N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296 does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on a person for his own discriminatory conduct.

Lilly v. State of New York · filed 2026-05-26(6)

Appellant is the only one alleged to have engaged in discriminatory conduct, and he may not be held liable for aiding and abetting his own violations of the State and City HRLs (see Hardwick v Auriemma, 116 AD3d 465, 468 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 908 [2014]).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discriminatory practices forbidden by the NYSHRL.

Madray v. Long Island University · filed 2011-06-02(6)

Instead, the Plaintiff names Dr. Kane in the fifth and sixth causes of action for discrimination and retaliation under the NYSHRL, which permit individual liability, ... and for aider and abettor liability, ... (“[T]he NYSHRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ‘for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.’”) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6)).

Section 296(6) permits aiding and abetting liability for non-employers, including out-of-state defendants.

Griffin v. Sirva Inc. · filed 2017-05-31(6)

The New York Court of Appeals decided that the district court had read Section 296(6) too narrowly, and explained that “Section 296(6) extends liability to persons and entities beyond joint employers,” that “Section 296(6) ... applies to out-of-state defendants,” and that the “provision should be construed broadly.” Id. at 14, 15, 29 N.Y.3d. at 187, 188, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 367, 76 N.E.3d 1063. Accordingly, we VACATE the order of the district court to the extent that it conflicts with the decision of the New York Court of Appeals and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

Section 296(6) requires an individual accused of aiding and abetting retaliation to have actually participated in the retaliatory conduct.

Kittle v. Mavis Discount Tire, Inc. · filed 2025-09-24(6)

While the Complaint alleges that Brown made racially derogatory remarks to Kittle, it does not allege that Brown participated in any way in the decision to transfer Kittle to a different work location or to terminate his employment.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees in compensation or employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of military status and requires a prima facie showing of protected status, satisfactory performance, adverse action, and circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Donley v. Village of Yorkville, New York · filed 2019-08-13(1)(a)

In addition to USERRA, the NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate "in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment" "because of" an individual's military status. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show that he was a member of a protected class who was performing his job duties satisfactorily, and that he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 296(1)(a) bars employment discrimination because of military status; a plaintiff must show an adverse employment action and facts supporting an inference of discrimination, while a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason supports judgment for the employer.

Won v. Amazon.com Services, Inc. · filed 2025-06-30(1)(a)

The NYSHRL similarly protects service members from discrimination. Under NYSHRL, it is unlawful for an employer, “because of an individual’s . . . military status .. . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a) (emphasis added). ... A plaintiff alleging military status discrimination under the NYSHRL must “plead both an adverse employment action and facts supporting an inference of discrimination.” ... The court finds that Amazon’s termination of Won was for a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason.

Section 296(2)(c)(iii) bars public accommodations from refusing to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities or failing to make those facilities available through alternative methods.

Range, Jr. v. 535 Broadway Group LLC · filed 2019-09-03(2)(c)(iii)

The NYSHRL bars “unlawful discriminatory practices” by public accommodations—as relevant here, a “refusal to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities,” or “a failure to make such facilities . . . available through alternative methods... .”

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and conclusory allegations that do not plausibly support discriminatory intent fail at the pleading stage.

Sewell v. Molloy University · filed 2019-09-26

Courts also analyze discrimination claims brought under NYSHRL using the McDonnell Douglas framework. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, the court will apply the framework to all of plaintiffs’ race-based discrimination claims under federal and state law, and to plaintiffs’ gender-based discrimination claims under state law. ... Thus, plaintiffs fail to state claim to relief for race-based discrimination under both federal and state law, and for gender-based discrimination under state law. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ race and gender discrimination claims is GRANTED.

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework; conclusory allegations that do not plausibly support discriminatory intent cannot survive a motion to dismiss.

Minto v. Molloy University · filed 2019-09-26

Courts also analyze discrimination claims brought under NYSHRL using the McDonnell Douglas framework. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, the court will apply the framework to all of plaintiffs’ race-based discrimination claims under federal and state law, and to plaintiffs’ gender-based discrimination claims under state law. ... Thus, plaintiffs fail to state claim to relief for race-based discrimination under both federal and state law, and for gender-based discrimination under state law. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ race and gender discrimination claims is GRANTED.

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, but conclusory allegations and unidentified comparators do not plausibly establish discriminatory intent.

Bacchus v. Molloy University · filed 2019-09-26

Courts also analyze discrimination claims brought under NYSHRL using the McDonnell Douglas framework. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, the court will apply the framework to all of plaintiffs’ race-based discrimination claims under federal and state law, and to plaintiffs’ gender-based discrimination claims under state law. ... These and the rest of the allegations in the complaints are conclusory and devoid of factual content that permits a plausible inference of any discriminatory conduct. ... Thus, plaintiffs fail to state claim to relief for race-based discrimination under both federal and state law, and for gender-based discrimination under state law. Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ race and gender discrimination claims is GRANTED.

Section 296 discrimination claims require a plausible allegation that the employer took adverse action and that a protected characteristic was at least a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Adams-Flores v. City of New York · filed 2020-03-02

To state a claim under both Section 1983 and NYSHRL, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against [her] and (2) [her protected characteristic] was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” ... Although Murphy’s comment about “Driving Miss Daisy,” taken by itself, may not rise to the level of a statutory violation, when considered together with the allegation that he “denigrated [Adams-Flores], withheld [resources] from Plaintiff[], and instructed others to ignore Plaintiff[’s] directions,” it is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the Section 1983 and NYSHRL claims against Murphy.

Section 296 discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; admitted misconduct and temporal proximity alone did not establish pretext.

Crews v. City of Ithaca · filed 2022-05-12

The same analysis applies to Crews’s discrimination claim under the NYSHRL. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). ... The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to Crews’s retaliation claims brought pursuant to both Title VII and the NYSHRL. See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). ... For substantially the same reasons as with her discrimination claims, no reasonable jury could find that IPD’s proffered reason for disciplining Crews—her substantially admitted record of misconduct—“was merely a pretext for an unlawful [retaliatory] motive.” Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, mere “temporal proximity”—the only factor that distinguishes Crews’s claim of pretext in the retaliation context from her claim of pretext in the discrimination context—“is insufficient to satisfy [her] burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext.” El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

For claims accruing before October 11, 2019, the NYSHRL's amended standards do not apply retroactively, and its discrimination and retaliation claims generally use Title VII's standards.

Osekavage v. Sam's East, Inc. · filed 2022-08-03

These claims under the NYSHRL are generally governed by the same standards as federal claims under Title VII. ... Several amendments to the NYSHRL, “the effect of which is to render the standard for claims closer to the standard of the [New York City Human Rights Law] . . . . only apply to claims that accrue on or after the effective date of October 11, 2019; they do not apply retroactively to Plaintiff's claims here. ... Thus, for the same reasons that the Court found issues of fact as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Defendants, the Court finds issues of fact as to Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims against Defendants.

Section 296 discrimination claims accruing after August 12, 2019, must be construed liberally to advance the statute’s remedial purpose, under a standard closer to the NYCHRL.

Farah v. Emirates · filed 2024-03-31

Intentional discrimination claims accrued prior to the August 12, 2019, amendment of the NYSHRL should be analyzed under the same standard as claims brought under Title VII. ... NYSHRL discrimination claims accrued after August 12, 2019, must be construed “liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purpose of [the law]” and should now be interpreted as “rendering a standard for claims closer to the standard of the NYCHRL.” ... Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim for intentional discrimination under Title VII, and thus also state a claim under the more lenient standards of NYSHRL, and NYCHRL with respect to the City Office employees.

A claim of marital-status discrimination under § 296(1)(a) must be decided by a court or the State Division of Human Rights, rather than an arbitrator.

In re the Arbitration between Fallon & Greater Johnstown School District · filed 1986-03-06(1)(a)

Since the sole issue submitted to the arbitrator was whether the clause of the collective bargaining agreement in question discriminated on the basis of marital status (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]), the conclusion is inescapable that public policy requires the issue to be determined in the courts or before the State Division of Human Rights.

Section 296(1)(a) provides a discrimination cause of action when the alleged facts are sufficient to sustain it.

Samper v. University of Rochester · filed 1988-11-15(1)(a)

Since plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to sustain a cause of action under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]) against these defendants, the cause of action under the Civil Rights Law must likewise be sustained (see, People v Hamilton, 125 AD2d 1000, 1001).

A proposed gender-based employment discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a) is legally sufficient when a woman alleges that her employer discharged and discriminated against her because of her gender.

Daniels v. Empire-Ore, Inc. · filed 1989-06-22(1)(a)

In this case, the plaintiffs’ proposed twelfth cause of action states a legally sufficient claim under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a). Specifically, plaintiff Rebecca Daniels alleges that she is a member of a protected class (women) and that "defendant discharged plaintiff Rebecca Daniels from her employment and discriminated against her during her employment because of her gender.”

A claim under section 296(4) requires facts supporting discriminatory conduct.

Posner v. Synagogue · filed 1994-03-17(4)

In denying leave to amend plaintiffs’ Civil Court complaint for breach of contract, the IAS Court properly determined, based upon the record and documentary evidence, that the proposed amendment, seeking to allege that the defendant, a tax-exempt, non-profit religious institution, had discriminated against three year old Daniel, a child with a disability, in violation of the New York Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [4]) by allegedly expelling the child from the defendant’s nursery school, was devoid of merit and patently insufficient on its face. ... Accordingly, plaintiff failed to establish any factual or legal basis for the proposed amended claim that the defendant had engaged in discriminatory conduct.

Section 296 allows a separate discrimination claim to accrue each time another person is improperly promoted to a position that should have been offered to the plaintiff.

Nielsen v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1994-12-08

While defendant’s argument is convincing insofar as the second cause of action is concerned, Supreme Court was correct in refusing to dismiss the first, for it is settled law that a separate cause of action for discrimination in promotion accrues every time another individual is improperly promoted to a position that should have been offered to the plaintiff (see, Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 98 AD2d 318, 325, affd 63 NY2d 541; Matter of Swem v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 76 AD2d 1025), and plaintiff has averred that he was wrongfully passed over for promotion several times within the limitations period.

A complaint under § 296 must allege specific facts supporting a discrimination claim; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Vanscoy v. Namic USA Corp. · filed 1996-12-05

Lacking factual specificity from which we could devise a viable cause of action under Executive Law § 296, dismissal was warranted (see, Muka v Greene County, supra; Melito v Interboro-Mutual Indem. Ins. Co., supra).

An age discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296 cannot be compelled to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement when the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply.

Crespo v. Kreisel Co. · filed 1997-04-10

Accordingly, since I conclude that the FAA is not applicable to the instant claim of age discrimination, and that State public policy, as reflected in Wertheim (supra), bars arbitration of such a claim, the motion to dismiss based on the arbitration clause in the Agreement is denied.

Section 296 discrimination claims may be subject to agreements made in advance to arbitrate them.

In re the Arbitration between Ball & SFX Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1997-12-04

Finally, given the policy in New York of encouraging the resolution of disputes through arbitration (see, Corcoran v Ardra Ins. Co., 77 NY2d 225, 233, cert denied sub nom. Ardra Ins. Co. v Curiale, 500 US 953), we perceive no public policy reasons for precluding anticipatory agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Human Rights Law (see, Fletcher v Kidder, Peabody & Co., 81 NY2d 623, 635-636, cert denied 510 US 993).

A Section 296 age discrimination claim may proceed in court when a collective bargaining agreement does not clearly waive a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims.

Crespo v. 160 West End Avenue Owners Corp. · filed 1999-02-02

Plaintiffs claim of age discrimination under Executive Law § 296 is obviously a statutory claim rather than a “differenc[e] arising between the parties * * * as to interpretation, application or performance of any part of this agreement.” ... Since there is nothing in the arbitration agreement here that even arguably encompasses statutory claims of employment discrimination, a fortiori, there is nothing that can be construed as a waiver of a judicial forum for resolution of such claims.

A plaintiff claiming racial or religious discrimination under Section 296 must show circumstances surrounding a discharge that support an inference of discrimination to raise a triable issue of fact.

Evans v. Rosa Lee Young Childhood Center, Inc. · filed 2000-10-10

Additionally, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to her claim of racial and religious discrimination, as she did not demonstrate that circumstances surrounding her discharge gave rise to an inference of such discrimination (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 625; see also, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792).

Section 296 requires a discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must give a legitimate reason and the plaintiff must show pretext.

Jordan v. Bates Advertising Holdings, Inc. · filed 2007-12-27

In order to recover under section 296 of the Executive Law, a three part analysis is required to determine whether a plaintiff has met his/her burden in establishing a discrimination claim (see Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 265, 270 [2006]). A plaintiff in a discriminatory termination action has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case with a legitimate reason, and then again shifts to the plaintiff to show that defendant’s reasons are pretextual.

Section 296 permits a discrimination claim to survive dismissal when alleged treatment of a transgender benefits recipient supports an inference of discriminatory intent.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2013-12-02

Both the City HRL and State HRL protect certain groups from policies or practices that discriminate against them in areas such as employment, public accommodations and housing (see Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code § 8-107). ... Thus, based on the foregoing, plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 296(1)(a) permits age and race discrimination claims that satisfy the liberal pleading standard for employment discrimination claims.

McIntosh v. Department of Education · filed 2014-03-11(1)(a)

Applying the liberal pleading standards applicable to employment discrimination claims under the State and City Human Rights Laws (HRLs) (see e.g. Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P., 67 AD3d 140, 144-145 [1st Dept 2009]; Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]), plaintiff has stated causes of action for violations of both the State and City HRLs based on age and race discrimination.

When an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for termination, an employee claiming discrimination under § 296(1)(a) must show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Miranda v. ESA Hudson Valley, Inc. · filed 2015-01-29(1)(a)

Even assuming, as plaintiff now contends, that he was falsely accused of entering inaccurate information on the controlled substances log and inventory sheets and, further, that defendant mistakenly held him accountable for ensuring that both doors to the controlled substances locker were secured, plaintiff's Executive Law claim survives only if he can demonstrate that the stated basis for his termination "was designed to mask . . . discrimination" (Sommerville v R.C.I., 257 AD2d at 885). This he failed to do.

Age and gender discrimination claims under Section 296 are analyzed under the same standard as corresponding Title VII claims.

Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab., Inc. · filed 2005-08-24

I address all of plaintiff's Title VII and state and city law claims together because age and gender discrimination claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law are subject to the same analysis as such claims brought under Title VII.

Section 296 discrimination and retaliation claims cannot survive summary judgment without admissible evidence substantiating them.

Ferraro v. New York City Dept. of Educ. · filed 2021-11-18

The court also properly granted summary judgment to defendants on the merits as plaintiff's claims were not substantiated by admissible evidence and, as this Court has previously determined, there existed no record evidence that defendants "discriminated against plaintiff or retaliated against him when he complained, and he admitted that his requests for accommodations were largely granted" ( Matter of Ferraro v Fariña , 156 AD3d at 550).

Section 296(1) permits individual liability for discrimination only when the individual has an ownership interest in the employer or authority to hire and fire employees.

Buczakowski v. Crouse Health Hospital Inc. · filed 2019-11-26(1)

Section 296(1) of the New York Executive Law prohibits an “employer” from discriminating based upon the [‘age’] of an employee or job applicant. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). Individuals are liable as employers under Section 296(1) only if they have ‘an ownership interest,’ or if they ‘themselves, have the authority to hire and fire employees.’ ... Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants are employers for the purposes of the NYSHRL “because they had the authority to do more than mere [sic] carry out personnel decisions made by others.” Am. Compl. 49. But Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Individual Defendants has “the power or authority to hire or fire” Plaintiff. Edwards, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 304. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that the Individual Defendants have any ownership interest in Crouse Hospital. See id. Accordingly, the Court concludes the Individual Defendants are not liable under the NYSHRL as employers.

Section 296(a)(1) does not impose employer liability on employees as individual employers.

Bonaffini v. Brooklyn College · filed 2021-07-09(a)(1)

First, federal courts have long understood the NYSHRL to allow individual liability if the individual qualifies as an “employer.” See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(a)(1)). In a recent opinion, however, the New York Court of Appeals clarified that the NYSHRL “does not render employees liable as individual employers.” Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450, 457, 143 N.Y.S.3d 286, 291 (2021). That statement forecloses “employer” liability in this case.

Section 296(1) permits individual liability for an employer who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, including an individual with power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Kamiel v. Hai Street Kitchen Co. · filed 2023-03-13(1)

First, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), “individual liability may be imposed on an ‘employer’ who ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination.’” ... “An individual qualifies as an ‘employer’ when that individual has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the ‘power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.’” ... The AC plausibly alleges that Kawauchi participated in—indeed catalyzed—the discriminatory conduct.

Section 296 generally imposes discrimination liability on employers, while an individual employee may be liable only for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.

Cho v. Osaka Zen Spa · filed 2024-07-10

�e NYSHRL and NYCHRL make it unlawful, among other things, for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of disability or to retaliate against them for engaging in a protected activity. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.; N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq. �e NYSHRL “provides for liability for discrimination on the part of employers only.” Nezaj v. PS450 Bar & Restaurant, No. 22-cv- 8494 (PAE), 2024 WL 815996, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2024). Individual employees can be held liable under the state statute, but “only on an aider-and-abettor theory.”

Section 296(1) imposes liability for employment discrimination only on an employer.

Peterec v. TGI Fridays, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25(1)

As relevant here, the ADEA and NYSHRL impose liability only on employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (ADEA), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1) (NYSHRL). ... It is clear on the face of the FAC that Plaintiff fails to allege that Fridays Franchisor is an “employer” under either statute. ... Accordingly, his NYSHRL claims against Fridays Franchisor must be dismissed.

Section 296(1) makes an employer liable for employment discrimination, while the statute separately permits aiding-and-abetting liability against any person under subsection (6).

Smith v. AVSC International, Inc. · filed 2001-06-26(1)

The New York State Human Rights Law (“State HRL”) also provides for individual liability, but limits liability to the plaintiffs “employer” for discrimination, see N.Y. H.R.L. § 296(1), and to “any person” for aiding and abetting the employer’s discrimination, see N.Y. H.R.L. § 296(6).

Section 296(a) treats a supervisor as an employer for liability when the supervisor actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Kohutka v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2014-01-29(a)

“A supervisor is an ‘employer’ for purposes of establishing liability under the [NYHRL] if that supervisor actually participates in the conduct giving rise to [the] discrimination.”

Section 296(1)(a) does not impose liability on an employer or owner for a supervisor’s discriminatory conduct without evidence that they encouraged, condoned, or approved it.

Escobar v. Spartan Assemblies, Inc. · filed 1999-12-13(1)(a)

Spartan and Pappas are not liable under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) since there was no evidence that they encouraged, condoned, or approved of Sarabia’s allegedly discriminatory conduct (see, Matter of Totem Taxi v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 NY2d 300, 305; Sormani v Orange County Community Coll., 240 AD2d 724; McBride v General Ry. Signal Co., 96 AD2d 1145).

Section 296(1)(a) permits liability for sex discrimination by a company and by its owner based on the owner's discriminatory conduct.

Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v. Team Taco Mexico, Corp. · filed 2016-06-15(1)(a)

The Commissioner also properly determined that Team Taco is liable for the discriminatory conduct of Orduna, who was its owner, and that Orduna is individually liable based on his ownership interest in Team Taco (see Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Steve’s Pier One, Inc., 123 AD3d at 729; Matter of Murphy v Kirkland, 88 AD3d 795, 796-797 [2011]; Matter of Eastport Assoc., Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 71 AD3d at 891).

Section 296(15) limits liability for employment discrimination based on a prior criminal conviction to public or private employers.

Trathony Griffin Et Al., Appellants, v. Sirva, Inc., Et Al., Respondents · filed 2017-05-04(15)

Because it incorporates Article 23-A by reference, section 296 (15) of the Human Rights Law likewise limits liability to a public or private employer.

Section 296(1) prohibits discriminatory conduct by employers rather than individual employees acting alone.

Kwong v. City of New York · filed 2022-04-07(1)

The State HRL prohibits discriminatory conduct by "employer[s]" only, not individual employees (Executive Law § 296[1]; see Doe v Bloomberg L.P. , 36 NY3d 450, 456-459 [2021]).

Control over an employee’s work is central to whether an individual qualifies as an employer under § 296.

Firestone v. Berrios · filed 2013-01-22

Thus, prior to discovery and especially in the absence of any proof with regard to this essential fourth factor, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Dr. Kendall is not an “employer” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.

Section 296(2)(a) requires a plaintiff to show discriminatory intent when alleging that a place of public accommodation denied services because of a protected characteristic.

Domen v. Vimeo, Inc. · filed 2020-01-15(2)(a)

Both the California Unruh Act and the New York Human Rights Law require that Plaintiffs show discriminatory intent. ... Here, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Vimeo’s conduct was animated by discriminatory intent against Domen.

Section 296(2)(a) intentional-discrimination claims require plausible allegations that the plaintiffs are members of a protected class, the defendants intended to discriminate against them, and the discriminatory acts concerned an enumerated contractual activity.

Meyer v. Haines · filed 2025-06-11(2)(a)

The standard for intentional discrimination under § 296 is identical to that for claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ... To establish a § 1981 claim, plaintiffs must plausibly allege facts sufficient to support a showing that: (1) plaintiffs are members of a protected class; (2) defendants acted with intent to discriminate against plaintiffs; and (3) defendants’ discriminatory act(s) concerned a contractual activity enumerated under the statute.

Section 296(7) requires discriminatory intent for an unlawful retaliation claim; alleged misconduct involving disabled clients alone does not suffice.

Torge v. New York Society for the Deaf · filed 2000-03-23(7)

Plaintiff establishes, at best, defendant’s possible misconduct unaccompanied by any discriminatory intent as required by the statute.

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination based on race or national origin to plausibly allege an adverse employment action and that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employment decision.

Li v. Chang Lung Group Inc. · filed 2020-04-07

In order to plead a race or national origin discrimination claim pursuant to the NYSHRL, Plaintiff must “plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against [him] and (2) [his] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015).

Section 296 prohibits refusing to hire or employ an individual because of age or national origin, and NYSHRL discrimination claims generally use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ali v. Westchester Medical Center · filed 2021-03-17

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful to refuse to hire or employ an individual because of an individual's age or national origin. ... The same framework generally applies to NYSHRL claims.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) prohibits refusing to rent or otherwise denying a housing accommodation because of race or national origin, and claims under it are evaluated under the same framework as FHA housing-discrimination claims.

CNY Fair Housing, Inc. v. Swiss Village, LLC · filed 2022-07-08(5)(a)(1)

"The NYSHRL provides that it is unlawful discriminatory practice to refuse to (1) \"sell, rent, lease or otherwise to deny ... any person or group of persons ... a housing accommodation because of the race ... [or] national origin ... of such person or persons\"; (2) \"discriminate against any person because of race ... [or] national origin ... in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any ... housing accommodation\"; or (3) \"make any record or inquiry ... N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(5)(a)(1)-(3), 296(5)(c)(2). 'Claims under the FHA and [NYS]HRL § 296 are evaluated under the same framework.' Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2014))."

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits New York employers from refusing to hire or employ, barring or discharging, or otherwise discriminating against a person in employment because of national origin or another listed protected characteristic.

Obah v. City of New York · filed 2025-06-17(1)(a)

The NYSHRL prohibits New York employers from refusing to “hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment” any person because of their “race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship” or discriminating against such persons in “terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a). ... As with his Title VII claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged additional facts to nudge his national origin-based NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Thus, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims be denied with respect to Plaintiff's discrimination claims based on national origin.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on an individual’s country of birth or the country where the individual’s ancestors were born, but does not cover discharge because of political differences with the employee’s father.

Ingalls v. Town of Lyndon · filed 1985-02-27(1)(a)

It is clear that by the enactment of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) and Executive Law § 292 (8), the legislative intent was to . prohibit discrimination based upon the country where an individual was born as well as the country where an individual’s ancestors were born and does not prohibit the discharge of an employee because of political differences with the employee’s father.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on sex or national origin; a finding of no unlawful discrimination may be upheld when substantial evidence supports it.

Periana v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1991-06-24(1)(a)

The determination by the Commissioner that the respondent Becton Dickinson Immunodiagnostics did not unlawfully discriminate against the petitioner on the basis of her national origin and sex was supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 77 NY2d 411, 417-418; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176). There was evidence that the petitioner did not follow company procedure in documenting her work, had poor interpersonal skills, did not get along with her co-workers, and kept irregular hours.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin or age.

Bedny v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2011-05-17(1)(a)

Even assuming that petitioner met his prima facie burden of showing that he was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of his national origin or age (see generally Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]), respondent established a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason as to why the academic institution chose not to hire him.

Section 296(1)(a) allows a race or national origin discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence raises a factual question about whether either played a role in an employee’s termination.

Young v. Bessemer Trust Co., N.A. · filed 2025-03-25(1)(a)

The Court finds that Young meets his burden under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL as the parties’ submissions raise questions of fact as to whether Young’s race and national origin played a role in his termination.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in compensation or other terms of employment because of race or national origin.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. Triple S. Contrs., Corp. · filed 2026-01-28(1)(a)

As relevant here, the Human Rights Law makes it unlawful for an employer, because of an individual's race or national origin, "to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment" (Executive Law § 296[1][a]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination in compensation or other terms of employment based on race or national origin.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. Spot-Less Landscaping · filed 2026-03-11(1)(a)

As relevant here, the Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on an individual's race or national origin ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]). ... Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the determination that the complainant demonstrated, prima facie, that the respondents discriminated against him in his employment because of his race and national origin ( see Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Roadtec, Inc. , 167 AD3d at 900).

Section 296 does not impose primary liability on a coemployee who lacks ownership or authority over personnel decisions; such an employee may be liable only as an aider-and-abettor.

Hoit v. Capital District Transportation Authority · filed 2020-03-30(1)(a)

This argument fails because Clanton, as a “coemployee who has not been shown to have any ownership interest in the corporate employer or to have the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others” is not subject to liability under the NYSHRL except as an aider-and-abettor.

After the 2019 amendments, the NYSHRL applies a more liberal standard to discrimination and retaliation claims, which are generally analyzed like Title VII claims.

Balchan v. New Rochelle City School District · filed 2024-05-07

Claims of discrimination under the NYSHRL and Title VII are generally treated as “analytically identical.” ... However, because the subject conduct occurred after October 11, 2019, the amended, more liberal standard of the NYSHRL applies to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim. ... Given the Court’s finding here that Plaintiff plausibly pled a discrimination claim in violation of Title VII, Plaintiff has plausibly pled a claim under the more liberal standard of the NYSHRL. ... Prior to the 2019 amendments to the NYSHRL, retaliation claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL were governed under the same standards. ... Given the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII, the Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly alleged retaliation under the more liberal NYSHRL standard.

Section 296 uses the same recovery standards as Title VII, including the requirement that a race discrimination plaintiff show the adverse employment decision was motivated in part by an impermissible reason.

Nelson v. HSBC Bank USA · filed 2007-06-05

The standards for recovery under the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296) are the same as the federal standards under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-2 et seq.; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623 [1997]).

Section 296 uses the same legal standards as the ADA to establish discrimination.

Gill v. Maul · filed 2009-04-09

We note at the outset that cases addressing claims asserted under the ADA are relevant to our analysis, as the ADA and Executive Law § 296 use the same legal standards to establish discrimination (see Pimentel v Citibank, N.A., 29 AD3d 141, 147 n 2 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; Engelman v Girl Scouts-Indian Hills Council, Inc., 16 AD3d 961, 962 [2005]).

Section 296(16) bars discriminatory inquiries into certain protected arrests and criminal accusations in licensing, housing, employment, credit, and insurance, but does not create an evidentiary privilege or shield a party from discovery in federal court.

Taylor v. City of New York · filed 2020-11-09(16)

Plaintiff also objects to Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14 on the grounds that they violate N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(16). (See Pl. 2d Opp. 2-3). Plaintiff’s invocation of this statute is inapposite. It protects applicants for, inter alia, housing and employment from discrimination on the basis of their criminal history, it does not create an evidentiary privilege or shield Plaintiff from discovery in federal court. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(16) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, ... to make any inquiry about ... any arrest or criminal accusation [protected by] section 160.50 of the criminal procedure law, ... in connection with the licensing, housing, employment, including volunteer positions, or providing of credit or insurance to such individual.” (emphasis added).

Section 296 prohibits discrimination based on an arrest, a criminal conviction, or an erroneously perceived criminal conviction.

State Division of Human Rights v. Sorrento Cheese Co. · filed 1985-11-15(15), (16)

It is as much a violation of the Human Rights Law to discriminate against a person because of an arrest (see, Executive Law § 296 [16]) or a conviction for a criminal offense (see, Executive Law § 296 [15]) as it is to discriminate against that person because of an erroneously perceived conviction for a crime.

Section 296(15) prohibits denying a license because of a criminal conviction, subject to an exception when the offense directly relates to the license sought.

Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt · filed 1986-07-11(15)

Executive Law § 296 (15) codifies the policy of this State with respect to the disqualification of ex-offender and reads in part: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, agency, bureau, corporation or association, including the state and any political subdivision thereof, to deny any license or employment to any individual by reason of his having been convicted of one or more criminal offenses”. That policy as pointed out by the Board includes an exception where there was as here a direct relationship between the criminal offense and the specific license being sought.

Section 296’s criminal-conviction protection did not afford relief to an employee terminated after an arrest rather than a prior conviction.

Green v. Wells Fargo Alarm Service · filed 1993-04-27

Executive Law § 296 applies only to persons applying for employment previously convicted of a criminal offense and article 23-A of the Correction Law, to which it refers, affords plaintiff no relief.

Section 296(15) prohibits unlawful employment discrimination based on a criminal conviction.

Pioneer Group v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1991-06-07(15)

We find that there was substantial evidence supporting the State Division of Human Rights’ (SDHR) determination that petitioners unlawfully discriminated against complainant because he had been convicted of a crime (see, Executive Law § 296 [15]; Correction Law § 752; see also, State Div. of Human Rights v Sorrento Cheese Co., 115 AD2d 323).

A claim that a promotion was denied because of a prior conviction under § 296(15) cannot rest on speculation.

Alston v. City of New York · filed 2000-03-02(15)

Petitioner’s disputed assertion that he was denied the promotion because of his prior conviction for Federal mail fraud, in violation of Executive Law § 296 (15), is speculative, given the evidence of his mediocre performance as a caseworker and of his prior attempt to deceive ACS by seeking a medical leave when he had actually taken a job with another City agency (cf., Matter of Johnson v Katz, 68 NY2d 649).

Section 296 [15] and [16] permit employment decision makers to consider an applicant’s traffic violations and the circumstances underlying the applicant’s record of arrests, even when the applicant would have received youthful offender status upon conviction.

Johnson v. Conway · filed 2001-06-05[15], [16]

Respondents lawfully considered the record of petitioner’s traffic violations (Executive Law § 296 [15]; Correction Law § 750 [5]), and the circumstances underlying his record of arrests (Executive Law § 296 [16]; Public Authorities Law § 1266-h [1]), notwithstanding that he would have received youthful offender status had he been convicted (see, Matter of Bell v Codd, 57 AD2d 814, 815).

Section 296(16) does not bar an employer from inquiring into an applicant’s criminal history when another statute requires that inquiry.

Johnson v. Association for the Advancement of the Blind & Retarded · filed 2008-07-08(16)

Thus, the recent amendment to Executive Law § 296 (16) does not bar defendant from inquiring into plaintiffs criminal history.

Section 296(16) bars an employer from relying on sealed criminal proceedings in making an employment determination.

Daveiga v. City of New York · filed 2008-12-30(16)

There is no evidence that, in reaching its determination, respondent, in violation of CPL 160.50, 170.56 (4) and Executive Law § 296 (16), relied on the sealed record of the criminal proceedings that were instituted against petitioner and dismissed.

Section 296(16) protects an employee who alleges facts sufficient to bring him within the statute's protections.

Rossetti v. Aretakis · filed 2010-11-30(16)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that he was an at-will employee (see Riccardi v Cunningham, 291 AD2d 547 [2002]; Poplawski v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 262 AD2d 543 [1999]), and also correctly determined that, to the extent that his fifth cause of action could be interpreted to encompass an allegation that L & W violated the proscriptions articulated in Executive Law § 296 (16), he did not allege facts sufficient to bring him within the protections of that statute (see Green v Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 192 AD2d 463 [1993]).

Section 296(15) bars discrimination based on certain criminal convictions, and section 296(16) bars discrimination based on arrests that did not result in a favorable termination.

Shih v. Waterfront Commission · filed 2011-04-21(15) and (16)

Petitioner’s termination did not violate Executive Law § 296 (15) and (16). Disorderly conduct, a violation, to which petitioner pleaded guilty, does not constitute a “criminal offense” within the meaning of subdivision (15), and his arrest did not result in the termination of the criminal action in his favor, as required by subdivision (16).

Section 296(15) prohibits governmental entities from denying a license or employment in violation of Correction Law article 23-A.

Baman v. State · filed 2011-06-16(15)

Executive Law § 296 (15), which prohibits governmental entities from denying a license or employment in violation of Correction Law article 23-A, is likewise inapplicable.

Section 296(16) protects the person whose arrest and prosecution are at issue; it does not require removal of related information from another person’s inmate record.

Amaker v. Fischer · filed 2014-08-08(16)

The court properly concluded that the statutes relied upon by petitioner — CPL 160.50 and Executive Law § 296 (16) — do not require respondent to remove any information concerning the 2006 incident from petitioner’s inmate record. Those statutes provide protection only to petitioner’s mother, not to petitioner.

Section 296(15) does not cover employment discrimination claims based on vacated convictions because they are not legally cognizable convictions.

Schwarz v. Consolidated Edison, Inc. · filed 2015-08-03(15)

Based on a plain reading of the statute and case law interpreting same, the court finds that the absence of a legally cognizable conviction renders article 23-A and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws inapplicable.

Under § 296(15), an employer makes a prima facie showing for summary judgment on a criminal history discrimination claim by establishing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse actions that were not pretextual.

Brown v. Uptown Communications & Electric, Inc. · filed 2015-09-23(15)

With respect to the causes of action alleging that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff due to his criminal history, the defendants established, prima facie, that the subject adverse employment actions were undertaken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, and that those reasons were not pretextual.

Section 296(16) protects against adverse consequences based solely on a criminal accusation unless the charges are sustained; a guilty plea makes the conduct more than an accusation.

Matter of Hodge v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2020-02-13(16)

Executive Law § 296(16) " simply means that no individual should suffer adverse consequences merely on the basis of an accusation, unless the charges were ultimately sustained in a court of law'" ( Matter of Joseph M. [New York City Bd. of Educ.] , 82 NY2d 128, 130 [1993]). Hodge pleaded guilty based upon the [*2]offending acts. Thus they were more than accusations.

Section 296(15) does not categorically bar disqualification from eligibility for a police-officer position.

Matter of Coyle v. Kampe · filed 2020-07-29(15)

Moreover, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the disqualification determination did not violate the Human Rights Law ( see Executive Law § 296[15]; Correction Law §§ 750[5]; 752; [*2]Matter of Little v County of Westchester , 36 AD3d at 617).

Section 296(16) does not prohibit a prospective employer from asking generally whether a job applicant has ever been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony.

Gordon v. Envision Physician Servs., LLC · filed 2026-06-18(16)

The exhaustive list of inquiries prohibited by Executive Law § 296 (16) does not include the generalized inquiry posed here, namely, whether a job applicant has ever been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony.

Section 296(1)(a) requires an employer-employee relationship, and a parent is an employer of a subsidiary's employees only when the entities operate as a single integrated enterprise, assessed under a four-factor test focused principally on centralized control of labor relations.

Musiello v. CBS Corporation · filed 2021-02-11(1)(a)

Where, as here, a plaintiff does not argue that she was a direct employee of a parent company or that she was jointly employed by the parent company and the corporate subsidiary that was her direct employer, “a parent company is considered an ‘employer’ of its subsidiary’s employees only when the parent and subsidiary represent a single, integrated enterprise.” ... The Second Circuit has adopted a four-part test to gauge whether a parent and subsidiary were a single employer. It examines evidence of “(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.” ... Of these factors, the most “critical” is the second: centralized control of labor.

Section 296(1) permits individual liability when a defendant has an ownership interest in the employer or authority to hire and fire employees.

Domingues v. Cadillac · filed 2021-02-17(1)

Specifically, the “NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: (1) if the defendant has ‘an ownership interest in the employer or has the authority to hire and fire employees, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), and (2) if the defendant was aiding and abetting the unlawful discriminatory acts of others, id. § 296(6).” Setelius v. Nat’l Grid Elec. Servs. LLC, No. 11-CV-5528, 2014 WL 4773975, at *34 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Barton was the owner of Barton Chevrolet at the time of the events giving rise to this dispute. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20; Barton Dep. at 5:19-6:10). Thus, the Court determines that a jury could find that individual liability under the NYSHRL extends to Barton.

Section 296(3)(a) requires reasonable accommodation of a known disability absent undue hardship, and section 296(7) bars retaliation for protected activity; the court found no violation.

Payne v. Cornell University · filed 2021-01-05(3)(a), (7)

Because the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that Defendant afforded reasonable accommodations to Plaintiff, and that she was actually able to utilize the accommodations provided to her, the Court finds that Defendant must be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA and NYSHRL. ... For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims under the ADA and the NYSHRL.

Section 296 prohibits disability discrimination, including failure to make a reasonable accommodation, and protects against retaliation for opposing covered discriminatory practices.

Thomas-Tupper v. Catholic Charities · filed 2023-06-16(2)(c)(i), (5), (7)

The FHA, Section 504, and the NYSHRL all prohibit discrimination based on disability status, including discrimination by failure to make reasonable accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (FHA); McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 2012) (Section 504); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i) (NYHRL). ... The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants because “the undisputed record reveals that [Plaintiff] was accorded a plainly reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 73 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, Defendants offered Plaintiff the exact accommodation she sought. ... Similarly, the NYHRL prohibits “retaliat[ion] . . . against any person because he or she has opposed any practices,” including opposing certain practices of discrimination based on disability status. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(5), (7). ... The district court found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation because she had not offered evidence that any adverse actions—namely, the eviction proceedings and eventual eviction—were causally connected to any protected activity. We agree. ... There is no basis on which to infer that the eviction was in retaliation for Plaintiff’s request to have Kellett serve as her live-in aide, when the eviction proceedings began before she made the request and Defendants had agreed to the request. Instead, the record demonstrates that the eviction occurred in response to Plaintiff’s violation of her lease.

Section 296 requires employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship, and prohibits retaliation for requesting such an accommodation.

Tafolla v. Heilig · filed 2023-08-18(3)(a)–(b), (7)

The ADA and the NYSHRL require an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); N.Y. Exec. L. 296(3)(a)–(b). ... Accordingly, summary judgment was unwarranted on the reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA and NYSHRL. ... In short, construing the evidence most favorably to Tafolla, a rational jury could find that defendants retaliated against her for making the accommodation requests by forcing her to go on a medical leave which ultimately led to her termination. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claims under the ADA and NYSHRL.

Section 296(3)(a) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to known disabilities, while § 296(7) does not treat a bare request for accommodation as protected retaliation activity but may protect opposition to an unlawful denial.

Samuels v. The Urban Assembly, Inc. · filed 2024-08-30(3)(a), (7)

Like the ADA, the NYSHRL prohibits employers from “refus[ing] to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities . . . of an employee.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3)(a). “Claims under the NYSHRL for a failure to accommodate are governed by the same legal standards as federal ADA claims.” ... The NYSHRL also makes it unlawful “to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL] or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [the NYSHRL].” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... Unlike the ADA, under the NYSHRL, “a request for reasonable accommodation is not a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim.” ... Here, Samuels asserts that her accommodation request should be “considered protected activity” under the NYSHRL and that her “allegations that she requested . . . medical leave for her injuries suffice . . . at the motion to dismiss stage.” Pl. Br. at 11. The Court disagrees. Although the complaint also asserts, in a conclusory manner, that Samuels “opposed unlawful conduct . . . under the NYSHRL,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 93, she fails to state “practices forbidden under” the NYSHRL which she “opposed,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). Given that she does not plausibly allege that she engaged in any protected activity under the statute, Samuels fails to state a NYSHRL retaliation claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is thus granted.

Section 296(7) does not treat a request for a reasonable accommodation as protected activity supporting an NYSHRL retaliation claim.

Jordan v. City of New York · filed 2024-11-22(7)

In short, the August 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL did not change the NYSHRL to mean that a request for a reasonable accommodation is protected activity under the statute. Accordingly, the intermediate state court decisions that predate the August 2019 amendment control absent persuasive evidence that the New York Court of Appeals would reach a different conclusion. Therefore, Jordan’s claim of retaliation under the NYSHRL is dismissed as a matter of law.

Section 296 housing-discrimination claims are analyzed under the FHA’s reasonable-accommodation framework, requiring landlords to permit a reasonable accommodation when necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.

Martinez v. Lexington Gardens Assocs., Dennis Ovalle, L.A. Equities Corp. · filed 2018-08-28

Housing discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL are similarly analyzed under the same framework as claims brought under the FHA. ... In sum, defendants are required by the FHA and its state and local counterparts to permit Thelma Martinez to live in the disputed apartment to care for her disabled sister.

Section 296(3)(a) requires New York employers to provide reasonable accommodations for an employee's known disability in connection with a job or occupation sought or held.

Pimentel v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2006-03-16(3)(a)

It is well-established that the statutory duty of a New York employer under New York’s Human Rights Law is to “provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee ... in connection with a job or occupation sought or held.” (Executive Law § 296 [3] [a].)

Section 296(3)(b) requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.

New Venture Gear, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2007-06-08(3)(b)

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (3) (b), employers are required to make reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, provided that the accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on the employer.

Section 296(18)(2) requires reasonable accommodation so a person with a disability has an equal opportunity to use and enjoy an apartment.

Mozaffari v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2009-06-30(18)(2)

The Commissioner’s findings that Schatz was disabled within the meaning of Executive Law § 292 (21) and that petitioner Mozaffari failed to provide the reasonable accommodation she requested to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her apartment (see Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]) are “supported by sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole” and are therefore “conclusive” (Executive Law § 298; see City of Schenectady v State Div. of Human Rights, 37 NY2d 421, 424 [1975]).

Section 296(3)(b) requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled employees unless the accommodation causes undue hardship.

DiNatale v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-10-01(3)(b)

“Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (3) (b), employers are required to make reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, provided that the accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on the employer. A reasonable accommodation is defined in relevant part as an action that permits an employee with a disability to perform his or her job activities in a reasonable manner”

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s known disability.

Vinikoff v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2011-04-07(3)(a)

The Human Rights Law requires an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s known disability (see Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]; Matter of Tosha Rests., LLC v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 79 AD3d at 1338).

Section 296(3) permits a disability discrimination claim to proceed when factual disputes remain about the employer’s interactive process and whether a reasonable accommodation was possible.

Martin v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc. · filed 2013-03-15(3)

Here, the court properly determined that defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact with respect to, inter alia, whether defendant engaged in an interactive process to ascertain plaintiffs needs and whether a reasonable accommodation was possible.

Section 296’s reasonable accommodation requirement can be satisfied by allowing a tenant’s adult daughter to live with her temporarily while the tenant needs disability-related care.

Chun Po So v. Rhea · filed 2013-05-14

Although petitioner has a disability requiring essentially 24-hour care, her disability was reasonably accommodated by the offer to permit her adult daughter to reside in the apartment on a temporary basis, which she can continue to do as long as petitioner requires her assistance (see Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [5] [a] [1]; [15]).

Section 296 does not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a requested work location as a reasonable accommodation.

Silver v. City of New York Department of Homeless Services · filed 2014-03-11

Defendant established that the denial of plaintiffs request to be reassigned to a certain work location did not constitute a refusal to make a reasonable accommodation for plaintiffs disability (see Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107).

Section 296 generally precludes summary judgment for an employer that has not shown it engaged in a good faith interactive process about a disabled employee’s requested accommodation.

Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hospital Corp. · filed 2014-03-27

Despite those differing standards, we conclude that both statutes generally preclude summary judgment in favor of an employer where the employer has failed to demonstrate that it responded to a disabled employee’s request for a particular accommodation by engaging in a good faith interactive process regarding the feasability of that accommodation.

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate a known disability; a claim fails when the employee did not propose an accommodation the employer refused to make.

Leon v. State Univ. of N.Y. · filed 2014-08-27(3)(a)

The New York Human Rights Law provides, “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer ... to refuse to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee” (Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]). Here, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiff’s complaint was subject to dismissal to the extent that it alleged that the defendants violated Executive Law § 296 (3). ... In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with evidence that he proposed a reasonable accommodation that the defendants refused to make.

Section 296 permits an employer to satisfy its reasonable accommodation duty by engaging in a good faith interactive process and providing an accommodation that addresses the employee’s disability.

Porter v. City of New York · filed 2015-05-07

Defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they engaged in a good faith interactive process through which they provided plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation to address her vision and reading disabilities (see Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107).

Under § 296, an employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim without showing that it considered the requested accommodation through an interactive process.

Cohen v. State of New York · filed 2015-06-17

An employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim pursuant to Executive Law § 296 “unless the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the employer duly considered the requested accommodation,” and the employer cannot present such a record “if the employer has not engaged in interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of the employee’s request” (Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 837 [2014]).

Section 296 permits a disability discrimination finding when an employer agrees to an accommodation but fails to implement it.

Serdans v. New York & Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2016-04-14

Evidence of continued attempts by her supervisors to assign plaintiff to areas outside the cardio-thoracic intensive care unit (CTICU), combined with evidence that defendant cancelled her requests for shifts with increased frequency after granting her the accommodation allowing her to work exclusively in the CTICU, supports the jury’s conclusion that defendant failed to implement the agreed-upon accommodation.

Section 296 requires a tenant seeking an accommodation to show a disability, qualification for the tenancy, a disability-related need for the accommodation to use and enjoy the apartment, and that the accommodation is reasonable.

Matter of 1 Toms Point Lane Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2019-10-16

To establish that a violation of the Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, Hough was required to demonstrate that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of her disability it is necessary for her to keep a dog in order for her to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow her to keep a dog ( see Matter of Kennedy St. Quad., Ltd. v Nathanson , 62 AD3d 879).

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employee seeking a transfer as a reasonable accommodation to show that a vacant funded position exists and that the employee is qualified to fill it.

Woolf v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2022-12-15(3)(a)

Under the State HRL, a plaintiff seeking to hold an employer liable for failing to make a transfer as a reasonable accommodation bears the "burden of demonstrating that a vacant funded position exists and that plaintiff was qualified to fill that position" ( Pimentel v Citibank, N.A. , 29 AD3d 141, 147 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]; accord Brice v State of New York Dept. of Health , 24 Misc 3d 141[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51701[U], at *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2009]).

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer aware of a prospective employee’s need for accommodation to discuss possible accommodations, even without a specific request.

Matter of Hirsch v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2024-11-15(3)(a)

However, even where a petitioner "did not request any specific accommodation" prior to initiating "litigation, [NYSHRL] require[s] [employers] to engage in an interactive dialogue regarding possible accommodations once they bec[o]me aware of [a prospective employee's] condition" requiring accommodation ( Cooney v City of N.Y. Dept. of Sanitation , 224 AD3d 585, 586 [1st Dept 2024], citing Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]).

Section 296(3)(a) does not require an employer to provide a scent-free workplace when enforcing it would unduly burden the employer and affect other employees.

Dorio v. Community Hous. Mgt. Corp. · filed 2026-01-08(3)(a)

However, plaintiff's claim for failure to accommodate fails for the prime reason that plaintiff's request for a scent-free or limited scent environment is not objectively reasonable. Here, plaintiff chose to work in an office with other employees, whose rights would also be affected by a scent-free policy. In addition, Community Housing would be unduly burdened with identifying and removing any scent emanating from an employee which plaintiff considers bothersome.

Section 296(3)(a) requires an individualized assessment of whether a disabled employee can perform the job with a reasonable accommodation.

Matter of Smelyansky v. New York State Off. of Gen. Servs. · filed 2026-06-11(3)(a)

While OGS acted within its legitimate authority to abridge its flexible pandemic-era remote work policy, it was still required to conduct an individualized assessment of petitioner's ability to work remotely to accommodate her disability after it resumed primarily in-person operations.

Section 296(1)(c) prohibits race discrimination in employment, and a plaintiff must plausibly allege an adverse employment action and discriminatory intent to proceed under the pre-amendment NYSHRL.

Jones-Cruz v. Rivera · filed 2021-03-14(1)(c)

Discrimination claims under Section 1981 and the NYSHRL are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... The Court concludes that the Complaint does not plead facts sufficient to demonstrate either an adverse employment action or discriminatory intent under Section 1981 and the NYSHRL. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss these claims will be granted.

Section 296(3)(a) requires reasonable accommodation for a known pregnancy-related condition, but pregnancy alone is not such a condition absent an inhibited normal bodily function.

LaBarbera v. NYU Winthrop Hospital · filed 2021-03-16(3)(a)

Under New York Executive Law § 296, it is an “unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer . . . to refuse to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities, or pregnancy-related conditions, of an employee . . . in connection with a job or occupation sought or held.” N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(3)(a). ... Plaintiff has no “pregnancy-related condition,” as defined by the statute, because she fails to articulate an inhibited “normal bodily function.” ... Moreover, pregnancy itself is not a statutory “pregnancy-related condition.”

Section 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability on individuals who actually participate in an employer’s unlawful discriminatory conduct, even when the employer is immune from suit and no judgment against it is obtained.

Tromblee v. The State of New York · filed 2021-03-16(6)

This Court sides with the former school of thought, and Plaintiff, for two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s position is supported by the text of the statute. The NYHRL provides that it is unlawful to aid or abet “the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article.” See N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(6). By its terms, this provision prohibits individuals from aiding and abetting prohibited conduct, broadly, without any qualification that the prohibited conduct must have resulted in a judgment against a principal violator. ... N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) extends liability to any individual defendant who “actually participates in” an employer’s unlawful conduct.

Section 296(6) permits individual employees to be held liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.

Roenick v. Flood · filed 2021-06-09(6)

Under both New York Executive Law section 296(6) and New York City Administrative Code section 8-107(6), “an individual employee may be held liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.”

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against employees because of specified protected characteristics.

Vazquez v. Dollar General Corporation · filed 2021-09-27(1)(a)

New York Human Rights Law provides: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer, “because of an individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence,” to “discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). To state a prima facie claim under this law, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action or was treated differently than other employees, and (4) “the adverse or different treatment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”

Section 296(6) prohibits any person from aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing acts forbidden by the NYSHRL, and liability requires actual participation in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Knox v. CRC Management Co., LLC · filed 2023-01-03(6)

The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL prohibit any person from “aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel[ling], or coerc[ing] . . . any of the acts forbidden” by the statutes. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-107(6). “The same standards of analysis used to evaluate aiding and abetting claims under the NYSHRL apply to such claims under the NYCHRL because the language of the two laws is virtually identical.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A defendant must “actually participate[ ] in the conduct giving rise to a . . . claim” in order to be held liable under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1999). Where a court has found no violation of the NYSHRL or NYCHRL, as here, individual employees cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting their own violations. See, e.g., Godwin v. Sirva, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 245, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Conklin v. County of Suffolk, 859 F. Supp. 2d 415, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A]s the employee’s liability [under NYSHRL] necessarily hinges on that of the employer, the employer must be held liable for an individual to also be held liable.”). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Knox’s claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL against Ashmeade and Ferris.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting an NYSHRL violation when the individual directly and purposefully participates in the primary discriminatory violation and shares the principal actor’s intent or purpose.

Johnson v. The Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC · filed 2024-03-21(6)

Under the NYSHRL’s aiding-and-abetting provision, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel[,] or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NYSHRL], or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). “An individual may be liable for aiding and abetting unlawful discriminatory acts if the individual ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,’ even though that individual lacked the authority to hire or fire the plaintiff.” Santana, 2021 WL 4523770, at *15 (emphasis added) (quoting Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also Warren v. Ultimate Fitness Grp., LLC, No. 19-CV-10315, 2021 WL 4239246, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021) (explaining that, to state an aiding and abetting claim under the NYSHRL, “a [p]laintiff must demonstrate that the non-employer had ‘direct, purposeful participation’ in the primary violation of the NYSHRL” (emphasis added) (citing Dodd v. City Univ. of N.Y., 489 F. Supp. 3d 219, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2020))). In other words, an alleged “aider and abettor must ‘share the intent or purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose.’” Warren, 2021 WL 4239246, at *5 (quoting Fried v. LVI Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-9308, 2011 WL 2119748, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011)); accord Mondelo, 2022 WL 524551, at *13 (“[A]iding and abetting liability [under the NYSHRL] does not attach to a supervisor unless the facts alleged demonstrate that the aider and abettor shared the intent or purpose of the principal actor.”).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct when the individual actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Popat v. Levy · filed 2017-05-19(6)

“[A]n individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding-and-abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.”

Section 296(6) and (7) allow individual liability for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct, but the claim depends on a viable underlying discrimination claim.

Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind · filed 2003-10-09(6) and (7)

As to the causes of action against the individual defendants for aiding and abetting, although “an individual may be held liable under Executive Law § 296 (6) and (7) for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct” (D’Amico v Commodities Exch., 235 AD2d 313, 315 [1997], citing Peck v Sony Music Corp., 221 AD2d 157 [1995]), the aiding and abetting claims here could only survive if plaintiff had successfully raised a question of fact as to any of the discrimination claims. These causes of action must fall with the failure of her underlying claims.

Section 296 prohibits sex discrimination and retaliation in employment, subject to an employer's legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision.

Childs v. New York Division of Human Rights · filed 2008-12-31[1][a], [7]

Even assuming, arguendo, that petitioner established a prima facie case of sex discrimination or retaliation (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; [7]; see generally Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C., 100 NY2d at 330), we conclude that the Department came forward with “legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision^]” (Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 937, 938 [1985]; see generally Matter of Laverack & Haines v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 88 NY2d 734, 738-739 [1996]; Bockino v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 224 AD2d 471, 472 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 805 [1996]).

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.

Carrea v. Imagimed, LLC · filed 2010-06-08(6)

Insofar as the cause of action was asserted against the individual defendants, John Kenny and Gary Altieri, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that Kenny lacked the authority “to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others” (Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541, 542 [1984]; see Cirillo v Muss Dev. Co., 278 AD2d 353, 355 [2000]), or that Altieri, who was alleged to have participated in and incited the allegedly discriminatory conduct, would not be personally liable under an aiding and abetting theory (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Nesathurai v University at Buffalo, State Univ. of N.Y., 23 AD3d 1070, 1072 [2005]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 471 [1998]).

Section 296(6) permits liability for individuals who aid and abet discriminatory conduct.

Long v. Aerotek, Inc. · filed 2022-02-10(6)

Finally, viewing the proof in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the individual defendants were either responsible for the discriminatory conduct against plaintiff or aided and abetted in it, and summary judgment dismissing the claims against them is not warranted ( see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc. , 151 AD3d 915, 919-920 [2017]).

Section 296(6) makes it unlawful to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce conduct forbidden by the Human Rights Law.

Mahoney v. City of Albany · filed 2022-12-22(6)

Further, the Human Rights Law provides that it "shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the Human Rights Law], or to attempt to do so" (Executive Law § 296 [6]), including harassment based on sex or gender identity or expression ( see Executive Law § 296 [1] [h]).

Section 296(1) discrimination claims require the plaintiff to show that age or disability was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.

Almanzar v. Millenium Hotels · filed 2021-04-19(1)

Although New York courts have not definitively decided whether the NYSHRL, like the ADA and the ADEA, requires but-for causation, federal courts in this circuit have consistently treated the NYSHRL and the federal analogs as employing the same substantive standard. ... Accordingly, even if such claims were not abandoned,14 his NYSHRL claim fails for the same reason that Plaintiff’s federal claims do not survive summary judgment.

Section 296(1) permits individual employee liability only for an employee with an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions, while section 296(6) permits coworker liability for aiding or abetting prohibited conduct with actual participation; aiding-and-abetting liability requires an established primary violation.

Matsko v. The State of New York · filed 2022-01-14(1), (6)

An employee may be individually subject to suit under section 296(1) of the NYSHRL only where they are "'shown to have an[] ownership interest or [the] power to do more than carry-out personnel decisions made by others.'" Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542 (1984)). A co-worker may also be found individually liable under section 296(6) of the NYSHRL where they "aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so" and "actually participate in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2004). No evidence has been presented that Defendant Safin had an ownership interest in the State Defendants or had the power to "hire or fire" Plaintiff. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. Nor can Plaintiff state a claim of aiding or abetting against Defendant Safin where primary liability against the State Defendants cannot be established. See Strauss v. New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 A.D.3d 67, 73 (3d Dep't 2005) ("Where no violation of the [NYSHRL] by another party has been established, we find that an individual employee cannot be held liable for aiding or abetting such a violation"); see also Wiley v. Plattsburgh, 407 F. Supp. 3d 119, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) ("Given that the only primary NYSHRL claims are dismissed based on sovereign immunity, the individual defendants cannot be liable for aiding and abetting those claims under § 296(6)"); Soloviev v. Goldstein, 104 F. Supp. 3d 232, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same); Ren Yuan Deng v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, No. 13-cv-6801, 2015 WL 221046, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015) (same). Accordingly, the portion of Defendant Safin's motion seeking summary judgment on Plaintiff's NYSHRL claim is granted.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual employee who actually participates in discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, even without supervisory or hiring-and-firing authority.

Murillo-Roman v. The Pension Boards-United Church of Christ, Inc. · filed 2024-01-23(6)

Under the NYSHRL, “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article [including discrimination and retaliation], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). “To be liable under § 296(6), an individual employee need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but must have ‘actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.’” ... Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Huggins and Linzey “actually participated” in the conduct giving rise to her claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) does not make fellow employees liable for discriminatory acts committed without the employer’s knowledge or consent.

Priore v. New York Yankees · filed 2003-05-29(1)(a)

These laws are addressed to unlawfully discriminatory practices in the hiring, retention or firing of employees, and were not intended to target fellow employees acting without the knowledge or consent of the employer.

Under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff need only show that discrimination was a motivating factor, and a supervisory individual may be liable for aiding and abetting if they actually participate in the discriminatory conduct.

Milord-Francois v. N.Y. State Office of the Medicaid Inspector Gen. · filed 2022-02-17

By contrast, for claims under Title VII and NYSHRL, a plaintiff need meet only the less rigorous “motivating factor” standard. ... Although “claims brought under New York State’s Human Rights Law are analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII,” there is one notable exception: “while an individual defendant with supervisory control may not be held personally liable under Title VII[,] an individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if [they] actually participate[] in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.”

Section 296 places the burden on an employee to show pretext when the employer establishes a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.

Hall v. Paladino · filed 1994-12-08

Our view of the record leads us to conclude that defendants have established a valid, nondiscriminatory basis for each of the challenged actions, which is sufficient to warrant denial of plaintiff’s motion and to shift the burden to him of proving that defendants’ stated reasons for suspending his employment are only a pretext for discrimination (see, Kipper v Doron Precision Sys., 194 AD2d 855, 856).

Under § 296, once a complainant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the employer must give a legitimate business reason for its action; the complainant must then prove that reason is a pretext for discrimination.

New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1995-12-07

Once the complainant establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the employer bears the burden of establishing a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason for its actions. If the employer sustains its burden, the complainant must then establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the business reason proffered is not true and is a pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792).

Section 296 retaliation claims are analyzed under a burden-shifting framework.

Sekul v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2026-05-06

A retaliation claim is analyzed under a burden-shifting framework (Matter of Clifton Park Apts., LLC v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 41 NY3d 326, 331).

Section 296(1)(a) applies to a nonresident’s discrimination claim only when the alleged discriminatory conduct impacts the plaintiff in New York.

Garcia v. Lewis Tree Service, Inc. · filed 2022-03-10(1)(a)

“New York State courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under the . . . NYSHRL by a non-resident plaintiff, when the alleged discriminatory conduct did not have an ‘impact’ on the plaintiff . . . within New York State[.]” ... “Based on the foregoing case law, the Court agrees with Defendants that the issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction and applies the corresponding standard.” ... “For these reasons, the Court agrees with Defendants that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims and those claims are dismissed without prejudice.”

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from firing or otherwise discriminating against an employee in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of sex, but liability requires more than an incidental or tangential New York impact.

King v. Aramark Services Inc. · filed 2024-03-20(1)(a)

Applying New York’s “impact test,” we conclude that any discriminatory impact felt in the state was incidental and cannot give rise to § 296(1)(a) liability. Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from firing an employee or otherwise discriminating against an employee “in [the] terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of the employee’s sex. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). In determining where the alleged discrimination took place, New York courts have instructed that we look at “the place where the impact of the alleged discriminatory conduct is felt” to ascertain whether an employer can incur § 296(1)(a) liability.

Section 296 applies to a nonresident's discrimination and retaliation claims only when the alleged conduct has an impact on the plaintiff within New York.

Dittes v. ChargeAfter USA, Inc. · filed 2025-07-17

“Where a non-resident plaintiff brings such claims, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction “when the alleged discriminatory conduct did not have an impact on the plaintiff within New York City (regarding the NYCHRL) and within New York State (regarding the NYSHRL).” Kraiem v. JonesTrading Institutional Servs. LLC, 492 F. Supp. 3d 184, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). ... Plaintiff here does not reside in New York, nor does she allege that she worked within the State, or that the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct had an impact within the City or State. See Compl. ¶ 2. While ChargeAfter has an office in New York City and is registered to do business within the State, id. ¶¶ 3–8, as in Hoffman, these connections are too tangential to establish a discriminatory impact for purposes of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Nor was Plaintiff’s supervisor’s presence in the State sufficient to establish a basis for jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s seven NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 296 covers discrimination claims by an out-of-jurisdiction employee when a New York employer is alleged to have made the discriminatory employment decision in New York.

Hoffman v. Parade Publications · filed 2009-05-07(1)(a)

We agree with the Schuler court’s view, and find nothing in the cited federal cases to convince us that an out-of-jurisdiction plaintiff is precluded from interposing claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL when the New York employer is alleged to have made its employment decisions in a discriminatory manner here.

A nonresident bringing an age discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a) must plead and prove that the alleged discrimination had an impact in New York.

Hoffman v. Parade Publications · filed 2010-07-01(1)(a)

Both the City and the State Human Rights Laws deem it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer to discharge an employee because of age (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]; Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). The question raised on this appeal is whether nonresidents of the city and state must plead and prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within those respective boundaries. We hold that the policies underpinning those laws require that they must.

A charge filed with the EEOC tolls the three-year statute of limitations for a related NYSHRL claim while the charge is pending.

Franchitti v. Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation · filed 2022-07-08

That is because the three-year statute of limitations for NYSHRL claims was tolled for the period in which Franchitti’s EEOC charge was pending.

Section 296(13) prohibits refusing to sell or otherwise discriminating against a person because of the race, color, national origin, or other protected traits of that person or specified associated persons, and the claim must plausibly allege discriminatory intent.

Western Beef Retail, Inc. v. Farmers Pride, Inc. · filed 2023-09-27(13)

As relevant here, Section 296(13) provides: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice (i) for any person to boycott or blacklist, or to refuse to buy from, sell to or trade with, or otherwise discriminate against any person, because of the race, creed, color, national origin . . . of such person, or of such person’s partners, members, stockholders, directors, officers, managers, superintendents, agents, employees, business associates, suppliers or customers, or (ii) for any person willfully to do any act or refrain from doing any act which enables any such person to take such action. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(13) (emphasis added). ... Here, the allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to plausibly allege that Defendant acted with discriminatory intent – i.e., that Defendant refused to sell to Plaintiff because of the race, color, and/or national origin of Plaintiff’s customers. See generally Am. Compl. ... These allegations, however, fall short of stating a claim under Section 296(13).

Section 296(13) does not cover cancellation of a contract or discharge from employment without blacklisting or a commercial boycott.

Mehtani v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1989-02-14(13)

In light of the clear legislative intent underlying Executive Law § 296 (13), we must reject Satish’s contention that this statute is applicable to a cancellation of contract or wrongful discharge from employment that is unaccompanied by any form of blacklisting or commercial boycott.

Section 296(13) covers discrimination involving commercial activity similar to boycotts, blacklisting, and refusals to trade.

Scott v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1995-10-19(13)

Since the term "discriminate” immediately precedes the list of terms including boycott, blacklisting and refusals to trade, that term should be construed to refer to similar types of commercial activity.

Section 296(13) prohibits refusing to deal with a person because of a customer’s race.

Feggoudakis v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-08-05(13)

In pertinent part, Executive Law § 296 (13) provides: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice (i) for any person to discriminate against * * * or to refuse to buy from, sell to or trade with, any person, because of the race, creed, color * * * of such person, or of such person’s * * * customers”. Thus, insofar as the evidence demonstrated that the petitioner refused to deal with Mr. Gray because of Ms. Montague’s race, an unlawful discriminatory practice was established.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discharge based on the employee’s own protected attributes, not solely on the protected characteristics of another person.

Ronen v. RedRoute, Inc. · filed 2025-01-24(1)(a)

Here, as explained above, Section 296 of the NYSHRL is unambiguous in stating it prohibits discharge of an individual based on the sex, disability, or other enumerated trait of “such individual.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). Because the statute does not contain language that could be read to prohibit an employee’s termination based on the protected characteristics of another individual—even on a liberal construction—Ronen’s associational discrimination theory is not viable under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(2)(a) does not protect a person from discrimination merely because she is associated with a disabled person.

Lugo v. Associates · filed 2003-07-10(2)(a)

As to Executive Law § 296 (2) (a), the state law which prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in public accommodations, plaintiff fails to offer any legal support for her contention that the statute prohibits discrimination against associated persons, and there is authority to the contrary. ... As plaintiff is not a member of the protected class under the state or local laws, she cannot prevail on a claim under these laws.

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of that individual's own disability.

Wharton v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 2009-01-08(1)(a)

Under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), plaintiff cannot claim discrimination based on her children’s disabilities, as said section merely provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual based upon such individual’s own disability.

Section 296(1)(a) permits an employment discrimination claim based on association with a member of a protected class.

MacChio v. Michaels Electrical Supply Corp. · filed 2017-04-05(1)(a)

Thus, to the extent that the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action under the NYSHRL for discrimination based on his association with African-Americans, the court erred.

Section 296 does not prohibit disability-based discharge when the disability prevents the employee from reporting to work or performing the job reasonably.

Camporeale v. Airborne Freight Corp. · filed 1990-03-13(1)(a), (1)(c)

For even assuming the truth of his allegations that he did in fact suffer from a “disability,” it is clear that if the disability actually prevents the employee from reporting to work or performing his job in a reasonable manner, then discharge from employment on that basis does not constitute unlawful discrimination under section 296 of the HRL. This conclusion is supported by the express language of the statute (see id.), as well as the cases.

Section 296 does not treat a hearing impairment related to a person’s ability to drive a school bus as a disability for which refusal to hire is unlawful discrimination.

State Division of Human Rights v. Averill Park Central School District · filed 1977-12-08

It is not for the Human Rights Appeal Board to determine if a bus driver’s hearing is sufficient, for that is a defect related to his ability to drive and thus does not qualify as a "disability” for which the refusal to hire a person constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice (Executive Law, §§ 296, 292).

Section 296 does not prohibit an employer from rejecting an applicant whose condition is related to the ability to perform the job.

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1978-07-13

Thus, it seems obvious that the disability was related to complainant’s "ability to engage in the activities involved in the job”. ... In Averill Park (supra), we called for the exercise of common sense and pointed out that the board exceeded its authority and that the board should restrict its intervention to cases in which the alleged disability is unrelated to the nature of the employment.

At the time of this dispute, § 296(1)(a) did not prohibit an employer from refusing to retain an employee whose disability prevented him from performing the duties of his occupation.

City of New York v. Cole · filed 1979-10-18(1)(a)

The statute as drafted at the time this controversy arose simply did not proscribe as unlawfully discriminatory an employer’s refusal to accept an employee who is unable to discharge the obligation of the occupation in which he is engaged.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of a disability only when the disability permits the employee to perform the job in a reasonable manner.

Silk v. Huck Installation & Equipment Division · filed 1985-03-07(1)(a)

While Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discharge an individual because of a “disability”, the term “disability” is “limited to disabilities which do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation” (Executive Law § 292 [21], as amended by L 1983, ch 902, § 1).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a disability discrimination complainant to provide substantial evidence that the disability does not prevent reasonable performance of the job.

National Basketball Ass'n v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1985-12-05(1)(a)

In our case, while there is no dispute that complainant, in terms of his disability, was a member of a protected class under the statute and his application to return to his former position had been denied, there is no substantial evidence in the record that his disability did not prevent him from performing in a reasonable manner as an NBA referee.

Section 296 permits an employer to terminate an employee who is physically unable to perform the job’s duties.

McAuliffe v. Taft Furniture Warehouse & Showroom, Ltd. · filed 1986-01-02(3-a)(g)

The statute specifically provides that it shall not be construed "to prevent the termination of the employment of any person who is physically unable to perform his duties” (Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [g]).