N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(1) permits a municipal employer to consider the risk of future disability when assessing an applicant under Civil Service Law § 50(4)(b).

In re State Division of Human Rights · filed 1986-06-17(1)

We believe the Division erred in assuming that section 296 (1) circumscribes petitioners’ discretion to assess the future impact of a disability under section 50 (4) (b).

Section 296 does not prohibit demoting an employee whose medical condition prevents reasonable performance of the principal duties of the position, because that employee is not protected as disabled under the Human Rights Law.

Miller v. Ravitch · filed 1987-05-11(1)

Because the petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Law, he was not protected by its provisions, and his demotion, accordingly, did not violate the antidiscrimination proscriptions contained therein.

Section 296(1)(a) does not prohibit discharge when a disability prevents an employee from performing the job reasonably.

Giaquinto v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1987-12-10(1)(a)

Since plaintiff’s condition was preventing her from reasonably performing her tasks, defendant’s decision to dismiss her was not unlawful discrimination (see, Matter of Halpin v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 65 AD2d 898, 899, lv denied 47 NY2d 705).

Section 296 does not protect an applicant whose condition may prevent reasonable performance of the job sought.

Seitz v. Suffolk County Department of Civil Service · filed 1989-01-17

Further, the petitioner’s contention that the respondent Department of Civil Service violated Executive Law § 296 in denying him this appointment by reason of this "disability” is without merit. The respondents sufficiently demonstrated that the petitioner’s elevated blood pressure condition may "prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought” (Executive Law § 292 [21]). In this regard, we note that the petitioner submitted no proof to the contrary.

Section 296 does not bar denial of an appointment based on a condition shown to prevent reasonable performance of the job’s duties.

Connolly v. Suffolk County Department of Civil Service · filed 1989-05-01

The petitioner’s contention that the Suffolk County Department of Civil Service violated Executive Law § 296 in denying him this appointment by reason of this "disability” is without merit (see, Matter of Seitz v Suffolk County Dept. of Civ. Serv., 146 AD2d 631). It was sufficiently demonstrated that the petitioner’s elevated blood pressure condition may "prevent [him] from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought” (Executive Law § 292 [21]).

Section 296 requires an individualized assessment of whether a disability prevents reasonable job performance; speculation about future incapacity cannot justify denying employment.

City of New York v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1987-06-11

He may not be subjected to discriminatory action based upon his disability, unless that disability renders him incapable of performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought (Executive Law § 292 [21]; § 296). ... Employment may not be denied based on speculation and mere possibilities, especially when such determination is premised solely on the fact of an applicant’s inclusion in a class of persons with a particular disability rather than upon an individualized assessment of the specific individual.

Section 296 does not protect an employee from disability discrimination when the employee is medically unqualified to reasonably perform the duties of the position.

LaMotta v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1990-09-24

We find unpersuasive the petitioner’s contention that her discharge as a probationary Transit Police Officer was violative of Executive Law § 296, which makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to discharge an employee because of a disability. ... In the present case, the uncontradicted medical evidence indicates that the petitioner suffered from a seizure disorder prior to her discharge and that her disorder would have prevented her from performing her full duties until long after the date on which her probationary status was scheduled to conclude. ... Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to sustain her claim of discrimination based upon her disability.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits dismissing an employee for a disability unless the employer shows that the disability prevents the employee from reasonably performing the job.

Antonsen v. Ward · filed 1991-03-26(1)(a)

We conclude that the Commissioner failed to demonstrate that Antonsen’s disability was such as would preclude him from being able to reasonably perform the duties and activities required, and thus, Antonsen’s dismissal violated the Human Rights Law.

A disability discrimination claimant must show that the disability would not affect the applicant’s ability to perform the job’s duties to establish a prima facie case under § 296(1)(a).

Tyson v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1993-11-22(1)(a)

Therefore, since the appellant failed to present any proof that his disqualifying disabilities would not affect his ability to perform the duties of a correction officer, he failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (see, Matter of LaMotta v New York City Tr. Auth., 165 AD2d 875).

Section 296 permits dismissal of an employee whose disability prevents the employee from reasonably performing the job.

DiGeronimo v. First Nationwide Bank · filed 1994-11-21

Executive Law § 296 permits the dismissal of an employee who happens to have a disability when the disabling condition prevents the employee from reasonably performing his job (see, Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506; Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527; Matter of Obas v Kiley, 149 AD2d 422).

Section 296(1)(a) requires substantial evidence that an applicant’s disability did not prevent reasonable performance of the job sought before a failure to hire can be found discriminatory.

AT&T Bell Laboratories v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1995-03-14(1)(a)

In order to withstand judicial review, a finding that a prospective employer discriminated against a person by failing to hire him or her because of a "disability” within the meaning of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) must be supported by substantial evidence to sustain, inter alia, the Commissioner’s finding that the disability did "not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held” (Executive Law § 292 [21]).

Section 296 permits dismissal of a disabled employee whose condition prevents the employee from reasonably performing the job.

Lawson v. High Bar Wholesale Food Distributors, Inc. · filed 1995-07-24

Executive Law § 296 permits the dismissal of a disabled employee when the disabling condition prevents the employee from reasonably performing his job (see, Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506; DiGeronimo v First Nationwide Bank, 209 AD2d 575).

Section 296(1) protects a rehabilitated alcoholic from termination based on past alcohol-related absenteeism when the employee can perform the job satisfactorily at the time of termination.

MATTER OF MCENIRY v. Landi · filed 1994-12-08(1)

The legislative purpose of preventing discrimination against employees with disabilities is best served by pinpointing the time of actual termination as the relevant time for assessing the employee’s ability to perform. It would defeat the goal of the Human Rights Law to permit an employer to justify terminating an employee based on past alcohol abuse problems that the employee has presently overcome.

Section 296(1)(a) does not prohibit disability discrimination against a person whose disability renders them physically unable to perform the duties of any available position.

In re Phillips · filed 1995-12-18(1)(a)

There is ample evidence, medical and otherwise, in the hearing record to support the Commissioner’s finding that the physical manifestations of the complainant’s disability rendered him physically "unable to perform the job duties of any available position” with 7-Up (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 77 NY2d 506; Lawson v High Bar Wholesale Food Distribs., 217 AD2d 646).

Section 296(1)(a) does not support an employment discrimination claim when the employee can no longer perform the duties of the position.

Molfino v. Town of Shelter Island · filed 1996-12-23(1)(a)

In addition, the petitioner has failed to set forth a valid claim of discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) since it is undisputed that the petitioner is no longer able to perform the duties of his position (see, Tyson v New York State Dept, of Correctional Servs., 198 AD2d 408).

Section 296 does not prohibit a medically supported disqualification from appointment when the applicant’s condition would affect performance.

Silbert v. Jackson · filed 1996-06-06

The decision to disqualify for appointment was neither arbitrary and capricious nor unlawfully discriminatory. ... Therefore, there was no violation of Executive Law § 296, or of the Federal Rehabilitation Act (29 USC § 794).

Section 296 does not support a disability discrimination claim when the employee was unable to perform her duties at the time of the adverse employment decision.

Kelly v. Poughkeepsie Area Chamber of Commerce · filed 1999-10-04

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, was unable to perform her duties at the time of the adverse employment decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed her claim of disability discrimination (see, Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [g]; Thomas v Austrian Airlines, 216 AD2d 554, 555; Harbas v Gilmore, 193 AD2d 553; McAuliffe v Taft Furniture Warehouse & Showroom, 116 AD2d 774).

Section 296(3-a)(g) makes an employee’s ability to perform the job’s duties at termination relevant to a disability discrimination claim.

Novak v. Royal Life Insurance Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 2001-06-28(3-a)(g)

The February 2, 1998 affidavit of Michael Walker, plaintiffs treating endocrinologist, raised a material question of fact on the ultimate issue of whether plaintiffs disability prevented him from being able to perform the duties of his job as of the time of his actual termination (see, Executive Law § 292 [21] [c]; § 296 [3-a] [g]; Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558; Matter of Antonsen v Ward, 11 NY2d 506, 513).

Section 296 makes discharge because of disability unlawful, but the protection does not apply when the disability prevents the employee from performing the job reasonably.

Dantonio v. Kaleida Health · filed 2001-11-09(1)(a); former (3-a)(g)

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to discharge an employee “because of’ the employee’s disability (see, Matter of Cahill v Rosa, 89 NY2d 14, 19; Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558-559). ... Thus, the applicable law precluded any claim of employment discrimination brought by an employee who, at the time of the termination, suffered from a disability that rendered him or her unable to perform his or her job duties in a reasonable manner (see, Matter of McEniry v Landi, supra, at 558; Matter of Miller v Ravitch, 60 NY2d 527, 532; Sherman v Kang, 275 AD2d 1016; Kelly v Poughkeepsie Area Chamber of Commerce, 265 AD2d 307, 308).

Section 296 does not support a disability discrimination claim when the plaintiff's disability prevents her from performing her former job's duties reasonably.

Fama v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 2003-06-09

The plaintiffs deposition testimony that she suffered from a disability which prevented her from performing the duties of her former job in a reasonable manner was fatal to her claim under Executive Law § 296 (see Kwarren v American Airlines, 303 AD2d 722 [2003]; DiSanto v McGraw-Hill, Inc./Platt’s Div., 220 F3d 61, 63-64 [2000]; Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]; Lawson v High Bar Wholesale Food Distribs., 217 AD2d 646 [1995]; DiGeronimo v First Nationwide Bank, 209 AD2d 575 [1994]).

Section 296(3)(a) does not require an employer to grant a requested accommodation if the employee cannot perform an essential job function with it.

Briffa v. New York State Dept. of Health · filed 2026-04-09(3)(a)

These statements make it clear that plaintiff was unable to perform the essential function of his job with the proposed accommodation.

Section 296(5) prohibits housing-related inquiries about marital status when they are used to discriminate, but permits such inquiries for a legitimate purpose.

Sassower v. Field · filed 1990-11-13(5)

What this law prohibits, plainly and clearly, is the use of the inquiry to discriminate on the basis of marital status.

Section 296(5)(a) can prohibit a landlord’s marital-status discrimination during an existing tenancy.

Hudson View Properties v. Weiss · filed 1981-07-17(5)(a)

Contrary to the argument made by the landlord, the proscriptions set forth in section 296 (subd 5, par [a]) of the Executive Law do not only apply to circumstances existing at the inception of a landlord-tenant relationship. A landlord’s conduct during the course of a tenancy may be shown to violate the provisions of section 296 (subd 5, par [a]).

Section 296(5)(a) prohibits enforcing a “singles only” residential lease restriction in a way that discriminates against a tenant based on marital status after the lease begins.

Leonedas Realty Corp. v. Brodowsky · filed 1982-06-07(5)(a)

This court holds that such “singles only” restriction is violative of the public policy of this State and city. It is quite apparent to this court that the arbitrary enforcement of a “singles only” restriction in said lease would, if respondent tenant Amy Brodowsky married or chose a life-style with a man without benefit of marriage, subsequent to the inception of the lease term, constitute marital discrimination.

Section 296(5)(a) does not treat the different legal rights of married spouses and unmarried cohabiters as discrimination because of marital status.

Young v. Carruth · filed 1982-11-16(5)(a)

Furthermore, as between the parties, marriage is a legal relationship with its own legal incidents, and the fact that those legal incidents are different from the legal incidents governing the legal relationship between cohabiters who are not married is not a discrimination because of marital status.

Section 296(5)(a) does not prohibit enforcing a lease restriction limiting occupancy to the tenant and immediate family when the restriction applies regardless of the tenant’s marital status.

Hudson View Properties v. Weiss · filed 1983-05-10(5)(a)

Were the additional tenant a female unrelated to the tenant, the lease would be violated without reference to marriage. The fact that the additional tenant here involved is a man with whom the tenant has a loving relationship is simply irrelevant. The applicability of that restriction does not depend on her marital status.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) does not treat a restriction on occupancy by people without a familial relationship as discrimination based on marital status.

McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay · filed 1984-12-17(5)(a)(1)

Under the interpretation adopted in Hudson View Props. v Weiss (59 NY2d 733), a restriction against occupancy by persons who have no familial relationship does not constitute illegal discrimination based on “marital status” under the statute (see, also, Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 NY2d 506; Maryland Comms. on Human Relations v Greenbelt Homes, 300 Md 75, 475 A2d 1192).

Section 296’s prohibition on marital status discrimination does not require a university to let a student live in university housing with an unmarried partner.

Levin v. Yeshiva University · filed 1999-03-15

I therefore conclude that the housing policy adopted by the defendants does not violate the provisions under the State Human Rights Law and the City Human Rights Law which prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status. These provisions do not bar the defendants from distinguishing between married and unmarried couples in the determination as to whom an Einstein student can reside with in university housing.

Section 296(5)(a) prohibits housing discrimination based on whether a person is married, but does not prohibit a landlord from refusing to rent to a couple because they wish to cohabit.

Hoy v. Mercado · filed 1999-11-12(5)(a)

We conclude that the protections of Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) do not extend to complainants in these circumstances because the denial of housing to a cohabiting couple does not constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of “marital status” (see, McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 105 AD2d 46, 50, affd 66 NY2d 544; Hudson View Props. v Weiss, 59 NY2d 733, 735; Brooklyn Hgts. Realty Co. v Gliwa, 92 AD2d 602, 602-603 [O’Connor, J., concurring]).

Section 296 does not treat a student-housing policy that permits students to live with fellow students, spouses, or dependent children as marital-status discrimination because it excludes unmarried students’ life partners.

Levin v. Yeshiva University · filed 2000-05-11(2-a), (5)(a)(1)

Defendants’ written policy, permitting medical students to live in its housing with fellow students or with their spouses and dependent children, did not discriminate against plaintiffs, unmarried women who were denied permission to live with their life partners in such housing, on the basis of marital status in violation of the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 296 [2-a], [5] [a] [1]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [5]; § 8-130; Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 NY2d 506; Hudson View Props. v Weiss, 59 NY2d 733; Matter of Hoy v Mercado, 266 AD2d 803; Raum v Restaurant Assocs., 252 AD2d 369, appeal dismissed 92 NY2d 946; Funderburke v Uniondale Union Free School Disk No. 15, 251 AD2d 622, lv denied 92 NY2d 813; McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 105 AD2d 46, affd 66 NY2d 544).

Section 296(5)(a)(1) prohibits discrimination based on marital status, but not discrimination based on the absence of a marital relationship.

Heard v. Stratford I Ltd. Partnership · filed 2006-03-17(5)(a)(1)

Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (1) prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s marital status, not based on an individual’s marital relationship (see Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484, 490-491 [2001]; Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 NY2d 506, 512 [1980]), i.e., it is not unlawful discrimination if plaintiffs are “denied [housing] ‘not for being [un]married, but for being [un]married to’ one another” (Matter of Hoy v Mercado, 266 AD2d 803, 804 [1999]).

Section 296(5) does not require a cooperative to treat an unmarried romantic partner as a spouse for an automatic lease transfer.

Matter of McCabe v. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. · filed 2024-12-17(5)

For the above reasons, petitioner's claims of discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [5]) and the Federal Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act of 1964 also fail.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person for opposing unlawful discrimination, and a supervisor qualifies as an employer when the supervisor actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Buczakowski v. Crouse Health Hospital Inc. · filed 2022-02-07(1)(e)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for “any employer” to discriminate against any person because she has opposed unlawful discrimination. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(e). “A supervisor is an ‘employer’ for purposes of establishing liability under the NYSHRL if that supervisor actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination.”

Section 296(2)(c)(i) requires public-accommodation owners to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to provide facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with disabilities.

Abadi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 2024-12-18(2)(c)(i)

Under the NYSHRL, it is a discriminatory practice for an owner of a place of public accommodation to “refus[e] to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities . . . .” N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(2)(c)(i). ... Abadi has not pleaded any facts that demonstrate a denial of access to Greyhound’s facilities or buses because of his disability under the NYSHRL. Abadi inquired whether he could travel on Greyhound’s buses without a mask or whether Greyhound would provide an accommodation that would allow him to use the buses. Compl. ¶ 30. In response, Greyhound provided Abadi with the process for seeking a medical exemption. Id. ¶ 31. Abadi, having elected to entirely forego Greyhound’s exemption procedures, cannot now claim a denial of access.

Section 296 requires reasonable accommodation for disabled persons, including access that may exceed the Building Code's requirements.

Jones v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2022-02-08(2)(c)(i)

To the extent there is any tension between the Building Code's provisions and the HRLs, such tension may be remedied by the rule of reasonableness which is an integral component of the HRLs' requirement that disabled persons be reasonably accommodated ( see Executive Law § 296[c][i]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[15][b]).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a constructive discharge claim to allege that the discharge was based on an unlawful discriminatory practice.

Peters v. Citibank, N. A. · filed 1998-09-21(1)(a)

The second cause of action was also properly dismissed since the plaintiff failed to allege that she was constructively discharged from her employment on the basis of any unlawful discriminatory practice pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a).

Section 296 bars constructive discharge when working conditions are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person would conclude there was no choice but to resign.

Martinez v. State University · filed 2002-05-02

With respect to that portion of the petition which alleges a claim for constructive discharge in violation of Executive Law § 296, the petition clearly fails to allege sufficient facts which would indicate that petitioner’s resignation was prompted by such difficult or unpleasant working conditions that a reasonable person would have concluded that he or she had no choice but to resign (see, Viera v Olsten/Kimberly Quality Care, 63 F Supp 2d 413).

Section 296 prohibits labor organizations from discriminating in membership admissions and prohibits discrimination in admission to training programs.

Gaynor v. Rockefeller · filed 1965-01-14(1)(b), (1-a)

Included within the legislative proscriptions is not only the practice of discrimination by a labor organization on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin in the admission of persons to membership therein but also discrimination on such basis by a labor organization or air employer or any joint labor-management committee in the admission of persons to training, guidance or retraining programs (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 1, par. [b]; subd. 1-a).

Section 296(1)(c) does not cover a corporation’s request for a labor agreement limited to one project.

Gomez v. New York State, Executive Department Division of Human Rights · filed 1986-07-03(1)(c)

The clear import of the paragraph is to prohibit a labor organization from excluding or expelling persons from its membership on the basis of age, creed, race, color, national origin, sex, disability or marital status, or to refuse to permit a person from working for an employer who maintains a union shop because of such reasons. The complaint clearly alleges acts which are not within the purview of the statute and are thus outside of the jurisdiction of the Division.

Section 296 permits age discrimination claims based on disparate impact.

Bennett v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. · filed 2016-04-26

This Court has previously recognized that disparate impact claims alleging age discrimination are cognizable under the State Human Rights Law (see Mete at 296-297), and we choose to follow our own precedent.

Executive Law § 296 does not recognize disparate impact claims under the Human Rights Law.

Matter of Spence v. State Univ. of N.Y. · filed 2021-06-17

However, disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the Human Rights Law ( see Bohlke v General Elec. Co. , 293 AD2d 198, 200 [2002], lv dismissed 98 NY2d 693 [2002]) and, although disparate impact claims are cognizable under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, no civil action may be commenced until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the EEOC ( see 29 USC § 626 (d)).

Section 296(1)(a) covers employment standards that exclude virtually all women without a job-related purpose, even if the employer did not intend to discriminate.

State Division of Human Rights v. New York City Department of Parks & Recreation · filed 1971-12-09(1)(a)

However, it is not necessary, in order to find a discriminatory practice, to conclude that the standards resulting in such discriminatory practice, were adopted with the intent to discriminate. It is enough if the statistics show that the standards imposed exclude virtually all women, and that those standards serve no job related purpose.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits using inflexible height and weight standards to bar women from employment when those standards are discriminatory and lack sufficient job-related justification.

New York State Division of Human Rights v. New York-Pennsylvania Professional Baseball League · filed 1971-04-27(1)(a)

While these factors are entitled to be taken into consideration in the hiring of an umpire, none of them, either individually or collectively, justify an inflexible standard of 5 feet 10 inches and 170 pounds. ... Rather, it is meant that the failure to meet these standards should not be considered a per se cause to bar such employment in the fight of the uncontroverted evidence that such standards are inherently discriminatory.

An age discrimination claim under § 296 based on disparate impact must allege that a facially neutral practice falls more harshly on a protected group and cannot otherwise be justified.

Domitz v. City of Long Beach · filed 2020-10-14

To state a cause of action to recover for employment discrimination on the basis of age under a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant's "facially neutral practices 'fall more harshly on a protected group than on other grounds and cannot otherwise be justified'" ( Mete v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities , 21 AD3d 288, 297 [emphasis omitted], quoting Waisome v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. , 948 F2d 1370, 1374 [2d Cir]).

Section 296(4) permits disparate impact claims involving admission to educational opportunities.

IntegrateNYC, Inc. v. State of New York · filed 2024-05-02(4)

Although there appears to be no binding authority addressing whether a disparate impact claim under the NYSHRL applies to education cases, we see no reason to limit a disparate impact claim to employment cases, as the City and PDE urge us to do.

Section 296 permits a police sergeant position to require patrolman experience when that experience is essential to supervising patrolmen.

Berni v. Leonard · filed 1972-04-28(1)(d)

When a particular sex is a “ bona fide occupational qualification ”, as for instance a female dramatic role, employment lines can be drawn to include that sex alone. (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 1, par. [d]); see Civil Service Law, § 50, subd. 7; U. S. Code, tit. 42, § 2000e-2, subd. [e].) ... The court finds therefore that restricting the job of police sergeant to patrolmen does not violate the Executive Law or Civil Service Law and is reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The party claiming a bona fide occupational qualification exemption from Section 296’s age discrimination provisions bears the burden of establishing it.

New York City Department of Personnel v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1977-03-24(1)(d)

Although the burden to establish this exemption is upon the party claiming it, the petitioner offered no evidence on that issue.

The party claiming the bona fide occupational qualification exemption for an age restriction bears the burden of proving it.

New York City Department of Personnel v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1977-07-12(1)(d)

Petitioner failed to establish its affirmative defense that the age restriction in effect when complainant took the examination was a bona fide occupational qualification exemption from the age provisions of the Human Rights Law. ... Although the burden to establish this exemption is upon the party claiming it, the petitioner offered no evidence on that issue.

Section 296(1)(d) permits an age limit for hiring New York City police officers when the limit is a bona fide occupational qualification.

Feimer v. Ward · filed 1984-10-03(1)(d)

Here the parties have presented both sides of that issue and this court finds the age limitation contained in Administrative Code § 434a-8.0 is not only a bona fide occupational qualification, but also rationally related to a legitimate State interest.

Section 296(3-a)(d) permits termination based on age when age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the employee’s duties; the amendment applies to pending litigation.

Ten Hoeve v. BD. OF EDUC. OF DUNDEE CENT. SCH. DIST. · filed 1985-04-04(3-a)(d)

It amended the Retirement and Social Security Law and Executive Law § 296 (3-a) to permit termination of employment because of age if age is a bona fide occupational qualification "reasonably necessary" to the performance of the employee's duties ( see , Retirement and Social Security Law § 530 [c]; Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [d]). The amendments apply to this litigation ( Post v 120 E. End Ave. Corp. , 62 N.Y.2d 19, 29; Mayer v City Rent Agency , 46 N.Y.2d 139, 149) and require remittitur for a determination of whether age is a bona fide occupational qualification for school bus drivers and plaintiff's entitlement to back pay and other benefits, if any, which may have resulted from his involuntary retirement at age 65.

Section 296(3-a)(d) permits termination because of age when age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the employee’s duties.

Hoeve v. Board of Education · filed 1985-04-04(3-a)(d)

It amended the Retirement and Social Security Law and Executive Law § 296 (3-a) to permit termination of employment because of age if age is a bona fide occupational qualification “reasonably necessary” to the performance of the employee’s duties (see, Retirement and Social Security Law § 530 [c]; Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [d]).

Section 296(1)(d) permits sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification for a sergeant assigned to male jail housing when the required inspections would violate inmates’ privacy if performed by a woman.

State Division of Human Rights v. Oneida County Sheriff's Department · filed 1986-04-04(1)(d)

Given those circumstances, we find that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification” within the exception of Executive Law § 296 (1) (d) and the fact that complainant was not assigned to the position of sergeant in the male housing unit was not an unlawful discriminatory practice (see, Carey v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 61 AD2d 804, affd 46 NY2d 1068, appeal dismissed 444 US 891; see also, Civil Service Law § 50 [7]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a sex-based hiring preference when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification and no reasonable alternative protects detainees’ privacy.

Wells v. City of New York · filed 2020-01-28(1)(a)

Defendants established prima facie that their selective hiring of male applicants as juvenile counselors did not violate the Human Rights law because, pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) (34 USC §§ 30301-09) and industry best practices, sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for juvenile counselors, and no reasonable alternatives to the preferential hiring of male counselors existed to protect the privacy interests of male juvenile detainees ( see Jennings v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 786 F Supp 376, 380-381, 387 [SD NY 1992] ["The gender-based assignment policy strikes a balance between the patients' privacy interests and the right of SHTAs (Security Hospital Treatment Assistants) to bid for position. Thus, we find that the requirement that at least one SHTA of the same gender as the patients be assigned to the ward is permissible under Title VII (federal antidiscrimination law)"], affd 977 F2d 731 [2d Cir 1992]; State Div. of Human Rights v Oneida County Sheriff's Dept. , 119 AD2d 1006, 1006-1007 [4th Dept 1986] ["The uncontradicted testimony of the Sheriff was that sergeants are required to conduct daily announced and unannounced inspections of cellblock areas to monitor security and sanitation conditions and, since inmates' toilet and shower facilities are in open view to personnel walking by the cells, it would be a violation of the male inmates' right to privacy to have a woman monitoring their activities"], affd 70 NY2d 974, 976 [1988]).

Section 296(1)(d) does not allow an employer to treat hearing acuity without a hearing aid as a bona fide occupational qualification for a court officer-trainee.

Matter of New York State Unified Ct. Sys. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2020-02-20(1)(d)

Similarly, while OCA's preference for those with a minimal amount of hearing acuity might be a bona fide occupational qualification (Executive Law § 296[1][d]), its preference for hearing acuity without the use of a hearing aid is not.

Section 296(1)(d) excludes newspapers from its employment advertising prohibition, and section 296(6) requires knowing and intentional participation to establish aiding and abetting.

National Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1972-11-30(1)(d), (6)

We likewise hold that if the Legislature intended to include newspapers within the ambit of section 296 (subd. 1, par. [d]), it could have said that it is an unlawful discriminatory act for any* person, newspaper, employer or employment agency to print or publish an advertisement which expresses a preference as to sex. Since it did not, the Legislature must have intended to exclude newspapers from the purview of that section. ... To hold that the respondent Gannett aided and abetted an unlawful discriminatory act in violation of subdivision 6 of section 296 of the Executive Law requires that it be established that there was a knowledgeable and intentional participation on its part in the unlawful conduct charged.

Section 296(1)(d) prohibits employment advertisements that express limitations based on age or sex.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. Golden Mine 2000, Inc. · filed 2024-12-18(1)(d)

Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's determination that Golden engaged in discriminatory employment practices by expressing limitations in its employment advertising based on age and sex ( see Executive Law § 296[1][d]).

Section 296(10)(c)'s Sabbath observance exception covers New York State Police positions.

State Division of Human Rights v. New York State Police · filed 1973-11-26(10)(c)

Treating the instant proceeding as a motion for declaratory judgment on the authority set forth above, this court finds that the New York State Police come within the exception set forth by the Legislature in subdivision 10 of section 296 of the Executive Law.

Section 296(10) prohibits terminating an employee because of the employee’s sabbath observance.

Reinach v. Wisehart · filed 1994-11-22(10)

Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment because of plaintiff’s sabbath observance in violation of Executive Law § 296 (10) (see, Matter of Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v State Div. of Human Rights, 48 NY2d 294), and that the award of $12,500 for mental anguish does not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (compare, Kelley v Analytab Prods., 204 AD2d 113).

Section 296(10)(c) permits an employer to deny a religious schedule accommodation when it would cause a significant increase in costs or a risk to industrial peace; hardship need not threaten the employer’s economic stability.

State Division of Human Rights v. Carnation Co. · filed 1977-06-07(10)(c)

If, as the employer contends, designating a qualified substitute for complainant’s Saturday shift would entail any significant increase in costs, that would be enough to establish undue hardship. It should be obvious that an undue economic hardship does not require any threat or undermining of the economic stability of an enterprise. It would be enough that a palpable increase in costs or risk to industrial peace would be required in order to accomplish the end sought by the employee.

Section 296(10)(c) places the burden on an employer to prove undue economic hardship from accommodating religious observance; a risk to industrial peace can establish that hardship.

Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1978-07-27(10)(c)

In our view the petitioner employer met its burden of proving that an accommodation such as that sought by the complainant herein would have resulted in a "risk to industrial peace” (State Div. of Human Rights v Carnation Co., supra) so as to be an "undue economic hardship” within the meaning of section 296 (subd 10, par [c]) of the Executive Law.

Section 296(10)(c) exempts an employer from the Sabbath accommodation requirement when uniform attendance rules are essential to prevent undue economic hardship.

State Division of Human Rights v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1979-07-06(10)(c)

Where the uniform application of the terms of attendance is essential to prevent undue economic hardship the provisions of subdivision 10 of section 296 of the Executive Law do not apply.

Section 296(10)(c) places the burden of proving undue economic hardship on an employer asserting that defense to religious accommodation.

Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. McCall · filed 1986-04-14(10)(c)

Moreover, we discern no error in the Commissioner’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to sustain its burden of proof regarding the defense of undue economic hardship (see, Executive Law § 296 [10] [c]).

Section 296(10)'s religious accommodation requirements can be satisfied by a process that explains how to request an accommodation and appeal a denial, gives reasons for denials, and provides administrative appeals.

Matter of Ansbro v. Nigro · filed 2025-02-20(10)

Petitioners have not "established that the City's process for resolving requests for accommodations to the vaccine mandate fell short of the requirements" of either the City Human Rights Law (HRL) or the State HRL ( Matter of Marsteller v City of New York , 217 AD3d 543, 545 [1st Dept 2023]; Matter of Bryan v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. , 222 AD3d 473, 473 [1st Dept 2023]; see Executive Law § 296[10]; Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-102, 8-107[3][a], 8-107[28][e]).

Section 296(10)(a) requires an employer to make a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held religious practice; an incomplete record of that effort can leave factual questions for trial.

Moye v. Mount Sinai Hosp. · filed 2025-04-29(10)(a)

Therefore, the court cannot determine from the exhibits submitted by defendants whether a reasonable accommodation was provided and whether a cooperative dialogue took place.

Section 296(10)(d) requires an employer claiming undue hardship from a religious accommodation to show significant expense or difficulty, including significant interference with safe or efficient workplace operations.

Moye v. Mount Sinai Hosp. · filed 2026-04-21(10)(d)

Defendants further failed to satisfy their burden of showing that accommodating plaintiffs in their current positions would cause such "significant expense or difficulty[,] including a significant interference with the safe or efficient operation of the workplace" as to constitute an undue hardship under the State and City HRLs (Executive Law § 296[10][d]; Administrative Code § 8-107[3][b] [internal punctuation omitted]).

Section 296(10) does not require an employer to accommodate a religious objection to vaccination by violating a vaccine mandate or relieving a patient-facing employee of her duties; either would be an undue hardship.

Wilson v. Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center · filed 2025-05-05(10)

For the reasons discussed earlier with respect to Title VII, requiring Defendants to violate the OMH Mandate would constitute an undue hardship under the NYSHRL, see Addonizio, 2024 WL 2958795, at *6-7; Algarin, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 509-10, as would relieving her of her duties as a patient-facing employee, see Conde, 2024 WL 168282, at *8.

Section 296(12) permits Division-approved affirmative action plans but does not require employers to adopt them.

Fullilove v. Carey · filed 1977-08-26(12)

It is permissible for an employer "to carry out a plan, approved by the division, to increase the employment of members of a minority group (as may be defined pursuant to the regulations of the division) which has a statewide unemployment rate that is disproportionately high in comparison with the state-wide unemployment rate of the general population.” (Executive Law, § 296, subd 12.) Clearly, the Legislature has not seen fit to require affirmative action programs and the attempt by the Governor to impose such a requirement is beyond his powers.

Section 296(12) permits an employer to carry out an agency approved affirmative action program but does not require contractors to establish one.

Fullilove v. Carey · filed 1978-07-06(12)

While section 220-e of the Labor Law clearly requires that State construction contracts shall contain a provision prohibiting discrimination by a contractor on account of "race, creed, color, sex or national origin”, and subdivision 12 of section 296 of the Executive Law (Human Rights Law) provides that it is not an unlawfully discriminatory practice for an employer to carry out an agency approved affirmative action program, neither of these statutes implies that contractors must establish affirmative action programs regardless of their present status as discriminators (active or passive) or nondiscriminators.

Section 296(12) requires a party relying on an affirmative action plan to show compliance with the applicable provisions of the Human Rights Law.

State Division of Human Rights v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1980-02-11(12)

Inasmuch as respondents here failed to show that they had complied with the applicable provisions of that law (see Executive Law, § 296, subd 12; see, also, 9 NYCRR 466.5), their argument that they were merely acting in accordance with an established affirmative action plan is unavailing.

Section 296 prohibits discriminatory practices but does not authorize the executive branch to create its own affirmative action policy.

Hase v. New York State Civil Service Department · filed 1988-11-28

Section 296 of the Executive Law prohibits unlawful discriminatory practices. ... It is a legislative mandate to bar discrimination, not an authorization for the executive branch to create its own affirmative action policy.

Section 296(14) prohibits an adverse licensing decision based on an arrest or criminal accusation later dismissed, but permits consideration of independent evidence of the underlying conduct.

MATTER OF SKYLINE INN CORP. v. New York State Liquor Auth. · filed 1978-03-28(14)

While it was permissible to consider the independent evidence of the conduct leading to the criminal charges against Harry Gordon, a shareholder, director and officer of petitioner, and although there was substantial evidence to support the findings of suffering or permitting prostitution at the licensed premises and of the likelihood that renewal would create a high degree of risk in the administration and enforcement of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, it was error to predicate disapproval of the renewal application, albeit in part, on the finding that Gordon was "arrested and indicted” for a criminal charge subsequently dismissed.

Section 296 does not apply when a legal bar prevents the person from holding the employment.

In re the Claim of Dounn · filed 1979-07-19(14), (15)

Claimant’s contention that the board’s decision is violative of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296, subds 14, 15) is without merit. Where the bar to employment is imposed by law (see Correction Law, § 751), the provisions of the Human Rights Law are not applicable.

Section 296 applies to the pregnancy disability claim if the employer’s disability plan is separate from its ERISA benefit plan; otherwise, ERISA controls.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1984-04-10

The record at the Division is silent as to whether petitioner’s disability plan is a separate plan, in which event, in the circumstances presented, New York’s Human Rights Law would apply, or part of any employee benefit plan, in which case ERISA would control.

Section 296 does not require pregnancy related disability benefits under an employer plan where ERISA preempts that application.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New York v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1982-08-26

Consequently, the complaint falls outside the purview of New York’s Human Rights Law.

Section 296(16) is not the exclusive remedy for adverse action based on an arrest that did not result in conviction; CPL 160.50 and 160.60 also protect against dissemination of the information.

Brown v. Passidomo · filed 1985-03-07(16)

While petitioner may also have an action against the insurer, it is clear that Executive Law § 296 (16) is not his only relief.

A sex discrimination claim under Section 296(1)(a) does not depend on the plaintiff’s membership in a collective bargaining unit.

Baker v. Board of Education · filed 1987-02-27(1)(a)

Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action in her complaint based on allegations of sex discrimination under State (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]) and Federal law (see, 42 USC § 1983), however, are not dependent upon plaintiff’s status as a unit member.

Section 296(5)(b)(2) prohibits refusing to sell commercial space because it will be used to provide facilities or services to disabled people.

Seitzman v. Hudson River Associates · filed 1987-03-24(5)(b)(2)

Executive Law § 296 (5) 0)) (2) makes it unlawful to discriminate by refusing to sell commercial space to anyone because those premises will be used, inter alia, in the furnishing of facilities or services to the disabled.

Section 296’s age-discrimination provisions do not apply to a retirement eligibility policy that predates those provisions, even when the policy is carried into a later retirement system.

Laudage v. Regan · filed 1987-04-13

Since PFRSA, which was enacted in 1966 approximately eight years after the anti-age discrimination provisions of NYHRL were enacted by Laws of 1958 (ch 738), embodies a policy which has been in effect prior to the passage of NYHRL, the provisions of Retirement and Social Security Law § 363 (a) (1) are exempt from NYHRL.

Before its July 18, 1990 amendment, § 296(3-a)(f) permitted compulsory retirement of tenured higher education employees who had reached age 70.

Semaan v. State · filed 1993-12-30(3-a)(f)

As the result of claimant’s failure to challenge the determination that he was retired as of June 30, 1990, claimant’s mandatory retirement occurred before the Human Rights Law was amended by chapter 483 of the Laws of 1990; therefore, pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (3-a) (f) as it then existed, the mandatory retirement was not an unlawful discriminatory practice.

Section 296(1)(a) permits supplemental benefits limited to service retirees when service and disability retirees have different needs and receive distinct benefits.

Gagliardo v. Dinkins · filed 1996-10-22(1)(a)

Under similar reasoning, we held that providing a disability pension program separate from a service pension does not violate the Human Rights Law’s prohibition against discrimination based on disability (Kuhnle v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 40 NY2d 720, appeal dismissed sub nom. Kuhnle v O’Hagan, 434 US 898 [1977]). Given the different needs of service and disability retirees and the unique benefits offered to each retirement classification, we cannot say that the for service limitation on VSF eligibility wrongly excludes disabled officers in violation of State law (see, Kuhnle, supra, at 723).

A challenge to a retirement plan under § 296(3-a)(g) must allege that the plan is a subterfuge to evade the statute’s purposes.

Doyle v. Board of Education of Deer Park Union Free School District · filed 1996-08-19(3-a)(g)

The plaintiffs have not alleged that the retirement plan in ...question was merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of Executive Law § 296 (see, Executive Law § 296 [3-a] [g]; see also, Ohio Pub. Empls. Retirement Sys. v Betts, 492 US 158, 180-181). The Supreme Court therefore erred in denying the motion of Deer Park Teachers Association to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Section 296(16) prohibited preemployment inquiries about prior arrests in 1981; the 1985 exception for law enforcement applicants applies prospectively.

Sheriff's Department v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1987-04-27(16)

In 1981 when the petitioner requested the respondent Withers to complete his application for employment as a mounted patrolman, it was a prima facie discriminatory practice to inquire about prior arrests on an application for employment (see, Executive Law § 296 [16]; Matter of New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 752). Although Executive Law § 296 was amended in 1985 to permit preemployment inquiry into the arrest records of law enforcement applicants (see, L 1985, ch 208), this amendment is clearly prospective in nature and is thus inapplicable to the instant matter (see, Matter of New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene v State Div. of Human Rights, supra).

Section 296(16), in its former form, allowed consideration of an applicant’s arrest circumstances when hiring a peace officer.

Bellacosa v. White · filed 1988-12-15(16)

While Executive Law § 296 (16) was amended during the pendency of the proceeding (L 1985, ch 208, §2) to exclude from the section’s proscription a situation such as this, i.e., an application for employment as a police officer or peace officer, and the new language could be applied (see, Matter of St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Center v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 109 AD2d 711, 712), we believe that the original language of the section would also cover the matter and, accordingly, grant the petition and annul the determination of the Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights.

Section 296(16), as amended in 1985, permits inquiry into qualifying past arrests or criminal accusations of applicants for peace officer positions, including correction officers.

New York City Department of Correction v. White · filed 1990-07-19(16)

Although it has since been amended to permit inquiry regarding any arrest or criminal accusation, not then pending, which was terminated in favor of an applicant for employment as a police officer or peace officer (L 1985, ch 208), Executive Law § 296 (16), in effect at the time, prohibited such inquiry and there is substantial evidence in the record that the complainant’s arrest record and petitioner’s misconception that he had been convicted were the primary reasons for petitioner’s nonselection of complainant for the position of correction officer. ... Finally, the cease and desist order should be annulled in light of the 1985 amendment to section 296 (16), which permits such inquiry of applicants for employment as peace officers, which includes correction officers (CPL 1.20 [33]; 2.10 [25]).

Section 296(2)(a) does not apply to gender-based risk classifications and rates expressly permitted by the Insurance Law.

National Organization for Women v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1987-06-23(2)(a)

Accordingly, Executive Law § 296 (2) (a), the sole basis of plaintiffs’ complaint, has no application to defendant’s gender-based, risk-classification, rate-making policies which are expressly sanctioned by the Insurance Law.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of a disability, but does not prohibit discharge for misconduct involving sick leave.

Dicocco v. Capital Area Community Health Plan, Inc. · filed 1988-03-03(1)(a)

Initially, we note that the first cause of action alleging discharge in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) should be dismissed. ... Plaintiff was not fired because she was unable to perform her duties as the result of a disability; rather, the reason was misconduct (see, Matter of Silk v Huck Installation & Equip. Div., 109 AD2d 930).

Section 296 does not prohibit an employee’s discharge for misconduct and absences when the discharge was not because of a disability.

Leyden v. Board of Education of North Merrick Union Free School District · filed 1991-08-12

The petitioner contends that his employment was terminated for excessive absence, primarily resulting from his alcoholism, in violation of Executive Law §§ 296 and 292. The record sufficiently demonstrates, however, that the petitioner was discharged for misconduct arising out of five incidents of theft of services, in addition to his failure to report to work for 15 full days and five half days, and not because of a disability (see, Dicocco v Capital Area Community Health Plan, 135 AD2d 308).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination because of disability.

Matter of Moran-Ruiz v. Ontario County · filed 2023-07-28

Here, we conclude that petitioner has failed to state a disability discrimination cause of action under Executive Law § 296 or Civil Rights Law § 40-c arising from her lawful use of medical marijuana, inasmuch as respondents placed her on leave pursuant to the CBA's drug policy, which expressly precluded petitioner's use of marijuana for any reason ( see Labor Law § 201-d [4]). Respondents' challenged actions in applying the terms of the CBA and placing petitioner on leave due to her use of medical marijuana were not discriminatory under Executive Law § 296 and Civil Rights Law § 40 because actions in accordance with a CBA are specifically exempted by statute.

Section 296(1)(d) does not override valid job-related physical fitness standards for police officers adopted under Civil Service Law § 58(1)(c).

Rice v. Schuyler County Civil Service Commission · filed 1988-06-02(1)(d)

Thus, valid job-related physical fitness standards promulgated by MPTC pursuant to Civil Service Law § 58 (1) (c) are enforceable legislative exceptions to the application of the Human Rights Law.

Section 296(16) does not prohibit an employer from acting on a criminal accusation while an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is pending; the protection applies after the action is dismissed.

Giles v. Lockport Savings Bank · filed 1988-07-07(16)

Defendant Lockport Savings Bank did not violate Executive Law § 296 (16) by firing plaintiff after the entry of an order adjourning the criminal action against her in contemplation of dismissal but before the action was dismissed six months later.

Section 296(3-b) prohibits brokers from linking a neighborhood’s changing racial or other protected composition to undesirable consequences; it does not prohibit all broker-initiated solicitation.

Campagna v. Shaffer · filed 1989-02-16(3-b)

The Legislature has explicitly enumerated the types of solicitation it views as forbidden blockbusting activity. Brokers are not to represent "that a change has occurred or will or may occur in the composition [of the neighborhood] with respect to race, creed, color, national origin * * * [and] that this change will or may result in undesirable consequences” (Executive Law § 296 [3-b]). The nonsolicitation order at issue leaps well beyond that legislative articulation and interdicts administratively all broker-initiated solicitation, not just the illegal solicitation as targeted by the Legislature.

Section 296(5)(b) permits punitive damages in appropriate circumstances when an aggrieved person sues in court.

Seitzman v. Hudson River Associates · filed 1989-04-26(5)(b)

Having chosen this tribunal, punitive damages under appropriate circumstances are available pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (5) (b) and as a consequence, this motion too is denied.

Executive Law § 296 does not allow punitive damages for a sexual harassment claim.

Collins v. Willcox Inc. · filed 1992-10-01

With respect to Collins’ sexual harassment claim, punitive damages are not available in an action, as here, instituted pursuant to Executive Law § 296, and accordingly, is deemed stricken as to the claim for sexual harassment.

Section 296(6) reaches a person who coerces a property owner to discriminate in a sale, even if that person is not a seller, landlord, or broker.

Delano Village Companies v. Orridge · filed 1990-01-12(6)

The same holds true under the Human Rights Act § 296 (6) (see also, § 296 [5]), regardless whether the violator is a seller, landlord, or broker (cf., National Org. for Women v State Div. of Human Rights, 34 NY2d 416, 421).

Section 296(1)(a) requires an employer whose drug testing is challenged to show that its method distinguishes opiate users from people who consumed lawful foods or medications.

Doe v. Roe, Inc. · filed 1990-04-05(1)(a)

While appellant may be legitimately entitled to discriminate against users of controlled narcotic substances, when challenged it must come forward with evidence establishing that its testing method accurately distinguishes between opiate users and consumers of lawful foodstuffs or medications.

A plaintiff who is not a person aggrieved cannot maintain a claim under § 296(2-a).

Faiola v. Jac Towers Apartments, Inc. · filed 1990-06-25(2-a)

The cross motion to dismiss the complaint is granted to the extent that the second and fifth causes of action are dismissed inasmuch as the plaintiff is not a person aggrieved under New York’s Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [2-a]; see, Belanoff v Grayson, 98 AD2d 353; Weinstein v Hospital For Joint Diseases & Med. Center, 53 AD2d 627).

Section 296 does not give standing to a party that was not a victim of the alleged discrimination or a recognized organization representing an affected class with a specific interest in the litigation.

Sisters of the Resurrection, New York, Inc. v. Country Horizons, Inc. · filed 1999-01-07

Clearly, defendants lack standing to assert a cause of action under Executive Law §§ 296 and 297 because they were not the victims of any alleged discrimination by third-party defendants (see generally, Dunn v Fishbein, 123 AD2d 659), nor do they constitute a recognized organization representing a class such as plaintiff with a specific interest in the underlying litigation (compare, National Org. for Women v State Div. of Human Rights, 34 NY2d 416, 419-420).

Section 296(1)(d) does not require an applicant to answer an inquiry about a medical condition unless it is based on a bona fide occupational qualification.

Claim of Harris v. Syracuse University · filed 1990-12-20(1)(d)

Moreover, we agree with the Board that claimant was under no compulsion to respond to any inquiry about her medical condition which was not based upon a bona fide occupational qualification (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [d]; State Div. of Human Rights v Xerox Corp., 65 NY2d 213, 218).

Section 296(1)(d) does not make a preemployment inquiry about a protected trait discriminatory by itself.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-12-31(1)(d)

Thus, such inquiry alone is not discriminatory.

Section 296(3-a)(a)’s age discrimination rule yields to the specific age limits for State Police hiring in Executive Law § 215(3).

Constantine v. White · filed 1991-05-02(3-a)(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the general age discrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law must yield to the specific age limitation provisions applicable to the State Police (see, Knapp v Monroe County Civ. Serv. Commn., 77 AD2d 817, lv denied 51 NY2d 708, appeal dismissed 51 NY2d 877).

Section 296(1)(a) does not impliedly repeal the special law setting a maximum appointment age for New York City police officers.

Walter v. City of New York Police Department · filed 1997-11-13(1)(a)

The age limitation, contained in a special law, has not been impliedly repealed by the general City and State Human Rights Laws (Administrative Code § 8-107 [a]; Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; see, Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council v New York City Dept, of Sanitation, 83 NY2d 215, 222-223).

Section 296(1)(a) permits an age discrimination claim based on a refusal to hire, but the applicant must raise a triable issue that the employer’s legitimate reasons were pretextual.

Ruderman v. New York State Ins. Fund · filed 2023-04-18(1)(a)

The court correctly dismissed the complaint alleging age discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]). NYSIF proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its refusal to hire plaintiff for its claims services representative or underwriter trainee positions, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons were pretextual ( see Sedhom v SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr. , 201 AD3d 536 [1st Dept 2022]).

Section 296(1)(g) permits a facially neutral death and disability provision in an employment agreement.

Flowers v. Stillrock Management Inc. · filed 1992-01-07(1)(g)

There is no basis to conclude that a death and disability provision in plaintiff’s employment agreement was applied to plaintiff, and, in any case, the subject provision is facially neutral, non-discriminatory and clearly comports with Executive Law § 296 (1) (g) (see, Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 84).

Section 296 prohibits gender-based discrimination and permits compensatory damages for mental anguish.

Credit Union News, Ltd. v. Winterbottom · filed 1992-04-07

Determination of the respondent Commissioner Designate of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated April 19, 1990, which found that petitioner discriminated on the basis of gender in violation of Executive Law § 296, and awarded $7500 in compensatory damages for mental anguish to respondent-cross-petitioner Julie Winterbottom, is unanimously confirmed, the petition and the cross-petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County, Beverly Cohen, J., entered June 14, 1990), dismissed without costs.

Section 296(13) prohibits gender discrimination in a broad range of commercial activities; a claim requires evidence of discriminatory animus.

West v. Mohawk Commercial Carpets · filed 1992-11-05(13)

Although Executive Law § 296 (13) clearly interdicts discrimination, based on gender, in a broad range of commercial activities (Holly v Pennysaver Corp., 98 AD2d 570, 572), and the complaint alleges that defendant discriminated against her business because of gender, aside from noting that lower bids were indeed tendered by Albany and Enjem’s, plaintiff offers no proof of any discriminatory animus on the part of defendant.

Section 296 claims alleging gender bias in promotion or termination may proceed against trustees when factual disputes remain about bias and the trustees’ liability.

Barnes-Pierce v. McDermott · filed 1993-11-10

Triable issues of fact exist as to whether the determinations not to promote plaintiff and to terminate her were the result of gender bias in violation of Executive Law § 296 or whether they constituted a breach of contract, as well as to whether, if plaintiff succeeds on these issues, defendants can be found liable.

Section 296(1)(a) covers unequal pay for the same job under similar conditions when the disparity results from intentional gender discrimination.

Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1995-10-12(1)(a)

There was no misperception on the ALJ’s part. His conclusion was based on clearly stated findings—amply supported by the record—that petitioner paid complainants less than their male counterparts who were performing the same job, under similar conditions, and that the disparity was the result of intentional discrimination against complainants on the basis of gender.

Section 296 prohibits gender discrimination in employment.

Liebowitz v. Luitpold Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2001-11-19

The defendants submitted evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was terminated from her job because the corporate defendant suffered a financial loss when she could not be reached during an emergency while she was on vacation, and not as a result of gender discrimination (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623).

Section 296 prohibits gender discrimination in employment, and a plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Maguire v. Quaker Ridge Golf Club, Inc. · filed 2003-06-02

In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant made a prima facie showing that its failure to grant the plaintiff postemployment benefits was not the result of gender discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623 [1997]; Liebowitz v Luitpold Pharms., 288 AD2d 352 [2001]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered reasons for the defendant’s actions were pretextual.

Section 296 prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of gender.

Wheeler v. Citizens Telecommunications Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 2005-05-12

Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her gender in violation of Executive Law § 296 and that defendant violated New York’s Equal Pay Law (see Labor Law § 194) by paying her less than it paid Bentley for substantially similar work. ... Nevertheless, termination does not equate, without more, to gender discrimination. Moreover, the record contains ample evidence of plaintiffs misconduct. Indeed, the insubordination which she exhibited on February 20, 1998 would have been reason enough to terminate her and there is not a scintilla of evidence that the termination was in any way motivated by her gender.

Section 296 prohibits employers from discriminating based on gender and bars aiding and abetting when no underlying violation by another party is established.

Barbato v. Bowden · filed 2009-06-05(1)(a), (6)

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), “an employer” is prohibited from discriminating against any individual on the ground of gender “in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”

Section 296 bars gender discrimination in employment and permits an employer to prevail by showing legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons that the plaintiff cannot prove are pretextual.

Short v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. · filed 2010-12-09

However, with respect to the reassignment of Asian accounts, defendant submitted evidence that the decision to have plaintiff focus on Australian product was initiated not by Kim, but by the new head of Australian product, and that the decision was made for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons related to staffing and the desire to rebuild the Australian desk. Accordingly, defendant successfully rebutted plaintiffs prima facie showing of discrimination (Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; St. Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 507 [1993]). Plaintiff did not submit evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact whether those explanations were pretextual (id.).

Section 296(h) treats gender-based workplace misconduct that subjects an employee to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment as unlawful discrimination.

Crawford v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc. · filed 2023-05-16(h)

Moreover, under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107) and amended New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[h]), the allegations that Corn sexually assaulted plaintiff in 2015 and engaged in a pattern of gender-based misconduct in the workplace, demonstrate that she was subjected to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of her gender ( see Anderson v Edmiston & Co., Inc. , 131 AD3d 416, 417 [1st Dept 2015]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a gender discrimination claim to proceed when the pleaded facts link rejected sexual advances to adverse employment treatment.

Alexandre v. Verizon N.Y. · filed 2025-03-26(1)(a)

Here -- viewing employee's allegations in their most favorable light and according them every possible favorable inference -- she sufficiently sets forth this claim.

Section 296 (1) (a) does not make the Board of Law Examiners liable for failing to certify an applicant when only the Court of Appeals can waive the written bar examination requirement.

Koeppel v. Wachtler · filed 1992-05-18(1)(a)

The plaintiff alleged in the third cause of action that the Board had violated the antidiscrimination provisions of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) by failing to certify him to practice law in New York. ... Thus, since the authority to waive the examination requirement in individual cases is reserved to the Court of Appeals and the Board plays no role in that determination, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Board.

An Executive Law § 296 claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when a federal court has decided the same discrimination issue after a full and fair opportunity to litigate, even if it expressly preserved the state claim.

Porras v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 1992-08-20

Although res judicata will not make a Federal Title VII adjudication binding on an Executive Law § 296 claim that the Federal court has expressly preserved (Lamontagne v Board of Trustees, 183 AD2d 424), collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of the merits of the claim asserted herein since they were decided by the Federal court after the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate (supra).

Section 296 prohibits unlawful employment discrimination, including disparate treatment and hostile work environment.

Chiara v. Town of New Castle · filed 2009-04-28

We note, however, that so much of the amended complaint as was predicated upon violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), and which alleged discrimination, disparate treatment, and hostile work environment, was not subject to dismissal based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see DiLauria v Town of Harrison, 32 AD3d 490 [2006]).

Section 296(11)’s exemption for religious organizations does not permit age discrimination in housing.

Priolo v. St. Mary's Home for Working Girls, Inc. · filed 1993-03-26(11)

Defendants’ policy violates the law against age discrimination and no exemption for religious organizations exists with respect to age discrimination. A catch-all phrase allowing "such action as is calculated * * * to promote” cannot be used to broaden the specific exemption granted by Executive Law § 296 (11) to allow discrimination against another protected group.

Section 296(11) permits a qualifying religious organization to give employment preference to people of its religion without requiring incorporation under the Religious Corporations Law.

Scheiber v. St. John's University · filed 1993-07-19(11)

We agree that the University falls within the ambit of Executive Law § 296 (11) and is therefore entitled to rely upon the exemption applicable to religious organizations. As the Supreme Court properly concluded, there is nothing in subdivision (11) which requires that an organization be incorporated pursuant to the Religious Corporations Law in order to invoke the exemption.

Section 296(11) permits a religious employer to prefer employees of the same faith when that preference is calculated to advance its religious mission.

Scheiber v. St. John's University · filed 1994-06-21(11)

Nor does Executive Law § 296 (11) empower a religious organization simply to discriminate against persons on the basis of religion. Rather, the exemption operates to exclude from the definition of "discrimination” exercise of a preference in hiring for persons of the same faith where that action is calculated by the institution to effectuate its religious mission.

Section 296(11) permits religious organizations to limit employment or give preference to people of the same religion or denomination, or to promote the organization’s religious principles, but does not exempt harassment or other discriminatory treatment.

Logan v. Salvation Army · filed 2005-11-16(11)

Executive Law § 296 (11) and Administrative Code § 8-107 (12) do expressly permit religious organizations to limit employment or give preference to persons of the same religion or denomination as the organization, or to promote the religious principles of the organization. However, those limited exemptions for religious organizations are a far cry from letting them harass their employees and treat the employees in an odiously discriminatory manner during their employment, and to use derogatory expressions toward the employees.

Section 296(11) lets qualifying religious or religiously connected charitable and educational organizations limit employment based on religion and take action to promote their religious principles.

Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio · filed 2006-01-12(11)

Executive Law § 296 (11) merely excuses such employers from compliance with Executive Law § 296.

Section 296(1)(a) permits a disability discrimination claim to proceed when evidence raises a triable issue about whether the worker was an employee or an independent contractor.

Malamood v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc. · filed 1994-12-01(1)(a)

On an earlier appeal (182 AD2d 359) we, inter alia, sustained plaintiffs decedent’s first cause of action for disability discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), wherein it was claimed decedent was terminated from his cantorial services due to his medical condition. On this appeal, we agree with the IAS Court’s conclusion that triable material issues of fact exist concerning whether plaintiffs decedent was an employee or independent contractor of defendant.

Section 296 protects public officers from unlawful employer discrimination because the Human Rights Law does not exclude them from its definition of employee.

Scopelliti v. Town of New Castle · filed 1994-12-12

Executive Law § 296 sets forth certain unlawful discriminatory practices on the part of an employer. Executive Law § 292 (6) defines an employee as "not including] any individual employed by his parents, spouse or child, or in the domestic service of any person”. There is no other limiting language, and thus the section does not exclude public officers from its coverage.

Section 296 covers a commissioned worker when the employer's control and direction establish an employer-employee relationship.

Bartle v. Mercado · filed 1997-01-09

The degree of control and direction reserved to this employer sufficiently established the existence of an employer/employee relationship (see, Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, 521; Matter of Villa Maria Inst. v Ross, 54 NY2d 691).

A volunteer firefighter may qualify as an employee under § 296 if the benefits received constitute significant remuneration; whether they do can be a question of fact.

Thygesen v. North Bailey Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 2013-05-03

The question before us on this appeal is whether plaintiff may invoke the protections of the Human Rights Law, i.e., whether he was an “employee” of defendants. ... We thus conclude that the court erred in determining as a matter of law that the benefits plaintiff received were insufficient to constitute compensation and that plaintiff therefore was not defendants’ employee as a matter of law.

Section 296(1)(a) and (b) require allegations of employment or referral to an employer; a mere contract for payment does not establish an employment relationship.

Samuels v. William Morris Agency · filed 2014-12-09(1)(a), (b)

The complaint further fails to adequately allege that Samuels sought “employment” with defendants, as required to support his State and City claims for unlawful discriminatory practices in “employment” by employers, and discrimination in referring him to an employer by an employment agency (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a], [b]; Administrative Code § 8-107 [1] [a], [b]).

Section 296 does not require an employer to accommodate Sabbath observance by overriding employees’ rights under a collective bargaining agreement.

New York City Transit Authority v. State · filed 1995-06-01(10)

However, an employer need not make accommodation for a Sabbath observer where such would be "clearly prohibited * * * by nondiscriminatory provisions of its collective bargaining agreement” (Matter of Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v State Div. of Human Rights, 48 NY2d 294, 299).

Section 296(10)(a) requires employers to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accommodate employees’ Sabbath observance.

New York City Transit Authority v. State · filed 1996-10-22(10)(a)

In the final analysis, what the "good faith” standard set forth in Schweizer requires is that the employer show that it exerted reasonable efforts to accommodate its Sabbath-observing employees.

Section 296(10)(a) requires accommodation of Sabbath observance but does not require accommodation of general religious practices.

Engstrom v. Kinney System, Inc. · filed 1997-07-31(10)(a)

Insofar as her complaint alleged defendants’ failure to accommodate her religious objections to wearing a bow tie, the law is clear that while -an employer must accommodate an employee’s observance of the Sabbath, there is no duty to accommodate general religious practices (see, Eastern Greyhound Lines Div. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 27 NY2d 279, 283-284 [uniformly applied company policy requiring that all employees be clean-shaven was not an unlawful discriminatory practice as applied to Muslim whose religion required him to wear a beard]).

Section 296(10) requires a plaintiff claiming failure to accommodate a religious belief to plead facts showing that the employee could perform the job with a reasonable accommodation that would not impose undue hardship on the employer.

Hunold v. City of New York · filed 2024-09-10(10)

To plead a cause of action for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must plead facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to an accommodation on the basis of a bona fide religious belief, the employer had notice of such belief, the plaintiff was able to perform their job with reasonable accommodation, the accommodation would not cause undue hardship to the employer, and the employer failed to make such accommodation (NY Exec. Law § 296[10]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a]; see Ashandra v 1199 Seiu Nat. Ben. Fund , 2023 WL 6975971, *1 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023]). ... Plaintiff does not, however, advance facts that would support a finding that he was able to perform his job as a police officer with reasonable accommodation. ... Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for failure to accommodate.

Section 296(5)(b)(1) does not prohibit refusing to lease commercial space because the proposed display is religious when the refusal is not based on the tenant’s creed.

Bruno v. Pembrook Management, Inc. · filed 1995-07-10(5)(b)(1)

At issue here is whether refusing to lease commercial space to a tenant, on the ground that the tenant intends to erect a religious display in the space, constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of Executive Law § 296 (5) (b). We hold that it does not.

Section 296(7)'s prohibition on retaliation does not give a bad-faith complainant absolute immunity from a defamation suit over false discrimination accusations.

Herlihy v. Metropolitan Museum of Art · filed 1995-10-10(7)

Accordingly, we conclude that statutory provisions prohibiting retaliatory conduct do not confer, upon bad-faith complainants making false discriminatory-related charges, absolute immunity from defamation actions that may arise out of those charges.

Section 296(1)(a) does not provide a remedy for discrimination in New York Air National Guard personnel decisions governed by military law and federal regulations.

Kolomick v. New York Air National Guard · filed 1996-05-13(1)(a)

In the instant action, the plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages for violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a). ... To permit the plaintiff an alternative mode of redress pursuant to the Human Rights Law would be contrary to those regulations, contrary to principles of Federal preemption, and contrary to the clear intent of the Legislature, as expressed in the Military Law.

Section 296(2)(a) requires substantial evidence of a discriminatory refusal to treat; a referral to a specialty clinic does not establish one where the dentist offered to continue care.

Lasser v. Rosa · filed 1997-03-10(2)(a)

We find that there is absent from the record substantial evidence supporting the determination of the SDHR that Dr. Lasser discriminated against the complainant based on her HIV positive status.

Section 296 requires factual allegations that women were denied accommodations or use of facilities because of gender to support a gender discrimination claim.

Mastro v. Oak Park Marina, Inc. · filed 1997-04-25

The fifth cause of action alleges gender discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 but does not factually allege a violation of that statute. There is no allegation that female patrons or guests were denied accommodations or the use of facilities on the basis of gender, and the record establishes that defendants also installed a video camera in the men’s room and surreptitiously conducted surveillance of persons using that facility.

A medically sound hospital referral for an HIV-positive dental patient does not establish discrimination under Section 296(2)(a) without evidence that the dentist denied treatment.

Schulman v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1997-05-27(2)(a)

Under all of these circumstances, the agency’s finding that Dr. Anker discriminated against the complainant by failing to refer him to Dr. Shteierman or another private practice dentist is not supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of North Shore Univ. Hosp. v Rosa, 86 NY2d 413, supra; Matter of Lasser v Rosa, supra).

Section 296 supports disability discrimination claims based on denial of a facility’s use or its accommodations, advantages, or privileges.

Stein v. 92nd Street YM-YWHA, Inc. · filed 2000-06-29(4), (2)(a)

We affirm the denial of defendant’s motion insofar as it sought dismissal of plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, other than the claims for retaliation, since the allegations of the complaint, when accepted as true and given the benefit of every favorable inference as they must be on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (see, e.g., Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83), adequately state claims for defendant’s denial of the use of its facilities and for its denial of accommodations, advantages or privileges to the infant plaintiff by reason of her disability (see, Executive Law § 296 [4], [2] [a]; see also, Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [4] [a]).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a place of public accommodation from discriminating against a customer because of race.

Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-03-19(2)(a)

We thus conclude that substantial evidence supports SDHR’s determination that the customer met her burden of demonstrating unlawful discrimination by the employee (see ... Executive Law § 296 [2] [a]; ...).

Section 296(2)(c) does not excuse a refusal to transport a wheelchair user when the provider fails to show that transport would fundamentally alter its service or impose an undue burden.

Matter of All Is. Airport Servs., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2015-04-15(2)(c)

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, it failed to demonstrate that its refusal to transport the petitioner was lawful on the ground that it would have required measures that “would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations” (Executive Law § 296 [2] [c] [i]), or would have otherwise “resulted] in an undue burden” (Executive Law § 296 [2] [c] [ii]).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits public accommodations from denying facilities or privileges because of disability; a claim concerning a school's transportation services survived summary judgment.

I.M. v. City of New York · filed 2019-10-29(2)(a)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alison Y. Tuitt, J.), entered on or about March 7, 2017, modified, on the law, to deny DOE's summary judgment motion dismissing plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. ... Footnote 12: The State HRL provides in relevant part that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any agent or employee of any place of public accommodation to "because of . . . disability . . . refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof" (Executive Law § 296[2][a]).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.

Kouri v. Eataly NY LLC · filed 2021-11-04(2)(a)

This testimony raises the issue of fact whether defendants' proffered reason for ejecting plaintiff was pretextual and the real reason was his sexual orientation ( see Johnson v Lord & Taylor , 25 AD3d 435, 435-36 [1st Dept 2006]).

Section 296(2)(a) protects disabled people from discrimination in places of public accommodation, including denial of reasonable access.

Jones v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2022-02-08(2)(a)

Crediting the allegations of the amended complaint, as amplified by the papers submitted on the motions, there can be no question that, for purposes of standing to sue ( see Matter of Schwartz v Morgenthau , 7 NY3d 427, 432 [2006]; Utica Ins. Co. v RJR Maintenance Group, Inc. , 90 AD3d 554, 555 [1st Dept 2011]), plaintiff, a disabled wheelchair user ( see Executive Law § 296[21]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-102[16]), falls within the zone of interest generally protected by the disability discrimination laws mandating disabled access to places of public accommodation, like defendants' restaurant ( see Executive Law § 296[2][a]; Administrative Code § 8-107[4][a][1][a]).

Section 296(2) requires a claimant alleging disability discrimination by a place of public accommodation to establish disability-based exclusion or denial of access to services.

Matter of Kolash v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2025-03-14(2)

Here, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the determination that petitioner failed to establish that he was excluded from or denied access to services of a place of public accommodation because of his disability. Petitioner asserted in his complaint that he arrived at the University's medical center to pick up his friend following completion of her medical procedure and that he had to wait in the lobby for 15 minutes because the reception desk was unstaffed and there were no auxiliary services available to him, but he failed to introduce evidence at the hearing demonstrating that a non-disabled individual would not have had to wait for the same length of time.

Section 296(2)(a) supports a claim of gender identity discrimination when a public accommodation is likely to deny a women's sports league a permit because transgender women participate.

Long Is. Roller Rebels v. County of Nassau · filed 2025-10-08(2)(a)

The plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits on the cause of action alleging discrimination on the basis of gender identity, defined as "a person's actual or perceived gender-related identity, appearance, behavior, expression, or other gender-related characteristic regardless of the sex assigned to that person at birth, including, but not limited to, the status of being transgender" (Executive Law § 292[35]), in violation of the NYSHRL and the Civil Rights Law ( see id. § 296[2][a]; Civil Rights Law § 40-c[2]; 9 NYCRR 466.13[b], [d]). ... The plaintiff made credible allegations that it would be denied a permit to use a place of public accommodation based on its designation as a women's team that allows transgender women to participate.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits disability discrimination in public accommodations, and claims under it are analyzed using the same standards as ADA claims.

Hulett v. City of Syracuse · filed 2017-05-30(2)(a)

Hulett’s ADA and NYSHRL claims -will be analyzed in tandem. Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 117 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (“New York State disability discrimination claims are governed by the same legal standards as federal ADA claims.”); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) (making it unlawful for any “person, [including] the owner .... agent or employee of any place of public accommodation” to discriminate against the disabled); id. § 292(9) (defining “place of public accommodation” to include “all public conveyances operated on land ..., as well as the stations and terminals thereof’).

Section 296(1)(a) permits employer liability for discrimination by high-level managers without proof that the employer condoned or acquiesced in it.

McIntyre v. Manhattan Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. · filed 1997-08-25(1)(a)

Moreover, where acts of discrimination are perpetrated by a high-level managerial employee, such as Czerniuk, Fingar and Vurckio, the employer may be liable even without any showing of condonation or acquiescence (supra).

Section 296 permits damages against an employer for a coworker’s sexual assault when the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved the conduct.

Hendricks v. 333 Bayville Avenue Restaurant Corp. · filed 1999-04-19

We conclude that the Club was entitled to dismissal of so much of the fifth cause of action as sought to impose liability for damages she suffered as a result of the rape. There is no evidence that the Club encouraged, condoned, or approved of this conduct (see, Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687; Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 221 AD2d 44, 53).