N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

For pre-October 11, 2019 employment-discrimination claims, § 296 uses the same discrimination standard as Title VII, and a demotion may qualify as an adverse action even without a pay cut when it diminishes the position’s prestige.

Moody v. Empire Hotel Development, Inc. · filed 2023-08-24

These facts are sufficient to at least raise an issue that Moody’s demotion was an adverse employment action because, although her pay was not cut and there is no evidence that her responsibilities changed, the title of her position had diminished prestige.

Section 296 prohibits a state agency from discriminatorily withholding an offer of transfer from an employee.

State Division of Human Rights v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1980-10-30

We agree that respondent’s withholding of an offer of transfer to complainant was discriminatory, els determined by the Division of Human Rights, in violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296).

Section 296(1)(a) requires an adverse employment action affecting employment terms, conditions, or privileges, and section 296(1)(e) requires a causal connection between protected opposition and retaliation.

Ponterio v. Kaye · filed 2006-01-05(1)(a), (1)(e)

Similarly, even if we were to consider plaintiff’s untimely employment discrimination claim and to assume that he is an employee entitled to the protection of the statute, we would conclude that he failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as he has not demonstrated any adverse employment action concerning the “terms, conditions or privileges” of his employment (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). His reassignment from a matrimonial part to a civil part, which did not involve a demotion, decrease in salary, loss of privilege, diminution of responsibilities or loss of benefits, did not constitute an adverse employment action (see e.g. Forrest v Jewish Guild for Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 306 [2004]; Galabya v New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F3d 636, 640-641 [2000]). ... As relevant here, Executive Law § 296 (1) (e) forbids “any employer, labor organization or employment agency to . . . discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under” Executive Law article 15. ... Accordingly, and again assuming without deciding that plaintiff was an employee entitled to protection within the meaning of the statute, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation and his claim was properly dismissed (see Kline v Town of Guilderland, 289 AD2d 741, 743 [2001]; Pace v Ogden Servs. Corp., 257 AD2d 101, 105-106 [1999]).

Section 296(7) requires an adverse employment action for an employment retaliation claim.

Chin v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2013-05-07(7)

However, none of this alleged conduct on defendant’s part either constituted an adverse employment action, under the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [7]; Silvis v City of New York, 95 AD3d 665, 665 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 861 [2013]), or disadvantaged plaintiff, under the New York City Human Rights Law (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [7]; Fletcher, 99 AD3d at 51-52).

Section 296 discrimination claims require an adverse employment action; the workplace complaints listed here did not qualify.

Sims v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. · filed 2019-01-31

He contends that he was micromanaged, assigned excessive work, written up for insubordination, threatened with discipline should he fail to meet expectations, and denied the use of a second locker to which the evidence demonstrates he was not entitled, none of which constitute an "adverse employment action" under the State HRL ( see Forrest , 3 NY3d at 306), or "disadvantaged" him under the City HRL ( Chin v New York City Hous. Auth. , 106 AD3d 443, 444 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 861 [2014]).

Section 296(7) requires an adverse employment action caused by protected activity; a former employer’s request for security at a hearing after termination does not qualify.

Miller v. City of Ithaca · filed 2020-01-09(7)

To state a prima facie case of retaliation under Executive Law § 296 (7), a plaintiff must allege that his or her employer took adverse employment action as a result of engaging in a protected activity ( see Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 154 AD3d at 1220-1221; Hanig v Yorktown Cent. School Dist. , 384 F Supp 2d 710, 724-725 [SDNY 2005]). Inasmuch as the City was no longer plaintiff's employer when it allegedly requested additional security at the May 14, 2013 workers' compensation hearing, such conduct could not constitute an adverse employment action ( see Hanig v Yorktown Cent. School Dist. , 384 F Supp 2d at 724-725).

Section 296(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; an employer may obtain summary judgment by showing legitimate reasons for its actions with no triable issue of pretext.

Reichman v. City of New York · filed 2020-01-29(1)

Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action within the meaning of NYSHRL and that, in any event, the plaintiff's unfavorable employment evaluation and subsequent transfer to another firehouse were motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and that there were no material issues of fact as to whether the defendants' explanations were pretextual ( see Bull v Metropolitan Jewish Health Sys., Inc. , 152 AD3d 639, 640; Langton v Warwick Val. Cent. Sch. Dist. , 144 AD3d at 869; Moise v Uptown Communications & Elec., Inc. , 134 AD3d 782, 783).

For claims filed before the 2019 amendments, § 296(1)(a) requires a materially adverse change in employment terms or conditions to support a disparate-treatment claim.

Golston-Green v. City of New York · filed 2020-05-13(1)(a)

Under the State Human Rights Law, at least at the relevant time, [FN2] to be actionable, the adverse employment action must be "a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment" ( Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d at 306).

Section 296 prohibits age discrimination in employment and requires an actionable adverse employment action for an age discrimination claim.

Lent v. City of New York · filed 2022-10-13

The court properly dismissed plaintiff's age discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), as plaintiff failed to allege an adverse employment action ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 306 [2004]).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a materially adverse change in employment terms for a discrimination claim; receiving a disciplinary letter alone does not qualify.

McKinley v. Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist. · filed 2024-11-20(1)(a)

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a claim for discrimination based on receiving a disciplinary letter because this is not a materially adverse employment action under the NYSHRL.

A lateral transfer that leaves an employee’s title, salary, and duties unchanged is not an adverse employment action under § 296(1)(a).

Crump v. City of New York · filed 2024-11-30(1)(a)

To begin, defendants have established that plaintiff’s transfer to the BRAM unit does not constitute an adverse action under the NYSHRL. ... Plaintiff retained his title and salary and his duties remained the same in this lateral transfer (see Ragoo v New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn., 132 AD3d 562, 562 [1st Dept 2015]; Silvis v City of New York, 95 AD3d 665, 665 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 861 [2013]).

Written warnings that do not constitute an adverse employment action do not establish a prima facie discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a).

Matter of Osorio v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2025-03-21(1)(a)

Contrary to petitioner's contention, there is substantial evidence to support the determination that he was not discriminated against on the basis of his age, race, color, or national origin ( see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, petitioner was required to demonstrate that he was a member of a protected class, that he was qualified for his position, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that the adverse action "occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory motive" ( Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 306 [2004]; see Matter of Phillips v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 217 AD3d 1595, 1596 [4th Dept 2023]). Here, we agree with SDHR that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because the written warnings he received from McAlpin did not constitute an adverse employment action ( see generally Forrest , 3 NY3d at 306; Sims v Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. , 168 AD3d 622, 623 [1st Dept 2019]; Matter of Russo v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 137 AD3d 1600, 1601 [4th Dept 2016]).

Section 296(2)(a) does not apply to New Hope's adoption services because the agency is not a place of public accommodation.

New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. James · filed 2022-09-28(2)(a)

Because the Court has determined that neither N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) or Civil Rights Law § 40-c are applicable to New Hope, it need not address whether those statutes would violate New Hope's constitutional rights.

Section 296(2)(a) requires discrimination in a place of public accommodation to involve denying a person an accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege because of a protected characteristic.

D.H. v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-01-09(2)(a)

The Court assumes for present purposes that the NYPD provides a service to the public in the course of law enforcement activities. A plaintiff states a claim under the NYHRL and NYCHRL, however, only if a defendant's actions are directed towards a plaintiff because of the plaintiff's gender, gender identity, or race and amount to "refus[ing], withhold[ing] from or deny[ing] to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges" of the place of public accommodation, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a), or to "refus[ing], withhold[ing] from or deny[ing] to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation," N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(1)(a). The Court assumes for the purpose of this motion that the NYPD, its precinct houses, and the services offered by its officers qualify as a public accommodation and that the NYHRL and the NYCHRL are broad enough to reach such services. But the determination by a police officer that there is probable cause, based upon the totality of the circumstances, to arrest a person for a violation of New York's Penal Law is neither a service, nor an accommodation, nor any other act covered by the NYHRL or the NYCHRL. It is a power bestowed by statute to police and peace officers that is held in check by two centuries of established judicial precedent. New York Criminal Procedure Sections 140.05, et seq., delineate the circumstances under which an arrest without a warrant may be made by police and peace officers, who are also subject to well-developed state and federal constitutional restraints. The motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.

Section 296(2)(a) imposes liability for disability discrimination in a public accommodation, including failing to remove architectural barriers that deny equal access.

Sofia v. L & R Corp. · filed 2020-05-22(2)(a)

Defendants L&R Corp. and Millhouse Inc. are liable to plaintiff Daniel M. Sofia for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(A)(iv), New York State Civil Rights Law § 40-c, and New York State Human Rights Law § 296(2)(a) for failing to remove architectural barriers at Mill House Inn.

Section 296(2)'s extension to public accommodations did not limit the Commission's existing authority over discrimination in public school employment.

Board of Higher Education v. Carter · filed 1964-04-02(2)

But in that year its jurisdiction was extended to include, in addition to discrimination in employment, discrimination in admission and use of facilities in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 2; L. 1952, ohs. 284-285). ... But this is an exclusion of a group of institutions from a class affected by a new statutory rule of admissions to certain public places; and has no relevance, in our view, to the scope of power over employment vested in the commission by the original 1945 statute; nor were any of the provisions of that statute as they affected employment altered by the 1952 amendment.

Section 296(2) does not make an airline liable for discriminatory visa decisions it cannot control when it does not treat passengers differently itself.

South African Airways v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1970-11-09(2)

It is not there alleged that petitioner differentiated in any way in its treatment of any of the persons who thereafter either obtained or were refused visas. Nor is it alleged that petitioner had or could have affected in any way the granting or withholding of visas by the Consul. ... Even if it be assumed that every fact alleged in the complaint before respondent here is true, no violation of law by petitioner is spelled out and no remedy or sanction as against it is shown to be available.

Section 296(2) prohibits notices or advertisements indicating that facilities or privileges will be denied because of sex, but does not prohibit signs or trade names that appeal to one sex.

Rosenberg v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1974-07-05(2)

The law does not prohibit appealing by signs or trade name to one sex or another. Rather, the prohibition is against displaying notice or advertisement to the effect that any of the facilities or privileges will be refused or withheld from or denied a person on account of sex (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 2).

Section 296(2)(a) generally requires public accommodations to provide goods and services without regard to sexual orientation, but its application may violate the First Amendment when it compels the provider’s own expressive activity; the sex-based public-policy provision does not create an exemption for sexual-orientation discrimination.

Carpenter v. James · filed 2024-07-12(2)(a), (2)(b)

In light of these factual allegations, Carpenter has plausibly stated a compelled speech claim because the Accommodations Clause of New York’s Human Rights Law requires her to extend her photography services to same-sex weddings.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits an agent or employee of a place of public accommodation from refusing or denying accommodations because of disability, and does not apply to jails because they are not places of public accommodation.

Ruotolo v. Town of New Paltz · filed 2025-01-23(2)(a)

However, a jail is not a “place of public accommodation.” ... As Plaintiff was held in Ulster County Jail, his Section 296(2)(a) claim is not applicable.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits discrimination in any place of public accommodation based on race, creed, or national origin, and a claim requires facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.

Khen v. US Coachways, Inc. · filed 2025-01-21(2)(a)

The NYSHRL prohibits discrimination in “any place of public accommodation” based on, among other things, “race, creed, [and] national origin.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a). ... Discrimination claims under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL require allegations of discriminatory intent. ... Plaintiffs’ NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims against Coachways are dismissed for the same reasons that their Title VI claim is dismissed: they have not pled facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a place of public accommodation from denying or withholding accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges because of race, creed, or color.

Alexander v. The Stop and Shop Supermarket Company LLC · filed 2024-09-30(2)(a)

The statute provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the race, creed, color, . . . of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof . . . .” New York Exec. Law § 296(2)(a).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits denying women membership and membership privileges in an organization that is a public accommodation.

United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1981-12-31(2)(a)

Consequently, membership and the privileges in their organization may be characterized as “accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges” of “placets] of public accommodation, resort or amusement” which cannot be denied to women (see Executive Law, § 296, subd 2, par [a]).

Section 296(2)(a) can reach both a national organization and its local affiliates when they offer a public accommodation.

United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1983-07-12(2)(a)

In view of its presence and its relationship to the local squadrons, both the United States Power Squadrons and the local squadrons properly may be considered as “owner[s]” or similar persons offering a public accommodation within the broad sweep of the statutory language contained in subdivision 2 of section 296 of the Human Rights Law.

Section 296(14) permits a hospital to exclude a guide dog from its delivery room when the restriction reasonably addresses health dangers.

Perino v. St. Vincent's Medical Center · filed 1986-05-09(14)

Drawing a parallel to the case at bar, the Human Rights Law was never intended to effectuate a radical change in respondent’s compliance with the Public Health Law concerning the control and/or prevention of infectious diseases. ... The restrictions against the guide dog’s presence are designed to prevent any dangers which may be caused thereby. The court cannot say that they are unreasonable or without foundation.

Section 296(2)(a) does not cover a travel-agent incentive program that offers no goods or services to the general public because it is not a place of public accommodation.

Ness v. Pan American World Airways · filed 1988-11-28(2)(a)

The dispositive issue in this case is whether the respondent Pan American WorldClub is a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) and § 292 (9). For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that it is not and that the order appealed from should be affirmed.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a dentist from refusing treatment because a patient is perceived to be at risk for HIV infection.

Cahill v. Rosa · filed 1997-01-27(2)(a)

After the complainant, who tested negative for the HIV virus, filed a complaint, the SDHR held a hearing to determine whether the petitioner did, in fact, discriminate against the complainant in violation of Executive Law § 296 (2) (a). The Administrative Law Judge who heard the case and whose findings were adopted by the Commissioner determined that certain acts of the petitioner’s employee constituted a refusal to treat the complainant based on his status as a person who was perceived to be at risk for the virus. ... A review of the record supports the determination here.

Section 296(2)(a) applies to a commodities exchange trading floor that is a place of public accommodation.

D'Amico v. Commodities Exchange, Inc. · filed 1997-01-23(2)(a)

It is unnecessary to decide whether plaintiff was an employee of the COMEX since she does not specifically assert Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), which expressly prohibits employment discrimination, and since it is clear that the trading floor of the COMEX is a place of public accommodation under Executive Law § 296 (2) (a).

Section 296(2)(a) permits additional infection-control precautions for a patient perceived to be at risk of carrying an infectious disease when prevailing medical knowledge warrants them and they are not a pretext for discrimination.

North Shore University Hospital v. Rosa · filed 1995-10-24(2)(a)

Clearly, respondent’s disease protocol was consistent with accepted medical practice in 1985 for treatment of patients known or perceived to be at high risk of infection of the then recently discovered, contagious and fatal disease and not a pretext for discrimination. Contrary to the Commissioner’s conclusion, respondent was not limited to the minimum precautions necessary but could take additional precautions which were warranted based on prevailing medical perceptions at the time.

Section 296(2)(a) does not prohibit a distinctly private lodge from denying an application for membership because the lodge is not a place of public accommodation.

Cummings v. Watertown Lodge No. 496 Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United States of America, Inc. · filed 1999-06-18(2)(a)

We agree with Supreme Court that Watertown Lodge No. 496 Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America, Inc. and Exalted Ruler John P. Bruce (defendants) did not violate Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) in denying plaintiffs’ application for membership because the Elks Lodge is not a place of public accommodation, but rather is “distinctly private” (Executive Law § 292 [9]; see, Gifford v Guilderland Lodge, No. 2480, 178 Misc 2d 707, 710).

Section 296(2)(a) does not apply to a benevolent order’s decisions about membership when the order is deemed distinctly private under Executive Law § 292(9).

Gifford v. Guilderland Lodge, No. 2480 · filed 1998-10-08(2)(a)

Since the plaintiff’s complaint refers only to acts or omissions of the Guilderland Lodge relative to her application for membership, the court finds that pursuant to Executive Law § 292 (9) Guilderland Lodge is not a place of public accommodation and therefore in this instance Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) has no application to the defendants.

Section 296(2)(a) gives the Division authority to adjudicate a complaint that a public accommodation denied an advantage because of mental illness.

Staten Island Alliance for Mentally Ill v. Mercado · filed 2000-06-06(2)(a)

The Commissioner’s jurisdictional determination was, however, arbitrary and contrary to law since the Division plainly has statutory authority to adjudicate petitioner’s complaint of a ... denial of advantage by respondent Authority, a provider of public accommodation, by reason of disability, i.e., mental illness (see, Executive Law § 296 [2] [a]).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits discrimination in public accommodations, and a reasonable accommodation is not relevant to a damages action under it.

Blum v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. · filed 2002-10-07(2)(a)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the issue of whether the Exchange provided a reasonable accommodation to the plaintiff is not relevant to an action to recover damages for discrimination brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) (see Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Assn. v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 79 AD2d 516, 517; Brown v Daytop Vil., 161 Misc 2d 248).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits denying a person accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges based on unlawful discrimination.

Ferdinand v. Crecca & Blair · filed 2004-03-15(2)(a)

Further, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the sixth cause of action alleging a violation of Executive Law § 296. Even assuming that a law firm or an attorney’s office may be considered a “place of public accommodation” as defined by Executive Law § 292 (9) (see Matter of Cahill v Rosa, 89 NY2d 14 [1996]), an issue which we need not decide, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action since she was not denied any “accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges” by the defendants (see Executive Law § 296 [2] [a]).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits owners of public accommodations from refusing, withholding, or denying disabled people access.

Bartman v. Shenker · filed 2004-09-01(2)(a)

Instead, Bartman’s claims fall within the broader reach of Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) which, as noted above, makes it unlawful for the owner of a “public accommodation” to “refuse, withhold from or deny” a disabled person access to that public accommodation.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits racially discriminatory denial of access to a public accommodation, requiring evidence that a stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Johnson v. Lord & Taylor · filed 2006-01-17(2)(a)

The motion court erred in denying Lord & Taylor summary judgment. In response to Lord & Taylor’s prima facie case that the momentary detention of plaintiff, by asking her to pass through the sensor a second time, had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis, i.e., the sensor’s sounding (see General Business Law § 218), plaintiff offered only speculative, conclusory statements insufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact (see Scott v Citicorp Servs., 91 NY2d 823, 825 [1997]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). No competent record evidence indicated that Lord & Taylor’s nondiscriminatory explanation of the incident was a pretext for racially disparate treatment, that plaintiff otherwise suffered racial discrimination or that the security guard even saw the Caucasian woman plaintiff described.

The section prohibits sex discrimination by public accommodations and does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual for their own discriminatory acts.

Goldin v. Engineers Country Club · filed 2008-09-02(2)(a), (6)

The plaintiffs failed to plead any facts demonstrating how they were denied the privileges of membership on the basis of sex, particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs, a male and female, were both suspended while the other couple involved in the dispute, also a male and a female, were reinstated (see Executive Law § 296 [2] [a]). Further, the plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging that the individual defendants aided and abetted the unlawful discrimination was properly dismissed, because an individual cannot be held to have aided and abetted his or her own actions (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67 [2005]).

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a place of public accommodation from using a religious quota to admit members.

Mill River Club, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2009-02-10(2)(a)

Substantial evidence also supports the Commissioner’s determination that the club violated the Human Rights Law by using a religious quota system to admit new members.

Section 296(2)(a)’s public accommodation protections do not cover prisons.

Outman v. Annucci · filed 2015-08-26(2)(a)

Particularly, Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) makes it impermissible for any place of “public accommodation” to withhold or deny “any of the accommodations” based upon, among other things, “sexual orientation” or “disability.” However viewed, a prison is simply not a “public accommodation.” Thus, under the very limited allegations set out in the petition, the Human Rights Law is not in any way implicated in this proceeding.

Section 296(2)(a) prohibits a restaurant from refusing service to customers because of their creed.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. Lucky Joy Rest., Inc. · filed 2015-08-12(2)(a)

The petitioner’s determination that Lucky Joy unlawfully ... discriminated against the complainants based on their creed in violation of Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 296(2)(a)'s public accommodations provision does not cover arrest and detention because they are not services offered to the public.

Matter of LeTray v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2020-03-20(2)(a)

For purposes of the Human Rights Law, a "public accommodation, resort or amusement" offers " conveniences and services to the public' " and is "generally open to all comers" ( Matter of Cahill v Rosa , 89 NY2d 14, 21 [1996]), and it defies logic to suggest that law enforcement is providing " conveniences' " or " services' " to those arrested and detained ( id. ).

Section 296 does not apply to a prison inmate’s sexual-harassment claim arising from correction officers’ searches during a facility transfer.

Budha T. v. State of New York · filed 2020-10-21(1)(h), (4)

To the extent that the claimant argues in opposition to the State's cross motion and on appeal that the claim sets forth a cause of action to recover damages for sexual harassment pursuant to Executive Law § 296, that statute is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case ( see Executive Law § 296[1][h]; [4]; Matter of Malcolm v New York State Dept. of Labor , 122 AD3d 1318, 1319; Capellan v Marsh , 71 AD3d at 505).

Section 296(2)(a) requires a public accommodations disparate treatment claim to allege facts supporting an inference that the defendant denied access because of the plaintiff’s disability.

Rodriguez v. Bitchin' Inc. · filed 2024-05-03(2)(a)

Here, plaintiff’s complaint fails to provide any facts that could plausibly support an inference of defendant’s discriminatory motive when it allegedly denied him access to their website. Plaintiff admits that he did not request from defendant a reasonable accommodation to allow him to access their website or otherwise contact defendant’s business before filing suit. In this context, where the public accommodation is a website instead of a physical public accommodation, plaintiff has not shown that defendant knew of his visual impairment let alone discriminated on said basis. As such, since plaintiff cannot plead that defendant discriminated against him “because of” his disability, hecannot not properly allege injury under a disparate treatment theory.

Section 296(2) prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations; allegations that shoppers were racially profiled and barred from Target stores gave sufficient notice to survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss.

Pinell v. Target Corp. · filed 2025-05-05(2)

Target's pre-answer motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' New York State and City Human Rights Laws public accommodation discrimination claims is denied. Pursuant to Executive Law § 296(2), it is unlawful for any owner, lessee, or propriety of a public accommodation to deny the "advantages, facilities, or privileges thereof' to anyone based on race.

Section 296(6) requires a primary NYSHRL violation for aider-and-abettor liability, including against corporate defendants, and separately recognizes liability for attempts to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce discrimination.

Griffin v. Sirva, Inc. · filed 2018-03-06(6)

In order for a defendant to be liable as an aider and abettor under section 296(6), a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL by an employer or principal. ... This principle applies even when the defendants are corporate entities. ... The Court finds the interpretation that section 296(6) prohibits attempts to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce, rather than attempts to discriminate, more persuasive. ... Therefore, there are two types of causes of action available under section 296(6) -aider and abettor liability and attempt liability.

Section 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability on an individual who actually participates in conduct underlying a discrimination claim.

Popat v. Levy · filed 2018-09-17(6)

"[A]n individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim." ... Therefore, the Court again concludes that, in construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim of discrimination and retaliation against Dr. Levy as an aider and abettor under the NYSHRL.

Section 296 imposes direct rather than vicarious employer liability for discrimination when upper-level supervisors know of the conduct and ignore it, and permits aiding-and-abetting liability for an employer that condones the discrimination.

Charlier v. 21 Astor Place Condominium · filed 2024-09-03(1) and (6)

Under New York state’s Human Rights Law, vicarious liability “is not available in cases involving discrimination, including sex-based discrimination and its sexual harassment component.” In re Father Belle Cmty. Ctr. v. N.Y.S. Div. of Hum. Rts., 221 A.D.2d 44, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). A plaintiff can recover against an employer only if she “demonstrate[s] that the employer acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct or subsequently condoned it.” Id. “Condonation . . . contemplates a knowing, after-the-fact forgiveness or acceptance of an offense. An employer’s calculated inaction in response to discriminatory conduct may . . . indicate condonation.” Id. A plaintiff need only establish that “upper-level supervisors had knowledge of the conduct and ignored it” and, if so, “the harassment will be imputed to the corporate employer and will result in imposition of direct liability.” Id. at 54.

Section 296(6) limits aider-and-abettor liability to parties outside the employment relationship who assist in employment discrimination.

Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. · filed 1996-05-31(6)

From a careful analysis of the statutory scheme, however, it is clear that the Legislature intended application of the aiders and abettors provision only to "parties outside the employment relationship who may assist in employment discrimination.” (Cohen, Individual Corporate Officer Liability, NYLJ, Aug. 7, 1995, at SI, col 1, S12, col 4, n 44.)

Section 296(5) housing-discrimination claims use the FHA’s standard, so race-based claims concerning inadequate housing repairs may proceed when supported by evidence of discriminatory motive.

273 Lee Ave. Tenants Ass'n v. Steinmetz · filed 2018-08-16(5)

NYHRL and NYCHRL housing discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standard as claims made under the FHA. See, e.g., Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC , 847 F.Supp.2d 578, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Marrero, J.). ... Here, Defendants have failed to set forth nondiscriminatory reasons for their failure to provide adequate accommodations and repairs, as alleged in the Complaint. ... For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Claims One, Two, and Three remain to the extent they accrued on or after December 15, 2014 for the FHA claim, and on or after December 15, 2013 for the NYHRL and NYCHRL claims. Claims Four and Five are dismissed in their entirety. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at ECF No. 96.

Section 296(5)(a)(2) permits summary judgment on a housing services discrimination claim when defendants show the alleged lack of services was unrelated to sexual orientation and the plaintiff raises no triable factual issue.

Maun v. Edgemont at Tarrytown Condominium · filed 2017-12-27(5)(a)(2)

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the alleged failure to furnish services to the plaintiff was not related to her sexual orientation. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Section 296(1)(a) permits individual liability for a supervisor who exercises sufficient control over employment decisions, while § 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual solely for that person's own discriminatory conduct.

Chau v. Donovan · filed 2019-01-07(1)(a), (6)

"The facts in the SAC, accepted as true, are sufficient to support a claim that Donovan had the requisite control over Chau to consider Donovan an "employer" for purposes of the NYSHRL. ... Through these statements, Donovan represented to Chau supervisory responsibilities, powers in support of hiring, firing, and salary decisions, and power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. ... At this stage, Chau has alleged enough to allow her claims against Donovan under the NYSHRL to proceed. ... Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiff's NYSHRL claim under section 296(6), but denies the motion to dismiss plaintiff's NYSHRL claim under section 296(1)."

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for an employer's owner or hiring/firing authority, or for a person who aids and abets discrimination or retaliation, but requires actual participation and does not permit liability for aiding and abetting one's own discriminatory conduct.

Jeanty v. Precision Pipeline Solutions LLC · filed 2019-08-02(6)

The NYSHRL allows for individual liability when the defendant (i) has an “ownership interest” in the employer or authority to “hire or fire” employees, Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); or (ii) aided or abetted conduct giving rise to a claim of discrimination or retaliation. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). In either case, the defendant must actually have participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d at 158. However, “an individual cannot aid and abet their own discriminatory conduct.” Boonmalert v. City of New York, 721 F. App’x 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order).

Section 296(1) permits individual discrimination liability only when the individual qualifies as an employer, requiring ownership or power beyond carrying out personnel decisions made by others.

Schaper v. The Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center · filed 2019-09-30(1)

Under the NYSHRL, “an individual is properly subject to liability for discrimination when that individual qualifies as an ‘employer.”” Townsend y. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)). “An individual qualifies as an ‘employer’ when that individual has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the ‘power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.’” Jd. (quoting Patrowich v. Chem. Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541 (N.Y.1984) (per curiam)); ... In this case, individual liability cannot be imposed against Defendant Wilson under the NYSHRL because Defendant Wilson did not exercise sufficient decision-making power over Plaintiff.

Section 296(1)(a) reaches individuals who qualify as employers through ownership or personnel-decision authority, while § 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability for discriminatory conduct entirely of the individual's own creation.

Dikambi v. City University of New York · filed 2021-09-14(1)(a), (6)

An individual may be liable for discriminatory practices under the NYSHRL only if that individual qualifies as an “employer,” a category that encompasses those with ownership interests or the authority to make personnel decisions. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542 (N.Y. 1984)). The NYSHRL also makes individuals liable for “aid[ing], abet[ting], inci[ing], compel[lling] or coerc[ing] the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or [] attempt[ing] to do so.” Id. § 296(6). In the absence of a ruling from the New York Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit has interpreted § 296(6) to permit liability of an individual defendant who “actively participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination.” Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. ... With respect to Adams’s position with the university, Plaintiff alleges only that he was a “professor,” a “well-known researcher, speaker, and education media figure,” and, at one time, chair of the Africana Studies Department. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 13, 17. None of these allegations permit the Court to reasonably infer that he had the authority to make personnel decisions, let alone that he enjoyed any ownership interest in New York City’s public university system. ... Nor can Adams be held liable under the aiding-and-abetting provision of the NYSHRL under these circumstances. He is the only individual alleged to have committed any actionable discrimination. ... Here, where Adams committed all of the alleged discriminatory acts himself, and no one else is alleged to have contributed to that discrimination, the Court would have to strain the statutory language of the human rights law to conclude that Adams “aid[ed], abet[ted], incite[d], compel[led] or coerce[d] the doing of” any discriminatory act, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... The Court finds those decisions to be persuasive interpretations of the statutory scheme, and finds that Adams cannot, as a matter of law, aid or abet discriminatory practices that were entirely of his own creation.

Section 296(1)(h) bars disability-based harassment regardless of whether it is severe or pervasive, and § 296(6) permits individual liability for an employer or a person who aids and abets unlawful discrimination.

Milner-Koonce v. Albany City School District · filed 2022-10-13(1)(h), (6)

The NYSHRL prohibits an employer from “subject[ing] any individual to harassment because of an individual’s [] race, creed, color, national origin, . . . disability, [or] predisposing genetic characteristics, . . . regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims.” ... “Under the NYSHRL, an individual can be liable where the defendant (i) is considered an ‘employer,’ or (ii) aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others[.]”

Section 296(6) permits individual liability under the NYSHRL only on an aiding-and-abetting theory, rather than merely because the individual held a supervisory role.

Luo v. AIK Renovation Inc. · filed 2024-10-08(6)

Under the NYSHRL, an individual defendant may be held liable “only on an aider-and-abettor theory.” Baptiste v. C.U.N.Y., 680 F. Supp. 3d 415, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); see Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P., 167 N.E.3d 454, 455–56 (N.Y. 2021) (clarifying previous decisions which had been taken to suggest that an individual in a supervisory role could be held liable as an “employer”); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Defendant does not plead aiding-and-abetting liability or argue that either individual aided or abetted discrimination by another. See AC ¶¶ 42, 44; Hardwick v. Auriemma, 983 N.Y.S.2d 509, 513 (1st Dep’t 2014) (“[A]n individual cannot aid and abet his or her own violation of the Human Rights Law.”). Therefore, summary judgment is granted for the Individual Defendants under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(1)(h) limits discrimination liability to the employer, while § 296(7) applies to any person who actually participates in retaliation.

Doyle v. American Glory Restaurant Corp. · filed 2024-04-04(1)(h), (7)

As such, because Fierro, the owner of American Glory, was not Doyle’s employer for purposes of the NYSHRL, this claim must be dismissed. ... As such, a business owner, like Fierro, can be held liable insofar as he “actually participate[d] in the conduct giving rise to” Doyle’s retaliation claim.

Section 296 makes an employer directly liable for discrimination, permits direct liability against individuals for retaliation, and requires actual participation and shared intent for aiding-and-abetting liability.

Kulick v. Gordon Property Group LLC · filed 2025-02-07(1)(a), (6), (7)

Only “employer[s]” can be liable for discrimination under the NYSHRL. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... As Borteck and Hirsch are individuals affiliated with the corporate entity, they cannot qualify as Plaintiff’s employer, and therefore the Court dismisses Count IV as to the individual Defendants only, with prejudice. ... Individual defendants can be held directly liable under these statutes for their own retaliatory conduct. ... “To make out an aiding and abetting claim, the pleadings must allege that [defendant] actually participate[d] in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” ... “[A]iding and abetting liability does not attach to a supervisor unless the facts alleged demonstrate that the aider and abettor shared the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” ... As such, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege aiding and abetting by Hirsch.

Section 296(5)(a)(2) prohibits race-based discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of selling, renting, or leasing housing, and claims under it are evaluated under the same framework as FHA claims.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2019-03-04(5)(a)(2)

Section 296(5) of the NYSHRL, like the FHA, prohibits housing discrimination and provides in relevant part: "It shall be ... [t]o discriminate against any person because of race ... in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any such housing accommodation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith." ... Indeed, "[c]laims under the FHA and [§] 296 are evaluated under the same framework."

Section 296(5)(a)(2) bars specified housing providers from discriminating based on race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing or related facilities and services, and housing-discrimination claims use the FHA's framework.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2019-12-06(5)(a)(2)

Section 296(5) of the NYSHRL, like the FHA, prohibits housing discrimination and provides in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee, sub‐lessee, assignee, or managing agent . . . [t]o discriminate against any person because of race . . . in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any such housing accommodation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5)(a)(2); see also id. § 296(6) (prohibiting aiding and abetting “any of the acts forbidden under this article”). Stating a housing discrimination claim under New York State law is substantially similar to stating a housing discrimination claim under the FHA. See Stalker v. Stewart Tenants Corp., 940 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602–03 (1st Dep’t 2012) (noting the “substantial identity between the language and purposes of Executive Law § 296(5) and those of the federal Fair Housing Act”). Indeed, “[c]laims under the FHA and [§] 296 are evaluated under the same framework.” Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 296 housing-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standard as claims under the Fair Housing Act.

Stone v. 23rd Chelsea Associates, LLC · filed 2020-03-30

“Section 1982, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL housing discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standard as claims made under the FHA.”

Section 296 prohibits misrepresenting apartment availability based on an applicant’s color or race.

Diona v. Lomenzo · filed 1966-12-15

Clearly there was also misrepresentation as to apartments available based on color and racial identity. Such conduct constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice under section 296 of the Executive Law and is prohibited.

Section 296 covers a builder’s refusal to construct a home for a buyer because of the buyer’s race.

Kaval Construction Corp. v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1972-07-05

Minniefield filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights that the petitioners had committed an unlawful discriminatory act by refusing to construct a house for him because he was a black man (Executive Law, §§ 296, 297). ... In our view, the evidence at the hearing sufficiently sustains the determination of an unlawful discriminatory practice.

Section 296(5)(a) does not include age discrimination in housing accommodations among its unlawful discriminatory practices.

Campbell v. Barraud · filed 1977-06-06(5)(a)

We would also note that although the New York State Human Rights Law generally declares equal opportunity in housing without discrimination because of age to be a civil right (Executive Law, § 291, subd 2), the more particularized section entitled "Unlawful discriminatory practices” does not include discrimination in housing accommodations because of age (Executive Law, § 296, subd 5, par [a]).

Section 296(5)'s ban on discrimination in private housing did not take effect until September 1, 1961.

Kates v. Lefkowitz · filed 1961-06-19(5)

Chapter 414 of the Laws of 1961, which became a law on April 11, 1961 with the approval of the Governor (Executive Law, § 296, new subd. 5), extended the discrimination ban to private multiple dwellings, 10 or more contiguous houses under single ownership or control, and also to commercial space, as well as making it applicable to real estate brokers and lending institutions. ... This court obviously cannot disregard the legislative mandate that the new law becomes effective on September 1, 1961, or fill the vacuum which will exist until then, by a legislative determination in the guise of a judicial ruling.

Section 296(5)(a)'s exemption for an owner-occupied two-family dwelling does not apply when the owner seeks to lease the apartment in which the owner resides.

Richards v. Mangum · filed 1970-09-25(5)(a)

Respondents submit no brief but by letter from their attorney agree with the contention of appellant that an owner-occupied two-family dwelling is not exempt under the statute where the owner seeks to lease the apartment wherein he resides. It follows that the order must be reversed.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) prohibits refusing to rent housing because of race or color; circumstantial evidence can establish the discrimination.

300 Gramatan Avenue Associates v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1978-07-13(5)(a)(1)

In no uncertain terms, the Human Rights Law provides "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner * * * or managing agent of, or other person having the right to * * * rent or lease a housing accommodation, * * * or any agent or employee thereof: (1) To refuse to * * * rent, lease * * * such a housing accommodation because of the race * * * color * * * of such person or persons” (Executive Law, § 296, subd 5, par [a], cl [1]). ... Thus guided in our review, we determine that the commissioner’s findings are amply supported.

Section 296(2-a)(a) makes refusing to rent or lease housing because of a person's lawful source of income unlawful.

Williams v. Settle Homes · filed 2024-05-28(2-a)(a)

While income and source of income or choice of occupation are not protected classes under the FHA, “lawful source of income” is a protected class under the New York State Human Rights Law. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2-a)(a) (making it unlawful “[t]o refuse to ... rent or lease or otherwise deny to or withhold from any person ... such housing accommodations because of the race, creed, color, disability, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, age, sex, marital status, lawful source of income or familial status of such person . . . .”).

Section 296(5)(a)(1) bars refusing to sell, rent, lease, or otherwise deny a housing accommodation because of race, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex.

Lopez v. The YWCA of North East New York · filed 2025-02-27(5)(a)(1)

The NYSHRL provides that it is unlawful discriminatory practice to refuse to (1) “sell, rent, lease or otherwise to deny . . . any person or group of persons . . . a housing accommodation because of the race . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or expression . . .[or] sex . . . of such-person or persons”; (2) “discriminate against any person because of race . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or expression . . .[or] sex . . . in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any . . . housing accommodation”; or (3) “make any record or inquiry in connection with the prospective purchase, rental or lease of . . . a housing accommodation which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to race . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or expression . . .[or] sex . . . or any intent to make any such limitation, specification or discrimination.” N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(5)(a)(1)–(3), 296(5)(c)(2). “Claims under the FHA and [NYS]HRL § 296 are evaluated under the same framework.” ... For the reasons stated above, in Part III.4.b. of this Decision, the Court finds a response is required to Plaintiff’s NYSHRL disability and sex-based discrimination claims pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(5) against Defendants.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) requires evidence that a seller’s refusal to modify a real estate sales contract was because of a protected characteristic.

Sullivan v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1980-01-21(5)(a)(1)

There is no evidence to support the determination that the refusal of the Sullivans (the contract vendors) to modify the executed contract of sale to increase the time for the contract vendees to obtain a mortgage commitment was "because of the race, creed, color [or] national origin” (Executive Law, § 296, subd 5, par [a], cl [1]) of one of the two contract vendees, or because the vendees were a "mixed couple”.

Section 296(5)(a)(1) protects a white housing applicant and his Black roommate when a landlord refuses an application because of the roommate’s race.

Dunn v. Fishbein · filed 1986-10-14(5)(a)(1)

If the allegations of their complaint were established at a trial, a jury could find that both Dunn and his roommate Pugh were injured by the defendants who were motivated by racial bias (see, Palmer v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 47 NY2d 734). The fact that Dunn is a Caucasian is of no relevance (see, e.g., Matter of Merrill v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 AD2d 548).

Section 296(5)(a) prohibits housing discrimination by owners, managing agents, others entitled to rent or lease housing, and their agents.

State Division of Human Rights v. Muia · filed 1991-10-31(5)(a)

Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) makes discrimination by two classes of people unlawful. The first class includes an "owner”, "managing agent” or "other person having the right to * * * rent or lease a housing accommodation” (Executive Law § 296 [5] [a]). The second class consists of "any agent” of a member of the first class.

A conclusory allegation that a subtenancy application was denied because of race is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on a Section 296 housing discrimination claim.

Hunter v. Board of Directors of Grymes Hill Owners Corp. · filed 1994-05-09

The plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that her application was denied because of her race was not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Joint Queensview Hous. Enter, v Balogh, 174 AD2d 605).

Section 296(5)(a)(2) does not treat a landlord’s installation of electric entrance locks as religious discrimination when the allegations do not support discriminatory intent.

Siegel v. Blair Hall, Inc. · filed 1994-08-29(5)(a)(2)

It is reasonable to assume that the act of installing electric locks was done for the sole purpose of deterring crime, and the record is devoid of any allegation from which it can be reasonably inferred that the installation was done with discriminatory intent.

Section 296 does not support a housing discrimination claim where the property was sold to other bidders on terms more favorable to the seller than those offered by the claimant.

Rice v. Buie · filed 1999-03-18

Plaintiffs’ housing discrimination claims under 42 USC § 1982 or § 3604 and Civil Rights Law § 40-c and Executive Law § 296 were properly dismissed where the property was sold to other bidders on terms more favorable to defendants than those then being offered by plaintiffs (see, Soules v United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F2d 817, 822).

Section 296(18) requires a plaintiff seeking building modifications to plead an offer to pay for them; corrected practices and policies, without evidence of others, do not support a discrimination claim.

Mansolino v. Haberman · filed 1997-05-22(18)(1), (18)(2)

The complaint was properly dismissed, since plaintiffs did not plead that they offered to bear the expense of building modifications they requested (Executive Law § 296 [18] [1]), admitted that the originally alleged discriminatory practices and policies (Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]) were corrected, and failed to adduce evidence of any other discriminatory practices and policies.

Section 296(5)(a) protects disabled occupants beyond the initial rental agreement, including when an eviction proceeding is based on disability or a protected occupant is denied notice of the proceeding.

DiScala v. Facilities Development Corp. · filed 1998-08-31(5)(a)

Although the language of the statute on its face appears only to apply to the initial entering into the agreement to either rent or buy a premises, to permit the institution of a summary proceeding based on an individual being a member of the protected class or to fail to give notice of a proceeding to a protected individual in such a situation would reduce the statute to meaningless words.

Section 296(18)(2) requires covered housing entities to make reasonable accommodations when needed to give a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

Doe v. Bell · filed 2003-01-09(18)(2)

First, a covered entity has an obligation to provide reasonable accommodations in the rules, procedures, and practices of a housing facility “when such accommodations may be necessary to afford said person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” (Executive Law § 296 [18] [2].)

Section 296(5)(a) prohibits denying housing because of sexual orientation but does not require adding a domestic partner to a lease when neither partner is deprived of housing.

Zagrosik v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal · filed 2006-06-02(5)(a)

Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) does not mandate the relief petitioner seeks. The statute prohibits a landlord from denying housing to a person because of his or her sexual orientation. Respondent’s decision, as noted, does not deprive petitioner and his partner of housing.

Section 296 prohibits a cooperative corporation from rejecting an apartment purchase application because of the applicant’s sex, race, or marital status.

Faulkner v. 609-611-615 Owner's Corp. · filed 2008-03-11

The defendant 609-611-615 Owner’s Corp. (hereinafter the defendant), a cooperative corporation, established its entitlement to summary judgment by showing that it did not reject the plaintiffs application to purchase an apartment in a cooperative development in violation of Executive Law § 296, based on the plaintiffs sex, race, or marital status.

Section 296(5)(a)(2) prohibits sexual harassment that discriminates against a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a housing accommodation because of sex.

State Division of Human Rights v. Stoute · filed 2006-11-28(5)(a)(2)

The issue is whether the Human Rights Law forbids same-sex sexual harassment in the context of the rental of housing accommodations. For the reasons discussed below, it does, and the evidence supports the conclusion that Stoute violated that law in his treatment of Boone.

Section 296(5) prohibits sex discrimination in housing, including sexual harassment that affects a term, condition, or privilege of housing.

Ewers v. Columbia Heights Realty, LLC · filed 2007-10-02(5)

“To prevail on a hostile housing environment theory, it must be shown that (1) the complainant is a member of a protected group, (2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome and extensive sexual harassment, in the form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, which were not solicited or desired by the complainant, and which were viewed as undesirable or offensive, (3) such harassment was based on the complainant’s sex, (4) such harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of housing, and (5) if vicarious liability is claimed, the complainant must show that the owner knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to remedy the situation promptly” (Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Stoute, 36 AD3d at 265).

Section 296(5)(a)(1) covers housing discrimination based on pregnancy.

Woehrling v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2008-11-21(5)(a)(1)

We conclude that the Commissioner’s determination that petitioner discriminated against the complainant based on her pregnancy is supported by substantial evidence and that the award of $10,000 for punitive damages is supported by the evidence and is authorized by Executive Law § 297 (4) (c) (iv) as a deterrent against housing discrimination.

The statute prohibits a housing owner from refusing to rent or lease to an applicant because of the applicant’s race.

New York State Division of Human Rights v. Caprarella · filed 2011-03-01(5)(a)(1)

The Human Rights Law (Executive Law §§ 290-301), among other things, prohibits an owner of a housing accommodation from refusing to rent or lease that housing accommodation to an applicant on the basis of the applicant’s race (see Executive Law § 296 [5] [a] [1]).

Section 296(5)(a)(2) bars discrimination against any person based on national origin or age in the sale of a housing accommodation.

Stalker v. Stewart Tenants Corp. · filed 2012-03-22(5)(a)(2)

However, in contrast to Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (1), section 296 (5) (a) (2) makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to “discriminate against any person” (emphasis added) on the basis of, inter alia, national origin or age in the sale of a housing accommodation.

Section 296(5)(a) prohibits housing owners from refusing to rent because of sexual orientation or discriminating on that basis in rental terms, facilities, or services.

New York State Division of Human Rights v. Stennett · filed 2012-08-01(5)(a)(1) and (2)

Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (1) prohibits, among other things, an owner of a housing accommodation from refusing to rent, or withholding from any person, such a housing accommodation based on the person’s sexual orientation. Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (2) prohibits, among other things, such an owner from discriminating against any person on the basis of sexual orientation in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the rental or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith.

Section 296(2-a) requires a claimant suing a rental assistance agency to show that the agency provides housing or a public accommodation.

DeCastro v. Wambua · filed 2013-06-07(2-a)

Petitioner has not demonstrated that a governmental agency that only administers financial rental assistance, but does not provide housing or a public accommodation, is nonetheless considered a provider of housing or public accommodation under either the State or the City Human Rights Law. Therefore she fails to establish a sufficiently meritorious claim against respondent Commissioner of HPD for violation of the NYSHRL or NYCHRL to permit her amendment to the petition to include such a claim.

Section 296(18)(2) requires reasonable accommodations for residents with disabilities in housing accommodations, including state-funded residential treatment facilities.

Wilson v. Phoenix House · filed 2013-12-10(18)(2)

Executive Law § 296 prohibits the owners of both private and publicly assisted housing accommodations from refusing to make reasonable accommodations in their rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ... A residential treatment facility which is funded by the State as an alternative to incarceration is clearly a publicly assisted housing accommodation.

Section 296 (5) (a) (1) prohibits an owner from refusing to rent or withholding a housing accommodation because of a person’s familial status.

Matter of Giura v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2016-01-13(5)(a)(1)

Here, substantial evidence in the record supports the determination of the Commissioner of the NYSDHR that the petitioner discriminated against the complainant on the basis of her familial status in violation of Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (1).

Section 296(18)(2) requires reasonable accommodations to housing rules when necessary for a person with a disability to use and enjoy a dwelling; evidence of a refusal can support a finding of probable cause to believe discrimination occurred.

Matter of Steinberg-Fisher v. North Shore Towers Apts., Inc. · filed 2017-04-12(18)(2)

Moreover, giving credence to the petitioner’s version of the events, and based on the facts established by the record, there is some evidence that North Shore unlawfully discriminated against the petitioner by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation in its rules and policies, despite such accommodation being necessary to afford her the opportunity to use and enjoy the apartment (see Reyes v Fairfield Props., 661 F Supp 2d 249, 261, 269-270 [ED NY 2009]).

Section 296(5)(c)(2) does not prohibit statements about a buyer’s relationship when, read in context, they express financial concerns rather than discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Verzatt v. Halstead Property, LLC · filed 2017-04-27(5)(c)(2)

To the extent that the challenged statements, which suggested, but did not require, that plaintiffs submit a letter describing the “longevity” and “solidity” of their relationship, and stating that they are married, can be construed as inquiry into their sexual orientation or marital status (of which defendants already were aware, but the cooperative board might not have been), when read in context with the relevant emails, they do not express any “limitation, specification or discrimination” on the basis of the couples’ sexual orientation, as opposed to financial concerns similar to any couple seeking to buy an apartment in the building (Executive Law § 296 [5] [c] [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [5] [c] [2] ; Alexander’s, Inc. v White, 115 AD2d 424 [1st Dept 1985]; see also Soules v United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F2d 817, 824 [2d Cir 1992]).

Under § 296(18)(2), an accommodation need only be shown to be potentially necessary to afford a person with a disability equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling; it need not be indispensable.

Hollandale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel · filed 2019-05-09(18)(2)

In our view, such a standard is inconsistent with the plain language of the FHA and the HRL, which requires only a determination that an accommodation " may be necessary" (42 USC § 3604 [f] [3] [B] [emphasis added]; see Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]; see generally Samiento v World Yacht Inc. , 10 NY3d 70, 77-78 [2008]).

Section 296(5)(a)(2) requires concrete factual allegations supporting a claim that defendants were motivated by discriminatory bias in a housing transaction.

Farkas v. River House Realty Co., Inc. · filed 2019-06-04(5)(a)(2)

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the anti-housing discrimination provisions of the New York State and City Human Rights Laws (State and City HRLs), or aided and abetted the violation of those statutes, by imposing uniquely onerous conditions on approval of the sale ( see Executive Law § 296[5][a][2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[5][a][1][b]). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under any of these statutes, however, as she has failed to plead any concrete factual allegations in support of her claim that defendants were motivated to frustrate the sale by anti-French bias ( see McCabe v Consulate Gen. of Can. , 170 AD3d 449, 450 [1st Dept 2019]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. , 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 296(5) requires facts showing a landlord’s substantial control over an alleged harasser to support a claim based on another tenant’s discriminatory harassment.

Edstrom v. St. Nicks Alliance Corp. · filed 2021-05-13(5)

Here, the complaint fails to state a claim under the FHA, because it provides no factual basis to infer that defendant had substantial control over the alleged harasser[*2], where it simply alleges the typically arms-length relationship between landlord and tenant. Because we evaluate claims for violations of the State HRL under the same framework as the FHA ( id. at 73), we find that plaintiff also fails to state a claim under section 296(5) of the NYSHR and thus the second cause of action was properly dismissed.

Section 296(5)(a)(2) prohibits housing providers from imposing different rental terms or conditions because of a person's lawful source of income.

Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. DASA Props. LLC · filed 2023-06-30(5)(a)(2)

Executive Law § 296 (5) (a) (2) provides in relevant part that it "shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having the right to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be [*2]constructed, or any agent or employee thereof . . . [t]o discriminate against any person because of . . . lawful source of income . . . in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any such housing accommodation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith."

Section 296 supports a housing discrimination claim when a qualified applicant alleges that a protected characteristic and the circumstances of a denied purchase give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Gibson v. 526 W. 158th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. · filed 2023-11-14

The motion court correctly determined that plaintiff's second amended complaint adequately pleaded a claim for housing discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3604 et seq .), and the New York State and City Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 et seq .; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[5]) by alleging that she is a member of a protected class as an African-American woman who has a son with autism, she was qualified to purchase the apartment, HDFC nevertheless denied her application, and the circumstances surrounding that denial give rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Sayeh v 66 Madison Ave. Apt. Corp. , 73 AD3d 459, 461 [1st Dept 2010]).

Section 296(2-a) prohibits housing discrimination based on race, color, creed, or familial status, and a landlord cannot obtain summary judgment when its stated rental reasons may be pretextual.

New York State Div. of Human Rights v. 153rd St. Assoc., LLC · filed 2024-02-28(2-a)(a), (b)

NYSHRL prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, creed, or familial status ( see Executive Law § 296[2-a][a], [b]). ... The defendant's submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant's proffered explanations for not leasing the last affordable three-bedroom apartment to the complainant and, instead, leasing the apartment to a white, Jewish family, were a pretext for intentional discrimination based on race, color, creed, or familial status ( see Blackman v Metropolitan Tr. Auth. , 206 AD3d 602, 604).

Section 296(5) does not support a housing discrimination claim based on an ambiguous comment that amounts to a petty slight or trivial inconvenience.

Berrios v. Rose Assoc., Inc. · filed 2024-12-19(5)

The comment makes no specific reference to race or sexual orientation and is more akin to a “petty slight” or “trivial inconvenience.”

Section 296(5)(c)(1) prohibits real estate brokers from denying services based on disability or lawful source of income.

Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. C&A Cent. Realty, Inc. · filed 2025-07-03(5)(c)(1)

DHR's findings that the brokers discriminated against complainant based on his disability and lawful source of income, which caused him mental anguish (Executive Law § 296[5][c][1]), are supported by "sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole" (Executive Law § 298; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Bystricky , 30 NY2d 322, 326 [1972]).

Section 296(5)(a)(1) does not apply to the collection and enforcement of property taxes when the dispute does not concern deprivation of access to housing.

County Acquisitions, LLC v. Cruz · filed 2025-09-17(5)(a)(1)

The defendants' contention of discrimination on the basis of national origin asserted in opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing was properly rejected by the Supreme Court, because Executive Law § 296(5)(a)(1) is inapplicable here, as this matter pertains to the collection and enforcement of property taxes and not the deprivation of access to housing.

Section 296 supports a housing discrimination claim when a qualified disabled tenant pleads an adverse housing action and circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Zelmanovich v. Eastmore Owners Corp. · filed 2026-04-23

Plaintiff stated causes of action for housing discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (42 USC § 3601 et seq.), the City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of the City of New York §§ 8-102 and 8-107 et seq.), and the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 et seq.) by pleading that she is a member of a protected class as a disabled person, that she was qualified for the tenancy, that defendant caused her to suffer an adverse action regarding her housing, and that the circumstances surrounding the adverse action gave rise to an inference of discrimination (see Gibson v 526 W. 158th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 221 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 296(18)(2) requires a housing provider to make reasonable accommodations that may be necessary for a disabled tenant to use and enjoy a dwelling, including allowing a needed service dog.

Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v. Winnie · filed 2026-05-14(18)(2)

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for a person having the right to rent a housing unit "[t]o refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a] person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" (Executive Law § 296 [18] [2]).

Section 296(1)(a) does not prohibit discrimination based on eye color.

Szewczyk v. Saakian · filed 2019-07-30(1)(a)

But Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL do not protect individuals from discrimination based on eye color. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107.

Section 296 claims concerning nonacademic employment matters at an educational institution may be pursued in a plenary action for damages.

Rogoff v. Long Is. Univ. · filed 2022-08-17

Since the causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and various violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL specifically relate to nonacademic matters for which recovery may be sought in a plenary action, and as the complaint otherwise sufficiently pled those causes of action, the Supreme Court properly denied dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see Eidlisz v New York Univ. , 15 NY3d 730, 731-732; O'Neill v New York Univ. , 97 AD3d 199; Fils-Aime v Ryder TRS, Inc. , 40 AD3d 914, 915).

Section 296(16) prohibits discrimination by covered educational institutions against complainants protected by the Human Rights Law.

Board of Education of Yonkers Public Schools v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2009-06-09(16)

Proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review a determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated March 30, 2007, which adopted the recommendation of an administrative law judge, made after a hearing, finding, inter alia, that the petitioner Board of Education of the Yonkers Public Schools discriminated against the complainant in violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [16]). ... Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

Section 296(6) requires an underlying employer-liability predicate for aiding-and-abetting liability, and the court applied a personal-involvement requirement to that claim; the related § 296(7) retaliation claim failed because the plaintiff did not establish an employment relationship with the Governor.

Cater v. New York · filed 2018-06-21(6) and (7)

An aiding and abetting claim against the Governor pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) must therefore fail with them, since "a predicate for aider and abettor liability under this provision is employer liability." Deng v. N.Y.S. Office of Mental Health, No. 13 Civ. 6801, 2015 WL 221046, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting NYSHRL discrimination only after liability has been established against the employer.

Wilkinson v. New York State · filed 2019-10-22(6)

“Crucially, however, the liability of an employer must be established as a predicate to individual liability for aiding and abetting. ... In light of these allegations, Plaintiff must first establish a viable claim of liability against the University under § 296(1) of the NYSHRL; only then can he assert claims against the Individual Defendants under § 296(6) for aiding and abetting violations of the NYSHRL. As discussed supra, however, Plaintiff cannot do so because the University and New York State are immune from NYSHRL suits under the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants under the NYSHRL must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.”

Section 296 permits an individual co-worker to be liable for aiding and abetting retaliation when the co-worker actually participates in the retaliatory conduct, even without authority to hire or fire the plaintiff.

DeBellis v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers and Delivery Employees, Industrial Employees, Warehousemen, Helpers and Miscellaneous Workers Greater New York and Vicinity Local Union No. 812 · filed 2019-12-03

The Second Circuit has stated that “a co-worker who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a [retaliation] claim [may] be held liable under the NYSHRL even though that co-worker lack[s] the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.”

Section 296(6) allows an individual to be liable for aiding and abetting retaliation when the individual actually participates in the retaliatory conduct.

Ulrich v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers and Delivery Employees, Industrial Employees, Warehousemen, Helpers and Miscellaneous Workers Greater New York and Vicinity Local Union No. 812 · filed 2019-12-03(6)

One notable exception to this rule is that, while an individual defendant . . . may not be held personally liable under Title VII, an individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.

Section 296 bars employment discrimination based on race, creed, or sex, retaliation for opposing forbidden practices, and aiding or abetting such violations; its discrimination, hostile-environment, and retaliation standards track Title VII, and individuals may be liable as employers or aiders and abettors.

Sherman v. Fivesky, LLC · filed 2020-05-05(1), (7), and (6)

The language in the NYSHRL is similar to that of Title VII, and as a result, the standards for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims are the same as under Title VII. See Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2006). The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer, “because of an individual’s . . . race, creed, [or] . . . sex, . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). It prohibits retaliation by making it unlawful for “any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). It also imposes aiding and abetting liability: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).

Section 296(6) makes it unlawful to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce conduct prohibited by New York's Human Rights Law, and permits personal liability for a coworker who actually participates in discriminatory conduct.

Kraiem v. JonesTrading Institutional Services LLC · filed 2021-05-26(6)

The NYSHRL states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has construed this language to allow a co-worker who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim” to be held personally liable under the NYSHRL even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff. ... Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Mazzullo aided and abetted the hostile work environment at Jones. ... Taking as true her allegations that Mazzullo engaged in discriminatory acts that contributed to that hostile work environment, id. ¶¶ 58–70, at this stage, the Court concludes that the proposed complaint adequately allege an aiding and abetting claim.

Section 296(6) requires a viable underlying NYSHRL violation by the employer or principal before an individual can be held liable for aiding and abetting.

Doe v. The NYS Office of Children and Family Services · filed 2021-07-07(6)

To the extent the proposed amended complaint alleges that Defendants aided and abetted OCFS or the state, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for relief under the NYSHRL for failure to allege liability against the OCFS.

Section 296(6) imposes accessorial liability for aiding or abetting unlawful NYSHRL acts only after liability is established against the employer or principal.

Gittens v. Winthrop Hospitalist Associates, P.C. · filed 2022-02-18(6)

NYSHRL § 296(6) provides that it shall be an unlawful “[f]or any person to aid, abet, incite compel or coerce the doing of any acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” ... To prevail under the statute, courts impose “a requirement that liability must first be established as to the employer/principal before accessorial liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor.”

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL, while § 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability only when the alleged aider actually participates and shares the principal actor’s discriminatory purpose.

Mondelo v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP · filed 2022-02-22(7), (6)

Under the NYSHRL, it is unlawful to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because he “has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because ... [he] has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... Retaliation claims brought under the NYSHRL are governed by the same standards as retaliation claims brought under Section 1981. ... So Plaintiff's NYSHRL retaliation claim survives for the same reason his Section 1981 retaliation claim survives. ... The language of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL is identical as to aiding and abetting liability; both provide that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-107(6)); see also Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (“because the language of the two laws is virtually identical,” the same standard governs aiding and abetting claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL). ... To state an aiding and abetting claim, a plaintiff must plead that the alleged aider and abettor “actually participated” in the discriminatory conduct of the primary violator. ... Under both of these laws, aiding and abetting liability does not attach to a supervisor unless the facts alleged demonstrate that the aider and abettor shared the intent or purpose of the principal actor. ... Because Mr. Calamari’s failure to take remedial measures does not in and of itself establish aiding and abetting liability, the aiding and abetting claims against him fail.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL, while section 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability only where a primary violation exists and the alleged aider actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Heron v. Medrite Testing, L.L.C. · filed 2022-04-25(7), (6)

Under the NYSHRL, it is unlawful to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she “has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because ... [she] has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... Retaliation claims brought under the NYSHRL are governed by the same standards as retaliation claims brought under Title VII. ... That means Plaintiff’s NYSHRL retaliation claim fails for the same reason her Title VII retaliation claim fails: she fails to allege that she engaged in any protected activity whatever prior to her termination, so she necessarily fails to allege that that she suffered any adverse employment action as a result of her engagement in a protected activity. ... The alleged aider and abettor need not have had an employer-employee or supervisory relationship with the plaintiff. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C Admin. Code § 8-107(6). ... But liability “must first be established as to the employer/principal before an individual may be considered an aider and abettor.”

Section 296(6) does not impose liability merely for aiding and abetting one’s own discriminatory conduct, while § 296(7) requires protected activity, knowledge, an adverse employment action, and causation for retaliation.

Friederick v. Passfeed, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31(6), (7)

In instances where a person is not directly liable for violating the NYSHRL, that person may still be liable if he is found to have “aid[ed], abet[ted], incite[d], compel[led] or coerce[d] the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this [provision], or to attempt[ed] to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... Although the Second Circuit has found individual defendants liable under the NYSHRL even where their own conduct created the hostile work environment that they were alleged to have aided and abetted, see Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus. Inc., 524 U.S. at 753, several courts since Tomka, including New York appellate courts, have held that “[a]n individual may not be held liable . . . merely for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct but only for assisting another party in violating the NY[S]HRL.” Virola v. XO Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-CV-5056 (JG) (RER), 2008 WL 1766601, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2008); Malena, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (same); Strauss v. New York State Dep’t of Educ., 26 A.D.3d 67, 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[W]e hold that individuals cannot be held liable under Executive Law § 296(6) for aiding and abetting their own violations of the Human Rights Law.”); see also Eckhart v. Fox News Network, LLC, 20-CV-5593 (RA), 2021 WL 4124616, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2021). ... To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff “must show (1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2001)). ... Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL retaliation provisions impose liability on “any person” who retaliates against another. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y. Code Title 8, § 8-107(7).

Section 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability only when a plaintiff establishes a primary NYSHRL violation by an employer or principal.

Alvarado v. United Hospice, Inc. · filed 2022-09-27(6)

In order for a defendant to be liable as an aider and abettor under § 296(6) of the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL by an employer or principal. ... As discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot establish a primary violation of the NYSHRL by United Hospice for discrimination, retaliation, or creation of a hostile work-environment. Therefore, Pace and Peacock cannot be liable for aiding and abetting any such violation.

Section 296(1) permits individual liability for an owner or person with authority to hire, fire, and promote employees, while § 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual for only the individual's own alleged discriminatory conduct.

Dingman v. Fuji Japanese Steakhouse Sushi Inc. · filed 2022-09-30(1), (6)

Here, it is undisputed that Chen was a part owner of Fuji and that he had authority to hire, fire, and promote employees. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 5–6.) Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Chen could at least be held individually liable under Section 296(1) of the NYSHRL. However, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s aiding and abetting claim against Defendant Chen under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Plaintiff offers no factual support or allegations that Defendant Chen assisted in other individual’s discriminatory conduct, and Plaintiff’s discrimination claim against Fuji is based solely on Chen’s conduct as part-owner of the restaurant. As Defendants point out, Defendant Chen cannot aid and abet his own alleged conduct.

Section 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability only after a plaintiff establishes a primary NYSHRL violation by an employer or principal.

Belyea v. The City of Glen Cove · filed 2023-02-10(6)

As discussed in the August 2022 Decision, in order for a defendant to be held liable as an aider and abettor under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6), a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL by an employer or principal.

Section 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability only when a plaintiff first establishes a primary NYSHRL violation by an employer or principal.

Murray v. The Dutchess County Department of Public Works · filed 2023-06-30(6)

In order for a defendant to be liable as an aider and abettor under § 296(6) of the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL by an employer or principal.

Section 296(6) permits an aiding-and-abetting retaliation claim to proceed where it is tied to a primary NYSHRL violation, but an aiding-and-abetting discrimination claim fails without an underlying discrimination violation.

Smith v. Davis · filed 2023-07-05(6)

Magistrate Judge Lovric further correctly found Plaintiffs' claim of aiding and abetting such retaliation against Defendant PMI should therefore require a response pursuant to New York Executive Law, because the claim of aiding and abetting violations against individual defendants are tied to the primary NYSHRL violations. ... However, Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly found the claim of aiding and abetting discrimination should be dismissed because it was also recommended that the underlying NYSHRL discrimination claim should be dismissed.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, even without supervisory or hiring-and-firing authority.

Emanuel v. Gap, Inc. · filed 2023-08-14(6)

A claim under this provision requires that the “defendant actually participated in the alleged discriminatory acts.” Bonterre v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-00745, 2021 WL 4060358, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“To be liable under § 296(6), an individual employee need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but must have ‘actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.’” (quoting Feingold, 366 F.3d at 158)).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting an employer’s NYSHRL failure to accommodate.

Schwartz v. Middletown City School District · filed 2024-03-25(6)

For this reason, Defendant DelMoro may be individually liable to the extent he “aided and abetted” the District’s failure to accommodate. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); see also Murtha v. New York State Gaming Comm’n, No. 17-CV-10040, 2019 WL 4450687, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019) (finding “individual [d]efendants can be held liable for failure to accommodate under the NYSHRL”).

Section 296(1)(e) bars retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL, and § 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability absent an underlying NYSHRL violation.

Kopmar v. The Association of Legal Aid Attorneys, Amalgamated Local Union 2325 of the International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO · filed 2025-07-15(1)(e), (6)

While the standards for stating a retaliation claim under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are more lenient than under Title VII in some respects, see Reach v. Healthfirst, Inc., No. 23-CV-8085, 2024 WL 4493769, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2024), each of the three statutes requires that the retaliation be because of a plaintiff’s prior conduct that opposed or challenged something prohibited by that statute. ... Because one cannot reasonably read Plaintiffs’ state-court lawsuit as stating claims under Title VII, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL, Defendants’ response to that lawsuit cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim under those statutes. And, because Plaintiffs have not stated a retaliation claim at the entity level under the NYSHRL, there can be no aiding and abetting liability under that statute either.

Section 296(7) bars retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL or participating in its proceedings, and section 296(1) supports individual liability when an individual qualifies as an employer.

Alcy v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2025-03-14(7), (1)

“The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she ‘has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . she has filed a complaint, testified[,] or assisted in any proceeding under this article.’” ... “The NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: where the individual-defendant is considered an ‘employer,’ of the plaintiff, or where the individual defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others.”

Section 296(6) permits individual defendants to be held liable under the NYHRL when they actually participate in or aid and abet an employer’s retaliatory conduct.

King v. Town of Wallkill · filed 2004-02-13(6)

These two subsections are read in concert and an individual defendant may be held liable under the NYHRL for actual participation in or aiding and abetting an employer’s retaliatory conduct.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting retaliation when the individual actually participated in the retaliation and the employer's conduct is retaliatory.

Bianchi v. Green · filed 2023-08-25(6)

However, Bianchi may still have a claim, pursuant to Executive Law § 296(6), for aiding and abetting retaliation against Green and Czajka, which allows for a finding of individual liability for individuals who do not qualify as employers but actually participated in the retaliation.

Section 296(6) and (7) allow an individual to be held liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.

Peck v. Sony Music Corporation · filed 1995-11-02(6), (7)

Executive Law § 296 (6) and (7) provide that an individual may be held liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting an employer’s retaliation, including by instigating a lawsuit.

Steadman v. Sinclair · filed 1996-01-16(6)

Defendant’s counterclaims alleging that the instant action was instigated by defendant’s employer in retaliation for the complaint defendant filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and seeking to hold plaintiffs individually liable as aiders and abettors of such retaliation under Executive Law § 296 (6), have support in our recent case law holding that "an individual may be held liable for aiding discriminatory conduct” (Peck v Sony Music Corp., 221 AD2d 157; see also, Tomka v Seiler Corp., 66 F3d 1295, 1317 [2d Cir 1995]). ... The amended counterclaims do clearly set forth the required element of aiding and abetting the employer’s retaliatory act of instigating this lawsuit.

Section 296(6) can make a managing agent liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory harassment even if it is not the plaintiff’s employer.

Sanchez v. Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc. · filed 1996-12-19(6)

We would add that an issue of fact also exists as to whether the managing agent, even if not plaintiff’s employer, aided and abetted the superintendent’s harassment of plaintiff, which would render it liable under Executive Law § 296 (6) (see, Peck v Sony Music Corp., 221 AD2d 157; Steadman v Sinclair, 223 AD2d 392).

Section 296(6) permits liability against coemployees who aid and abet an employer’s discriminatory practice.

Murphy v. ERA United Realty · filed 1998-06-15(6)

It is the employer’s participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.

Section 296(6) does not allow an individual to be liable for aiding and abetting their own violation of the Human Rights Law.

Strauss v. New York State Department of Education · filed 2005-12-15(6)

In other words, we hold that individuals cannot be held liable under Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting their own violations of the Human Rights Law (see Trovato v Air Express Intl., supra at 334; DeWitt v Lieberman, 48 F Supp 2d 280, 294 [SD NY 1999]; cf. Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [2d Dept 1998]; Bennett v Progressive Corp., 225 F Supp 2d 190, 213-214 [ND NY 2002]).

Section 296 makes an employer liable for an employee’s discriminatory act only when the employer becomes a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it, and it bars an employee from aiding and abetting their own violation.

Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v. Kirkland · filed 2010-12-14(1), (6)

Under the Executive Law, “[a]n employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it” (Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687 [1985] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bianco v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 54 AD3d 304, 305 [2008]; Matter of New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 236 AD2d 310, 310-311 [1997]).

Section 296(6) requires a claim against a coemployee to allege that the coemployee aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced the employer’s discriminatory behavior.

Croci v. Town of Haverstraw · filed 2014-04-30(6)

Since the plaintiff failed to allege that LoBlanco aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced the Town’s alleged discriminatory behavior, she has not sufficiently pleaded a cause of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6) (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]; cf. Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 888 [2010]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 72-73 [2005]).

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for aiding and abetting an employer's discrimination when the employer is independently liable under § 296(1).

Matter of New York State Division of Human Rights v. Miranda · filed 2016-02-25(6)

Inasmuch as the restaurant and Miranda are independently liable for violating Executive Law § 296 (1), their participation in the discriminatory conduct serves as a predicate for the imposition of personal liability against Paduano pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting his employer's violations (see Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 471-473 [1998]; compare Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 888 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 716 [2011]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 73 [2005]).

Section 296(6) permits an individual aiding-and-abetting claim when the alleged facts sufficiently connect that person to discriminatory conduct.

Mykytyn v. Hannaford Bros. · filed 2016-07-08(6)

We reject defendants’ contention that the court erred in denying that part of the motion with respect to the ninth cause of action insofar as that cause of action asserts against Rosati a claim of aiding and abetting Schneider’s alleged violations of the Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Nesathurai v University at Buffalo, State Univ. of N.Y., 23 AD3d 1070, 1072 [2005]). Contrary to defendants’ contention, we conclude that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against Rosati individually for aiding and abetting the alleged discriminatory conduct (see Moskal v Utica Coll., 59 AD3d 956, 957 [2009]; Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]).

Section 296(6) permits aiding and abetting liability for an individual who directly participates in discriminatory conduct.

Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v. International Fin. Servs. Group · filed 2018-06-26(6)

The record further supports the imposition of liability upon individual respondent Carlos Zapata, for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct, since he directly participated in the discriminatory conduct by, among other things, terminating complainant ( see Executive Law § 296[6]; Peck v Sony Music Corp. , 221 AD2d 157, 158 [1st Dept 1995]; Miloscia v B.R. Guest Holdings LLC , 33 Misc 3d 466, 479 [Sup Ct, NY County 2011], affd in part, mod on other grounds in part 94 AD3d 563 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 296(6) permits aiding and abetting liability for discrimination when defendants are alleged to have acted jointly.

Kouri v. Eataly NY LLC · filed 2021-11-04(6)

Since they are alleged to have acted jointly, the individual defendants' alleged actions may give rise to aiding and abetting liability for discrimination ( see Executive Law § 296[6]; Administrative Code § 8-107[6]; Bistreich v City of New York , 191 AD3d 554 [1st Dept 2021]; Schindler v Plaza Constr. LLC , 154 AD3d 495 [1st Dept 2017]).

Section 296(6) allows an aiding and abetting harassment claim against a person alleged to have instigated supervisors' discriminatory treatment.

Elco v. Aguiar · filed 2024-04-03(6)

Furthermore, contrary to Freeborn's contention, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Freeborn had aided, abetted, and incited this alleged harassment ( see Executive Law § 296[6]). The plaintiff alleged that the harassing conduct by her superiors was instigated by Freeborn sending her harassing text messages and contacting her superiors both about her personal relationships and to make false accusations regarding custody issues and her work performance. The plaintiff sufficiently alleged that, without Freeborn's conduct, there is no indication that her superiors would have subjected her to inferior terms of employment.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for an employee who aids and abets discrimination, even if the employee did not participate in the primary violation.

Gala v. City of New York · filed 2024-08-21(6)

An employee who did not participate in the primary violation itself, but who aided and abetted that conduct, may be individually liable based on those actions under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. See Executive Law § 296(6); Administrative Code § 8-107(6).

Section 296(6) permits individual aiding-and-abetting liability for participation in discriminatory conduct, but that liability requires a valid underlying discrimination or retaliation claim.

McKinley v. Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist. · filed 2024-11-20(6)

Here, there are simply no allegations that Valenti participated in any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct against plaintiff or even that he was aware of any of this alleged conduct but failed to take corrective measures. Moreover, as there are no valid underlying discrimination or retaliation claims, there can be no basis to impute employer or aiding and abetting liability on Valenti.

An individual cannot be liable for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory acts under § 296(6).

Greenberg v. Seton Educ. Partners · filed 2025-01-30(6)

The proposed additional allegations are "palpably insufficient" to state a claim for aiding and abetting against either Defendant, in that it is alleged that Defendant Hanratty directly discriminated against the Plaintiff and Defendant Hanratty cannot aid and abet his own discriminatory acts.

Section 296(6) allows a claim that a coworker aided and abetted the creation of a hostile work environment to go to a jury when her involvement is disputed.

Mikesh v. County of Ulster · filed 2025-04-03(6)

Furthermore, as this claim is based partially on Trojak's harassment and bullying, plaintiff's theory that Trojak is liable as she aided and abetted Gulnick in creating a hostile work environment is similarly a determination best suited for a jury ( see id. at 1222; see also Executive Law § 296 [6]; Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc. , 151 AD3d at 918).

Section 296 does not impose aiding and abetting liability on a person for their own discrimination.

Chamale-Eustace v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook · filed 2026-01-21(6)

The complaint failed to state causes of action alleging aiding and abetting discrimination against Berchuck, as he may not be held liable for aiding and abetting his own violation of the NYSHRL ( see Perez v Y & M Transp. Corp. , 219 AD3d 1449, 1451; Croci v Town of Haverstraw , 116 AD3d 993, 994; Goldin v Engineers Country Club , 54 AD3d 658, 660; cf. Elco v Aguiar , 226 AD3d 649, 651).