N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(7) permits retaliation claims against senior executives who engage in retaliatory conduct; their titles do not exempt them from potential liability.

Rozwadowski v. Authentic Brands Group LLC · filed 2025-01-15(7)

Contrary to defendants' assertions, Heckman and Levinsohn are not exempt from potential liability for retaliatory conduct under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL simply because of their status as senior executives.

Section 296(7) permits retaliation claims against individuals even if they are not employers.

Hendrix v. Pactiv LLC · filed 2020-02-05(7)

With regard to retaliation claims specifically, NYHRL § 296(7) subjects “any person,” not only employers, to potential liability.

Section 296(6) allows personal liability for an individual who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.

Riedinger v. D'AMICANTINO · filed 1997-08-19(6)

Our Court of Appeals, however, has clearly stated that § 296(6) of the [Human Rights Law] states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice 'for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.’ N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).... Based on this language, several courts [in the Second Circuit] have distinguished Patrowich by holding that a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the [Human Rights Law]. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. Riedinger alleges that all defendants participated in the conduct resulting in the sexual harassment and retaliation. As discussed above, genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether the individual defendants are liable for sexual harassment and retaliatory discrimination. Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under New York’s Human Rights Law.

Section 296(3-a)(d) contains an exception identical to the ADEA's reasonable-factors-other-than-age defense, and the court applies its waiver analysis to that HRL exception.

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory · filed 2009-05-01(3-a)(d)

In addition, the HRL itself contains an identical exception to that in the ADEA at issue here. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3-a)(d). The discussion herein regarding plaintiffs' claims under the ADEA and its exception apply as well to their claims under the HRL and its identical exception.

Age-discrimination claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 are analyzed under the same framework as claims under the ADEA.

Morris v. Charter One Bank, F.S.B. · filed 2003-04-30

Age claims brought pursuant to the HRL are subject to the same analysis as claims under the ADEA. ... Accordingly, the ensuing discussion addresses plaintiff's ADEA and HRL claims.

Section 296 age-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas framework as ADEA claims.

Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc. · filed 2003-11-24

Because of the similarity of the elements of age discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL to claims brought under the ADEA, all three claims are subject to the same McDonnell Douglas analysis.

Section 296(3-a)(d) contains a reasonable-factors-other-than-age exception identical to the ADEA's exception, and HRL disparate-impact claims are analyzed under the same reasonableness approach.

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory · filed 2006-08-14(3-a)(d)

Moreover, the HRL contains a RFOA exception identical to that contained in the ADEA. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(3-a)(d). Therefore, we have no reason to think that, in analyzing the HRL, New York will reject our interpretation of the impact of City of Jackson on analysis of the ADEA.

Age-discrimination claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 are analyzed under the same framework as ADEA claims.

Woodman v. Wwor-Tv, Inc., News America, Inc., and Fox Television Stations, Inc. · filed 2005-06-13

Plaintiff-Appellant Brenda K. Woodman appeals from an award of summary judgment entered on December 2, 2003, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denise L. Cote, Judge) in favor of defendants-appellees WWOR-TV, Inc. (“WWOR”), News America, Inc., and Fox Television Stations, Inc. (“Fox”), on Woodman’s claims of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; and New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107. ... Because Woodman's age discrimination claims under state and city law are subject to the same analysis as her ADEA claim, see Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.1999), we need not discuss them separately in this opinion.

For a New York State Human Rights Law claim accruing before the 2019 amendment, Section 296 uses the federal ADEA burden-shifting framework.

Hanley v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2025-12-18

Dr. Hanley brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–101 et seq. Because her claims accrued in 2018, before the NYSHRL was amended, we apply the federal ADEA framework to her NYSHRL claim.

Section 296(1) requires a plaintiff asserting age discrimination under the NYSHRL to show, as part of a prima facie case, that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of age.

Russo v. SYSCO Food Services of Albany, L.L.C. · filed 2007-05-21(1)

In order to make out a prima facie claim of age discrimination under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he was discriminated against because of his age. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1) (McKinney 2005).

Section 296(3-a) permits mandatory retirement under a retirement plan that is not a subterfuge to evade its age discrimination protections.

Kozlowski v. State · filed 1978-05-26(3-a)

It is clear that petitioner’s mandatory retirement under subdivision e of section 381-b of the Retirement and Social Security Law was not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the age discrimination provisions of the Executive Law and, ... therefore, was not within its ban on age discrimination (cf. Matter of New York State Teachers’ Retirement System v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 83 Misc 2d 993).

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment, and pleading age as one of multiple significant factors does not defeat the claim because “but-for” causation does not require age to be the employer’s only consideration.

Fagan v. U.S. Carpet Installation, Inc. · filed 2011-03-10(l)(a)

The condition that a plaintiffs age must be the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action is not equivalent to a requirement that age was the employers only consideration, but rather that the adverse employment actions would not have occurred without it. ... Thus, reading the complaints in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that by identifying multiple “significant factors” that may have motivated the Defendants’ ultimate decision to terminate their employment, the Plaintiffs did not, as a matter of law, affirmatively allege that age was not the “but for” cause.

Section 296(1) bars employers from discriminating based on age, and section 296(7) bars retaliation against an employee for engaging in protected conduct; claims proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Providence Aiossa v. Bank of America, N.A., AKA Bank of America & Co. · filed 2013-09-04(1), (7)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL make it unlawful for an employer to, among other things, discriminate on the basis of age, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, and to retaliate against an employee for engaging in protected conduct, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, the latter of which we assume for purposes of this appeal to include complaining about racial discrimination against a fellow employee. ... We analyze discrimination and retaliation claims under § 296 of the NYSHRL under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2010). Under that framework, if a plaintiff puts forth a prima facie case of discrimination and the defendant then provides a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. Id.

Section 296's age-discrimination and retaliation claims are evaluated under the same standards as analogous ADEA claims.

Zenie v. College Of Mount Saint Vincent · filed 2020-09-14

Despite the general presumption, the Court concludes that, in the interest of judicial economy, it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Zenie’s NYSHRL age discrimination and retaliation claims, as it is well established that the standards for evaluating them are the same as the standards under the ADEA. ... Instead, they are dismissed for the same reasons.

Section 296 age-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as claims under the ADEA.

Hoffman v. CIBA VISION CORP. · filed 2006-06-07

"Age claims brought pursuant to the [NYSJHRL are subject to the same analysis as claims under the ADEA ... Accordingly, the ensuing discussion addresses plaintiffs ADEA and [NYS]HRL claims."

Section 296(3-a)’s prohibition on age discrimination does not supersede the Civil Service Law’s age limits for police officer appointments.

Knapp v. Monroe County Civil Service Commission · filed 1980-07-10(3-a)

We also hold that section 58 does not contravene the prohibition against age discrimination afforded by the Human Rights Law in subdivision 3-a of section 296 of the Executive Law and is not, as plaintiff argues, superseded by that section.

Section 296(3-a)(c) permits involuntary retirement under an employer retirement plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the age discrimination law.

Gross v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1981-02-05(3-a)(c)

Section 296 (subd 3-a, par [c]) of the Executive Law mandates that the provisions of section 296 of the Executive Law must not be construed to “affect the retirement policy or system of any employer where such policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to avoid the purposes” of the Human Rights Law relating to age discrimination.

Under § 296, an age-discrimination plaintiff can defeat summary judgment by raising a triable issue as to whether the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext.

Ferrante v. American Lung Ass'n · filed 1996-08-29

Because plaintiff raised a triable material issue of fact as to whether the reason proffered for his discharge was a pretext for age discrimination, defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.

Section 296 requires circumstances supporting an inference of age discrimination; a pay disparity and the timing of another worker’s hiring alone do not establish that inference.

Orlando v. Rubersi Sales, Inc. · filed 1998-11-19

In our view, the disparity in compensation between plaintiff and Lembersky and the timing of Lembersky’s hiring, without more, does not support the inference that plaintiff was discriminated against based upon his age.

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for an individual who actually participates in discriminatory conduct as an aider or abettor, with the employer’s discriminatory practice serving as the predicate for that liability.

Kantha v. Blue · filed 2003-05-02(6)

Under Second Circuit precedent, an individual defendant “who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim” may be personally liable under 296(6). ... However, “[i]t is the employer’s participation in the discriminatory practice that serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.” ... Here, the state’s sovereign immunity prevents Kantha from bringing suit against the Division as her employer. ... As a result, I find those cases inapposite and decline to grant summary judgment on plaintiffs state law claim against Blue.

Section 296(6) permits a co-worker who actually participates in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim to be held individually liable for aiding and abetting discrimination, even without authority to hire or fire the plaintiff.

Feingold v. New York · filed 2004-04-30(6)

In addition, the NYSHRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice "for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). In Tomka, we found that this language allowed a co-worker who "actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim" to be held liable under the NYSHRL even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317.

Section 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability for unlawful discrimination against an individual who was aware of the discrimination, participated in or condoned it, and shared the principal actor’s intent; a supervisory relationship with the plaintiff is not required.

Choudhury v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2025-08-08(6)

This section of the NYSHRL makes it unlawful to “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing” of any unlawful acts of discrimination, including the creation of a hostile work environment. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... To be liable under Section 296 for aiding and abetting a violation of the NYSHRL, the defendant “need not have had an employer-employee or supervisory relationship with the plaintiff.” ... Nevertheless, a plaintiff must show that that the defendant at issue actually participated in unlawful conduct. ... To establish aiding and abetting liability, the plaintiff must establish that the individual defendant “was aware of the discrimination, and participated or condoned it.” ... Additionally, “[t]he aider and abettor must also share the intent or purpose of the principal actor.”

Section 296 imposes NYSHRL liability on employers and on individuals who aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce conduct forbidden by the statute.

Drinks-Bruder v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 2025-08-21

As this Court explained in its previous decision, see Drinks-Bruder, 2024 WL 1094980, at *12, under the NYSHRL, liability is imposed only on employers and individual employees who “aid, abet, incite, compel[,] or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under” the statute. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; see Bonaffini v. City Univ. of New York, 2021 WL 2895688, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2021).

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on individuals who actually participate in discriminatory conduct and share the principal actor’s intent or purpose.

Faus v. Indian River Central School District · filed 2025-08-29(6)

Plaintiffs’ NYSHRL claims against Decker, Green, and Caddick are brought under an aiding and abetting theory pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... Plaintiffs have also made the requisite showing for their aiding and abetting claim against Decker, Green, and Caddick. See Bautista v. PR Gramercy Square Condo., 642 F. Supp. 3d 411, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“To state a claim for aiding and abetting discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “actually participate[d]” in the unlawful conduct and that the aider and abettor “share the intent or purpose of the princip[al] actor.”). Plaintiffs have demonstrated that each individual defendant was personally involved in the discriminatory application of the P.E. Plan. Supra.

Section 296(6) permits secondary liability for a non-employer individual who actually participates in discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, and its aiding-and-abetting provision is construed broadly.

Garcia v. Westhampton Primary Care · filed 2025-08-30(6)

Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL provides: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so”—including creating a hostile work environment or engaging in retaliation. N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(6). The New York Court of Appeals has instructed that the NYSHRL aiding and abetting “provision should be construed broadly.” Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 858 F.3d 69, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2017) (reporting response to certified question by the New York Court of Appeals). Accordingly, a non-employer individual who “actually participates” in the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory conduct can be held secondarily liable under the NYSHRL. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 81 (2d Cir. 2021).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discrimination when the individual actually participates in, encourages, or condones the discriminatory conduct, and an underlying statutory violation exists.

Brown · filed 2025-09-30(6)

Under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, individuals may be held liable if they actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim. Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2004); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must allege that an individual defendant actually took part in, encouraged, or condoned the discriminatory conduct.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces conduct forbidden by the NYSHRL, and a co-worker’s actual participation can support liability when the employer’s NYSHRL violation is adequately alleged.

Calenzo · filed 2025-12-01(6)

“Under a theory of aiding and abetting, it is unlawful for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NYSHRL], or to attempt to do so.” ... “Therefore, at this early stage, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently pled that Dennis and Glass aided and abetted Waste Management's alleged creation of a hostile work environment.”

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who directly and purposefully participates in discriminatory conduct and shares the principal actor’s intent; a supervisor may be liable when the supervisor actually participates in conduct giving rise to the discrimination.

Hinds · filed 2026-02-02(6)

Under NYSHRL “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... To establish aiding and abetting liability for unlawful discrimination and harassment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “actually participate[d] in the conduct giving rise to the plaintiff's [discrimination or] retaliation claim.” ... The aider and abettor must “share the intent or purpose of the principal actor,” and the plaintiff must demonstrate that there was “direct, purposeful participation.” ... When the aider and abettor is the plaintiff’s supervisor, they can be considered “an employer for the purposes of establishing liability under the NYSHRL if that supervisor actually participates in conduct giving rise to the discrimination.”

Section 296(5) discrimination claims are analyzed like Fair Housing Act claims; Section 296(7) retaliation claims are analyzed like ADA claims; and Section 296(6) aiding-and-abetting liability requires actual participation in the discriminatory conduct.

Elmowitz v. Executive Towers at Lido, LLC · filed 2008-07-22(5), (6), (7)

Similarly, claims of discrimination under NYHRL Section 296(5) are analyzed using the same approach as the FHA. ... As violations of NYHRL Section 296(7) are examined in the same manner as violations under the ADA, ... Plaintiff also sufficiently states a claim under Section 296(7). ... The Second Circuit has interpreted Section 296(6) to establish liability for aiding and abetting only when the defendant in question “ ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.’ ”

Section 296 applies the Title VII analytical framework to discrimination claims, prohibits retaliation for opposing forbidden practices, and permits claims against anyone who aids or abets prohibited discrimination.

Lore v. City of Syracuse · filed 2008-10-30(1)(a), (1)(e), (6)

The HRL prohibits, inter alia, the following conduct as an “unlawful discriminatory practice:” (1) employer discrimination on the basis of an employee’s gender, age, race, creed, national origin, or marital status; (2) employer discrimination “against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this article;” and (3) the conduct of anyone, regardless of whether they are an employer, in an effort to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce another to engage in behavior that is otherwise prohibited by the statute. N.Y. Executive Law §§ 296(l)(a), (l)(e), (6). ... While plaintiff does not have an action pursuant to § 1983 against defendant Lemm for any alleged violation of her First Amendment Rights, plaintiff may assert a claim of unlawful discrimination against defendant Lemm under subsection (e) of the HRL on the grounds that defendant Lemm aided in the commission of unlawful discrimination as defined within the statute.

Section 296(6) makes it unlawful for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce discriminatory acts, allowing individual employees to face personal liability as aiders and abettors when the employer is liable, but not allowing an employer to aid and abet its own violation.

Gallo v. Alitalia—Linee Aeree Italiane—Societa Per Azioni · filed 2008-11-05(6)

However, the HRL and CHRL both provide that an individual employee may be personally liable for a hostile work environment, discriminatory termination, and retaliation claims. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.”); ... Galli and Libutti could be held liable under the HRL and CHRL as aiders and abettors. ... Before accessorial liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor, the plaintiff must first establish liability as to the employer/principal. ... This also means, as the plain language of the HRL and CHRL suggest, that an employer cannot aid and abet its own alleged violations of the discrimination laws. For that reason, Alitalia’s claim for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for aiding and abetting is granted.

Section 296(3)(a) prohibits an employer from refusing reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified employee, while § 296(6) permits liability for a person who aids and abets unlawful discrimination, including where the person's conduct forms the predicate for the employer's vicarious liability.

Tully-Boone v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Hospital System · filed 2008-12-06(3)(a), (6)

Both the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and NYHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3)(a), make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified” employee. ... The Second Circuit has recognized that in the context of a motion to dismiss “[w]hile there may be claims requesting [accommodation] under the ADA that warrant dismissal as unreasonable as a matter of law,” many cases require “a fact-specific inquiry,” and are therefore not properly disposed of at the pleading stage. ... At this early stage, the Court is unwilling to find that such requests for accommodation were unreasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA and NYHRL is denied. ... NYHRL provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ‘for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.’ ” ... The Court is mindful that the Tomka interpretation of § 296(6) is not without controversy. Nevertheless, “until the Second Circuit revisits the issue, Tomka is the law in this circuit.” ... Accordingly, Backus may be held liable for aiding and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by her employer even where her actions serve as the predicate for the employer’s vicarious liability. ... The Plaintiffs complaint is replete with allegations that Backus “actually participated” in the alleged unlawful conduct, and therefore, the Plaintiff has adequately pled that she may be held liable as an aider and abetter under § 296(6).

Section 296(6) permits liability against persons who aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce violations of New York’s Human Rights Law.

Early v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2009-02-25(6)

Plaintiff claims that Bracco and Wardrop “aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or coerced the aforementioned unlawful conduct in violation of N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).” (Complt. ¶ 54.) ... Plaintiffs claims against Braceo and Wardrop must fail because they rely on the failed claims against Wyeth. Yet even without reference to the failed claims against Wyeth, plaintiffs aiding and abetting claims against Wardrop and Braceo must still fail. ... Given plaintiffs candid admissions in her own sworn statements, plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof that Braceo or Wardrop engaged in any action that either aided or abetted Wyeth in violating her rights. Plaintiffs individual claims against Wardrop and Braceo are therefore dismissed.

Section 296(6) permits personal aider-and-abettor liability for a person who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, even without an ownership interest or the power to hire and fire.

Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of America · filed 2009-10-05(6)

In addition, the NYSHRL provides a broader base of liability, making it an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). “The Second Circuit has interpreted this language to mean that ‘a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable’ as an aider and abettor under the NYSHRL, even if that defendant has neither an ownership interest nor the power to hire and fire.”

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a coworker who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, regardless of whether the coworker had authority to do more than carry out others’ personnel decisions.

Cohn v. KeySpan Corp. · filed 2010-05-13(6)

Nonetheless, Section 296(6) provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has held that individual liability may be imposed under the NYSHRL on a co-worker who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” irrespective of whether that coworker possessed the authority to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Section 296(6) prohibits a newspaper from aiding and abetting sex discrimination by placing help-wanted advertisements in separate male and female columns.

National Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1974-06-19(6)

However, since it published its want ads under separate sex designations, we hold that it aided and abetted sex discrimination, and such aiding and abetting is condemned by subdivision 6 of section 296 of the Executive Law.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against employees because of protected traits, while § 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on persons who directly and purposefully participate in such discrimination.

Emmons v. City University of New York · filed 2010-07-02(1)(a), (6)

Two separate provisions of NYSHRL § 296 create potential liability. Section 296(l)(a) provides that it “shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [f|or an employer ..., because of the age, race, ... color, national origin, ... sex, [or] disability ... of any individual, ... to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” ... Section 296(6) provides for “aiding and abetting” liability for § 296(l)(a) violations, explaining that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). To be found liable under this provision, an individual need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, ... but still must have “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination” and engaged in “direct, purposeful, participation.” ... Accordingly, plaintiffs causes of action pursuant to § 296(6) of the NYSHRL and § 8-107(6) of the NYCHRL against all defendants save for CUNY, and Jackson and Guada in their official capacities, survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on any person, not only an employer or employee, for helping commit acts forbidden by the Human Rights Law.

Stanley v. Guardian Security Services, Inc. · filed 2011-07-14(6)

Under the Human Rights Law, “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the Human Rights Law], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) (emphasis added). By its terms, § 296(6) of the Human Rights Law creates a “ ‘broad[ ] source of personal liability’ ” that is not limited to employers or employees.

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding and abetting discriminatory acts, but an individual’s aider-and-abettor liability requires liability first to be established against the employer.

M.O.C.H.A. Society, Inc. v. City of Buffalo · filed 2012-05-30(6)

However, the case law is clear that in order for an individual to be found liable as an aider and abettor under this provision, liability must first be established as to the employer.

Section 296(6) permits aider-and-abettor liability for actual participation in discriminatory conduct, but only when a primary violation has been established.

Mazyck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2012-09-04(6)

Actual participation in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may support liability under § 296(6). ... However, accessory liability may only be found where a primary violation has been established. ... Because Plaintiff is not able to establish a primary violation, individual Defendants MeConville and Culhane cannot be liable for aiding and abetting.

Section 296(6) imposes accessorial liability only after liability is established against the employer or principal, so an individual cannot be liable as an aider and abettor when the employer's retaliation claim fails.

Redd v. New York State Division of Parole · filed 2012-12-20(6)

Because these provisions contain virtually identical aiding-and-abetting provisions, they are evaluated under the “same standards of analysis.” ... Under New York law, “liability must first be established as to the employer/principal before accessorial liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor.” ... Because Redd’s Title VII retaliation claim lacks merit, she has not established principal liability for the DOP under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. ... By extension, she cannot establish aider-and-abettor liability for Burgos. ... Summary judgment is therefore appropriate as to Redd’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims against Burgos.

Section 296(6) permits aider-and-abettor liability for actual participation in another party’s discriminatory violation, including a supervisor’s failure to investigate or take remedial measures after notice, but requires an underlying violation and does not impose liability for aiding one’s own discriminatory conduct.

Moore v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2013-08-22(6)

[24-26] Plaintiff asserts that Culhane and McConville should be held individually liable under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL as aiders and abettors.18 Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, it is unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this [provision], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); Admin. Code N.Y.C. § 8-107(6). Actual participation in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may support liability under both statutes. See Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F.Supp.2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y.2012). Liability “may extend to supervisors who failed to investigate or take appropriate remedial measures despite being informed about the existence of alleged discriminatory conduct.” Morgan v. N.Y. State Att’y Gen.’s Office, No. 11 Civ. 9389, 2013 WL 491525, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013). However, “aiding and abetting ‘is only a viable theory where an underlying violation has taken place.’ ” Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3303, 2013 WL 1316712, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, under both statutes, “ ‘an individual may not be held liable merely for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct but only for assisting another party in violating’ that law.” Malena, 886 F.Supp.2d at 367-68 (citation and alterations omitted).

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding or abetting discriminatory acts, and an individual may be liable for assisting another party only when an underlying discrimination violation exists.

Urquhart v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2013-09-25(6)

Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, it is unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this [provision], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); Admin. Code N.Y.C. § 8-107(6). ... However, “aiding and abetting ‘is only a viable theory where an underlying violation has taken place.’ ” Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3303, 2013 WL 1316712, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, under both statutes, “ ‘an individual may not be held liable merely for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct but only for assisting another party in violating’ that law.” Malena, 886 F.Supp.2d at 367-68 (citation and alterations omitted). Plaintiff has not raised an issue of material fact as to whether Culhane or McConville failed to take appropriate remedial measures or otherwise assisted another party in discriminating against Plaintiff within the three-year statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs NYSHRL and NYCHRL aiding-and-abetting claims is GRANTED.

Section 296(6) makes it unlawful for a person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce acts prohibited by the NYSHRL, but aider-and-abettor liability requires an underlying violation.

Housel v. Rochester Institute of Technology · filed 2014-03-17(6)

NYSHRL also makes it unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce” prohibited acts under the statute. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Importantly, aiding and abetting “is only a viable theory where an underlying violation has taken place.”

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing discriminatory acts; actual participation may support aider-and-abettor liability, but an individual cannot be liable merely for aiding and abetting their own discriminatory conduct, and an underlying violation is required.

Kellman v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2014-03-26(6)

Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, it is unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this [provision], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); Admin. Code N.Y.C. § 8-107(6). Actual participation in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may support liability under both statutes. See Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F.Supp.2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y.2012). Liability “may extend to supervisors who failed to investigate or take appropriate remedial measures despite being informed about the existence of alleged discriminatory conduct.” Morgan v. N.Y. State Att’y Gen.’s Office, No. 11 Civ. 9389, 2013 WL 491525, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013). However, “aiding and abetting ‘is only a viable theory where an underlying violation has taken place.’ ” Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3303, 2013 WL 1316712, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, under both statutes, “ ‘an individual may not be held liable merely for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct but only for assisting another party in violating’ that law.” Malena, 886 F.Supp.2d at 367-68 (citation and alterations omitted).

Section 296(6) imposes liability on an individual who aids or abets a discriminatory act even if the individual did not personally participate in the primary violation.

D'Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc. · filed 2014-06-10(6)

The relevant provision of the NYSHRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); see Dkt. 2 at ¶¶ 66-68 (“Deféndants Ayhan Hassan and Dario Gomez aided and abetted Defendant Ayken[.]”). An individual does not have to take part in the primary violation himself to violate the terms of § 296(6).

Section 296(6) makes it unlawful for a person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce acts forbidden by the New York State Human Rights Law, or to attempt to do so.

Matthews v. Corning Inc. · filed 2014-12-31(6)

Specifically, the NYSHRL provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ‘for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.’ ” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6)).

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability only when there is an underlying discriminatory practice by the employer.

Harris Ex Rel. Demas's Bankruptcy Estate v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2015-06-30(6)

The sex discrimination and aiding-and-abetting claims fail for a common reason: there is no record evidence from which it could be inferred that Demas’s sex played any role in the way she was treated by Waite or anyone else. ... Without evidence of discrimination, the aiding-and-abetting claim against Waite also fails. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); see also Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1998) (“It is the employer’s participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.”).

Section 296(6) permits individual aiding-and-abetting liability for one who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, and § 296(7) treats a retaliatory failure to investigate as an adverse action when it responds to a separate protected act.

Delisi v. National Ass'n of Professional Women, Inc. · filed 2014-09-29(6), (7)

Assuming these facts to be true, the Court finds that they sufficiently allege that Wesser “actively participated” in conduct of discrimination or retaliation to support an aiding and abetting claim under § 296(6). ... Here, Plaintiff alleges that she repeatedly complained in 2012, including to this Defendant, left on a medical leave, filed a *497complaint with the EEOC, returned to work in January 2013, and then complained again to this Defendant. She alleges that the failure to investigate following her return to work in January 2013 was in retaliation of her earlier complaints. The Court finds that these facts are distinguishable from those in Fincher, and notes that court stated “[w]e do not mean to suggest that failure to investigate a complaint cannot ever be considered an adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim. It can be if the failure is in retaliation for some separate, protected act by the plaintiff.” Id. at 722. Such is the case here.

Section 296(6) permits an individual employee to be liable for aiding and abetting the employer’s discriminatory conduct through the employee’s own conduct, even if the employer is not a defendant because of a procedural bar, provided the plaintiff proves the employer’s underlying violation.

Johnson v. County of Nassau · filed 2015-01-30(6)

That a judgment under the NYSHRL cannot be obtained against the County itself because of plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim does not preclude plaintiff from attempting to prove that the County encouraged, condoned, or approved DaSilva’s alleged discriminatory conduct and that DaSilva aided and abetted that violation through his own conduct under Section 296(6).

Section 296 imposes aider-and-abettor liability only after liability has first been established against the employer or principal.

Soloviev v. Goldstein · filed 2015-05-13

Under both statutes, however, there is “a requirement that liability must first be established as to the employer/ principal before accessorial liability can be found as to ah alleged aider and abettor.”

Section 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability for discriminatory conduct only when an underlying violation has occurred, and an individual cannot be liable merely for aiding and abetting that individual's own discriminatory conduct.

Villar v. City of New York · filed 2015-09-29(6)

It is likewise unlawful, pursuant to identical provisions of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this [provision], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(6). Aiding and abetting liability “may extend to supervisors who failed to investigate or take appropriate remedial measures despite being informed about the existence of alleged discriminatory conduct.” Morgan v. N.Y. State Att’y Gen.’s Office, 2013 WL 491525, at *13. However, “aiding and abetting ‘is only a viable;.theory where an underlying violation has taken place.’” Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3303, 2013 WL 1316712, at 21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, under both statutes, “‘an individual may not be held liable merely for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct but only for assisting another .party in violating that,law.” Malena, 886 F.Supp.2d at 367-68 (citation and alterations omitted)..

Section 296(6) permits individual liability under the NYSHRL for an employee who aids and abets discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by actually participating in it, even without authority to hire or fire the plaintiff.

Whipple v. Reed Eye Associates · filed 2016-10-03(6)

Plaintiff, however, need not allege supervisory control in order to state a plausible claim for retaliation under the NYHRL under an “aiding and abetting” theory. In contrast to discrimination and retaliation claims under federal law, an employee may be held individually liable as an “aider and abetter” for purposes of establishing liability under the NYSHRL, if he or she actually participates in the discriminatory or retaliatory conduct at issue. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) (it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article”); Pellegrini v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 740 F.Supp.2d 344, 356 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that an employee who aids and abets the employer in discrimination, including by perpetrating it, can be held individually liable under the NYHRL, and collecting cases).

Section 296(6) permits individual aiding-and-abetting liability without supervisory control when the defendant actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Figueroa v. KK Sub II, LLC · filed 2018-01-26(6)

The NYSHRL makes it "an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). A defendant need not exercise supervisory control to be held individually liable under this provision; rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant "actually participate[d] in the conduct giving rise to [the] discrimination claim." Rojas , 660 F.3d at 106-07 n.10 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp. , 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) ); Feingold v. New York , 366 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). Accordingly, the proper question here is whether a reasonable jury could determine that Defendants Hammel and Pharo "participated in the conduct" giving rise to Plaintiff's claim of retaliation.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting NYSHRL discrimination when the individual actually participates in the conduct underlying the discrimination claim.

Aslin v. University of Rochester · filed 2019-08-28(6)

The NYHRL provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel[,] or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden” by that law. ... “[A]n individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.’”

Section 296(6) imposes individual aider-and-abettor liability only when the defendant directly and purposefully participates in discriminatory conduct and an underlying impermissible discrimination is established.

Rodriguez v. Nassau County · filed 2019-09-25(6)

The NYSHRL allows for individual liability where a defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others. ... It is axiomatic, then, that the predicate to imposing individual aider and abettor liability under § 296(6) is the finding of impermissible discrimination.

Section 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on individual defendants when the underlying NYSHRL claims against the employer are barred by sovereign immunity.

Wiley, Ed.D v. Plattsburgh · filed 2019-09-27(6)

Given that the only primary NYSHRL claims are dismissed based on sovereign immunity, the individual defendants cannot be liable for aiding and abetting those claims under § 296(6).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for a coworker who actually participates in discriminatory conduct and shares the principal actor’s intent, while § 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL and requires protected activity, employer awareness, adverse action, and causation for a prima facie claim.

Xiang v. Eagle Enterprises, LLC · filed 2020-01-16(6), (7)

The NYSHRL’s aiding and abetting provision makes it unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has held that “this language allow[s] a co-worker who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim to be held liable under the NYSHRL even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.” ... These factual allegations are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of aider and abettor liability under § 296(6). ... “Aiding and abetting liability requires that the aider and abettor share the intent or purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose.” ... The NYSHRL’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful “to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NYSHRL, as under [Title VII], a plaintiff-employee must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” ... As with her Title VII retaliation claim, Xiang’s NYSHRL retaliation claim founders on the first prong of the prima facie case: She has not pled facts that, if true, would establish that she engaged in protected activity under the NYSHRL. This claim is therefore dismissed.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who directly and purposefully participates in discriminatory conduct while sharing the principal actor's intent, and that liability can extend to attorneys.

Mondschein v. NY 101, INC. · filed 2020-03-17(6)

“A claim of aiding and abetting under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) requires ‘a showing that the defendant actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination.” Rivera, 2014 WL 6784384, at *5 (quoting Fried v. LVI Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-9308, 2011 WL 2119748, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011)). The aider and abettor must “share the intent or purpose of the principal actor” to be liable, “and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose.” /d. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), Accordingly, there must be “direct, purposeful participation” by the defendant. /d. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), Aider and abettor liability is not limited to employers and employees with authority to make decisions, see Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995), and it extends to attorneys, see Rivera, 2014 WL 6784384, at *5.

Section 296(6) permits liability for a non-employer who aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, but aider-and-abettor liability requires an underlying NYSHRL violation.

Iazzetti v. Town of Tuxedo · filed 2020-07-27(6)

In contrast to the ADEA, however, the NYSHRL allows for “[i]ndividuals who are not a plaintiff’s employer to be held liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory or retaliatory conduct.” Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) (“It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.”). But, because Plaintiff has failed to establish violations of Title VII or the ADEA—and, therefore, the NYSHRL—against the Town, there is no basis on the face of the Complaint to impute aider and abettor liability to Defendant Rost.

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing an act forbidden by the NYSHRL, and an aiding-and-abetting claim requires an underlying forbidden act.

Zheng-Smith v. Nassau County · filed 2020-09-14(6)

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim under NYSHRL insofar as it provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce” any act forbidden by the statute. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Because the court now dismisses all of Plaintiffs other claims under NYSHRL, there was no forbidden act to aid or abet and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing discriminatory conduct and permits liability for a coworker who actually participates in that conduct even without authority to hire or fire.

Kraiem v. JonesTrading Institutional Services LLC · filed 2020-09-30(6)

In addition, the NYSHRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice "for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so." N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has construed this language to allow a co-worker who "actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim" to be held liable under the NYSHRL even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who actually participates in conduct underlying a valid NYSHRL discrimination, retaliation, or hostile-work-environment claim.

Rossbach v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 2021-03-11(6)

The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL prohibit any person from “aid[ing], abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing . . . any of the acts forbidden” by the statutes. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-107(6). ... “A defendant must “actually participate[] in the conduct giving rise to a . . . claim” in order to be held liable under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. ... A precondition to a valid aiding and abetting claim under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL is a demonstration of a valid primary claim for discrimination or retaliation.

Section 296(5)(a)(2) bars landlords from discriminating based on race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing rental or related services, and § 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on persons who aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce forbidden discrimination.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2021-03-25(5)(a)(2), (6)

The NYSHRL makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for a landlord to “discriminate against any person because of race . . . in the terms, conditions or privileges of the . . . rental or lease of any . . . housing accommodation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith.” ... We have held that “[c]laims under the FHA and [NYS]HRL § 296 are evaluated under the same framework.” ... Because we conclude that Francis has failed to state a claim under the FHA, we conclude that he also fails to state a claim under Section 296(5) of the NYSHRL. ... New York law also provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article [including discrimination].” ... “[A]n individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.”

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discrimination when the individual actually participates and acts with discriminatory intent, even if the individual is a coworker rather than an employer.

Ruiz v. Bayshore - Brightwaters Rescue Ambulance, Inc. · filed 2021-03-31(6)

However, under the NYSHRL, individuals may be held liable for aiding or abetting discriminatory conduct. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The aiding and abetting provision applies to a co-worker who actually participates in discrimination, regardless of whether that co-worker was an employer. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004). An individual may be held liable for their own conduct under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL, because the predicate liability belongs to the employing organization. See Geras v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 3d 300, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). As an aiding and abetting statute, § 296(6) requires a showing of discriminatory intent. See Edwards v. Khalil, No. 12-CIV-8442 (JCM), 2016 WL 1312149, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits age-based discharge or discrimination in compensation or other employment terms, and § 296(6) permits individual aider-and-abettor liability only when impermissible discrimination is established.

Benson v. Ruttura · filed 2021-03-31(1)(a), (6)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [f]or an employer” to discharge an individual or “discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” on the basis of age. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). “Claims of age-based discrimination under the NYSHRL are analyzed under the same standard as discrimination claims brought under the ADEA,” i.e., the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. ... The NYSHRL allows for individual liability where a defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). However, the predicate to imposing individual aider and abettor liability under § 296(6) is the finding of impermissible discrimination.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on any person who actually participates in actionable discriminatory acts, even if that participation also constitutes the person's primary violation and regardless of whether other employees were involved.

Bonterre v. City of New York · filed 2021-09-07(6)

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) makes it unlawful for any person—regardless of supervisor status—to “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce” any actionable discriminatory act. To state a claim under § 296(6), a plaintiff must allege that a defendant “actually participated in the alleged discriminatory acts.”

Section 296(6) imposes liability on a person who aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces an actionable discriminatory act, requiring actual participation in the alleged discrimination.

Fierro v. The City of New York, Department of Education · filed 2022-02-10(6)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for any person to “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce” any actionable discriminatory act. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Thus, to state a claim under § 296(6), a plaintiff must allege that a defendant “actually participated in the alleged discriminatory acts.” Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.2d 295, 328 (2004) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, and a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures may constitute such participation.

Bowles v. The State University of New York at Geneseo · filed 2022-03-30(6)

The NYSHRL prohibits “‘aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], [and] compel[ling] or coerc[ing] the doing’ of any unlawful acts of discrimination . . . including sexual harassment and retaliation.” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (some alterations in original) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6)). Indeed, “[A]n individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” Popat v. Levy, 253 F. Supp. 3d 527, 540 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] co-worker who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim [can] be held liable under the NYSHRL [ ] even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.” Id. “A supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures in response to a complaint of discrimination can, with proper factual allegations, constitute actual participation.” Id. (citation & internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability for discriminatory conduct, but a corporate employer cannot aid and abet its own alleged violation when the same conduct would establish its primary liability.

Sanchez v. L' Oreal USA, Inc. · filed 2022-05-17(6)

Defendant cannot be liable as an aider and abettor under either NYCHRL or NYSHRL because Defendant’s alleged participation in the conduct giving rise to the underlying violation would be the basis for just that claim—an underlying violation of NYCHRL or NYSHRL.

Section 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability only after a plaintiff establishes a primary NYSHRL violation by an employer or principal.

Sokolovsky v. Silver Lake Specialized Care Center · filed 2023-09-14(6)

In order for a defendant to be held liable as an aider and abettor under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) and N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-107(6), a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL or NYCHRL by an employer or principal.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding or abetting discrimination or retaliation when the individual actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.

Arroyave v. Universal Remote Control, Inc. · filed 2023-09-14(6)

The NYSHRL permits liability against an individual defendant who aided or abetted conduct giving rise to a claim of discrimination or retaliation. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). To be liable, a defendant must have actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing conduct prohibited by the NYSHRL and requires actual participation in the discriminatory conduct.

Cela v. NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2023-09-25(6)

“The New York Human Rights statutes provide that it is unlawful for a person ‘to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce’ any conduct prohibited by the statute.” ... “Courts have interpreted this language to require a showing that the defendant actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination.”

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who actually participates in discriminatory conduct and shares the principal actor’s intent; a supervisor’s knowing failure to remedy discrimination may constitute actual participation.

Al-Shimary v. State University of New York at Binghamton · filed 2023-10-30(6)

The NYSHRL “prohibit[s] ‘aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel[ing] or coerc[ing] the going’ of any unlawful acts of discrimination[,] . . . including sexual harassment and retaliation.” ... To state a claim, a plaintiff should allege that the “aider and abettor ‘actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination,’ and that the ‘aider and abettor share the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” ... A supervisor who “took no action to remedy . . . behavior” that violated the NYSHRL “although they were aware of it” or engaged in adverse employment actions against a plaintiff “on the basis of impermissible factors” can be liable for aiding and abetting as well.

Section 296(6) makes aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing unlawful discrimination actionable, but accessorial liability requires direct, purposeful participation and first requires liability against the employer or principal.

Marshall v. Westchester Medical Center Health Network · filed 2024-02-16(6)

The NYSHRL provides “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Liability exists under the NYSHRL where a defendant “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination” and shares “the intent or purpose of the principle actor.” Fried v. LVI Serv. Inc., No. 10-CV-9308 (JSR), 2011 WL 2119748, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011). A finding “that a defendant actually participated in the discriminatory conduct requires a showing of direct, purposeful participation.” Id. (quoting Brice. v. Sec. Ops. Sys., Inc., No. 00-CV-2438 (GEL), 2001 WL 185136, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2001)). ... Under the NYSHRL standard for aiding and abetting liability, “[t]here is, however, a requirement that liability must first be established as to the employer/principal before accessorial liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor.” DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). As Plaintiff has fails to assert NYSHRL retaliation and discrimination claims against Defendant WMCHN, her aiding and abetting claim against Robinson and Mackay must also fail.

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing unlawful discrimination and requires actual participation plus shared intent; § 296(7) prohibits employer retaliation against an employee for opposing prohibited practices or filing a complaint.

Nezaj v. PS450 Bar and Restaurant · filed 2024-02-27(6), (7)

Both “prohibit ‘aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel[ing] or coerc[ing] the doing’ of any unlawful acts of discrimination under either title[.]” ... To state a claim for aiding and abetting unlawful discrimination or retaliation, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant “actually participate[d]” in the unlawful conduct of the principal actor. ... The aider and abettor must also “share the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” ... The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she “has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because .. . she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.”

Section 296(6) makes it unlawful to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce discriminatory or retaliatory acts, and an employee is liable only if the employee actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.

Scott v. Grace Cuisine, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28(6)

NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article [including discrimination and retaliation], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). To be liable under § 296(6), an individual employee must have “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.”

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing unlawful discrimination, and generally makes a co-worker liable when they actually participate in the discriminatory conduct.

Riggs v. Akamai Technologies · filed 2024-07-08(6)

Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL prohibit “aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel or coerce the doing” of any unlawful acts of discrimination under either title, including sexual harassment. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C Admin. Code § 8-107(6). The state and city laws apply the same standard to aiding and abetting claims, which generally makes a co-worker liable if they “actually participate[] in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants subjected her to vulgar and sexist comments, which are sufficient to allow a reasonable employee to find that the conditions of her employment altered for the worse. (AC ¶¶ 67-68, 80-82.) The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss sexual harassment claims against individual defendants under state and local human rights laws.

Section 296(6) requires an aiding-and-abetting claimant to allege that the defendant actually participated in the employer’s unlawful discriminatory conduct, while § 296(7) reaches retaliation only where the plaintiff has a past or present employment relationship, or at least an ongoing economic relationship, with the retaliator.

Trooper 1 v. New York State Police · filed 2024-07-12(6) (7)

Of particular relevance here, the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL also prohibit “aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compel[ling] or coerc[ing] the doing” of any unlawful acts of discrimination, including sexual harassment and retaliation. ... However, to successfully plead an aiding and abetting claim under either statute, plaintiffs must allege that a defendant “actually participate[d]” in unlawful discriminatory conduct by the employer. ... The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because she “has opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL] or because . . . she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [the NYSHRL].” ... There can be no question that the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL relate specifically to conduct arising under the employer-employee relationship. ... Without sufficient factual allegations that would support a past or present employment relationship, or at least an “ongoing economic relationship,” a plaintiff’s retaliation claim will be unsuccessful.

Section 296(6) allows liability for a person who aids or abets discrimination or retaliation, including a nonemployer, when the person actually participates and shares the principal actor’s intent, but an underlying discrimination or retaliation claim is required.

Roethel v. Softheon, Inc. · filed 2024-09-30(6)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit “aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compell[ing] or coerc[ing] the doing” of any unlawful discrimination or retaliation. ... While aiding and abetting liability is not limited to employers, it “generally [is] reserved for a plaintiff’s coworkers or supervisors.” ... Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 174, 187 (2017) (“[N]othing in the statutory language or legislative history [of NYSHRL § 296(6)] limits [its] reach . . . to employers.”). ... To establish an aiding and abetting claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant: (1) “actually participate[d]” in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination or retaliation claim; and (2) “share[d] the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” ... A primary discrimination or retaliation claim is a “prerequisite[] for bringing successful aiding and abetting claims.”

Section 296(6) prohibits aiding, abetting, compelling, or coercing unlawful discrimination and requires actual participation, shared intent or purpose with the principal actor, and an underlying discrimination or retaliation claim.

Owens v. Delta Airlines, Inc. · filed 2025-01-23(6)

These statutes prohibit “aid[ing], abet[ting], compel[ing] or coerc[ing] the doing” of any unlawful acts of discrimination. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-107(6). Both statutes apply the same standard, Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004), requiring Plaintiff to prove “that the defendant: (1) actually participated in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination or retaliation claim; and (2) shared the intent or purpose of the principal actor,” Roethel v. Softheon, Inc., No. 23-CV-7894, 2024 WL 4350618, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024). “A primary discrimination or retaliation claim is a prerequisite for bringing” such claims. Id.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability only when a primary NYSHRL violation exists and the defendant directly and purposefully participates in it while sharing the principal actor’s intent; merely failing to respond to or prevent another’s violation is insufficient without more.

Warren v. Ultimate Fitness Group, LLC · filed 2021-09-17(6)

In order for a defendant to be liable as an aider and abettor under Section 296(6), a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL by an employer or principal. ... However, a Plaintiff must demonstrate that the non-employer had “direct, purposeful participation” in the primary violation of the NYSHRL. ... The aider and abettor must “share the intent or purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose.” ... Failing to respond to others’ violations of the NYSHRL does not, without more, support aiding and abetting liability.

Section 296(6) makes a newspaper liable for aiding and abetting sex discrimination when it publishes an obviously discriminatory employment advertisement for a job that clearly lacks a bona fide occupational qualification.

State Division of Human Rights v. Binghamton Press Co. · filed 1979-04-06(6)

Our first inquiry as this case is presented... is whether a newspaper aids and abets sex discrimination when the body content of a published advertisement is palpably discriminatory and the published job title clearly lacks any basis as a bona fide occupational qualification. We hold that it does and that the publication of such an advertisement constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice within the meaning of subdivision 6 of section 296 of the Executive Law.

Section 296(6) does not reach advocacy that merely asks associates to urge others to discriminate, without assistance to potential violators or a closer connection between speech and unlawful action.

Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Community Relations Council · filed 1992-02-25(6)

Defendants did not provide, attempt or offer to provide assistance to those who could have denied access to plaintiffs and thus did not aid or abet, or attempt to aid or abet unlawful conduct. Nor did defendants' conduct rise to the level of incitement or an attempt to incite. The term "incite" connotes a much closer connection between speech and action than is present in this case. Defendants' conduct here, asking associates to ask others to engage in prohibited conduct, is too far removed from the potential unlawful conduct to be considered incitement.

Section 296(6) covers a person who aids or abets discriminatory acts, even when that person is not the plaintiff’s employer.

Nesathurai v. University at Buffalo · filed 2005-11-10(6)

Further, although the court properly concluded that defendant cannot be held liable on the Human Rights Law cause of action as plaintiffs employer within the meaning of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541 [1984]), the court nevertheless erred in granting that part of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. Defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing as a matter of law that he did not aid or abet the other named defendants in the alleged discriminatory acts against plaintiff (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 471-472 [1998]; D'Amico v Commodities Exch., 235 AD2d 313, 315 [1997]; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Section 296(6) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual for his own alleged discriminatory conduct.

Krause v. Lancer & Loader Group, LLC · filed 2013-05-01(6)

Here, since Levine’s alleged actions give rise to the discrimination claim, he cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting, and this claim fails (see Raneri v McCarey, 712 F Supp 2d 271, 282 [SD NY 2010]).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for an employee who aids and abets discrimination without participating in the primary violation.

Ananiadis v. Mediterranean Gyros Products, Inc. · filed 2017-06-21(6)

An employee who did not participate in the primary violation itself, but who aided and abetted that conduct, may be individually liable based on those actions under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Administrative Code § 8-107 [6]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin and imposes liability on individuals who aid and abet an employer's discriminatory conduct.

Oluwo v. Sutton · filed 2022-06-08(1)(a), (6)

Here, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of La Peninsula's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL based on disparate treatment ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code § 8-107[1][a]; Golston-Green v City of New York , 184 AD3d 24, 34). ... Moreover, the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action against his supervisor, Sutton, pursuant to Executive Law § 296(6) and Administrative Code § 8-107(6), which impose liability upon individuals who aid and abet an employer that commits employment discrimination ( see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc. , 27 AD3d 703, 707; see also Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc. , 151 AD3d 915, 917).

Section 296(6) requires a viable underlying discrimination or retaliation claim for aiding and abetting liability.

Weir v. Montefiore Med. Ctr. · filed 2022-09-27(6)

The aiding and abetting claims fail because plaintiff has no viable discrimination or retaliation claims under either the City or State Human Rights Law ( see Executive Law § 296[6]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[6]).

Section 296 prohibits age discrimination, retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices, and aiding or abetting those unlawful acts.

Shapiro v. State of New York · filed 2023-06-07(1), (6), (7)

The NYSHRL prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age and retaliation against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices, as well as the aiding and abetting of any such discriminatory act ( see Executive Law § 296[1], [6], [7]). A plaintiff alleging discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL must establish that [*2](1) he or she is a member of a protected class, (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position, (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO , 6 NY3d 265, 270; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305).

Section 296(6) permits an aiding-and-abetting discrimination claim where allegations sufficiently plead a union’s participation in the underlying discriminatory practice.

Jusino v. Federation of Catholic Teachers, Inc. · filed 2024-03-25(6)

Both statutes further dictate that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this [provision], or to attempt to do so" (Executive Law § 296 [6]; NYC Admin. Code § 8-107 [6]). ... The Court finds that these factual allegations manifest a cause of action for aiding and abetting an unlawful discriminatory practice cognizable at law ( Guggenheimer , 43 NY2d at 275; Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]; NYC Admin. Code § 8-107 [1] [c]; id. § 8-107 [7]).

Section 296 employment-discrimination claims are evaluated at summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ortiz v. Brookstone Co. · filed 2003-07-29

The plaintiffs claims for discrimination under Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law, and for discrimination in violation of § 1981, are all employment discrimination claims, and are governed at the summary judgment stage by the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 296(l)(e) claims use the same elements as parallel Title VII discrimination claims, including the requirement of an adverse employment action.

Westchester County Corrections v. County of Westchester · filed 2004-11-24(l)(e)

It is clear, therefore, that Defendants’ policy does not constitute an adverse action for the purposes of Title VII. As such, the transportation policy cannot be form the basis of liability in this case. ... The same is true of any claims under the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e).

Section 296 employment-discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff lacks evidence supporting the required inference of discrimination or other essential elements.

Kiseleva v. Litman · filed 2025-05-19

Discrimination claims under Section 1981 and the NYSHRL are analyzed under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... Because the same standard governs Plaintiff’s Section 1981 and NYSHRL claims, Alvarado, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 111, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims for the same reasons they prevailed on Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims.

An unsubstantiated allegation of age discrimination under Section 296 is insufficient to defeat summary judgment when the employer supports its stated reason for dismissal with evidence.

Hill v. Westchester Aeronautical Corp. · filed 1985-08-12

Without more, plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegation of discrimination was insufficient to defeat defendants’ motion (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; Krupp v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 103 AD2d 252, 261-262).

A section 296 age discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when the evidence raises a factual question whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for age discrimination.

Ferrante v. American Lung Ass'n · filed 1997-10-23

We conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently raised a question of fact as to whether defendant’s proffered reasons for plaintiff’s termination were merely a pretext for age discrimination.

In an age discrimination action under § 296, factual disputes about replacement by a younger person and whether the employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext can defeat summary judgment.

Dolgon v. Standard Motor Products, Inc. · filed 1998-06-01

There are triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff was replaced by a younger person and whether the reason advanced by the defendants for his discharge was, in fact, a pretext (see, Mayer v Manton Cork Corp., 126 AD2d 526). Thus, the defendants did not establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 296 discrimination claims follow Title VII principles, and a plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by raising a factual issue about either the employer’s false explanation or discriminatory motive.

Morse v. Wyoming County Community Hospital & Nursing Facility · filed 2003-05-02(1)(a)

A discrimination case decided under Executive Law § 296 is governed by the same principles that apply to discrimination cases under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII) (42 USC § 2000e et seq.) (see Ferrante, 90 NY2d at 629), and the United States Supreme Court has rejected the application of the “pretext-plus” rule to title VII cases (see Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 US 133, 147-149 [2000]). The “pretext-plus” rule therefore has no application to discrimination cases under the Executive Law and in such cases, as in title VII cases, a discriminatory intent may be inferred from “the very fact that an employer offers a sham excuse for its action” (Classic Coach, 280 AD2d at 169). Thus, contrary to the determination of the court, a plaintiff may defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment in a discrimination case under the Executive Law by raising a triable issue of fact concerning either the falsity of the employer’s explanation for the challenged action or the employer’s discriminatory motive (see Layaou v Xerox Corp., 298 AD2d 921, 922 [2002]).

Section 296 employment discrimination claims may be defeated on summary judgment when the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and the plaintiff cannot show those reasons are pretextual.

Morse v. Cowtan & Tout, Inc. · filed 2007-06-12

To establish entitlement to summary judgment in a case alleging discrimination, “defendants must demonstrate either plaintiffs failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; see Cesar v Highland Care Ctr., Inc., 37 AD3d 393, 394 [2007]; DelPapa v Queensborough Community Coll., 27 AD3d 614 [2006]; Hemingway v Pelham Country Club, 14 AD3d 536 [2005]).

Section 296 prohibits gender discrimination in employment and requires a plaintiff to establish intentional discrimination or show that an employer's legitimate reasons are pretextual.

DeFrancis v. North Shore Plainview Hospital · filed 2008-06-10

To establish its entitlement to summary judgment in a gender discrimination case, a defendant “must demonstrate either plaintiffs failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 631 [1997]; Hemingway v Pelham Country Club, 14 AD3d 536, 536-537 [2005]; Maguire v Quaker Ridge Golf Club, 306 AD2d 253 [2003]).

Section 296 requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to show intentional discrimination or, when the employer gives legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, a material factual issue that those reasons are pretextual.

Apiado v. North Shore University Hospital · filed 2009-10-27

To establish entitlement to summary judgment in a case alleging discrimination, a defendant “must demonstrate either plaintiff’s failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; see Morse v Cowtan & Tout, Inc., 41 AD3d 563 [2007]; Cesar v Highland Care Ctr., Inc., 37 AD3d 393, 394 [2007]; DelPapa v Queensborough Community Coll., 27 AD3d 614 [2006]; Hemingway v Pelham Country Club, 14 AD3d 536 [2005]).

Section 296 requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was false or pretextual to defeat summary judgment.

Michno v. New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens · filed 2010-03-09

The defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff was discharged for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason consisting of her unexcused absence from work for more than three weeks for an alleged illness without proper medical documentation or application for a leave of absence, which was in violation of hospital policy and was a ground for dismissal (see generally Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 308). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant’s explanation for her termination was false or unworthy of belief, or was a pretext for discrimination (see id.; Apiado v North Shore Univ. Hosp. [At Syosset], 66 AD3d 929 [2009]; DeFrancis v North Shore Plainview Hosp., 52 AD3d 562 [2008]; Morse v Cowtan & Tout, Inc., 41 AD3d 563 [2007]).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin and allows an aggrieved employee to seek damages.

Lerner v. Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n · filed 2010-05-25

To establish entitlement to summary judgment in a case alleging discrimination, the defendant “must demonstrate either plaintiff’s failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; see Michno v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 71 AD3d 746 [2010]; Balsamo v Savin Corp., 61 AD3d 622 [2009]; DelPapa v Queensborough Community Coll., 27 AD3d 614 [2006]).

Section 296's disability discrimination rules are similar in scope to the ADA, and facts sufficient to support a claim under it also support a Civil Rights Law § 40-c claim.

Gordon v. PL Long Beach, LLC · filed 2010-06-08

Finally, the same triable issues of fact which preclude an award of summary judgment on the ADA cause of action also preclude an award of summary judgment in favor of either the plaintiffs or the defendant on the causes of action alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law {see Executive Law § 296) and New York State Civil Rights Law § 40-c.

A defendant can obtain summary judgment on a § 296 age discrimination claim by showing that the plaintiff cannot establish qualification for the position or circumstances supporting an inference of age discrimination.

Dzikowski v. J.J. Burns & Co. · filed 2012-08-01

Here, the defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the plaintiff cannot establish the elements of intentional discrimination: that she was qualified to hold the position from which she was terminated or that her discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.

To obtain summary judgment on a Section 296 age discrimination claim, an employer must show that the plaintiff cannot establish every element of intentional discrimination or that no material factual dispute exists over whether its stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Dzikowski v. J.J. Burns & Co. · filed 2012-08-01

To establish entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a cause of action alleging age discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296, a defendant “must demonstrate either [the] plaintiff’s failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for [its] challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether [its] explanations were pretextual” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; see Ehmann v Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., 90 AD3d 985, 985-986 [2011]; Hemingway v Pelham Country Club, 14 AD3d 536, 536-537 [2005]).

Under § 296(1)(a), evidence that an employer’s stated reason for termination may be a pretext for discrimination can create a triable issue of fact.

Sandiford v. City of New York Department of Education · filed 2013-10-17(1)(a)

Triable issues of fact exist as to whether the principal’s stated reason for terminating plaintiff was “merely a pretext for discrimination” ... and whether, absent a discriminatory motive, the referral of plaintiff to the Office of Special Investigations and the principal’s subsequent decision to terminate plaintiff would have occurred (see Michaelis v State of New York, 258 AD2d 693, 694 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 806 [1999]; Raskin v Wyatt Co., 125 F3d 55, 60 [2d Cir 1997]).

An employer can establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on a § 296 employment discrimination claim by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a transfer.

Nura v. International Shoppes, LLC · filed 2015-07-08

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff was transferred to another store for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason consisting of her problems with coworkers and leaving the store unattended.

Section 296(1)(a) permits summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim when the defendants offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions and no triable issue of pretext remains.

Moise v. Uptown Communications & Electric, Inc. · filed 2015-12-09(1)(a)

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of the State Human Rights Law.

Section 296 employment discrimination claims may be dismissed on summary judgment when the employer establishes legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged actions and the plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of pretext.

Mendelsohn v. New York Racing Assn., Inc. · filed 2015-12-16

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the fourth and sixth causes of action, which alleged employment discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-107. The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing these causes of action by showing that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions at issue.

Under § 296(1)(a), an employer moving for summary judgment on an age discrimination claim bears the initial burden of showing that no triable issue remains about its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.

Lester v. New York State Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preservation · filed 2016-05-04(1)(a)

Here, the defendant failed to meet its initial burden on that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first cause of action as alleged employment discrimination based on age.

An employer can obtain summary judgment on a § 296 employment-discrimination claim by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination and no triable issue of pretext.

Andaya v. Atlas Air, Inc. · filed 2017-01-11

The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination pursuant to Executive Law § 296 by showing that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment, and that there were no triable issues of fact as to whether its explanation for the termination was pretextual (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 131 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2015]).

Section 296(1)(a) allows an employment age discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when the evidence raises a material issue whether the employer's stated reason was false or unworthy of belief and age was more likely than not the real reason.

DeFreitas v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. · filed 2019-01-22(1)(a)

In opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging age discrimination in employment, plaintiffs met their burden under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]) of showing that a material issue of fact exists as to whether defendant's stated reason for terminating DeFreitas's and Walker's employment is false or unworthy of belief and that more likely than not their age was the real reason ( see Ferrante v American Lung Assn. , 90 NY2d 623, 630 [1997]).

Once an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination in a § 296 employment discrimination claim, the employee must raise a triable issue that the reason was pretextual.

Averbeck v. Culinary Inst. of Am. · filed 2020-02-19

Thus, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the reason given for his termination was merely pretextual ( see Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC , 131 AD3d at 1160). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in this regard.

Section 296(1)(a) permits summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim when the employer establishes a legitimate, nonpretextual reason for termination and the employee raises no triable issue of pretext or disability-based motive.

D'Agostino v. MMC E., LLC · filed 2020-06-17(1)(a)

Here, the defendants satisfied their burden on those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action in the amended complaint insofar as asserted against POH by establishing a legitimate, nonpretextual reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment. ... The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in this regard ( see Cotterell v State of New York , 129 AD3d at 653). Further, the plaintiff presented no evidence that her actual or perceived disability played a role in POH's decision to terminate her employment ( see Singh v Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC , 131 AD3d at 1160).

Section 296(1)(a) permits summary judgment for an employer when no evidence would allow a jury to find that discrimination played any role in the employment decision.

Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr. · filed 2025-04-23(1)(a)

Applying these principles here, we conclude that the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of the NYSHRL by demonstrating that there was no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to find that discrimination played a role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment ( cf. Ellison v Chartis Claims, Inc. , 178 AD3d at 668; Kosarin-Ritter v Mrs. John L. Strong, LLC , 117 AD3d 603, 604).

A section 296(1)(a) age-discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employer gives an age-neutral reason for termination and the employee raises no triable issue of pretext.

Hemingway v. Pelham Country Club · filed 2005-01-18(1)(a)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, which alleged that the defendant terminated the plaintiffs employment as head tennis professional because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC § 621 et seq.) and the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). ... In support of its motion, the defendant presented evidence that it terminated the plaintiffs employment for reasons that were not related to his age.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual in compensation or employment terms because of sex, and pregnancy-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Pellegrino v. County of Orange · filed 2004-04-07(1)(a)

In pertinent part, the New York Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law § 296(1) (“HRL”) states that ... It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice: ... (a) For an employer ... because of the ... sex ... of any individual, to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. ... The same analysis applies to claims brought under the New York Discrimination Law. ... Accordingly, neither party is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs PDA and NYSHRL claims.

Section 296 pregnancy-discrimination claims use the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

DeMarco v. CooperVision, Inc. · filed 2010-03-12

Pregnancy discrimination claims are analyzed using the three-step burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1998). DeMarco’s HRL claim is analyzed under the same standard. See Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).

Section 296(1) prohibits discharging an employee because of pregnancy, and NYSHRL discrimination standards track Title VII standards.

Polito v. TRI-WIRE ENGINEERING SOLUTION, INC. · filed 2010-03-19(1)

The NYSHRL prohibits discharge of an employee based on pregnancy. See Mittl v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 763 N.Y.S.2d 518, 794 N.E.2d 660 (2003) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)). The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under the NYSHRL are the same as those governing Title VII cases.

Section 296(1)(a) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination, and section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing that discrimination; liability under these provisions does not require proof of malice.

Rocco v. Goldberg (In re Goldberg) · filed 2013-01-29(1)(a) and (7)

Although the statute does not specifically name pregnancy as a type of actionable discrimination, courts have held pregnancy discrimination to be actionable under the NYSHRL. ... To prevail in a case of pregnancy discrimination, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her pregnancy played a “motivating role” in prompting the employer’s discriminatory treatment. ... To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NYSHRL, the plaintiff must show that: ... (1) she engaged in protected activity; ... (2) the employer was aware of this activity; ... (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee; ... and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. ... There being no requisite or express finding of “malice” (or its analog) in holding the Debtor liable for discrimination or retaliation under the NYSHRL, the Court cannot find that the legal elements necessary to support a judgment of discrimination and retaliation under the NYSHRL are identical to the elements of section 523(a)(6).

Section 296 treats discrimination based on pregnancy, including related medical conditions, as discrimination based on sex.

Wilcox v. Cornell University · filed 2013-11-14

Under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, discrimination on the basis of a woman’s pregnancy — including because of any “related medical conditions” — constitutes discrimination “on the basis of sex.”

Section 296 prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment.

Mazariegos v. King Lawrence Pawn Shop Inc. · filed 2025-04-23

Finally, the Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges pregnancy discrimination against all Defendants pursuant to NYSHRL § 296. See Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 68, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits a public school board from requiring pregnant teachers to begin unpaid leave at a fixed stage of pregnancy when other teachers begin leave only upon medical necessity or request.

Board of Education v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1973-06-25(1)(a)

Thus, it discourages by the use of sanctions a practice of employers "because of the * * * sex of any individual * * * to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment" (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 1, par. [a]). ... The policy does present a manifest infirmity by singling out pregnancy among all other physical conditions to which a teacher might be subject as a category for special treatment in determining when leave from duty shall begin. In the case of other conditions such as ailments or the onset of disease, a leave of absence is not required by the petitioner to commence until medical necessity is demonstrated or the teacher voluntarily requests it. Hence, the female teacher is placed under a restriction dependent on sex alone by the terms of the petitioner's policy. In short, we find that the respondents' determinations that the policy was discriminatory is justified on this record.

Section 296 prohibits sex-discriminatory maternity leave provisions in a collective bargaining agreement.

Union Free School District No. 6 v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1973-11-26

We think that the obligation of the agent is equally as broad in refraining from entering into labor contracts which discriminate on account of sex. The same statute and the same public policy apply to both racial and sexual discrimination (Executive Law, §§ 290, 296).

Section 296(1)(a) requires maternity leave to be treated like other disability leave when crediting time toward a teacher’s probationary service.

State Division of Human Rights v. Board of Education · filed 1975-01-28(1)(a)

Having determined that maternity leave should be treated as all other disabilities, the question which is not answered in the record before us is—how are disability leaves considered in crediting the leave time toward probationary service.

Section 296(1)(a) does not require sick leave benefits during a teacher’s elected unpaid maternity leave when sick leave is available for actual physical disability.

State Division of Human Rights v. Board of Education · filed 1976-04-01(1)(a)

There is no more reason why a teacher on unpaid maternity leave should be granted sick leave benefits for the period of pregnancy related disability than she should be granted such benefits for a disability completely unrelated to pregnancy occurring during this period.

Section 296 does not support a pregnancy discrimination claim when the record shows no connection between the employee’s pregnancy and her termination.

Ditaranto v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1985-06-27

The record makes no connection between petitioner’s seven months’ pregnancy and this 14 months of insouciance toward her employment.

Discharging an employee because of pregnancy establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to justify its treatment.

Energy Expo, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1985-07-15(1)(a)

Inasmuch as complainant had made out a prima facie case that she was discharged from her employment because of the gender-related condition of pregnancy, it became the petitioners’ burden to prove that the circumstances warranted their treatment of claimant (Board of Educ. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 42 AD2d 49, 52, affd 35 NY2d 674).

Section 296 treats a subsequently adopted seniority system that excludes a period of forced pregnancy leave as a distinct discriminatory wrong.

State Division of Human Rights v. Board of Education · filed 1985-07-29

A subsequently adopted seniority system which fails to take into account the period of forced resignation imposes a distinct discriminatory wrong.

Section 296(2)(a) treats a hospital’s blanket exclusion of pregnant patients as sex discrimination unless the hospital shows that the exclusion is medically warranted or that it cannot identify which patients it can safely treat.

Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases North General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1993-05-06(2)(a)

Nonetheless, North General’s policy is supportable if the hospital can establish (1) that the blanket exclusion is medically warranted, i.e., that no pregnant woman, regardless of the state of her general health, the stage of her pregnancy, or the severity of her addiction, can be treated safely, or (2) that it cannot, prior to admission, identify with reasonable medical certainty those women who might receive treatment without needing immediate, on-site obstetrical services.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits terminating an employee because she is pregnant, and an unrebutted prima facie showing supports a finding of discrimination.

State Division of Human Rights v. Dimi Lass Ltd. · filed 1996-10-31(1)(a)

Respondent, who did not appear at the hearing, challenge the determination nor appear in this proceeding, obviously fails to rebut what was a prima facie showing that it had ... terminated the complainant’s employment because she was pregnant, in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see, Matter of Energy Expo v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 112 AD2d 302; Matter of Hamilton v New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 199 AD2d 223).

A pregnancy discrimination claim under § 296 cannot survive summary judgment without evidence supporting an inference that the employer knew of the pregnancy before terminating the employee.

Smith v. Paris International Corp. · filed 1999-12-06

In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. There was no evidence that the defendant’s president, Stuart Paris, knew of her pregnancy before he terminated her employment.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, including terminating an employee because of pregnancy.

Mittl v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2002-04-02(1)(a)

A dismissal on such ground would constitute sex-based discrimination, in violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]). ... DHR concluded that Rivera-Maldonado was a member of a protected class whose termination amounted to illegal sex discrimination under the Human Rights Law. We disagree. ... The conduct of petitioner herein might be described, at worst, as disloyalty to a valued secretary, but that does not support a finding that Rivera-Maldonado’s termination was due to her pregnancy and thus unlawfully discriminatory.

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination because of pregnancy and provides remedies for the resulting harm.

Palmblad v. Gibson · filed 2009-06-09

The determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights that Veronica Rinaldi was discriminated against on the basis of her pregnancy is supported by substantial evidence (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 331-332 [2003]; Matter of A.S.A.P. Personnel Servs. v Rosa, 219 AD2d 648 [1995]).

Section 296(1) prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, including pregnancy.

Argyle Realty Associates v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2009-06-30(1)

Turning to the merits, we find that the Commissioner’s finding that the complainant was discriminated against in the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment on the basis of her pregnancy, and thus on the basis of sex (see Executive Law § 296 [1]; Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 330 [2003]; Elaine W. v Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 81 NY2d 211, 216 [1993]), is supported by substantial evidence (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d at 331; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d at 180-181; Matter of Andrew Naclerio Assoc., Inc. v Pradhan, 45 AD3d 585, 587 [2007]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee based solely on her pregnant condition.

KT'S Junction, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-06-18(1)(a)

Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 seeking, inter alia, to annul the determination of respondent, New York State Division of Human Rights (hereafter, SDHR), that petitioner discharged complainant based solely on her pregnant condition in violation of the Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Matter of Binghamton GHS Empls. Fed. Credit Union v State Div. of Human Rights, 77 NY2d 12, 17 [1990]). Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we conclude that the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 179-181 [1978]).

Section 296 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of sex; a hiring decision tied to pregnancy can support an inference of discrimination.

Mambretti v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2015-06-19

Executive Law § 296 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or employ an individual based on, inter alia, the individual’s sex. ... Petitioner was unavailable to work, however, because of her pregnancy, and we conclude that discrimination could be inferred from the record before us (see Hatch Assoc. Consultants, 110 AD2d at 1050).

Section 296 disability-discrimination claims are governed by the same standards as parallel federal ADA claims, including the standards for reasonable accommodation.

Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C. · filed 2004-05-24

New York State disability discrimination claims are governed by the same legal standards as federal ADA claims. ... Thus) although our discussion will focus on Dr. Rodal’s ADA accommodation claim, our decision pertains equally to his parallel state claim.

Section 296 prohibits disability-based discharge or employment discrimination, but the court applied New York’s reasonable-accommodation qualification standard and held that an employee unable to perform the job’s duties with such accommodation is not protected from termination.

Burton v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2003-02-12

Under state law, the standard is that “the particular disability must be such that it prevents the particular individual from performing in a reasonable manner the particular activities involved in the job or occupation before an employer is permitted to terminate the individual employee,” Antonsen v. Ward, 77 N.Y.2d 506, 513, 569 N.Y.S.2d 328, 571 N.E.2d 636 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), and here defendants have satisfied it.

Section 296(10)(a) bars requiring an employee to violate a sincerely held religious practice unless the employer cannot reasonably accommodate it without undue hardship.

Conde v. Mid Hudson Regional Hospital Medical Center · filed 2024-01-12(10)(a)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful to: impose upon a person as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment . . . any terms or conditions that would require such person to violate or forego a sincerely held practice of his or her religion . . . unless, after engaging in a bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s . . . sincerely held religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. N.Y. Exec Law § 296(10)(a). ... Where, as here, an employee’s request would require her employer to violate a state regulation, the proposed “accommodation” constitutes an undue hardship as a matter of law. ... Therefore, plaintiff has failed to allege defendants could have reasonably accommodated her religious objections to the vaccine requirement without undue hardship. ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL claims must be dismissed.

Section 296(2) requires an educational institution to provide reasonable accommodations for a student's known disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship, and the claim may fail when the proposed accommodation was reasonable.

Bahl v. New York Institute of Technology · filed 2025-12-30(2)

A court will analyze failure-to-accommodate claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the New York State Human Rights Law under the same standard and consider the claims together. ... “In the education context,” the third element “require[s] a covered institution to offer reasonable accommodations for a student’s known disability unless the accommodation would impose an ‘undue hardship’ on the operation of its program.” ... Whether NYIT’s proposed accommodation was reasonable was appropriately submitted to the jury for two reasons.

Section 296(3)(a) prohibits an employer from refusing reasonable accommodations for an employee’s known disability, but does not require indefinite medical leave; the employee must be able to perform the essential job duties with the accommodation.

Roberts v. Ground Handling, Inc. · filed 2007-03-30(3)(a)

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3)(a) prohibits an employer from “refusing] to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee ... in connection with a job or occupation sought ....” Just as with her claim for discriminatory discharge, to succeed on her NYSHRL accommodation claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that she could have performed the essential duties of her position with reasonable accommodation. ... In the present case, plaintiff was unable to work at all and consequently requested medical leave for an indefinite period of time. The law is clear that such an accommodation request is not reasonable. ... Accordingly, defendant was not obligated by the NYSHRL to allow plaintiff to take an indefinite period of medical leave.

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s known disability when the employee can perform the essential functions of the job with that accommodation.

Missick v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-22(3)(a)

In order to set out a prima facie case of failure to accommodate under the NYHRL or NYCHRL the plaintiff must show that 1) she has a disability as defined by the statutes, 2) her employers had notice of the disability, 3) with reasonable accommodation she could perform the essential functions of her job, and 4) the defendants refused to make reasonable accommodations for her needs.

Section 296 disability-discrimination claims are governed by ADA standards: the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, including that reasonable accommodation would permit performance of the job’s essential functions and the employer refused it; the burden then shifts to the employer to show the accommodation was unreasonable.

Lavigna v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2010-08-24

Disability discrimination claims brought pursuant to NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, are governed by the same legal standards that govern federal ADA claims. ... In making out a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge based on a disability, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) [she] is a person with a disability under the [statute]; (2) an employer [subject to] the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, [she] could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” ... Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the proposed accommodation is unreasonable. ... Therefore, for these reasons, the court denies both LaVigna and State Farm’s motions for summary judgment on the issue of discriminatory discharge under NYSHRL.