prima facie case, given that he was not similarly situated to his female colleagues whom he claims received better treatment because of their gender. ... Because Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim based on IBM’s adoption and application of its PBL and its COVID-19 Emergency Leave policies. ... It is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee on account of his having complained of discrimination. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (7).8 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. ... Based on the evidence cited above, no reasonable jury could conclude that IBM retaliated against Plaintiff for his June 28 comments. ... The Court grants summary judgment with respect to both of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

Section 296(15) prohibits denying employment because of a criminal conviction when the denial violates Article 23-A of the New York Correction Law.

Whitfield v. City of New York · filed 2024-12-23(15)

NYSHRL Section 296(15) makes it unlawful to deny employment to an individual “by reason of his or her having been convicted of one or more criminal offenses . . . when such denial is in violation of the provisions of article twenty-three-A of the [New York] correction law.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(15). Thus, “liability under section 296(15) arises only upon a violation of article 23-A.” Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 174, 182 (2017).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee because of sex, and NYSHRL discrimination claims are construed liberally under the 2019 amendment.

Rios v. Max Mara USA Inc. · filed 2025-01-10(1)(a)

Under the NYSHRL, Section 296(1) renders it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). Following the New York legislature’s 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 300, courts must now scrutinize discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL under a lenient pleading standard similar to the standard for NYCHRL discrimination claims.

Section 296(1)(a) bars an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of sex in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Carmody v. New York University · filed 2023-09-07(1)(a)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual . . . in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(1)(a). ... Because all of Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims accrued on or after December 2020, they “rise and fall with her NYCHRL claims.” Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 568 F. Supp. 3d 314, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). Plaintiff’s Title VII claim of discriminatory termination survives Defendants’ motion. Because the NYSHRL and NYCHRL parallel Title VII in some respects and are more generous than Title VII in others, Plaintiff’s state and city claims for discriminatory termination survive summary judgment for the same reasons and a fortiori.

Section 296(16) does not prohibit an appointment decision supported by a reason unrelated to the applicant’s prior arrest and acquittal.

Lebensbaum v. Adelphi University · filed 1985-05-28(16)

There was substantial evidence to support the determination that petitioner was not appointed chairman of the accounting department of Adelphi University because the faculty was sharply divided over his appointment, and not because he had previously been arrested on, and acquitted of, a criminal charge (see, Executive Law § 296 [16]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a sex discrimination claim when a supervisor’s sexual relationship with another employee causes the claimant to be denied favorable employment benefits, terms, or conditions.

Kersul v. Skulls Angels Inc. · filed 1985-11-08(1)(a)

Rather, she is alleging that she was denied favorable benefits, terms and conditions of employment because of her supervisor’s favoring of another employee, Ms. Nevins, with whom he was having a sexual relationship. ... Based on the guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the rationale set forth in the cases of Toscano v Nimmo (supra) and King v Palmer (supra), the court finds that the plaintiffs first cause of action alleging sexual discrimination as against Mr. Maggio must be sustained.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of an actual or perceived disability when the person can reasonably perform the job.

Doe v. Roe, Inc. · filed 1989-03-29(1)(a)

Thus, the HRL forbids discrimination on the basis of a person’s actual or perceived disability, now defined as including physical, mental or medical conditions which do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought.

Section 296(1)(a) does not make an isolated act of sexual favoritism actionable without additional allegations of sex discrimination.

Nicolo v. Citibank New York State, N. A. · filed 1990-04-18(1)(a)

However, in the pending case, the first cause of action merely alleges an isolated act of sexual favoritism involving one female employee, and without additional allegations, fails to state a cause of action under Executive Law § 296.

Section 296(16) prohibits terminating an employee solely because of an arrest that did not result in prosecution, but does not prevent termination for workplace disruption caused by repeated arrests.

Wallick v. Barrios-Paoli · filed 1998-03-31(16)

Nor was petitioner terminated solely by reason of her first ... arrest, which would not have been proper since that arrest did not result in prosecution (see, Executive Law § 296 [16]). Petitioner’s termination was rather premised upon and justified by the disruptiveness to the workplace of petitioner’s repeated arrests at the office and petitioner’s activities in contravention of several provisions of the New York City Code of Conduct.

Section 296(16) permits a claim when an employer takes adverse action against an employee because of an arrest that did not result in a conviction.

Annabi v. Cassino · filed 2000-02-28(16)

The complaint alleged that the defendant took adverse employment actions against the plaintiff, based on the fact that the plaintiff, a police officer, was arrested, although the arrest had not resulted in a conviction. Accordingly, it properly stated a cause of action for a violation of Executive Law § 296 (16) (see, Matter of Wallick v Barrios-Paoli, 248 AD2d 332; Matter of Lebensbaum v Adelphi Univ., 111 AD2d 393).

Section 296(1)(a) does not treat discharge arising solely from strained relations after a consensual sexual relationship as sex discrimination.

Mauro v. Orville · filed 1999-10-28(1)(a)

This appeal poses the question of whether a male employer’s discharge of a female employee because of strained relations which existed following the employer’s termination of their consensual sexual relationship may be found of itself to constitute sexual discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296. We answer the question in the negative and accordingly reverse so much of Supreme Court’s order as granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on her first cause of action.

Section 296(1)(a) gender based employment discrimination claims follow federal standards and have a three year statute of limitations.

Mascola v. City University of New York · filed 2005-01-18(1)(a)

The alleged gender-based employment violations under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]) are keyed to federal standards (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]), and governed by a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2]; Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442 [1984]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits refusing to hire a person because of a mental disability.

Isaksson-Wilder v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2007-09-11(1)(a)

Substantial evidence in the record supports the finding of the New York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the SDHR) that the individuals responsible for hiring teachers at the school district were unaware that the petitioner was disabled, and that they did not perceive her to be disabled.

Section 296(1)(a) forbids employers from discriminating against employees in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of sexual orientation.

Martinez v. County of Monroe · filed 2008-02-01(1)(a)

Having concluded that plaintiffs marriage to Golden is entitled to recognition in New York, we further conclude that, by refusing to recognize plaintiffs valid Canadian marriage, defendants violated Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), which forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee “in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of the employee’s sexual orientation.

Section 296(1)(a) permits employment discrimination claims based on sex plus another characteristic, such as having children.

Bailey v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2012-12-05(1)(a)

There is, accordingly, no legal basis for finding that “sex plus” discrimination is not actionable under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) permits a sex discrimination claim when a woman alleges that similarly or less qualified men were hired instead of her.

Walzer v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2014-05-13(1)(a)

Plaintiff, a former provisional road car inspector with defendant New York City Transit Authority, sufficiently alleged, inter alia, that despite similar, if not better qualifications, she was not hired to the position of cleaner while other former provisional road car inspectors, who were males, were hired to the same position (see generally Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296 permits an employee to establish a discrimination claim based on the religion of the employee’s spouse.

Chiara v. Town of New Castle · filed 2015-01-14

Accordingly, the plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated his membership in a protected class by virtue of the defendants' alleged discriminatory conduct stemming from his marriage to a Jewish person.

A finding that an employer violated § 296(15) by automatically disqualifying applicants with prior convictions requires substantial evidence that it used such a disqualifier.

Matter of Costco Wholesale Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2015-06-02(15)

The determination sustaining charges that petitioner violated Executive Law § 296 (15) and article 23-A of the Correction Law is not supported by substantial evidence (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 181-182 [1978]). The evidence did not show that petitioner’s online employment application system automatically disqualified applicants with a prior criminal conviction.

Section 296(15) incorporates article 23-A’s prohibition on denying employment because of a prior criminal conviction; a complaint must allege facts sufficient to state that discrimination claim.

Schwarz v. Consolidated Edison, Inc. · filed 2017-02-07(15)

Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state an employment discrimination claim under either the New York State or New York City Human Rights Law (HRL) based on his “having been convicted of one or more criminal offenses” (Executive Law § 296 [15]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [10]). The State and City HRLs incorporate article 23-A of the Correction Law, which prohibits denial of employment to an individual “by reason of the individual’s having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of ‘good moral character’ when such finding is based upon the fact that the individual has previously been convicted of one or more criminal offenses” (Correction Law § 752; Executive Law § 296 [15]; Administrative Code § 8-107 [10]).

Section 296 does not prohibit termination based on exclusion from the Medicaid program rather than the disposition of the employee's criminal case.

Matter of Crittenden v. New York State Off. for People With Dev. Disabilities · filed 2018-12-27(16)

Similarly, we find no violation of Executive Law § 296 inasmuch as petitioner's termination from employment was based upon her exclusion from the Medicaid program and not the disposition of her criminal action, which was still pending at the time that petitioner received notification of her termination.

Section 296(15) prohibits denying employment because of a criminal conviction when the denial violates Correction Law article 23-A.

Matter of Whitfield v. City of New York · filed 2021-11-18(15)

Nor is there any basis for finding that respondent declined to hire petitioner because of his criminal conviction ( see Correction Law § 752; Executive Law § 296[15]).

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or discriminate against an individual in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of age or sex or gender.

Ayers v. Bloomberg, L.P. · filed 2022-03-16(1)(a)

Both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL make it unlawful for an employer, as relevant here, to refuse to hire or to discriminate against an individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of that person's age or sex/gender ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a][2], [3]).

Section 296[1][a] prohibits employers from discriminating against or discharging employees because of sex, gender, or familial status.

Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v. Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC · filed 2023-02-01[1][a]

The Human Rights Law makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual or discharge such person from employment on the basis of the individual's sex, gender, or familial status ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination in employment based on sex.

Silvers v. Jamaica Hosp. · filed 2023-07-26(1)(a)

The NYSHRL (Executive Law § 290 et seq. ) and the NYCHRL (Administrative Code § 8-101 et seq. ), prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of sex ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code § 8-107[1][a]).

Section 296(2)(a) bars a person associated with a place of public accommodation from withholding or denying its accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges because of sexual orientation or sex.

Guarino v. ProHEALTH Care Assoc., LLP · filed 2023-08-02(2)(a)

As relevant here, Executive Law § 296(2)(a) makes it impermissible for any person associated with a place of public accommodation to withhold or deny "any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges" provided by that accommodation based upon "sexual orientation" or "sex."

Section 296(1)(a) does not protect an employee from discrimination based on association with a disabled person.

Aponte v. Town of Islip · filed 2025-03-06(1)(a)

Nor does the State HRL extend to plaintiff's alleged association with a disabled person. Discriminatory action against an employee based on association with a disabled person cannot be taken "because of" the employee's own disability (Executive Law § 296[1][a]; see e.g. Arazi v Cohen Bros. Realty Corp. , 2022 WL 912940, *8 n 7, 2022 US Dist LEXIS 56549, *24 n 7 [SD NY 2022, 1:20-cv-8837-GHW]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on pregnancy as a form of sex, gender, or familial status discrimination.

Matter of Head Injury Assn., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2025-09-10(1)(a)

The New York State Human Rights Law makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of the individual's sex, gender, or familial status ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]). Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of gender, sex, and familial status discrimination ( see id. § 292[26][a]; Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC , 213 AD3d at 673).

Section 296 covers claims that an employer denied promotions because of race, color, national origin, or age.

Graham v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1997-09-29

The Executive Deputy Commissioner’s determination must be confirmed since there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the New York City Transit Authority did not deny the petitioner’s applications for promotions based upon his race, color, national origin, or age (see, Executive Law §§ 296, 297 [5]; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 77 NY2d 411, 417; see also, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180; Matter of Pace Coll, v Commission on Human Rights, 38 NY2d 28, 40).

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits employment discrimination because of listed protected characteristics, including discrimination in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and NYHRL claims are analyzed under the Title VII framework.

Bang v. IBM Corporation · filed 2009-02-23(l)(a)

The New York Human Rights Law provides that it is unlawful for any employer “because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military-status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status of any individual, ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec Law § 296(l)(a) (McKinney 2005). Claims brought pursuant to the N.Y. HRL are analyzed in accord with the rules governing Title VII claims.

Section 296(1)(A) makes it unlawful for an employer or licensing agency to refuse to hire or employ, bar, or discharge an individual, or discriminate against the individual in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of specified protected characteristics.

Faggiano v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 2005-07-21(1)(A)

That statute makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(A). The Court notes that the elements of Title VII and New York Discrimination Law claims “can be analyzed, for purposes of determining sufficiency of the evidence, in a manner virtually identical to those under Title VII.”

The NYSHRL applies the same elements as the ADA for employment-discrimination claims, so allegations sufficient under the ADA can establish discrimination liability under the NYSHRL.

Moreno v. Capital Concrete NY Inc. · filed 2025-09-05

In the Second Circuit, “the same elements that must be proven to establish an ADA [discrimination] claim must be also demonstrated to prove claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL.” ... Plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination claims ate based on the same allegations as his ADA claims. Plaintiffs allegations, therefore, are also sufficient to establish Defendants’ liability for discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296 prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against individuals in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of disability, and disability-discrimination claims under it use the same legal standards as federal ADA claims.

Cilus · filed 2025-09-17

The NYSHRL similarly prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against individuals “in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of an individual’s disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. “A claim of disability discrimination under the [NYSHRL] ... is governed by the same legal standards as govern federal ADA claims.” Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, the Court analyzes Plaintiffs ADA and NYSHRL discrimination claims together.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating based on race, color, or sex in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Bosman v. McDonough · filed 2025-08-14(1)(a)

“Under the NYSHRL, it is ‘an unlawful discriminatory practice’ for an employer, based on an individual's race, color, or sex, ‘to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’”

Section 296(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, discharge, or discriminate in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of listed protected characteristics.

Guarino v. St. John Fisher College · filed 2008-04-16(1)

The Court notes that the elements of Title VII and New York Executive Law § 296 claims “can be analyzed, for purposes of determining sufficiency of the evidence, in a manner virtually identical to those under Title VII.”

Section 296 prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals because of protected characteristics in hiring, employment, compensation, or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

KERCADO-CLYMER v. City of Amsterdam · filed 2009-04-10

NYSHRL is codified at N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and states in pertinent part that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (West 2009). ... This court must “analyze [a plaintiffs] federal and state law claims together because the Second Circuit applies federal standards of proof to discrimination claims brought under NYHRL.”

Section 296(5) prohibits aiding, inciting, compelling, or coercing employment discrimination, including attempts to do so.

Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package Store Ass'n · filed 1961-01-26(5)

To aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce or to so attempt any of the acts forbidden by the statute, including discrimination in employment is likewise unlawful (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 5, first enacted as § 131 by L. 1909, ch. 23).

Section 296(1) bars an employer from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Memnon v. CLIFFORD CHANCE US, LLP · filed 2009-10-27(1)

However, Plaintiff overlooks express statutory language that indicates that the prohibition in each of the relevant statutes is imposed against an “employer” and disallows discrimination in the terms, conditions and/or privileges of employment. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1) (prohibiting action by “an employer” that constitutes discrimination “in terms, conditions or privileges of employment”); NYCHRL § 8-107 (same); see also Patterson, 375 F.3d at 224-25 (finding that § 1981 “outlaws discrimination with respect to the enjoyment of benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of a contractual relationship, such as employment, ... and is applicable to a plaintiff complaining of discrimination during an employment period”). For this reason alone, Memnon’s employment discrimination claims against Clifford Chance must fail.

Section 296 prohibits discrimination in employment based on age, and courts analyze NYSHRL age-discrimination claims under the same framework as ADEA claims.

Rupert v. City of Rochester, Department of Environmental Services · filed 2010-03-30

Both the ADEA and the NYSHRL prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of age, see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and claims under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same legal framework as ADEA claims.

Section 296(1)(a) bars employers from discriminating in employment terms based on age, gender, or race, and § 296(7) bars retaliation for opposing discrimination.

Butler v. New York Health & Racquet Club · filed 2011-01-26(1)(a), (7)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of age, gender, or race. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(a). ... Like the federal anti-discrimination statutes, both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL also prohibit retaliation. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(7).

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual because of sexual orientation or sex in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; the SHRL's pregnancy-discrimination prohibition mirrors Title VII's.

Zambrano-Lamhaouhi v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2011-11-21(l)(a)

Under the SHRL, in relevant part, it is unlawful for an employer, “because of an individual’s ... sexual orientation ... [or] sex, ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). “Claims brought under New York State’s Human Rights Law are analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII.” Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 107 n. 10 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title VIPs prohibition of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is mirrored by the SHRL. See DeMarco v. CooperVision, Inc., 369 Fed.Appx. 254, 255 (2d Cir.2010); Gonzalez v. N.Y.S. Office of Mental Health, 26 Misc.3d 1227(A), at *6, 2010 WL 653991 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Kings Co.2010).

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of age in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Robles v. Cox & Co. · filed 2013-11-23(l)(a)

Similarly, the NYSHRL proscribes an employer, “because of an individual’s age,” from “discharging] from employment such individual or [ ] discriminating] against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a).

Section 296(1) prohibits employers from discriminating because of sex in hiring, discharge, compensation, or employment terms, while § 296(7) protects employees from retaliation for protected activity.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2013-09-09(1), (7)

Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s ... sex .;. to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). ... Similarly, the NYSHRL safeguards employees against retaliation for engaging in protected activities. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics, and § 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person who opposes practices forbidden by the article.

De Curtis v. Ferrandina (In re Ferrandina) · filed 2015-05-01(1)(a), (7)

A discrimination claim brought under the New York State law requires that the plaintiff establish willful conduct. Under the New York State Law, it is unlawful for “an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... The New York State Law makes it unlawful “for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article [such as gender discrimination], N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the New York State Law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (4) a causal connection exists between the pro*29tected activity and the adverse action.” Goldberg, 487 B.R. at 124 (quoting Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F.Supp.2d 349, 362-61 (S.D.N.Y.2012)).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including denying a material employment benefit for a discriminatory reason.

Tolbert v. Smith · filed 2015-06-24(1)(a)

Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” § 2000e-2(a)(1), the NYSHRL similarly prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a), and § 1981 provides that all “persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,” § 1981(a). Refusing to award a contract or a material employment benefit for a discriminatory reason violates those statutes.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in employment on the basis of protected characteristics, and courts analyze NYSHRL employment-discrimination claims under the same framework as Title VII.

Concha v. Purchase College State University of New York · filed 2019-07-17(1)(a)

The NYSHRL covers analogous discriminatory acts by employers, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a), and “[e]mployment discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL are analyzed identically to claims under . . .Title VII.” Cooper v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 819 F.3d 678, 680 n.3 (2d Cir. 2016).

Section 296 prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual because of sex and applies a prima facie framework requiring protected-class membership, qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Villeti v. Guidepoint Global LLC · filed 2021-08-11

The NYSHRL similarly prohibits an employer from discriminating “because of an individual’s . . . sex.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL are treated as “analytically identical.” Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 107 n.7 (2d Cir.2019). To establish a prima facie claim of employment discrimination under those statutes, Plaintiffs must show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race and other protected categories in the terms and conditions of employment.

Dobney v. The Walt Disney Company · filed 2024-01-29(1)(a)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment based on race and other protected categories. ... First, Dobney sufficiently pleads a discrimination claim under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL as a result of Defendants’ subjecting her to burdens to which her non-Black counterparts were not subject.

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Mwantuali v. Hamilton College · filed 2024-03-20(1)(a)

Similarly, the NYSHRL provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [f]or an employer," on account of an individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin, "to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a).

Section 296(1) bars employers from refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of sex or other protected characteristics.

Moretti v. Luxury Cars of Westchester LLC · filed 2024-04-24(1)

Similarly, under the NYSHRL, it is unlawful for “an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sexual orientation [or] gender identity or expression, . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such an individual or to discrimination against such an individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). “For employment discrimination claims under Title VII or the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.”

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual because of age in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges, and an allegation that the person was treated less well at least partly because of age can suffice at the pleading stage.

Li v. China Merchants Bank Co., LTD. · filed 2024-08-13(1)(a)

The NYSHRL similarly states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ..., because of an individual’s age, ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... For the purposes of this motion, however, the Court will assume arguendo that the amended NYSHRL aligns with the NYCHRL, as the parties analyze Plaintiff’s state and city claims under the same legal standard. ... Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that this standard is satisfied. ... These allegations, accepted as true at this stage of the litigation, sufficiently allege that Plaintiff was treated “less well” due to her age. ... Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims, and allows the claims to proceed alongside her claims for discrimination on the basis of her gender and citizenship.

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on listed protected characteristics; claims based on circumstantial evidence use the McDonnell Douglas framework, and the plaintiff must provide evidence supporting discrimination, pretext, causation, or inferior treatment as applicable.

Dodd v. My Sisters' Place, Inc. · filed 2024-06-17(1)

The NYSHRL similarly prohibits discrimination against an employee based on that employee’s “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). ... When, as here, a plaintiff’s Title VII, Section 1981, or NYSHRL discrimination claims are based on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the claims are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL race discrimination claims. ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL disability discrimination claims. ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL retaliation claims. ... To state such a hostile work environment claim under the NYSHRL’s less stringent standard, a plaintiff must establish that he was “subjected to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of [his] membership in one or more protected categories.” ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII, Section 1981, ADA, and NYSHRL hostile work environment claims.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of race or disability, and the NYSHRL applies a more liberal standard than comparable federal laws.

Murray v. Brag Sales Inc. · filed 2024-08-27(1)(a)

Similar to the ADA and Title VII, the NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge from employment [an] individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of his race or disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). In 2019, the NYSHRL was amended “to establish that its provisions should be construed liberally even if ‘federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article,’ have been construed narrowly.” Arazi v. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp., No. 20-CV-8837, 2022 WL 912940, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (quoting Deveaux v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 19-CV-9734, 2020 WL 1812741, at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020)); see N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 (2019). Murray’s claim under the NYSHRL is premised on the same factual allegations as the other claims: his discharge from Uneeda on the basis of race and disability. Because Murray states a claim under the ADA and Title VII, he also states a claim under the more liberal NYSHRL standard.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating based on sex or disability, and section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for protected discrimination complaints.

Contreras v. Castro · filed 2024-09-10(1)(a), (7)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit employers from discriminating based on sex. See N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(1)(a); ... Plaintiff therefore establishes defendants’ liability for sex discrimination and a hostile work environment under the NYSHRL. ... Under the NYSHRL, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of a disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, plaintiff must show that (1) she participated in a protected activity known to the defendant; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); ... Plaintiff has established defendants’ liability for retaliation under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

Section 296 prohibits discrimination only in specified contexts, such as employment, housing, and credit, rather than creating a general cause of action for discrimination.

Dieng v. New York City NYPD · filed 2024-10-28

But the NYSHRL does not create a general cause of action for discrimination; instead, it makes unlawful discrimination in contexts that are not relevant here (such employment, housing, and credit).

Section 296(3-a)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against people eighteen or older in hiring, promotion, compensation, or employment conditions because of age, and an age-discrimination claimant must satisfy the prima facie elements applied here.

Kearney v. County of Rockland · filed 2005-06-15(3-a)(a)

Similarly, under the NYSHRL, it is unlawful discriminatory practice for “an employer ... to refuse to hire or employ or license or to bar or to terminate from employment an individual eighteen years of age or older, or to discriminate against such individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(3-a)(a). ... To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position; (3) she has suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding that action give rise to an inference of age discrimination. See id. at 466-67 (discussing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, employing, barring, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against an individual in employment because of age.

Finizia v. Crawford & Company · filed 2023-06-23(1)(a)

The NYSHRL similarly provides that an employer may not “refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of, among other characteristics, an individual’s age. ... “Age discrimination claims under the ADEA and NYSHRL are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” ... Therefore, defendants have articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff's employment, and the facts proffered by plaintiff, when considered cumulatively with the rest of the record, do not create a triable issue as to whether age was the but-for cause of defendants’ decision to terminate his employment. ... Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants is warranted, and plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.

Section 296 prohibits the police officer height requirement sought by the petitioners.

Police Conference of New York, Inc. v. Municipal Police Training Council · filed 1978-08-25

The height requirement demanded by petitioners also violates the State Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296).

Section 296(1)(a) permits an employment discrimination finding when the evidence supports that a school board discriminatorily refused a teacher retention rights.

New York City Board of Education v. Simley · filed 1983-08-29(1)(a)

There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to support the finding that the board of education discriminated against Staten by refusing him retention rights as an evening community center per-session teacher in district No. 19 (Executive Law, § 296, subd 1, par tal).

Section 296(1)(a) treats withdrawal of a job offer because of disability as a refusal to hire that occurs when the employer withdraws the offer.

State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1979-12-14(1)(a)

Petitioner was not rejected for employment until respondent, based on the results of the examination, withdrew its offer of employment. The earliest dated documentary evidence that respondent refused to hire the petitioner is the letter dated September 3, 1974 advising petitioner that the offer of employment was withdrawn. It is this refusal to hire petitioner which is prohibited by section 296 of the Executive Law, and, therefore, the discriminatory act occurred after September 1, 1974.

Section 296 requires an employee alleging age discrimination to show protected-class membership, discharge, and qualification, plus a younger replacement or direct or statistical evidence of discrimination.

Mayer v. Manton Cork Corp. · filed 1987-01-12

In order to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must (1) demonstrate that he was a member of the protected class; (2) prove that he was discharged; (3) prove that he was qualified for the position he held; and (4) either (a) show that he was replaced by a person younger than himself; (b) produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent; or (c) produce statistical evidence of discriminatory conduct.

Section 296(1)(d) prohibits a preemployment inquiry about race only if it expresses a limitation, specification, or discrimination.

Alexander's, Inc. v. White · filed 1985-12-19(1)(d)

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer "to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color or national origin” (Executive Law § 296 [1] [d]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment even when an employee is not formally terminated.

Brown v. State · filed 1986-12-04(1)(a)

Moreover, the Human Rights Law forbids not only discriminatory termination (see, Executive Law § 296 [7]), but also "discrimination] * * * in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from forcing an employee to resign because of race or sex.

State Division of Human Rights v. County of Onondaga Sheriff's Department · filed 1987-02-27(1)(a)

There is substantial evidence supporting the determination that complainant was forced to resign because of race and her sex. Thus, the Commissioner correctly determined that the Sheriff’s Department committed an unlawful discriminatory practice (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) can cover discrimination affecting a medical resident’s work schedule when the residency is both a job and an educational program.

Samper v. University of Rochester Strong Memorial Hospital · filed 1987-06-19(1)(a)

However, the residency program was both a job and an educational prerequisite to the career goals of the plaintiffs. It is difficult, if not impossible at this point of the litigation, to separate some of the factual allegations into job/education categories. Comments reflecting a discriminatory attitude, coupled with changes in plaintiff Samper’s work schedule, create a possible factual basis for a conclusion of discrimination on the job. Further discovery will draw a brighter light to bear on the factual contentions of the parties, which may help to resolve this difficult issue. At this juncture, the plaintiffs have made out a case for possible employment discrimination.

Section 296 permits a sex discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint alleges that an employee was fired for refusing to perform menial tasks outside her job description.

Spector v. Hebrew Hospital Home, Inc. · filed 1996-07-29

The plaintiff alleges that she was unlawfully discharged from her position as an administrative assistant to the defendant Isaac Cohen, the Director of Finance for the defendant Hebrew Hospital Home (hereinafter the Hospital), on the basis of her sex. The plaintiff seeks to recover lost earnings and reinstatement to her former position pursuant to Executive Law § 296. ... The plaintiff alleges that she was actually fired from her position because she refused to perform certain menial tasks, such as bringing Cohen coffee, tea, and oranges in the morning, which were not part of her job description. The plaintiff further alleges that her successor, also a female, was fired for refusing to do the same tasks. Accepting these allegations as true (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83), we find that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to withstand the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, Daniels v Empire-Orr, Inc., 151 AD2d 370).

In an employment race discrimination claim, the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination.

Broome v. Keener · filed 1997-02-18

However, after the defendants presented their case, the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the stated premise for his discharge was only a pretext for underlying discrimination.

An employment discrimination complaint under Section 296 must state the essential elements of the claim.

Taverna v. Microchip Technology, Inc. · filed 2000-01-24

Here, the court properly dismissed the cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination, since the complaint failed to state the essential elements required for such a cause of action (see, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 252-253; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623).

Section 296(1)(a) permits an employer to use years of service or years since a degree in setting salaries under the circumstances described by the court, even though those factors correlate with age.

Hardy v. General Electric Co. · filed 2000-03-16(1)(a)

In our view, defendant’s use of years of service or years since an employee’s Bachelor’s degree in setting salaries is, under these circumstances, a permissible employment practice.

A claimant alleging employment discrimination under Section 296 need not provide additional proof of discriminatory intent beyond a prima facie case and evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Classic Coach v. Mercado · filed 2001-03-19(1)(a)

In our view, the elimination of the “pretext-plus” rule is both logical and salutary and should be carried over into New York law.

Section 296(1) prohibits termination for alcohol-related absenteeism before rehabilitation when the employee performs satisfactorily after rehabilitation and the employer fails to show the employee was unable to perform the job at termination.

Singleton v. Kerik · filed 2001-04-23(1)

We agree with the Supreme Court that the petitioner’s termination for pre-rehabilitation alcohol-related absenteeism violated the Human Rights Law (see, Executive Law § 296 [1]; Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554).

Under § 296, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment must raise a material issue of fact that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Jordan v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 2001-05-29

The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to raise a material issue of fact with respect to whether the claimed reason for the defendant’s failure to promote her and for her termination was, in reality, merely a pretext for illegal discrimination (see, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 253; see also, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 804; cf., Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 937, 939).

Section 296(16) governs whether an employee’s termination violated the statute, and factual issues can prevent summary judgment on that claim.

Annabi v. Cassino · filed 2001-11-05(16)

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment since there are issues of fact as to whether the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was in violation of Executive Law § 296 (16) (see, Bacchi v Fritz Cos., 271 AD2d 558).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics such as age, gender, and race.

Hutchinson v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2003-10-27

The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons given were false, or whether her age, gender, or race were the real reasons for the decision.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits unlawful discrimination in employment.

Under Elms, Inc. v. Tolbert · filed 2003-11-03(1)(a)

In any event, the determination of the respondent Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights finding unlawful discrimination was supported by substantial evidence (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Matter of Fella v County of Rockland, 297 AD2d 813, 815 [2002]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits adverse employment actions because of race, and a plaintiff must show that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind · filed 2004-10-26(1)(a)

But plaintiff still cannot avoid summary judgment for defendants because, even assuming that she has made a prima facie showing as to the fourth element, she has failed to rebut defendants' proof that the purported termination did not arise under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination — that is, that she was not terminated "because of [her] race" (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]).

Section 296 bars age discrimination in employment and requires a claimant to show that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext.

Ospina v. Susquehanna Anesthesia Affiliates, P.C. · filed 2005-11-10

Defendant, however, met its burden of demonstrating an age-neutral explanation for its decision to terminate plaintiffs contract (see id.). ... With defendant having presented nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiffs contract, plaintiff, in turn, failed to establish that “defendant[’s] reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination” (Moon v Clear Channel Communications, 307 AD2d 628, 632 [2003]; see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., supra at 629-630).

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on age.

Quintas v. Pace University · filed 2005-11-15(1)

Finally, plaintiff failed adequately to allege facts warranting the inference that the challenged denial was a discriminatory employment action actually motivated by age (see Executive Law § 296 [1]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics, including disparate impact, discriminatory intent, and hostile work environment claims.

Tokko v. Consolidated Edison Co. · filed 2009-05-19

He alleges that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race (Arab), national origin (Lebanese), and religion (Islam), in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296) and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107. ... Plaintiffs motion to restore the action was properly denied since plaintiff failed to allege that the mechanic B test had a disparate impact on a group of which he was a member (see Becker v City of New York, 249 AD2d 96, 98 [1998]); he does not contend otherwise on appeal.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual in hiring, firing, compensation, or employment terms because of age.

Lichtman v. Martin's News Shops Management, Inc. · filed 2011-02-08(1)(a)

The standards for summary judgment dismissal of a claim brought pursuant to the ADEA and Executive Law § 296 are the same (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; Simeone v County of Suffolk, 36 AD3d 890, 891 [2007]; Brannigan v Board of Educ. of Levittown Union Free School Dist., 18 AD3d 787, 789 [2005]; Hemingway v Pelham Country Club, 14 AD3d 536, 536-537 [2005]). ... In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants’ proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 308 [2004]; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d at 630-631).

Section 296 makes it unlawful for an employment agency to discriminate based on gender or national origin.

Smith v. Blavatnik · filed 2011-08-31

It is unlawful for an employment agency to discriminate on the basis of gender or national origin. (Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [b].)

Section 296(1)(a) employment discrimination claims require an adverse employment action; an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons can support summary judgment when there is no triable issue of pretext.

Cenzon-Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital · filed 2012-12-19(1)(a)

With respect to the Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) claim, the defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action ... and, in any event, offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions and demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact as to whether those explanations were pretextual (see Furfero v St. John’s Univ., 94 AD3d at 697).