N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(3)’s New York injury requirement is satisfied when the original event causing the injury occurs in New York, as when a New York bank refuses to honor a sight draft.

Incline Casualty Company v. The Corinthian Group · filed 2025-08-06(a)(3)

Here, the first effect of CCB Asia’s negligent supervision was felt when CCBNY declined to honor Plaintiffs’ sight draft upon presentment. That event, which occurred in New York where CCBNY is headquartered, triggered Plaintiffs’ reinsurance losses because it formally caused their loss of reinsurance coverage.

Section 302(a)(3) does not permit personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state injury causes financial consequences in New York solely because the plaintiff lives there.

Marks v. Farm & Wilderness Foundation · filed 1991-01-07(a)(3)

Financial consequences felt in the state of New York solely because plaintiff resides there, flowing from injury without the state, do not meet the test under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires a plaintiff to show that an out-of-state tortious act caused injury in New York; an injury with no alleged New York location does not establish jurisdiction.

Merritt v. Airbus Americas, Inc. · filed 2016-08-22(a)(3)

Plaintiff does not allege that her injury occurred in any particular state, let alone New York. ... As a result, Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of jurisdiction pursuant to 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)'s in-state injury requirement is satisfied when an out-of-state tort allegedly causes the loss of customers in New York.

Granada Television, International, Ltd. v. Lorindy Pictures International, Inc. · filed 1984-12-06(a)(3)

It is enough they allege the loss of customers in New York. We hold that plaintiffs have satisfied the first part of section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York from an out-of-state tort; the plaintiff’s New York domicile or business presence alone does not establish that injury.

Sturm v. Schrank · filed 1984-10-04(a)(3)

Subparagraph (3) requires a showing that defendants’ tortious acts, committed outside New York, caused injury to a person or property within the forum state. However, an injury does not occur in New York simply because the plaintiff is domiciled or does business there.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits a threshold showing of personal jurisdiction based on an out-of-state tortious act causing direct injury in New York.

Augsbury Corp. v. Petrokey Corp. · filed 1983-12-08(a)(3)(ii)

We believe that plaintiff has made out a threshold case for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]) as some evidence of a direct injury from acts without the State are alleged. Plaintiff has alleged an out-of-State tortious act and an in-State injury.

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York; indirect economic loss there from a conversion committed elsewhere does not suffice.

Associated Trade Development, Inc. v. Condor Lines, Inc. · filed 1984-06-01(a)(3)

Applying that principle to the instant case, it is apparent that there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over Condor under CPLR § 302(a)(3). If Condor committed any act amounting to a conversion of funds belonging to plaintiff, such act was committed in Maryland where the monies collected were allegedly retained, not in New York. Indirect economic injury in New York cannot, even if proven, sustain jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires evidence that a component manufacturer knew or should have foreseen the completed product’s destination in New York.

Martinez v. American Standard · filed 1982-12-20(a)(3)(ii)

Evidence that Vitreous knew or should have foreseen the ultimate destination of the completed product is essential to satisfy the statutory requisites of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]), and the constitutional due process requirements announced in Hanson v Denckla (357 US 235, 253, supra).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury within New York; later damage suffered there from an injury sustained elsewhere does not suffice.

Diskin Ex Rel. Diskin v. Starck · filed 1982-05-06(a)(3)

Plaintiffs cannot sustain jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) merely by showing that as domiciliaries of this state, they suffered further damage (either economic or physical), on account of the earlier injuries sustained outside the state.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant could reasonably expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Prentice v. Demag Material Handling, Ltd. · filed 1981-02-26(a)(3)(ii)

Since appellant shipped the hoist from its plant in Canada to respondent husband’s employer in North Tonawanda, appellant must be deemed to have been aware that any tortious act it committed during the manufacture of the hoist would have forum consequences. At issue is the question whether appellant was sufficiently engaged in international commerce so as to meet the second requirement for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]). ... Since appellant is in sole possession of information that may refute the allegation that it engages in substantial international trade, denial of appellant’s motion at this stage of the action was proper (see Siegel, New York Practice, § 93, pp 108-109).

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose business in New York satisfies paragraph (i), or whose substantial interstate revenue and reasonably foreseeable in-state consequences satisfy paragraph (ii).

Andrulonis v. United States · filed 1981-11-12(a)(3)

CPLR 302 is satisfied under both (3)(i) and (3)(ii) here. First, the Court’s holding sustaining jurisdiction over Glatt under 301’s “doing business” test a fortiori justifies jurisdiction under 302(a)(3)(i)’s identical language. ... Second, both prongs of 302(a)(3)(ii) are met. As noted above, Glatt derives two-thirds of its revenue from interstate commerce. Moreover, the Court finds that Glatt expected or reasonably should have expected any defective products to have consequences in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires injury in New York and reasonably foreseeable New York consequences from an out-of-state tort.

Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co. · filed 1980-02-14(a)(3)(ii)

It was likewise error not to dismiss the tort claim, because there was neither an injury in New York nor foreseeability of New York consequences within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not confer jurisdiction solely because a non-domiciliary’s out-of-state conduct causes financial loss to a New York resident.

Harem-Christensen Corp. v. MS Frigo Harmony · filed 1979-10-03(a)(3)(ii)

Moreover, even if it were constitutionally possible for us to assume jurisdiction, the applicable New York statute does not empower us to do so. ... In the instant litigation, we find the holding of the Appellate Division in Fantis, supra, to be wholly unpersuasive.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; a plaintiff’s New York domicile does not make an injury elsewhere an injury in New York.

McGowan v. Smith · filed 1979-12-21(a)(3)

Under those circumstances, jurisdiction over Mogi cannot be sustained by virtue of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, els [i], [ii]). An injury does not occur in New York simply because the plaintiff is domiciled here.

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York; economic loss to a New York domiciliary from physical injury suffered elsewhere does not qualify.

Dunn v. Southern Charters, Inc. · filed 1981-01-26(a)(3)

This section affords no basis for jurisdiction in this case, however, because the physical injuries claimed were not sustained within New York but in Rhode Island’s waters. The economic loss occasioned by physical injury to a New York domiciliary outside New York is not the “injury to person or property” the statute requires.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not confer jurisdiction for an out-of-state conversion when foreseeability rests only on the plaintiff’s New York location and the collateral was never in New York.

Sterling National Bank & Trust Co. v. Southern Scrap Export Co. · filed 1979-03-30(a)(3)(ii)

In the present case, plaintiff has not alleged any additional facts to support foreseeability other than the mere fact that Sterling is located in New York. Further, there were no negotiations in New York and the collateral in question was never located in New York. Accordingly, the Court determines that CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) does not provide a basis to assert jurisdiction over Southern Scrap.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury that has occurred in New York; a threatened injury is insufficient.

City of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc. · filed 1977-05-11(a)(3)

The cross motion by Werblin and the Authority to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is granted. Tort long-arm jurisdiction (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 3) on which the City has relied is not effective. For jurisdiction to be acquired injury must have occurred. While the complaint describes the threat of injury in this State, there is neither allegation in the complaint, nor factual showing on the motion that any injury has occurred in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) requires the tortious injury to occur in New York; the plaintiff’s New York residence alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Corke v. Sameiet M. S. Song of Norway · filed 1977-08-11(a)(3)

An injury does not occur within New York simply because plaintiff is a resident of the state. ... The situs of the injury from neither the fall nor the alleged medical malpractice is New York. Therefore, there is no personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302 permits a court to deny a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff shows purposeful concerted activity directed toward New York.

Lazarow, Rettig & Sundel v. Castle Capital Corp. · filed 1978-07-20

Upon review of this record we find that Castle has made a showing of purposeful concerted activity by third-party defendants sufficient in scope to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of CPLR 302, and sufficient in quality to warrant denial of third-party defendants’ motions to dismiss (see Peterson v Spartan Inds., 33 NY2d 463).

Section 302(a)(3) requires a direct injury in New York; lost profits felt there only because the plaintiff is based there are insufficient.

Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc., and Lehigh Colonial Corporation, Vsv. Norman Birenbaum, and David Birenbaum · filed 1975-11-28(a)(3)

We have held that section 302(a)(3) is not satisfied by remote or consequential injuries such as lost commercial profits which occur in New York only because, the plaintiff is domiciléd or doing business here.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York and substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce for jurisdiction based on an out-of-state tort.

Security National Bank v. Ubex Corporation Ltd. · filed 1975-11-25(a)(3)(ii)

Second, while the lack of injury in New York itself precludes a finding of personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a) (3) (ii), we may also note that third-party plaintiffs have failed to show that Chemical received substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York only if one of the standards in clauses (i) or (ii) is met.

Badger v. Lehigh Valley Railroad · filed 1974-10-31(a)(3)

Personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary defendant who commits a tortious act outside of the State which causes injury inside the State, as claimed by the plaintiff, cannot be secured unless the defendant meets one of the standards set forth in CPLR 302 (sub. [a], par. [3], els. [i], [ii]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires evidence that the defendant could reasonably expect its out-of-state act to have consequences in New York; proximity to the border alone is insufficient.

Tracy v. Paragon Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1974-05-23(a)(3)(ii)

The mere proximity of Robert Packer Hospital to the New York border is not, in these circumstances, sufficient of itself to establish a reasonable expectation on defendant’s part that there might be New York consequences, unless it also appeared that defendant had some knowledge thereof.

Section 302(a)(3) does not require a plaintiff to prove the underlying tort at a jurisdiction hearing; the defendant must have committed acts outside the state from which an adequately pleaded tort claim arises.

Evans v. Planned Parenthood of Broome County, Inc. · filed 1974-02-14(a)(3)

In our view, there is no requirement that the plaintiff prove a tortious act without the State (see 1 Weinstein-Kom-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 302.09). Once the requirements of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3, els. [i], [ii]) have been met, the only additional requirement is that the defendant was the author of acts without the State and that the complaint adequately frames a cause of action in tort arising from those acts.

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when its allegedly infringing products cause injury in New York.

Car-Freshner Corp. v. Broadway Manufacturing Co. · filed 1971-12-03(a)(3)

Defendant’s alleged infringement and unfair competition of which plaintiffs complain is a tortious act occurring within and without the State of New York, causing injury to plaintiffs in this state. ... Defendant’s motions are accordingly denied.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer jurisdiction based solely on economic injury felt in New York.

HH Trinity Apex Invs. LLC v. Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P. · filed 2022-11-10(a)(3)

Plaintiffs' reliance on the alleged extortion as a basis for CPLR 302(a)(3) jurisdiction is also misplaced, because their having felt economic injury in New York, alone, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction under [*2]that subsection.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident for an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury when the defendant should reasonably expect consequences in New York and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Archer-Vail v. LHV Precast Inc. · filed 2022-10-27(a)(3)(ii)

Turning first to the statutory requirements, we find that plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to establish that jurisdiction comports with the requirements of CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits New York courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant when an out-of-state tort causes injury in New York, the defendant should expect consequences there, and the defendant derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Mattheos v. JLG Industries, Inc. · filed 2022-12-01(a)(3)(ii)

The Court is thus satisfied that “RLM did more than just sell products to JLG that resulted in a tort in New York,” ECF No. 48 at 6 (emphasis added), and concludes that it has jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York; a death in Connecticut does not become a New York injury because the decedent’s estate can recover damages.

Crimi v. Elliot Bros. Trucking Co. · filed 1968-02-09(a)(3)

No matter how much one might stretch or strain Section 302(a), par. 3, the cold hard fact still remains that the actual injury caused by Demby’s alleged tort was the death of Lambert in Connecticut. Since the injury was not in New York, no jurisdiction can be exercised in this forum.

Section 302(a)(3) does not establish personal jurisdiction for conversion when the injury occurred where the defendant acted with respect to the property, rather than in New York.

American Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Cheshire Management Co. · filed 1988-08-18(a)(3)

Even assuming, as plaintiff argues, that Lyons was a willful conspirator in the conversion by CMC, jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(3) is not established. In cases of conversion, the injury is “deemed to occur in the place where the defendant’s acts respecting the property are committed.”

Section 302(a)(3) does not permit jurisdiction based on remote or consequential New York injuries that arise only because the plaintiff is domiciled, incorporated, or doing business there.

Friedr. Zoellner (New York) Corporation v. Tex Metals Company · filed 1968-06-12(a)(3)

Section 302(a) (3) is not satisfied by remote or consequential injuries which occur in New York only because the plaintiff is domiciled, incorporated or doing business in the state.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s tort causes injury in New York, the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there, and it derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce.

McCrory Corporation v. Cloth World, Inc. · filed 1974-06-24(a)(3)(ii)

Defendants certainly expected or should have expected their alleged acts to have consequences in New York. And, it is uncontested that Cloth World derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce. Thus, each of the terms of N.Y. CPLR § 302(a) (3) (ii) is clearly met.

For a claim involving lost business, § 302(a)(3) places the injury where the customers are located, rather than where the injured company is domiciled.

Sales Arm, Inc. v. Automobile Club of So. Cal. · filed 1975-10-22(a)(3)

In addition, with respect to the conspiracy count of the complaint, the claim of personal jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(3) must fail because there has been no injury suffered in New York to bring the case into New York under the statute. The place of injury, for the purposes of § 302(a)(3), is where the business is lost, i. e., where the customers are located, rather than where the injured company is domiciled.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a plaintiff alleging a commercial tort outside New York to show that the tort caused lost business in New York.

Securities Training Corp. v. Securities Seminar, Inc. · filed 1986-03-20(a)(3)

Assuming that copyright infringement is a commercial tort, section 302(a)(3) requires the plaintiff to show injury in the form of loss of business in New York arising from the tort.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; for asbestos exposure, the injury occurs where the exposure took place, even if the person later suffers from the disease in New York.

Hamilton v. Garlock, Inc. · filed 1998-12-29(a)(3)

Thus, while Hamilton may have suffered from his mesothelioma in New York or became aware of the disease in New York, his “injury” under § 302(a)(3) did not occur in New York, but in Virginia where his exposure to asbestos took place.

Section 302(a)(3) governs jurisdiction for a fraudulent statement made outside New York and directed to a person in New York.

Kelly v. MD Buyline, Inc. · filed 1998-04-01(a)(3)

Consistent with this history, the courts recognize that a fraudulent statement made outside New York and directed to a person in New York is a tort committed outside the state and must be assessed under section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; unpaid fees do not establish one merely because payment was due to a New York resident.

Whitaker v. Fresno Telsat, Inc. · filed 1999-12-14(a)(3)(ii)

If the conspiracy to defraud is the tort, the first or “original event” is either the structuring of the partnership sale to avoid payment or the actual withholding of payment to Whitaker, both of which occurred outside New York. To confer jurisdiction according to where payment should be made would be to base jurisdiction solely upon the fact that plaintiff resides in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state tortfeasor whose act causes injury in New York when the defendant should expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Roberts-Gordon, LLC v. Superior Radiant Products, Ltd. · filed 2000-02-25(a)(3)(ii)

As the court has found that § 302(a)(3)(ii) permits it to exercise personal jurisdiction over Superior with respect to the alleged trademark infringement, the court next determines whether the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with due process.

Section 302(a)(3)’s in-state injury requirement is satisfied when an out-of-state termination first affects employment performed in New York.

Distefano v. Carozzi North America, Inc. · filed 2001-10-18(a)(3)

In sum, we hold that since DiStefano’s employment took place in New York, the “original event which caused the injury” occurred in New York. Therefore, New York constitutes the “situs of injury” for § 302(a)(3) purposes in this case.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an alleged injury in New York unless the defendant also satisfies the requirements of subsection (i) or (ii).

Melnick v. Adelson-Melnick · filed 2004-12-22(a)(3)

The contention that plaintiff has been harmed here invokes Section 302(a), subd. 3, but it fails because there is not even a suggestion that defendant meets the requirements of Section 302(a), subd.3(i) or (ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose out-of-state tort causes injury in New York when the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

High River Ltd. Partnership v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2005-01-27(a)(3)(ii)

Because the court finds that personal jurisdiction over Mr. Coury would be proper under § 302(a)(3), the court need not address the other provisions. ... Section 302(a)(3)(ii) provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state” if he or she “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.”

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. v. Ingenium Technologies Corp. · filed 2005-06-14(a)(3)(ii)

It is reasonably foreseeable that the provision of materials that infringe the copyrights and trademarks of a New York company will have consequences in New York, see Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F.Supp.2d 549, 568 (S.D.N.Y.2000), and the defendant derives substantial revenue from international commerce. New York’s long-arm statute is therefore satisfied with respect to the federal-law claims.

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York; a plaintiff’s residence and resulting economic or emotional harm felt there do not alone establish it.

Lipin v. Bergquist · filed 2008-08-28(a)(3)

Plaintiff does not allege any injury that occurred within the state of New York within the meaning of § 302(a)(3). The only arguable basis for the existence of such an injury would be Plaintiffs residence in New York and Plaintiffs subsequent “experience” of economic and/or emotional injury in this state.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant whose out-of-state tort causes injury in New York when the defendant expected or reasonably should have expected consequences there and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha · filed 2010-06-15(a)(3)(ii)

It provides for jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who "commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, . . . if he . . . expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . ." In order to establish jurisdiction under that subsection of the law, a plaintiff is thus required to demonstrate that (1) the defendant's tortious act was committed outside New York, (2) the cause of action arose from that act, (3) the tortious act caused an injury to a person or property in New York, (4) the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected that his or her action would have consequences in New York, and (5) the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) treats injury to a New York copyright holder from unauthorized online uploading of a printed literary work as occurring in New York for personal jurisdiction purposes.

Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha · filed 2011-03-24(a)(3)(ii)

Thus, we conclude that the alleged injury in this case occurred in New York for purposes of CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause an initial injury in New York; a later arrest in New York does not satisfy that requirement when the initial injury occurred elsewhere.

Doe v. Delaware State Police · filed 2013-04-04(a)(3)

The issuance of the warrant was therefore the “original event” that caused any injuries that followed, and it took place in Delaware. ... Therefore, even if the allegations in the Complaint are accepted as true, Plaintiffs have not pled that Seaford PD “commit[ted] a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state,” as is required for personal jurisdiction under either subsection of § 302(a)(3).

Under § 302(a)(3)(ii), a New York copyright holder suffers an in-state injury when its printed literary work is uploaded without permission to the Internet for public access.

Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha · filed 2011-05-12(a)(3)(ii)

The Court of Appeals' decision now compels us to "agree with Penguin" and to conclude, for the purposes of the personal jurisdiction analysis pursuant to New York's long-arm statute, that the situs of Penguin's alleged injury was New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) treats New York as the situs of injury when a New York copyright holder’s printed literary work is uploaded without permission to the Internet for public access.

Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha · filed 2011-05-12(a)(3)(ii)

The Court of Appeals’ decision now compels us to “agree with Penguin” and to conclude, for the purposes of the personal jurisdiction analysis pursuant to New York’s long-arm statute, that the situs of Penguin’s alleged injury was New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes injury in New York, the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there, and it derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corp. v. NCS Power, Inc. · filed 2012-02-10(a)(3)(ii)

Given the size of the New York market and the quantity of batteries placed into the U.S. stream of commerce, it strains credulity that Yoku could not have foreseen that its actions would have consequences in New York. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that it can properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over Yoku pursuant to § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) does not authorize personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes no injury within New York.

Mirman v. Feiner · filed 2012-09-28(a)(3)

Thus, as the alleged tort did not “caus[e] injury to person or property within the state,” as that term is understood under CPLR § 302(a)(3), the exercise of personal jurisdiction under that subsection is not permitted.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) can support jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes foreseeable injury in New York and the defendant deliberately solicits New York residents through a website.

Mrs. United States National Pageant, Inc. v. Miss United States of America Organization, LLC · filed 2012-07-13(a)(3)(ii)

In the case at bar, I conclude that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of personal jurisdiction over defendants, both under New York’s long-arm statute and as a constitutional matter. The record before me indicates that defendants have deliberately reached into New York, primarily through the operation of their website, and that defendants’ allegedly tortious acts caused an injury to plaintiff within this state.

Section 302(a)(3) requires allegations supporting the applicable business or interstate-commerce conditions before a New York court may exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for an out-of-state tort.

Value Manufactured Homes, LLC v. Key Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-01-28(a)(3)

Plaintiffs premise jurisdiction over Brown on N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (mistakenly cited by both plaintiffs and Brown as § 302(c)(3)), which provides for jurisdiction in New York over a nondomiciliary who commits a tortious act outside New York causing injury to a person or property within New York, if the nondomiciliary either does business in New York or “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.... ”...There are no allegations in the complaint suggesting that Brown “expectfed] or should reasonably [have] expect[ed his] act[s] to have consequences in” New York, nor is there any suggestion that Brown “derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” In short, the complaint and the record before this Court are devoid of evidence, or even factual allegations, that support the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Brown.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Lawson v. Full Tilt Poker Ltd. · filed 2013-03-07(a)(3)(ii)

Although the Court reaches the same result as Segal with respect to § 302(a)(1), the Court finds that it does have jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state trademark defendant when the alleged infringement injures someone in New York, its consequences there were reasonably foreseeable, and the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co. · filed 2015-02-06(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to meet its burden of establishing jurisdiction over the defendants under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). ... The defendants should have reasonably expected its acts to have consequences in New York when it used its allegedly infringing website and emails to attract customers across the nation, including New York. ... Finally, the evidence clearly establishes that the defendants derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

For tortious interference claims under § 302(a)(3)(ii), the injury occurs where the plaintiff lost business.

United Mobile Technologies, LLC v. Pegaso PCS, S.A. De C.V. · filed 2013-01-30(a)(3)(ii)

In this case of tortious interference, the lower court properly found a lack of personal jurisdiction in New York, when the loss of business occurred in Mexico.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires facts showing a direct, non-speculative injury in New York; an intellectual property owner’s New York residence and economic losses alone do not suffice.

Troma Entertainment, Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc. · filed 2013-09-06(a)(3)(ii)

But it is just that: a theory of injury that—certainly in cases of the uploading and making available of copyrighted works, but also perhaps in isolation—may satisfy section 302(a)(3)’s injury requirement in a particular case. We find nothing in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, however, that relieves intellectual property owners of the obligation, in each case, to allege facts demonstrating a non-speculative and direct New York-based injury to its intellectual property rights of the sort Penguin II recognized.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; in a patent infringement case, the injury occurs where an infringing sale is made.

Rates Technology Inc. v. Cequel Communications, LLC · filed 2014-03-25(a)(3)

Drawing upon guidance from the Federal Circuit, several courts have held in patent infringement cases the situs of the injury is the place where the infringing sale is made. ... Yet, there are no allegations that the purportedly infringing sales took place in New York, and Mr. Lanham’s affidavit affirmatively confirms there are no sales to New York residents. ... Since RTI cannot establish an injury within New York, the Court need not consider the other elements of § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York to support personal jurisdiction based on a tort committed outside the state.

Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman · filed 2015-01-05(a)(3)

Next, to the extent Plaintiff alleges tortious conduct that occurred outside New York, the Court is unable exercise jurisdiction over PTI or Grossman under § 302(a)(3) because Plaintiff has not alleged that the resulting injury took place within New York.

For jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3), an injury from fraud occurs in New York when the victim’s financial loss first occurs there.

Sands Harbor Marina Corp. v. Wells Fargo Insurance Services of Oregon, Inc. · filed 2016-01-13(a)(3)

Thus, the situs of the injury inflicted upon Sands Harbor was in New York because Sands Harbor’s financial loss occurred there.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; a New York copyright holder's lost income or an online posting alone does not establish one.

Adwar Casting Co. v. Star Gems Inc. · filed 2018-10-18(a)(3)

However, that a New York plaintiff may have lost income does not constitute "injury to person or property within the state." ... That the images at issue were allegedly uploaded to the internet does not warrant a finding of in-state injury under Penguin Group as this case does not involve the type of digital piracy at issue therein.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)'s foreseeability requirement is not satisfied by a manufacturer's general awareness that its products might reach New York.

Boyce v. Cycle Spectrum, Inc. · filed 2015-12-08(a)(3)(ii)

With respect to the second additional condition (302)(a)(3)(ii)), HL Corp. at best had a general awareness that its products might end up in New York, a large market for bicycles. Such a generalized awareness is insufficient to satisfy the statute.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer whose product causes injury in New York when the manufacturer derives substantial revenue from international commerce and should reasonably expect its conduct to have consequences in New York.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Swizz Style, Inc. · filed 2017-03-23(a)(3)(ii)

Based on the allegations presented and Swizz Style’s supporting declaration, Swizz Style has made a prima facie showing that Stadler Form derives substantial revenue from international commerce... and should reasonably have expected the potential design flaw associated with the air purifier to have ramifications in the United States generally and New York specifically.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires reasonably foreseeable, direct consequences in New York from an out-of-state tortious act; hypothetical, indirect consequences do not suffice.

Touro College v. Fondazione Touro University Rome Onlus · filed 2018-09-24(a)(3)(ii)

A plaintiff relying on section 302(a)(3)(ii) must satisfy five elements, but we need only address the fourth: whether the Foundation “expected or should reasonably have expected the [alleged tortious] act to have consequences in New York . . . .” Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 16 N.Y.3d 295, 302 (2011). ... We conclude that these hypothetical consequences in New York are too indirect to satisfy the test.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on damages felt in New York when the injury-causing event occurred elsewhere.

Seabrooks v. Brown, Jr. · filed 2019-10-24(a)(3)

Plaintiff’s damages that occurred in New York are not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) where the underlying events took place outside New York.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; receiving treatment there does not satisfy that requirement when the injury occurred elsewhere.

Santamaria v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2020-04-28(a)(3)

The long-arm statute’s third subsection confers personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3). ... Despite undergoing treatment in New York, Plaintiff does not allege that the incident which caused his injuries occurred in New York—it occurred in Florida.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a plaintiff alleging an out-of-state tort that caused injury in New York to satisfy one of the provision’s additional conditions for personal jurisdiction.

Williams v. Stephens · filed 2019-09-18(a)(3)

But this particular provision of the long-arm statute attaches additional conditions. A defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under this provision only if she “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state” or if she “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(i)–(ii). Neither condition is alleged by the complaint. The complaint therefore does not successfully establish this Court’s jurisdiction over Stephens.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; the injury occurs where the original event caused it, rather than where resulting damages are felt.

Strauss v. The Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure · filed 2020-03-26(a)(3)

Moreover, the injury at issue in Strauss’s cases — the loss of his Kentucky medical license —indisputably occurred in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, as did, in fact, all the alleged conduct in his cases. Therefore, Strauss has suffered no injury within New York sufficient for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the KBML.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; a plaintiff’s New York residence does not establish that requirement when the events causing the injury occurred elsewhere.

Bonilla v. Nelson & Kennard · filed 2020-09-28(a)(3)(ii)

As each of the events that caused Plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred in California, the Court finds that the situs of injury is California, and not New York. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)’s foreseeability requirement can be met when a component manufacturer knows its parts will be incorporated into products sold in New York, even if the particular product at issue was sold elsewhere.

Peerless Insurance Company v. A.O. Smith Corporation · filed 2020-07-21(a)(3)(ii)

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires consideration of two conjunctive prongs: the reasonable foreseeability of consequences in New York, and the derivation of substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. ... The court concludes that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing at this stage that Component Manufacturer Defendants could have foreseen the potential consequences in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a tortious act committed within New York, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce for jurisdiction based on an out-of-state act causing in-state injury.

Lynx Capital Partners of NJ, LLC v. Bayes Capital LLC · filed 2023-06-22(a)(2), (a)(3)(ii)

However, the complaint should have been dismissed as against Hockeytown for lack of personal jurisdiction, as plaintiff failed to make a "sufficient start" in demonstrating jurisdiction under either CPLR 302(a)(2) or (3)(ii) (see Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 185 AD3d 22, 30 [1st Dept 2020]). As to personal jurisdiction over Hockeytown under CPLR 302(a)(2), both the alleged transferor and the alleged transferees were New Jersey entities, and the complaint offers no other indicia that the transfers occurred in New York (see Kramer v Vogl, 17 NY2d 27, 31 [1966]). As to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), plaintiff has not alleged that Hockeytown "derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce," as required to confer jurisdiction under that subsection.

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for certain tortious acts outside New York that cause injury in New York, subject to additional conditions.

Konopka v. Clemons · filed 2023-08-21(a)(3)

As a threshold issue, Section 302(a)(3) “is expressly limited to tortious conduct, and thus cannot confer jurisdiction over plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.” AVRA Surgical Robotics, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 361; see Madison Cap. Markets, LLC v. Starneth Eur. B.V., No. 15-CV-7213, 2016 WL 4484251, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016). That subsection therefore cannot provide a basis for personal jurisdiction for Konopka’s breach-of-contract claim.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act within New York, while section 302(a)(3) requires a tortious act outside New York causing injury to person or property within New York.

Koh v. Koo · filed 2023-08-21(a)(2) and (a)(3)

Second, Plaintiffs invoke N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) and (3), provisions of New York’s long-arm statute. ... Most notably, nowhere do Plaintiffs address the Maum Entities’ argument that they fail to allege that Defendants “commit[ed] a tortious act within the state,” as required by Section 302(a)(2), or that Defendants “commit[ed] a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state,” as required by Section 302(a)(3). ... But such allegations do not suffice. ... In short, Plaintiffs have “not articulated a non-speculative and direct injury to person or property in New York,” so they cannot establish personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) confers jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when five elements are met, including injury to a person or property within New York.

UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corporation · filed 2023-07-19(a)(3)

UPS failed to allege the third element under Section 302(a)(3), which requires that the tortious act caused injury to a person or property within New York.

Section 302(a)(3) locates an unfair competition injury where the plaintiff lost business for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Spectacular Promotions, Inc. v. Radio Station WING · filed 1967-09-01(a)(3)

In determining the situs of an injury resulting from an act of unfair competition for jurisdictional purposes — and here the relevant consideration is fairness of the trial forum — there are three possibilities worth considering: (1) any place where plaintiff does business; (2) the principle place of business of the plaintiff; and (3) the place where plaintiff lost business. For purposes of a jurisdictional statute such as New York’s, the first can be rejected almost out of hand; the second has slight merit; and the third seems most apt.

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes injury in New York and the defendant either solicits business there or reasonably expects consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce.

Newman v. Charles S. Nathan, Inc. · filed 1967-10-23(a)(3)

We therefore have a situation where a cause of action arising from a tortious act without the State causes injury to a person within the State and where the nondomiciliary third-party defendant admittedly solicits business in this State. This alone would warrant jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3, cl. [i]). In addition, it also appears that Middletown could reasonably expect its alleged tortious act to have consequences in this State and that it derives substantial (98% of its total sales) revenue from interstate commerce, which would also warrant jurisdiction over said nondomiciliary under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3, cl. [ii]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires the original injury to occur in New York; later damage suffered there by a New York domiciliary does not suffice.

Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc. · filed 1967-12-08(a)(3)

In other words, CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3) looks to the imparting of the original injury within the State of New York and not resultant damage, in order that jurisdiction might be effectuated.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) can provide jurisdiction over a claim arising from an out-of-state tortious act causing injury in New York even when the claim is framed as contractual.

Garbellotto v. Montelindo Compagnie Navegacion, S. A. · filed 1969-01-06(a)(3)(ii)

There is nothing in the substantive interests with which the New York legislature was concerned in enacting § 302(a) (3) which could warrant making jurisdiction turn upon technical distinctions between “tort” and “contract.”

Section 302(a)(3) can provide jurisdiction over an out-of-state commercial tort causing injury in New York when the defendant regularly solicits business there.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Richardson · filed 1969-02-19(a)(3)

Turning to CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3), it appears to this court that the affidavits and exhibits attached thereto establish that the defendant Manheim regularly solicits business in the State of New York. ... The tort in question, however, as noted above, is commercial in nature, contractual if you will. ... Nonetheless, on the language of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3) it seems to this court that plaintiff has established a jurisdictional basis to acquire in personam jurisdiction over defendant Manheim.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary manufacturer that derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce and should reasonably foresee New York consequences from its alleged out-of-state tort.

Gonzales v. Harris Calorific Co. · filed 1970-01-08(a)(3)(ii)

No determination need be made, however, as to whether the volume of New York .sales is sufficient to satisfy CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3, cl. [i]) since it is the opinion of this court that personal jurisdiction attaches under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3, cl. [ii]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires the original injury to occur in New York; a more severe result that later manifests there is insufficient.

Kramer v. Hotel Los Monteros S. A. · filed 1977-05-12(a)(3)(ii)

CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii] is inapplicable because the plaintiffs have not only failed to show the • doing-business requirement of that subdivision but also because the injury, the dog bite, occurred in Spain even though its most severe medical result, septicemia, did not manifest itself until the plaintiff husband had returned to New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; the plaintiff’s New York domicile alone does not establish where the injury occurred.

Stark Carpet Corporation v. M-Geough Robinson, Inc. · filed 1980-01-17(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff’s assertion that it was injured in New York rests only on the basis of its domicile in New York. The cases discussed above make it abundantly clear that residence alone does not locate the injury in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) does not provide personal jurisdiction when the alleged tort causes death outside New York, even if the decedent’s distributees suffer resulting losses in New York.

Porcello v. Brackett · filed 1981-12-23(a)(3)(i)

This wrongful death claim arises out of Cheney’s death in Ohio as a result of the alleged negligence of Brackett and there is no basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [i]).

Section 302(a)(3) does not treat financial loss felt in New York solely because the plaintiff lives there as an injury within the state.

Mije Associates v. Halliburton Services · filed 1982-12-13(a)(3)

It is of no importance for jurisdictional purposes that the financial consequences of the mishap may be felt in New York because the partners live here.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires the original injury to occur in New York; later damages suffered there do not establish personal jurisdiction.

Ditchik v. Baines · filed 1987-08-05(a)(3)(ii)

These subsequent damages, howéver, cannot supply the predicate injury to invoke long arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; a resident’s pecuniary loss from an alleged out-of-state tort, without more, does not establish one.

Cooperstein v. Pan-Oceanic Marine, Inc. · filed 1986-11-10(a)(3)(ii)

Therefore, the plaintiffs allegation that he suffered pecuniary loss based upon Mutual’s alleged fraud and misrepresentation, without more, is insufficient to sustain his burden of showing that the injury occurred in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) does not establish jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s New York injury is remote from the alleged tort and results merely from its domicile in the State.

Davidson Extrusions, Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co. · filed 1987-06-01(a)(3)

Additionally, the plaintiffs contention that jurisdiction may be established pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) is unavailing. The injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff in New York are clearly remote from the alleged tortious conduct and are merely the result of its domicile in the State (see, Sybron Corp. v Wetzel, 46 NY2d 197; American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F2d 428).

Section 302(a)(3) locates an injury where the original injurious event occurred, rather than where the plaintiff later feels the resulting damages.

Hermann v. Sharon Hospital, Inc. · filed 1987-12-21(a)(3)

The Supreme Court properly found that CPLR 302 (a) (3) is inapplicable here, since the alleged injury occurred in Connecticut. The situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff (see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 273-274; Kramer v Hotel Los Monteros, 57 AD2d 756, lv denied 43 NY2d 649).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act in New York, while § 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort.

Van Essche v. Leroy · filed 1988-08-24(a)(2), (a)(3)

Because the alleged tort committed by defendants occurred in Texas, and because the alleged injury was sustained by plaintiff in Monaco, no jurisdiction exists over defendants under either § 302(a)(2) or (3) of New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; economic loss attributable only to the plaintiff’s New York domicile is insufficient.

United Rope Distributors, Inc. v. Line · filed 1992-02-28(a)(3)

Since Kim-Sail has not shown that the events leading up to the sinking of the Katia occurred in New York or that these events resulted in a loss of Kim-Sail’s New York customers, the court’s jurisdiction may not be predicated on section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires only one of its two alternative conditions for personal jurisdiction based on an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York.

David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld · filed 1993-02-02(a)(3)

In addition, Tunick has satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, subsections (i) and (ii) of CPLR § 302(a)(3), only one of which is necessary to a finding of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires the specified New York contacts before an out-of-state tortious act can support long-arm jurisdiction.

Porter v. LSB Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-07-16(a)(3)

In any event, commission of a tortious act without the State, without the requisite New York contacts, would not justify the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over LSB.

A non-domiciliary’s alleged tortious interference and unfair competition involving New York customers can support a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2) or (a)(3).

Modern Computer Corp. v. Ma · filed 1994-09-23(a)(2), (a)(3)

Construing the pleading and affidavits in favor of the plaintiff, the Court believes that at this stage of the litigation the plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Ma pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2) and (a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) require allegations that the defendant transacted business in New York or was present there when committing the alleged tortious acts.

Sud v. Sud · filed 1995-01-05(a)(1), (a)(2)

...plaintiffs complaint failed to allege either that Cheng was physically present or had transacted any business in New York when she committed the alleged tortious acts (CPLR 302 [a] [1], [2]; Van Essche v Leroy, 692 F Supp 320, 321).

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the alleged tortious acts and resulting injury both occurred outside New York.

Huxley Barter Corp. v. Considar, Inc. · filed 1995-06-06(a)(3)

... any tortious acts alleged by plaintiff occurred in Europe and caused injury in Europe (see, CPLR 302 [a] [3]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) can provide personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a personal injury action.

Kavakis v. Total Care Systems · filed 1994-11-14(a)(3)(ii)

The Supreme Court correctly found that the plaintiff had acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant Cleasby Manufacturing Company, Inc. (hereinafter Cleasby), pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) (see, Darienzo v Wise Shoe Stores, 74 AD2d 342).

CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) requires the plaintiff to establish an injury in New York and that the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Rosenberg v. Cosgrove · filed 1995-02-06(a)(3)(ii)

The plaintiff failed to establish that he sustained an injury within the State (see, Herman v Sharon Hosp., 135 AD2d 682; Weiss v Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, 85 AD2d 861). Moreover, the plaintiff did not establish that the defendants derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3) does not permit personal jurisdiction based solely on a plaintiff’s financial loss from the defendant’s conduct.

Cliffstar Corp. v. California Foods Corp. · filed 1998-10-02(a)(3)

We reject plaintiff’s contention that jurisdiction may be premised upon CPLR 302 (a) (3), based upon the financial loss allegedly suffered by plaintiff as the result of defendant’s conduct.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires injury in New York from an out-of-state tort; financial loss felt there by a resident does not establish injury in New York when the conversion occurred abroad.

Popper v. Podhragy · filed 1998-12-04(a)(3)(ii)

Here, the injury occurred either in Austria or in London when Johannes and Johanna undertook to sell a portion of the Trust property at a Christie’s auction. Although Popper suffered financial loss in New York, as Standard did in Fantis Foods, the actions that injured him occurred in Austria or London.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tortious act to cause injury in New York for personal jurisdiction to apply.

Miller v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1999-01-13(a)(3)

There is no jurisdiction over Commercial under CPLR 302 (a) (3). That statute contemplates jurisdiction where the nondomiciliary “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state”. It does not apply here, because the out-of-State tortious act did not cause injury in New York within the meaning of the statute (see, Lancaster v Colonial Motor Frgt. Line, 177 AD2d 152 [1st Dept 1992]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires the injury from an out-of-state tort to occur in New York; continuing damages experienced there do not suffice.

Domond v. Great American Recreation, Inc. · filed 2000-09-15(a)(3)

Here, the Plaintiffs admit that Marie suffered her injury in New Jersey. While she continues to suffer the damages resulting from that accident at her home in New York, the locus of the injury was not in the State of New York, and thus, outside the scope of CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires a tort committed outside New York that causes injury within the State; an alleged breach of contract alone does not satisfy that requirement.

World Sports Group, Inc. v. Motion Picture Academy of Arts & Sciences · filed 2000-06-08(a)(3)

In this action to enforce an alleged contract for the sale of $90 non-transferrable tickets to the Academy Awards ceremony for $5,000 per ticket, the court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3), over defendants Meyerkamp and Quinn Emanuel. Under the cited section of New York’s long-arm statute, jurisdiction is premised on the defendant’s commission of a tort outside New York causing injury within the State.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing Co. · filed 2000-07-06(a)(3)(ii)

The conferral of jurisdiction under this provision rests on five elements: First, that defendant committed a tortious act outside the State; second, that the cause of action arises from that act; third, that the act caused injury to a person or property within the State; fourth, that defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the State; and fifth, that defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. ... In short, we have no difficulty in concluding that CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) was satisfied in this case.

CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose out-of-state tort causes injury in New York when it reasonably should expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce.

Crair v. Saxena · filed 2000-11-13(a)(3)(ii)

Under the circumstances, NEMCH, through Dr. Raben, expected or reasonably should have expected consequences in New York resulting from the intended distribution of HGH to New York patients (see, Darienzo v Wise Shoe Stores, 74 AD2d 342; cf., Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592).

Section 302(a)(3)’s requirement of a claimed effect in New York can be satisfied by a resident’s alleged fear resulting from an out-of-state threat.

M.P. v. M.S. · filed 2000-10-17(a)(3)

This court holds that the petitioner’s assertion of fear resulting from the threat alleged to have been made in Florida is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of CPLR 302 (a) (3) that an out-of-State act must have a claimed effect within New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a plaintiff to establish that it sustained injury in New York.

HT Capital Advisors, L. L. C. v. Optical Resources Group, Inc. · filed 2000-10-26(a)(3)(ii)

In addition, plaintiff failed to establish that it sustained injury in New York as required by CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) (see, Weiss v Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, 85 AD2d 861).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort and the specified business activity or expected consequences tied to New York.

Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co. · filed 2001-08-30(a)(3)

This contention is unavailing because (i) any injury Nasik suffered from the alleged inducement was suffered in India, not New York (see Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 50, 62, 97, 123-25), and (ii) in any event, there is nothing in the record to suggest that either defendant engages in any conduct in New York, derives revenue from goods used or services rendered here, or expected that their acts would have consequences in New York, as would be required for jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; economic loss felt there solely because the plaintiff is located there is insufficient.

American Para Professional Systems, Inc. v. LabOne, Inc. · filed 2001-11-13(a)(3)

The mere fact that the economic consequence of what transpired in Tucson may be felt in New York “due to the fortuitous location of plaintiffs in New York is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3).”

Section 302(a)(3)(i) and (ii) require direct injury in New York from a tort committed outside the state; financial loss felt there solely because the plaintiff is based there is insufficient.

Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v. Sir-Tech Software, Inc. · filed 2002-09-05(a)(3)(i), (ii)

Under the circumstances, it is apparent that plaintiff is unable to establish the kind of direct injury within New York that the statute requires, for any injury sustained by plaintiff is sustained in this state solely because plaintiff has its corporate presence here.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose out-of-state tort causes injury in New York when it engages in a persistent course of business conduct in the state.

Allen v. Marais · filed 2003-07-24(a)(3)(i)

While the complete extent of the revenue received by defendant from the use of its equipment in New York is not evident from the record, it clearly appears that defendant engaged in a persistent course of business conduct in this state sufficient to bring it within the scope of CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i).

Section 302(a)(3) does not establish personal jurisdiction merely because a plaintiff feels the loss of payments in New York when the alleged conduct occurred elsewhere.

Uebler v. Boss Media, AB · filed 2005-03-29(a)(3)

The mere fact that Uebler’s experience of having the payments terminated occurred in New York is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign accounting entity when it prepares misleading financial statements to solicit New York investors who rely on them and suffer harm.

Franklin High Income Trust v. APP Global, Ltd. · filed 2004-05-18(a)(3)

Plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant AWSC Société Coopérative (AWSC), a Swiss cooperative domiciled in Geneva, Switzerland, prepared financial statements that were to be used to solicit the interest of New York investors and, in so doing, either knowingly or recklessly misrepresented the financial condition of defendant APP Global, Ltd. and its subsidiaries, to the detriment of New York investors who relied upon the alleged misrepresentations, are adequate to sustain the action as against that branch of AWSC’s CPLR 3211 motion seeking dismissal of the action as against it for lack of personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 302 [a] [3]), notwithstanding any Swiss law to the contrary.

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) supports personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s members attend New York meetings where the alleged wrongdoing is discussed and advanced.

Semi-Tech Litigation, L.L.C. v. Ting · filed 2004-12-16(a)(1), (a)(2)

There was jurisdiction pursuant to both CPLR 302 (a) (1) and (2) over Ernst & Young (Hong Kong) based on the admission, which is uncontested, that its members attended meetings in New York where the allegedly false certificates and their consequences were discussed, and where the purported cover-up was allegedly advanced.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes injury to property in New York, the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there, and the defendant derives substantial revenue from international commerce.

Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Aktiengesellschaft · filed 2006-04-25(a)(3)(ii)

We rely upon CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) in affirming the motion court’s denial of CAIB’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (see Matter of American Dental Coop. v Attorney-General of State of N.Y., 127 AD2d 274, 279 n 3 [1987]). In our view, plaintiffs sufficiently allege, without dispute, that defendants, through CAIB’s wholly owned subsidiary and especially employees Lopatinsky and Radzinsky, committed tortious acts (the misrepresentations) outside of New York causing injury to property within New York, that they should have reasonably expected such acts to have consequences in New York, and that they derive substantial revenue from international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3) treats a tort causing economic injury as a basis for long-arm jurisdiction.

Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid Corp. · filed 2006-06-06(a)(3)

For purposes of establishing long-arm jurisdiction, a tort should be broadly defined to encompass one that causes economic injury.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an adequate link between a nonresident’s out-of-state conduct and injury in New York to support personal jurisdiction.

Rivas v. AmeriMed USA, Inc. · filed 2006-11-09(a)(3)

The claim against defendant Engelman for tortious interference with contractual relations was subject to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, since this Arizona resident’s alleged extrajurisdictional conduct was not adequately linked to injury in New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [3]).

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes injury in New York and the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Wing Shing Products (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co. · filed 2007-03-29(a)(3)

In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiff has carried its burden in establishing that Simatelex is subject to personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3); namely, that Simatelex’s alleged out-of-state tortious activity caused an injury within New York, and that Sima-telex should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in New York and derives substantial revenue from international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a plaintiff relying on an out-of-state tortious act to show that the defendant meets the requirements of subdivision (i) or (ii).

International Equity Investments, Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd. · filed 2007-03-01(a)(3)

But plaintiffs have made no showing that OF and OP meet the requirements of CPLR § 302(a), subd. 3(i) or (ii). Accordingly, the tenth claim will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

For long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), the situs of injury is where the event causing the injury occurred, not where the resulting damages occurred.

Uzan v. Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. · filed 2008-05-08(a)(3)(ii)

First, “the situs of the injury for long-arm purposes is where the event giving rise to the injury occurred, not where the resultant damages occurred” (Marie v Altshuler, 30 AD3d 271, 272 [2006]). The Telsim directors’ post-August 2005 refusal to grant a constructive trust over Telsim’s shares occurred in Turkey, not New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; medical treatment there after an injury in another state does not satisfy that requirement.

Vaichunas v. Tonyes · filed 2009-04-21(a)(3)(ii)

The situs of the plaintiffs injury was Atlantic City, New Jersey. Given that the injury occurred in New Jersey, and involved a nondomiciliary, it was not necessary to consider whether the additional aspects of CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) were met (see Siegel, NY Prac § 88, at 164 [4th ed]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) places the injury at the original event causing it, rather than where the plaintiff feels the resulting financial loss.

M & M Packaging, Inc. v. Kole · filed 2008-10-28(a)(3)(ii)

Here, the “underlying, original event” which caused the injury — IPC’s failure to grant M & M a license to use its certification mark — occurred in Idaho. As such M & M fails to meet the situs-ofinjury test and we lack personal jurisdiction.

For commercial, nonphysical losses, Section 302(a)(3) locates the injury where the critical events associated with the dispute took place.

Benefits By Design Corp. v. Contractor Management Services, LLC · filed 2010-07-08(a)(3)

The critical events allegedly constituting defendant’s breach of duty—that is, its alleged failure to properly inspect the documents before releasing the escrow funds—took place entirely in Arizona; thus, there was no basis shown supporting long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3).

Under CPLR 302(a)(3), the situs of solely economic injury from a commercial tort is where the original critical events occurred, rather than where the financial loss was felt.

CRT Investments, Ltd. v. BDO Seidman, LLP · filed 2011-06-09(a)(3)

Plaintiffs’ alternative argument, that BDO Tortuga is subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3), is also unavailing. ... Plaintiffs’ claim that they were sold the investment in New York is irrelevant, because the injury did not arise out of their purchase of the investment here, but, rather, out of EDO Tortuga’s alleged failure to appropriately perform its audit services.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort that causes injury in New York when its statutory requirements are met.

Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp. · filed 2010-06-23(a)(3)(ii)

The jurisdictional facts presently before this Court indicate that jurisdiction is most clearly available pursuant to § 302(a)(3)(ii), for a tortious act committed outside the state that causes injury within the state.

Section 302(a)(3) requires the original injury from an out-of-state tort to occur in New York for long-arm jurisdiction.

Gerena v. Korb · filed 2012-01-03(a)(3)

It simply does not matter what other contacts Korb has with New York - in the absence of the original injury occurring in New York, jurisdiction does not exist.

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York; alleged construction delays in New York can suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.

Urfirer v. SB Builders, LLC · filed 2012-05-31(a)(3)

We reach a similar conclusion as to plaintiffs’ alternate basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3). ... In our view, even assuming that all of Carlson’s and Ridgeway’s purported misrepresentations occurred in Connecticut, plaintiffs nonetheless have alleged sufficient facts as to the construction delays occasioned by defendants’ asserted failure to pay the New York subcontractors to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury-causing event in New York; the plaintiff’s residence there alone does not establish injury in the state.

Peters v. Peters · filed 2012-12-04(a)(3)(ii)

The court also properly found that UBS Bahamas is not subject to jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii), since the allegedly wrongful disbursement of approximately $20 million was not an injury-causing event in New York, but, rather, a decision by a trustee in the Bahamas to authorize the release of funds from bank accounts in Switzerland.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; for economic injury, the location of the first effect of the tort determines where the injury occurred.

Continental Industries Group, Inc. v. Equate Petrochemical Co. · filed 2014-10-10(a)(3)

The critical question for assessing where the injury took place for purposes of CPLR § 302(a)(3) is “where the first effect of the tort was located that ultimately produced the final economic injury.” ... Since the situs of the injury was Turkey, the district court did not have jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort; the injury occurs where the original event causing it took place.

Levans v. Delta Airlines, Inc. · filed 2013-12-23(a)(3)

In sum, plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) because Guyana, not New York, is the situs of injury.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the alleged injury occurred outside New York, even if the defendant engaged in a persistent course of conduct in the State.

Hardware v. Ardowork Corp. · filed 2014-05-20(a)(3)

Personal jurisdiction over Mr. Hardware may not, however, be based on CPLR 302 (a) (3) because, although he engaged in a persistent course of conduct within the State, the situs of the injury alleged in the third-party complaint is Connecticut, where the infant plaintiff was allegedly exposed to lead-based paint at a property owned by Mr. Hardware, regardless of whether the child resided in New York at the time (see Magwitch, L.L.C. v Pusser’s Inc., 84 AD3d 529, 532 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York; treatment of a New York resident’s relative outside the state did not establish that injury.

Waggaman v. Arauzo · filed 2014-05-07(a)(3)(ii)

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant’s alleged tortious act—prescribing medication in Texas to the plaintiffs mother while she was in Texas and in Florida—caused injury in New York (see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 112 AD3d 34 [2013]; O’Brien v Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 305 AD2d 199 [2003]; Hermann v Sharon Hosp., 135 AD2d 682 [1987]; cf. Penguin Group [USA] Inc. v American Buddha, 16 NY3d 295 [2011]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York, have reasonably foreseeable consequences there, and involve a defendant who derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Waggaman v. Arauzo · filed 2014-05-07(a)(3)(ii)

A plaintiff relying on CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) “must show that (1) the defendant committed a tortious act outside New York; (2) the cause of action arose from that act; (3) the tortious act caused an injury to a person or property in New York; (4) the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in New York; and (5) the defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce” (Penguin Group [USA] Inc. v American Buddha, 16 NY3d 295, 302 [2011]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York, located where the original event causing the injury occurred rather than where the plaintiff felt the resulting damages.

Thackurdeen v. Duke University · filed 2016-09-01(a)(3)

For jurisdiction to be proper under § 302(a)(3), the injury must have occurred in New York. ... “The situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are felt by the plaintiff.” ... Here, the “original events” all occurred outside of New York; jurisdiction is therefore improper under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) does not treat economic harm felt in New York after an out-of-state physical injury as an injury occurring in New York.

Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2016-12-30(a)(3)

There is no merit to Plaintiffs argument that New York may be considered the situs of the injury because she felt "economic injury” in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York and the defendant to derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Cotia (USA) Ltd. v. Lynn Steel Corp. · filed 2015-12-10(a)(3)(ii)

Thus, this alleged tortious act did not cause injury within New York, but in New Jersey. Plaintiff has also offered nothing but conclusory allegations that any defendant “derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce,” as required for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury to a person or property in New York for personal jurisdiction to exist.

McBride v. KPMG International · filed 2016-01-19(a)(3)(ii)

The motion court correctly found that New York lacks personal jurisdiction over KPMG UK pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii). While plaintiffs allege that KPMG UK committed a tort outside the state (negligently auditing nonparty Madoff Securities International, Ltd. [MSIL] in the United Kingdom), and their causes of action arise out of that tort, KPMG UK’s act did not cause injury to a person or property within the state.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a plaintiff relying on an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York to identify the defendant’s regular New York business or substantial revenue connection.

Yu v. Ma · filed 2016-12-15(a)(3)

Plaintiffs also contend, again in entirely conclusory fashion, that defendant committed a tort outside New York causing injury to them in New York, but, even if true, plaintiffs cite no instances of defendant doing regular business in New York, deriving substantial revenue in the state, or deriving substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce (CPLR 302 [a] [3]).

Section 302(a)(3) does not treat access to infringing content in New York, by itself, as an in-state injury to a copyright owner that neither resides nor has its principal place of business there.

Pablo Star Ltd. v. Welsh Government · filed 2016-03-16(a)(3)

For these reasons, a copyright owner that neither resides in New York nor has its principal place of business in New York may not assert that New York is the situs of injury in an online copyright infringement case where, as here, the basis for locating the injury in New York is simply that New Yorkers can access the infringing content online.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) does not support jurisdiction when the alleged malpractice and resulting injury occurred outside New York.

Venegas v. Capric Clinic · filed 2017-02-07(a)(3)(i)

Therefore, to the extent plaintiff alternatively relies on CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i), he failed to make a sufficient start in showing jurisdiction under that provision (id.).

Section 302(a)(3) locates a nonphysical commercial injury where the events causing it occurred, rather than where the plaintiff feels the resulting financial loss.

Katherine Sales & Sourcing, Inc. v. Fiorella · filed 2017-09-08(a)(3)

CPLR 302 (a) (3) permits the New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who commits a tortious act outside the State that causes injury to a person or property within the State. ... The situs of such a nonphysical commercial injury is the place where the original events that caused the injury took place, in this case California and New Jersey, not where the resultant monetary loss occurred ( see , Polansky v Gelrod , 20 AD3d 663, 664-665; American Para Professional Systems, v Labone, Inc. , 175 F Supp 2d 450, 455 [EDNY]).

CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; economic loss felt there alone is insufficient when the events causing the injury occurred elsewhere.

Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik · filed 2018-07-03(a)(3)(ii)

That plaintiff felt economic injury in New York, alone, is an insufficient basis to confer jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not provide jurisdiction when the original event causing the injury occurred outside New York, even if symptoms appeared in New York later.

Lebron v. Encarnacion · filed 2017-05-31(a)(3)(ii)

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the situs of the Plaintiffs injury is the Dominican Republic, and therefore, personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(3) is unavailable.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York; a petitioner’s New York executive offices alone do not establish that the injury occurred there.

IMAX Corp. v. Essel Group · filed 2017-10-10(a)(3)

Initially, petitioner failed to establish that New York courts have personal jurisdiction over the Essel Group and the individual respondents on the basis of a tortious act committed without the state “causing injury to person or property within the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [3]). As the original event that caused the economic injury was the demerger of E-City in India, the situs of the injury is India (see e.g. Cotia [USA] Ltd. v Lynn Steel Corp., 134 AD3d 483, 484 [1st Dept 2015]). Petitioner’s executive offices in New York do not alone constitute a sufficient predicate for jurisdiction (see Fantis Foods v Standard Importing Co., 49 NY2d 317, 326 [1980]; Peters v Peters, 101 AD3d 403, 404 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; damages later felt there do not move the site of an out-of-state injury to New York.

Abad v. Lorenzo · filed 2018-07-25(a)(3)

We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination that personal jurisdiction over the Amikle defendants was not conferred pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3) based upon alleged tortious activity occurring outside New York, causing injury within New York ( see Penguin Group [USA] Inc. v American Buddha, 16 NY3d 295, 302; Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592, 596-597). The situs of the injury is New Jersey, where the accident occurred, not New York, where the resultant damages were subsequently felt by the plaintiff ( see Bloomgarden v Lanza, 143 AD3d 850, 852; Minella v Restifo, 124 AD3d 486; Vaichuna v Tonyes, 61 AD3d 850; Lang v Wycoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 55 AD3d 793).

Section 302(a)(3) does not permit New York jurisdiction when the original event causing the injury occurred outside New York, even if the plaintiff later feels its effects in New York.

Haidon v. Budlong & Budlong, LLC · filed 2018-07-19(a)(3)

In applying the situs-of-the-injury test, it is clear that the original events that Plaintiff alleges caused each of her injuries occurred in Connecticut. It is of no consequence that Plaintiff continues to experience any ramifications of Defendants' alleged misconduct in New York after subsequently moving to this State.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort, with the injury’s location determined by the original event that caused it.

Jean-Louis v. Carrington Mortgage Services LLC · filed 2020-03-04(a)(3)

Under CPLR § 302(a)(3), the situs of an injury is determined by the location of the “original event which caused the injury.” ... In essence, the situs of the “wrong” he claims is where it was alleged to have occurred, namely, Connecticut.

For commercial torts causing purely economic loss, section 302(a)(3) locates the injury where the event giving rise to it occurred, rather than where the resulting damages occurred.

U.S. Immigration Fund LLC v. Litowitz · filed 2020-04-30(a)(3)

As to the remaining claims, New York's long-arm jurisdiction statute (CPLR 302[a][3]) does not serve as a basis for jurisdiction. In the context of commercial torts, where the damages are purely economic, "the situs of the injury is the location where the event giving rise to the injury occurred, and not where the resultant damages occurred" ( O'Brien v Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr. , 305 AD2d 199, 201-202 [1st Dept 2003]; see McBride v KPMG Intl. , 135 AD3d 576, 577 [1st Dept 2016]). The motion court correctly found that the critical events associated with the return of the investments occurred in Florida, where the plaintiffs' corporate offices are located, and not in New York, where the construction projects took place and where one of the plaintiffs was domiciled.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; an alleged injury to a business in Connecticut does not establish jurisdiction.

SK's Cosmetic Boutique, Inc. v. J.R. Silverberg Realty, LLC · filed 2020-06-24(a)(3)

Given that the situs of the injury was squarely in Connecticut, the Court has no basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to Sections 302(a)(2) or (a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; diversion of funds from outside New York to recipients outside New York does not place the situs of injury there.

Greenbacker Residential Solar LLC v. OneRoof Energy, Inc. · filed 2019-07-09(a)(3)(ii)

Because the conduct complained of involved the diversion of funds from outside New York to recipients outside New York, the "critical events," and thus the situs of injury, were not in New York ( see Deutsche Bank AG v Vik , 163 AD3d 414, 415 [1st Dept 2018]; CPLR 302[a][3][ii]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; lost licensing fees from online promotional videos did not establish one here.

Freeplay Music, LLC v. RIGOL Technologies USA, Inc. · filed 2020-02-04(a)(3)

As in Abrogast and Nian, Freeplay has failed to establish an injury in New York for purposes of CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)'s requirements concerning expected consequences in New York and substantial interstate or international revenue may warrant jurisdictional discovery when the evidence leaves material facts unresolved.

McDonough v. Cycling Sports Grp., Inc. · filed 2019-08-06(a)(3)(ii)

In particular, the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs and CSG, read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, indicates that AIM worked closely with CSG to design and manufacture cycling forks, knowing that those cycling forks would be incorporated into bicycles that would be sold by CSG within the state of New York. In addition, the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs and CSG demonstrates that AIM's products are sold worldwide, rendering it likely that AIM in fact has substantial revenues from international commerce. Significantly, in moving for summary judgment prior to any discovery having been taken, AIM has not presented any evidence regarding its revenues from which the Court could conclude that it does not derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the requirements of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) are not met.