N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(1)(a) permits employer liability for a hostile work environment caused by coworker harassment when the employer lacks a reasonable avenue for complaint or knows or should know of the harassment and fails to take appropriate action.

Mykytyn v. Hannaford Bros. · filed 2016-07-08(1)(a)

To establish that an employer was negligent in the context of a claim of hostile work environment, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that [his] employer ‘failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint’ or that ‘it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action’ ” (Duch v Jakubek, 588 F3d 757, 762 [2009]).

Section 296 requires hostile workplace conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.

Radler v. Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc. · filed 2016-11-09

The defendants also established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the first cause of action, alleging the existence of a hostile work environment, by demonstrating that the conduct and remarks about which the plaintiff complained were not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to permeate the workplace and alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment (see La Marca-Pagano v Dr. Steven Phillips, P.C., 129 AD3d 918 [2015]; Chiara v Town of New Castle, 126 AD3d 111, 126 [2015]; Thompson v Lamprecht Transp., 39 AD3d 846, 847 [2007]).

Section 296 requires a hostile work environment to involve discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions.

Pall v. Roosevelt Union Free School District · filed 2016-11-23

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to set forth a viable cause of action to recover damages for a hostile work environment- in violation of Executive Law § 296. The plaintiff’s allegations of a hostile work environment fell short of alleging that the workplace was “ ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working environment’ ” (Torres v Louzoun Enters., Inc., 105 AD3d 945, 946 [2013], quoting Kamen v Berkeley Coop. Towers Section II Corp., 98 AD3d 1086, 1087 [2012]).

Section 296(1) permits a hostile work environment claim against an employer that knew or should have known of sexual harassment and failed to take appropriate action.

Reynolds v. State of New York · filed 2020-02-06(1)

To the contrary, the evidence clearly supports the finding that OPWDD knew or should have known of Bezek's harassing conduct and failed to take appropriate action.

Section 296(1)(a) permits a hostile work environment claim against a school district and its board when a supervisor allegedly engages in unwelcome sexual conduct and they fail to reasonably investigate or correct it after receiving a report.

Root v. Salamanca Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2021-03-19(1)(a)

We further conclude that the court properly denied defendants' motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the first cause of action against the District and the School Board for failure to state a cause of action ( see generally Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Plaintiff alleged that Long subjected her to "unwelcome sexually harassing conduct and comments" during her employment and that Long's behavior became physical on at least one occasion. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants effectively acquiesced to Long's conduct inasmuch as they did not reasonably investigate or take corrective action after plaintiff reported Long's inappropriate and offensive conduct to the appropriate representative at the District ( see Matter of Father Belle Community Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 221 AD2d 44, 53-54 [4th Dept 1996], lv denied 80 NY2d 809 [1997]).

Section 296(1)(a) governs hostile work environment claims based on race or color under the pre-2019 State Human Rights Law.

Pichardo v. Carmine's Broadway Feast Inc. · filed 2021-11-23(1)(a)

As to the conduct at issue that is not barred by the limitations period, although the motion court properly concluded that it does not rise to the level of "severe and pervasive" under the applicable pre-2019 State HRL, plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact regarding the hostile work environment claims under the more protective City HRL ( Williams , 61 AD3d at 74; Executive Law § 296[1][a]; Administrative Code § 8-107[1][a][2], [3]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual because of sex in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including through a hostile work environment.

Parker Waichman, LLP v. Mauro · filed 2023-04-19(1)(a)

Under Executive Law § 296(1)(a), "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . , because of an individual's . . . sex, . . . to discriminate against such individual in compensations or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." An employment discrimination cause of action may proceed on a hostile work environment theory ( see Harris v Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 US 17, 21; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 310-311; Ortega v Bisogno & Meyerson , 2 AD3d 607).

A State hostile work environment claim requires discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.

Pitter-Green v. NYU Langone Med. Ctr. · filed 2024-01-23

Regarding her State hostile work environment claim, plaintiff's showing was insufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the workplace was "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive work environment" ( Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 310 [2004], quoting Harris v Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 US 17[*3], 21 [1993]; see e.g. Chin v New York Hous. Auth. , 106 AD3d 443, 444-445 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 861 [2014]).

Section 296(1)(h) permits a sex-based hostile work environment claim when harassment subjects an employee to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Campbell v. Authentic Brands Group LLC · filed 2025-01-15(1)(h)

Campbell has sufficiently pled a discrimination cause of action under a hostile work environment theory pursuant to the NYSHRL since she alleges that she was subjected to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of her sex.

Section 296(1)(h) allows a hostile work environment claim based on inferior employment terms, conditions, or privileges because of race or national origin.

Pierluissi v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-26(1)(h)

Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a discrimination cause of action under a hostile work environment theory under both NYSHRL and the NYCHRL because he has alleged that he was subjected to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of his race/nationality, as well as being treated less well than similarly situated white officers, due to his race.

Section 296(1)(h) requires a hostile work environment claim based on disability to show inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the disability.

Makharadze v. Ognibene · filed 2025-06-18(1)(h)

The hospital defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff's allegations did not demonstrate that she was subjected to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges on the basis of her disability ( see Executive Law § 296[1][h]) or that she was treated less well than other employees on the basis of her disability ( see Reichman v City of New York , 179 AD3d 1115, 1118).

Under the pre-amendment Section 296, sporadic offensive comments do not establish a hostile work environment unless they permeate the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.

Breiding v. High Hopes Films, LLC · filed 2026-05-05

However, the court should have dismissed plaintiff's hostile work environment and retaliation claims under the pre-amendment New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296). The comments made by Piliere over the course of four years, while inappropriate and often coarse, were too sporadic to show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult (see Sedhom v SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr., 201 AD3d 536, 538 [1st Dept 2022]; see also Hernandez v Kaisman, 103 AD3d 106, 114 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 296(1)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race or gender identity or expression, among other protected characteristics.

Peck v. County of Onondaga, New York · filed 2021-08-20(1)(a)

That is because the NYSHRL prohibits discrimination by employers, so any misconduct by an employee who lacks the requisite authority to be classified as an employer only aids and abets the employer’s discrimination. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (making it unlawful for “employer” to discriminate on basis of race or gender identity or expression, among others), with id. § 296(6) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel[,] or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article[.]”).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination by an employer or licensing agency, but it does not provide a cause of action to independent contractors.

Keeney v. Kemper National Insurance · filed 1997-04-23(l)(a)

Under the New York Human Right Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a) based on employment discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is an employee or a prospective employee of the defendants. Section 296 does not provide a cause of action for independent contractors.

Section 296’s employment-discrimination protections cover employees, not independent contractors, and employee status turns on the hiring party’s control over the results or means of the work.

Tagare v. NYNEX Network Systems Co. · filed 1997-12-08

Like Title VII, the NYSHRL’s proscriptions against unlawful employment discrimination apply solely to employees and not to independent contractors.- ... Under the NYSHRL, a hired party’s status is determined by whether “a traditional employment relationship” exists. ... This determination focuses on the degree of the hiring party’s “control over the results produced or over the means used to achieve the results.” ... Moreover, “Minimal or incidental control over one’s work product without the employer’s direct supervision or input over the means used to complete it is insufficient to establish a traditional employment relationship.”

Section 296(l)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of disability in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Menes v. CUNY University of New York · filed 2000-04-12(l)(a)

The NYHRL states in relevant part that it shall be an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer, because of the disability of any individual, to “discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual ... in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). ... The same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to NYHRL discrimination claims, whether brought pursuant to the ADA, Title VII, or other federal employment discrimination statutes. ... As noted above, Defendants provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Menes: even when he had been provided with a reasonable accommodation for his disability — a three-day work week — he could not perform his job at a minimum standard of acceptability. For this reason, his NYHRL claims must fail.

Sections 296(l)(a) and 296(l)(e) protect employees from discrimination based on specified protected characteristics and prohibit retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYHRL; taking FMLA leave alone is not a protected characteristic or opposition to an unlawful NYHRL practice.

Cooper v. New York State Nurses Ass'n · filed 2012-03-16(l)(a), (l)(e)

The NYHRL prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because of her “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic victim status.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). An employer also violates the NYHRL by terminating an employee “because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he or she has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e). ... Plaintiff has failed to show, however, that the conduct she opposed (i.e., her negative treatment and termination following her return from leave) constitutes employment practices forbidden by the NYHRL. Thus, she has failed to demonstrate an essential element of her claim. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e) (forbidding retaliation against an employee “because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article); see also McKenzie, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (dismissing claim that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for requesting additional leave time to accommodate her disability because plaintiff failed to allege “that her request was made in opposition to a practice forbidden by” the NYHRL).

Section 296(1)(a) bars employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees in compensation or employment terms because of race, creed, color, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex, or disability.

Thomas v. Amazon.com Services LLC · filed 2025-01-21(1)(a)

The NYSHRL prohibits an employer from, inter alia, “discharg[ing] from employment” or “discriminat[ing] against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” “because of,” inter alia, an individual’s race, creed, color, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex, or disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts showing that he was discriminated against because of his race, skin color, gender, sexual orientation, or disability. ... These are conclusory statements based on Plaintiff’s own beliefs that are unsupported by facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race and the other listed protected characteristics.

Garrison v. American Sugar Refining, Inc. · filed 2025-06-25(1)

Similarly, the NYSHRL prohibits discrimination against an employee based on that employee’s “age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). When, as here, a plaintiff’s Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL discrimination claims are based on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the claims are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on specified protected characteristics; a consensual workplace relationship, without allegations of sex-based discrimination in an employment matter, does not establish a violation.

Lange v. Empire Holdings and Investments, LLC · filed 2025-07-10(1)

The NYSHRL prohibits discrimination based on age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). ... The conduct of which she complained—his appearing with a bathing-suit-clad female employee in a photograph in a non-work setting (or the inference that he was intimate with a female employee)—does not violate Title VII, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL; there is no allegation supporting sex-based discrimination or any other violations of the relevant law.

Section 296 protects individuals, not theatrical productions, from discrimination.

Mason v. American Theatre Wing, Inc. · filed 1995-05-22

Next, the statute protects only "individuals” not "shows”.

Section 296(1)(a) does not protect against discrimination based on citizenship.

Sheikh v. Habib Bank Ltd. · filed 2000-03-16(1)(a)

There is no legally cognizable discrimination cause of action based on citizenship (see, Espinoza et Vir v Farah Mfg. Co., 414 US 86; Cheung v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 913 F Supp 248, 252). As to this claim, plaintiffs, therefore, failed to establish that they were members of the class protected by Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see, supra).

Section 296 prohibits discrimination affecting opportunities such as employment and housing; it does not cover threats and vandalism between neighbors.

Seltzer v. Bayer · filed 2000-05-30

Thus, Executive Law § 296 specifically prohibits discriminatory practices affecting, inter alia, employment and housing. It is not concerned with threats and vandalism such as plaintiff alleges in the instant action.

Section 296(16) protects a defined class of people from employment discrimination, and a person outside that class cannot establish a prima facie discrimination case under the statute.

Iatauro v. St. John's University · filed 2002-06-17(16)

Accordingly, since the plaintiff was not a member of the class protected by Executive Law § 296 (16) and Administrative Code § 8-107 (11), and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to that statute and ordinance, respectively, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the amended complaint (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629).

Section 296 prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment, education, public accommodations, housing, and commercial space.

Golden v. Paterson · filed 2008-09-02

Executive Law § 296 applies only to employment, education, public accommodations, housing, and commercial space; the executive directive encompasses these spheres as well as every other sphere the State regulates.

Section 296(1)(a)-(c) does not protect an employee from discrimination based on caring for an ailing family member.

Matter of Floriano-Keetch v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2019-08-22(1)(a)-(c)

To the extent that petitioner challenges SDHR's determination on the basis that she was discriminated against based on her status as a caregiver, her challenge fails as a matter of law. As SDHR correctly determined, caring for an ailing family member is not a protected activity under the Human Rights Law ( see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]-[c]; cf. Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-102, 8-107 [1] [a]; see generally Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]).

Section 296(1)(a) requires a discrimination claim to allege membership in a protected category; an allegation of discrimination because of “health” is insufficient.

Anderson v. City of New York · filed 2025-06-25(1)(a)

As with the defects in his pleading regarding the NYCHRL claims, plaintiff does not allege that he was a member of a group protected under the NYSHRL, and therefore covered by the NYSHRL (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a] [providing that (i)t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... (f)or an employer ... because of an individual’s age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment”]).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for an employee who aids or abets discrimination when the employee controls the plaintiff's employment terms, including having the power to hire and fire, and actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Donovan v. Eastern Milk Producers Cooperative Ass'n · filed 1997-07-16(6)

Individual liability attaches under Section 296(6) if the employee exercises control over the terms, and conditions of the plaintiffs employment. ... More precisely, individual liability attaches if the defendant had “the power to hire and fire plaintiff.” ... However, as President and Vice-President of the Board, Gardner and Schoen were voting members of an entity that controlled the terms and conditions of Donovan’s employment. ... Donovan has raised a triable issue of fact as to this issue, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating in hiring, discharge, compensation, and employment conditions, while § 296(6) permits personal liability for a person who actually aids or participates in conduct forbidden by the Human Rights Law.

Harrison v. Indosuez · filed 1998-05-20(1)(a), (6)

HRL § 296(1) provides: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a) (McKinney’s 1993). ... There is no dispute that Gruffat, as a senior officer at the Bank, had the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. Thus, he may be individually liable under the HRL as an employer. ... Section 296(6) of the HRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) (McKinney’s 1993). The Tomka Court distinguished Pa-trowich and held that under § 296(6), a defendant who actually participates in the conduct that gives rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the HRL, regardless of the defendant’s status in the corporation.

Section 296(6) imposes personal liability on individuals who participate in discriminatory conduct or aid and abet another person's primary violation, but not for mere ineptitude, insensitivity, or factual error in responding to a harassment complaint.

Beattie v. Farnsworth Middle School · filed 1998-12-09(6)

Section 296(6) has been interpreted in the Second Circuit to extend personal liability in sexual harassment claims to “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” ... as well as to those individuals who “aide or abet a primary violation of the HRL committed by another employee." ... Defendants correctly argue that mere “ineptitude and insensitivity” in response to a complaint of harassment standing alone is insufficient to support a finding of personal liability. ... Marcil cannot be said to have aided or abetted conduct which did not continue after Plaintiffs internal complaint was lodged. Although Salerno is the individual who ultimately communicated to' Plaintiff the District’s findings and response to the complaint and counter-charges, an allegation of personal liability cannot be sustained based on those acts alone. Salerno may or may not have been incorrect in his findings and response, but personal liability under § 296(6) does not extend for mere factual error.

Section 296 can impose liability on individual employees who participate in discriminatory or retaliatory conduct and possess authority beyond merely carrying out personnel decisions made by others.

McKnight v. Dormitory Authority · filed 1999-11-04

Although the scope of the liability of individual defendants under the HRL is unclear,13 Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to find that Pugliese and Gehr are individually liable for discrimination and or retaliation. On the facts before this Court, it appears that both Pugliese and Gehr actually participated in the review of Plaintiffs medical documentation and her termination for job abandonment. It also appears that both individual.Defendants had sufficient authority within DASNY to “do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” See Patrowich, 63 N.Y.2d at 542, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11 (1984). ... Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the individual Defendants, other than Felix Pugliese and Marilyn Gehr,15 actually participated in the review and rejection of her medical documentation or her ultimate termination on the grounds of job abandonment. Thus, Plaintiff has both abandoned her claims against the seven remaining individual Defendants (Plaintiffs opposition papers did not address her claims against the individual Defendants) and failed to provide sufficient evidence on which a rational trier of fact could find the remaining Defendants liable under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Section 296 claims against Defendants John L. Buono, Paul J. Burgdorf, Samuel R. Davidson, Theodore A. Holmes, Donald H. McDowell, Douglas H. Van Vleck and Woodie G. Williams16 is granted and the claims are dismissed.

Section 296(6) can impose individual aiding-and-abetting liability on a supervisor whose failure to take adequate remedial measures amounts to actual participation in an underlying discriminatory practice, even if the supervisor did not personally commit the primary violation.

Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority · filed 1999-11-17(6)

Under Tomka, only a defendant who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim” may be held liable under HRL § 296(6). To “actually participate” in the discrimination, however, an individual employee need not himself take part in the primary violation. ... Rather, the case law establishes beyond cavil that a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can rise to the level of “actual participation” under HRL § 296(6).

Section 296(6) requires an underlying employer violation before an individual can be held liable for aiding or abetting discrimination.

DeWitt v. Lieberman · filed 1999-01-13(6)

As Lieberman acted alone, plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support a claim of aider or abettor liability under the HRL.

Section 296(l)(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because of the employee's disability.

Scott v. Flaghouse, Inc. · filed 1997-10-16(l)(a)

The NYSHRL provides, inter alia, that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because of her disability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a) (McKinney Supp.1997). ... The NYSHRL and ADA are interpreted and analyzed in a virtually identical manner. ... If anything, to the extent that the NYSHRL’s definition of “disability” differs from that of the ADA, the former is the more restrictive of the two in that it requires complete rather than substantial impairment. ... Therefore, because our ADA analysis dictates our determination of the pendent NYSHRL claim, we grant Flaghouse’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the latter claim as well.

Section 296 prohibits disability discrimination, and for the issues decided on appeal its analysis parallels the ADA’s analysis.

Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries · filed 2000-02-28

For the same reasons, the district court also granted summary judgment to the defendants under the NYSHRL. Because the analysis under the slate law parallels that used in the ADA context for all issues relevant to this appeal, see Micari v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 43 F.Supp.2d 275, 279 (E.D.N.Y.1999), we reverse the grant of summary judgment on Parker’s state law discrimination claim as well.

Section 296 permits a mixed-motive discrimination claim even without a concurrent Title VII claim; the plaintiff must show that the discriminatory factor was a motivating or substantial factor in the employment decision.

Rivkin v. Coleman · filed 1997-10-21(l)(a)

The mixed motives analysis was applied in the context of New York Executive Law Section 296 case in Card v. Sielaff, 154 Misc.2d 239, 586 N.Y.S.2d 191, 196-97 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1992) (holding that plaintiffs Title VII claim requires direct application of the mixed motives test, and that “there is no basis in law or reason for not applying [the Pnce Water-house] mixed motives analysis” to the New York statute as well). ... We therefore conclude that a New York court would, in the appropriate circumstances, apply the mixed motives analysis even in the absence of a concurrent Title VII claim.

Section 296(5) does not require proof of discriminatory intent as an element of a housing-discrimination claim.

Broome v. Biondi · filed 1997-11-04(5)

The Broomes brought claims for discrimination under the Federal Fair Housing Act, section 296 of the New York Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. Proof of discriminatory intent is an element for only the 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 claims.

Section 296(9)(a) makes it unlawful for a volunteer fire department or company to deny membership to, expel, or discriminate against a person because of sex or other listed protected characteristics.

Gibson v. Hurleyville Fire Co. No. 1 · filed 1998-04-16(9)(a)

A written or unwritten policy to exclude female applicants clearly violates both federal and state law.

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for a person who actually participates in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim by aiding or abetting the prohibited acts.

Ross v. Mitsui Fudosan, Inc. · filed 1998-04-22(6)

Section 296(6) of the HRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” ... The Tomka Court distinguished Patrowich and held that a defendant who actually participates in the conduct that gives rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the HRL. ... Mullarkey and Rubens therefore also might be liable as “aiders” and “abettors” under the HRL. However, the Complaint does not state that Ray participated in any conduct that gives rise to a discrimination claim. Just as Ray is not an “employer” under the HRL, she is neither an “aider” nor an “abettor”; the HRL claims against her are dismissed.

Under § 296(l)(a), an employer is liable for an employee’s discriminatory act only when it became a party to the act by encouraging, condoning, or approving it; calculated inaction may establish condonation, while a reasonable investigation and corrective action may disprove it.

Ponticelli v. Zurich American Insurance Group · filed 1998-09-03(l)(a)

The liability of an employer under the HRL, however, differs from the Torres analysis in that under the HRL, “an ‘employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.’” ... “An employer’s calculated inaction in response to discriminatory conduct may, as readily as affirmative action, indicate condonation.” ... An employer may disprove this condonation by a showing that “the employer reasonably investigated a complaint of discriminatory conduct and took corrective action.” ... Thus, “employer liability under the [HRL] is very similar to the fourth prong of the Torres test, except that actual notice, rather than constructive notice, appears to be required under the [HRL].”

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII discrimination claims.

Conway v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2006-02-14

asserting claims of discriminatory discipline on the basis of his race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and Title 8 of the Administrative Code and Charter of the City of New York, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq. ... The plaintiff also brings discrimination claims under New York state and city law, which are also subjected to the same analysis as claims under Title VII, and are therefore analyzed in tandem below.

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims.

Bush v. Fordham University · filed 2006-09-25

The plaintiff also brings discrimination claims under New York state and city law, and as the state and city law claims are also subject to the same analysis as claims under Title VII, all claims are analyzed in tandem below.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits an employer from discriminating based on sex in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and the court applied the employer requirement to dismiss the claim against an entity not alleged to be the plaintiff’s employer.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2004-08-09(1)(e)

The plaintiff also asserts claims pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e). ... In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court considers the claims under the New York Human Rights Laws in tandem with Title VII claims. ... Because the plaintiff has not alleged that the Diocese is her employer under Title VII, her claims against the Diocese under NYSHRL must also be dismissed for similar reasons.

Section 296(1)(a) imposes primary liability on an employer for discriminatory employment practices, but does not make individual employees liable as employers; those employees may instead face derivative aiding-and-abetting liability under § 296(6).

Okafor v. New York State Insurance Fund · filed 2025-08-08(1)(a)

The first theory of liability is not viable in this case because, as the parties agree, the individual defendants are not “employers” under the statute. See Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P., 167 N.E.3d 454, 458 (N.Y. 2021) (“[T]he State HRL does not render employees liable as individual employers.”). The individual defendants therefore cannot be held liable under § 296(1).

Section 296 does not make an employer liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer encouraged, condoned, or approved the act.

Woodson v. Target Corporation · filed 2025-08-19

The New York Court of Appeals has consistently held that an “employer cannot be held liable for an employee’s discriminatory act [under Section 296] unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” ... Woodson never alleges that Target encouraged, condoned, or approved the security guard’s conduct, and therefore she cannot rely on a violation of Section 296.

Section 296(1) prohibits an employer from discriminating based on protected characteristics such as creed, while § 296(6) prohibits any person from aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing prohibited discriminatory acts.

Pagan · filed 2025-09-30(1), (6)

New York Executive Law makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer” to discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics, including an individual’s “creed.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). ... Under the NYSHRL, it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). An individual defendant may be liable under the NYSHRL for aiding and abetting a principal if he “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination [or retaliation] claim,” even if he “lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.”

The NYSHRL permits direct employer liability for discriminatory acts involving upper-level supervisors when their involvement establishes the employer’s acquiescence or condonation.

Schwartz · filed 2025-10-15

The one claim that is proceeding—i.e., that the District’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to use accrued benefits, including his accrued paid sick/leave time, during the period of his unpaid leave constituted an adverse employment action taken because of his disability—can proceed against the District under the NYSHRL as well. The individuals allegedly involved in the District’s purportedly discriminatory decision regarding Plaintiff’s use of his benefits were DelMoro and Lloyd, both upper-level supervisors whose involvement can establish an employer’s acquiescence or condonation for purposes of the NYSHRL. See Father Belle Cmty. Ctr., 221 A.D.2d at 54; Castillo, 2023 WL 6664552, at *6. Accordingly, the NYSHRL claim against the District can go forward on this limited basis.

Under § 296, an individual employee is not an “employer” for discrimination liability, but may be liable for aiding and abetting an employer’s unlawful discrimination, and the NYSHRL’s post-2019 retaliation standard is broader than the federal § 1983 standard.

Dawson v. Beebe · filed 2025-08-19(1)(a), (6), (7)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice … [f]or an employer … because of an individual’s … gender identity or expression … [or] sex … to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a) (emphasis added). ... The Court concurs with other courts in this Circuit that have applied the logic of Doe to public employers — including DOCCS — and found that individual employees are not “employers” for NYSHRL purposes. ... Defendant Beebe is an individual employee of DOCCS, and not Plaintiff’s employer. Therefore, he cannot be held liable for gender discrimination under the NYSHRL. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim against Beebe for this reason. ... The NYSHRL allows individual employees to be held liable for aiding and abetting a liable employer. ... More fundamentally, “liability must first be established as to the employer/principal before accessorial liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor.” ... Moreover, even if Plaintiff had specifically alleged aiding and abetting by Beebe, because she does not assert an NYSHRL discrimination claim against her employer (DOCCS), any aiding and abetting claim against Beebe would necessarily fail. ... The NYSHRL was amended in 2019 to provide that its provisions “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 300. ... Retaliation claims under the NYCHRL (and, for purposes of this motion, the NYSHRL) are subject to a broader standard than under § 1983 or Title VII. ... Consequently, the Court concludes that because Plaintiff adequately alleges a § 1983 retaliation claim against Rivera, she adequately alleges a NYSHRL retaliation against Rivera, and thus the Court denies Rivera’s motion to dismiss this claim.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating because of age, race, national origin, or sex in discharge, compensation, or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and its recovery standards accord with Title VII.

Costello v. NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASS'N · filed 2011-04-25(l)(a)

The NYSHRL provides, in relevant part, “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s age, race ... national origin ... [or] sex ... to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” ... “The standards for recovery under New York State’s Human Rights Law ... are in accord with Federal standards under [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” ... As the NYSHRL analysis parallels the Title VII analysis, Costello’s attempt to sustain a prima facie case of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation also fail under the NYSHRL.

For disability-discrimination claims, § 296 uses the same liability standards as the equivalent federal antidiscrimination laws, including the ADA.

Lewis v. Blackman Plumbing Supply L.L.C. · filed 2014-09-29

. For purposes of resolving the instant Motion, the standard of liability under New York state law is the same as the ADA standard. See Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that, in the context of a disability-discrimination claim, "[t]he standards for liability under [N.Y. Exec. Law § 296] are the same as those under the equivalent federal antidiscrimination laws”); Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 117 n. 1 (2d Cir.2004) ("New York state disability discrimination claims are governed-by the same legal standards as federal ADA claims.”); Gill v. Maul, 61 A.D.3d 1159, 876 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (2009) (recognizing that "the ADA and Executive Law § 296 use the same legal standards to establish discrimination”). The Court therefore will not separately address Plaintiff’s state-law claim.

Section 296 permits employment-discrimination, hostile-work-environment, and retaliation claims to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges discriminatory or retaliatory adverse treatment.

Legrand v. Walmart Stores East · filed 2019-07-11

LeGrand’s employment discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, § 1981, and the NYSHRL is plausible. ... LeGrand’s other employment discrimination claims are analyzed using the same standard. ... For many of the same reasons, LeGrand plausibly alleges a hostile work environment under the same statutes. ... These facts are all that is required to raise inference of retaliatory conduct sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Section 296(1)(a) does not make a discretionary revocation of a police inspector detail reviewable for an unstated discriminatory motive.

Foran v. Cawley · filed 1973-10-17(1)(a)

The protection afforded by the Human Bights Law does not, however, affect the holdings of Kaminsky v. Leary (supra,) and Delicati v. Schechter (supra).

Section 296(1) does not make a coworker’s or superior’s ethnic slurs an unlawful discriminatory practice when the employer neither knows of nor acquiesces in them.

State Division of Human Rights v. Henderson · filed 1975-10-31(1)

The only subject for our consideration is whether the use of ethnic slurs and insults by a coworker or superior without the knowledge or acquiescence of the employer (the use of such language obviously was not a policy of the employer) is an unlawful discriminatory practice reached by the statute. We hold that it is not (see Come v Bausch & Lomb, 390 F Supp 161; Howard v National Cash Register Co., 388 F Supp 603).

Section 296(1)(a) can cover a single discriminatory incident affecting an employee’s working conditions; a pattern of discrimination is unnecessary.

Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board · filed 1980-12-22(1)(a)

Thus, on the basis of the complainant's testimony alone, that her employer reviled her religion or creed in a matter related to her working conditions, the commissioner could find that petitioners engaged in an unlawful discriminatory employment practice which should be redressed. He did not have to also find that this was a regular practice, nor did he have to wait and see if it would become one.

Section 296 employment discrimination and retaliation claims fail on summary judgment when the employer shows a legitimate reason for termination and the employee raises no triable issue of pretext.

Reyes v. Brinks Global Services USA, Inc. · filed 2013-12-18

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Executive Law § 296. In that regard, the defendants demonstrated that the plaintiff’s employment was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonreialiatory reason — specifically, the incident on May 25, 2009, which materially compromised the safety and security of the facility and the valuable property stored therein — and that there are no material issues of fact as to whether that explanation was pretextual (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Cenzon-Decarlo v Mount Sinai Hosp., 101 AD3d 924, 926 [2012]; Thide v New York State Dept. of Transp., 27 AD3d 452, 454 [2006]). In response, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants’ proffered reason for his termination was merely pretextual (see Apiado v North Shore Univ. Hosp. [At Syosset], 66 AD3d 929 [2009]; Morse v Cowtan & Tout, Inc., 41 AD3d 563, 564 [2007]; Thide v New York State Dept. of Transp., 27 AD3d at 454; Jordan v American Intl. Group, 283 AD2d 611, 612 [2001]).

A Section 296 gender discrimination claim survives summary judgment when the evidence raises a triable issue whether the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext.

Browne v. Board of Education · filed 2014-11-05

In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for charging the plaintiff with misconduct, the plaintiffs submissions raised *564 a triable issue of fact as to whether this reason was false, misleading, or incomplete, and thus, a pretext for discrimination (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 AD3d 29, 41 [2011]).

Section 296(1)(a) allows employer liability under a condonation theory when supervisors know of a discriminatory promotion policy and fail to act.

Emengo v. State of New York · filed 2016-10-13(1)(a)

Plaintiff further alleges that there was a long-standing policy of refusing to promote black NYSIF employees above the title of Supervising Insurance Field Investigator, that all óf the individual defendants were at least aware of this policy, that all of the individual defendants were aware that plaintiff was being refused promotions in accordance with this policy, and that none of the defendants took any action in response to this conduct. Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately pleaded employer liability, as to all of the individual defendants, under a condonation theory (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 66 NY2d 684, 687 [1985]; Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541 [1984]).

Section 296 employment discrimination claims use the same standards as Title VII claims.

Hutting v. Independent Living, Inc. · filed 2021-10-13

The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under Executive Law § 296 are the same as those governing cases under Title VII ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 305 n 3; see also Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 100 NY2d 326, 330).

For a discrimination or retaliation claim under § 296, an employer seeking summary judgment must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim or that no material factual dispute remains over whether its stated reasons were pretextual.

Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc. · filed 2019-12-04(1)(a), (1)(e), (7)

To establish entitlement to summary judgment dismissing a cause of action alleging discrimination or retaliation under the NYSHRL, the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie claim or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory, or nonretaliatory reasons for the challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether the explanations were pretextual ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d at 305; Keceli v Yonkers Racing Corp. , 155 AD3d 1014, 1015; Furfero v St. John's Univ. , 94 AD3d 695, 697).

Section 296 requires a discrimination plaintiff to show protected status, qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. · filed 2022-03-02

A plaintiff alleging discrimination in violation of NYSHRL must establish that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class, (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position, (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" ( Reichman v City of New York , 179 AD3d 1115, 1116-1117; see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 312-313).

Under § 296(1)(a), the timing of a pregnancy announcement and termination, standing alone, does not establish an inference of discrimination when numerous other employees were laid off at the same time.

Margarita v. Mountain Time Health, LLC · filed 2025-07-09(1)(a)

However, under the circumstances presented, including that numerous other MTH employees were laid off at the same time as the plaintiff, the temporal proximity between her pregnancy announcement and the termination of her employment, standing alone, does not give rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Tibbetts v Pelham Union Free Sch. Dist. , 143 AD3d at 808; Parris v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 111 AD3d 528, 529).

Section 296 claims must generally be filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory act.

Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp. · filed 1999-02-17

Claims arising under the New York Human Rights Law must be filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory act.

Section 296(3-a)(a) does not apply to alleged employment discrimination occurring in Connecticut against a Connecticut resident.

Brink v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 1999-02-18(3-a)(a)

Given the above, I need but observe that Brink’s New York Human Rights Law claim fails for lack of jurisdiction since, in 1992 he was a Connecticut resident and the álleged discrimination took place there.

Section 296(1)(a) requires a nonresident plaintiff invoking the State Human Rights Law to show that the discriminatory action had an actual impact in New York State.

Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc. · filed 2007-03-06(l)(a)

This Court agrees with the line of decisions that have found that the State Human Rights Law requires that there have been an impact in New York State. Courts have traditionally read the City and State Human Rights Laws in parallel. ... This Court thus follows Lucas and similar decisions in holding that both the City and the State Human Rights Laws require Plaintiff to show Defendants’ discriminatory actions had an actual impact in New York.

Section 296 applies to employment-discrimination claims at this federal enclave because New York retained concurrent jurisdiction over the property.

Benjamin v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC · filed 2005-08-24

Rather, the Court concludes that the word “process” is defined as “[t]he proceedings in any action or prosecution.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. At 1242. Thus, the Court finds because that the State of New York expressly stated that “the laws or authority of the state of New York may be executed thereon in the same way and manner as if such jurisdiction had not been ceded ....,” the motion to dismiss the New York State Human Rights claims on the ground that the Defendant is a federal enclave is denied.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits discrimination based on race, national origin, military status, and other protected grounds, but NYSHRL discrimination claims are unavailable for discrimination arising from federal employment.

Arnold · filed 2025-08-05(1)(a)

The New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) prohibits discrimination based on race, national origin, military status, and other protected grounds. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... The claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, like the claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, are “unavailable to persons asserting claims of discrimination … arising from federal employment.” Williams v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:23-CV-2348 (LTS), 2023 WL 3728375, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023); Moore v. DeJoy, No. 18-CV-9967 (JPC), 2021 WL 4523503, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (dismissing a USPS mail carrier’s discrimination claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL).

Section 296 requires alleged discrimination by nonresident defendants to have an impact in New York; the plaintiff’s employment in New York alone is insufficient.

Hardwick v. Auriemma · filed 2014-04-08(1)(a), (e)

Without more, plaintiffs mere employment in New York does not satisfy the “impact” requirement.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for testifying in a proceeding under the New York Human Rights Law, and the claim requires discriminatory action by the employer.

Paula L. COFFEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC. and John Bryson, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1999-03-15(1)(e)

Similarly, New York’s Executive Law prohibits an “employer” from retaliating against an employee for testifying in a proceeding under the New York Human Rights Law. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e). Accordingly, Coffey may prevail on her retaliation claim only if she demonstrates that her employer, not some other party, discriminated against her in retaliation for her deposition testimony.

Section 296 employment-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework used for comparable federal discrimination claims.

Grant v. Cornell University · filed 2000-03-02

Similarly, courts examine claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law under the same analysis.

Section 296(7) prohibits employment retaliation, and refusal to rehire someone after they file an employment-discrimination charge may support a retaliation claim.

Steven Weissman, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Dawn Joy Fashions,inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 2000-06-05(7)

The NYHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7), and Administrative Code' § 8-107(7) contain anti-retaliation provisions substantially similar to the ADA’s provision. A claim of refusal to rehire an individual following the filing of an employment discrimination charge may be a basis for a claim of retaliation.

Section 296(6) permits personal liability under the HRL for a person who actually participates in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim, even without ownership or authority to fire.

Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Services, Inc. · filed 2000-07-31(6)

Moreover, he is still a proper defendant under § 296(6) of the HRL, which states that it is unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). In interpreting this section of the statute, the Second Circuit in Tomka distinguished Pa-trowich and found that “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the HRL.” Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. The Appellate Division, First Department, has adopted this interpretation as well. See Steadman v. Sinclair, 223 A.D.2d 392, 393, 636 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1st Dep’t 1996); Peck v. Sony Music Corp., 221 A.D.2d 157, 158, 632 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1st Dep’t 1995). Tullgren’s motion under the HRL, consequently, is denied.

An action under § 296 is subject to a three-year limitations period, and a discrimination claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury constituting the basis of the action.

Carr v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, Inc. · filed 2000-08-31

Plaintiff Frank H. Carr (“plaintiff’ or “Carr”) brings this action against defendants Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York (“HIP”), the Queens-Long Island Medical Group, P.C., and Reza Sabet (“Sabet”) (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that they violated his federally protected right to contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as under related state and city provisions, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502. ... For similar reasons, plaintiffs 1996 claim must also be dismissed because the operative statute of limitations has run. Here, it is undisputed that the operative time limit for plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the related state causes of action is three years. ... A discrimination claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know” of the injury that constitutes the basis of the action.

Section 296(6) permits an individual employee to be liable as an aider and abettor when the employee actually participates in conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim, while § 296(1)(a) does not make individual employees directly liable as employers.

Beattie v. Guilderland Central School District · filed 2000-12-14(6), (1)(a)

It is well settled in New York that individual employees cannot be liable under Section 296(1) of the NYHRL, which provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... The Second Circuit and several state courts have held, however, that individual employees can be hable as aiders and abettors under section 296(6) of that statute. ... The Second Circuit held in Tomka that an individual who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim” can be liable as an aider and abettor under Section 296(6).

Section 296(l)(a) applies employer liability to the employer that engaged in the discriminatory conduct rather than unrelated employers, while § 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability only when discrimination is adequately alleged and the aider substantially assists or encourages it, requiring more than inaction.

Wynn v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. · filed 2002-01-24(l)(a), (6)

The scope of “employer” liability is the same under the ADEA, the FEHA, and the NYHRL. ... Therefore, while this discussion focuses primarily on the ADEA, it applies to the FEHA and NYHRL compo nents of the cause of action as well. ... In contrast to the ADEA, the FEHA and the NYHRL do contain express provisions of liability for aiding and abetting. ... Since neither statute provides a definition of aiding and abetting, courts have looked to the common law definition. ... Furthermore,' both California and New York courts have held that “substantial assistance or encouragement” requires actual participation in the discriminatory conduct, and that failure to plead such actual participation is fatal to an aiding and abetting claim. ... This Court agrees with Plaintiffs in that the above cases do not imply that those accused of aiding and abetting in unlawful discrimination must have also affirmatively committed the underlying discriminatory acts. However, “substantial assistance or encouragement” does require that Plaintiffs allege more than the mere inaction of another party to prevent discrimination.

Section 296(3-a)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual because of age in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2001-02-12(3-a)(a)

The State HRL makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against [an] individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 3-a. The City HRL prohibits the same conduct. N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(a). Although there are differences between the State HRL, the City HRL and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., age discrimination suits brought under the State HRL and City HRL are subject to the same analysis as claims brought under the ADEA.

Section 296(1)(e) protects opposition to unlawful employment practices and participation in related proceedings; the protection can apply when the investigated conduct involves a different employer, so long as the employee reasonably believes the conduct violates the Human Rights Law.

McMenemy v. City of Rochester · filed 2001-03-02(l)(e)

Moreover, the defendants’ argument regarding the fifteen-employee requirement of Title VII does not apply to the New York Human Rights Law claim because that statute defines an employer as having at least four employees. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 292. It is undisputed that the Union had at least four employees. McMenemy’s belief that the alleged sexual harassment of Kern violated the Human Rights Law was thus unquestionably reasonable. The plaintiff therefore has a viable retaliation claim under New York law.

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability only when an underlying discriminatory act forbidden by the NYHRL exists.

Gonzalez v. City of New York · filed 2001-03-28(6)

Although the complaint does not explain the basis for such liability, in light of the fact that the Union is not an “employer” under New York Human Rights law, liability must be based on Executive Law § 296(6), which forbids “aiding and abetting” of discrimination. ... Because, as explained above, plaintiffs’ claims against the non-Union Defendants are without merit, there are no acts “forbidden under [that] article,” which could have been aided or abetted by the Union. ... Thus, the Union’s motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims under NYHRL.

Section 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability for a person who directly participates in discriminatory conduct, even without being the employer or having authority to hire or fire the plaintiff.

Dunson v. Tri-Maintenance & Contractors, Inc. · filed 2001-11-01(6)

The Second Circuit has held that liability under § 296(6) is distinguishable from direct liability under § 296(1), in that a defendant need not be the employer, or hold authority to hire or fire the plaintiff, in order to be found liable for aiding and abetting pursuant to provision § 296(6).

Section 296's prohibition on age discrimination is not limited to employees over age forty.

Shannon v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 2001-06-07

While this statistical proffer would clearly not be admissible under the ADEA — which protects employees over the age of forty — the NYHRL and the City law, under which Shannon brought his claims, do not have an age forty cut-off.

Section 296(8) makes breaching a conciliation agreement an unlawful discriminatory practice but does not revive the underlying discrimination claims resolved by that agreement.

Hughes v. Lillian Goldman Family, LLC · filed 2001-07-25(8)

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(8) provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any party to a conciliation agreement made pursuant to [the HRL] to violate the terms of such agreement.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(8). ... Thus, although the plaintiff still has a claim under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(8), for breach of the Conciliation Agreement, which she asserts in her Fifth Cause of Action, in accordance with the plain language of the Conciliation Agreement, the plaintiffs First through Fourth Causes of Action are dismissed as against JMG.

Section 296(l)(e) makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee opposed a discriminatory practice.

Dooner v. Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc. · filed 2001-08-17(l)(e)

Both the New York City and the New York State Human Rights Laws make it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee has opposed a discriminatory practice.

The NYSHRL's age-discrimination and retaliation claims are evaluated under the same analytical framework as the corresponding federal claims.

Carr v. WestLB Administration, Inc. · filed 2001-10-24

Plaintiffs NYSHRL age discrimination claim is treated in a manner identical to plaintiffs ADEA claim. ... While the court will only explicitly address the ADEA claim, the court's analysis applies equally to the state law claim. ... Plaintiffs state law claims are evaluated under the same analytical rubric as his federal claims.

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under a framework virtually identical to Title VII claims when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.

Lotosky v. University of Rochester · filed 2002-01-28

Claims brought under § 286 of New York Executive Law, New York’s Human Rights Law, can be analyzed for purposes of determining sufficiency of the evidence, in a manner virtually identical to those under Title VII.”

Section 296 discrimination claims are analyzed under the same analytical framework as Title VII discrimination claims.

Ames v. Cartier, Inc. · filed 2002-03-29

As an initial matter, the court notes that analysis of claims of discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law proceeds under the same analytical framework as Title VII claims. See Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.1999). Therefore the following discussion of plaintiffs Title VII claims applies equally to his state and local law claims.

Section 296 race-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII.

Crawford-Mulley v. Corning Inc. · filed 2002-03-29

Race discrimination suits brought under the HRL are subject to the same analysis as claims brought under the § 1981 and Title VII.

Section 296(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an individual because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, or sex, and discrimination claims under it are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Tappe v. Alliance Capital Management L.P. · filed 2001-10-25(1)

Because courts analyze discrimination claims brought under Title VII, the New York Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law in the same manner, this Court’s consideration of the federal discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm applies with equal force to the state and local actions.

Section 296(3-a)(a) protects all employees over eighteen from employment discrimination based on age.

Girma v. Skidmore College · filed 2001-11-07(3-a)(a)

The NYSHRL does not limit the protected classification for age, but rather provides protection from employment discrimination based on age considerations for all employees over the age of eighteen. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3-a)(a).

Section 296(1) discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as parallel Title VII claims, including the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.

Tappe v. Alliance Capital Management L.P. · filed 2001-12-19(1)

Because courts in this Circuit analyze discrimination claims brought under Title VII, the New York Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law in the same manner, this Court’s consideration of Tappe’s federal discrimination claims applies with equal force to his state and local actions.

Section 296(1)(a) does not impose discrimination liability on individual employees because it addresses unlawful practices by an employer.

Yerry v. Pizza Hut of Southeast Kansas · filed 2002-02-06(l)(a)

It is well settled in New York that individual employees cannot be liable under Section 296(1) of the Executive Law, which provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a).

Section 296(6) can impose liability on an individual who directly participates in unlawful discriminatory conduct, regardless of the individual's status in the corporation.

Bass v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2001-02-14(6)

Although primarily aimed at curbing discrimination by employers, the Executive Law holds individuals liable under certain circumstances. Under § 296(1), an individual may be liable if he has the power to do more than simply carry out personnel decisions made by others. ... Also, an individual may be liable under § 296(6) for directly participating in the unlawful conduct, regardless of his status in the corporation.

Section 296(3-a)(a) protects employees over the age of eighteen as the protected class for age-discrimination claims.

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory · filed 2002-02-13(3-a)(a)

The HRL defines the protected class as those over the age of eighteen. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3-a)(a).

Section 296 racial-discrimination claims use the same burden-shifting analysis as Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims.

Lee v. ITT STANDARD · filed 2002-04-02

The same burden-shifting analysis is applied to racial discrimination actions based on N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.

Section 296 discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the Title VII framework, so they are subject to the same analysis as parallel § 1981 claims.

McDowell v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc. · filed 2011-06-02

The plaintiff also asserts a discrimination and retaliation claim against the defendant based on New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Just as Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the Title VII framework, New York State Human Rights Law causes of action for discrimination and retaliation are also analyzed under this rubric. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000). Thus, the plaintiffs New York State Human Rights Law claim is subject to the same analysis as his Section 1981 claims, and the plaintiffs New York State Human Rights Law claim therefore fails for the same reasons.

Section 296(7) protects complaints and opposition to forbidden discriminatory practices but does not give complainants absolute immunity from defamation suits.

Herlihy v. Metropolitan Museum of Art · filed 1994-01-10(7)

Executive Law § 296 (7) and Administrative Code § 8-107 (7) do not bar all retaliatory action in any event, but limits their protections to those who have filed a complaint or participated ... in a proceeding, or who have "opposed any practices forbidden under this article” — i.e., discriminatory hiring or discharge, use of public accommodations, rental or sale of residential or commercial space, etc.

Section 296 retaliation claims require protected activity known to the employer, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

Herskowitz v. State of New York · filed 2023-12-28

In order to state a claim for retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), a plaintiff must show that (1) he was engaged in a protected activity, (2) his employer was aware that he participated in such activity, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action based upon his activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action ( Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d 582, 585 [1st Dept 2018], citing Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]).

Section 296(7) retaliation claims follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; the plaintiff must show that the protected activity caused the alleged adverse action.

Russo v. Wyandanch Union Free School District · filed 2023-03-28(7)

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). Under both statutes, retaliation claims are reviewed under the burden- shifting approach promulgated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... As such, plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient proof beyond mere speculation to demonstrate that her complaint against Sibblies was a but-for cause of her reassignment by the District.

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation for a known disability, and a failure-to-accommodate claim requires the employee to request an accommodation that the employer denies.

Anyan v. New York Life Insurance · filed 2002-04-03(3)(a)

If a plaintiff is, indeed, disabled, within the meaning of the NYHRL, it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, licensing agency, employment agency or labor organization to refuse to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of an employee, prospective employee or member in connection with a job or occupation sought.” ... A claim of disability discrimination arising from discharge of an employee based on failure to accommodate is not made out unless the employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation has been denied by the employer.

Section 296(10)(a) requires an employer to accommodate a sincerely held religious practice unless, after a bona fide effort, it demonstrates that accommodation is impossible without undue hardship; § 296(10)(d)(1) defines undue hardship as significant expense or difficulty, including significant interference with safe or efficient workplace operation or violation of a bona fide seniority system.

Lee v. New York City Fire Department · filed 2025-09-29(10)(a) (10)(d)(1)

In order to state a claim pursuant to the NYSHRL for religious discrimination for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must plead “that (1) they held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) they informed their employer of this belief; and (3) they were disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” ... If the plaintiff sufficiently pleads the foregoing elements, the next step in the analysis is determination of whether “a requested accommodation would pose an undue burden on an employer,” which “is an affirmative defense.” ... dismissal of a complaint based on undue hardship is only permissible where the facts establishing the defense are evident on the fact of the complaint. ... Defendants’ motion as to these state law and city law claims, which is solely based on the contention that accommodating Plaintiff would have caused an undue hardship, ECF No. 18 at 25-28; ECF No. 26 at 9-13, is unconvincing and is denied. At this juncture, determination of whether accommodating Plaintiff would have been an undue hardship for Defendants is premature, as the Court cannot make such a determination in Defendants’ favor based on the face of the complaint.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits creed discrimination in employment, and § 296(10)(a) prohibits conditioning employment on forgoing a sincerely held religious practice while allowing an undue-hardship defense.

Carbone · filed 2025-11-17(1)(a), (10)(a)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer ... because of an individual’s ... creed ... to discriminate against such individual ... in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1)(a). Discrimination includes “impos[ing] upon a person as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment ... any terms or conditions that would require such person to for[]go a sincerely held practice or condition of his or her religion.” Id. § 296(10)(a). ... That Carbone was terminated because he failed to comply with a condition of employment is thus sufficient to satisfy the third prong under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL.

Section 296(3)(a) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for employees’ known disabilities; a failure-to-accommodate claim requires disability, employer notice, ability to perform essential functions with accommodation, and refusal of a reasonable accommodation.

Ramirez v. Temin & Company, Inc. · filed 2021-09-24(3)(a)

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for any employer to fail to provide reasonable accommodations for known disabilities of their employees. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3)(a). ... In order to make out a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, the plaintiff must show that (1) she was disabled as defined by the statutes; (2) her employers had notice of the disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of her job, and (4) the defendants refused to make reasonable accommodations of her needs.

Section 296(3) requires an employer to engage in a good faith interactive process concerning a disabled employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation.

Jochelman v. New York State Banking Department · filed 2011-04-19(3)

Based on the conflicting evidence, Supreme Court properly determined that genuine issues of fact exist as to whether defendant engaged in the good faith interactive process required by the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296 [3]; see also Phillips v City of New York, 66 AD3d 170, 176 [2009]).

Section 296(3)(b) does not require an employer to create a permanent light-duty position to accommodate an employee’s disability.

Coles v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2014-11-14(3)(b)

It is well settled that an employer is neither required to create a new light-duty position to accommodate a disability ... nor to assign an employee with more than a temporary disability to a position in a light-duty program designed to accommodate only temporary disabilities (see Kees, 973 F Supp at 1194).

An employee requesting a reasonable accommodation must cooperate in providing information needed to evaluate the request.

Graham v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2017-10-26(3)(c)

Indeed, the Human Rights Law requires an employee requesting a reasonable accommodation to “cooperate in providing medical or other information . . . that is necessary for consideration of the accommodation” (Executive Law § 296 [3] [c]; see Matter of Vinikoff v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 83 AD3d 1159, 1162 [2011]).

Section 296(3)(a) requires an employer aware of an applicant’s condition to discuss possible accommodations, even if the applicant has not requested a specific accommodation.

Cooney v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Sanitation · filed 2024-02-27(3)(a)

Although plaintiff did not request any specific accommodation until this litigation, both the State and City HRLs required defendants to engage in an interactive dialogue regarding possible accommodations once they became aware of plaintiff's condition ( see Executive Law § 296[3][a]; 9 NYCRR 466.11[j][4]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[15][a]; Estate of Benitez v City of New York , 193 AD3d 42, 48 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 906 [2021]). Defendants engaged in this dialogue with plaintiff during the internal appeals process.

Section 296 requires employers and employees to engage in a good-faith dialogue about a requested disability accommodation; an employee responsible for ending that process may not recover for failure to accommodate.

Alvarez v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2024-08-14

Under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, both the employer and the employee have a duty to engage in a good-faith dialogue once the interactive process begins, and "[a]n employee who is responsible for the breakdown of that interactive process may not recover for a failure to accommodate" ( Matter of Strong v Fernandez , 188 AD3d 1590, 1592 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Administrative Code § 8-102; Pimentel v Citibank, N.A. , 29 AD3d at 148).

Section 296 does not require a landlord to promptly tell a holdover tenant whether it will pursue unpaid rent as a reasonable accommodation.

Chen v. Wilder · filed 2025-08-15(2-a)(d)(2)

Defendant's request that he be informed by his landlord "promptly" whether or not his landlord was going to pursue him, a holdover tenant, for unpaid rent is not a reasonable accommodation request under Executive law§ 296.

A Section 296(5)(a)(1) housing-discrimination claim fails when the plaintiffs do not establish a prima facie case.

Mitchell v. Century 21 Rustic Realty · filed 2002-04-29(5)(a)(l)

The Mitchells failed to present a prima facie housing discrimination case. Accordingly, both their FHA and New York Executive Law claims must fail and their preliminary injunction motion must be denied.

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging gender discrimination in employment to establish a prima facie case by showing protected-group membership, qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Byerly v. Ithaca College · filed 2003-11-10

Claims under both Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law are analyzed under the same legal standard. ... To state a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law, a plaintiff must show (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) that she was qualified for the job in question; (3) that the defendant took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) that the circumstances support an inference of discrimination. ... Based upon this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs failure to achieve highly effective teaching, coupled with her average or below-average accomplishments in the other areas of evaluation, support the conclusion that Defendant’s decision to deny her tenure was based upon legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs claims of gender discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law.

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employers from refusing to hire or employ, barring or discharging, or discriminating in compensation or employment terms because of an individual’s age.

Fass v. Northwell Healthcare System · filed 2025-07-24(1)(a)

The NYSHRL similarly provides that an employer may not “refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of, among other characteristics, an individual’s age. ... “Age discrimination claims under the ADEA and NYSHRL are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” ... Accordingly, plaintiff has met his burden to put forth a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Section 296 age-discrimination claims require protected-class membership, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action, and minimal evidence suggesting discriminatory motivation at the prima facie stage.

Distefano · filed 2026-01-26

“Under the ADEA and NYSHRL, a prima facie case of age discrimination consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff's membership in a protected class; (2) the plaintiff's qualification for a particular position of employment; (3) an adverse employment action by the defendant employer; and (4) some minimal evidence suggesting an inference that the employer acted with discriminatory motivation.”

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful employment discrimination; at the pleading stage, a retaliation claim requires plausible allegations of protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, and causation.

Marte · filed 2026-05-01(7)

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims pursuant to both Title VII and the NYSHRL are subject to the same three-part burden-shifting standard. ... “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must make four showings: that ‘(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.’” ... Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII and the NYSHRL5 based on her filing of a grievance and the subsequent termination of her employment. Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to these claims is therefore denied.

Section 296(10) requires a plaintiff claiming religious discrimination to show a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement, notice to the employer, and discipline for noncompliance.

Bowles v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2008-07-10(10)

To make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff alleging a violation of Title VII or New York’s Human Rights Law must prove that: “(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.”

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual because of disability, and a prima facie claim requires disability, employer coverage and notice, qualification with or without reasonable accommodation, and termination because of disability.

Schlenger v. Fidelity Employer Services Co., LLC · filed 2011-03-31(1)(a)

Thus to make out a prima facie case under Section 296, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that she is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that [Defendant] is subject to the [New York State Human Rights Law] and had notice of the disability; (3) that she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her position, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) that she was fired because of her disability.” ... The latter position would be a seemingly insurmountable hurdle to an HRL claim, which protects only those able to work.

For housing-discrimination claims, the NYSHRL uses the same analytical standard as the FHA; claims that fail under that standard also fail under the NYSHRL.

Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC · filed 2012-03-07(2-a), (5)(a)

Section 1982, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL housing discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standard as claims made under the FHA. ... Because, as discussed in Part II.C.1.b, supra, Haber’s discriminatory treatment claims under the FHA fail under the McDonnell Douglas test, and because § 1982, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL use the same standards as the FHA, Haber’s discriminatory treatment claims under these latter provisions must fail as well. Therefore, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment as to Haber’s § 1982, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL claims.

Section 296 prohibits age discrimination in employment, and an age-discrimination plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Cho v. City of New York · filed 2013-12-16

“To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show four things: (1) he is a member of the protected class; (2) he is qualified for his position; (3) he has suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding that action give rise to an inference of age discrimination.” ... “Accordingly, we find that Cho failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, and therefore we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”

For disability discrimination, § 296 uses the same prima facie elements as the ADA.

Kaufman v. Columbia Memorial Hospital · filed 2014-02-19

“The elements of a prima facie case for discrimination prohibited by the NYSHRL are the same as a claim under the ADA[.]”

Section 296(5)(a)(2) applies the same analytical framework as the FHA to housing-discrimination claims, and here the landlord’s claim failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege the discriminatory conduct required for liability.

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. · filed 2015-03-16(5)(a)(2)

Claims under the FHA and New York Executive Law § 296 are “evaluated under the same framework.” Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir.2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04-CV-875 (RJD)(KAM), 2007 WL 2437810, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61940, at *56-57 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007) (“the standard relevant to [the NYHRL] claims parallel those applicable under the Fair Housing Act”). Thus, the Plaintiffs claim under New York Executive law § 296(5)(a)(2) against the KPM Defendants fails as a matter of law for the same reason the FHA claims do, and those claims are dismissed.

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination and requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, including circumstances supporting an inference of discriminatory intent, under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Henek v. CSC Holdings, LLC · filed 2020-03-30

Discrimination claims under Title VII and NYSHRL are governed by the familiar burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... To show a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and NYSHRL, a plaintiff must provide evidence showing that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he is qualified for the position held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. ... The parties agree as to the first three elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case: he is a member of his protected class; he was qualified to be a salesman; and his termination was an adverse employment action. But I see no way that a reasonable jury could conclude that his termination occurred under circumstances suggesting religious or national origin discrimination. As a result, whether viewed as a failure to show the fourth requirement for a prima facie case or inability to satisfy the third step of McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff’s case fails.

The NYSHRL requires an employment-discrimination plaintiff to present admissible evidence sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory motive, and genuine disputes of material fact can prevent summary judgment.

Tatas v. Ali Baba's Terrace, Inc. · filed 2022-12-30

For the discrimination claims under Section 1981 and the NYSHRL, the plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, which requires a showing of some admissible evidence of circumstances that would be sufficient to infer a discriminatory motive.

Section 296's disability-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and their prima facie elements are generally the same as under the ADA.

Russell v. Westchester Community College · filed 2023-09-21

The three-part burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) is used to analyze discrimination claims under the ADA and NYSHRL. ... The elements of a prima facie claim of discrimination under the NYSHRL are generally the same as those under the ADA.

Section 296 discrimination claims require a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is in a protected class, is qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and that the action occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Santiago v. City Of New York · filed 2024-09-28

Discrimination and disparate treatment claims are analyzed using the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII or SHRL, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the employment; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

A qualified older employee who is discharged and replaced by a younger employee can make a prima facie age discrimination claim under § 296(1)(a).

O'Connor v. Frawley · filed 1991-08-29(1)(a)

We believe that petitioner made out a prima facie case of age discrimination by alleging, inter alia, that he was fifty years old, that he was discharged and replaced by a woman fifteen years younger than he, that he was qualified for the position, and that Mr. Pasichow’s predecessors had rendered highly favorable evaluations of petitioner’s job performance (see, Mayer v Manton Cork Corp., 126 AD2d 526).

A prima facie claim of age discrimination requires the claimant to show that he was qualified for the position he held.

Pantaleone v. Jackson · filed 1994-05-09

In order to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, the petitioner must establish in the first instance that he was qualified for the position he held (Mayer v Manton Cork Corp., 126 AD2d 526).

Section 296 requires more than conclusory statements to establish a prima facie claim of quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment.

Watts v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1995-03-16

As petitioner’s claims are only supported by bald conclusory statements, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of either quid pro quo sexual harassment (Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 909 [11th Cir 1982]), or harassment based on the existence of a hostile work environment (Fair v Guiding Eyes for the Blind, 742 F Supp 151 ([SD NY 1990]).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a prima facie showing of age discrimination when an employer terminates an employee and replaces him with a younger person.

Laverack & Haines, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 1995-07-14(1)(a)

We agree with SDHR that complainant made out a prima facie showing of age discrimination by establishing that ... petitioner terminated complainant and replaced him with a younger person.

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging unequal enforcement of a sexual harassment policy to show different treatment from female employees in the same situation to make out a prima facie sex discrimination claim.

Traviglia v. Fleet Bank, N. A. · filed 1995-09-18

The plaintiff’s factual allegations failed to make out a prima facie case of sexual discrimination since he did not show that he was treated differently from female employees in the same situation (cf., State Div. of Human Rights v County of Onondaga Sheriff’s Dept., supra).

Conclusory allegations unsupported by the record are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Executive Law § 296.

Gagliardi v. Trapp · filed 1995-11-06

The plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the City violated Executive Law § 296 are without support in the record and are, therefore, insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination (see, Matter of Maloff v City Commn. on Human Rights, 46 NY2d 908, 910; see also, Matter of Pace Univ. v New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 NY2d 125, 128; Hall v Paladino, 210 AD2d 595, 596; cf, Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554).

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging gender-based termination to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; failure to do so warrants summary judgment.

Gilroy v. Continental Corp. · filed 1997-03-03

There being no factual issues, and the plaintiff having failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful termination based on gender, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted (see, Wozniak v Components Assembly Div., 220 AD2d 934; Traviglia v Fleet Bank, 219 AD2d 644).

A plaintiff claiming employment discrimination under § 296(1)(a) must allege that they were qualified for the position.

Stephenson v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Local 100 · filed 1998-01-27(1)(a)

The complaint was properly dismissed against both plaintiffs since they failed to allege either in the complaint or in opposition to the motion to dismiss that they were qualified for the positions from which they were terminated.

Section 296 requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory or retaliatory termination to establish a prima facie case that the termination was for an impermissible reason.

Del Valle v. Office of the District Attorney · filed 2000-01-06

Our review of the evidence, particularly as it bears upon plaintiff’s work attendance, confirms that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that she was terminated from her employment for impermissible discriminatory or retaliatory reasons (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629-630; Matter of Pace Univ. v New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 85 NY2d 125, 128-129).

Section 296(1)(a) permits a disability discrimination claim based on an employee being disabled or regarded as disabled, being qualified, and being terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Grullon v. South Bronx Overall Economic Development Corp. · filed 2000-08-09(1)(a)

The foregoing evidence adequately established plaintiffs prima facie case of disability discrimination — that he was disabled or perceived or regarded as being disabled, that he was terminated, that he was qualified and that he was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. ... Finally, plaintiff’s State and City disability discrimination claims are identical and the disability discrimination provision of the State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; § 292 [21]) is virtually identical to the disability discrimination provision of the City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code § 8-107 [1] [a]).

A gender-discrimination claim under § 296 cannot survive summary judgment when the defendant shows the absence of a prima facie case and the plaintiff raises no material issue of fact.

Dodd v. Middletown Lodge (Elks Club) No. 1097 · filed 2000-11-13

However, the defendant demonstrated the absence of a prima facie case of discrimination under Executive Law § 296, and the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of any material issue of fact (see, Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 631).

Section 296 requires an age discrimination plaintiff to show protected status, discharge, qualification, and circumstances supporting an inference of age discrimination.

Wiesen v. New York University · filed 2003-04-24

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination pursuant to Executive Law § 296, plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was a member of the class protected by the statute; was actively or constructively discharged; was qualified to hold the position from which he or she was terminated; and the discharge occurred under circumstances which give rise to an inference of age discrimination (Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]; Terranova v Liberty Lines Tr., 292 AD2d 441, 442 [2002]).