N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213(1) provides the six-year limitations period that makes this action timely.

HSBC Mortgage Corp. v. Oberlander · filed 2007-03-20(1)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the present action was timely commenced (see CPLR 213 [1]; Sorrentino v Mierzwa, 25 NY2d 59, 61 [1969]).

Section 213 provides a six-year New York limitations period for a maintenance-and-cure claim treated as contractual.

Phillips v. Luckenbach Steamship Co. · filed 1964-02-26

The New York statute of limitations is six years. Civil Practice Act § 48(1); CPLR § 213.

Section 213(2) gives a public welfare official six years after a reimbursement claim accrues to file suit or a claim.

In re the Estate of Herman · filed 1964-05-25(2)

The time within which the public official may file suit or claim begins to run ‘ ‘ from the time the cause of action accrued” (CPLR 203, subd. [a]) and continues for 6 years thereafter (CPLB 213, subd. 2).

Section 213 requires an action on an express or implied contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

City & County Savings Bank v. M. Kramer & Sons, Inc. · filed 1964-08-06(2)

An action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, must be commenced within six years (CPLR 213).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims based on an implied contract.

City of New York v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1967-04-12

As such, the controlling Statute of Limitations is the six-year period set forth in CPLR 213.

CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period applies to actions based on fraudulent transfer or constructive fraud.

Martin v. Martin · filed 1968-03-04

Under either of these theories, the six-year Statute of Limitations in CPLR 213 is controlling and this action consequently was timely brought.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period that bars counterclaims first asserted more than six years after the claimant learned of the alleged fraud.

Psaroudis v. Psaroudis · filed 1968-07-15(2)

... in 1957, in which event the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 2) additionally served to defeat defendant’s counterclaims which were pleaded and asserted for the first time in 1964.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period for contract actions applies to a breach-of-warranty-of-seaworthiness claim.

Licari v. Isbrandtsen Co. · filed 1969-02-03

The applicable time limitation with respect to .breach of warranty of seaworthiness is the State six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions (Ingravallo v. Pool Shipping Co., 247 F. Supp. 394; CPLR 213).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period applicable to a trustee’s action to recover damages for waste of corporate assets.

Bartle v. Markson · filed 1969-05-23(8)

I find and conclude that the action is not time barred. It was instituted the day after the Trustee qualified to recover damages for waste of corporate assets and the six-year statute is applicable (CPLR 213, subd. 8).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions for moneys had and received or unjust enrichment.

MATTER OF EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOC'Y OF THE UNITED STATES v. Branch · filed 1969-07-14(2)

The petition clearly states an action for moneys had and received or for unjust enrichment, which is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 2). Accordingly, the proceeding was not time-barred.

Section 213(1)'s six-year residual period does not apply when the comparable New York remedy is an Article 78 proceeding for reinstatement.

Romer v. Leary · filed 1969-10-16(1)

In seeking a comparable New York period, he refers the court.to section 213(1) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) which specifies a six year limitation for “an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.” ... The conclusion this court adopts, and the one which a state court would undoubtedly adopt, is that the only relief not yet granted in the plaintiff’s case is reinstatement, which generally is effected through Article 78 proceedings with a four month period of limitations.

Section 213(2) supplies a six-year limitations period that the court applied by analogy to assess laches in a maritime action.

Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pakistan · filed 1969-11-14(2)

The state statute of limitations, which is applicable by analogy to this action, Redman v. United States, 176 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949); West African Steamship Co. v. McAllister Brothers, Inc., 287 F.Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), is six years, N.Y. CPLR § 213(2). This action was commenced within six years; accordingly, plaintiff is not guilty of laches.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for claims seeking an accounting for loan overcharges and omitted credits or alleging breach of contract.

Klein v. Bower · filed 1970-01-23(2)

Cause number three based on overcharges and omitted credits in appellant’s loan account is subject to the six-year period governing actions for an accounting and for breach of contract.

Section 213(6) sets a six-year limitation for actions based upon mistake.

In re the Estate of Fisch · filed 1968-06-18(6)

Under the revised practice, the limitation for such an action is fixed at six ... years (CPLR 213, subd. 6), but it is also provided that whenever ‘1 a cause of action accrued before, and is not barred when this article becomes effective, the time within which an action must be commenced shall be the time which would have been applicable apart from the provisions of this article, or the time which would have been applicable if the provisions of this article had been in effect when the cause of action accrued, whichever is longer ”.

CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period applies to the State’s common-law action to recover improperly paid unemployment benefits.

People v. Duggan · filed 1968-06-27

Moreover, what is involved is obviously not a penalty or a forfeiture. Accordingly, the six-year Statute of Limitations is applicable (King v. King, 13 A D 2d 437) and since we find advanced no cogent reason why summary judgment should not be granted to the State, it is so ordered.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims based on an oral agreement that accrue when the promisor repudiates the agreement.

Mettler v. Mettler · filed 1970-10-08

It is the six-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 213 which applies to all of the causes of action, which accrued in 1968, when the defendant allegedly renounced and repudiated his obligations under the alleged oral agreement.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action on an express or implied contractual obligation, including a claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.

Abrams v. Carrier Corp. · filed 1970-11-04(2)

In the present case, the proper *1253limitation period to be applied to the contract claim against Carrier is the six-year limitation set out in N.Y. CPLR § 213(2) for “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied.”

Section 213(1) sets a six-year residual limitations period.

In re the Estate of Barabash · filed 1971-11-04(1)

CPLR 213 (subd. 1) effective September 1, 1963, corresponds with former section 53 of the Civil Practice Act and reduces the residual Statute of Limitations from 10 to 6 years.

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period; for a general average contribution claim, the period does not begin when the general average statement is issued.

Liman v. India Supply Mission · filed 1974-05-29

The applicable New York statute, CPLR § 213, provides for a six year limitation period. Plaintiff’s contention that the statute began to run when the general average statement was issued is erroneous.

Section 213(2) bars claims for dividends declared outside its limitations period; a provision for cumulative dividends does not extend that period.

Leon Corp. v. Franchise Stores Realty Corp. · filed 1972-05-22(2)

In our opinion, that part of plaintiff’s claim which is for dividends declared prior to May 3, 1965, is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 2). We do not agree with either of plaintiff’s contentions that the provision for cumulation of dividends extended the statutory period in which to commence the action or that computation of the limitation period commenced with actual discovery of facts pursuant to CPLR 203 (subd. [b]).

Section 213(1) bars recovery of pension benefits accruing more than six years before the action began.

Walsh v. Andorn · filed 1973-02-26(1)

Recovery, of' pension benefits accruing more , than-six years prior to the commencemerit- of this action is time" barred '.(CPLR- 213; subd. 1).

Section 213(1) bars recovery of pension benefits that accrued more than six years before the action began.

Walsh v. Andorn · filed 1973-03-13(1)

Recovery of pension. benefits accruing more than six years prior to the commencement of this action are time-barred (CPLR 213, subd. [1]).

Section 213(1) bars rescission claims brought more than six years after they accrued.

Howard v. Murray · filed 1974-12-23(1)

We deem it unnecessary to reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims since we are of the view that the causes of action pleaded by them are time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations provided for in CPLR 213 (subd. 1).

CPLR 213 sets a six-year limitations period for a claim for accounting services, subject to tolling.

In re the Estate of Bourne · filed 1975-07-03

Unless the Statute of Limitations has been tolled in some manner, this claim is barred by the six-year statute (CPLR 213), insofar as it relates to services allegedly performed prior to the date of decedent’s death.

Section 213 gives a Department six years to bring a public assistance recovery claim, running from discovery of a living recipient’s or responsible relative’s property, or from death for a claim against an estate, subject to applicable extensions.

In re the Estate of Colon · filed 1975-08-18

A cause of action against a living recipient or RR accrues at the time he is "discovered” to have property and runs for six years (CPLR 213). A cause of action or claim against an estate accrues when the recipient or RR "dies” leaving property and runs for six years (CPLR 213) if not further extended by delay in appointing a personal representative or as provided by statute.

CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period applies to a city’s claim for management and supervision fees when the housing company agreed to be bound by the governing housing law.

City of New York v. Kingsview Homes, Inc. · filed 1975-11-20

This court is of the opinion that the contract of April 23, 1953 evidences an agreement to be bound by the Redevelopment Companies Law (subsequently the Private Housing Finance Law) and that CPLR 213 is applicable.

CPLR 213(1) provides a residual six-year limitations period for claims seeking redress for wrongs that existed before statutes supplied additional remedies or standing.

State of NY v. Cortelle Corp. · filed 1975-11-25(1)

Consequently, all of the challenged causes of action were timely brought'within the so-called residual six-year period of limitation (CPLR 213, subd 1).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to a cross claim seeking recovery on checks.

Seligson v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 1975-12-18(2)

Special Term correctly held that the six-year statute applied to Central’s cross claim on the Gil checks.

Section 213’s six-year limit does not bar an implied-in-fact contract claim filed within six years when the original complaint sufficiently set forth that claim.

Prudential Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. · filed 1976-03-03

The taking took place on December 16, 1963, and this action was filed on September 27, 1967. The complaint was sufficient to set forth a claim for relief based on a contract implied in fact.

Section 213 bars a later action for legal fees under a guaranty when the fee claim accrued with an earlier action and the six-year period has expired.

Century Factors, Inc. v. New Plan Realty Corp. · filed 1976-03-16

Since the action for legal fees presently before the court necessarily accrued simultaneously with the first action, the action is time-barred (CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a claim arising from an employee’s contractual duty of loyalty to an employer.

Western Electric Co. v. Brenner · filed 1976-03-16(2)

The employer-employee relationship is clearly contractual in nature, be that contract express or implied (36 NY Jur, Master and Servant, § 10), and therefore the complaint is governed by a six-year limitation period and is not time-barred (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on a contractual obligation or liability.

Arneil v. Ramsey · filed 1976-05-12(2)

Applying therefore New York CPLR § 213(2), which provides a six year limitation period for actions based upon a contractual obligation or liability, it is clear that plaintiffs’ § 6 claims are not time-barred.

Section 213(2) and (7) provide a six-year limitations period for the corporation’s contract and fiduciary-duty claims against Leeds.

Frigi-Griffin, Inc. v. Leeds · filed 1976-05-18(2), (7)

Since the applicable limitation is six years (CPLR 213, subds 2, 7), these three causes of action are not barred as against Leeds.

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period bars a belated defense seeking to change an agreed allocation of lease expenses.

In re the Arbitration between SCM Corp. & Fisher Park Lane Co. · filed 1976-06-29(1)

The fifth defense is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations, provided for in CPLR 213 (subd 1) and, in any event, is not arbitrable since it, in reality, seeks reformation.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for actions arising from contractual obligations.

Cromwell Towers Redevelopment Co. v. City of Yonkers · filed 1976-12-02

The Statute of Limitations for an action arising from a contractual obligation is six years (CPLR 213) and this action was brought well within that period since the contract, having been entered into on August 25, 1971, was first breached on May 31, 1973 when city council approved the tax assessment.

Section 213(9) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or two years after discovery, whichever is longer, when read with § 203(f).

Stull v. Bayard · filed 1977-01-07(9)

The relevant New York statutes are CPLR §§ 213(9) and 203(f). When read together, these statutes provide that, in actions based on fraud, suit must be commenced either within six years of the time the fraud is committed, or within two years of the time the fraud is, or should have been, discovered by the plaintiff, whichever period is longer.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for equitable actions generally, with constructive fraud claims accruing when the fraud is committed rather than discovered.

Curry v. Chollette · filed 1977-04-25(1)

Although his complaint alleges fraud, duress and overreaching, his cause of action is based upon a constructive fraud and is controlled by CPLR 213 (subd 1)—the six-year Statute of Limitations governing equitable actions in general. Thus, the cause of action accrued from the commission, rather than the discovery, of the fraud (see Buttles v Smith, 281 NY 226; 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48).

Section 213 generally requires actions to be commenced within six years, with fraud claims subject to the longer of six years from commission or two years after discovery.

SCHMIDT v. McKAY · filed 1977-05-12(1), (2), (8)

CPLR § 213(2) provides in relevant part that "an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied," must be commenced within six years. ... Although there is no express provision for a statute of limitations in promissory estoppel cases, CPLR § 213(1) provides that where no limitations period is specifically prescribed, an action must be commenced within six years. ... CPLR § 213(8) (Supp.1976) provides that an action based on fraud must be brought within six years after the time the plaintiff "discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligency have discovered it."

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitation period for actions for specific performance.

Springut v. Don & Bob Restaurants of America, Inc. · filed 1977-05-20(2)

Petitioner’s cause of action based upon the application of the shareholders’ agreement to petitioner’s removal from office may be treated as an action for specific performance pursuant to CPLR 103 (subd [c]) and the six-year limitation provided by CPLR 213 (subd 2) applies.

Section 213 requires an action on a life insurance policy to be commenced within six years after the insured’s death, and ignorance of the policy does not suspend that period.

Shaw v. Union Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1977-07-20

However, it is fundamental law that the general six-year Statute of Limitations relating to contractual obligations applies to an action on a life insurance policy (see 31 NY Jur, Insurance, § 1569). Thus, the beneficiary of the policy herein was entitled to recover upon the death of the insured and obligated to commence action on the policy within six years from the insured’s death. Applying the principle of the Nigro case (supra), to the case at bar the court is constrained to hold that the claimants’ ignorance of the existence of the policy does not suspend the operation of the Statute of Limitations any more than it suspended the operation of the policy time limitation in the Nigro case.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period, but the court held that it did not govern the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment action.

Lombard v. Board of Ed. of City of New York · filed 1977-11-15

Despite an obiter suggestion by Judge Werker in Santora v. The Civil Service Commission, City of New York, (S.D.N.Y.1977) Docket No. 76C 1695, that the controlling statute might be the six year statute contained in CPLR § 213, it seems clear to us that, as in Fine, plaintiff’s action under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially a tort action and as such is subject to the provisions of Section 3813 of the Education Law and Section 50 — i of the General Municipal Law.

Section 213 imposes a six-year time limit on actions covered by its Statute of Limitations.

Yeshiva University Development Foundation, Inc. v. Consultants & Designers, Inc. · filed 1977-12-06

This action was commenced in October, 1975, and is apparently governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213. Accordingly, the action is barred as to the calendar years 1968 and earlier and defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted as to those years.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for the applicable action.

Hurlbut v. Christiano · filed 1978-06-022

The parties neither expressly nor impliedly shortened the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period, but it does not apply to this personal-injury tort claim.

Serrano v. Flight Motel, Inc. · filed 1978-06-21(1)

Under the circumstances, the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 does not apply.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitation period for an action alleging that infringement of an easement breached a contractual obligation regarding maintenance of electrical service.

Oneida County Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 1978-07-13

Moreover, even were Niagara Mohawk to assert some basis for the application of a six-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 213 on the ground that infringement of the easement is a breach of a contractual obligation regarding the maintenance of electrical service, such an action would also be barred (see Tarantela v Tripp Lake Estates, 23 AD2d 905, 906).

Section 213(9) gives fraud based actions the longer of six years from accrual or two years after discovery, or when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Panayotopulas v. Chemical Bank · filed 1979-01-11(9)

Accordingly, I hold that N.Y.C.P. L.R. § 213(9) provides the appropriate period of limitations. Plaintiff’s action may be maintained if it was commenced within six years from accrual of the cause of action, or within two years from the time when the facts of the alleged fraud were discovered or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Subdivision 2 applies a six-year limitations period to indemnity liability based on negligence, running from payment of any judgment.

Methodist Hospital v. Leon D. De Matteis Construction Corp. · filed 1979-02-082

Insofar as any liability for indemnity predicated upon movant’s negligence is concerned, the applicable Statute of Limitations is six years, which begins to run from the time of payment of any judgment against the third-party plaintiff. (Emil v Pelt & Co., 45 AD2d 677; CPLR 213, subd 2.)

Section 213(2) requires a six-year limitations period for actions on obligations to provide services, running separately from each breach.

Bulova Watch Co. v. Celotex Corp. · filed 1979-04-03(2)

On the limitations question, it is clear that the separate bond obligations, as agreements contemplating services, were subject to a six-year statute (CPLR 213, subd 2; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.13) running separately for the damages occasioned each time a breach of the obligation to repair the bonded roof occurred (see Putnam’s Sons v Owens, 51 AD2d 527; Colpan Realty Corp. v Great Amer. Ins. Co., 83 Misc 2d 730, 731-732).

Section 213 gives equity actions a six-year limitations period.

Smith v. Driscoll · filed 1979-04-16

Inasmuch as a six-year Statute of Limitations governs the equity action, it is not time barred (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to a breach of warranty claim for a sale made before September 27, 1964.

Fazio v. Ford Motor Corp. · filed 1979-04-30(2)

If the sale occurred prior to September 27, 1964—the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code—then the six-year period of limitations applies (see CPLR 213, subd 2).

Subdivision 8 gives fraud claims a six-year limitations period, and the period had not expired here.

Central Trust Co. v. Goldman · filed 1979-05-22(8)

The motion was properly denied as to the second and third causes of action since the complaint states a cause of action in fraud and the applicable six-year statute has not expired (CPLR 213, subd 8).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues, which may be after a reasonable time for performance expires.

Lituchy v. Guinan Lithographic Co. · filed 1977-12-19(subd 2)

Special Term held that since the contract specifies no date or time of performance, the parties have a reasonable time to perform and that the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run as soon as such reasonable time has expired (see Brockhurst v Ryan, 2 Misc 2d 747). We agree with this legal premise, and believe that the question as to what constitutes a reasonable time under the circumstances presented here is a factual one requiring a trial.

Section 213(2) requires an action to be commenced within six years of when the cause of action accrues.

Carlin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States · filed 1978-10-30(2)

Plaintiff’s cause of action thus accrued, and the statutory period began to run, when each of the complained of loan transactions was made. This is not a case where the running of the statute was suspended until the discovery of the wrong (see Shaw v Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 91 Mise 2d 64; cf. Schiffman v Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36 AD2d 31).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for this declaratory judgment action.

Solnick v. Whalen · filed 1978-06-15(1)

The four-month Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 217 is inapplicable to this declaratory judgment action. The six-year limitation period found in CPLR 213 (subd 1) applies (see Lutheran Church in Amer. v City of New York, 27 AD2d 237).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for actions covered by it.

Perlmutter v. Don's Ford, Inc. · filed 1978-10-23

For the same reason, the four-year Statute of Limitations under section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply in this case. Instead, the six-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 213 is applicable.

Section 213(2) provides at least six years from accrual to move for permission to file a late claim.

Lahti v. State · filed 1979-02-23(2)

Further, claimants have, at the least, six years from September 13, 1974 (the earliest accrual date suggested herein), or until September 13, 1980, to move for such permission (CPLR 213, subd 2; Court of Claims Act, section 10, subd 6).

Section 213 gives an action for money had and received a six-year limitations period that begins when the right to sue becomes vested; when payment is conditioned on an audit, accrual awaits the audit and rejection.

City of White Plains v. City of New York · filed 1978-07-31

With respect to when the claim of the respondent City of White Plains "accrued” so as to commence the running of the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to an action for money had and received (see CPLR 213), the law seems settled that a cause of action accrues when the right to sue has become vested (Rason Asphalt v Town of Oyster Bay, 8 Misc 2d 411). ... It follows that where, by contract or statute, the governmental body’s obligation to pay is conditioned upon an audit, no suit can be brought by a claimant until the official charged with making the audit has done so and has formally rejected all or some part of the claim (City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659).

Section 213 requires an action to rescind a lease to be brought within six years after execution of the lease.

35 Park Ave. Corp. v. Campagna · filed 1979-11-20

The cause of action to rescind the lease between plaintiff corporation as landlord and defendants as tenants, interposed more than six years after the execution of the lease, is time barred (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(8) gives fraud actions six years from accrual, subject to the alternative two-year period from discovery when that period is longer.

IIT v. Cornfeld · filed 1980-03-17(8)

The combined effect of CPLR 213(8) and 203(f) thus is “two separately-timed and alternative limitations periods in the case of a delayed discovery: six years from accrual or two years from discovery whichever is longer.”

Subdivisions 1 and 2 provide a six-year limitations period for actions at law, running from accrual.

Goodyear Publishing Co. v. Mundell · filed 1980-04-24(1), (2)

The Statute of Limitations defense is unavailing for plaintiffs causes are actions at law which accrued on the nonsubmission of an acceptable manuscript by August 30, 1973, and this suit was commenced January 4, 1979, well within six years thereafter. (CPLR 213, subds 1, 2.)

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to quasi-contractual indemnification actions, accruing when the indemnitee pays the injured party.

McDermott v. City of New York · filed 1980-05-012

Given the quasi contractual character of the indemnification action, it was obvious that the contract Statute of Limitations, now six years (CPLR 213, subd 2), would be held controlling (Occhialino, Contribution, Nineteenth Ann Report of NY Judicial Conference, 1974, at pp 229-230).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitation period when no more specific limitation applies.

Ton-Da-Lay, Ltd. v. Friedman · filed 1980-05-29

Since no limitation of time pertains specifically to actions under section 861, a six-year Statute of Limitations governs (CPLR 213). This action was not commenced until 1975 and, therefore, the fourth cause of action is time barred.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for general contract actions.

Back O'Beyond, Inc. v. Telephonic Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1980-06-23(2)

The record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether the parties’ contract is in essence one for "services”, and accordingly governed by the general contractual six-year Statute of Limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (subd 2), or one for a "sale” of goods, in which event the four-year Statute of Limitations period set forth in section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code would apply.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period under its catchall rule.

Williamsville Southeast Amherst Homeowners Ass'n v. Sharpe · filed 1980-07-10(1)

The six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (subd 1) should apply to the present action, and Special Term erred in holding otherwise.

Section 213 gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Matter of REA Holding Corp. · filed 1980-12-12

The six year statute of limitations for contract actions contained in CPLR § 213 applies, and thus the fifth claim was not time barred when the amended complaint was served and filed on July 2, 1980.

Section 213 gives a six-year time limit for this contract action, measured here from the default in payment on Note No. 96.

Commercial Trading Co. v. Freidus · filed 1981-02-03

The action, based upon defendants’ contractual guarantee of payment and commenced in April, 1979 as to defendant Ella Freidus and May, 1979 as to defendant Jacob Freidus, was timely (CPLR 213). It was instituted within six years of the default in payment on Note No. 96, due March 28, 1974.

CPLR 213 (subd 1) provides a six-year Statute of Limitations when no other form of proceeding exists for resolving a challenge to a legislative act.

Harby Associates, Inc. v. City of Gloversville · filed 1981-06-25(1)

Since no other form of proceeding exists for the resolution of the issue, the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 1) applies (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224).

CPLR 213(1) gives an action seeking an injunction a six-year limitations period.

Rahabi v. Morrison · filed 1981-07-06(1)

Plaintiff does not, however, sue for damages. He seeks the equitable remedy of injunction which is governed by the six-year period of CPLR 213 (subd 1) (see 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.01). Thus, the action for an injunction was timely commenced.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Gallagher v. Gibbs · filed 1981-10-29(2)

Plaintiff, however, contends that the action is not on the policy itself and points out that the action is not against an insurance company, but is one for breach of contract for defendants’ failure to deliver a policy and is, therefore, governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions (CPLR 213, subd 2). Concededly, no policy was issued here and we conclude that the action is not to recover on the policy but rather is based on a breach of contract for failure to issue the policy.

Section 213 does not govern a simple conversion claim that falls under CPLR 214's three-year limitation.

Topal v. Exclusive Envelope Corp. · filed 1982-01-25

Even were the Sears, Roebuck case to be read as broadly as possible, the allegations of conversion are so remote from any contract that may have existed between the accountants and the corporations that there is no way to carry this simple claim from CPLR 214 to CPLR 213.

Section 213 requires an action to recover taxes paid on an unconstitutional levy to be brought within six years, with the period accruing when the taxes are paid.

City of Buffalo v. Wysocki · filed 1982-02-11(2)

The law is clear. An action to recover taxes paid on an unconstitutional levy is based upon an implied contractual obligation and is subject to a six-year Statute of Limitations which accrues when the taxes are paid.

Section 213(2) requires contract actions within six years, while section 213(8) sets a six-year period for fraud actions from discovery, subject to CPLR 203(f).

Lazzaro v. Kelly · filed 1982-04-02(2), (8)

Since the stock was purchased in 1970, the cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2). ... Although CPLR 213 (subd 8) provides that an action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from discovery of the fraud, that section must be read in conjunction with CPLR 203 (subd [f]) which requires that such an action “be commenced within two years after such actual or imputed discovery or within the period otherwise provided, computed from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever is longer.”

Section 213(8) gives fraud actions a six-year limitations period.

Kings Antiques Corp. v. Tucker · filed 1982-06-08(8)

There are triable issues as to when the facts constituting the alleged fraud occurred, and when they were discovered or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered, so that it cannot be determined on the papers submitted whether the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, either the six-year statute applicable to actions based upon fraud (CPLR 213, subd 8) or the two-year statute premised upon actual or imputed discovery of facts (CPLR 203, subd [f]).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period, and for constructive trust claims the period runs from the commission rather than discovery of the alleged fraud.

Muller v. Muller · filed 1982-06-16

Furthermore, the action is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations pursuant to CPLR 213. It has been held that as to a constructive trust action the statute runs from the commission, rather than the discovery, of the alleged fraud (Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; Motyl v Motyl, 35 AD2d 1051.)

Section 213(2) requires an action on the guarantee to be commenced within six years after the default.

Gazza v. United California Bank International · filed 1982-06-21(2)

Absent the tolling provisions of CPLR 203 (subds [c], [e]) which, for Statute of Limitations purposes, relate the time of service of counterclaims and amended answers back to the date of service of the original summons, the bank’s action would be untimely since it was not instituted within six years after Rocke’s default (see CPLR 213, subd 2\ American Trading Co. vFish, 42 NY2d 20; General Phoenix Corp. v Cabot, 300 NY 87; Shayne v Reynolds, 225 App Div 70).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for the contract claim at issue.

Brew v. Mason · filed 1982-07-09(2)

Accordingly the six-year Statute of Limitations was applicable (see CPLR 213, subd 2).

The section gives contractual claims a six-year limitations period.

Croken v. County of Nassau · filed 1982-10-12

Furthermore, because the substance of appellant’s claim and the relief sought are contractual in nature, the six-year Statute of Limitations period (CPLR 213) is applicable (cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assoc., 43 NY2d 389).

Subdivision 2 requires a contract claim to be brought within six years after the breach.

Todd Equipment Leasing Co. v. Logistic Distro Date, Inc. · filed 1982-11-01(2)

With respect to the Statute of Limitations question, plaintiff’s cause of action is founded upon an alleged breach by defendant Bright and his codefendants Smith and Hayutin, of their contractual obligation guaranteeing the payments due under the lease, and the claim must therefore have been interposed within six years from the breach (CPLR 213, subd 2).

For constructive fraud, Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period that runs from the commission of the wrong.

Childs v. Brandon · filed 1982-11-09(1)

whereas the New York Statute of Limitations for constructive fraud is six years (CPLR 213, subd 1) and runs from the commission of the wrong (see Bey Constr. Co. v Yablonski, 76 AD2d 875; McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, 1981-1982 Pocket Part, CPLR 213, pp 92-93).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year residual limitations period for actions not governed by a more specific limitations period.

Lyons v. Quandt · filed 1982-12-02(1)

The present action, therefore, is governed by the six-year residual Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 1; Savage v Savage, 63 AD2d 808, 809, app dsmd 46 NY2d 771).

The section imposes a six-year limitation period running from accrual, subject to the longer fraud-discovery period described by the court.

In re the Arbitration between PlyGem of Laurel, Inc. & Lee · filed 1982-12-07(2), (8)

The period of limitation is six years from the accrual of the cause of action (CPLR 213, subds 2, 8) or two years from the discovery of the fraud, whichever is longer (CPLR 203, subd |f]; Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353; see 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.25).

Section 213 gives contract actions six years to be commenced.

Bauer v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 1982-12-16(2)

Plaintiff has six years in which to sue for breach of contract. The breach occurred either on April 1, 1978 when plaintiff’s employment ceased or on the subsequent date when plaintiff became entitled to receive his retirement benefits, either of which is well within the prescribed Statute of Limitations.

Section 213 requires actions subject to its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years.

Nahmias v. Merchants Mutual Insurance · filed 1982-12-27

Also, the action was timely commenced under the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213; see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 193).

Section 213 bars an action governed by its six-year limitations period when commenced more than six years after the loss.

O'Neal v. General Electric Co. · filed 1983-04-20

Regardless of whether the plaintiffs’ action is one based on conversion or on breach of contract, it is barred by the Statute of Limitations (see CPLR 213, 214).

Section 213 requires this contract action to be commenced within six years.

Micha v. Merchants Mutual Insurance · filed 1983-05-05

Plaintiff’s cause of action clearly seeks recovery of damages for defendant’s alleged breach of its obligation to pay first-party benefits, an obligation created by contractual provisions contained in its insurance policy as required by law (Insurance Law, § 672), and thus the action must be commenced within six years (CPLR 213).

Subsection 1 gives equity actions a six-year limitations period, and subsection 8 gives fraud claims six years after commission or two years after discovery.

Pacchiana v. Pacchiana · filed 1983-05-09(1), (8)

While continuing duress or undue influence may toll a Statute of Limitations (Kamenitsky v Corcoran, 97 Mise 384, revd on other grounds 177 App Div 605; 54 CJS, Limitations of Actions, § 197; Ann., 121 ALR 1294), the instant suit is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations relative to equity actions, since the asserted coercion ceased upon the execution of the agreement (see CPLR 213, subd 1; Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86). Moreover, even if the complaint can be construed as alleging fraud by the husband in misrepresenting his assets, it is clear that the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the fraud within a short time after the marriage. Thus, even a claim of fraud would be untimely since the action was not commenced within six years after commission of the fraud or within two years after its discovery (CPLR 213, subd 8; 203, subd [f]).

Section 213 requires actions to reform an agreement based on mutual mistake to be commenced within six years of the occurrence and bars claims brought more than six years after payment.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1983-06-09(6), (8)

An action to reform an agreement based on mutual mistake must be commenced within six years of the occurrence (CPLR 213, subd 6) or two years from the discovery of the mistake (CPLR 203, subd [f]).

Section 213 supplies a six-year time limit for commencing covered actions.

Donahue-Halverson, Inc. v. Wissing Construction & Building Services Corp. · filed 1983-06-16

Therefore, the six-year Statute of Limitations on all of plaintiff’s causes of action expired prior to the commencement of this action in August, 1982 (CPLR 213; Rappaport v Blank, 66 AD2d 690; Siepka v Bogulski, 164 Mise 831).

CPLR 213 (subd 1) provides a six-year limitations period for claims not governed by a more specific limitations provision.

Pauk v. Board of Trustees · filed 1983-06-16(subd 1)

The essence of plaintiff’s-first cause of action is thus neither contractual nor statutory, but constitutional. For this reason, CPLR 213 (subd 1) is applicable to it and plaintiff’s action has not expired.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contractual and quasi-contractual claims, including property or pecuniary injury claims arising from a contractual relationship.

Baratta v. Kozlowski · filed 1983-06-27(2)

Since the action was commenced four and one-half years after its causes of action accrued, we must decide whether it is the three-year Statute of Limitations governing conversion, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty (see CPLR 214, subds 2, 3; Tobias v Celler, 37 NYS2d 399, affd 265 App Div 1065; Dinerman v Sutton, 45 Misc 2d 791) or the six-year statute governing contractual and quasi-contractual claims (see CPLR 213, subd 2) that applies. ... Since the claimed damage is to property or pecuniary interests and the asserted liability not only relates in part to an alleged failure to use due care, but also “had its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., supra, p 396), application of the six-year Statute of Limitations to the claims against the Bank is mandated by Sears and Video Corp. (supra). Thus, the complaint against the Bank is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim with no specifically prescribed limitation a six-year period running from the wrongful act or event creating the duty of restitution, and section 213(8) applies a six-year period to fraudulent-conveyance claims.

Dolmetta v. Uintah National Corporation · filed 1983-06-28(1), (8)

Since a cause of action for a constructive trust is one "for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law," it is governed by New York's six-year statute of limitations, N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law and Rules (CPLR) 213(1) (McKinney 1972) and runs from the occurrence of the wrongful act or event which creates a duty of restitution. ... Here, again, the period of limitations governing such claims under New York law is six years. CPLR 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); see Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v. Mastroianni, 56 A.D.2d 353, 358, 392 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1977), appeal dismissed, 42 N.Y.2d 824 (1977). ... Plaintiffs' failure to file suit until January 29, 1982 requires the dismissal of the seventh cause of action.

Section 213 applies a six-year limitations period to contract actions, including student loan contracts.

State of New York Higher Education Services Corp. v. Zamore · filed 1983-06-28

Although the Congress has seen fit to limit the right of a student borrower to a discharge in bankruptcy (US Code, tit 11, § 523, subd [a], par [8]; see State of New York v Wilkes, 41 NY2d 655), neither the Congress nor our State Legislature has excluded student loan contracts from the ambit of the six-year period of limitations applicable to contracts (CPLR 213).

The six-year fraud limitations period applies only when the injury would not have occurred without the fraud; incidental fraud allegations do not qualify.

New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1983-09-12(8)

The six-year fraud Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 8) is only applicable when there would be no injury but for the fraud (Glover v National Bank of Commerce, 156 App Div 247, 256). Where the allegations of fraud are only incidental to another cause of action, the fraud Statute of Limitations cannot be invoked (Brick v Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., supra).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Marine Midland Bank, N. A. v. Jerry Hamam, Inc. · filed 1983-09-23(2)

Even though the counterclaim may incidentally sound in tort, it pleads a cause of action for breach of contract which is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (see Western Elec. Co. v Brenner, supra; see, also, Erie v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 NY2d 321).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year catch-all limitations period when no more specific statutory period governs the claim.

Landmark Colony v. Board of Supervisors · filed 1983-09-28(1)

Otherwise, the six-year “catch-all” Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (subd 1) is applicable (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., 43 NY2d 389, 396).

Section 213(1) gives rescission causes of action a six-year limitations period.

Bowes & Co. v. American Druggists' Insurance · filed 1983-09-29(1)

There is a six-year Statute of Limitations for a rescission cause of action (CPLR 213, subd 1). Thus, the rescission claim is time barred and, therefore, not arbitrable, since it was not brought until 1981, more than six years after the effective date of the contract.

CPLR 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on the state breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Buccino v. Continental Assurance Co. · filed 1983-12-29(1)

This analysis applies to plaintiffs’ state breach of fiduciary duty claim as well. Under New York’s six year statute of limitations, CPLR 213(1), plaintiffs’ claim is barred with respect to events before February 17, 1976, not August 20, 1976, however, because the state claim was interposed for statute of limitations purposes when a similar action was brought against defendants in this Court in the name of the Fund.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for the breach of contract claim.

Lancaster v. Kindor · filed 1984-01-10

With regard to the breach of contract cause of action, the complaint states that plaintiff expected from the agreement to receive “the return on her investment in March of 1974.” Service by mail pursuant to the order was effected on February 19, 1980, and service by the Arizona process server took place on March 30, which would bring that cause of action within the ambit of the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213).

Section 213 generally requires covered actions to be commenced within six years.

Chase Architectural Associates v. Moyers Corners Fire Department, Inc. · filed 1984-01-27

Thus the demand for arbitration of Moyers’ claims for breach of contract and negligence was timely (see CPLR 213; Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., 58 NY2d 1026; Baratta vKozlowski, 94 AD2d 454).

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period, accruing when the trust agreement is breached or repudiated.

Schirano v. Paggioli · filed 1984-02-21(1)

An action to impose a constructive trust is equitable in nature (Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119), and is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 1; Augustine v Szwed, 77 AD2d 298, 300 [Simons, J. P.]). The cause of action accrues, in circumstances such as apparently exist here, when there has been a breach or repudiation of the trust agreement (Augustine v Szwed, supra, p 301; Bey Constr. Co. v Yablonski, 76 AD2d 875; Saldi v Saldi, 32 Mise 2d 516 [Hopkins, J.]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Calfapietra v. Donahue · filed 1984-03-052

Therefore, the applicable Statute of Limitations is the six-year period in CPLR 213 (subd 2) governing contract claims, and the claims are not time barred (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224; Cromer v County of Nassau, 77 AD2d 610, revd on other grounds 54 NY2d 927).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contract actions, including negligence claims seeking contract-recoverable property or pecuniary damages.

Hess Mobil Park, Inc. v. Sear-Brown Associates, P. C. · filed 1984-03-06(2)

“[Ain action for failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract insofar as it seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action is governed by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2).”

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for contract claims and fraud claims, subject to the applicable borrowing rule.

Klock v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. · filed 1984-03-30(2), (8)

Ordinarily, then, the six-year limitations period established in N.Y. Civ.Prac.Law § 213(8) for “an action based on fraud” would apply to securities fraud suits brought in New York. ... In the instant case, plaintiff seeks damages for injury to his pecuniary interests. He alleges that such damages resulted from defendants’ failure to act with due care and that such duty had its genesis in the contractual relationship between the parties. Upon this pleading, this claim for relief is subject to the six-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract claims in New York.

Subdivision 2 provides a six-year limitations period for contractual obligations, accruing on specific demand when no performance date is fixed.

Lopez v. Highmount Associates · filed 1984-04-05(2)

The applicable Statute of Limitations for commencement of the instant counterclaims was six years (CPLR 213, subd 2). However, since no time for performance was fixed in the ancillary contract, the six-year period did not begin to run until one of the parties to the agreement made a specific demand for performance (Rossi v Oristian, 50 AD2d 44,47; see, also, 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts, § 283).

CPLR 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to actions upon contractual obligations.

Medical Facilities, Inc. v. Pryke · filed 1984-05-03(2)

The court below correctly concluded that in the absence of the “165 lines” required by subdivision 5 of section 168 of the Insurance Law, or any reference to a shortened Statute of Limitations, this breach of contract action was governed by the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (subd 2).

Subdivision 2 gives contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Perritano v. Town of Mamaroneck · filed 1984-06-11(2)

The underlying claim is one in contract and the six-year limitations period (CPLR 213, subd 2) applies (Nassau Ch. of Civ. Serv. Employees Assn, v County of Nassau, 84 AD2d 784; Aloi v Board ofEduc., 81 AD2d 874).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Wydallis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1984-10-16(2)

The provisions of the all risk policy, however, limited the period for suit only for actions instituted within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Accordingly, an action lawfully instituted in New York by a New York resident is governed by this State’s six-year statute.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to statutory water charges for unmetered premises.

City of New York v. Steinfeld · filed 1984-10-18(2)

The City urges us to apply the six-year limitations period provided in CPLR 213 (2), since, it is argued, the duty to pay water charges is derived from an implied contract. While that contention may find truth with respect to water furnished to metered premises, where a “voluntary purchase” is involved and the charge imposed reflects the quantity of water consumed and services rendered (City of New York v Idlewild Beach Co., 182 Misc 205, affd 182 Misc 213), it is not accurate as concerns water furnished to unmetered premises, where the “rates so imposed must be paid regardless of the quantity of water used, or whether any water is used. Such a rate is a tax * * * and the obligation to pay it is created by the exercise of the taxing power of the local authorities” (New York Univ. v American Book Co., supra, p 297; see also, State Univ. v Patterson, 42 AD2d 328).

Section 213(1) generally gives declaratory judgment actions a six-year limitations period.

Costantakos v. Board of Education · filed 1984-11-26(1)

A declaratory judgment action is generally governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations period (CPLR 213, subd 1). However, where such action could have been brought as a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, a four-month limitations period applies (CPLR 217; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224).

Section 213(1) gives six years to bring an action for a permanent injunction removing an obstruction that interferes with an affirmative easement, with accrual when the obstruction causes a different and more extensive violation.

Filby v. Brooks · filed 1984-11-26(1)

An action for a permanent injunction to remove an obstruction which interferes with an affirmative easement is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 213 (subd 1) (Rahabi v Morrison, 81 AD2d 434). In this case, it is apparent that although a barrier has existed for more than six years, said barrier was moved on October 31,1981 in such a way as to cause “a different [and] more extensive violation” of the plaintiff’s easement (Rahabi v Morrison, supra, p 441). Plaintiff’s cause of action, therefore, accrued as of that date, and thus, her claim was interposed in a timely manner.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for actions for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.

Musso v. Tesmetges (In Re Tesmetges) · filed 1984-12-17(1)

In the present action, the applicable period of law for the bringing of an action in equity is provided by New York’s CPLR § 213(1) which allows six years for the bringing of actions “for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.” ... Alternatively, even if the period of wrongdoing began at the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy creating an estate in all his legal and equitable interests, in November of 1980, the Trustee’s filing in February of 1982 and his subsequent amended complaint in March of 1983, both, would have been well within the six year statute of limitations. ... Finally, it should be underscored that the Rubino case does not stand for limiting the time period of recovery to six years.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on express or implied contractual obligations or liabilities.

State v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co. · filed 1984-12-18(2)

As an action for indemnity, the applicable statute is the six-year period for actions “upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied” (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Borne · filed 1984-12-21

Consequently, if Borne had asserted this counterclaim when he filed his answer in March 1981, it would have been time barred under the six-year statute of limitations of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on contractual obligations.

Columbus Trust Co. v. Campolo · filed 1985-04-01(2)

Accordingly, this action which was commenced in or about October 1982, was not barred by the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; cf. Gazza v United Cal. Bank Intl., 88 AD2d 968).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims that are not liabilities created or imposed by statute.

City of New York v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1985-05-23

Hence, the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (2) is inapplicable, and the six-year period of CPLR 213 governs.

Subdivision (1)'s six-year limitations period for a constructive trust claim runs from the wrongful act giving rise to restitution, not from discovery of fraud.

Boronow v. Boronow · filed 1985-06-03(1)

With regard to the second cause of action to impress a constructive trust, it is well settled that the applicable six-year limitations period, CPLR 213 (1) commences to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered (Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954; Motyl v Motyl, 35 AD2d 1051).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, subject to revival by a qualifying partial payment.

Stabulas v. Brooks Piece Dye Works Corp. · filed 1985-06-10(2)

The portion of plaintiff’s claim that accrued within six years prior to the commencement of the action is not barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; 2 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 13:85). As to the portion of plaintiff’s claim that accrued more than six years prior to the commencement of the action, we agree with Special Term that there is a question of fact as to whether a partial payment revived the debt and took that portion of plaintiff’s claim out of the Statute of Limitations.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for constitutional challenges to statutes.

Burns v. Egan · filed 1985-07-01(1)

As a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute itself, the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1) would apply (see, Press v County of Monroe, 50 NY2d 695; Unanue v Town of Gardiner, 105 AD2d 1025, 1026-1027).

Section 213 generally bars contract claims for obligations accruing more than six years before suit, but a partial payment can revive the debt when it implies a promise to pay the remainder.

Jacobs v. Patterson · filed 1985-07-29

Defendant correctly concedes that the appropriate Statute of Limitations is the six-year statute applicable to contracts (see, CPLR 213). The general rule is that "[ojbligations under a separation agreement which accrued prior to six years before the commencement of an action for the recovery of arrears are barred by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations” (Galyn v Schwartz, 77 AD2d 437, 439-440, appeal dismissed 53 NY2d 701, mod on other grounds 56 NY2d 969, 972; Matter of Philippe, 31 Misc 2d 193, affd 19 AD2d 587, affd 14 NY2d 600; Kominos v Kominos, 12 Misc 2d 524, affd 9 AD2d 938). However, as with any other installment agreement, partial payment may function to revive a debt which would otherwise be barred; to have that effect, the payment must be made in circumstances from which "a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder” (Crow v Gleason, 141 NY 489, 493; Galyn v Schwartz, supra, at p 440).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period when no specific statutory time limit applies.

Tauber v. Lebow · filed 1985-09-17(1)

Rather, because there is no time limitation specifically prescribed by statute, the six-year period provided in CPLR 213 (1) applies.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to claims governed by it.

John W. Cowper Co. v. Buffalo Hotel Development Venture · filed 1985-11-15(2)

In our view, defendants’ claims are controlled by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limit on actions to recover child support arrears under a divorce decree or separation agreement unless the arrears were reduced to a judgment.

Story v. Brady · filed 1985-11-25

An action to recover child support arrears claimed pursuant to a divorce decree or separation agreement is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213), unless the arrearages have been reduced through further proceedings to a judgment (see, Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596; Galyn v Schwartz, 56 NY2d 969, modfg 77 AD2d 437).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period when no other form of proceeding is available to resolve the claims.

McClary v. Civil Service Employees Ass'n · filed 1985-12-09(1)

If there is no other form of proceeding available for the resolution of the litigants’ claims, the six-year limitation of CPLR 213 (1) will then be applicable. (Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224.)

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions to which it applies.

Chandler v. Coughlin · filed 1986-03-20(1)

Accordingly, the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]) applies rather than the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 since the constitutional challenge to the regulation could not be properly reviewed in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see, Press v County of Monroe, supra, p 701; Matter of Emery v LeFevre, supra).

Subsection (2) provides a six-year limitations period for a money-damages remedy, measured from when final payment fell due.

Yeshiva University v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. · filed 1986-03-25(2)

Such a remedy would be available for a period of six years measured from the time final payment fell due under the subcontract (CPLR 213 [2]; see, City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 668).

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for contract actions and accounting claims, with accrual governed by the breach or payment duty.

Bernstein v. La Rue · filed 1986-05-05

The Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions is six years (CPLR 213) and the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time of the breach (Kassner & Co. v City of New York, 46 NY2d 544). ... The plaintiffs cause of action for an accounting is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213) and accrues only when the duty to pay arises (see, Schochet v Public Natl. Bank, 220 App Div 201).

CPLR 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to actions seeking recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action.

A. Devaney, Inc. v. Graphic Solutions, Inc. · filed 1986-05-12[2]

Since the action at bar is one seeking "recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action” (Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., 58 NY2d 1026, 1028), Special Term properly found that the six-year contract Statute of Limitations is applicable (see, Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., supra; CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year general limitations period for a misrepresentation claim.

Hernandez v. Empire Mutual Insurance · filed 1986-06-17(1)

The cause of action for misrepresentation is also time barred under the theory of fraud, or the six-year general limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(2) requires actions on express or implied contractual obligations to be commenced within six years after final services have been rendered.

Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff · filed 1986-06-18(2)

Under NY CPLR § 213(2), an action must be commenced within six years after final services have been rendered if it is “an action upon a contractual obligation of liability express or implied.”

Section 213 bars claims subject to its six-year statute of limitations.

Bernstein v. Spatola · filed 1986-07-14

These claims are time barred (CPLR 213).

Subsection 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for equitable actions generally.

Brown v. Tonawanda Housing, Inc. · filed 1986-09-26(1)

A cause of action for constructive fraud accrues at the time the alleged fraud was committed, not when it was discovered (see, 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48; Buttles v Smith, 281 NY 226) and is subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations governing equitable actions in general (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Hearn 45 St. Corp. v Jano, 283 NY 139; Curry v Chollette, 57 AD2d 604; cf. Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353).

Section 213(1) gives actions for reformation of a contract a six-year limitations period.

Schmitt v. Schmitt · filed 1986-10-06(1)

However, an action for reformation of a contract is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]). The defendant’s counterclaim to reform the separation agreement was not brought until 1985, some IVz years after the parties entered into the agreement. Therefore, that counterclaim was time barred and should have been dismissed.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitation period for actions for which no specific time limit is prescribed.

State v. INA Underwriters Insurance · filed 1986-10-08(1)

Consequently, the applicable limitation period is the six years set forth in CPLR 213 (1) governing actions for which no time limitation is specifically prescribed.

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues.

Thompson v. Pittman · filed 1986-10-14(1)

Furthermore, such an amended counterclaim, based upon a transaction to which the original pleadings did not give notice, would have been barred at the time of trial (CPLR 203 [e]) by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]), which commenced to run on the date the plaintiff took title in his own name rather than in both names (see, Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954).

Section 213(1) requires an action for a constructive trust to be brought within six years of accrual.

Flaum v. Birnbaum · filed 1986-11-10(1)

An action for a constructive trust must be brought within six years of accrual (CPLR 213 [1]; Lyons v Quandt, 91 AD2d 709, 710).

Section 213 imposes six-year limitation periods on the contract, duress, and fraud claims, subject to the applicable accrual and discovery rules.

Pearl-Wick Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. · filed 1986-12-18(1), (2), and (8)

The first cause of action, alleging that Chase acted in a commercially unreasonable manner in choosing to auction the corporation’s assets and foreclosing on the mortgages, rather than asserting a claim for payment under the insurance policy, is a claim sounding in contract, governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations. (Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., 58 NY2d 1026, 1028; CPLR 213 [2].) Pursuant to CPLR 203 (a), this six-year period is to be computed from the time the cause of action accrued, which in this case was July 13, 1978, when Chase received possession of the collateral. ... The second cause of action, alleging duress in signing the letter agreeing to surrender the collateral peacefully, besides not being supported by adequate facts, is also time barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 213 [1].) ... The fourth cause of action, alleging that Chase made false representations to Pearl-Wick to induce it to enter into the July 13, 1978 letter, is also time barred. Assuming, arguendo, that false representations were made to induce Pearl-Wick to sign the July 13, 1978 letter, they must have been made prior to or on the date of the letter. The signing of the letter, however, occurred more than six years before the action was commenced, and this cause of action is, accordingly, time barred. (CPLR 213 [8].)

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period, but concealment does not extend it when the plaintiff knew of the injury giving rise to the action.

Payne v. Geary · filed 1987-01-27

Plaintiff attempts to invoke the six-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR § 213 by alleging that defendants are continuing to “conceal” their acts. Even if they are engaged in a cover-up, however, the alleged beating and refusal to treat are the bases for the action, and plaintiff plainly had reason to know of them. The injury giving rise to plaintiff’s action could not have been concealed from him in this case.

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for the stated equitable claims and fraud, subject to the fraud discovery exception.

Fava v. Kaufman · filed 1987-01-29(1), (8)

At best, the six-year period of limitations contained in CPLR 213 (1) applied to plaintiff’s equitable causes of action for a constructive trust, an accounting, breach of fiduciary relationship and restitution (see, Boronow v Boronow, 111 AD2d 735, 737; Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954; Guild v Hopkins, 271 App Div 234, 244, affd 297 NY 477; Siegel, NY Prac § 36, at 38). Regarding plaintiff’s claim for damages for fraud, the period of limitations would be six years from the commission of the fraud or two years from its discovery (CPLR 213 [1], [8]; 203 [f]; Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353, appeal dismissed 42 NY2d 824).

Section 213(4) gives six years to commence an action on a mortgage obligation.

Lovell v. Jimal Holding Corp. · filed 1987-02-17(4)

An undischarged mortgage of record does not constitute a defect in title where all action with respect thereto is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (62 NY Jur, Vendor and Purchaser, para 67, at 296; Matter of Bond & Mtge. Guar. Co., 69 NYS2d 564; see, CPLR 213 [4]). Here, the mortgagee averred that he had received only one payment of $100 on the mortgage and that as of November 11, 1967, he was still owed $11,900, plus interest. Therefore, absent a toll of the Statute of Limitations, any claim for the principal and/or interest is time barred.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to a declaratory judgment claim arising from an alleged contract, accruing when the contract is breached.

Nusca v. Fodera · filed 1987-04-06(2)

The plaintiffs declaratory judgment cause of action arose from an alleged contract and was therefore governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224). The claim accrued upon the breach of the contract, i.e., the time when the defendants failed to perform as required by the contract (see, Kassner & Co. v City of New York, 46 NY2d 544).

CPLR 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on the action at issue.

Frasca v. Frasca · filed 1987-04-27(2)

The Supreme Court properly concluded that the plaintiff’s first cause of action is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; Davis v Davis, 95 AD2d 674).

Section 213(6) provides a six-year limitations period for claims based on mistake.

In re the Arbitration between Allen & First Wallstreet Settlement Corp. · filed 1987-05-07(6)

Applying this liberal standard to the facts at hand, we find that respondent has articulated a colorable claim of mistake. Hence, the six-year period of CPLR 213 (6) is the governing time period.