N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

A section 296 termination claim fails when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual or that similarly situated employees were treated differently because of race or criminal history.

Godbolt v. Verizon New York Inc. · filed 2014-03-11

He presented no evidence that defendant’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual and identified no evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated employees because of his race or criminal history.

Section 296 employment discrimination claims are adequately pleaded when alleged adverse employment actions and surrounding facts support an inference of discrimination.

Demir v. Sandoz Inc. · filed 2017-11-14

We further conclude that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show that she was subjected to adverse employment actions under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]), including that she was passed over for a promotion for no legitimate reason, that she was “demoted in title,” and eventually terminated on February 4, 2014, and that she and other women, including other Muslim women, had been subjected to abusive and derogatory remarks and questions about her accent and her religious practices in a male-dominated environment.

Under § 296, an employee who makes a prima facie showing of age or gender discrimination must raise a triable issue of pretext when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Basso v. EarthLink, Inc. · filed 2018-01-02

Plaintiff carried her "de minimis burden" of showing a prima facie case of discrimination based on age and gender ( Melman v Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 98 AD3d 107, 113-114, 115 [1st Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; Baily v New York Westchester Sq. Med. Ctr. , 38 AD3d 119, 123 [1st Dept 2007]; see generally Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8—107[1][a]). ... The motion court nevertheless correctly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint because plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact whether defendants' reason for terminating her employment was pretextual ( see Melman , 98 AD3d at 113-114).

A § 296(1)(a) employment discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employer offers legitimate, independent, nonpretextual reasons for discharge and the employee raises no triable issue of pretext.

Wallace v. Suny Upstate · filed 2018-06-29(1)(a)

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the court properly granted that part of defendants' motion with respect to the Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) cause of action. Defendants met their initial burden by offering legitimate, independent and nonpretextual reasons for their employment decision, and plaintiff in opposition failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether the reasons stated for his discharge were pretextual ( see Tibbetts v Pelham Union Free Sch. Dist. , 143 AD3d 806, 807-808 [2d Dept 2016]; Kulaya v Dunbar Armored, Inc. , 110 AD3d 772, 772-773 [2d Dept 2013]; see also Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]).

Section 296 employment discrimination claims cannot survive summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to raise a factual issue that the employer's stated reasons were pretextual or motivated at least in part by discrimination.

Cubelo v. City of New York · filed 2019-01-31

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact whether DOT's proffered reasons were false and a pretext for, or motivated at least in part by, discrimination ( see Forrest , 3 NY3d at 305; Hudson , 138 AD3d at 514-515).

Section 296 employment discrimination claims may be dismissed when the plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Abe v. New York Univ. · filed 2019-02-07

Assuming that plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, immigration status, or age ( Melman v Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 98 AD3d 107, 112-113 [1st Dept 2012]; Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc. , 92 AD3d 29, 35 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 811 [2012]; Bailey v New York Westchester Sq. Med. Ctr. , 38 AD3d 119, 123 [1st Dept 2007]; see Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8—107[1][a]), [*2]the Supreme Court properly dismissed that claim because plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact whether defendants' reason for terminating him was pretextual ( see Melman , 98 AD3d at 113-114, 120).

Section 296 permits an employment discrimination claim when a qualified member of a protected class alleges an adverse employment action under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Matter of Local 621 v. New York City Dept. of Transp. · filed 2019-11-07

However, the discrimination claims of Bharat and Kubair were improperly dismissed. A plaintiff states a "claim of invidious discrimination under the State and City [Human Rights Laws] by alleging (1) that he/she is a member of a protected class, (2) that he/she was qualified for the position [held or for a promotion], (3) that he/she was subjected to an adverse employment action (under State HRL) or that he/she was treated differently from or worse than other employees (under City HRL), and (4) that the adverse or different treatment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" ( Harrington v City of New York , 157 AD3d 582, 584 [1st Dept 2018]; see also Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of N.Y., § 8—107).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits age-based discharge, but a justice whose term expires by constitutional mandate has not been discharged.

Matter of Gesmer v. Administrative Bd. of the N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys. · filed 2021-03-09(1)(a)

Under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), it is unlawful for an employer to, among other things, discharge an employee based on age. There was no discharge here insofar as the term of each petitioner Justice expired on December 31, 2020 by constitutional mandate ( see Matter of Loehr v Administrative Bd. of the Cts. of the State of N.Y. , 29 NY3d at 384).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on age.

Gregorian v. New York Life Ins. Co. · filed 2022-12-07(1)(a)

Under the law applicable here, a plaintiff alleging discrimination in employment in violation of the NYSHRL must establish that (1) she or he is a member of a protected class, (2) she or he was qualified to hold the position, (3) she or he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305; Ayers v Bloomberg, L.P. , 203AD3d 872, 874; Golston-Green v City of New York , 184 AD3d 24, 36).

Section 296(1)(a) requires factual allegations supporting an inference that an employee’s termination was discriminatory and that the stated reason was pretextual.

Lewkowicz v. Terence Cardinal Cook Health Ctr. · filed 2023-01-10(1)(a)

Plaintiff failed to state a claim for age discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code of City of New York § 8-107[1][a]). While he alleged that he was 79 years old at the time defendants terminated his employment, he did not otherwise set forth any factual allegations showing that he was terminated under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Massaro v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. , 121 AD3d 569, 570 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 26 NY3d 903 [2015]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. , 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]). Nothing in the pleading supports his contention that the articulated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Section 296 permits an employment race discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges an inference of discrimination.

Thompson v. City of New York · filed 2024-06-11

Accordingly, that branch of Defendant's motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of race discrimination pursuant to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL is denied as the complaint contains factual allegations sufficient to allege an inference of racial discrimination.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals based on sex, gender, or familial status.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. Elite Dental Care, P.C. · filed 2025-04-09(1)(a)

The Human Rights Law makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of the individual's sex, gender, or familial status ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]).

Section 296(1) requires a gender-discrimination plaintiff opposing summary judgment to raise a triable issue that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Niemotko v. Mount St. Mary Coll. · filed 2025-08-13(1)

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants' reason for discontinuing those stipends was a pretext for gender discrimination ( see Grella v St. Francis Hosp. , 149 AD3d 1046, 1049; Langton v Warwick Val. Cent. Sch. Dist. , 144 AD3d at 869).

Section 296(1)(a) requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to show protected-class membership, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

McIntosh v. City of New York · filed 2026-03-25(1)(a)

A plaintiff alleging discrimination in employment in violation of the NYSHRL must establish that (1) she or he is a member of a protected class, (2) she or he was qualified to hold the position, (3) she or he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305; Golston-Green v City of New York , 184 AD3d 24, 36).

The 2019 amendment extending Section 296's educational-institution coverage to public colleges and universities does not apply retroactively absent a clear legislative expression of retroactivity.

Weiss v. City University of New York · filed 2021-07-02(6)

I decline Plaintiff’s request to reinstate her claims under New York State Human Rights Law §§ 292 and 296. ... While § 292 now defines educational institutions to include public institutions, it expresses no intent to apply the amendment retroactively. ... Therefore, I will not reinstate Plaintiff’s claims under New York State Human Rights Law §§ 292 and 296.

Section 296(2-a) and (5)(a) limit liability for specified housing-discrimination practices to the listed owners, possessors, lessors, sellers, agents, employees, and related actors.

Concern for Independent Living, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, New York · filed 2025-01-29(2-a), (5)(a)

“Executive Law § 296 (2-a) and (5) (a) specifically set forth the categories of actors which may be held liable for engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practices that are defined within the statute[;]”

Section 296(5)(a) protects against housing discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation, and its housing-statement provision imposes liability on specified housing providers and their agents or employees, not ordinary neighbors.

Burley v. Chapman · filed 2025-09-25(5)(a)

As an initial matter, and unlike the FHA, the NYSHRL expressly includes both sex and sexual orientation as protected characteristics. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5)(a). ... Additionally, it appears that the portion of the NYSHRL on which Plaintiffs rest their claim does not impose liability on individuals who are only neighbors. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 46(a) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5)(a)); Fair Hous. Just. Ctr., Inc. v. Broadway Crescent Realty, Inc., No. 10-cv-34, 2011 WL 856095, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011) (“NYSHRL section 296(5) makes the following types of persons liable: ‘the owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having the right to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be constructed, or any agent or employee thereof.’”) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5)(a)). Accordingly, the Court denies this portion of the Motion and dismisses this prong of Plaintiffs’ NYSHRL claim.

Section 296(2-a)(b) protects domestic-violence victims from discrimination in publicly assisted housing, and § 296(7) bars retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL; a claim requires plausible discriminatory treatment or protected opposition.

Evans · filed 2025-12-03(2-a)(b), (7)

Although Evans is clearly within a protected class as defined by the NYSHRL, she has not alleged that Bronxworks is the owner, sub-lessee, or managing agent of her new apartment. Even assuming that to be the case, as with her claims under the FHA, Evans has failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against on the basis of her status as a victim of domestic violence. ... Because Evans has not alleged that she was discriminated against based on her status as a victim of domestic violence, nor that she submitted a complaint on that basis, she cannot state a claim for retaliation under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(2-a) and (5)(a) limit direct liability for housing discrimination to the categories of actors listed in those provisions.

New York State Div. of Human Rights v. Town of Oyster Bay · filed 2019-11-20(2-a), (5)(a)

Executive Law § 296(2-a) and (5)(a) specifically set forth the categories of actors which may be held liable for engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practices that are defined within the statute ( see Griffin v Sirva, Inc. , 29 NY3d 174, 181). Executive Law § 296(2-a) identifies those actors as "the owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of publicly-assisted housing accommodations or other person having the right of ownership or possession of or the right to rent or lease such accommodations." Executive Law § 296(5)(a) identifies those actors as "the owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having the right to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be constructed, or any agent or employee thereof." Here, inasmuch as the Town and LIHP are not within the categories of actors set forth in Executive Law § 296(2-a) and(5)(a), the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of their separate motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first, second, and third causes of action insofar as asserted against each of them.

Section 296(5)(a) limits housing discrimination liability to the listed categories of actors.

K.D. v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-13(5)(a)

Here, inasmuch as the City is not within the categories of actors set forth in Executive Law § 296(5)(a) or Administrative Code § 8-107(5)(a), the Supreme Court should have granted the City's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from refusing to hire or discharging an employee because of race, and employment-discrimination claims under it use the same standard as Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Concrete Applied Construction Technologies Corp. · filed 2007-08-30(1)(a)

The NYHRL prohibits employers from refusing to hire or discharging employees based on a variety of factors, including the individual’s race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 1-a. The standard for employment discrimination claims pursuant to NYHRL § 296 is the same for those brought under Title VII, Cruz v. Coach Stores, 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000); Calhoun v. Mastec, Inc., 2006 WL 2806452 * 4 (W.D.N.Y.2006) (citing cases), and, as Myles’s claims are subject to the same tests, both claims will be addressed under the Title VII analysis applicable in this Circuit. Id.

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual because of race, and employment-discrimination claims under the NYSHRL use Title VII’s liability and proof framework.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2010-01-13(1)(a)

Both statutes make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual “because of’ his or her race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a) (McKinney’s 2009); NYC Administrative Code § 8-107(1)(a). Both parties agree that employment-discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL use the same liability standard and proof structure as Title VII claims, and are analyzed in the same manner.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating because of race, creed, color, or national origin in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

DeNigris v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2012-03-09(l)(a)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL provide that it is unlawful “[f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s ... race, creed, color, [or] national origin ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(a).

Race-discrimination claims under the NYHRL are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Men of Color Helping All Society, Inc. v. City of Buffalo · filed 2013-07-01

Race discrimination claims under Title VII, NYHRL, and §§ 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... Plaintiffs-Appellants’ disparate treatment claims fail because they are unable to point to sufficient evidence in the record to create a genuine issue to be tried as to whether the Buffalo Fire Department acted with a discriminatory motive. ... Defendants-Appellees are thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claims.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race or color, and claims under the provision are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Benson v. Otis Elevator Co. · filed 2014-02-21(1)(a)

Both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit employers from, among other things, discriminating on the basis of race or color. ... We analyze claims under the NYSHRL under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... In sum, we find no evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants’ proffered justifications were pretextual, or that race or color played any role in Benson’s termination.

Section 296 prohibits mobile home park operators from refusing to negotiate the sale or rental of a mobile home site because of race.

State Division of Human Rights v. Cerminaro · filed 1978-05-26

The evidence upon which the order is based conclusively demonstrates that respondents, as the owners and operators of a mobile home park, discriminated against complainants because of their race (see Executive Law, § 296) by refusing to negotiate with them for the sale or rental of a mobile home site.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating based on race or color in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and liability requires an employer-employee relationship determined under common-law agency principles.

Karupaiyan v. CVS Health Corporation · filed 2023-09-05(1)(a)

Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer, based on an individual’s race or color, ... “to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... To be held liable under Title VII and the NYSHRL, an employer-employee relationship must have existed between the parties at the time of the alleged discrimination. ... To determine whether an individual is an employee (as opposed to an independent contractor) under these statutes, courts apply the common law of agency.

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race and, when the claim relies on circumstantial evidence, applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Davis, JD v. Merck & Co. · filed 2025-01-29(1)

Similarly, the NYSHRL prohibits discrimination against an employee based on that employee’s “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). When, as here, a plaintiff’s Section 1981 and NYSHRL discrimination claims are based on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the claims are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 296(1) prohibits employers from refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against an employee in compensation or employment terms because of race, creed, color, or national origin.

Detouche v. JTR Transportation Corp · filed 2020-12-14(1)

Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice [f]or an employer . . . because of,” inter alia, “an individual’s . . . race, creed, color, [or] national origin . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW. § 296(1).

Section 296 prohibits terminating an employee because of race.

Cosmos Forms, Ltd. v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1989-05-08

The determination that the petitioner discriminated against the complainant on the basis of race, terminating her employment in violation of Executive Law § 296, is supported by substantial evidence in the record (see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits race and color discrimination, and a finding of a violation may be confirmed when supported by substantial evidence.

General Motors Corp. v. Rosa · filed 1992-11-18(1)(a)

The Commissioner’s determination that petitioner discriminated against complainant on the basis of race and color, in violation of the Human Rights Law (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]), is supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v County of Onondaga Sheriff’s Dept., 71 NY2d 623, 630-631; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176).

A finding of unlawful race discrimination under Section 296 may be sustained when supported by substantial evidence.

Courant v. Rosa · filed 1993-07-19

The Commissioner’s determination that the complainant was subject to unlawful discrimination by the petitioner because of her race is supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of Purdy v Kreisberg, 47 NY2d 354, 358).

Section 296(1) permits a racial discrimination claim to proceed when factual issues remain about disparate treatment and whether an employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext.

Clark v. Cargill, Inc. · filed 1994-07-15(1)

The court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action alleging that the disparate treatment and eventual discharge of plaintiff from employment constituted unlawful racial discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1). ... factual issues nevertheless remain concerning the alleged disparate treatment of plaintiff during employment and whether his discharge pursuant to the absenteeism policy constituted a pretext for racial discrimination.

Under § 296(1)(a), an employer seeking summary judgment on a race discrimination claim based on discipline must show that comparable employees of another race were disciplined as severely for comparable misconduct.

Michaelis v. State · filed 1997-11-06(1)(a)

As was the case on the previous motion, however, defendants have still not made an unassailable showing that minority employees holding positions similar to plaintiffs position have been disciplined as severely for comparable infractions (see, 135 AD2d 1005, 1006, supra).

Section 296 prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race.

Cooks v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2001-12-10

Once the defendant established that it had valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging the plaintiff from employment, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the stated reasons for his discharge were pretextual for racial discrimination (see, Hall v Paladino, 210 AD2d 595).

Section 296 employment discrimination claims use the strong-basis-in-evidence standard when an employer takes race-conscious action to avoid disparate-impact liability; factual disputes about the employer's basis can preclude summary judgment.

Margerum v. City of Buffalo · filed 2015-02-17(1)(a)

Based on the record before us, we conclude that whether the City had "a strong basis in evidence to believe it [would] be subject to disparate-impact liability" at the time that it terminated the promotion eligibility lists while the MOCHA litigation was still pending raises issues of fact that cannot be determined on motions for summary judgment.

Section 296 permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when alleged racial comments, in the context of sexual harassment, signal discriminatory views in the workplace.

Eustache v. Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. · filed 2023-11-14

Applying the lenient notice-pleading standard afforded to discrimination claims ( Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P. , 67 AD3d 140, 145 [1st Dept 2009]), plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to race discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) (Executive Law § 296) and New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107). ... LaFia's alleged comments about plaintiff's race, in the context of her sexual harassment, signaled her discriminatory views on race in the workplace ( Hernandez v Kaisman , 103 AD3d 106, 114-115 [1st Dept 2012]).

A race discrimination claim under § 296 is assessed under a lenient notice-pleading standard.

Eustache v. Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y. · filed 2024-06-13

Applying the lenient notice-pleading standard afforded to discrimination claims ( Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P. , 67 AD3d 140, 145 [1st Dept 2009]), plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to race discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) (Executive Law § 296) and New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107).

Section 296(1)(a) allows an employment race discrimination claim when adverse changes in employment and racial remarks support an inference of discrimination.

Parham v. City of New York · filed 2024-10-02(1)(a)

Here, Plaintiff states a cause of action for unlawful race discrimination under the NYSHRL. Plaintiff met his burden by pleading that he is a black male, was employed by the Law Department, received a favorable performance evaluation, had a material alteration of his job responsibilities, and was terminated (NYSCEF Doc No. 27, verified amended complaint ¶¶ 7, 20, 58, 60, 78, 86, 128, 166). Plaintiff's allegations that Finkelstein and Segreti called black people lazy, referred to support staff as "lint on a jacket," clucked at and subjected Plaintiff to unwanted comments about fried chicken, watermelon, and Oreos, are sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination ( id . ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 34, 35, 42).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits disability discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, but the NYHRL does not cover a claimant whose disability prevents job performance even with reasonable accommodation.

Casale v. Reo · filed 2007-11-07(1)(a)

Under NYHRL, it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer to discriminate against an individual in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s disability, among other things. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). ... NYHRL does not protect an employee who “even upon the provision of reasonable accommodation, is physically unable to perform his or her duties.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3-a)(g). ... In light of Plaintiffs own admissions of total disability, she is not covered by NYHRL. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs fifth and ninth causes of action must be dismissed as to all Defendants.

Section 296's disability-discrimination protections require the plaintiff to establish that he has a qualifying disability.

Giaccio v. City of New York · filed 2009-01-23

Finally, Giaccio’s argument that he suffers from a disability — substance dependence or abuse — and thus has viable claims pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 is belied by his own deposition testimony, in which he stated that (1) he suffered from no disability other than anxiety, (2) he had been tested for drugs approximately a dozen times over the course of his employment with the New York City Department of Transportation and had failed only two of those tests, and (3) he did not believe that the second positive test was a legitimate result.

Section 296’s disability discrimination prohibition does not apply to an employment application terminated before the prohibition took effect unless the applicant affirmatively renews it.

Long Island Rail Road v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1978-04-17

Absent any showing that the complainant affirmatively acted to formally renew his application for employment with the railroad, it must be concluded that the job application was terminated on August 22, 1974, prior to the effective date of the Flynn Act. The action of Dr. Fox on September 17, 1974 was neither sufficient to renew the application, nor of sufficient substantiality to permit the application of section 296 of the Executive Law in this case.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from denying an available light duty assignment to a temporarily disabled employee while assigning nondisabled employees to that work.

City of New York v. Cole · filed 1978-05-02(1)(a)

After hearing, the commissioner found that the refusal to assign complainant to light or limited clerical duty during the period from September 30, 1974 to December 9, 1974, while at the same time, freely assigning nondisabled officers to such duty, constituted an unlawful discriminatory practice prohibited by section 296 (subd 1, par [a]) of the Executive Law. The commissioner’s determination and findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 296 covers a medically diagnosable impairment as a disability, without requiring that the impairment substantially limit the person’s normal activities.

Levine v. Smithtown Central School District · filed 2008-07-14

While disability discrimination claims under the ADA and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, ... (“NYSHRL”) are analyzed similarly, the definition of disability is broader under the NYSHRL. ... A disability under the NYSHRL is a condition that either (1) prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or (2) is “demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” ... “Thus an individual can be disabled under the [Human Rights Law] if his or her impairment is demonstrable by medically accepted techniques; it is not required that the impairment substantially limit that individual’s normal activities.” ... In other words, any “medically diagnosable impairment” is a disability under the NYSHRL.

Section 296 treats a medically diagnosable impairment as a disability without requiring that it substantially limit the person's normal activities.

Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free School District · filed 2008-09-30

A disability under the NYSHRL is a condition that either (1) prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or (2) is “demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Reeves, 140 F.3d at 155. “Thus an individual can be disabled under the [Human Rights Law] if his or her impairment is demonstrable by medically accepted techniques; it is not required that the impairment substantially limit that individual’s normal activities.” Lovely H. v. Eggleston, 235 F.R.D. 248, 260 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Hazeldine v. Beverage Media Ltd., 954 F.Supp. 697, 706 (S.D.N.Y.1997)). In other words, any “medically diagnosable impairment” is a disability under the NYSHRL. Barr v. New York City Trans. Auth., 2002 WL 257823, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.20, 2002). The Court’s grant of summary judgment on the ADA claims is therefore not disposi-tive of Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 296 disability-discrimination claims use the ADA prima facie framework, but the NYSHRL defines disability more broadly: a demonstrable impairment need not substantially limit a major life activity.

McCowan v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2010-02-12

Plaintiff correctly notes that the definition of “disability” is broader under the NYSHRL than it is under the ADA. ... Thus, under state law, a disability need only be a demonstrable impairment; it does not have to substantially limit a major life activity. ... Accordingly, if the evidence presented by plaintiff is credited, a reasonable jury could find that she had a disability within the meaning of the NYSHRL at the time of HSBC’s alleged adverse employment actions.

Section 296(2-a) prohibits refusing, denying, or withholding housing because of disability, and a claimant must plausibly allege the same prima facie elements required under the FHA, including qualification to rent.

Johnson v. Levy · filed 2011-09-19(2-a)

These same elements are applicable to claims for housing discrimination based on disability under NYHRL § 296(2-a), which similarly makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person or group of persons such housing accommodations because of ... disability ... of such person or persons, or to represent that any housing accommodation or land is not available for inspection, sale, rental or lease when in fact it is so available”.

Section 296 disability-discrimination claims are analyzed under ADA standards but use a broader definition of disability that includes medical impairments without requiring substantial limitation of normal activities.

Penberg v. HEALTHBRIDGE MANAGEMENT · filed 2011-10-17

While disability discrimination claims under the ADA and the [NYSHRL], N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq .... are analyzed similarly, the definition of disability is broader under the NYSHRL. ... There appears to be no dispute that HealthBridge is covered by the NYSHRL. However, based on the NYSHRL’s broader definition of “disability,” the Court finds that a triable issue of fact has been raised regarding whether plaintiffs diabetes constitutes a disability under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(1) prohibits discharge because of disability, and § 296(7) prohibits retaliation for protected conduct, including seeking disability accommodations; claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework and require evidence that the stated reason was pretextual.

Gioia v. Forbes Media LLC · filed 2012-11-05(1), (7)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL make it unlawful, among other things, for an employer to discharge an employee because of his or her disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. The NYSHRL and NYCHRL also prohibit retaliation against employees for engaging in protected conduct, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, which we assume for purposes of this appeal to include seeking accommodations for a disability.

Section 296's disability-discrimination claim is evaluated on the same basis as the ADA claim in this case.

Alexiadis v. New York College of Health Professions · filed 2012-09-20

Similárly, the Court also denies summary judgment on the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 claim for the same reasons that the Court denies summary judgment on the ADA claim.

Section 296(l)(a) bars an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual in employment because of disability, and a failure-to-accommodate claim requires disability, employer notice, ability to perform essential job functions with a reasonable accommodation, and refusal to provide it.

Jackson v. Battaglia · filed 2014-12-03(l)(a)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual or otherwise discriminate against them in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of their disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). A so-called “failure to accommodate” claim requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she was disabled *225within the meaning of the statute; (2) the employer had notice of her disability; (3) she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) the employer refused to make such an accommodation. ... At this stage, these allegations suffice to establish a plausible claim of failure to accommodate arising from Jackson’s pregnancy-related complications. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs Eighth Cause of Action against Battaglia will be denied.

Section 296 prohibits disability discrimination and retaliation, and claims under it are governed and analyzed using the same standards as comparable ADA claims.

Moran v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. · filed 2014-12-12

The NYHRL contains provisions against discrimination and retaliation that are similar to those under the ADA, and are thus governed and analyzed using the same standards.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits covered persons associated with places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability and is analyzed under the same standards as ADA disability-discrimination claims.

Novick v. Vill. of Wappingers Falls · filed 2019-03-27(2)(a)

New York State disability discrimination claims are governed by the same legal standards as federal ADA claims. ... see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) (making it unlawful for any "person, [including] the owner, ... agent[,] or employee of any place of public accommodation" to discriminate on the basis of disability). ... The Court will thus analyze the Plaintiff's ADA and NYSHRL § 296 claims in tandem. ... Plaintiff's Complaint thus does not contain sufficient factual matter to plausibly identify a similarly situated comparator and to thereby raise an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiff's ADA and NYSHRL § 296 discrimination claims are dismissed.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a person, including an owner, agent, or employee of a place of public accommodation, from discriminating on the basis of disability, and New York disability-discrimination claims are governed by the same standards as ADA claims.

Soto v. Marist College · filed 2019-06-05(2)(a)

Disability discrimination claims under the ADA and § 296 of the NYSHRL are also analyzed under the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas. ... “New York State disability discrimination claims are governed by the same legal standards as federal ADA claims.” ... see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) (making it unlawful for any “person, [including] the owner, . . . agent[,] or employee of any place of public accommodation” to discriminate on the basis of disability). The Court will thus analyze the Plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL § 296 claims in tandem.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual in employment because of the individual's disability.

Wellner, M.D. v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 2019-08-29(1)(a)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s ... disability ... to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Accordingly, summary judgment is denied with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination under the ADA and the NYSHRL, and, by extension, under the less stringent standards of the NYCHRL.

For disability-discrimination claims, § 296 uses the same legal standards as the ADA, so allegations establishing ADA liability can establish NYSHRL liability.

O'Rourke v. Drunken Chicken In NY Corp. · filed 2020-07-16

The Complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish liability under the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. “A claim for disability discrimination under [the] NYSHRL . . . is governed by the same legal standards as the ADA.” Ross, 2018 WL 6313208, at *4. Here, “[p]laintiff’s state and municipal law claims are based upon the same architectural barriers that underlie [his] ADA claim.” Id. Moreover, although different standards govern NYCHRL claims, a “one-way ratchet” exists, where the ADA constitutes a “floor below which the [NYCHRL] cannot fall.” Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, because plaintiff has met the standard for establishing liability under the ADA, he has also demonstrated that defendants are liable for violating the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) bars an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of disability, while § 296(7) bars retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL.

Davis v. Power Authority of the State of New York · filed 2022-02-02(1)(a), (7)

Finally, “the NYSHRL states that it is ‘an unlawful discriminatory practice’ for an employer, based on an individual’s [disability], ‘to discharge from employment . . . or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’” Farmer v. Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a)). ... “The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because []he ‘has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . []he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.’” Farmer, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 330 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7)).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of disability in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Brito v. Marina's Bakery Corp. · filed 2022-03-24(1)(a)

The NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq., provides that it shall be an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer, on account of an individual’s disability, to “discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... For the reasons discussed immediately infra, the Court finds that Plaintiff Brito has sufficiently alleged both hostile work environment and a failure to accommodate under New York law.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on the plaintiff’s own disability and does not authorize an able-bodied employee’s claim based solely on association with a person with a disability.

Arazi v. Cohen Brothers Realty Corporation · filed 2022-03-28(1)(a)

But the logic does not work well in the context of a disability claim because the text refers to the “disability” of the relevant individual. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (it is unlawful for an employer “because of an individual’s . . . disability . . . to discriminate against such individual . . . .”). Under the statute, to be unlawful the discrimination must be based on the individual’s disability. ... In short, because the NYSHRL makes illegal discriminatory conduct based on the “disability” of the plaintiff, and association with a person with a disability does not render a non-disabled plaintiff “disabled,” the NYSHRL does not give rise to a claim for associational discrimination on the basis of disability. ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the conclusion that claims for associational disability are not cognizable under the NYSHRL.

Section 296 requires a plaintiff bringing a disability failure-to-accommodate claim to be otherwise qualified for the job, meaning able to perform its essential functions with or without a reasonable accommodation.

Frilando v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. · filed 2022-08-19

On appeal, Frilando first argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he was not “otherwise qualified” for the train operator, track worker, and bus operator positions. Each of the statutes at issue in this appeal require an individual be “otherwise qualified” to succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim. See Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2003) (ADA and NYSHRL); Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2009) (Rehabilitation Act). ... “[A]n individual is otherwise qualified for a job if she is able to perform the essential functions of that job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation.”

For NYSHRL disability-discrimination claims, Section 296 covers any medically diagnosable impairment and requires a plausible allegation that the disability caused the challenged employment behavior.

Koonce v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. · filed 2023-12-01

To state a claim under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) [he] suffers from a disability as that term is defined under the statute, and (2) that the disability caused the behavior for which [he] was terminated.” Anyan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 228, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The definition of disability under the NYSHRL is “significantly broader than the ADA definition.” Id. “Any medically diagnosable impairment is sufficient” to plead a disability pursuant to the NYSHRL. Attis v. Solow Realty Dev. Co., 522 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(21)(a).

The relevant disability-discrimination provisions of Section 296 are interpreted similarly to the ADA, so adequately pleaded ADA liability can establish liability under the NYSHRL.

Norris v. RPC Restaurant Corp. · filed 2025-01-27

The relevant portions of the NYSHRL are interpreted to be similar to those of the ADA. See Kriesler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., No. 10-CV-7592 (RJS), 2012 WL 3961304, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2012), aff’d, 731 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013). Accord Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006). ... As Plaintiff has established liability under the ADA, I find that his properly pleaded allegations are also sufficient to establish liability for purposes of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) covers employment discrimination claims based on disability, including alcoholism, and requires a prima facie showing before the burden shifts to the employer and then back to the plaintiff to show pretext.

Lugo v. Milford Management Corp. · filed 1997-02-18(1)(a)

New York courts have held that a plaintiff pleads a claim of discrimination under the Human Rights Law if he alleges that he suffers from a disability and the disability caused the behavior for which he was terminated. ... Alcohol dependency has been held to qualify as a disability within the meaning of the Human Rights Law. ... Given the liberal pleadings rule, the court finds that plaintiff has made out a Human Rights Law claim sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss. ... In order for a plaintiff to prevail under the Human Rights Law, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer who must show that the disability prevented the employee from performing his job in a reasonable manner or that the employee’s termination was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose. ... The burden of proof then shifts back to the plaintiff who must establish that the reason provided by defendant for its actions was a “pre-text for discrimination.”

Section 296 permits an employer to act on a condition that prevents an employee from reporting to work because the condition relates to the employee’s ability to perform the job.

Halpin v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1978-11-30

A condition which prevents an employee from reporting to work is certainly related to the employee’s ability to perform the job and employer action motivated by such a condition is permissible (see Matter of Moscatiello v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 AD2d 904).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits refusing to hire a person because a disability might theoretically affect job performance when the person can perform the job in a reasonable manner.

State Division of Human Rights on Complaint of Giannavola v. Le Roy Central School District · filed 1985-03-01(1)(a)

Here, the district could not ignore the 1979 amendment and refuse to hire the complainant simply because her handicap might in theory affect her ability to perform the job, even though it did not in fact do so.

Under the 1974 version of § 296(1)(a), an employer could not refuse to hire a person with a disability unrelated to the job because of its possible effect on disability or life insurance programs.

State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1985-05-07(1)(a)

Since the Commissioner found, and it is not disputed, that there is no relationship between complainant's condition and her ability to perform the job she seeks, the company could not refuse to hire her because of the collateral effect her impairment, if it be that, might have on existing disability and life insurance programs.

Section 296 requires an employee claiming disability-based termination to prove that the termination was because of the disability and that the impairment did not prevent reasonable performance of the employee’s duties.

Doin v. North American Carbide of New York, Inc. · filed 1985-07-03

In order to establish liability under the Executive Law, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that his employment termination was because of his disability and that, although disabled, his impairment did not preclude him from performing his duties in a reasonable manner.

Section 296(1)(a) requires an employer to make a good-faith assessment of whether an alleged disability interferes with reasonable job performance before discharging an employee on that basis.

Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1986-03-27(1)(a)

On the present state of the record, however, we find it impossible to conclude that respondent has made a good-faith effort to evaluate the extent to which petitioner’s alleged impairment will interfere with the reasonable performance of his duties as is required by respondent’s governing regulations and Executive Law § 296 (1) (a).

Section 296 does not prohibit a refusal to promote based on illness-related absences when the illness prevents the employee from coming to work and therefore is not a disability under § 292(21).

Schmitt v. Kiley · filed 1986-11-10

The petitioner also argues that because his absenteeism resulted from actual physical illness, the refusal to promote him amounts to discrimination on the basis of a disability in violation of Executive Law § 296. Executive Law § 292 (21) defines disability as a deficiency which does not prevent the employee from coming to work. In the instant case, the petitioner’s illness prevented him from coming to work and is not a disability as defined in Executive Law § 292 (21) (see also, Matter of Silk v Huck Installation & Equip. Div., 109 AD2d 930; Matter of Halpin v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 AD2d 898).

Section 296 does not prohibit discharging an employee for a disability when the employee cannot reasonably perform an essential function of the job.

Caminiti v. New York City Transit Authority Police Department · filed 1986-12-01

The petitioner’s employment was not improperly terminated pursuant to Executive Law § 296, which provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to discharge an employee because of a disability. ... It is undisputed that the petitioner cannot be placed on patrol duty, the most important function of a police officer. The petitioner is, therefore, unable to reasonably do what the position requires, and in light of this, the termination of his employment was proper (see, Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527).

Section 296 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or job applicants because of a disability.

Obas v. Kiley · filed 1989-04-03

The Human Rights Law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or job applicants because of a disability (see, Executive Law § 296).

Section 296(1) prohibits disability discrimination in employment, but a person whose condition prevents them from performing the job’s duties in a reasonable manner is not considered disabled under the statute.

Uryevick v. Pepcom Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-11-06(1)

While the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1]) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual who is disabled, a person whose condition prohibits him from performing employment duties of the position in question in a "reasonable manner” (Executive Law § 292 [21] [c]) is not considered disabled under the statute (see, Matter of Caminiti v New York City Tr. Auth. Police Dept., 125 AD2d 306).

Section 296 does not prohibit denying an appointment when an applicant’s condition may prevent reasonable performance of the job.

Mainzer v. Suffolk County Department of Civil Services · filed 1990-03-19

Because it was sufficiently demonstrated that the condition of the petitioner’s knee may "prevent the [petitioner] from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought” (Executive Law § 292 [21]), the petitioner’s contention that the SCDCS violated Executive Law § 296 in denying him this appointment because of a "disability”, must be disposed of summarily (see, Matter of Connolly v Suffolk County Dept. of Civ. Serv., 150 AD2d 373, lv denied 74 NY2d 611; Matter of Seitz v Suffolk County Dept. of Civ. Serv., 146 AD2d 631; see also, Pascal v County of Orange, 104 AD2d 865; Matter of Palozzolo v Nadel, 83 AD2d 539).

Section 296(14) prohibits discrimination against a hearing-impaired person whose speech discrimination score is 40% or less in the better ear with appropriate correction, as certified by a licensed audiologist or otorhinolaryngologist.

Waskewicz v. Guy · filed 1988-12-07(14)

Further, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to discriminate against a hearing-impaired person who has a hearing impairment manifested by a speech discrimination score of 40% or less in the better ear with appropriate correction as certified by a licensed audiologist or otorhinolaryngologist (ear, nose, and throat specialist).

Section 296(1)(a) does not prohibit discharge based on a disability that prevents the employee from performing the job in a reasonable manner.

O'Hare v. New York City Police Department · filed 1990-05-24(1)(a)

Petitioner asserts he was terminated in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), which states that it is unlawful to discharge an individual from employment on the basis of a disability. ... The record clearly demonstrates that petitioner’s disability does not fall within the definition of the term "disability” as contemplated by the Executive Law and, accordingly, the termination of petitioner did not constitute an unlawful discrimination on the part of respondent.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits refusing to rehire someone because of a disability that does not prevent them from reasonably performing the job; their ability is assessed at the time of the refusal.

New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1990-12-06(1)(a)

Significantly, it is IBR’s refusal to rehire respondent which constitutes the alleged discriminatory act (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; State Div. of Human Rights v Xerox Corp., 73 AD2d 806, 807; Matter of Gamble v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 71 AD2d 165, 167, lv denied 50 NY2d 801). Thus, only evidence regarding the nature of respondent’s disability and its relationship to his ability to reasonably do what the position requires, at the time IBR refused to rehire him, is relevant.

Section 296 permits an inference of disability discrimination when an employer’s stated misconduct reason for discharge may be a sham.

Miano v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. · filed 1992-06-04

If, at the time plaintiff’s employment was terminated, defendant did not actually have a good-faith belief that plaintiff’s disability had ended some six months earlier, the misconduct claimed as the reason for firing plaintiff would be a sham, giving rise to an inference of an improper motive. It is our view that evidence of the doubts expressed by defendant’s physician shortly before plaintiff was fired as to whether plaintiff was capable of performing the duties of his job creates a question of fact concerning defendant’s good-faith belief about plaintiff’s condition when defendant accused him of receiving benefits after his disability had ended.

Section 296(1) requires a showing that the employee’s disability was the basis for discharge to establish disability discrimination.

In re the Claim of Atkinson · filed 1992-07-09(1)

We are equally unpersuaded by claimant’s alternate contention that her discharge constitutes discrimination in employment against the disabled in violation of the State Human Rights Law (see, Executive Law § 296 [1]). There has been no showing whatsoever that the basis of claimant’s discharge was her disability due to drug dependency (see, Executive Law § 292 [21]).

Section 296 does not prohibit denying overtime work to an employee whose medical condition prevents performance of an important function of that work.

Yasinosky v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1993-05-17

Under the circumstances, the failure to assign overtime work to him did not violate the antidiscrimination proscriptions of the Human Rights Law (see, Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 130 AD2d 579).

Section 296(1)(a) and (e) requires facts connecting a termination to a qualifying disability or opposition to discriminatory practices; a past disability alone does not guarantee continued employment.

Harbas v. Gilmore · filed 1993-05-25(1)(a) and (e)

While we disagree with the IAS Court that plaintiff’s absence from work due to his injury necessarily meant that the injury was not a "disability” as defined in Executive Law § 292 (21), qualifying plaintiff to the protection against discrimination afforded by Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) and (e), we nevertheless affirm, since no facts are alleged connecting plaintiff’s termination two months after he returned to work to either his disability or his opposition to defendants’ alleged discriminatory practices. Only speculation and unsupported conclusions are offered in this regard. The statute does not provide lifelong job assurance to every employee who has ever sustained a qualifying disability.

Section 296 permits medical disqualification of a police officer applicant whose condition makes his shoulder susceptible to dislocation.

Sherman v. Leonard · filed 1993-10-12

In addition, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the respondent did not discriminate against the petitioner (see, Executive Law § 296), since the evidence indicated that the petitioner’s condition at the time of his examination rendered his shoulder susceptible to dislocation (cf., Matter of State Div. of Human Rights [Granelle], 70 NY2d 100, 106).

Section 296 permits an employer to reject an applicant whose disability, shown by individualized evidence, prevents reasonable performance of the job’s duties.

McCarthy v. Nassau County · filed 1994-10-24

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion for summary judgment is granted, and it is declared that the defendants did not discriminate against the plaintiff in violation of Executive Law § 296 when they rejected his application for employment as a Nassau County Police Officer.

Section 296 (1) prohibits terminating an employee because of her disability.

Liska v. Paramount Group, Inc. · filed 1995-03-30(1)

The evidence in the record adequately supports the jury’s determination that defendant terminated plaintiff because of her disability, in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (see, Sogg v American Airlines, 193 AD2d 153, lv denied 83 NY2d 754, lv dismissed 83 NY2d 846).

Section 296(1)(a) does not prohibit refusing to hire an applicant whose condition prevents reasonable performance of the job, because that condition is excluded from the statutory definition of disability.

Curcio v. Nassau County Civil Service Commission · filed 1995-10-31(1)(a)

However, Executive Law § 292 (21) excepts from the definition of "disability” those conditions which "prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held”. The Commission’s determination that the petitioner’s condition would prevent the complainant from performing his duties in a reasonable matter was supported by the evidence in the record. Accordingly, the condition was not a "disability” within the meaning of Executive Law § 292 (21), and the Commission did not violate Executive Law § 296 (1) (a).

Smoking outside the workplace, without more, does not establish a disability or perceived disability for an employment discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a).

Fortunoff Fine Jewelry & Silverware, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-05-20(1)(a)

The complainant has not established that at the time she sought an application to work at Fortunoff she was disabled, or was wrongly perceived as disabled, within the meaning of Executive Law § 292 (21), based upon her smoking outside the workplace. The defendant’s status as a smoker outside of the workplace, without more, does not constitute a disability within the aforesaid section (cf., Labor Law § 201-d; L 1992, ch 776). Thus, there was no violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), the petition must be granted, and the determination is annulled.

A disability discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence of termination or that the termination was based on disability.

Lambert v. General Electric Co. · filed 1997-11-26(1)(a)

We conclude that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his employment was in fact terminated, but even if we were to so ... find, we would agree with the conclusion of Supreme Court that plaintiff has failed to supply any evidence supporting his contention that his termination was based upon a disability rather than upon the series of unsatisfactory performance evaluations that defendants have documented in their moving papers. Hence, summary judgment was properly granted as to the Executive Law § 296 claim.

Section 296(1)(a) allows a disability discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when evidence that the employer’s stated reason for firing was a sham supports an inference of improper motive.

Wehling v. Bayex, Inc. · filed 1998-03-13(1)(a)

The court also properly denied that part of the motion seeking dismissal of that part of the third cause of action alleging that defendants unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff because of a physical disability (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). Although defendants submitted proof that plaintiff was fired for misconduct, plaintiff responded with proof that “the misconduct claimed as the reason for firing plaintiff [is] a sham, giving rise to an inference of an improper motive” (Miano v Caterpillar Tractor Co., 184 AD2d 807, 808).

Executive Law § 296 permits an employer to defeat a prima facie disability discrimination claim by establishing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Siano v. Dolce · filed 1998-12-28

Under the circumstances of this case, while the petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination based on her alcoholism, the respondents established by substantial evidence that the petitioner’s termination was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (see, Matter of McEniry v Landi, supra, at 558).

Section 296 does not support a disability discrimination claim where an employee never seeks to return to work, with or without accommodation.

Fallon v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority · filed 1999-03-23

In his 12-year absence on disability leave, petitioner never sought to return to work with or without accommodation, even after he was denied ordinary disability retirement. This being the case, there is no ground to conclude that respondent violated the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), prohibiting disability-based discrimination.

Weight alone does not qualify as a disability under § 296(1)(a).

Delta Air Lines v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1997-12-17(1)(a)

We are satisfied that weight, in and of itself, does not constitute a disability for discrimination qualification purposes and the discrimination claims in that respect are, therefore, correctly unsustainable.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of the employee’s disability.

Umansky v. Masterpiece International Ltd. · filed 2000-10-23(1)(a)

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discharge an employee because of the employee’s disability (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296 prohibits disability discrimination when a condition limits an employee's ability to perform the job and permits an employer to justify its action with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Genesky v. Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, CSEA · filed 2001-10-22

The plaintiff failed to establish that his surgery and subsequent radiation treatment limited his ability to perform his job within the meaning of the Human Rights Law (see, Collins v Christopher, 48 F Supp 2d 397). Assuming that the plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the movants met their burden of demonstrating that the plaintiffs termination was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (see, Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554; Matter of Siano v Dolce, 256 AD2d 582; Matter of Hickman v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 237 AD2d 289; Gilroy v Continental Corp., 237 AD2d 251; Wozniak v Components Assembly Div., 220 AD2d 934; Matter of Friedel v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 219 AD2d 547).

Section 296 prohibits disability discrimination when the stated nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual.

Godinez v. Siena College · filed 2001-11-15

Plaintiffs proposed cause of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296, alleging discrimination based on his mental health disability, lacks merit as it is clear from plaintiffs past behavior that Siena had a legitimate, not pretextual, nondiscriminatory reason for declaring him “persona non grata” (see, Matter of North Shore Univ. Hosp. v Rosa, 86 NY2d 413, 419-420).

Section 296(1)(a) does not protect an alcoholic employee who relapses after rehabilitation and is dismissed for misconduct.

Sills v. Kerik · filed 2004-03-18(1)(a)

The Human Rights Law does not, as in the case herein, protect an individual who, subsequent to the completion of rehabilitation, suffers a relapse and is found guilty of, and is dismissed for, misconduct (see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554 [1994]; Matter of Myszczenko v City of Poughkeepsie, 239 AD2d 584, 560-561 [1997]; see also Riddick v City of New York, 4 AD3d 242 [2004]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on disability.

Walker v. Connetquot Central School District of Islip Central School Offices · filed 2004-05-24

However, in opposition, the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether he was reasonably able to perform his job duties, and whether his demotion from head custodian to groundskeeper was based on his disability (see Executive Law § 296; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 631 [1997]; Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]; Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527, 532 [1983]).

Section 296 bars employment discrimination based on disability, and a plaintiff opposing summary judgment must show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Haviland v. Yonkers Public Schools · filed 2005-08-22

In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action alleging employment discrimination based on disability, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the stated reasons for her discharge were pretextual (see Timashpolsky v State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn, 306 AD2d 271, 272 [2003]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on disability and retaliation for protected activity when an adverse employment action is causally connected to that activity.

Rastogi v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2005-09-06

In response to the plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination based on his disability set forth in his complaint, the defendants offered evidence that the plaintiffs work schedule was modified for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, thereby making out a prima facie case for summary judgment (see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]; Blum v New York Stock Exch., 298 AD2d 343, 344 [2002]). ... Moreover, the plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing in support of his unlawful retaliation claim that he suffered an adverse employment action while engaged in a protected activity, and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 313 [2004]; Todzia v Saint Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs., 6 AD3d 523, 524 [2004]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Section 296 prohibits a housing accommodation owner from making a record or inquiry connected with a prospective purchase, rental, or lease that expresses discrimination based on disability.

Hirschmann v. Hassapoyannes · filed 2005-12-01(5)(a)(3)

Like the Fair Housing Act, the New York State and City Human Rights laws expressly prohibit an owner of a housing accommodation “to make any record or inquiry in connection with the prospective purchase, rental or lease of such a housing accommodation which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to . . . disability” (Executive Law § 296 [5] [a] [3]; see also Administrative Code § 8-107 [5] [a] [3]).

Section 296(1)(a) forbids an employer from terminating an employee because of a disability.

Pepler v. Coyne · filed 2006-10-17(1)(a)

The Human Rights Law forbids “an employer” from terminating an employee because of a disability (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on disability.

Johnson v. Kelly · filed 2006-12-21(1)(a)

Nor did the termination violate Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), prohibiting employment discrimination based on disability. Petitioner has not demonstrated a disability within the meaning of the statute (see Executive Law § 292 [21]). In any event, petitioner’s condition represented a threat to himself (see 9 NYCRR 466.11 [g] [2] [i]).

Section 296 (1) (a) does not apply when an applicant is incapable of performing essential police duties and therefore is not disabled under § 292 (21).

O'Sullivan v. City of New York · filed 2007-03-29(1)(a)

It is undisputed that a conclusive finding that plaintiff is incapable of performing the essential duties of a police officer would mean that there was no violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) inasmuch as he would not be disabled within the meaning of Executive Law § 292 (21) (see Bellamy v City of New York, 14 AD3d 462, 463 [2005]).

Section 296(1) requires a claimant alleging employment discrimination based on alcoholism to show that the drug abuse leading to termination was causally related to the alcoholism.

Kirk v. City of New York · filed 2008-01-03(1)

Petitioner failed to establish that his drug abuse was causally related to his alcoholism, and thus did not state a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (1).

Section 296 prohibits discrimination against individuals who are themselves disabled and does not create a cause of action for disability association discrimination.

Rivera v. Lutheran Medical Center · filed 2008-10-16

The plain language of the NYSHRL clearly indicates that it only prohibits discrimination against individuals who are themselves disabled and was not intended to provide a cause of action for disability association discrimination (Bartman v Shenker, 5 Mise 3d 856 [2004]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of a disability and requires a disability discrimination claim to allege the disability and causation.

Vig v. New York Hairspray Co. · filed 2009-09-15(1)(a)

Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) provides, inter alia, that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discharge an employee on the basis of a disability (Germakian v Kenny Intl. Corp., 151 AD2d 342 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 615 [1989]). Accordingly, in order to state a cause of action for disability discrimination under the State HRL, the complaint must allege that the plaintiff suffers a disability and that the disability caused the behavior for which the individual was terminated (Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]).

Section 296 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of a disability and requires reasonable accommodation.

Tosha Restaurants, LLC v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-12-09

“The Human Rights Law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees due to a disability” (Matter of New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 57 AD3d 1057, 1058-1059 [2008], citing Executive Law § 296), and an employer must provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability (see Executive Law § 296 [3] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of disability, and a claim may proceed when factual disputes remain over whether the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Clark v. Thruway Fasteners, Inc. · filed 2012-11-09(1)(a)

We conclude that plaintiff established that there are triable issues of fact “both [whether] the stated reasons were false and [whether] discrimination was the real reason” (id.; see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629-630 [1997]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discharging an individual because of disability.

Clark v. Thruway Fasteners, Inc. · filed 2012-11-09(1)(a)

Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” to discharge an individual “because of’ his or her disability.

Section 296(5) permits a disability-based housing discrimination claim to proceed after a lease-breach judgment when the earlier proceeding did not decide whether disability harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of housing.

Curley v. Bon Aire Properties, Inc. · filed 2015-01-28(5)

The prior summary proceeding did not decide whether the plaintiff was subjected to harassment based on his mental illness, whether such harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his housing, or any other elements of his cause of action to recover damages for housing discrimination based on disability in violation of Executive Law § 296 (5) (see Ewers v Columbia Hgts. Realty, LLC, 44 AD3d 608, 610 [2007]; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Stoute, 36 AD3d 257, 265 [2006]).

Section 296 prohibits denying employment based solely on a person's membership in a disability class without assessing that person's individual abilities.

Matter of Brentwood Union Free School Dist. v. Kirkland · filed 2015-03-18

Here, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, there is substantial evidence in the record to support a conclusion that it unlawfully discriminated against the complainant by denying him employment based solely on his membership in a class of persons with the same condition, chronic obstructive ... pulmonary disease, instead of upon an individualized assessment of his particular abilities (see Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506, 513 [1991]; Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527, 532 [1983]; Matter of Daubman v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 195 AD2d 602, 603 [1993]).

Section 296 disability-discrimination claims may be barred by a prior federal finding that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons were not a pretext for discrimination.

Clifford v. County of Rockland · filed 2016-06-29

Here, the District Court determined that the County had legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions, and that those reasons were not a pretext for discrimination (see Clifford v County of Rockland, 2012 WL 2866268, *6, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 98783, *15-16). This determination was dispositive of the plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 313 [2004]; Kulaya v Dunbar Armored, Inc., 110 AD3d 772, 772 [2013]; Adentran v State of New York, 106 AD3d 844, 845 [2013]).

Temporal proximity between a disability and discharge does not support an inference of discrimination when the employer did not know of the disability.

Tibbetts v. Pelham Union Free School District · filed 2016-10-12(1)(a)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the temporal proximity between the alleged onset of her disability and her discharge does not give rise to an inference of discrimination in this case since the defendant demonstrated that it had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s alleged disability at the time that she was fired (see Matter of Gentili v State Div. of Human Rights, 106 AD2d 742, 742 [1984]; see also Raytheon Co. v Hernandez, 540 US 44, 54 n 7 [2003]; Volmar v Cold Spring Hills Ctr. for Nursing & Rehabilitation, 395 Fed Appx 795, 796 [2d Cir 2010]; Brown v The Pension Bds., 488 F Supp 2d 395, 406 [SD NY 2007]; Barnett v Revere Smelting & Ref. Corp., 67 F Supp 2d 378, 392 [SD NY 1999]; cf. La Marca-Pagano v Dr. Steven Phillips, P.C., 129 AD3d 918 [2015]).

Under Section 296, medical clearance to work without restrictions can establish that an employee had no disability requiring accommodation when employment ended.

Bull v. Metropolitan Jewish Health System, Inc. · filed 2017-07-14

This evidence established, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not suffer a disability requiring any accommodation at the time her employment was terminated (see Matter of Delta Air Lines v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 91 NY2d 65 [1997]; Caban v New York Methodist Hosp., 119 AD3d 717, 718 [2014]; cf. Matter of Levi v Lauro, 58 AD3d 851, 852 [2009]).

Section 296 bars employment discrimination based on disability when the employee could perform the essential job functions with reasonable accommodation.

Brouillard v. Sunrun, Inc. · filed 2023-08-09

A complaint states a cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the NYSHRL if it alleges that the plaintiff suffers from a disability and that the disability engendered the behavior for which they were discriminated against in the terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment or refusal to hire ( see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. , 22 NY3d 824, 834).

Section 296(5)(a)(1) prohibits disability discrimination in housing.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. Weichert · filed 2024-07-26(5)(a)(1)

We agree with SDHR that the Commissioner's determination that respondents discriminated against Fair Housing based on disability is supported by substantial evidence ( see Executive Law § 296 [5] [a] [1]; Matter of Sherwood Terrace Apts. v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 61 AD3d 1333, 1334 [4th Dept 2009]).

Section 296(1)(a) requires factual allegations supporting an inference that adverse employment treatment occurred because of disability.

Maldonado v. City of New York · filed 2024-09-09(1)(a)

The complaint, though, fails to plead any factual allegations sufficient to support the inference that this action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of disability discrimination (see Lively v Wafra Inv. Advisory Group, Inc., 211 AD3d 432, 433 [1st Dept 2022]; Llanos v City of New York, 129 AD3d 620, 620 [1st Dept 2015]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]), nor does the complaint contain any factual allegations that plaintiff was treated less well than other similarly situated correction officers because of her disability (see Wolfe-Santos v NYS Gaming Commn., 188 AD3d 622, 622 [1st Dept 2020]).

Section 296(1) requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to allege a statutory disability, qualification to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse employment action suggesting discrimination.

Troche v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2025-05-29(1)

To state a claim for disability discrimination under the NYSHRL, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Weight alone is not a protected class under § 296(1)(a); a weight-based disability claim requires allegations connecting the plaintiff's weight to a medical condition.

Sacchi v. Ribbon Worldwide LLC · filed 2026-02-25(1)(a)

Therefore, inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to allege that his weight was as a result of a medical condition such that he would be "disabled" within the meaning of the NYSHRL (see Spiegel v Schulmann, 604 F3d 72, 80-81 [2d Cir. 2010]), the complaint fails to establish that plaintiff is a member of a protected class under the NYSHRL.

A NYSHRL disability discrimination complaint must allege facts showing that the employee could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation.

Watson v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. · filed 2026-04-22(1)(a)

However, the complaint failed to set forth factual allegations, which, if true, would be sufficient to show that, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his job (see Brouillard v Sunrun, Inc., 219 AD3d at 562). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly directed dismissal of the cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the NYSHRL.

Section 296 discrimination claims are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Camarda v. Selover · filed 2016-12-14

Discrimination claims brought under § 1983, Title VII, and the NYSHRL are all governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of sex, including pregnancy.

Farmer v. Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC · filed 2020-07-21(1)(a)

Similarly, the NYSHRL states that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer, based on an individual’s gender or sex, “to discharge from employment . . . or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... The assembled circumstances thus comfortably plead that defendants’ termination of Farmer was motivated, at least in part, by her pregnancy.

Section 296 prohibits sex discrimination in compensation and termination and retaliation for protected opposition; the court held that refusing a fee-based bonus and terminating an employee can support a discrimination claim, while an unclarified request for equal pay was not protected activity, but filing the discrimination lawsuit and facing baseless counterclaims supported retaliation.

Miller v. Levi & Korsinsky, LLP · filed 2023-09-27

“To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances surrounding the employment action that give rise to an inference of discrimination.” ... Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adduced evidence sufficient to satisfy the third element because Defendants’ refusal to offer Plaintiff a fee-based bonus agreement and their termination of Plaintiff are adverse employment actions. ... “To demonstrate that he or she engaged in protected activity, “[t]he onus is on the speaker to clarify to the employer that he [or she] is complaining of unfair treatment due to his [or her] membership in a protected class and that he [or she] is not complaining merely of unfair treatment generally.” ... The filing of a lawsuit asserting claims for discrimination is protected activity, and Defendants clearly had notice of that protected activity because they answered the Complaint and asserted counterclaims.

Section 296(1)(c) makes it unlawful for a labor organization to discriminate based on protected characteristics; a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the union's conduct to discriminatory animus or differential treatment, not merely conclusory assertions.

Zaki v. OTG Management LLC · filed 2024-10-24(1)(c)

Both New York State and New York City law make it unlawful for a labor organization to discriminate on the basis of the protected categories Plaintiff alleges: gender, age, national origin, color, and race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (1)(c); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(c). ... Accordingly, I find that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal of her proposed discrimination claims against the Union Defendants under the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL, and amendment of her complaint to include these claims would be futile.

Section 296 prohibits failing to promote a person because of her sex.

Board of Education of the Plain-edge Union Free School District v. McCall · filed 1985-02-19

The determination that petitioners failed to promote complainant because of her sex, in violation of Executive Law § 296, is supported by substantial evidence (see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176).

Section 296 requires a sex discrimination claim to allege an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of sex discrimination.

Reilly v. First Niagara Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-06-19

The plaintiff failed to allege that an adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on her sex ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305; Llanos v City of New York , 129 AD3d 620; Scarfone v Village of Ossining , 23 AD3d 540, 541).

Section 296 treats adverse employment actions motivated by sexual attraction as unlawful gender discrimination.

Quintanar v. New York State Off. of the Attorney Gen. · filed 2026-05-12(1)(a)

Further, adverse employment actions motivated by sexual attraction constitute unlawful gender discrimination in violation of the State and City HRL (see Edwards v Nicolai, 153 AD3d 440, 442 [1st Dept 2017]).

Section 296(5)(b) prohibits discriminatory denial or unequal terms, conditions, privileges, facilities, or services in the sale, rental, or lease of commercial space, and a franchise may qualify as commercial space; section 296(6) permits liability for a person who aids or abets discrimination but not for aiding and abetting one's own discriminatory conduct.

Dipilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2009-08-25(5)(b)(1)-(2), (6)

A 7-Eleven franchise falls within the meaning of said “commercial space.” ... Here, given 7-Eleven’s statements regarding leases to franchisees as part of its franchise relationships, as well as the cost and fee arrangements in connection with said relationship, the Court concludes that denying plaintiff a 7-Eleven franchise for the alleged discriminatory reasons would be covered by said statute; particularly given the landlord/tenant type arrangement in the franchise. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs assertion that Lynch told her that her franchise application should be denied because she was a single female over the age of forty (40) sufficiently states an actionable claim. ... Additionally, under § 296(6), an individual “who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim” can also be held personally liable. ... Lynch cannot be held liable under NYHRL for aiding and abetting her own alleged discriminatory conduct.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of actual or perceived sexual orientation, applies when the discriminatory act occurs in New York even if its impact is elsewhere, and does not protect independent contractors.

Rohn Padmore, Inc. v. LC Play Inc. · filed 2010-01-11(1)(a)

In relevant part, the NYSHRL states: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [ ][f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s ... sexual orientation ... to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... The Court agrees with the recent caselaw indicating that the NYSHRL and NYCHRL apply when a discriminatory act is committed in New York, even if the impact of that act is felt outside of New York. ... LaQue and Padmore agree that the NYSHRL protects employees and not independent contractors.

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

Stouter v. Smithtown Central School District · filed 2010-02-12(l)(a)

Unlike Title VII, the New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

Section 296(l)(a) recognizes discrimination in the workplace based on sexual orientation as unlawful under the NYSHRL.

Anderson v. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP · filed 2012-03-06(l)(a)

However, discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation is recognized under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(a).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and requires a plaintiff to plead protected-class status, qualification, adverse action, and facts suggesting discriminatory motivation.

Castillo v. Isakov · filed 2023-10-12(1)(a)

Both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL proscribe discrimination based on sexual orientation. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a); see also Small v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 2023 WL 112546, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2023). ... To obtain a default judgment on a discrimination claim under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must plead “(1) that []he is a member of a protected class, (2) that []he was qualified for the position . . . , (3) that []he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) [that he] can sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.”

Section 296 prohibited sexual discrimination based on sexual orientation beginning January 16, 2003, and the amendment applies prospectively.

New York State Department of Correctional Services v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2008-07-10

Although Executive Law § 296 did not prohibit sexual discrimination based on sexual orientation until January 16, 2003 (see L 2002, ch 2), and the amendment applies prospectively only (see Wilder v Newman, 167 Fed Appx 828 [2006]; Logan v Salvation Army, 10 Misc 3d 756, 759-760 [2005]), the discriminatory conduct proven at the hearing was based upon Humig’s gender as well as her sexual orientation, and it continued until July 2003, well after the amendment’s effective date (see generally Matter of Binghamton GHS Empls. Fed. Credit Union v State Div. of Human Rights, 77 NY2d 12, 17 [1990]; Matter of Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y. v Carter, 14 NY2d 138, 145 [1964]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation; a disciplinary charge and penalty do not establish such discrimination without evidence that they were motivated by the employee’s sexual orientation.

Asch v. New York City Board/Department of Education · filed 2013-03-05(1)(a)

It is beyond question that Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) prohibits discrimination based upon “age, race, creed, color, national origin [or] sexual orientation.” ... In short, the record is completely devoid of any indicia that either the charges or the penalty imposed were motivated in whole or in part by petitioner’s sexual orientation.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a wedding venue open to the public from refusing to host a same-sex wedding because of the couple’s sexual orientation.

Gifford v. McCarthy · filed 2016-01-14(2)(a)

Accordingly, petitioners discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation when they refused to host the McCarthys’ wedding on the premises.

Section 296 (1) allows a sexual orientation discrimination claim to proceed when evidence raises a factual dispute about whether the stated reason for adverse action was pretextual.

Thygesen v. North Bailey Volunteer Fire Co., Inc. · filed 2017-06-09(1)

We agree with plaintiff, however, that he raised an issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion of the Fire Company and defendants Warren G. Holmes, individually and in his capacity as president of the Fire Company, and David Humbert, individually and in his capacity as Fire Chief of the Fire Company (collectively, Fire Company defendants), with respect to the first and second causes of action, alleging that they violated Executive Law § 296 (1) and Civil Rights Law § 40-c by discriminating against him based upon his sexual orientation.

Section 296(1-a)(c) makes it unlawful for a labor organization controlling apprentice training programs to discriminate against a person in pursuing or receiving the terms, conditions, or privileges of those programs because of the listed protected characteristics.

Langford v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 30 · filed 2011-02-16(1-a)(c)

Those same principles counsel in favor of refraining from applying Martin’s pleading requirements to the case at bar. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1-a)(c) specifically provides: ... (c) To discriminate against any person in his or her pursuit of such programs or to discriminate against such a person in the terms, conditions or privileges of such programs because of race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, age, disability or marital status; ... When the statute specifically charges labor organizations such as Local 30 with liability for discriminatory practices in apprenticeship programs, it has evinced the Legislature’s judgment that for the purposes of the statute, contrary to Martin’s holding, that the labor organization does have an existence independent of its members. ... Accordingly, the Court finds neither decision persuasive and declines to dismiss Langford’s state and city law claims.

Section 296(1-a)(a) requires apprentices to be selected on objective qualifications without reference to minority status.

Broidrick v. Lindsay · filed 1976-05-11(1-a)(a)

Subdivision c of section 3 of the regulations, governing apprenticeship programs, is inconsistent with State law providing the standards for such programs (Labor Law, § 815, subd 5; Executive Law, § 296, subd 1-a, par [a]). Essentially, the State statutes provide that apprentices shall be selected on the basis of objective qualifications alone, without reference to minority status (id.).

At the relevant time, § 296(4) prohibited educational corporations from denying use of their facilities based on specified categories, but did not prohibit discrimination based on sex or gender.

Doe v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2024-01-12(4)

Turning to Plaintiff’s specific claims, however, her NYSHRL claims fails because the CVA only revives previously lapsed claims, see Holloway v. Holy See, 537 F. Supp. 3d 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“the CVA itself does not create a cause of action, nor does it regulate conduct”), and the relevant provisions of the NYSHRL did not include sex or gender as a protected class at the time when the underlying conduct occurred. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(4) (effective Nov. 16, 2002, to Jan. 15, 2003) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an education corporation . . . to deny the use of its facilities to any person . . . by reason of his race, color, religion, disability, national origin, age or marital status.”). As contemporary caselaw explains, the statute “d[id] not prohibit discrimination based on sex.”

Section 296(4) prohibits an educational institution from denying an otherwise qualified person use of its facilities based on race, sex, or age, and NYSHRL claims are evaluated under the same liability standards as analogous federal claims while also covering sex and age.

Minto v. Molloy University · filed 2024-02-06(4)

Finally, under Section 296(4) of the NYSHRL, it is an “unlawful discriminatory practice for an educational institution to deny the use of its facilities to any person otherwise qualified” based – among other things – on “race,” “sex,” or “age.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(4). In the Second Circuit, a claim under the NYSHRL is evaluated under the same standard as an analogous claim under a federal antidiscrimination law. Padmanabhan v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech. Campus, N.Y., No. 18-cv-5284 (ER), 2019 WL 4572194, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019). The federal statute analogous to Section 296(4) of the NYSHRL is Title VI. Id.; see Folkes v. N.Y. Coll. Of Osteopathic Med. of N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 214 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting summary judgment and finding “for the reasons stated . . . in regard to [plaintiff’s] Title VI claim” that plaintiff “presented wholly insufficient evidence of racial discrimination and [could not] invoke section 296(4) on that basis”). Accordingly, the Court evaluates the plaintiffs’ Title VI and NYSHRL claims under the same liability standards with the exception that the NYSHRL applies to sex and age discrimination and Title VI does not.

Section 296(4) bars an educational institution from permitting race-based harassment of a student and, according to the court, does not impose liability on individual employees.

Davis v. Winston Preparatory School · filed 2025-06-30(4)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful “for an educational institution .. . to permit the harassment of any student . . . by reason of his race[.]” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(4). ... Given the statute’s reference to “educational institution,” it does not appear that it imposes liability on individuals.

Section 296(4) does not treat a school district as an education corporation subject to its antidiscrimination requirements.

East Meadow Union Free School District v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2009-09-29(4)

Hence, a school district cannot be an “education corporation” within the meaning of Human Rights Law §296(4).

Section 296(4) permits the State Division of Human Rights to exercise jurisdiction over discrimination complaints against public school districts.

Union Endicott Central School District v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2011-06-30(4)

In any event, in view of our decision in Matter of Ithaca City School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights (supra), wherein we uphold SDHR’s jurisdiction over public school districts such as petitioner pursuant to the Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 290 et seq.), petitioner’s claims here as to that issue are without merit.

Section 296(4) applies to public school districts and permits the State Division of Human Rights to address discrimination by them.

Ithaca City School District v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2011-06-30(4)

Thus, we conclude that public school districts are among the “educational institutions” over which SDHR has jurisdiction and that Executive Law § 296 (4) is the statutory mechanism by which it can seek to eliminate any discrimination by such school districts.

Section 296(4) does not cover public school districts, so the Division of Human Rights lacks jurisdiction to investigate complaints against them under that provision.

North Syracuse Central School District v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2012-06-12(4)

Because a public school district is not an “education corporation or association” under Executive Law § 296 (4), the SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate the complaints filed by the students in these appeals.