N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296 requires a discrimination plaintiff to plead and prove the elements of a prima facie case.

King v. Brooklyn Sports Club · filed 2003-05-12

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Executive Law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was actively or constructively discharged, (3) she was qualified to hold the position from which she was discharged, and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997], citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 802 [1973]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an individual because of a disability and sets the burden shifting framework for proving disability discrimination.

Timashpolsky v. State University of New York Health Science Center · filed 2003-06-02(1)(a)

To state a prima facie case of employment discrimination due to a disability under both the Executive Law and the Administrative Code, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffers from a disability and that the disability caused the behavior for which he or she was terminated (see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate “that the disability prevented the employee from performing the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or that the employee’s termination was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” (Matter of McEniry v Landi, supra at 558). If the employer establishes that it had valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging the plaintiff from employment, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discharge were pretextual (see Cooks v New York City Tr. Auth., 289 AD2d 278, 279 [2001]).

Section 296 requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge were pretextual.

Laub v. St. Vincent's Medical Center of Richmond · filed 2003-06-09

In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant’s stated reasons for her discharge were pretextual (see Cooks v New York City Tr. Auth., supra at 279; Jordan v American Intl. Group, supra at 612).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from refusing to hire, firing, or discriminating in compensation or employment terms because of an individual's age or sex.

Kent v. Papert Companies, Inc. · filed 2003-09-18(1)(a)

Insofar as is relevant herein, Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice * * * [f]or an employer * * * because of the age * * * [or] sex * * * of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”

Section 296 requires a discrimination plaintiff to establish protected status, discharge, qualification, and circumstances suggesting discrimination, after which burdens shift to the employer and plaintiff.

Pramdip v. Building Service 32B-J Health Fund · filed 2003-09-22

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Executive Law § 296, the plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was actively or constructively discharged, (3) she was qualified to hold the position from which she was discharged, and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging age discrimination to establish four elements of a prima facie case.

Listemann v. Philips Components · filed 2004-12-20

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under Executive Law § 296, a plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class, (2) he or she was actively or constructively discharged, (3) he or she was qualified to hold the position from which he or she was discharged, and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296(5)(a)(2) prohibits housing discrimination based on sex, marital status, or familial status and requires a prima facie claimant to allege protected status, qualification, an adverse housing action, and circumstances suggesting unlawful discrimination.

Dunleavy v. Hilton Hall Apartments Co. · filed 2005-01-10(5)(a)(2)

Therefore, to make out a prima facie case of housing discrimination, the complaint must allege that the plaintiff was a member of a protected group, that she was qualified to lease the premises, that she was asked to vacate the premises, and that this occurred under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination (see generally Sogg v American Airlines, 193 AD2d 153, 156 [1993]; Broome v Biondi, 17 F Supp 2d 211 [SD NY 1997]).

Section 296 requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show a disability, discharge, qualification for the position, and circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on disability to establish a prima facie case.

Engelman v. Girl Scouts-Indian Hills Council, Inc. · filed 2005-03-24

To sustain allegations of disability discrimination under the Human Rights Law, plaintiff was required to demonstrate that he suffers from a disability, he was discharged, he was qualified to hold the position, and the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on his disability (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 330 [2003]; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; see also Executive Law § 296).

Section 296 requires discrimination plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must give a legitimate reason and the plaintiff must prove pretext.

Mete v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation · filed 2005-08-18

In accord with federal standards of recovery under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997], citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 252-253 [1981] and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 802 [1973]), plaintiffs claiming discrimination under the New York Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296) bear the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are members of the class protected by the statute, that they were qualified for their positions, and that they were discharged or suffered other adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Ferrante, 90 NY2d at 629).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and allows the employer to rebut it with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, after which the plaintiff must show pretext.

Dickerson v. Health Management Corp. of America · filed 2005-08-25(1)(a)

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in employment has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. To meet this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he was terminated from employment or suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the termination or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]). If plaintiff meets this burden, the employer must produce evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (see St. Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502 [1993]). If the employer produces such evidence, plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination by demonstrating “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason” (id. at 515; see also Brennan v Metropolitan Opera Assn., 284 AD2d 66, 71 [2001]).

Section 296 bars employment discrimination and retaliation based on protected characteristics and requires a plaintiff to state a prima facie claim.

DuBois v. Brookdale University Hospital & Medical Center · filed 2006-05-16

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention on appeal, even accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, and giving her every favorable inference to be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case of illegal discrimination (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Whidbee v Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F3d 62, 69 [2000]; McLee v Chrysler Corp., 109 F3d 130 [1997]; Lumhoo v Home Depot USA, Inc., 229 F Supp 2d 121 [2002]).

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination to show that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the position's essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Simeone v. County of Suffolk · filed 2007-01-30

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under either the Executive Law or the ADA, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that he or she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without a reasonable accommodation (see Executive Law § 292 [21]; Thide v New York State Dept. of Transp., 27 AD3d 452, 453 [2006]; Heyman v Queens Vil. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F3d 68, 72 *891[1999]).

Section 296 requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show that they were qualified to perform the essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, to establish a prima facie case.

McCarthy v. St. Francis Hospital · filed 2007-06-26

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Executive Law, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that he or she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without a reasonable accommodation (see Executive Law § 292 [21]; Simeone v County of Suffolk, 36 AD3d 890 [2007]; Fama v American Intl. Group, 306 AD2d 310, 312 [2003]; Heyman v Queens Vil. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program, Inc.,198 F3d 68, 72 [1999]).

For a Section 296 age-discrimination claim based on constructive discharge, the plaintiff must show protected status, constructive discharge, qualification for the position, and circumstances supporting an inference of age discrimination.

Balsamo v. Savin Corp. · filed 2009-04-07

In the context of this case, to support her cause of action alleging age discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate prima facie (1) that she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she was constructively discharged, (3) that she was qualified to hold the position from which she was terminated, and (4) that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that includes evidence sufficient to infer the ability to perform the job with reasonable accommodations.

Evans v. City of New York · filed 2009-07-14(1)

Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, 558 [1994]).

Section 296(5) requires a housing discrimination plaintiff to show protected status, qualification and an attempted purchase, rejection, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Sayeh v. 66 Madison Avenue Apt. Corp. · filed 2010-05-06(5)

To make a prima facie case of housing discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (5) and under its federal counterpart (42 USC § 3601 et seq.), plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he is a member of the class protected by the statute; (2) that he sought and was qualified to purchase the apartment; (3) that he was rejected; and (4) that the coop’s denial of his application occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Dunleavy v Hilton Hall Apts. Co., LLC, 14 AD3d 479, 480 [2005]; Mitchell v Shane, 350 F3d 39, 47 [2003]).

Section 296 requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, after which the employer must provide legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and the plaintiff must prove pretext.

Lambert v. Macy's East, Inc. · filed 2011-05-03

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in employment has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295 [2004]). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position; (3) he or she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (id.; see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]). The burden then shifts to the employer or employers “ ‘to rebut the presumption of discrimination by clearly setting forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision’ ” (Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d at 629, quoting Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 937, 938 [1985]). To thereafter succeed on the claim, the plaintiff must prove that the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendants were merely a pretext for discrimination, by demonstrating both that the stated reasons were false, and that discrimination was the real reason (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d at 629-630).

Section 296 requires an age-discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, after which the employer may rebut the presumption with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the factfinder may infer pretextual discrimination.

Ehmann v. Good Samaritan Hospital Medical Center · filed 2011-12-27

To support a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Human Rights Law, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is a member of the class protected by the statute; (2) that she was actively or constructively discharged; (3) that she was qualified to hold the position from which she was terminated; and (4) that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]). Once a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption with evidence that the plaintiff was discharged for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If such evidence is produced, the presumption is rebutted and the factfinder must determine whether the proffered reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. A factfinder who concludes that the proffered reasons are pretextual is permitted to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination but is not required to do so {id. at 630).

Section 296 prohibits age discrimination in employment and retaliation against a person who raises an age discrimination claim.

Furfero v. St. John's University · filed 2012-04-03(1)(e) and (7)

At trial, to support a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of age pursuant to Executive Law § 296, the plaintiffs must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) they are members of a protected class, (2) they are qualified to hold the position, (3) they suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 296(1)(a) requires an employment discrimination complainant to prove a prima facie case, after which the employer must give a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and the complainant must prove pretext.

Kaplan v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2012-05-15(1)(a)

To establish liability under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) arising from the termination of employment, a complainant must establish, before the DHR, a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence (see Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 265, 270 [2006]), by showing that the complainant (1) is a member of a class protected by the statute; (2) was actively or constructively discharged; (3) was qualified to hold the position from which he or she was terminated; and (4) was terminated under circumstances which give rise to an inference of discrimination (id., citing Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

Section 296(5)(a)(1) permits a housing discrimination claim when a qualified member of a protected class is denied rental housing under circumstances supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination.

MONTANARO, KRISTY v. WEICHERT, ROBERT M. · filed 2016-12-23(5)(a)(1)

Contrary to defendants’ contention, the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for discrimination inasmuch as plaintiff alleged that she is a member of a protected class and was qualified to rent housing ... that was denied her under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination (see generally Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Caprarella, 82 AD3d 773, 774).

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity known to the employer, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

Harrington v. City of New York · filed 2018-01-23(7)

To make out a prima facie claim of retaliation under the State HRL, a plaintiff must show that (1) he/she has engaged in a protected activity, (2) his/her employer was aware of such activity, (3) he/she suffered an adverse employment action based upon the activity, and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action ( Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]; Executive Law § 296[7]).

A claimant alleging sexual-orientation discrimination under § 296(5)(c)(1) must make a prima facie showing of discrimination.

DeLaurentis v. Malley · filed 2018-05-10(5)(c)(1)

Plaintiff's claim for housing discrimination under Executive Law § 296(5)(c)(1) was also properly dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that either he or his client were discriminated against on account of their sexual orientation ( see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green , 411 US 792, 802 [1973]; Sayeh v 66 Madison Ave. Apt. Corp. , 73 AD3d 459, 461 [1st Dept 2010]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a prima facie age discrimination showing based on reduced assignments to a qualified member of a protected class under circumstances suggesting age bias.

Miller v. News Am. · filed 2018-06-05(1)(a)

Plaintiff minimally established a prima facie case of age discrimination by demonstrating that he was a member of a protected class, that he was qualified to work as a freelance sports photographer, and that defendant reduced the number of assignments it offered him under circumstances giving rise to a an inference of age discrimination ( see Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO , 6 NY3d 265, 270 [2006]; see Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a]; Hudson v Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. , 138 AD3d 511, 514 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 902 [2016]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on disability and requires a prima facie showing of protected class membership, qualification, adverse employment action, and circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Matter of Town of Hempstead v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2023-04-26(1)(a)

To make a prima facie showing of a violation of Executive Law § 296(1)(a), which prohibits discrimination in employment based upon a disability, the complainant "must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position; (3) he or she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" ( Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Roadtec, Inc. , 167 AD3d at 900 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 100 NY2d at 330).

Claims under § 296 are analyzed under the same burden-shifting scheme as Title VII claims.

Gadsden v. Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc. · filed 2002-07-11

Plaintiff’s claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York City Admin. Code § 8-107(1), are analyzed under the same burden-shifting scheme as plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

Claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 proceed under the McDonell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Doe v. Board of Education · filed 2003-05-15

Claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYHRL all proceed under the familiar burden-shifting analysis articulated by McDonell Douglas and its progeny.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of sex, and claims under it are evaluated under the same burden-shifting framework as Title VII claims.

Burniche v. General Electric Automation Services, Inc. · filed 2004-02-12(1)(a)

Discrimination claims under New York State law “are evaluated using the same analytical framework used in Title VII actions.”

Claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 are analyzed under the same burden-shifting scheme as ADEA and Title VII claims.

Tarshis v. Riese Organization · filed 2002-04-02

Plaintiffs claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, are analyzed under the same burden-shifting scheme as plaintiffs ADEA and Title VII claims.

Section 296 race-discrimination claims are analyzed under the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse · filed 2008-04-09

Race-based employment discrimination claims under Title VII, the NYSHRL, § 1983, § 1981, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are all analyzed under the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 296 employment-discrimination claims are evaluated under the same Title VII burden-shifting framework; a plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Hargett v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2009-08-04

The standard for a plaintiff bringing a claim under § 296 of the NYHRL is also identical to Title VII. ... Since the Title VII burden-shifting frame work is applies to both Hargett’s claim under NYHRL § 296 and his claim under § 1981 against Grill, Ross, and McIntosh in their personal capacity, the Court will consider these claims together.

Claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 are evaluated under the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and standard of proof as Title VII employment-discrimination claims.

Desir v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2011-03-29

Discrimination claims pursuant to New York state law are evaluated under the same burden-shifting analysis as that utilized by courts evaluating Title VII claims. ... This Court, in keeping with the usual practice of this Circuit, will treat Plaintiffs Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law claims “as analytically identical, applying the same standard of proof to both claims.”

Section 296(1) claims may be analyzed virtually identically to Title VII claims when determining whether the evidence is sufficient.

Kleehammer v. Monroe County · filed 2010-09-08(1)

The Court notes that the elements of Title VII and New York Executive Law § 296 claims “can be analyzed, for purposes of determining sufficiency of the evidence, in a manner virtually identical to those under Title VII.”

Claims under the New York State Human Rights Law are analyzed under standards closely paralleling Title VII, including for hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims.

Berger-Rothberg v. City of New York · filed 2011-03-23

New York courts examining claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL take an analytical approach that closely parallels the analysis used for corresponding Title VII claims. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000) (citations omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment is also denied as to Plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL hostile work environment claims. ... Retaliation claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL are governed by the same standards as federal claims under Title VII, while those brought pursuant to NYCHRL are subject to an even “broader” standard.

Section 296 discrimination and retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ben-Levy v. Bloomberg, L.P. · filed 2013-05-01

The burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), governs claims of discrimination under the ADA, ADEA, and NYSHRL. ... Thus, we conclude that Ben-Levy has failed to make a showing of discrimination under the ADA, ADEA, or NYSHRL. While there are slight differences in the showing needed to make out a prima facie case for retaliation from that for discrimination, claims of retaliation under the ADA, ADEA, NYSHRL, and FMLA remain subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Section 296 discrimination claims are evaluated under the same three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework used for Title VII claims.

O'Diah v. Yogo Oasis · filed 2013-07-22

Discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL are evaluated according to the same burden-shifting framework.

Section 296 discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Shapiro v. City of New York · filed 2016-05-20

Shapiro’s federal and NYSHRL claims are governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).

The NYSHRL applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to age-discrimination and retaliation claims, requiring an age-discrimination plaintiff to show pretext after a nondiscriminatory reason is offered and a retaliation plaintiff to establish protected activity, employer awareness, adverse action, and causation.

McGuire-Welch v. the House of the Good Shepherd · filed 2018-01-17

Age discrimination claims brought under the ADEA and NYSHRL are governed by the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). ... Retaliation claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and NYSHRL are also governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. ... To carry her prima facie burden, McGuire-Welch had to show that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer was aware of this activity, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) a causal connection existed between the adverse employment action and her protected activity.

Section 296 discrimination claims based on race, national origin, and disability are analyzed under the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Lambert v. Trump Int'l Hotel & Tower · filed 2018-03-31

Under Title VII and the NYSHRL, discrimination claims on the basis of race, national origin, and disability are analyzed under the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 296 prohibits refusing to hire or employ an individual because of age or national origin, and NYSHRL claims generally use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ali v. Westchester Medical Center · filed 2022-07-05

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful to refuse to hire or employ an individual because of the individual’s age or national origin. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. ... The same framework generally applies to NYSHRL claims. ... This claim fails because there is no evidence that Ali’s rejection from the residency program “occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of a discrimination” based on national origin. ... Given that showing, the burden shifts to Ali to “establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,” that the defendants’ justification is a “pretext for discrimination.”

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and liability does not require discrimination to be the sole cause of the adverse employment action.

Tyson v. The Town of Ramapo · filed 2023-06-12

The standards governing liability for race and gender discrimination claims under § 1983 and NYSHRL § 296 are subject to the same standard as Title VII claims. ... These claims are analyzed at the summary judgment stage “under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” ... This standard, applicable Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims, does not require proof that discrimination was the sole cause of the employer’s action, as there may exist multiple “but-for” causes, each one of which may be sufficient to support liability.

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework as Title VII claims, subject to timely filing.

Lu v. Chase Investment Services Corp. · filed 2011-03-08

The same is true for Lu’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, to the extent they were timely filed. See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[C]onsideration of claims brought under the state and city human rights laws parallels the analysis used in Title VII claims.”); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2) (McKinney 2003) (three year statute of limitations for claims under the NYSHRL); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(d) (same for NYCHRL). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Section 296(1)(a) places the burden on an employer in a mixed-motives discrimination case to show it would have made the same decision without the unlawful motive.

Card v. Sielaff · filed 1992-03-26(1)(a)

Once petitioner has made out a prima facie case of mixed motives, the burden shifts to the employer to show that its employment decision would have been the same absent the unlawful motive.

Under Executive Law § 296, an employer is entitled to summary judgment when it establishes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision and the plaintiff raises no material factual issue that the reason was false or that age or gender was the real reason.

Alfano v. Miller Environmental Group, Inc. · filed 1998-08-10

Assuming that the plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant succeeded in establishing that the alleged adverse employment decision was based on legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623; Matter of Miller Brewing Co. v State Div. of Human Rights, 66 NY2d 937). The plaintiff failed to raise material issues of fact as to whether the reasons given were false and whether her age or gender was the real reason (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., supra; Matter of Laverack & Haines v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 88 NY2d 734).

Section 296(1)(a) requires the factfinder to decide whether an employer’s stated reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

Draman v. Lamar Advertising of Penn, Inc. · filed 2000-06-16(1)(a)

Finally, the Commissioner erred in failing to determine whether the reasons given by petitioner’s employer for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

In a mixed-motives age-discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a), the employee must show that age played a motivating or substantial role; the employer must then show it would have made the same decision without that motive.

Allen v. Domus Development Corp. · filed 2000-06-16(1)(a)

In a “mixed-motives” case, unlike a “pretext” case, “the burden is on the plaintiff to show that an illegitimate factor * * * played a motivating or substantial role in the defendant’s employment decision * * * If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to support an inference of impermissible discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that the employment decision would have been reached in the absence of that impermissible motive” (Michaelis v State of New York, 258 AD2d 693, 694, lv denied 93 NY2d 806; see, Tyler v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F2d 1176, 1180-1181, cert denied 506 US 826).

Section 296(1)(c) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating against individuals because of age and requires a three part burden shifting analysis for discrimination claims.

Stephenson v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO · filed 2006-02-16(1)(c)

A three part analysis is required to determine whether plaintiffs have met their burden to establish a discrimination claim under Executive Law (Human Rights Law) § 296.

Section 296 requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and sets the burden shifting framework.

Thide v. New York State Department of Transportation · filed 2006-03-07

To state a prima facie case of employment discrimination due to a disability under Executive Law § 296, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffers from a disability and that the disability engendered the behavior for which he or she was discriminated against in the terms, conditions, or privileges of his or her employment (see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554 [1994]; Timashpolsky v State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn, 306 AD2d 271 [2003]). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the disability prevented the employee from performing the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or that the employer’s action was motivated by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons (see Matter of McEniry v Landi, supra at 558; Timashpolsky v State Univ. of N.Y. Health Science. Ctr. at Brooklyn, supra at 272). If the employer establishes that it had valid nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the stated reasons were pretextual (see Cooks v New York City Tr. Auth., 289 AD2d 278 [2001]).

Section 296 requires an employment-discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and show that an employer’s legitimate reasons are pretextual.

Bailey v. New York Westchester Square Medical Centre · filed 2007-01-09

Plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination in employment. To meet this burden, plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified to hold the position, (3) she was terminated from employment or suffered other adverse employment action, and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]).

Section 296 requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to show that an employer's stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual after the employer met its prima facie burden.

Saia v. Suffolk County Community College · filed 2009-07-14

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant met its prima facie burden of establishing that its decision not to appoint the plaintiff to the position of full-time professor was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, and not his age (see Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 265, 270 [2006]; Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; Tardif v Town of Southold, 56 AD3d 755, 756 [2008]; Listemann v Philips Components, 13 AD3d 494 [2004]; Herskowitz v Greystone Jewish Ctr., 270 AD2d 391 [2000]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons proffered by the defendant were pretextual (see Tardif v Town of Southold, 56 AD3d at 756; DelPapa v Queensborough Community Coll., 27 AD3d 614 [2006]; Herskowitz v Greystone Jewish Ctr., 270 AD2d at 391).

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination based on race and uses a prima facie and burden-shifting framework for proving such claims.

Baldwin v. Cablevision Systems Corp. · filed 2009-09-29

In order to make out a claim of racial discrimination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified for the position, and was terminated or suffered some other adverse employment action, and that the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004], citing Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]).

For a Section 296 retaliation claim, a prima facie showing shifts the burden to the employer to give legitimate, independent, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Matter of Troge v. State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2016-02-24(7)

If the petitioner made this initial showing, the burden would shift to the Town respondents to present legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support their actions.

Section 296(1) generally does not impose individual liability on a corporate employee without an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions, but § 296(6) can impose aider-and-abettor liability on individuals who actually participate in discriminatory conduct.

Briggs v. New York State Department of Transportation · filed 2002-11-12(1), (6)

Thus, individual liability is sharply circumscribed under section 296(1). While this would seem to doom plaintiffs HRL claims against the individual defendants, in Tomka, the Second Circuit held that section 296(6)’s aider and abettor provision supplies a basis for imposing liability upon individuals who actually participate in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Section 296(1) sharply limits individual liability for discrimination, while section 296(6) permits aider-and-abettor liability for individuals who actually participate in discriminatory conduct.

Wait v. Beck's North America, Inc. · filed 2003-01-14(1), (6)

Thus, individual liability is sharply circumscribed under section 296(1). Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Walsh had the authority to hire and fire. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 5, 48) This allegation is sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss. Moreover, in Tomka v. Seiler, 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir.1995), the Second Circuit held that section 296(6)’s aider and abettor provision supplies a basis for imposing liability upon individuals who actually participate in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Section 296(1) can impose liability on individual supervisors who have authority to carry out employment decisions, and § 296(6) can impose aider-and-abettor liability on an individual who actually participates in discriminatory conduct even without authority to hire or fire.

Reed v. Garden City Union Free School District · filed 2013-12-16(1), (6)

The Court finds Plaintiff has adequately pled and the termination letter indicates, that these Defendants as the building administrators, rather than the Board of Education, had the power to carry out employment decisions concerning the Plaintiff and thus could be deemed “employers” as required to impose liability under the N.Y. Exec. Law. ... It is possible for an individual to be liable under § 296(6) for “actually participating” in the discriminatory conduct even thought he or she lacks the authority to hire or fire the plaintiffs.

Section 296(1) can impose employer liability on an individual with an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions, while § 296(6) imposes individual aiding-and-abetting liability on a person who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, including a direct perpetrator.

Prince v. Madison Square Garden · filed 2006-04-10(1), (6)

There are two bases for holding an individual liable under the NYSHRL — as an employer under Section 296(1) or as an “aider or abettor” under Section 296(6). See N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(1), (6). ... The New York Court of Appeals has held that an employee is not individually subject to suit under § 296 of the HRL as an employer “if he is not shown to have any ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... In addition to alleging, upon information and belief, that Halkett had the power to hire and fire her, the Amended Complaint also specifically alleges that he participated in discharging her. Such allegations have been held sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Wait, 241 F.Supp.2d at 179, and are deemed so here. ... With respect to aiding and abetting liability, Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). According to the Second Circuit, this language imposes individual liability on “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” irrespective of whether the individual possesses power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. ... Additionally, in Tomka, the Second Circuit interpreted Section 296(6) as holding individually liable those within the employment relationship who primarily and directly perpetrated the harassment. ... In accordance with the Second Circuit’s interpretation, it is too early to dismiss Prince’s claim of “aiding and abetting” liability against Halkett under the NYSHRL and the NYCAC.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation, and retaliation claims under it are governed by the same standards as ADA retaliation claims.

Joseph v. Treglia v. Town of Manlius · filed 2002-12-16(7)

The Rehabilitation Act and NYHRL contain similar provisions against retaliation and are governed in this respect by the same standards as the ADA.

Section 296 covers discrimination affecting employment in New York, requires retaliation complaints to give the employer notice that the employee opposes prohibited discrimination, and permits aider-and-abettor liability for actual participation when a primary violation is established.

International Healthcare Exchange, Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exchange, LLC · filed 2007-01-11(7), (a), (6)

“Protected activity” refers to any action taken to protest or oppose discrimination prohibited by the statute. ... However, ambiguous complaints that do not make the employer aware of alleged discriminatory misconduct do not constitute protected activity. ... However, Cuene brings her state claims under section 296, which covers acts of discrimination that occur within New York State, regardless of the residency status of the parties. ... An out-of-state employer’s discriminatory conduct falls within section 296 if it affects the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ... within New York.” ... The Second Circuit has held that actual participation in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may support liability under § 296(6). ... However, accessory liability may only be found where a primary violation has been established.

Section 296(e) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing an unlawful employment practice and is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Giannone v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. · filed 2005-09-21(e)

Title VII provides that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of [its] employees ... because [such employee] has opposed any ... unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The HRL and NYCHRL contain similar provisions. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(e); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). Unlawful retaliation claims are also governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, although the prima facie case is different. ... Given the particular weakness of Plaintiffs evidence of causation at the prima facie stage, this Court concludes that Giannone has failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to believe that retaliation was the real reason for Deutsche Bank’s termination decision. ... Because Giannone is unable to make the required showing of pretext, Deutsche Bank is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge.

Section 296(7) prohibits an employer from retaliating or discriminating against an employee for opposing practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law or for filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in a proceeding under it.

McGrath v. Fire Department of the City of New York · filed 2025-09-23(7)

“The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because [he] ‘has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because. . . [he] has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.”

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation or discrimination against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL or participating in a proceeding under it.

Fox v. Northwell Health Inc. · filed 2025-09-29(7)

Likewise, New York law provides: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). Claims for retaliation under Title VII and the NYSHRL apply the same standard.

Section 296(7) protects employees from retaliation, and retaliation claims under it are assessed under the same standards as ADA retaliation claims.

Milner-Koonce v. Albany City School District · filed 2025-09-30(7)

The New York Human Rights Law contains similar provisions against retaliation as the ADA and claims for retaliation under the NYHRL are therefore assessed under the same standards as the ADA.

Section 296 permits retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and requires proof that the plaintiff opposed discrimination and then suffered conduct reasonably likely to deter such opposition; the claim is evaluated under Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas framework.

Rahman · filed 2025-10-28

The NYSHRL similarly permits such claims. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Both § 1983 and NYSHRL retaliation claims are analyzed pursuant to Title VII principles and are thus evaluated under the three-step burden-shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 802-05 (1973). ... By contrast, under the NYSHRL, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that she took an action opposing her employer’s discrimination and that, as a result the employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in such action.” ... Because plaintiff has met her prima facie burden under § 1983, she has necessarily met her prima facie burden under the less stringent NYSHRL.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits discrimination against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL; requesting a reasonable accommodation alone is not opposition to illegal conduct and is not protected activity for retaliation.

Guerrero v. Constellation Home Care, LLC (NY) · filed 2025-09-04(1)(e)

This is because state courts have reasoned NYSHRL prohibits “discrimination against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e), and requesting an accommodation does not amount to opposing an employer’s illegal conduct. McKenzie, 35 A.D.3d at 677. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that she was retaliated against for complaining about or opposing denial of a requested accommodation, but only that she was retaliated against for making such a request in the first place. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NYSHRL-based retaliation claim must be dismissed.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation or discrimination for opposing NYSHRL-forbidden practices or participating in NYSHRL proceedings, and § 296(6) permits aider-and-abettor liability only after a primary NYSHRL violation by an employer or principal is established.

Pompey · filed 2025-09-24(7), (6)

“The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because []he ‘has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . []he has filed a complaint, testified[,] or assisted in any proceeding under this article.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7)). ... Section 296(6) provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel[,] or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NYSHRL], or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). In order for a defendant to be liable as an aider and abettor under Section 296(6), a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a primary violation of the NYSHRL by an employer or principal.

Section 296(e) prohibits an employer, labor organization, or employment agency from discharging or otherwise discriminating against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the article or participating in related proceedings.

Schultz · filed 2025-09-30(e)

Further, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(e) it is unlawful “[f]or any employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” Schultz’s alleged opposition to Defendants’ purported scheme to hire white writers instead of BIPOC writers falls within the statute.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL or filing a complaint; a retaliation claim requires a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Avila v. ACACIA Network, Inc. · filed 2025-08-06(7)

The FHA, NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and NYSRPL each prohibits retaliation against individuals who assert rights under these statutes. ... Avila claims that, as a result of his filing three lawsuits against the ACACIA and Grant Realty defendants, defendants retaliated against him by terminating his tenancy. ... Given the absence of any allegations that would suggest that the Grant Realty defendants were aware of the lawsuit before Avila’s eviction, the Report was clearly correct to recommend dismissal of those claims for failure to allege a causal connection between the protected activity and the termination of the tenancy.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on specified protected characteristics but does not make taking FMLA leave a protected trait, while § 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the statute or participating in related proceedings and permits direct liability for individual retaliators.

Palmese · filed 2026-02-02(1)(a), (7)

The NYSHRL prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual based on the “individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Having taken leave under the FMLA also does not constitute a protected trait under the NYSHRL. ... Both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit employers from retaliating against an employee for engaging in protected activity, which includes “oppos[ing] any practice forbidden” under each statute, as well as “fil[ing] a complaint, testif[ying,] or assist[ing] in any [related] proceeding.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). ... Individual defendants can be held directly liable for retaliation under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, as well as for discrimination under the NYCHRL.

Section 296(7) makes retaliation an unlawful discriminatory practice under the NYSHRL.

Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc. · filed 2007-07-24(7)

The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL contain similar provisions that describe retaliation as an unlawful discriminatory practice. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7).

Section 296 prohibits retaliation against an employee who complains about unlawful discrimination and, for this claim, is analyzed identically to Title VII.

Malacarne v. City University of New York · filed 2008-08-08

Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action (Title VII violation), Eighteenth Cause of Action (N.Y. Exec. Law § 296), and Twenty-Second Cause of Action (N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107) all allege violations of laws that prohibit retaliation against an employee who complains about unlawful discrimination. ... As we have noted previously, claims brought under the Human Rights Laws of New York State and New York City, including the sections alleged in this lawsuit, are analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII. ... Therefore, we address here only the Title VII claim.

Section 296(7) prohibits an automobile rental firm from refusing to rent a vehicle to someone because that person previously filed a discrimination complaint against the firm.

Avis-High Bennett Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1972-12-11(7)

In our opinion, substantial evidence was adduced at the ... Division hearing to warrant the Commissioner’s determination that petitioner had committed a retaliatory act against the complainant in violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 7).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation in covered activities, including by employment agencies under section 296(1)(b), so liability does not require the defendant to be the plaintiff’s employer.

Infantolino v. Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry · filed 2008-10-01(7), (1)(b)

JIB also argues, to no avail, that the lack of an employment relationship exempts it from liability for retaliation under city and state laws and regulations. Section 296 of the New York State Executive Law makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person ... because he ... has filed a complaint ... under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7) (emphasis added). ... The “activity” covered by these provisions includes not only the conduct of employers, but also that of, e.g., employment agencies, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(b), and labor organizations and their agents, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(c). As with the ADA, a defendant could violate either of these provisions even if he is not the plaintiffs employer. Accordingly, the fact that JIB is not Infan-tolino’s employer does not entitle JIB to summary judgment as to the retaliation claims.

Section 296(7) retaliation claims are analyzed under Title VII principles, including the rule that an adverse action is actionable when it could dissuade a reasonable worker from supporting a discrimination charge.

Hicks v. Baines · filed 2010-02-02(7)

All of plaintiffs’ retaliation claims are analyzed pursuant to Title VII principles. ... “We consider [plaintiffs] state law claims in tandem with her Title VII claims because New York courts rely on federal law when determining claims under the New York [State] Human Rights Law.”

Section 296(e) prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful employment discrimination.

Russell v. County of Nassau · filed 2010-02-18(e)

The NYSHRL similarly prohibit retaliation. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(e). Claims of retaliation pursuant to Title VII and NYSHRL are analyzed according to the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 141 (2d Cir.2003).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices and requires a prima facie retaliation claim to show protected activity, employer knowledge, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection.

Mayers v. Emigrant Bancorp, Inc. · filed 2011-04-22(7)

“To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the NYSHRL, ‘a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he participated in a legally protected activity; (2) his employer knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action ensued; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’ ”

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, the defendant’s knowledge, an adverse educational decision, and a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse decision; non-retaliatory explanations defeat the claim.

Hyman v. Cornell University · filed 2011-07-01(7)

To establish a retaliation claim under the Human Rights Law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of that activity; (3) that she suffered an adverse educational decision; and (4) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse decision. Cf. Hill v. Children’s Vill, 196 F.Supp.2d 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (using analogous language in an employment context) (citations omitted). Regarding the causal connection, courts in New York State have found that, where there are non-retaliatory explanations for allegedly retaliatory actions, no violation of the Human Rights Law has occurred.

Section 296 makes employment agencies liable for discriminatory hiring practices, permits liability for aiding and abetting unlawful discrimination, and prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful practices.

Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc. · filed 2012-01-10(1)(a)-(b), (6), (7)

Employment agencies are liable for discriminatory hiring practices under both NYSHRL and NYCHRL. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a)-(b); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(b). ... Likewise, under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, employment agencies are responsible for discriminatory hiring practices and as aiders and abettors of such unlawful conduct. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107(6). ... NYSHRL and NYCHRL contain similar provisions. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). ... To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) Defendants were aware of this activity, (3) they took adverse employment action against her, and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits firing an employee in retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices, but a complaint must concern discrimination based on a legally protected characteristic.

Bennett v. Hofstra University · filed 2012-02-03(1)(e)

Both Title VII and New York’s Executive Law prohibit the firing of an employee in retaliation for their opposition to discriminatory practices. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir.1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e)). ... However, in order to constitute a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim, the complaint must be related to discrimination on a basis prohibited by Title VII.

Section 296(1)(e) protects an employee who in good faith complains that workplace mistreatment is based on race or national origin; the complaint need not use specific words such as “discrimination” if it conveys the alleged unlawful conduct.

Zhou v. State University of New York Institute of Technology · filed 2012-10-10(1)(e)

Because retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and the NYSHRL are analyzed according to the same principles, see Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997), we discuss them collectively. ... There is no requirement that, to have engaged in protected conduct and thus presented a prima facie claim of retaliation, an employee must have used specific words. Rather, Zhou only needed to put forward evidence showing that he had a good faith belief that the complained-of mistreatment was based on his race or nationality, and that Panebianco and Havlovic were aware that Zhou’s complaint was directed at that alleged unlawful conduct.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation or discrimination against a person for opposing practices forbidden by New York’s antidiscrimination laws, including by filing an EEOC complaint about gender discrimination.

Noel v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. · filed 2013-01-11(7)

Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7) and N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107(7), it is a violation of New York law to “retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden” by New York’s antidiscrimination laws. Filing a federal EEOC complaint based on gender discrimination constitutes opposing a practice forbidden by New York law (i.e., gender discrimination), and therefore retaliating against plaintiff for filing such a complaint appears to provide plaintiff a tenable claim under New York law.

Section 296(l)(e) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing discriminatory conduct, and retaliation claims under it are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Wesley-Dickson v. Warwick Valley Central School District · filed 2013-09-24(l)(e)

Title VII, the ADA, and the NYSHRL contain anti-retaliation provisions that prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing discriminatory conduct prohibited by the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e). ... The anti-retaliation provisions in Title VII, the ADA, and the NYSHRL all contain nearly identical language and are governed by the same burden-shifting analysis. ... Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. ... Therefore, the plaintiffs claims of retaliation must be dismissed.

Section 296(l)(e) retaliation claims are interpreted consistently with Title VII, including the requirement that protected activity be a but-for cause of the adverse employment action.

Ellis v. Century 21 Department Stores · filed 2013-09-28(l)(e)

Since the NYSHRL statutory language is the same, and the New York Court of Appeals has consistently stated that federal Title VII standards are applied in interpreting the NYSHRL, this Court will continue to interpret the standard for retaliation under NYSHRL consistent with Title VII jurisprudence, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Nassar.

Section 296(1)(e) retaliation claims are analyzed under the same standard as Title VII retaliation claims.

Puglisi v. Town of Hempstead, Department of Sanitation, Sanitary District No. 2 · filed 2013-10-18(1)(e)

Because retaliation claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e) are analyzed under the same standard as Title VII retaliation claims, we review them together.

For retaliation claims under § 296(l)(e), the court applies Title VII's but-for causation standard, requiring protected activity to be the but-for cause of the adverse employment action.

Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Medical Center · filed 2013-08-14(l)(e)

Since the NYSHRL statutory language is the same, and the New York Court of Appeals has consistently stated that federal Title VII standards are applied in interpreting the NYSHRL, this Court will continue to interpret the standard for retaliation under NYSHRL consistent with Title VII jurisprudence, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Nassar.

Section 296 retaliation claims are interpreted using Title VII’s but-for causation standard.

Joseph v. Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc. · filed 2014-03-24(7)

Since the NYSHRL statutory language is the same, and the New York Court of Appeals has consistently stated that federal Title VII standards are applied in interpreting the NYSHRL, this Court will continue to interpret the standard for retaliation under the NYSHRL in a manner consistent with Title VII jurisprudence, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Nassar.

Section 296's retaliation provision requires a plaintiff to allege protected activity of which the employer was aware.

Lucio v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2014-08-05

Lucio has also failed to state a plausible claim of retaliation under any of the statutory schemes that she invokes, all of which require the plaintiff to have engaged in protected activity of which the employer is aware. ... Although Lucio alleges that she complained of Douyon’s treatment of her to Douyon’s supervisor and subsequently received an unsatisfactory rating, Lucio nowhere alleges that she complained that Douyon’s treatment was discriminatory. ... While it is unnecessary for an individual to specifically invoke the word discrimination when complaining in order to alert her employer to her protected activity, there must be some basis to conclude that the employer was aware that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity.

Section 296(3-a)(c) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against a person for opposing practices forbidden by § 296.

Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2015-03-27(3-a)(c)

The NYSHRL similarly prohibits an employer from “discharging] or otherwise discriminating] against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under [§ 296].” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3-a)(c). Courts analyze claims for retaliation pursuant to Title VII and NYSHRL under the familiar three-part framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Section 296 prohibits retaliation for protected activity, and a state-law retaliation claim may proceed when the alleged retaliatory delay in returning an employee to work is plausibly linked to that activity.

Pediford-Aziz v. City of New York · filed 2016-03-17

The same standards govern Plaintiffs state law claims. ... Plaintiffs federal and state retaliation claims survive to the extent they are based on the prolonged suspension.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation and is governed by the same standards used for ADA retaliation claims.

McGuire-Welch v. House of the Good Shepherd · filed 2016-11-04(7)

The RA and NYHRL contain similar provisions against retaliation and are governed in this respect by the same standards as the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); Weixel v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2002) (elements of a retaliation claim under RA are same as the ADA); Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying ADA analysis to plaintiffs retaliation claim under both ADA and NYHRL).

Section 296(e) prohibits an employer from discharging, expelling, or otherwise discriminating against a person because she opposed practices forbidden by the NYHRL.

Kirkland v. Speedway LLC · filed 2017-05-18(e)

New York Executive Law provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or any employer ... to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because .. .■ she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article[.]” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(e).

Section 296(7) applies the same plausibility standard to retaliation claims as the standards used for analogous federal retaliation claims.

Murray v. The Dutchess County Department of Public Works · filed 2019-09-25(7)

The same standard is used regardless of whether the allegations are brought pursuant to § 1983, Title VII, or the NYSHRL. ... Retaliation claims under § 1983 and the NYSHRL are subject to the same standard. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff plausibly states a retaliation claim.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination and uses the same protected-activity standard as the ADA.

Dipinto v. Westchester County · filed 2019-08-30(7)

The NYSHRL contains a similar provision against retaliation, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7), and is governed by the same standard, see Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying ADA analysis to retaliation claim under both ADA and NYSHRL).

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, employer awareness, adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Scotto v. City of New York and Erica Caraway · filed 2019-12-09(7)

Mr. Scotto also asserts a cause of action for retaliation under the NYSHRL, which similarly requires that a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. ... For the reasons explained in the foregoing NYCHRL analysis, Mr. Scotto’s NYSHRL claim for retaliation survives as well.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation and is governed by the same standard as the ADA.

Cornetta v. Town of Highlands · filed 2020-01-22(7)

The NYSHRL contains a similar provision against retaliation, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7), and is governed by the same standard, see Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying ADA analysis to retaliation claim under both ADA and NYSHRL).

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits employers from retaliating against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL or participating in a proceeding under it, and the claim is analyzed under the same framework as a federal Title VII retaliation claim.

Wu v. GSHMC · filed 2020-05-20(1)(e)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for “any employer . . . to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e) (McKinney). Plaintiff’s state-law retaliation claim under Section 296 is subject to the same analysis as a federal Title VII retaliation claim.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the New York State Human Rights Law.

Gandhi v. NYS Unified Court System · filed 2020-06-24(7)

The New York State Human Rights Law prohibits retaliation based upon an individual opposing any practices forbidden under the statute.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing discriminatory conduct, and retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Stryker v. HSBC Securities USA · filed 2020-08-31(7)

The ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing discriminatory conduct prohibited by the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(7). Claims under the ADA and the NYSHRL statutes are analyzed under the same three-part McDonnell Douglas framework that governs the plaintiff’s discrimination claims, although claims under the NYCHRL require a more liberal analysis. See, e.g., Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2019) (ADA and NYSHRL); Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (NYSHRL and NYCHRL).

Section 296(7) prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who oppose discriminatory practices or bring discrimination charges, and retaliation claims require proof that retaliation was the but-for cause of the challenged action.

Palencar v. New York Power Authority · filed 2020-12-08(7)

We similarly apply a burden-shifting framework to retaliation claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL, which prohibit employers from retaliating against employees because, as relevant here, the employee opposed a discriminatory practice or brought a discrimination charge against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... Based on the totality of the record, we agree with the district court that a rational jury could not find that retaliation was the but-for cause of the actions taken against Palencar.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing NYSHRL-forbidden practices or participating in an NYSHRL proceeding, and a retaliation plaintiff must show protected activity, employer awareness, adverse action, and causation.

Warmin v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2021-02-11(7)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate ... against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” ... To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “[i] []he engaged in protected activity, [ii] the employer was aware of this activity, [iii] []he was subjected to an adverse employment action ..., and [iv] a causal connection existed between the alleged adverse employment action and [his] protected activity.” ... Because Defendants began the process of terminating Plaintiff — or perhaps had already made the decision to terminate Plaintiff — before he engaged in protected activity, the Court determines that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for retaliation against the DOE under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, or against Marrero under the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL.7 In any event, Defendants have established that there were legitimate, non- discriminatory reasons to terminate Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to the DOE on Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, and to Marrero on Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, alleging termination in retaliation for Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodation.

Section 296 retaliation claims are analyzed under the same standard as Title VII retaliation claims, including whether the alleged conduct could be materially adverse.

Bryan v. Commack Union Free School District · filed 2021-02-18

The standards under the NYSHRL and Sections 1981 and 1983 are the same. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n.1 (2d Cir.1997) (“claims brought under New York State’s Human Rights Law are analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII”); Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 91 (2d Cir. 2015) (“… the elements of a retaliation claim based on an equal protection violation under § 1983 mirror those under Title VII”).

Section 296(7) requires a plaintiff pleading retaliation to plausibly allege that a relevant adverse employment action occurred because of protected activity.

Adams-Flores v. City of New York · filed 2021-03-10(7)

To successfully plead such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she suffered a relevant adverse employment action “because” of a protected activity. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); see also Farmer v. Shake Shack Enters., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Section 296(1)(e) retaliation claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: after a prima facie case and the employer’s legitimate reason, the plaintiff must show that the reason was pretext for unlawful retaliation.

Gokhberg v. PNC Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-02-01(1)(e)

We evaluate Gokhberg’s NYSHRL retaliation claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the standard is the same under Title VII and NYSHRL). Under this framework, Gokhberg must establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2019). If he does, PNC must “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If it does, Gokhberg “bears the ultimate burden to show that the employer’s proffered reason was merely a pretext for an unlawful motive.”

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits an employer from expelling or otherwise discriminating against a person for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL and requires protected activity, employer awareness, adverse action, and causation for a prima facie retaliation claim.

Gangadharan v. GNS Goods And Services · filed 2022-03-18(1)(e)

Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to “expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because [she] has opposed any practices forbidden under this article . . . .” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must make four showings: that ‘(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.’” ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that: (1) she engaged in protected activities by making verbal complaints to Mr. Hill about the treatment of women in the workplace; (2) GNS Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s protected activities because the complaints were made to Defendant Hill, GNS Defendants’ Director; (3) GNS Defendants took an adverse employment action, terminating Plaintiff indirectly by not giving her a new office placement; and (4) a causal connection existed between Plaintiff’s protected activities and her termination, as demonstrated by Defendant Hill’s numerous threats that Plaintiff could be fired at any time in response to her complaints about the hostile work environment and use of profanity against female employees.

Section 296 prohibits employer retaliation against an employee for filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in a proceeding, and a prima facie retaliation claim requires protected activity, employer knowledge, an adverse action, and a causal connection.

Postell v. Wells · filed 2022-04-08(7)

The NYSHRL states that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer, to “retaliate . . . because [an employee] . . . has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the NYSHRL, the plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) his employer was aware of this activity, (3) the employer took an action disadvantaging the plaintiff, and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.” ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim for retaliation has been sufficiently pled.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation or discrimination against an employee for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL or filing, testifying, or assisting in a proceeding under it; a retaliation claim requires protected activity and a causal connection to an adverse action.

Williams v. Westchester Medical Center Health Network · filed 2022-09-27(7)

“The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because []he ‘has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . []he has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this article.’” ... “For a complaint to constitute a protected activity, “a plaintiff must [make the complaint] in ‘sufficiently specific terms so that the employer is put on notice that the plaintiff believes he or she is being discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, or national origin.’” ... “Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged either direct or indirect causality between Plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse event, Plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary elements of a retaliation claim. Defendants’ Motion regarding all retaliation claims is therefore granted.”

Section 296(7) permits personal liability for retaliation by any person against someone who opposed practices forbidden by the statute or participated in a proceeding under it.

Verne v. New York City Department Of Education · filed 2022-09-30(7)

NYSHRL section 296(7) makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7).

Section 296(e) prohibits retaliation against employees who engage in protected activity, and retaliation claims under it use essentially the same burden-shifting framework as discrimination claims.

Schwartz v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2023-03-31(e)

Title VII, the ADEA, and the NYSHRL prohibit retaliation against employees who engage in protected activity under those statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(e). These retaliation claims are analyzed under the essentially same burden-shifting framework as Plaintiff’s discrimination claims.

Section 296(7) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for bringing a discrimination charge, and retaliation claims proceed under a burden-shifting framework.

Ireland v. Rochester Institute of Technology · filed 2023-05-11(7)

The Court applies a “burden-shifting framework to retaliation claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL, which prohibit employers from retaliating against employees because, as relevant here, the employee . . . brought a discrimination charge against the employer.” Palencar v. N.Y. Power Auth., 834 F. App’x 647, 651 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7)).

Section 296(7) makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in a proceeding under the NYSHRL.

Obrien v. City of New York · filed 2023-08-14(7)

Title VII and NYHRL also prohibit retaliation against an employee alleging discrimination, making it unlawful for any employer to retaliate against an employee because he has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 or because he has “filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7).

Section 296(7) requires a plausible retaliation claim to allege protected activity known to the defendant, a disadvantaging employment action, and a causal connection; conclusory allegations that a counterclaim was retaliatory are insufficient.

Dobrykov v. Brickhouse Food LLC · filed 2024-01-19(7)

To assert a claim for retaliation under the Title VII or NYSHRL, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: “(1) she participated in a protected activity known to the defendant; (2) the defendant took an employment action disadvantaging her; and (3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” ... Because Plaintiff’s proposed amendments fail to plausibly state a claim for retaliation under Title VII or the NYSHRL, the Court determines such amendments are futile and declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint to add a retaliation claim. ... Plaintiff’s proposed claim against Defendant Kaja for retaliation under the NYSHRL and Title VII is futile— Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient factual allegations to plausibly state a claim.

Section 296(7) makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee for opposing a practice forbidden under the NYSHRL, and NYSHRL retaliation claims use the same burden-shifting standard as Title VII claims.

Khazin v. The City of New York · filed 2024-03-29(7)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL similarly make it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because he or she has opposed a practice that is forbidden under those statutes. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(7). ... The same standard for retaliation claims under Title VII also applies to retaliation claims pursuant to Section 1983 and the NYSHRL. See Conklin v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 859 F. Supp. 2d 415, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Section 1983); Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (NYSHRL).

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation plaintiff to plausibly allege protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them; the court held that the post-amendment causation standard remained unsettled but causation was still required.

Addonizio v. Nuvance Health · filed 2024-06-11(7)

Similarly, the NYSHRL forbids employers from retaliating against an employee because she “has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because . . . she has filed a complaint, testified[,] or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show that (1) she participated in protected activity; (2) the defendants were aware of the protected activity; (3) the defendants subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. ... At the motion to dismiss stage, however, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege that (1) the defendants discriminated or took an adverse employment action against her because (2) she opposed an unlawful employment practice. ... While the applicable standard of causation under the post-amendment NYSHRL remains an open question, the NYSHRL still requires a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the alleged retaliatory conduct. ... In sum, Plaintiff was not terminated because she engaged in any protected activity; she was terminated because she did not receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Because Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege any semblance of causation, she cannot satisfy even the more lenient burden under the NYSHRL. Counts II and IV are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

Section 296(7) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law or participating in a related complaint or proceeding.

Hellwig v. County of Saratoga · filed 2024-08-13(7)

The NYSHRL similarly makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against an employee because “he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). ... Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing evidence that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the defendant was aware of the activity; (3) the defendant took an adverse employment action against him; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. ... If the employer demonstrates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show “that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person who opposes practices forbidden by the NYSHRL, and an employee plausibly engages in protected activity by opposing an employment practice reasonably believed to be unlawful.

Passoni v. Early Warning Services, LLC · filed 2025-06-30(7)

The NYSHRL prohibits retaliation “against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL] or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [the NYSHRL].” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). “Courts evaluate ADA retaliation and NYSHRL retaliation claims under the same legal framework.” ... Here, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she engaged in protected activity by opposing an employment practice that she reasonably believed to be unlawful. ... Plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL retaliation claims, as alleged, thus suffice to withstand the motion to dismiss.

Section 296(7) prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination; a NYSHRL retaliation plaintiff must show protected opposition, conduct reasonably likely to deter such opposition, and that the protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s action.

Faustin v. The New York and Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2025-06-25(7)

State and city law likewise prohibit employers from retaliating against employees for opposing unlawful discrimination. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(7). Federal, state, and city retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework already described. ... A plaintiff’s burdens are somewhat less stringent under state and city law. Under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL, a plaintiff claiming retaliation must establish “that she took an action opposing her employer’s discrimination and that, as a result, the employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in such action.” ... Moreover, a plaintiff must establish that her protected activity was a motivating factor behind the defendant’s retaliatory action, not a but-for cause.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliatory discharge, and evidence sufficient to create a factual issue on federal discrimination likewise creates a factual issue under the state law.

Perry v. Manocherian · filed 1987-11-30(7)

The New York Human Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.Law § 296, is a comprehensive civil rights law, comparable in breadth to title VII. It too forbids discrimination in employment, see Imperial Diner Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 52 N.Y.2d 72, 417 N.E.2d 525, 436 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1980), and includes a codified law against retaliatory discharge, N.Y. Exec.Law § 296(7); see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 36 A.D.2d 898, 320 N.Y.S.2d 999 (4th Dept. 1971). Thus, since plaintiffs have presented enough evidence to raise an issue of fact as to discrimination under federal law, so too have they raised issues of fact as to discrimination under state law.

Section 296 protects opposition to a practice only if the practice is actually unlawful; filing an administrative complaint receives absolute protection.

Mohawk Finishing Products, Inc. v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1981-09-10(1)(e); (3-a)(c); (7)

Thus, while our decision in this case makes clear that the propriety of action taken against an employee who believes he is opposing forbidden practices will depend upon whether the practices are, in fact, unlawful, it in no way abridges the absolute protection afforded those who seek redress by the commencement of an administrative proceeding (see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 36 AD2d 898).

Section 296(1)(e) does not support a retaliation finding when the opposed practice was lawful and there is no finding of a reasonable basis for the employee’s belief that it was unlawful.

MATTER OF MOHAWK FINISHING PRODS., INC. v. State Div. of Human Rights · filed 1982-10-19(1)(e)

The only finding was that complainant "believed" that the practices were in violation of the statutory proscription. The board and complainant chose to proceed on the basis of this finding alone. It is not, however, a sufficient finding under the Federal standard. ... The Appellate Division standard was not met inasmuch as it was determined that the practices of which the employee complained did not in fact violate the Human Rights Law. Accordingly, inasmuch as the board has met neither the Federal nor the Appellate Division standard in this case, there is no sufficient basis for the determination that this employer discriminated against complainant because she opposed practices forbidden by the Human Rights Law, and there is no need to determine which is the applicable standard.

Section 296(7) covers retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint; a refusal to promote supported by poor job performance does not establish retaliation.

Joslyn v. Santaella · filed 1985-07-15(7)

Petitioner, in his second complaint, alleged that his employer failed to promote him to a higher position at the hospital and that this was in retaliation for his filing of the previous complaint (see, Executive Law § 296 [7]). Again we find that the Division, after a fair investigation, correctly determined that there was no probable cause to believe that the refusal to promote petitioner was retaliatory. On the contrary, upon the record before it, the Division had a rational basis upon which to conclude that the refusal to promote petitioner was motivated not by retaliation, but by petitioner’s extremely poor job performance, as exemplified by numerous instances of misconduct and unprofessional behavior.

Section 296(1)(e) protects an employee from retaliation for opposing practices the employee reasonably believes are forbidden by the Human Rights Law.

New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1990-11-21(1)(e)

Upon reflection, we are of the view that the reasonable belief standard is appropriate. Considering the remedial nature of the Human Rights Law and an explicit statutory admonition to construe the law liberally (see, Executive Law § 300), it strikes us that a person who suffers retaliation after reasonably acting to protect others from forbidden discrimination should be protected.

Section 296(1)(e) requires evidence that an employee was terminated because she complained about discriminatory conduct.

Eustace v. Millard Fillmore Hospital · filed 1992-10-07(1)(e)

Further, the record is devoid of evidence that the alleged remarks of the co-worker were condoned by defendant or that plaintiff was terminated because she complained about the alleged remarks.

A jury may infer retaliatory discharge under § 296(1)(e) when an employee is fired shortly after complaining of sexual harassment and the evidence undermines the employer’s stated reason.

Gleason v. Callanan Industries, Inc. · filed 1994-04-21(1)(e)

Thus, we conclude that a rational jury could have inferred that plaintiffs employment was terminated in retaliation for her complaint of sexual harassment and that the jury did not incorrectly assess the evidence presented (see, Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493; see also, Sogg v American Airlines, 193 AD2d 153).

Section 296 can provide relief for retaliatory discharge even when an employee’s contract and tort claims fail.

Fisher v. Maxwell Communications Corp. · filed 1994-06-14

The IAS Court also properly dismissed plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action, while allowing his second cause of action, for statutory retaliatory discharge under the New York Human Rights Law, to proceed, since statutory restrictions on the right to discharge may provide a statutory right to relief for discharged employees as an alternative to unviable contract and tort claims (see, e.g., Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 306-307; cf., e.g., Connolly v Macklowe Real Estate Co., 161 AD2d 520).

Section 296(1)(e) does not require retaliatory conduct to occur against a current employee.

Landwehr v. Grey Advertising Inc. · filed 1995-01-31(1)(e)

There is no requirement that the retaliatory conduct occur against a current employee (Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [7]; see, e.g., Catalina Beach Club v State Div. of Human Rights, 95 AD2d 766).

Section 296(7) covers refusal to pay a broker’s commission in retaliation for participation in a Division of Human Rights conference.

Comor v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1996-09-30(7)

There was substantial evidence in the record to support the determination of the New York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the DHR) finding that the petitioner was guilty of discrimination by refusing to pay a broker’s commission in retaliation for the complainant’s participation in a conference held by the DHR (see, Executive Law § 296 [7]; People ex rel. Vega v Smith, 66 NY2d 130; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222).

Section 296(1)(e) covers an employer’s retaliatory challenge to a former employee’s unemployment benefits after she files a discrimination complaint, even when the challenge occurs after discharge.

Electchester Housing Project, Inc. v. Rosa · filed 1996-03-25(1)(e)

Given the facts of this case, the employer’s act of contesting the complainant’s right to receive unemployment insurance benefits, after assuring the complainant that she would be entitled to such benefits, solely because she filed a complaint with the SDHR was a disadvantaging employment action for the purpose establishing a claim of retaliation (see, Johnson v Palma, 931 F2d 203, 207 [2d Cir 1991]). We reject the employer’s contentions that such conduct was within its rights and, having occurred after the discharge of the complainant, is not actionable in the context of this proceeding (see, Landwehr v Grey Adv., 211 AD2d 583; Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [7]; see, e.g., Catalina Beach Club v State Div. of Human Rights, 95 AD2d 766).

Section 296(1)(e) does not protect participation in an in-house investigation unless the complaint concerns conduct prohibited by the Human Rights Law.

Unotti v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1999-04-20(1)(e)

The section by its own terms is limited to proceedings brought under this article. In-house investigations of complaints are not such proceedings. Employees taking part in such investigations are not covered by the section unless the complaint relates to conduct prohibited by the Human Rights Law.

Section 296 permits an employment retaliation claim based on allegations that an employer harassed and intimidated employees because they participated in Human Rights Commission proceedings.

Mohammad v. Board of Managers · filed 1999-06-10(1)(e), (7)

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a prima facie case of employment discrimination under New York’s Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), by alleging that, in the aftermath of their participation in proceedings before the Human Rights Commission involving their employer, defendant condominium board, their employer has on numerous occasions harassed and intimidated them with a retaliatory motive (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]; [7]; see also, True v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 613 F Supp 27).

Section 296(1)(e) requires an employer to offer a legitimate, independent and nondiscriminatory reason for its action once an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation.

Pace v. Ogden Services Corp. · filed 1999-06-17(1)(e)

Once plaintiff has met this initial burden, the burden then shifts to defendants to present legitimate, independent and nondiscriminatory reasons to support their actions.

Section 296(1)(e) requires an employee claiming retaliatory discharge to have had a reasonable basis to believe the opposed conduct was actionable discrimination; opposition to conduct expressly excluded from section 296(2) does not support the claim.

Dodd v. Middletown Lodge (Elks Club) No. 1097 · filed 1999-09-13(1)(e)

Therefore, since the plaintiff was not even “colorably aggrieved” under Executive Law § 296 (2) by the defendant’s denial of her membership application, there was no basis for a claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (e) (see, Matter of Electchester Hous. Project v Rosa, supra, at 773).

Section 296(1)(e) requires a reasonable basis to believe that the conduct opposed was discriminatory.

Herskowitz v. Greystone Jewish Center · filed 2000-03-20(1)(e)

The Supreme Court also properly dismissed the plaintiffs cause of action based on retaliation as there was no reasonable basis for him to believe that the defendants engaged in any discriminatory practice prohibited by the Executive Law (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]; Dodd v Middleton Lodge [Elks Club] No. 1097, 264 AD2d 706; Matter of Electchester Hous. Project v Rosa, 225 AD2d 772, 773).

Section 296(1)(e) requires a causal connection between protected activity and an employee’s discharge to establish retaliation.

Grafe v. Iona College · filed 2001-03-29(1)(e)

While plaintiff’s comments regarding a “glass ceiling” with respect to tenured female professors in defendant’s History Department could constitute a protected activity under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC 2000e-3 [a]) and the New York Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a], [e]), there was no showing that the comment caused her to be discharged from her employment.

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliatory action against a person who complains about unlawful discrimination.

Martinez v. Triangle Maintenance Corp. · filed 2002-04-29[7]

Additionally, since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the temporary change in her duties was disadvantageous to her (see Pace v Ogden Servs. Corp., 257 AD2d 101; cf. Matter of Electchester Hous. Project v Rosa, 225 AD2d 772) or that the restriction on her entry into the warehouse was based on a “subjective retaliatory motive” (Matter of Pace Univ. v New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 NY2d 125, 128), the cause of action based on retaliatory action (see Executive Law § 296 [7]) should also have been dismissed.

Section 296(7) prohibits employment retaliation, and a prima facie retaliation claim requires an adverse employment action.

Todzia v. Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers · filed 2004-04-12(7)

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, to recover damages for retaliation under State of New York and City of New York employment discrimination laws (see Executive Law § 296 [7]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [7]). Those causes of action were properly dismissed insofar as asserted against the respondents. The plaintiff could not establish an element of a prima facie case of retaliation, namely, an adverse employment action as a result of the retaliation (see ...).

Section 296 requires an employee claiming retaliatory discharge for refusing to participate in a discrimination investigation to show pressure to give false statements or provide evidence the employee did not possess.

Nieves v. Admiral Cooling & Heating, LLC · filed 2005-04-04

To assert a claim for retaliatory discharge, an employee fired for refusing to participate in the employer’s investigation of discrimination must show that the employer pressured him or her to give false statements or to provide evidence that he or she did not possess (cf. Thomas v Norbar, Inc., 822 F2d 1089 [1987], cert denied 484 US 1013 [1988]; Merkel v Scovill, Inc., 787 F2d 174 [1986]).

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits retaliation concerning a qualifying proceeding under the Human Rights Law.

Dorvil v. Hilton Hotels Corp. · filed 2006-01-17(1)(e)

The in-house investigation conducted by defendant Hilton did not relate to conduct prohibited under the Human Rights Law and was not a “proceeding” for purposes of Executive Law § 296 (1) (e) (see Unotti v American Broadcasting Cos., 273 AD2d 68 [2000]).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for engaging in protected activity.

Beharry v. Guzman · filed 2006-10-17(7)

To establish that claim, the plaintiff must show that “(1) she has engaged in a protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in that activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action based upon her activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, supra at 312-313).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices and requires protected activity, employer awareness, adverse action, and a causal connection.

Cesar v. Highland Care Center, Inc. · filed 2007-02-06(7)

The plaintiff also failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing that it did not discharge her from employment in retaliation for her activities in opposing any discriminatory practices, in violation of Executive Law § 296 (7).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices.

Keooulay v. Transcore, Inc. · filed 2008-05-20[7]

Under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15), it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices (see Executive Law § 296 [7]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312 [2004]).

Section 296(1)(e) protects assistance in a discrimination proceeding.

Hunts Point Multi-Service Center, Inc. v. Bizardi · filed 2007-11-27(1)(e)

Notwithstanding the close temporal relationship between defendant’s filing of the EEOC complaint and plaintiffs filing of this action, defendant’s allegation that plaintiff’s internal investigation concerned the coemployee’s discrimination claims is conclusory, and her counterclaims otherwise fail to show that she either assisted or encouraged the coemployee to bring a discrimination claim (cf. Sorrentino v Bohbot Entertainment & Media, 265 AD2d 245, 245 [1999]) or assisted in a “proceeding” within the meaning of Executive Law § 296 (1) (e) or Administrative Code of the City of NY § 8-107 (7).

Section 296(1)(e) bars retaliation against an employee for opposing an actionable discriminatory practice under the state Human Rights Law.

McKenzie v. Meridian Capital Group, LLC · filed 2006-12-19(1)(e)

In order to assert a viable claim of retaliatory discharge, an employee must demonstrate that there was a reasonable basis to believe that his or her employer engaged in an actionable discriminatory practice and that the employer discharged the employee as a result of the employee’s opposition to that practice (see Dodd v Middletown Lodge [Elks Club] No.. 1097, 264 AD2d 706, 707 [1999]; see also Herskowitz v Greystone Jewish Ctr., 270 AD2d 391, 391 [2000]; Matter of Electchester Hous. Project v Rosa, 225 AD2d 772, 773 [1996]). ... Accordingly, she failed to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under those statutes.

Section 296(7) bars retaliation against an employee for opposing unlawful discriminatory practices and requires proof of protected activity, employer awareness, adverse action, and causation.

Ruane-Wilkens v. Board of Education of City of New York · filed 2008-11-18(7)

Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (7), it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee because he or she opposed statutorily-forbidden discriminatory practices. To make a prima facie showing of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she participated in a protected activity, (2) the employer was aware of his or her participation in that activity, (3) the employer took an adverse employment action, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 313 [2004]).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for filing a sexual harassment complaint.

Brightman v. Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 2009-05-12(7)

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these allegations state a claim for retaliation pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296 (see generally Clayton v Best Buy Co., Inc., 48 AD3d 277, 278 [2008]; Mohammad v Board of Mgrs. of 50 E. 72nd St. Condominium, 262 AD2d 76, 77 [1999]).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for filing a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination.

Zhang v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2010-02-11(7)

In addition, petitioner failed to establish that SUNY Geneseo and Dahl engaged in retaliation after petitioner filed his complaint for unlawful discrimination (see Executive Law § 296 [7]).