N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of race or color, rather than for other, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Company and S. Theodore Nygreen · filed 1977-04-06(1)(a)

Under this provision, the appellant was required to demonstrate that she "was discharged because of racial or color discrimination," and not for other reasons, such as absenteeism and tardiness.

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment, while § 296(l)(e) prohibits retaliation against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law; the claims use a burden-shifting framework with the ultimate burden of persuasion on the plaintiff.

In Re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. · filed 1997-08-18(l)(a), (l)(e)

The New York Human Rights Law affords protections similar to the ADEA, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a) (McKinney’s 1997), as does the Pennsylvania Human Rights Law embodied in section 955(a) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations law. All of New York’s and Pennsylvania’s employment discrimination laws and the ADEA follow the analysis and shifting burdens of proof outlined by courts interpreting civil rights violations under title VII. ... The New York Human Rights Law provides that it shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under that law. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e). Retaliation claims require the same shifting burden of proof analysis as for age discrimination claims and the ultimate burden of persuasion rests, as always, on the plaintiff.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race or other listed protected characteristics, and claims under it use the same burden-shifting framework as federal discrimination claims.

Anderson v. Hertz Corp. · filed 2007-07-30(1)(a)

The New York State Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in employment by making it unlawful “for an employer ... because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status of any individual ... to discharge from employment such individual.... ” N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(l)(a). Claims arising under § 296 are also decided under the same burden-shifting framework that applies to federal actions under § 1981 and Title VII.

Section 296(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of race or national origin, even when the employee has no vested right to the position.

NYC BD. OF EDUC. v. Batista · filed 1981-11-24(1)

Although Batista and Fletcher had no vested rights in their positions, they could not be discharged for a constitutionally or statutorily proscribed reason ( James v Board of Educ. , 37 N.Y.2d 891). Among the impermissible reasons for discharging an employee are the employee's race and national origin (Executive Law, § 296, subd 1). That an employee has no job security does not mean that he or she has no right to be free from unlawful discrimination.

Section 296(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of race or national origin.

New York City Board of Education v. Batista · filed 1981-11-24(1)

Among the impermissible reasons for discharging an employee are the employee’s race and national origin (Executive Law, § 296, subd 1).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a claimant alleging discriminatory discharge to prove that the employer discharged the employee because of a disability.

Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home Co. v. Fireman's Insurance of Newark · filed 1982-01-28(1)(a)

In order to recover in their action under subdivision 9 of section 297 of the Executive Law, the Woods must first prove that plaintiff discharged Kathleen Wood because of her disability (Executive Law, § 296, subd 1, par [a]).

Section 296 covers an alleged racially motivated termination by New York State acting as an employer.

Figueroa v. State · filed 1984-11-20

However, the allegations do properly set forth a cause of action stating a violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, §§ 296, 297, subd 9), which statutorily created action may be maintained against the State of New York in its role as an employer (Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442).

A discriminatory-discharge claim under Section 296 lacks support when the employee was not reasonably able to perform the position’s duties.

Dukelow v. Lum · filed 1985-07-15

Nor is there any support for petitioner’s contention that there was a discriminatory motive for her discharge in contravention of Executive Law § 296 (see, Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527, 532) since the record indicates that she was not reasonably able to perform the duties of the subject position.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discipline based on race even when an employee serves at will or lacks civil service protection.

Michaelis v. State · filed 1987-12-23(1)(a)

Even an employee "at will” or without civil service protection may not be disciplined because of race, color or any of the other classifications set forth in the Human Rights Law (see, Matter of New York City Bd. of Educ. v Batista, 54 NY2d 379, 382-383; Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296(1)(a) bars public employers from discharging at-will employees on the basis of race or sex.

State Division of Human Rights v. County of Onondaga Sheriff's Department · filed 1988-04-26(1)(a)

Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), which is part of the New York Human Rights Law and which applies to public employers, bars discrimination in employment on the basis of sex or race (see, e.g., Matter of City of Schenectady v State Div. of Human Rights, 37 NY2d 421, 430). Thus complainant, although an employee at will, could not lawfully be discharged from her employment on these bases.

Section 296 prohibits terminating an employee because of race or color.

Quality Care, Inc. v. Rosa · filed 1993-06-07

The determination that the petitioner Quality Care, Inc., discriminated against the complainant Vernita Bing on the basis of race and color, terminating her employment in violation of Executive Law § 296, is supported by substantial ... evidence in the record (see, Executive Law § 298; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v County of Onondaga Sheriff’s Dept., 71 NY2d 623, 630-631; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights [Granelle], 70 NY2d 100, 106; Matter of CUNY-Hostos Community Coll. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 NY2d 69, 75).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a showing that an employee’s dismissal was based on discrimination.

Feinberg v. Higgins · filed 1993-12-06(1)(a)

There was no showing that the petitioner’s dismissal was based on discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), resulting from the petitioner’s handwriting disability.

Section 296(1)(a) allows an at-will employee to bring a claim for prohibited employment discrimination.

Thomas v. Austrian Airlines · filed 1995-06-26(1)(a)

An at-will employee is not barred from bringing a claim based on the statutorily impermissible practices of the employer such as discrimination based on marital status, disability, or national origin as alleged by the plaintiff (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v County of Onondaga Sheriff’s Dept., 71 NY2d 623, 630).

A discriminatory termination claim under § 296 requires sufficient direct or indirect evidence that the termination occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Anthony v. Nemec · filed 1996-03-07

In the absence of sufficient evidence, either direct or indirect, to demonstrate that the termination of plaintiffs employment occurred under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted (see, supra).

Section 296 is not violated by a dismissal supported by a rational, nondiscriminatory basis.

Tsang v. Safir · filed 1998-12-01

Finally, since it had a rational, nondiscriminatory basis, respondents’ determination was not in violation of Executive Law § 296 (see, Matter of Silbert v Jackson, 228 AD2d 198, lv denied 88 NY2d 814).

Under § 296(1)(a), an employee challenging a stated reason for discharge must show that it was false or pretextual and that racial discrimination was the likely reason for termination.

Sommerville v. R.C.I. · filed 1999-01-21(1)(a)

His Executive Law claim survives only if he can show that defendant’s proffered reason was false or pretextual and that his termination was most likely racially motivated.

Section 296 prohibits discriminatory discharge, but a claim fails when no rational view of the evidence supports finding that the employer discharged the employee in violation of the section.

Mitchell v. Boys Harbor, Inc. · filed 1999-03-08

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and giving her the benefit of every inference that might properly be drawn in her favor, we agree that by no rational process could the finder of fact ... have concluded that the defendant discharged the plaintiff from employment in violation of Executive Law § 296 (see, ...).

Under § 296(1)(a), an employer may obtain summary judgment on a discriminatory discharge claim by showing a legitimate reason for termination when the employee raises no triable issue that the reason was pretextual.

Singh v. Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC · filed 2015-09-23(1)(a)

Here, the defendant satisfied its burden on its motion for summary judgment by establishing a legitimate nonpretextual reason for terminating the plaintiff's employment. Specifically, it presented evidence that the plaintiff was found asleep while on duty, that sleeping while on duty is a violation of company rules, and that the plaintiff's employment was terminated in accordance with a no-tolerance policy for such violations. The burden thus shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the reason given for the termination of his employment was true or was pretextual ( see Nura v International Shoppes, LLC , 130 AD3d 697; Nettles v LSG Sky Chefs , 94 AD3d at 728). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in this regard ( see Cotterell v State of New York , 129 AD3d 653, 655; Apiado v North Shore Univ. Hosp. [at Syosset] , 66 AD3d 929, 930).

Section 296(1) requires employee benefit plans to cover pregnancy-related disability on the same basis as other covered disabling conditions, and its application is not preempted by ERISA, Title VII, or the RLA.

Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al. v. Werner H. Kramarsky, et al. · filed 1981-05-11(1)

Section 296 of the HRL requires that employee benefit plans provide coverage for disability due to pregnancy on the same basis on which other disabling conditions are covered. ... We consider first plaintiffs' claims that federal law forbade enforcement of the HRL. For the reasons below, we conclude that the HRL was not preempted by ERISA, or Title VII, or the RLA. ... In short, the HRL did not require employers to discriminate against men on the basis of their sex and was therefore not unlawful under Title VII. ... Accordingly, we hold that the HRL was not preempted by the RLA.

Section 296 requires employee benefit plans to provide coverage for pregnancy-related disability on the same basis as coverage for other disabling conditions.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky · filed 1981-05-11(1)

Section 296 of the HRL requires that employee benefit plans provide coverage for disability due to pregnancy on the same basis on which other disabling conditions are covered. ... For the reasons below, we conclude that the HRL was not preempted by ERISA, or Title VII, or the RLA.

Section 296 requires disability benefit plans to provide pregnancy-related disability benefits on the same basis as benefits for other disabilities, and ERISA does not preempt that requirement.

Burroughs Corporation v. Kramarsky · filed 1981-05-11

Plaintiff is also subject to New York's Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980-1981) ("HRL"). ... HRL requires that disability benefit plans such as plaintiff's provide benefits for disabilities related to pregnancy on the same basis as for other disabilities. ... For the reasons discussed in our decision today in Delta, plaintiff's claim that ERISA preempts the HRL is untenable in light of the Supreme Court's action in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota, 444 U.S. 1041, 100 S.Ct. 725, 62 L.Ed.2d 726 (1980).

Section 296(1)(a)'s prohibition of sex discrimination does not repeal the Disability Benefits Law's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities.

American Airlines, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1976-01-15(1)(a)

We hold, therefore, that the Human Rights Law as amended in 1965 did not repeal subdivision 3 of section 205 of the Disability Benefits Law, and that both laws can be given full effect so that the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under the Disability Benefits Law can coexist with the provisions of the Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination because of sex.

Section 296(1)(a) requires employers to provide pregnancy-related disability benefits on the same terms as disability benefits for male employees.

American Bank Note Co. v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1979-07-10(1)(a)

The Human Rights Law does not, however, require an employer to pay female employees benefits for disability due to pregnancy in circumstances in which the employer does not pay male employees benefits for disability.

Section 296 permits a sexual-harassment claim under New York’s Human Rights Law, for which compensatory damages and potentially punitive damages are available.

O'BRIEN v. King World Productions, Inc. · filed 1987-09-18

However, in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f), and because the New York statute closely parallels the language of Title VII, we construe the complaint to invoke the New York Human Rights Law. ... However, compensatory damages are available under the New York Human Rights Law. ... The plaintiff may also be entitled to punitive damages under the New York law. ... For this reason, the motion to strike the plaintiffs demand for damages is granted only to the extent the request for such relief pertains to the plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Section 296(2)(a) does not require purposeful discrimination, intent, or malice to establish unlawful discrimination in a public accommodation.

Perino v. Cohen (In Re Cohen) · filed 1988-09-30(2)(a)

Cohen was found to have violated Sections 296(2)(a) and 296(14) of the Human Rights Law. ... Unlike the New York Civil Rights Law, which is the state’s equal protection statute, purposeful discrimination is not a “necessary element” of a cause of action under Section 296 of the Human Rights Law. ... Further, a determination by the Human Rights Division of unlawful discrimination does not require a finding that the discrimination was intentional, let alone malicious. The statutory provisions that Cohen was found to have violated require neither intent nor malice to sustain a finding of unlawful discrimination.

Section 296 does not authorize liquidated damages against an individual defendant whose liability rests on New York's Human Rights Law.

Keith Cross and Alfred Francis v. New York City Transit Authority and Gregory Warren, Docket No. 04-2912-Cv · filed 2005-08-02

The plaintiffs cannot, however, recover liquidated damages against individual defendant Gregory Warren because his liability is predicated on New York’s Human Rights Law, which does not provide for liquidated damages.

Section 296(1)(a) equal-pay discrimination claims use the Title VII framework and require proof that the pay differential was motivated by discriminatory animus.

Cox v. Quick & Reilly, Inc. · filed 2005-10-06(1)(a)

NYSHRL discrimination claims “are evaluated using the same analytical framework used in Title VII actions.” ... Equal pay claims under the EPA, Title VII, and the NY[S]HRL are generally analysed under the same standards; “however, claims pursuant to Title VII or the NY[S]HRL require a plaintiff to prove that the pay differential was motivated by a discriminatory animus.”

Before the 2019 amendment, § 296 discrimination claims were analyzed under the same framework as analogous Title VII and ADEA claims.

Allen v. City of New York · filed 2025-11-12

Plaintiffs' disparate impact claim under the NYSHRL is subject to the same federal standards, and so fails for the same reasons. ... Under the pre-amendment regime, this Court has repeatedly held that discrimination claims under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same framework as corresponding Title VII and ADEA claims. ... Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims brought under the NYSHRL are subject to the same standard as analogous claims brought under Title VII or the ADEA. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for H&H on the NYSHRL disparate treatment claim.

Claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 are generally analyzed under the same standards as claims under the Equal Pay Act.

Kanhoye v. Altana Inc. · filed 2009-12-03

Claims under Title VII, the New York Executive Law, and the Nassau Administrative Code are “generally analyzed under the same standards used in an EPA claim.”

Section 296 permits money damages, including back pay, to be treated as a legal remedy decided by a jury.

Zhang v. Rosenbaum, Famularo & Segall, P.C. · filed 2025-02-25

In contrast, “any form of money damages . . . is a legal remedy to be decided by the jury under the NYSHRL.” Chisholm v. Mem’l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Accordingly, “back pay is a legal remedy, as to which [a plaintiff] is entitled to a jury verdict, under [New York Law] . . . .” Dodd v. City Univ. of New York, 541 F. Supp. 3d 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). ... As the jury may hear evidence of Plaintiff’s economic damages related to his claims arising under the NYSHRL, for the sake of judicial economy, the Court will also rely on the empaneled jurors as an advisory jury pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c)(1) with respect to his claims for economic damages arising under federal law.

Section 296 prohibits an employer from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex, and an employment-discrimination damages claim under it is not barred by the notice-of-claim requirement in General Municipal Law § 50-e.

Lenihan v. City of New York · filed 1986-01-15

That statute forbids an employer from, inter alia, discriminating against its employees on the basis of sex. ... As plaintiff has properly pointed out, however, § 50-e applies on its face only to tort actions. In addition, the New York courts have specifically ruled that it does not apply to employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to § 296.

Mental anguish awards for discrimination under Section 296 must be supported by the record and accord with awards for similar discrimination.

Kearns v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1994-10-31

Moreover, the award to each complainant of $5,000 for mental anguish was supported by the record and is in accordance with awards for similar types of discrimination (see, Matter of Courant v Rosa, 195 AD2d 555; Matter of Alverson v State Div. of Human Rights, 181 AD2d 1019; Matter of Cosmos Forms v State Div. of Human Rights, 150 AD2d 442).

Section 296 uses the same standards for establishing unlawful discrimination as Title VII cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Deshpande v. TJH Medical Services, P.C. · filed 2008-06-17

The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under Executive Law § 296 are the same as those governing Title VII cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 330 [2003]; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296 applies the same recovery standards as Title VII.

MTA Trading, Inc. v. Kirkland · filed 2011-05-03

“The standards for recovery under the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296) are the same as the federal standards under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 n 3 [2004]; see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 330 [2003]; Matter of Aurecchione v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 98 NY2d at 25-26).

An age-discrimination claim under § 296 is analyzed analogously to an ADEA claim, using the same elements and burden of proof.

Cronin v. ITT CORPORATION · filed 1990-03-26

Because an age discrimination claim under the New York Human Rights Law is analogous to an action under the ADEA and the same elements and burden of proof apply, Cronin’s state claim is also dismissed.

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits age-based discharge, and an age-discrimination claim under it is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Munn v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. · filed 1996-11-27(l)(a)

The New York Human Rights Law provides similar protection. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). Under both the ADEA and the New York Human Rights Law, the ultimate question is whether an employer discriminated against an employee on account of that person’s age. ... Where a plaintiff claims discharge from employment in violation of these statutes, the three-step “burden-shifting” test of ... supplies the appropriate analytical framework for determining a defendant’s summary judgment motion. ... I also find that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing on the essential elements of his age discrimination case to avoid summary judgment. I therefore recommend that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of the age discrimination claims in the complaint.

For age-discrimination claims, New York Human Rights Law follows the same substantive standard as the ADEA.

Connell v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York · filed 2000-08-16

The substantive law under the New York Human Rights Law is the same as under the ADEA.

Section 296 discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and fail on summary judgment here because the plaintiff lacked sufficient evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motive.

Beachum v. AWISCO New York · filed 2011-03-16

Because Plaintiff has not presented any direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the Court will review Plaintiffs various discrimination claims under the three-step, burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). ... Accordingly, considering all of the evidence in the record and granting Plaintiff all of the inferences to which he is entitled, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in adducing sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Plaintiff was terminated for discriminatory reasons. AWISCO’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted as to Plaintiffs Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL race discrimination claims. ... AWISCO’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted as to Plaintiffs Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL retaliation claims.

Section 296(3) prohibits employment discrimination based on age against persons who are 18 or older.

Hanley v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Inc. · filed 2024-03-22(3)

The NYSHRL prohibits age-based employment discrimination against anyone who is 18 or older. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3).

Section 296 shifts the burden of producing a justification to the employer once an employee makes a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

Kelly v. Town of North Hempstead · filed 1984-07-09

Accordingly, we conclude that a prima facie case was made out by plaintiff and that the burden of coming forward with evidence to justify the action taken against plaintiff was shifted to the defendants, which burden they failed to meet.

A Section 296 age discrimination claim requires sufficient evidentiary proof to raise a triable issue of discrimination.

Faillace v. Port Authority · filed 1987-07-02

Finally, we disagree with the dissent’s contention that plaintiff’s papers make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, since, based upon our examination of the record, we find that plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidentiary proof of such discrimination to raise a triable issue of fact.

A plaintiff alleging age discrimination under § 296 must rebut the employer’s evidence that the challenged action was taken for legitimate business reasons.

Keith v. Carrier International Corp. · filed 1987-07-10

In this age discrimination suit alleging a violation of Executive Law § 296, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to rebut defendants’ evidence that the alleged discriminatory action was taken for legitimate business reasons as part of a valid corporate reorganization plan (see, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792).

An age discrimination plaintiff who shows neither replacement by a younger person nor statistical evidence must produce evidence of discriminatory intent to oppose summary judgment.

Brown v. General Electric Co. · filed 1988-11-03(3-a)(a)

We further find plaintiff’s cause of action based on a violation of Executive Law § 296 (3-a) (a) to be legally insufficient. Where plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was replaced by a younger person or to produce statistical evidence of discriminatory conduct, he is required to demonstrate evidence of discriminatory intent (see, Mayer v Mantón Cork Corp., 126 AD2d 526) in order to counter defendant’s motion.

Section 296 age-discrimination claims follow a shifting burden framework, beginning with the plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie case.

Ioele v. Alden Press, Inc. · filed 1989-01-19(3-a)(a)

In interpreting this statute, New York courts follow the shifting burden formula set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green (411 US 792).

An age discrimination claim under § 296(3-a)(a) requires enough evidence to create a triable issue of age-based discrimination.

Schmitt v. Hicksville UFSD No. 17 · filed 1994-01-24(3-a)(a)

Moreover, there is insufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether the administrators discriminated against her on the basis of her age (see, Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [a]; see also, Matter of Comfort v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 101 AD2d 663).

Once an employer shows a facially valid, independent and nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, an employee must raise a question of fact as to whether that reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Wozniak v. Components Assembly Division, Inc. · filed 1995-10-26(1)(a)

Defendant having shown that it had a facially valid, independent and nondiscriminatory reason for the questioned conduct, the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise a question of fact with respect to whether the claimed reason for his termination is, in reality, merely a pretext for illegal discrimination (see, Rabideau v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 195 AD2d 923, 926; cf., Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 937, 939).

In a section 296 age discrimination claim, the employer may rebut a prima facie case with legitimate reasons for its decision, and the plaintiff must show those reasons were pretextual.

Bockino v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 1996-02-13

On the present record, we discern no basis for disturbing the trial court’s determination that the defendants rebutted the plaintiffs prima facie case of age discrimination and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the legitimate reasons advanced by the defendants were merely pretextual.

Section 296(1)(a) allows an employer to rebut a prima facie age discrimination case by showing that economic setbacks caused the job termination.

Laverack & Haines, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-10-15(1)(a)

The downsizing of a company’s employment rolls, due to business failings and economic setbacks, constitutes a sustainable rebuttal and explanation for the decision to terminate a particular employee, when demonstrated virtually without contradiction, as in this case and record.

In a § 296 age discrimination claim, asking whether the employee met the employer’s required qualifications at discharge does not unfairly increase the employee’s burden of proof.

Schutz v. Finkelstein, Bruckman, Wohl, Most & Rothman · filed 2000-08-21

Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, the second question on the ...verdict sheet did not unfairly increase his burden of proof by asking whether he possessed the qualifications necessary for the position required by the employer at the time of his discharge.

Section 296 prohibits pregnancy discrimination and applies Title VII burden shifting standards to prove unlawful discrimination.

Mittl v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2003-06-05(1)

Article 15 of the Executive Law — known as the Human Rights Law — prohibits discharge of an employee because of pregnancy (see Executive Law § 296 [1]; Elaine W. v Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 81 NY2d 211, 216 [1993]). ... The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under section 296 of the Human Rights Law are the same as those governing title VII cases under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296 applies the same standards used under the ADEA to analyze age discrimination claims.

Brannigan v. Board of Education of Levittown Union Free School District · filed 2005-05-31

The elements of an age discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law and the ADEA are essentially the same and courts apply the same standards for analyzing age discrimination claims under both statutes (see Lightfoot v Union Carbide Corp., 110 F3d 898, 913 [1997]; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623 [1997]; Hardy v General Elec. Co., 270 AD2d 700, 701 [2000]).

Section 296 requires an employee to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, after which the employer may offer a legitimate reason and the employee may show that reason is pretextual.

Woodie v. Azteca International Corp. · filed 2009-03-24

The employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the prima facie case with a legitimate reason, in which case the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the proffered reasons are pretextual.

Section 296 requires a disability discrimination claimant to bear the same burden of proof as under the ADA.

Abram v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-03-19

She bears the same burden of proof under Executive Law § 296 (see Gill v Maul, 61 AD3d 1159, 1160 [2009]; Pimentel v Citibank, N.A., 29 AD3d 141, 147 n 2 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 707 [2006]).

For an age discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, § 296 requires a claimant to show membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, and an adverse employment action under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

DeKenipp v. State · filed 2012-07-26(1)(a), (3-a)(a)

Historically, New York and federal courts have employed the same framework in analyzing age discrimination claims. Relative to claims such as this, involving circumstantial evidence, a claimant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that the claimant was a member of the protected class, that the claimant was qualified for the position, and that the claimant experienced an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 296 requires a plaintiff to raise a triable issue of pretext when an employer establishes valid nondiscriminatory reasons for its action.

Kulaya v. Dunbar Armored, Inc. · filed 2013-10-09

If the employer establishes that it had valid nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the stated reasons were pretextual (see Thide v New York State Dept. of Transp., 27 AD3d at 453).

Section 296 age discrimination and retaliation claims may be dismissed on summary judgment when the plaintiff raises no triable issue that discrimination or retaliation played a role in the challenged actions.

Swan v. St. John's University · filed 2014-04-23(1)(a), (1)(e)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. For the same reasons, the Supreme Court also should have granted those branches of the appellants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the second, fourth, and sixth causes of action, which allege age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a], [e]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305-306, 312-313 [2004]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits summary judgment on an age discrimination claim when the employer establishes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination and the employee fails to raise a triable issue of fact.

Buonagura v. New York Racing Assn., Inc. · filed 2015-06-03(1)(a)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of Executive Law § 296. The defendant established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence showing that the termination of the plaintiff’s employment was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason ... In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Leon v State Univ. of N.Y., 120 AD3d 771 [2014]; Dzikowski v J.J. Burns & Co., LLC, 98 AD3d 468 [2012]; Kelderhouse v St. Cabrini Home, 259 AD2d 938 [1999]).

A claim under § 296 cannot be litigated in court after the claimant files the same claim with the DHR, unless the DHR dismisses it for administrative convenience.

DeWald v. Amsterdam Housing Authority · filed 1993-06-07

Section 296, while seemingly expansive at first glance, is subject to a qualification that limits a plaintiffs ability to rely upon it in bringing a suit. Specifically, section 297 of the Executive Law, commonly known as the law’s “election of remedies” provision, requires a party seeking relief pursuant to section 296 to pursue her claim in either a judicial forum or a “local commission on human rights,” but not both. N.Y.Exec. Law § 297(9) (McKinney Supp.1992); ... The only exception to this rule pertains to situations in which the DHR dismisses an administrative claim “for administrative convenience”; only under these circumstances may a party subsequently litigate the same claim in a court of law. N.Y.Exec.Law § 297(9). Federal courts exercising ancillary jurisdiction over a claim under section 296 must strictly adhere to New York’s election of remedies scheme. ... Thus, a federal court may not adjudicate a claim of unlawful discriminatory practice under section 296 which has already been filed with the state DHR unless the DHR dismissed the claim for administrative convenience.

Section 296(1)(a) permits a sexual-harassment claimant to seek compensatory damages for mental suffering, and the extent of that anguish bears on the damages award.

Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1994-02-03(l)(a)

Similarly, mental anguish may also be relevant to a plaintiffs sexual harassment claims under New York Executive Law § 296(i) since a plaintiff may be entitled to compensatory damages for mental suffering under that statute. ... Therefore, the extent of a plaintiffs mental anguish is pertinent in determining the amount of damages to be awarded under New York law.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits age-based discharge or discrimination, and age-discrimination claims under it use the same proof standard as claims under the ADEA.

Hastie v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1994-10-28(1)(a)

The standard of proof for a claim under the New York Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296 is the same as that of the standard of proof for a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623.

A claim under § 296 cannot be maintained while the same discrimination complaint remains pending before the DHR, unless the DHR dismissed it for administrative convenience.

Gonzalez v. New York State Department of Correctional Services Fishkill Correctional Facility · filed 2000-11-29

Plaintiff cross-moves to amend her Complaint to assert claims for violation of N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (the “Human Rights Law” or “HRL”), the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision against Mann and Ercole. ... Because the matter is still before the DHR, Plaintiff is precluded from maintaining an action against Defendants pursuant to the HRL. Thus, permitting an amendment on this ground would be futile.

Section 296 discrimination claims may be pursued through either an administrative NYSDHR proceeding or a judicial action, but those remedies are mutually exclusive; a later judicial claim is barred when NYSDHR has already decided the claim on the merits.

Lugo v. The Center · filed 2023-10-12

The NYSHRL allows Plaintiffs to file complaints for unlawful discrimination either through an administrative action with the NYSDHR or through judicial action. Importantly, “the remedies of administrative review through the Division or judicial review are mutually exclusive.” ... Because these remedies are mutually exclusive, a complaint that has already been dismissed on the merits by the NYSDHR “must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”

Section 296 claims cannot be brought in federal court after the plaintiff has pursued the same claim before the NYSDHR.

Carris v. First Student, Inc. · filed 2017-03-08

A plaintiff cannot bring a claim in federal court under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 if she has already pursued that claim with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”). See Desardouin v. City of Rochester, 708 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2013); N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9) (setting out election of remedies). Here, the district court properly dismissed Carris’s state law claim: she filed a complaint with the NYSDHR, which that body dismissed for lack of probable cause.

A Human Rights Law claim under § 296 is not barred by election of remedies when the State Division of Human Rights dismisses the related complaint for administrative convenience, and the claim may be heard pendent to a federal claim.

Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1990-04-13

Carter-Wallace does not require dismissal of plaintiff’s Human Rights Law claim. Section 297(9) of the Human Rights Law provides that “where the Division has dismissed such complaint on the grounds of administrative convenience, such person shall maintain all rights to bring suit as if no complaint had been filed.” New York courts interpreting this language have held that an administrative convenience dismissal does not bar a complainant from maintaining the same type of action in state court.

Section 296 claims based on discriminatory acts occurring before March 2, 2018 are barred by the election-of-remedies doctrine.

Windley/Edwards v. NYC Dept. of Education · filed 2025-08-27

“* Plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims against all Defendants premised on acts of discrimination that occurred before March 2, 2018, are dismissed with prejudice because the election of remedies doctrine bars her claims, see id. at 25—26.”

Section 296 claims may be barred by res judicata and the election of remedies doctrine.

Bradshaw v. City of New York · filed 2021-12-16

Plaintiff's claims for gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296) and New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107) are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because the claims could have been brought in her prior federal action, which alleged gender discrimination under 42 USC § 1983 ( see Matter of Hunter , 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]; see also Abe v New York Univ. , 169 AD3d 445, 449 [1st Dept 2019], lv dismissed 34 NY3d 1089 [2020]).

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or employ, barring, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of a disability; evidence that the individual could perform the job in a reasonable manner can establish a prima facie claim.

Jefferlone v. Canadian Pacific (U.S.), Inc. · filed 1995-05-26(l)(a)

Lastly, defendants argue that, even if the RLA does not preempt the plaintiff from remedy under state law, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case under the Human Rights Law. ... To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must show that he suffered an adverse employment action due to his disability. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs allegations, coupled with several affidavits supporting his assertion that he was capable of performing the job of trainman/freight conductor, make out a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of his disability.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of disability in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Capasso v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2002-04-12(1)(a)

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 provides, in relevant part: ... 1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: ... (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. ... Because plaintiff has utterly failed to demonstrate how she in particular was adversely treated on the basis of a disability or other personal attribute, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants with respect to this claim.

Section 296 protects against disability discrimination even when the perceived disability does not substantially limit a major life activity.

Peters v. Baldwin Union Free School District · filed 2003-02-12

The district court also granted JMOL to the defendants on Peters's claim under the New York Human Rights Law ("HRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. The HRL provides broader protection to disabled individuals than the Rehabilitation Act, in that a plaintiff under the HRL is not required to show that a perceived disability substantially limits a major life activity. See Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir.2001). If Peters's evidence was sufficient to survive JMOL on her Rehabilitation Act claim, then a fortiori her HRL claim should have been submitted to the jury. See Ashker v. IBM, 168 A.D.2d 724, 563 N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (1990) (permitting plaintiff's claim, that she was forced to accept early retirement in violation of HRL because "defendant [allegedly] incorrectly believed plaintiff suffered from a mental impairment," to proceed). The district court's grant of JMOL to the defendants on Peters's HRL claim is vacated.

Section 296(14) protects a person with a hearing impairment who uses a guide, hearing, or service dog only if the impairment meets the statute’s specified speech-discrimination threshold; the general “person with a disability” language does not eliminate that hearing-specific limit.

Cave v. East Meadow Union Free School District · filed 2007-03-19(14)

Thus, the court finds that the plaintiffs failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that John, Jr.’s hearing fell within the forty percent or less, set forth in N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(14).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual because of the individual's disability, including in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; disability claims under it are generally construed similarly to ADA claims, although its disability definition is broader.

Robertson v. Amtrak/National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2005-11-30(1)(a)

For the most part, disability claims brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL are construed similarly to ADA claims. Although the definition of disability under the NYSHRL is broader than the federal definition, Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir.1998); see also State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 218-19, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 480 N.E.2d 695 (1985), the NYSHRL is substantially similar to the ADA, providing, in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) for an employer ... because of the ... disability ... of an individual ... to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Section 296 applies the ADA’s discrimination elements to disability-discrimination claims and permits liability against an employer or joint employer; retaliation still requires protected activity.

Moreno v. Capital Concrete NY Inc. · filed 2025-08-13

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL do not explicitly define the term “employer.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 292 (defining “employer” as “includ[ing] all employers within the state.”); ... Thus, courts have relied on common-law principles and considered the following factors to determine who may be liable as an employer under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL: “(1) the selection and engagement of the servant; (2) the payment of salary or wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control of the servant’s conduct.” ... The analysis of the joint employer doctrine under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL is identical to that under the ADA. ... Capital Concrete constitutes Plaintiff’s “employer” under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL because it employs fifteen or more employees, paid Plaintiff’s wages, and had the power to control Plaintiff for the reasons discussed above. ... Ocean Sky Services qualifies as Plaintiff’s joint employer under the statutes because it had “immediate control” over Plaintiff. ... Accordingly, they are properly considered as Plaintiff’s “employer” under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. ... Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination claims are based on the same allegations as his ADA claims. Plaintiff’s allegations, therefore, are also sufficient to establish Defendants’ liability for discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. ... Because I find that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege the first element of his retaliation claim under the ADA, Plaintiff also fails to sufficiently allege his retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296 bars disability discrimination based on a qualifying disability and requires disability information to remain confidential, but a temporary COVID-19 infection without severe, long-lasting symptoms is not a qualifying disability.

Hayes · filed 2025-09-26(3)(d)

Because a temporary COVID-19 viral infection is not a recognized disability under the ADA or NYSHRL, Plaintiff’s employer did not violate any ADA or NYSHRL confidentiality requirement by revealing Plaintiff’s COVID-19 status to others in the workplace.

Section 296(a) requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to plausibly allege that she is disabled within the statute’s meaning; unsupported allegations do not state a claim.

Mercer v. ViacomCBS/Paramount · filed 2026-06-22(a)

Mercer failed to state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. To establish a claim of disability discrimination under these statutes, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that she was disabled within the meaning of the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Law § 8-107(1); see also Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006). ... Because Mercer’s allegation that she was disabled lacked factual support, she failed to plausibly allege a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.

A claim under § 296 for discrimination based on a predisposing genetic characteristic must be sufficiently pleaded to survive dismissal.

Peterson v. City of New York · filed 2014-09-17

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the complaint did not sufficiently plead a cause of action to recover damages for discrimination based upon a predisposing genetic characteristic in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law.

Section 296(1)(a) protects domestic violence victims from employment discrimination; the challenged treatment must be based on that status.

Matter of Curtis v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2015-01-22(1)(a)

While petitioner contends that the School District created negative reviews based on fabricated problems or treated her differently from other teaching assistants, the record does not show that any such treatment was based on her status as a domestic violence victim.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits discharge or other discrimination for opposing practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law or participating in a related proceeding; a retaliation plaintiff must show protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, and causation, and protected activity requires a good-faith reasonable belief that the opposed practice was unlawful.

Joann S. Reed, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-09-11(1)(e)

Similarly, New York’s Executive Law prohibits the discharge of employees in retaliation for their opposition to discriminatory practices or their participation in an investigation under the New York Human Rights Law. ... We consider Reed’s state law claims in tandem with her Title VII claims because New York courts rely on federal law when determining claims under the New York Human Rights Law. ... To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) the employee was engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of that activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. ... The defendant’s argument that Infantino’s comment cannot be considered an unlawful employment practice highlights a recurring theme in retaliation cases: an employee “need not establish that the conduct [s]he opposed was in fact a violation of Title VII,” but rather, only that she had a “good faith, reasonable belief’ that the underlying employment practice was unlawful. ... In sexual harassment cases, we have interpreted these principles to require that “a plaintiff ... prove that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it” in order for the employer to be held liable. ... In these circumstances, the jury could impute Infantino’s conduct to Lawrence, and could conclude that the plaintiffs complaint was protected “opposition” under Title VII and N.Y. ExeC. Law § 296 (McKinney 1993). In light of this evidence the jury could reasonably have found that the plaintiff had met her burden to show a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.

Section 296(1)(h) prohibits harassment based on a protected characteristic when it subjects an individual to inferior employment terms, conditions, or privileges, without requiring severe or pervasive conduct, subject to an affirmative defense for petty slights or trivial inconveniences.

Brikman v. Westchester Medical Center Advanced Physician Services, P.C. · filed 2025-08-13(1)(h)

The New York state legislature amended the NYSHRL, effective October 11, 2019, and the relevant amended provision states: an employer . . . to subject any individual to harassment because of an individual’s age . . . national origin . . . [or] disability . . . regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims. Such harassment is an unlawful discriminatory practice when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s membership in one or more of these protected categories . . . . It shall be an affirmative defense to liability under this subdivision that the harassing conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h). This amendment “eliminate[s] the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be severe or pervasive for it to be actionable and . . . adopt[s] instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ... Plaintiff has highlighted a number of examples in the SAC where he was purportedly treated “less well” by Defendants (see, e.g., Pl. Br. at 13; see also SAC ¶¶ 238-239, 267-269, 307). While Plaintiff’s allegations do not suffice to state a claim under the more stringent “severe and pervasive” standard under Title VII, his allegations do indicate, at least at this stage, that Plaintiff was treated “less well,” satisfying the post-2019 standard under NYSHRL. ... Accordingly, this branch of Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims eleven and seventeen is denied.

Section 296 permits individual liability for a hostile work environment only when the individual actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.

Drew v. PLAZA CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION · filed 2010-01-28

Though NYSHRL and NYCHRL allow for liability of individual defendants on the basis of a hostile work environment claim, unlike under Title VII, the individual must have “actually participate [d] in the conduct” from which the claim arises.

For pre-October 11, 2019 claims, § 296(1)(h) required harassment to be severe or pervasive and required a basis for imputing the hostile environment to the employer.

Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Securities Corp. · filed 2021-01-08(1)(h)

To survive a motion to dismiss on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, or the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h), Plaintiff must adequately plead that: (i) “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult ... that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,” and (ii) “a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer.”

Section 296 employment-discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and NYSHRL hostile-work-environment claims use the same standard for imputing an employee’s conduct to the employer as Title VII claims.

Espinosa v. Weill Cornell Medical College · filed 2021-03-19

The framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) guides the Court’s analysis of an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII and the NYSHRL. Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n. Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 316 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Employment discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL are analyzed identically to claims under . . . Title VII.”). ... NYSHRL applies the same standard. Bermudez v. City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 560, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

For post-October 11, 2019 hostile-work-environment claims, § 296(1)(h) eliminates the severe-or-pervasive requirement and prohibits conduct that results in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Williams v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2021-03-23(1)(h)

For hostile work environment claims that occurred after the 2019 amendment’s effective date, the standard has changed “to eliminate the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be ‘severe or pervasive’ for it to be actionable and to adopt instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in ‘inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’” Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., No. 19-cv-10042, 2021 WL 76410, at *3 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h)). In this case, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate either that she was treated in a discriminatory manner on the basis of her race or gender, or that she was exposed to a hostile work environment, under either standard. With respect to the plaintiff’s hostile environment claim, the majority of the challenged events occurred before the amendment took effect on October 11, 2019, and thus are analyzed in the same manner as the plaintiff’s federal hostile work environment claims; and the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the presence of objectively hostile or unreasonable conditions. Further, to the extent that claims occurred after October 11, 2019, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the presence of a hostile work environment that resulted in “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y.S. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h).

The NYSHRL’s amended hostile-work-environment standard, replacing “severe or pervasive” with “petty slights and trivial inconveniences,” applies only to claims accruing on or after October 11, 2019.

WILSON v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-11-08

That is true, see Ruiz v. Bay Shore-Brightwaters Rescue Ambulance, Inc., No. 18-CV-280 (RRM), 2021 WL 1210315, at *13 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021), but the new standard does not apply here because Wilson’s claims accrued before October 11, 2019, see McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, ... 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17-CV-3479 (KPF), 2019 WL 4081898, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual in employment because of sex, and pre-amendment claims require a sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile work environment.

Girardi v. Ferrari Express, Inc. · filed 2023-03-31(1)(a)

Similarly, Section 296(1) of the NYSHRL renders it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . because of an individual’s . . . sex . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Construing the facts in the pleading as true, I find that Plaintiff has stated a claim for hostile work environment. ... For this reason, I find that the Plaintiff has also plausibly alleged a hostile work environment claim.

Section 296(1)(h) makes harassment actionable without a severe-or-pervasive showing when it subjects an employee to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges, subject to a petty-slights or trivial-inconveniences defense; § 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability on a person who actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Wray v. Westchester Medical Center Advanced Physician Services, P.C. · filed 2022-08-09(1)(h), (6)

This amendment “eliminate[s] the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be severe or pervasive for it to be actionable and . . . adopt[s] instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ... A claim under this provision requires that the “defendant actually participated in the alleged discriminatory acts.” ... Amendola is the source of all the discriminatory conduct of which Plaintiff complains. The motion to dismiss the aider and abettor claim against Amendola is denied.

For claims accruing on or after October 11, 2019, § 296(1)(h) is construed liberally and does not require harassing or discriminatory conduct to be severe or pervasive; conduct resulting in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment may be actionable.

Ndugga v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2022-08-17(1)(h)

“[H]owever, these amendments only apply to claims that accrue on or after the effective date of October 11, 2019.” ... Specifically, the statute was amended “to eliminate the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be “severe or pervasive” for it to be actionable and to adopt instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”

Section 296(1)(h) makes workplace harassment because of race or national origin actionable when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, without requiring severe or pervasive conduct.

Charles v. New York City Fire Dept. (FDNY) · filed 2023-03-31(1)(h)

This has the effect of eliminating any requirement that “harassing or discriminatory conduct be ‘severe or pervasive’ for it to be actionable and [adopting] instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in ‘inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’”

Section 296(1)(h) makes race- or national-origin-based harassment actionable without a severe-or-pervasive requirement when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Everett v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2023-08-31(1)(h)

This has the effect of eliminating any requirement that “harassing or discriminatory conduct be ‘severe or pervasive’ for it to be actionable and [adopting] instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in ‘inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’”

Section 296(1)(h) requires a plaintiff to show inferior employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected characteristic, while petty slights or trivial inconveniences do not suffice for a hostile-work-environment claim.

Ndongo v. Bank of China Limited · filed 2023-02-24(1)(h)

Under the amended provision, a plaintiff need only show that she was subjected “to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of [her] membership in one or more of [the] protected categories.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h); see also Alford v. NFTA-Metro, 2022 WL 17655868, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2022). “Nevertheless, a NYSHRL hostile work environment ‘claim will not succeed if the offending actions are no more than petty slights or trivial inconveniences.” Alford, 2022 WL 17655868, at *6 (quoting Black v. ESPN, Inc., 139 N.Y.S.3d 523 (Table) (Sup. Ct. Feb. 19, 2021)).

Section 296(1)(h) makes harassment actionable when it results in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, eliminates the severe-or-pervasive requirement, and provides an affirmative defense for petty slights or trivial inconveniences; the amendment applies to claims accruing on or after October 11, 2019.

Stanley v. Mount Sinai Health System, Inc. · filed 2023-12-01(1)(h)

The amended NYSHRL also eliminates the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be “severe or pervasive” for it to be actionable; instead, the conduct need only result in “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h); Maiurano v. Cantor Fitzgerald Secs., No. 19-CV-10042, 2021 WL 76410, *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021). Although Plaintiff need not show that she was treated differently than others in a non-protected class, it is “an affirmative defense . . . that the harassing conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h). Section 300’s liberal construction directive was made effective August 12, 2019, but Section 296’s eradication of the “severe or pervasive” standard applies only to claims that accrue on or after the amendment’s effective date, which was October 11, 2019.

Section 296(1)(h) bars subjecting an employee to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of a protected characteristic, and permits a hostile-work-environment claim without requiring harassment to be severe or pervasive.

DeJesus v. Bon Secours Community Hospital · filed 2024-02-12(1)(h)

To state such a NYSHRL hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege she has been subjected to “inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of [her] membership in one or more . . . protected categories.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(h). The statute provides for hostile work environment claims “regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive.” Id.

Section 296(1)(h) requires a hostile-work-environment plaintiff to show inferior employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of a protected category, while § 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing a prohibited discriminatory act.

Drinks-Bruder v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 2024-03-13(1)(h) (6)

Like Title VII, the NYSHRL prohibits employment discrimination as well as retaliation against employees who oppose such discrimination. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. ... The exception is NYSHRL hostile work environment claims, which require a plaintiff to show that she was subjected to “inferior terms, conditions[,] or privileges of employment because of [her] membership in one or more . . . protected categories.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(h). ... “Nevertheless, . . . the NYSHRL . . . offer[s] a second type of individual liability”: An individual may be held liable for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing the doing of a prohibited act. Id. (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6)).

Section 296(1)(h) makes race-based workplace harassment actionable when it subjects an employee to inferior employment terms, conditions, or privileges, without requiring severe or pervasive conduct, while § 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL.

Wilkerson v. Blink Holdings, Inc. · filed 2024-06-10(1)(h), (7)

Thus, under the NYSHRL, Wilkerson need not allege that the “harassing or discriminatory conduct [was] severe or pervasive for it to be actionable.” ... Instead, Wilkerson need only alleged that the conduct “results in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ... The NYSHRL also makes it unlawful to “retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... At the motion to dismiss stage, the close temporal proximity between Wilkerson’s complaint and his termination is sufficient to plead a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 296 does not require hostile conduct to be severe or pervasive, but an age-based claim still requires age to be the motivating factor behind the workplace hostility.

Gilani v. Deloitte LLP · filed 2024-09-04

Under the NYCHRL and the NYSHRL, “hostile conduct need not be severe or pervasive,” see, e.g., Boonmalert v. City of New York, 721 Fed. App’x 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (NYCHRL); Charles v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-5567 (JPC), 2023 WL 2752123, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (NYSHRL), but a plaintiff “must still allege that his age was the motivating factor behind any workplace hostility,” Boonmalert, 721 Fed. App’x at 34.

For conduct occurring on or after October 11, 2019, Section 296(1)(h) does not require harassment to be severe or pervasive; it prohibits conduct resulting in inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and the amendment is not retroactive.

Hamilton v. The Federal Savings Bank · filed 2024-09-10(1)(h)

Specifically, the relevant provision of the NYSHRL, § 296(1)(h), was amended, effective October 11, 2019, to eliminate the requirement that harassing or discriminatory conduct be “severe or pervasive” for it to be actionable and to adopt instead a more protective standard that prohibits conduct that results in “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” ... The amendment was signed in August 2019 and applies to claims occurring on or after October 11, 2019, without retroactive effect. ... Here, the post-amendment version of the NYSHRL applies to Hamilton’s NYSHRL claims because the incident in question occurred after the amendment’s October 11, 2019 effective date.

Under § 296, an employer-hostile-work-environment claim requires proof that the defendant is vicariously liable for discriminatory conduct, and the claim may proceed where a jury could find the employer failed to take adequate remedial action after learning of harassment.

Beatty v. New York City District Council of Carpenters and Joiners of America · filed 2025-03-31

To prevail on a claim against an employer for a hostile work environment under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, “a plaintiff must prove that . . . the defendant is vicariously liable for the discriminatory conduct.”

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination and retaliation; under the NYSHRL’s liberal standard, a discrimination plaintiff need only show by a preponderance that they were treated less well because of race, while retaliation requires conduct reasonably likely to deter protected activity.

Baker · filed 2025-09-29

But even though these claims are subject to the same burden shifting framework, in contrast with claims under Title VII, in order to establish a discrimination claim under the NYCHRL or NYSHRL, a plaintiff need only show “by a preponderance of the evidence that []he has been treated less well than other employees because of h[is]” race. ... Plaintiff’s claims for race discrimination and hostile work environment therefore survive summary judgment under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, but the retaliation claim is dismissed.

Section 296(1)(a) treats racial or ethnic insults and harassment as discrimination in the conditions of employment.

Broad Elm Auto Centers, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1990-03-16(1)(a)

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice to discriminate against an individual because of race or national orgin in the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]) including where, as here, an employee is the victim of racial or ethnic insults and harassment (see, Matter of Imperial Diner v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 NY2d 72; Glen Cove Pub. Schools v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 58 AD2d 591).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim and uses federal standards to determine whether the harassment is actionable.

Espaillat v. Breli Originals, Inc. · filed 1996-05-21(1)(a)

The "virtually identical * * * federal standards for actionable sexual harassment are used in determining claims brought under the New York Human Rights Law” (Zveiter v Brazilian Natl. Superintendency of Merchant Mar., 833 F Supp 1089, 1095).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a hostile work environment sexual harassment claimant to show unwelcome, gender-based harassment affecting employment and an employer that knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to act.

Town of Lumberland v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-07-03(1)(a)

The elements of sexual harassment resulting in a hostile work environment, as relevant to the instant proceeding, are that (1) Golembiowsky belongs to a protected group, (2) she was the subject of unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) such harassment was based on her gender, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment, and (5) petitioner knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action (see, supra, at 155).

Section 296 requires proof of a hostile and abusive work environment based on gender to sustain a gender harassment claim.

Seal v. Marks · filed 1996-10-28

The defendants submitted sufficient proof to establish that they had not created a hostile and abusive work environment based upon the plaintiff’s gender, thus entitling them to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s first and sixth causes of action.

Section 296(1)(a) requires a hostile-work-environment plaintiff to show unwelcome gender-based harassment affecting employment and that the employer knew or should have known of it but failed to take remedial action.

Pace v. Ogden Services Corp. · filed 1999-06-17(1)(a)

To do so, plaintiff must establish that (1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was the subject of unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her gender, (4) the sexual harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment and, the only element seriously at issue here, (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action (see, Fair v Guiding Eyes for the Blind, supra, at 155; Matter of Town of Lumberland v New York State Div. of Human Rights, supra, at 636).

Section 296 requires workplace harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a sexual harassment claim.

Baliva v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 2000-11-02

Even if the allegations regarding defendant VanBenschoten were all true they simply fail to rise to the level of being “severe or pervasive” so as to constitute sexual harassment.

Section 296 permits hostile work environment claims based on discriminatory conduct in employment.

Hanford v. Plaza Packaging Corp. · filed 2001-06-12

Thus, a separate cause of action for the creation of a hostile work environment under Executive Law § 296 is not precluded by plaintiffs recovery of compensation benefits.

Section 296 does not cover workplace conduct that falls below the level required for a hostile work environment.

Baliva v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2001-09-28

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs (see, Dix v Pines Hotel, 188 AD2d 1007), we conclude that the conduct complained of does not rise to the level contemplated by Executive Law § 296 (see, e.g., Lucas v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 54 F Supp 2d 141, 147-149 [ED NY]; Lamar v NYNEX Serv. Co., 891 F Supp 184, 185 [SD NY]).

Section 296 imposes employer liability for hostile work environment harassment when the employer acquiesces in or condones the discriminatory conduct, subject to imputed liability based on the perpetrator’s rank.

Pascal v. Amscan, Inc. · filed 2002-01-14

After the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant acquiesced in the alleged discriminatory conduct while it was occurring, or subsequently condoned it (see, Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687; Matter of Totem Taxi v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 NY2d 300, 305). Moreover, the alleged perpetrator of the harassment was not of such a high rank in the company as to invoke the rule of imputed liability for his actions (cf., Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 53).

Section 296 prohibits sex based hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory firing.

Vekiarellis v. Pall Corp. · filed 2003-02-03

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, the first cause of action sufficiently alleges hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory firing in violation of Executive Law § 296 (see San Juan v Leach, 278 AD2d 299; Walsh v Covenant House, 244 AD2d 214).

Section 296 (1) prohibits sex-based hostile work environment harassment when the employer acquiesces in or condones the environment.

Boodram v. Brooklyn Developmental Center · filed 2003-12-16(1)

The Center makes no showing that, if all of the alleged exaggerations, inaccuracies and inconsistencies were resolved in its favor, the jury’s determinations on these issues would be against the weight of the evidence.

Section 296 treats sexual discrimination that creates a hostile work environment as unlawful.

Constantine v. Kay · filed 2004-11-08(1)(a)

Sexual discrimination which establishes a hostile work environment constitutes a violation of title VII and Executive Law § 296 (see Lamar v Nynex Serv. Co., 891 F Supp 184 [1995]; San Juan v Leach, 278 AD2d 299 [2000]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination, including a hostile work environment and constructive discharge based on protected characteristics.

Kaptan v. Danchig · filed 2005-06-13

The defendant failed to satisfy her prima facie burden with respect to so much of the first and third causes of action as alleged a hostile work environment based on religion and national origin, as the plaintiffs workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, supra at 310, quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993]; see Stetson v NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F2d 355, 361 [1993]).

Section 296 requires a hostile work environment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive working environment.

Schenkman v. New York College of Health Professionals · filed 2006-05-09

The plaintiffs’ factual allegations, however, fell short of establishing that the “workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiffs’] employment and create an abusive working environment” (Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits hostile work environments that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions, and section 296(1)(e) prohibits retaliation causing a disadvantageous employment action.

Sutherland v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2007-04-20(1)(a), (1)(e)

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for pervasive sexual harassment by a coworker that allegedly created a hostile work environment (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; see generally Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141, 142-143 [2001]). ... We conclude, however, that the court erred in granting that part of defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as it alleges that defendants subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment for the period prior to and including July 27, 1999, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. ... Even assuming, arguendo, that defendants met their initial burden, we conclude that plaintiff raised triable issues of fact whether the workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiffs] employment” (Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 50 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 809 [1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and whether defendants were aware of and acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct of plaintiffs coworker (see Vitale, 283 AD2d at 143).

Section 296 requires discriminatory conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment and supports claims for constructive discharge and retaliation against adverse employment action.

Thompson v. Lamprecht Transport · filed 2007-04-24

Summary judgment is appropriate where, as here, the defendants demonstrated that the plaintiffs will not be able to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination ... Thompson’s sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment must fail as a matter of law because there is no evidence that her coworker’s isolated remarks and offensive conduct were so severe or pervasive as to permeate the workplace and alter the conditions of her employment (see Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993]; Matter of Macksel v Riverhead Cent. School Dist., 2 AD3d 731, 731-732 [2003]; Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 51 [1996]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination and recognizes a hostile work environment claim when discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive working environment.

Clauberg v. State · filed 2008-03-04

A hostile work environment claim exists “ ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004], quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993] [citation omitted]; Matter of Anagnostakos v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 46 AD3d 992 [2007]).

Section 296 (1) (a) requires harassment to be severe or pervasive for a hostile work environment claim.

Williams v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2009-01-27(1)(a)

The sexual harassment claim was dismissed on the basis that the conduct complained of was not “severe or pervasive.” ... We agree with the court’s analysis as it pertains to plaintiffs state claims under the Executive Law.

Section 296(1)(a) allows an employer to be held liable for a hostile work environment created by its employee when substantial evidence supports that finding.

New York State Division of Human Rights v. Village Plaza Family Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2009-02-06(1)(a)

We further conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support petitioner’s determination that the Restaurant is liable for the hostile work environment created by respondent employee of the Restaurant (see Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 54-55 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 809 [1997]).

Section 296 treats a workplace as unlawfully hostile when discriminatory conduct is severe or pervasive enough to change employment conditions and create an abusive environment.

Barnum v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2009-05-12

Under Executive Law § 296, “[a] hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” (Morse v Cowtan & Tout, Inc., 41 AD3d 563, 564 [2007]; see Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004]).

Subsection (1) prohibits sex based hostile work environment harassment when discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment terms or conditions.

Eastport Associates, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-03-16(1)

Sexual harassment based upon a hostile work environment exists under Executive Law § 296 (1) when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment” (Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141, 143 [2001], quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993] [internal quotation marks omitted] [construing title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e et seq. (hereinafter title VII)]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits a hostile work environment where discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive working environment.

Artis v. Random House, Inc. · filed 2011-05-20(1)(a)

State law prohibits discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment where “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”

Section 296 prohibits race discrimination, hostile work environments, and retaliation for complaints of discrimination.

Nettles v. LSG Sky Chefs · filed 2012-04-03(1)(a), (1)(e), and (7)

As a matter of law, neither the plaintiffs personality conflict with Mancini nor the one isolated incident of derogatory comments made outside of the plaintiffs presence by another employee are severe, offensive, or pervasive enough to amount to a hostile work environment under the Executive Law (id. at 310-311).

Section 296 prohibits retaliation for protected activity and hostile work environments that are sufficiently severe or pervasive and motivated by retaliatory animus.

Clauberg v. State · filed 2012-05-03

To support a retaliatory hostile work environment claim, the actions complained of must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment and stem from a retaliatory animus (see Noviello v City of Boston, 398 F3d 76, 92-93 [1st Cir 2005]; Sclafani v PC Richard & Son, 668 F Supp 2d 423, 438-439 [ED NY 2009]).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a hostile work environment claim to allege discriminatory conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive workplace.

Kamen v. Berkeley Cooperative Towers Section II Corp. · filed 2012-09-26(1)(a)

Moreover, the factual allegations supporting the third and fourth causes of action, which sought to recover damages for discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of sex and harassment, respectively were insufficient to state causes of action (see Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659 [2008]; Burrell v International Assn. of Firefighters, 216 AD2d 346, 346 [1995]; Couch v Schmidt, 204 AD2d 951, 953 [1994]), and the factual allegations supporting the sixth cause of action alleging the creation of a hostile work environment, even when viewed as true, “fell short of establishing that the ‘workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” 0Schenkman v New York Coll, of Health Professionals, 29 AD3d 671, 673 [2006], quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]).

Section 296 requires conduct to be severe and pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim; sporadic offensive incidents fall short.

Hernandez v. Kaisman · filed 2012-12-27

Subjecting the state claim to the “severe and pervasive” standard, plaintiffs fall short.

Section 296(1)(a) requires a hostile work environment claim to allege discriminatory conduct severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.

Torres v. Louzoun Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2013-04-17(1)(a)

Here, the plaintiff failed to allege a cognizable cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination under the laws of either New York State or New York City (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]). ... Moreover, the facts in support of her allegations of a hostile work environment “fell short of [alleging] that the workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive working environment” (Kamen v Berkeley Coop. Towers Section II Corp., 98 AD3d 1086, 1087 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993]; Schenkman v New York Coll, of Health Professionals, 29 AD3d 671, 673 [2006]).

Section 296(1)(a) covers workplace harassment directed at an employee because of membership in a protected category.

Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 2014-09-30(1)(a)

Issues of fact also exist whether the harassment was directed toward plaintiff based on his membership in a category protected by the statute (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; see Forrest, 3 NY3d at 307).

Section 296 claims for a hostile work environment and constructive discharge can survive summary judgment when the alleged harassment and working conditions present triable issues.

Nelson v. Vigorito · filed 2014-10-15

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging discrimination based on the creation of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge from employment.

Section 296 prohibits sex-based hostile work environments and retaliation in employment.

Matter of HP Ronkonkoma, Inc. v. Kirkland · filed 2014-11-12

Here, contrary to the petitioners’ contention, there is substantial evidence in the record demonstrating that they unlawfully discriminated against the complainant in relation to her employment on the basis of sex by subjecting her to a hostile work environment and retaliated against her in violation of Executive Law § 296 (see Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v ABS Elees., Inc., 102 AD3d 967, 968 [2013]; Matter of Murphy v Kirkland, 88 AD3d 267, 278 [2011]; Bianco v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 54 AD3d 304, 305 [2008]).

Section 296 requires conduct to be severe and pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim.

Gonzalez v. EVG, Inc. · filed 2014-12-09

Although the complained-of behavior does not rise to the level of “severe and pervasive” for purposes of a hostile environment claim under the State HRL, plaintiff’s claim under the City HRL is viable (see Hernandez v Kaisman, 103 AD3d 106, 114-115 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 296 requires a hostile work environment based on gender to alter the conditions of employment; sustained gender-based harassment can satisfy that requirement.

Matter of Rensselaer County Sheriff's Department v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2015-08-13

A violation of Executive Law § 296 based on a hostile work environment must be supported by proof that the "workplace [was so] permeated [by a] discriminatory" atmosphere that it "alter[ed] the conditions of the [complainant's] employment" (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of West Taghkanic Diner II, Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 105 AD3d at 1107). ... Considering the evidence presented at the hearing, there is a rational basis for the determination that, but for Seabury's gender, she would not have suffered the harassment that she described and that such harassment altered the conditions of her employment so as to create an abusive work environment.

Section 296 requires a hostile work environment to involve discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult severe or pervasive enough to alter employment conditions and create an abusive workplace.

Johnson v. North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc. · filed 2016-03-16

In order to establish a claim of a hostile work environment in violation of Executive Law § 296, a plaintiff must show that the workplace was “ ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 310, quoting Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 US 17, 21 [1993]).

Section 296(1) requires sexually harassing conduct to be severe or pervasive enough to make the work environment objectively hostile or abusive.

Pawson v. Ross · filed 2016-03-31(1)

While Ross' alleged conduct was certainly offensive and grossly unprofessional, those aspects of it that were sexually harassing were not severe or pervasive enough to render any plaintiff's work environment objectively hostile and abusive as these terms are construed under the Human Rights Law.