N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, employer awareness, adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

Bendeck v. NYU Hospitals Center · filed 2010-10-26(7)

In order to make out a claim of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity, (3) she suffered adverse employment action based on her activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]).

Section 296 requires a retaliation claimant to show protected activity, employer awareness, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection.

Murphy v. Kirkland · filed 2011-10-11

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the complainant Ronald Maher was required to show that “(1) [he] has engaged in activity protected by Executive Law § 296, (2) [the employer] was aware that [he] participated in the protected activity, (3) [he] suffered from a disadvantageous employment action based upon [his] activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action taken by [the employer]”

Section 296 requires a retaliation claimant to prove protected activity, employer awareness, an adverse employment action based on that activity, and a causal connection.

Clauberg v. State · filed 2012-05-03

To establish a claim for retaliation, claimant was required to prove that he engaged in protected activity, that his employer was aware that he engaged in such activity, that he suffered an adverse employment action based upon his activity and that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for opposing unlawful discrimination or participating in a related proceeding.

Awoshiley v. Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 2011-02-17(1)(e)

Plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim fails to state a cause of action because it does not allege any conduct by defendants that violates the Executive Law (see Executive Law § 296 [1] [e]; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing discrimination; a claim requires protected activity known to the employer, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection.

Asabor v. Archdiocese · filed 2013-01-22(7)

Under the State HRL, it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices (see Executive Law § 296 [7]). To prove unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she has engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]). Here, plaintiff has established the first two prongs, and has raised issues of fact regarding the third and fourth prongs sufficient to require the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 296 protects employees from retaliation for opposing forbidden discrimination; complaints unrelated to such discrimination are not protected activity.

Adeniran v. State · filed 2013-05-15

The defendants met their initial burden of demonstrating that the claimants could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation ... by showing that the complaints made by Caroline Adeniran to her supervisors did not relate to statutorily forbidden discriminatory practices, and that she, therefore, had not engaged in protected activity.

A Section 296 retaliation claim based on denied reinstatement cannot survive summary judgment when the plaintiff’s only evidence of a retaliatory reason is hearsay.

King v. North Shore Long Is. Jewish Hosp. at Plainview · filed 2015-04-15(1)(e), (7)

The defendant also established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the plaintiffs claim that she was subject to retaliation, as defined in Executive Law § 296 (1) (e) and (7), by being denied reinstatement. ... The hearsay evidence submitted by the plaintiff, that a shop steward told the plaintiff that she was *929 not reinstated because she had filed a civil rights complaint, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Section 296(7) requires a causal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action; close timing between the two can establish that connection.

La Marca-Pagano v. Dr. Steven Phillips, P.C. · filed 2015-06-17(7)

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff cannot establish that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Section 296 applies the same recovery standards as Title VII to retaliation claims, including the requirement of injury or harm.

Napierala v. New York State Division of Human Rights · filed 2016-06-17(7)

The Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 et seq.) and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e et seq.) “are textually similar and ultimately employ the same standards of recovery,” and thus “federal case law in this area . . . proves helpful to the resolution of this appeal” (Matter of Aurecchione v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 98 NY2d 21, 26 [2002]). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has written, title VII “does not protect an employee from ‘all retaliation,’ but only ‘retaliation that produces an injury or harm’ ” ... and here there was no injury or harm.

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity known to the employer, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two.

Keceli v. Yonkers Racing Corp. · filed 2017-11-29(7)

In order to make out a cause of action alleging unlawful retaliation, the “plaintiff must show that (1) she has engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action based upon her activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 312-313).

A complaint states a retaliation claim under § 296(7) when it alleges that the employer terminated the employee about two weeks after she disclosed her discrimination claims and intent to sue.

Kaplan v. New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene · filed 2016-09-21(7)

The Supreme Court also erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s causes of action alleging retaliation pursuant to the NYSHRL (see Executive Law § 296 [7]) and the NYCHRL (see Administrative Code § 8-107 [7]). The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that her employment was terminated approximately two weeks after she informed NYCHMH of her claims and advised it of her intent to sue.

A retaliation claim under Executive Law § 296 requires a causal connection between protected activity and an adverse employment action.

Langton v. Warwick Valley Central School District · filed 2016-11-16

Here, the defendants met their initial burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that the challenged actions were not causally connected to any protected activity by the plaintiff (see Cotterell v State of New York, 129 AD3d 653, 655 [2015]; cf. Krebaum v Capital One, N.A., 138 AD3d 528, 528-529 [2016]).

Section 296(7) requires a causal connection between complaints of discrimination and the alleged retaliatory employment action.

Humphries v. City University of New York · filed 2017-01-03(7)

That award collaterally estops plaintiff from establishing a causal connection between the termination of her employment and her complaints of discrimination, as is required to state a cause of action for retaliation (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]; Executive Law § 296 [7]).

Section 296(7) requires evidence connecting a discrimination complaint to the alleged retaliation; a complaint made approximately four years before the alleged constructive discharge was too remote to raise a triable issue.

Mejia v. T.N. 888 Eighth Ave. LLC Co. · filed 2019-02-28(7)

Furthermore, the court correctly determined that plaintiff had no viable retaliation claim under the State and City HRLs ( see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]; Fletcher v Dakota, Inc. , 99 AD3d 43, 51-52 [1st Dept 2012]; Executive Law § 296[7]; Administrative Code § 8-107[7]). Plaintiff failed to specify any instances, dates or times of those complaints she made of unlawful discrimination, other than her verbal complaint to a customer who was an off duty police officer in 2009, which occurred approximately four years earlier than her alleged constructive discharge, and thus was too remote in time to raise a triable issue of retaliation.

Compensatory damages for lost wages and benefits following retaliation under § 296 may be denied without evidence that the retaliation cost the complainant a particular job.

Matter of Chaplin v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2020-07-29

The determination to not award Chaplin any compensatory damages for, inter alia, lost wages, pension benefits, and fringe benefits was not arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an abuse of discretion given the SDHR's finding that Chaplin failed to present evidence that he was not hired for a particular job as a result of any improper or retaliatory conduct by his former employer ( see Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 77 NY2d at 420; Matter of Imperial Diner, Inc. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd. , 52 NY2d 72, 79).

Section 296(7) requires protected activity known to the employer, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them for a retaliation claim.

Franco v. Hyatt Corp. · filed 2020-12-15(7)

Under the State Human Rights Law, a claim for retaliation requires that (1) the employee has engaged in a protected activity, (2) of which the employer was aware, (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action ( Forrest , 3 NY3d at 312-13; see Executive Law § 296[7]).

Section 296 treats a negative employment reference given in retaliation for a discrimination complaint as an adverse employment action; a six-month gap does not necessarily defeat causation.

Matter of Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Foster · filed 2020-07-29(7)

Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the SDHR's finding that Lagnado provided the Oceanside UFSD with a negative reference in response to DeRosa's inquiry about Chaplin, which was an adverse employment action related to the filing of his initial complaint ( see e.g. Hashimoto v Dalton , 118 F3d 671, 674 [9th Cir]; Beckett v Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 893 F Supp 234, 240 [SD NY]; see generally Matter of Argyle Realty Assocs. v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 65 AD3d at 283). The six-month period which elapsed between the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct was not so attenuated that there could be no causal connection between the two ( see Summa v Hofstra Univ. , 708 F3d 115, 128 [2d Cir]; Grant v Bethlehem Steel Corp. , 622 F2d 43, 45-46 [2d Cir]).

Section 296 prohibits discrimination and retaliation under the State Human Rights Law.

Pappas v. Moody's Inv. Serv. · filed 2022-02-24

The complaint fails to state causes of action for discrimination and retaliation under the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 296 and Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107). It fails to allege that plaintiff is a member of a protected class ( see Matter of Local 621 v New York City Dept. of Transp. , 178 AD3d 78, 81 [1st Dept 2019], lv dismissed 35 NY3d 1106 [2020]) or that he was treated differently or less well than his female coworkers ( see e.g. Massaro v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. , 121 AD3d 569 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 26 NY3d 903 [2015]).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for engaging in protected activity under the Human Rights Law.

Alshami v. City Univ. of N.Y. · filed 2022-03-24(7)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged retaliation by showing that: (1) he engaged in protected activity in December 2016 when he filed a complaint stating that his supervisor was discriminating against him, (2) defendants were aware that he participated in such activity, (3) he was denied a promotion in February and May 2017, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action ( Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 312-313 [2004]; see Executive Law § 296[7]).

Section 296(7) prohibits retaliation against a person for filing a human rights complaint.

Matter of Clifton Park Apts., LLC v. New York State Div. of Human Rights · filed 2022-04-28(7)

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice to retaliate against a person for filing a human rights complaint ( see Executive Law § 296 [7]).

Section 296(7) requires a retaliation claim to sufficiently allege potentially actionable retaliatory conduct.

Matter of Local 621, S.E.I.U. v. New York City Fire Dept. · filed 2024-09-11(7)

However, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the respondents/defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action to recover damages for unlawful retaliation in violation of NYSHRL and NYCHRL, as the second amended petition/complaint failed to sufficiently allege potentially actionable retaliatory conduct ( see Kwong v City of New York , 204 AD3d 442, 443; see also Brightman v Prison Health Serv., Inc. , 108 AD3d 739, 742; McKenzie v Meridian Capital Group, LLC , 35 AD3d 676, 677; cf. Kassapian v City of New York , 155 AD3d 851, 853).

Section 296 permits a retaliation claim to proceed when termination the day after protected activity sufficiently pleads a causal connection.

Wu v. Wunderkind Corp. · filed 2024-09-26(7)

The branch of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's retaliation claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL is also denied. ... His termination the next day is sufficiently close in time to the protected activity to establish a causal connection for pleading purposes (See Herskowitz v State, 222 AD3d 587, 588 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 296 protects an employee’s complaint about discriminatory pay as activity for which the employer may not retaliate.

Roberson v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. · filed 2024-11-30(7)

Under both the State and City Human Rights Laws, it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices. This complaint by Roberson is therefore a protected activity.

Section 296(7) permits a retaliation claim when the alleged response to protected activity, viewed as a whole, amounts to an adverse employment action.

Callahan v. City of New York · filed 2024-11-30(7)

Viewed as a whole, and according plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, these allegations sufficiently plead an “adverse employment action” under the State HRL, and a “disadvantage” to plaintiff under the City HRL (see Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d at 585-586 [placing a psychological hold on plaintiff’s application for employment and ultimately finding him unfit for the position constituted adverse action]).

A retaliation claim under Section 296 requires facts showing that the plaintiff opposed or complained about statutorily prohibited discrimination.

Caracappa v. Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist. · filed 2024-11-06(1)(e)

The Supreme Court also properly granted dismissal of the second cause of action, alleging a violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), as the plaintiff did not allege facts demonstrating that she engaged in a protected activity by opposing or complaining about statutorily prohibited discrimination ( see id. § 296[1][e]; Brunache v MV Transp., Inc. , 151 AD3d 1011, 1014; Clarson v City of Long Beach , 132 AD3d at 800).

Section 296(7) permits a retaliation claim when an employee alleges termination shortly after reporting discriminatory conduct.

Moscatelli v. Woodbury Med. Practice, P.C. · filed 2025-09-17(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the Woodbury defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the second and fifth causes of action, alleging retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, respectively, insofar as asserted against them ( see Executive Law § 296[7]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[7]). Contrary to the Woodbury defendants' contentions, the second amended complaint sufficiently stated causes of action against them to recover damages for retaliation by alleging that the plaintiff's [*3]employment was terminated shortly after he took a protected action by reporting the alleged discriminatory conduct to Sullivan ( see Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc. , 151 AD3d 915, 917-918; Kaplan v New York City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene , 142 AD3d at 1051-1052).

For a § 296(7) retaliation claim, adverse actions occurring almost immediately after an employee opposes discrimination can support a causal connection at the pleading stage.

Alexandre v. Verizon N.Y. Inc. · filed 2025-03-26(7)

Lastly, plaintiff sufficiently alleges that these adverse actions have a causal connection to her opposition, as they occurred almost immediately after the meeting (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 001, Complaint, , 39, 47, 51).

Section 296(7) permits a retaliation claim to proceed when allegations of adverse action after discrimination complaints sufficiently plead a causal connection.

Neel v. New York Univ. · filed 2026-02-26(7)

And when considering the lenient notice pleading standard afforded to retaliation claims, this allegation satisfies the fourth element of a claim for retaliation under both NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296(7) requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant retaliated or discriminated against them because they opposed a practice forbidden by the Human Rights Law.

J.K. v. Viscardi Ctr., Inc. · filed 2025-12-03(7)

Here, the amended complaint failed to allege that the City retaliated or discriminated against the plaintiff because he opposed the alleged violations of Executive Law § 296 by the Viscardi defendants' employees, and an affirmation of the plaintiff's attorney, who asserted no personal knowledge of the facts, is without evidentiary value ( see Tarzia v Brookhaven Natl. Lab. , 247 AD2d 605, 606; Gorman v Gorman , 88 AD2d 677, 678).

Section 296(7) does not require a person opposing discrimination to identify a specific ground if a jury could reasonably find a causal connection between the opposition and the alleged retaliation.

Liebman v. Albany Med. Ctr. · filed 2025-12-11(7)

Contrary to defendants' assertion, a plaintiff alleging retaliation need not oppose discrimination on a specific ground, as long as a jury could reasonably find a causal connection between his or her opposition and the alleged retaliatory conduct ( see Albunio v City of New York ,16 NY3d at 479; see e.g. Matter of Board of Educ. of New Paltz Cent. School Dist. v Donaldson , 41 AD3d 1138, 1141 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 706 [2008]).

Section 296(7)(iii) treats seeking a reasonable exemption as protected activity, but a retaliation claim requires facts supporting an inference that the employer fired the employee for making the request.

Banasik v. Mount Sinai Health Sys. · filed 2026-05-14(7)(iii)

Though seeking a reasonable exemption qualifies as protected activity under both the City and State Human Rights Laws ... the facts alleged do not support an inference that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for seeking an accommodation.

Section 296(7) retaliation claims are analyzed under the same standard as Title VII retaliation claims.

Moccio v. Cornell University · filed 2012-08-27(7)

“Courts apply the same standard used in Title VII eases in analyzing NYSHRL retaliation claims.” Caban v. Richline, No. 10-cv-559, 2012 WL 2861377, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2012) (citing Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 115-17 (2d Cir.2007)). Accordingly, the above analysis of Moccio’s retaliation claim under Title VII applies in full here. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Moccio’s claims of retaliation in violation of NYSHRL § 296(7) is granted.

A retaliation claim under § 296(7) survives summary judgment when the evidence is sufficient to sustain an ADA retaliation claim.

Nofal v. IMCMV Times Square LLC · filed 2024-03-15(7)

Because Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on the ADA retaliation claim, he has necessarily done so with respect to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims.

Section 296 claims under the New York Human Rights Law are subject to a three-year limitations period measured from filing in court, and the period begins when the employee receives notice of termination rather than when the employment relationship fully ends.

Murphy v. General Electric Co. · filed 2003-01-16

Claims raised under the New York Human Rights law are subject to a three year statute of limitations measured from the filing of the action in court. ... Moreover, the statute commenced to run here when Murphy received notice of his termination, a date well prior to February 11, 1997, and not the date on which his employment relationship with GE ended completely. ... Murphy’s third cause of action under New York law is time-barred.

Section 296 discrimination claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations for filing a complaint.

Hill v. Citibank Corp. · filed 2004-03-26

Discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to three-year statutes of limitations for filing a complaint.

Section 296 claims may proceed past the three-year limitations period when the complaint adequately alleges a continuing violation, including an ongoing discriminatory policy or practice.

Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc. · filed 2004-06-01

Defendants ILMC, NCGA, and Del-Al move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiffs causes of action under New York’s Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, as being time-barred. ... Plaintiff asserts that she benefits from the “continuing violation” exception to the limitations period. ... Plaintiffs complaint adequately asserts a continuing violation arising from defendants’ alleged course of action in placing and retaining plaintiff in an H-2B position and their alleged policy and practice of placing women in H-2B positions. It cannot be said that it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle her to relief. ... Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the ground of the statute of limitations is denied.

Section 296 discrimination claims are subject to a three-year limitations period, accruing when an adverse employment determination is made and communicated; discrete discriminatory acts cannot be aggregated into a continuing violation to avoid that limitation.

Milani v. International Business MacHines Corp., Inc. · filed 2004-06-14

Milani’s claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... “[A]n employment discrimination claim accrues on the date that an adverse employment determination is made and communicated to the plaintiff.” ... Instead, Milani’s claims are based on discrete acts of discrimination, each of which is subject to its own three-year limitations period.

Section 296 allows three years to sue for discrimination, so a salary-discrimination claim is timely as to paychecks received within that limitations period.

Forsyth v. Federation Employment And Guidance Service · filed 2005-06-06

Similarly, plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law would not be time-barred because he brought this suit on April 25, 1997 and was still working in 1996.

Section 296 discrimination claims may be filed within three years from the date of the injury allegedly caused by discrimination.

Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance Service · filed 2005-06-06

Section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-502 (1993), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, allow complainants three years from the date of the injury allegedly caused by discrimination to file suit.

Section 296 requires discrimination claims under New York law to be brought within three years of the challenged adverse action.

Ortiz-Moss v. New York City Department of Transportation · filed 2008-04-18

Under New York law, claims of discrimination must be brought within three years of the adverse action being challenged. ... N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2003); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d). ... Plaintiffs 2002 reassignment and office claims arose on or about April 1, 2002, and this action was not filed until April 27, 2005. Thus, they are time-barred under New York law as well.

Section 296 discrimination claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations; discrete acts accruing before May 22, 2005, are untimely absent equitable tolling, waiver, or estoppel.

Cortes v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-30

Plaintiffs state law claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Thus, Plaintiffs claims arising out of his June 16, 2006, suspension and his February 22, 2007, termination are timely, and Plaintiffs claims for discrete acts of discrimination that accrued before May 22, 2005, are untimely absent equitable tolling, waiver or estoppel.

Section 296 claims generally must be filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory act.

Gutierrez v. City of New York · filed 2010-11-29

Claims under the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (“NYSHRL”), New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107 and 8-502 et seq. (“NYCHRL”), and § 1983 must be filed in court within three years of the alleged discriminatory act or are considered time-barred.

Claims under § 296 are subject to a three-year limitations period, and each failure to accommodate is treated as a discrete act for limitations purposes.

Kornmann v. The City of New York Business Integrity Commission · filed 2020-06-15

The statute of limitations for plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin Code § 8-502. Each failure to accommodate a request for accommodations is a discrete act for statute of limitations purposes. See Gomez v. New York City Police Dep’t, 191 F. Supp. 3d 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Plaintiff’s claims for failure to accommodate as requested in the November 4, 2015 meeting and for constructive discharge based on his January 7, 2016 resignation are therefore timely under state and local law. However, plaintiff alleges no other failure to accommodate or other discrimination claims that occurred within the three year period prior to his commencement of this case. Any earlier claims for failure to accommodate are therefore time-barred.

Claims under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 are generally subject to a three-year limitations period measured from the alleged discriminatory acts.

Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, Inc. · filed 2022-11-09

Claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are generally time-barred unless filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory acts. See Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2003); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–502(d)).

Claims under § 296 are subject to a limitations period; for claims against Mount Vernon, the court applied the Charter’s one-year period and held these claims untimely.

Roches-Bowman v. The City of Mount Vernon · filed 2022-08-24

Regardless of whether the filing of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge tolled the statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely. As discussed above, the relevant date for the statute of limitations is the date of Plaintiff’s alleged sexual assault. Thus, even if Plaintiff’s EEOC charge tolled the statute of limitations, Plaintiff filed the EEOC charge 439 days after her sexual assault, which exceeds the one-year statute of limitations. (See Compl. ¶ 39; City’s Mem. 7.) Plaintiff’s state law claims are therefore dismissed as untimely.

A claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a) is governed by the three-year limitations period in CPLR 214(2).

Koeppel v. Wachtler · filed 1988-06-13(1)(a)

However, the plaintiff’s third cause of action, alleging a violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), was governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2), and therefore, that cause of action was not time barred (see, Koerner v State of New York, Pilgrim Psychiatric Center, 62 NY2d 442; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 306-307).

A discrimination claim against the State under § 296 is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Jones v. State · filed 1989-04-10

A civil action against the State based on an alleged violation of the Human Rights Law is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442). Since the petitioner was no longer associated with the respondent as of October 1983 and did not commence the instant proceeding until December 1986, her discrimination claim is time barred.

Civil actions for damages under Executive Law § 296 have a three-year limitations period under CPLR 214 (2).

Stoetzel v. Wappingers Central School District · filed 1990-10-22

It is well established that the institution of civil actions to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296 is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations prescribed in CPLR 214 (2) (see, Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Jones v State of New York, 149 AD2d 470; Koeppel v Wachtler, 141 AD2d 613).

An action for damages under Executive Law § 296 is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Alaimo v. New York City Department of Sanitation · filed 1994-04-25

We further note that the commencement of the instant action to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296 is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations prescribed in CPLR 214 (2) ... and the plaintiff here filed his complaint within the three-year ... limitations period.

Claims under § 296 have a three-year limitations period.

Fern v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1994-05-19(1)(a)

Addressing first the timeliness of plaintiff’s first cause of action based upon defendant’s failure to consider him for reimbursement under the Plan, we note that the applicable statute of limitations period for actions arising under Executive Law § 296 is three years (Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442).

An action for damages under § 296 has a three-year statute of limitations.

Lane-Weber v. Plainedge Union Free School District · filed 1995-03-20

Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, an action to recover damages for discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296 is governed by a three year Statute of Limitation as prescribed by CPLR 214 (2) (see, Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442; Mills v County of Monroe, 89 AD2d 776, affd 59 NY2d 307, cert denied 464 US 1018; Alaimo v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 203 AD2d 501).

A claim under § 296(2)(a) is subject to a three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(2).

Karczewski v. Sharpe · filed 1999-04-26(2)(a)

The plaintiffs motion for leave to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action alleging a violation of Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) was properly denied as it was made after the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (2).

An action under § 296 is subject to a three-year limitations period, which is not tolled by pursuing a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.

Mitchell v. Nassau Community College · filed 1999-10-18

The Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiff’s action to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices was time-barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (see, Koerner v State of New York-Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442, 446; Alaimo v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 203 AD2d 501; Yasinosky v New York City Tr. Auth., 193 AD2d 731). While the plaintiff exercised his right to pursue a grievance proceeding against the defendant as permitted by the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiffs invocation of this alternate remedy did not toll the Statute of Limitations (see, Matter of Queensborough Community Coll. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 NY2d 926; Roufaiel v Ithaca Coll., 241 AD2d 865; Bitterman v Herricks Teachers’ Assn., 220 AD2d 473; Matter ofVasbinder v Hartnett, 129 AD2d 894).

A constructive discharge claim under Section 296 accrues when the employee delivers a written resignation, even if the resignation takes effect later.

Clark v. State · filed 2001-01-31

As in Flaherty (supra), this court finds Clark’s claim accrued the date she delivered her written resignation, October 4, 1985, even though not effective until October 7, 1985. The three-year limitations period expired October 4, 1988.

An employment discrimination claim under Section 296 accrues when an adverse employment decision is made and communicated to the employee.

Cordone v. Wilens & Baker, P. C. · filed 2001-09-13

It is settled that an employment discrimination claim accrues on the date that an adverse employment determination is made and communicated to the plaintiff (Delaware State Coll. v Ricks, 449 US 250, 258).

Claims under Executive Law § 296 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Kwarren v. American Airlines · filed 2003-03-31

Further, the plaintiffs causes of action alleging violations of Executive Law § 296 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307 [1983]). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory conduct prior to October 1995 are time-barred.

A claim under Section 296 against a school district is subject to Education Law § 3813 (2-b)'s one-year limitation period.

Amorosi v. S COLONIE SCH DIST. · filed 2007-12-18

Despite any provision for a longer statute of limitations, such as the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (2), as urged by petitioner, the one-year limitation prescribed in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) should govern discrimination claims against a school district.

Section 296 employment discrimination and retaliation claims may be subject to an enforceable contractual six-month filing deadline.

Hunt v. Raymour & Flanigan · filed 2013-04-24

The plaintiffs contentions that the shortened limitations period set forth in the employment application was not applicable or was unenforceable are without merit. Accordingly, since the plaintiff commenced this action more than six months after the date his employment was terminated, the first and second causes of action insofar as asserted against R & F should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1).

Claims under Executive Law § 296 have a three-year statute of limitations.

Cahill v. State of New York Stony Brook University Hospital · filed 2016-05-11

Causes of action alleging violations of Executive Law § 296 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Koerner v State of N.Y., Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442, 447 [1984]; Kwarren v American Airlines, 303 AD2d 722 [2003]).

Claims under Executive Law § 296 have a three-year statute of limitations.

Williams v. City of Yonkers · filed 2018-04-25

Causes of action brought under Executive Law § 296 have a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[2]; Cahill v State of N.Y. Stony Brook Univ. Hosp., 139 AD3d 779, 780; Kwarren v American Airlines, 303 AD2d 722).

A § 296 claim seeking individual money damages from a county is subject to a one-year-and-90-day limitations period.

Weslowski v. Zugibe · filed 2018-12-19

Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court should have determined that the third cause of action, alleging violation of Executive Law § 296, was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations of one year and 90 days ( see County Law § 52; General Municipal Law § 50-i[1][c]; Piontka v Suffolk County Police Dept. , 202 AD2d 409, 410; Geslak v Suffolk County , 2008 WL 620732, *2-3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, *5-6 [ED NY, Mar. 5, 2008, No. 06-CV-251 (NGG) (AKT)]), since the plaintiff sought to vindicate his individual interest, in the form of money damages, for an alleged invasion of his personal and/or property rights ( see Nostrom v County of Suffolk , 100 AD3d 974, 975; Zarate v Nassau County Med. Ctr. , 9 AD3d 427, 427-428; Hibbert v Suffolk County Dept. of Probation , 267 AD2d 205).

Claims alleging discrimination under Executive Law § 296 must be commenced within three years of the alleged discriminatory practice.

Mouscardy v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2020-07-01

Actions alleging discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL must be commenced within three years after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice or act of discriminatory harassment ( see CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code § 8-502[d]; Mejia v T.N. 888 Eighth Ave. LLC Co. , 169 AD3d 613, 613-614).

A denial of an employment application is a single act, so the continuing violation exception does not toll the limitations period for a claim under § 296(15).

Carrington v. New York State Off. for People With Dev. Disabilities · filed 2019-03-15(15)

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the denial of an employment application is a single act rather than an ongoing policy of discrimination, and thus the continuing violation exception did not apply to toll the statute of limitations ( see generally Burroughs Corp. , 73 AD2d at 801; Martinez-Tolentino , 277 AD2d at 899).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment; claims under it are subject to a three-year limitations period that can be tolled by an EEOC charge.

Gabin v. Greenwich House, Inc. · filed 2022-11-15(1)(a)

Plaintiff's action, asserting claims of age discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]) and the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code § 8-107), was timely commenced, as the three-year statute of limitations was tolled by her filing of a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ( see Martinez-Tolentino v Buffalo State Coll. , 277 AD2d 899 [4th Dept 2000]; see also DeNigris v New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. , 861 F Supp 2d 185 [SD NY 2012]; Butler v New York Health & Racquet Club , 768 F Supp 2d 516, 536 [SD NY 2011]; Nixon v TWC Admin. LLC , 2017 WL 4712420 at *3-4, 2017 US Dist LEXIS 160175, *8-10 [SD NY, Sept. 27, 2017, No. 16-CV-6456 (AJN)]).

A cause of action under section 296 has a three-year statute of limitations.

Richardson v. Tops Mkts., LLC · filed 2025-11-21

A cause of action based on Executive Law § 296 is governed by the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214 (2) ( see Goldin v Engineers Country Club , 54 AD3d 658, 659 [2d Dept 2008], lv dismissed in part & denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]; Henderson v Town of Van Buren , 15 AD3d 980, 981 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 710 [2005]; Karczewski v Sharpe , 260 AD2d 606, 606 [2d Dept 1999], lv dismissed 94 NY2d 858 [1999]).

A discriminatory discharge claim under Section 296 has a three-year statute of limitations.

Horan v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 2003-10-23

The complaint alleges that defendant terminated plaintiffs employment solely because of his disability due to alcoholism, in violation of New York State Executive Law § 296. An action for discriminatory discharge is governed by a three-year statute of limitations, and this action is clearly untimely, having been commenced more than three years after plaintiffs termination (Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442, 447 [1984]).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination because of disability, and covers claims based on an employer’s misperception of disability even without discriminatory animus.

Makinen v. City of New York · filed 2014-09-30(l)(a)

The NYSHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f|or an employer .... because of an individual’s ... disability ... to discriminate against such individual ... in [the] terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). ... This Court agrees with Nelson’s analysis and holds that Plaintiffs’ claims are cognizable under the ADA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Section 296(1)(a) protects a nondisabled employee whom an employer wrongly perceives as impaired.

Ashker v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1990-12-06(1)(a)

The statutory language is sufficiently broad, and the legislative history sufficiently supportive of an interpretation (see, Executive Dept mem, 1983 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2705-2706), that nondisabled individuals like plaintiff, whom an employer wrongfully perceives as impaired, come within its reach (see, Doe v Roe, Inc., 160 AD2d 255, 256).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on a perception that someone is HIV-positive, whether or not that perception is correct.

Petri v. Bank of New York Co. · filed 1992-02-11(1)(a)

It follows then that the statute bans discrimination based upon the perception, correct or not, that someone is HIV-positive.

Section 296 (1) (a) covers discrimination against a person mistakenly perceived to have a disability.

Scardace v. Mid Island Hospital, Inc. · filed 2005-08-01(1)(a)

Although Scardace was not infected with the HIV-virus, he may nevertheless seek redress pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), “on the theory that, having been mistakenly evaluated as being at a higher than normal risk of HIV infection, he was incorrectly thought to be affected by a disability” (Matter of North Shore Univ. Hosp. v Rosa, 194 AD2d 727, 729 [1993], affd 86 NY2d 413 [1995]; see Doe v Roe, Inc., 160 AD2d, 255, 256 [1990]).

Section 296(1)(a) reaches employer sex discrimination, while § 296(6) permits personal aider-and-abettor liability for an individual who actually participates in discriminatory conduct; a supervisor may also be individually liable under § 296(1) only with an ownership interest or authority to do more than carry out others’ personnel decisions.

Perks v. Town of Huntington · filed 2003-03-12(1)(a), (6)

An individual supervisor such as Scarpati-Reilly can be sued under Section 296(1) but only if she is shown either to have an ownership interest or the power “to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... Section 296(6) of the NYHRL, however, provides a broader source of personal liability. Under Section 296(6), it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” ... The Second Circuit has interpreted this language to mean that “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally hable” as an aider and abettor under the NYHRL, even if that defendant has neither an ownership interest nor the power to hire and fire.

Section 296(1)(a) permits individual supervisor liability only when the supervisor has an ownership interest or authority beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions, while § 296(6) permits broader individual liability for a person who aids or abets discrimination or actually participates in it.

Gentile v. Town of Huntington · filed 2003-10-22(1)(a), (6)

An individual supervisor such as Richard may be sued under Section 296(1) but only if he is shown either to have an ownership interest or the “power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... Individual liability under section 296(1) is limited and includes only supervisors, who themselves, have the authority to “hire and fire” employees. ... In any event, the plaintiffs NYSHRL claims may be maintained against Richard because section 296(6) provides a broader sense of personal liability. Section 296(6) makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” ... Thus, because the complaint alleges that Richard “actually participate[d] in the conduct giving rise to [the] discrimination claim,” Richard can be held individually liable under NYSHRL.

Section 296(1) places general workplace-discrimination liability on employers, while § 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting when the individual actually participates in the discriminatory conduct, even if the individual is a primary actor.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rotary Corp. · filed 2003-12-29(1), (6)

Though the Second Circuit did not indicate in which ways such liability is possible, employees escape individual liability under the NYHRL’s general discrimination provision, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1). Under that provision, like Title VII’s general discrimination provision, only employers may be held liable for discriminatory conduct occurring in or by virtue of the workplace. Thus, the most plausible reading of the Second Circuit’s statement is that individuals may be liable under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6), which makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NYHRL], or to attempt to do so.” This provision, known as the aiding and abetting provision, is invoked where an individual defendant “ ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim’ ” under the general discrimination provision. ... To the extent that Makarwich and Barry claim they cannot be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision because they were the primary actors in the alleged discrimination under Section 296(1), such an argument — though certainly not devoid of logic and perhaps policy support — is rejected in light of Mandell and for the same reasons it was rejected in Bennett, 225 F.Supp2d at 214, which will not be repeated and explained again here.

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for an individual who aids, abets, or actually participates in discriminatory conduct; § 296(1) does not impose liability on a supervisor who is not the plaintiff’s employer.

Pfeiffer v. Lewis County · filed 2004-03-17(6), (1)

LaDuc can be held personally liable under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6), which makes it an unlawful act to “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Under this section of the HRL, “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable.” ... Because there is sufficient evidence upon which a fair-minded trier of fact could reasonably conclude that LaDuc actually participated in the conduct giving rise to a hostile work environment, under New York law, he is subject to personal liability. ... Plaintiff seeks to hold Jock liable under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1) on the theory that Jock and the County were, her “joint employers.” ... Although Jock necessarily had some authority over Plaintiff as her supervisor, he was not her employer. ... Having failed to demonstrate any basis for imposing liability against Jock under the HRL, that claim is dismissed.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability under the NYSHRL for aiding and abetting discrimination when the plaintiff has adequately pleaded discrimination by a principal employer.

Naula v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2025-03-30(6)

Defendants argue that Principal Klager cannot be held liable under NYSHRL because an individual may only be held liable under the NYSHRL for aiding and abetting discrimination. See Def. Mem. at 34 (citing N.Y. Exec Law § 296(6)). But the Court has not dismissed Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against the DOE; thus, Plaintiff can still seek to hold Principal Klager individually liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under the NYSHRL. See Nezaj, 719 F. Supp. 3d at 333 (finding, “as a predicate to claiming aiding and abetting discrimination, a plaintiff must have pled discrimination by a principal”).

Section 296 permits individual-employee liability for discriminatory conduct only when the employee is the employer or owner, can make personnel decisions, or participates in the discriminatory conduct; an aiding-and-abetting claim requires employer liability or the individual employee’s participation in that conduct.

Evans-Gadsden v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, LLP · filed 2004-08-06(l)(a), (6)

The Second Circuit, and subsequent decisions by district courts, have found that § 296 allows for an individual employee to be liable for discriminatory conduct only if that employee (a) has an ownership interest in the employer, or is the employer, (b) the power to make, rather than carry out, personnel decisions or (c) actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim. ... As indicated above, the Plaintiff may also state a claim against the Individual Defendants under § 296(6), which makes it unlawful for “any person” to aid or abet the violation of the statute. ... Pursuant to § 296(6), one of two showings must be made: (1) that the employer has already been found liable for discrimination; or (2) a lesser showing, that the individual employee participated in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Section 296 permits liability for an individual employee who is the employer or owns the employer, has power to make personnel decisions, or actually participates in the discriminatory conduct, and § 296(6) prohibits aiding and abetting discrimination.

Abdi v. Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC · filed 2006-08-16(1)(a), (6)

Section 296 imposes liability on an individual employee only if that employee (a) has an ownership interest in the employer, or is the employer; (b) has the power to make, rather than carry out, personnel decisions; or (c) actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim. See Hicks v. IBM, 44 F.Supp.2d 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y.1999).

Section 296(1)(e) prohibits employer discrimination in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on protected characteristics, and § 296(6) imposes individual liability on a person who actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Gad-Tadros v. Bessemer Venture Partners · filed 2004-07-26(1)(e), (6)

The plaintiff also asserts claims of employment discrimination and retaliation against the corporate defendants BVP and DMC pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(e). The NYHRL provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be unlawful discriminatory practice ... for an employer ... because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex ... to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. ... Because the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, she has also adequately pleaded these claims against BVP and DMC for purposes of the NYSHRL. ... Section 296(6) of the NYHRL states that it is unlawful discriminatory practice for “any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has held that this language imposes individual liability on “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” even though the employee is not alleged to have any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. ... The Court finds that these allegations sufficiently set forth a cause of action for individual liability under the NYHRL.

Section 296(6) permits a discrimination claim against an individual who aids or abets prohibited acts, without requiring an employer-employee relationship or that the individual be a supervisor or employer.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2005-07-05(6)

The New York Executive Law does not require that an employer-employee relationship exist to maintain a cause of action under state law. Section 296(6) of the statute provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article.” ... However, as stated above, Section 296(6) of the N.Y. Exec, law permits actions against individuals, not only supervisors or employers.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for persons who aid and abet an employer's discriminatory acts, and the plaintiff must first establish liability for the employer's discrimination.

Goldschmidt v. New York State Affordable Housing Corp. · filed 2005-08-08(6)

Under the same facts, plaintiffs claims against defendants Becker, Drillings, and White for aiding and abetting the agencies’ discriminatory termination of Goldschmidt survive summary judgment. ... The Second Circuit has held that an employee may be held individually liable under § 296(6) as an aider and abettor, irrespective of whether he had power to do more than carry out personnel decisions.

Section 296(6) imposes individual liability on a person who actually participates in conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim, even without power beyond carrying out personnel decisions made by others.

Tardd v. Brookhaven National Laboratory · filed 2006-01-07(6)

Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL states that it is unlawful discriminatory practice for “any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has held that this language imposes individual liability on “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” even though the employee is not alleged to have any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. ... That reasoning in that regard is equally applicable here. Thus, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted with respect to White’s NYSHRL claim against the defendant Foster, and otherwise denied.

Section 296(6) makes aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing acts forbidden by the NYSHRL unlawful and imposes individual liability on a person who actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Peres v. Oceanside Union Free School District · filed 2006-03-31(6)

Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL states that it is a unlawful discriminatory practice for “any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). The Second Circuit has held that this language imposes individual liability on a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.

Section 296(6) permits a discrimination action against an individual even when the individual is not a supervisor or employer.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2006-05-13(6)

However, as previously stated in the Court’s July 5, 2005 Order, Section 296(6) of the N.Y. Exec, law permits actions against individuals, not only supervisors or employers.

Sections 296(6) and 296(7), read together, allow an individual defendant to be liable for actually participating in or aiding and abetting an employer’s retaliatory conduct, but accessory liability requires liability of the employer or principal first.

Patane v. Clark · filed 2006-06-21(6), (7)

These two subsections are read in concert and an individual defendant may be held liable under the NYHRL for actual participation in or aiding and abetting an employer’s retaliatory conduct. ... In New York, liability must first be established as to the employer/prineipal before accessory liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor.

Section 296 permits individual liability for discrimination by an owner or supervisor with authority to hire and fire under subsection (1), and for a person who actually participates in or aids and abets the discriminatory conduct under subsection (6).

Banks v. Correctional Services Corp. · filed 2007-02-15(1), (6)

Pursuant to NYHRL § 296 an individual may be liable as either an employer or as an “aider or abetter.” ... Individual liability under Section 296(1) has been limited to individuals with ownership interest or “supervisors, who themselves, have the authority to ‘hire and fire employees.’ ” ... According to the Second Circuit, this language imposes individual liability on “a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” irrespective of whether the individual possesses power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Section 296(1)(a) limits discrimination liability to employers, while § 296(7) permits individual liability for retaliation when the individual actually participates in the retaliatory conduct.

Nokaj v. Pappas New York · filed 2025-08-15(1)(a) and (7)

“NYSHRL permits liability for discrimination by employers only.” ... “Therefore, Licul and Turcinovic are not employers for purposes of the NYSHRL, and the discrimination claims against them must be dismissed. ... “The NYSHRL and NYCHRL both permit individual liability of any person for retaliatory acts regardless of whether the individual can be considered an employer,” so long as the “individual defendant . . . ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to’ the plaintiff's retaliation claim.” ... “But, again, the Amended Complaint does not allege that Licul and Turcinovic personally participated in any retaliatory conduct, so Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against them for retaliation under either NYSHRL or NYSCHRL.”

Section 296(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on disability, and § 296(6) permits personal liability for an employee who actually participates in aiding or abetting an employer’s discriminatory conduct.

Martinez · filed 2026-01-06(1), (6)

Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL contain identical provisions that state, “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(6). “The NYSHRL permits an employee to be held liable for aiding and abetting a liable employer.” Nanakumo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 23-CV-00314 (ALC), 2025 WL 919479, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025). “To be liable under [the NYSHRL], an individual employee need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but must have ‘actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.’” Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Under the NYHRL, an employer’s individual agents may be held personally liable for discriminatory conduct.

Pasqualini v. MortgageIT, Inc. · filed 2007-07-27

We note, and defendants do not dispute, that individual liability is possible under the NYHRL and plaintiffs may therefore proceed on those claims against the individual defendants.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting unlawful discriminatory practices.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2008-02-06(6)

These provisions impose liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices. ... the Second Circuit has held that individuals can be held liable under these specific state and city statutory provisions. ... This Court, following the decision of the Second Circuit, will not dismiss Plaintiffs state and city law claims against Tefft.

Section 296 allows an individual supervisor to be sued either as an employer when the supervisor has an ownership interest or authority beyond carrying out others' personnel decisions, or as an aider or abettor who participates in forbidden discriminatory acts.

Lopes v. Caffe Centrale LLC · filed 2008-04-16(1), (6)

An individual may be liable under the NYSHRL either as an employer, under Section 296(1), or as an “aider or abettor,” under Section 296(6). ... “The New York Court of Appeals has held that an employee is not individually subject to suit under § 296 of the HRL as an employer ‘if he is not shown to have any ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.’ ” ... However, irrespective of an employee’s power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others, an employee can be held liable for acts which “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.”

Section 296(6) permits personal liability for an individual employee who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, while Section 296(1) does not impose liability on an employee without ownership or hiring-and-firing power.

Miotto v. Yonkers Public Schools · filed 2008-01-22(1), (6)

Under the aiding and abetting provision of NYHRL, an individual employee who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable. ... Although defendants argue that this conduct was “years prior” to the incident at issue, and that they knew nothing of the current incident until the complaint was made, plaintiff has pled that defendants, as employees of the District, had knowledge or acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct of their co-worker, Westhoff, sufficiently to survive this motion to dismiss. Under the circumstances, it is plausible that plaintiff can prove a set of facts which will support her claim. Pierorazio and Mazzola’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs New York Executive Law claim as against them is therefore denied.

Section 296 permits individual liability for discriminatory conduct only when the individual actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Westbrook v. City University of New York · filed 2008-12-19

Similarly, an individual cannot be held liable for discriminatory conduct under the NYSHRL unless that individual “actually participate^ in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.”

Section 296 prohibits employment discrimination and retaliation, permits individual liability for supervisors with authority to hire and fire, and permits aiding-and-abetting liability for supervisors or coworkers who actually participate in discriminatory conduct.

Carmody v. Village of Rockville Centre · filed 2009-09-30(1)(a), (1)(e), (1), (6)

Section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status .... ” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). With respect to retaliation, Section 296 provides that it is unlawful for any employer to “discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article .... ” Id. § 296(l)(e). Analysis of a retaliation claim under Section 296 is the same as that under Title VII. ... Unlike Title VII, however, Section 296 provides for individual liability. Under Section 296(1), a supervisor may be held liable as an “employer” if he or she has “the authority to ‘hire and fire’ employees.” ... In addition, both supervisors and co-workers may be held individually liable under an aiding and abetting theory where he or she “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.”

Section 296 permits individual liability under the NYSHRL where the individual has an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out others' personnel decisions, or actually participates in the discriminatory conduct.

Stevens v. New York · filed 2009-11-23

Claims of discrimination in violation of New York’s Human Rights Law can also be brought against individuals. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. Under this provision, an individual can be liable if he has an “ownership interest or ... power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others,” or if he “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317. ... Therefore, any individual liability under the NYSHR hinges on whether the accused actually participated in the alleged discriminatory conduct.

Section 296(1) does not impose individual liability on persons who lacked the power to take the adverse employment action, while § 296(6) permits individual liability under an aiding-and-abetting theory for actual participation in discriminatory conduct.

Frank v. Lawrence Union Free School District · filed 2010-02-22(1), (6)

The Court agrees that Dr. Fitzsimons, Mr. Akst and Ms. Lineal lacked the power to deny Mr. Frank tenure or fire him. But that absolves them of individual liability only under N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1). It does not shield them from individual liability under an aiding and abetting theory, as set forth in § 296(6).

Section 296(1) permits personal liability for a supervisor who qualifies as an employer through ownership or authority beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions; section 296(6) permits personal liability for an individual who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, even when that conduct is the sole predicate for the employer’s liability.

Maher v. ALLIANCE MORTGAGE BANKING CORP. · filed 2009-09-03(1), (6)

A supervisor may be subject to personal liability under § 296(1) of the NYSHRL where such individual has been deemed an “employer” for purposes of the NYSHRL. ... This Court accepts as it must the interpretation of § 296(6) set forth in Tomka, declines to follow Hicks, and likewise holds that until the Second Circuit revisits this issue, an individual may be liable under § 296(6) for aiding and abetting an unlawful discriminatory practice of his employer even where his conduct serves as the sole predicate for the employer’s liability.

Section 296(1) permits individual liability for an employee with an ownership interest or authority to do more than carry out others’ personnel decisions, while section 296(6) permits individual aiding-and-abetting liability for actual participation in discriminatory conduct, including potentially failing to take adequate remedial action.

Pellegrini v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc. · filed 2010-09-15(1), (6)

Unlike Title VII though, the NYSHRL provides several bases upon which an individual employee may be held liable. First, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), individual liability attaches where an employee is shown to have an “ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decision made by others.” ... Employees may also be held individually liable under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6) for, among other things, aiding and abetting discriminatory practices. ... Critical to this case, the Second Circuit has held that an individual may be liable under § 296(6) where he “not only took no action to remedy [the alleged] behavior although [he] was aware of it, but also terminated [plaintiffs] employment on the basis of Impermissible factors.” ... While the Feingold court did not explicitly state that an intermediate supervisor’s failure to take any remedial action is sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting, this court concludes that Laurin and Hamzaoui’s alleged conduct in ignoring, writing off, discouraging, and failing to investigate Pellegrini’s complaints could amount to acquiescence in and aiding and abetting of the creation of a hostile work environment. ... There is no evidence, however, that Laurin or Hamzaoui participated in any retaliatory conduct. ... And as to Koroso, there is no question that her actions in handling Pellegrini’s complaints and terminating Pellegrini, if performed on an impermissible basis, would subject her to liability under § 296(6) as well.

Section 296(6) permits personal or aiding-and-abetting liability for knowledgeable, intentional participation in discriminatory conduct, but an individual cannot aid and abet his own conduct; section 296(7) makes retaliation for protected complaints actionable.

Raneri v. McCAREY · filed 2010-05-13(6), (7)

Under New York Executive Law § 296(6), an employee may be held personally liable if he actually participated in the discriminatory conduct complained of. ... This claim is actionable under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7), but not Title VII, due to the statute of limitations. ... Under New York State Executive Law § 296(6), it is “unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet ... or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” Liability may be imposed on the County where it is established that there was a knowledgeable and intentional participation on its part in the unlawful conduct charged. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... An individual cannot aid and abet his own alleged discriminatory conduct.

Section 296 permits an individual defendant to be held liable under the NYHRL when the individual is alleged to have participated in discrimination.

D'Lima v. Cuba Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2011-06-15

The NYHRL is cognizable against an individual, such as Boser, who is alleged to have participated in discrimination. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.

Section 296 prohibits sex discrimination and retaliation and permits individual liability for employees who have authority over personnel decisions or aid and abet a discriminatory practice.

Atkinson v. New York State Olympic Regional Development Authority · filed 2011-09-30(l)(a), (l)(e), (6)

Section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of, inter alia, sex. ... It also makes it unlawful for any employer to “discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden” under § 296. ... Unlike Title VII, the NYSHRL provides for individual liability in certain circumstances. First, an individual employee may be personally liable if he is shown to “have any ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... Second, individual liability attaches where “any person,” inter alia, aids or abets any discriminatory practice forbidden under § 296. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... To be liable under § 296(6), a plaintiff must show that “the individual aided or abetted a primary violation of the NYSHRL committed by another employee or the business itself.”

Section 296(6) makes aiding or abetting prohibited discrimination unlawful; an individual need not have supervisory or hiring-and-firing power but must have actually participated in the discriminatory conduct.

Davis-Bell v. Columbia University · filed 2012-03-19(6)

Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL provides for “aiding and abetting” § 296(1)(a) violations, explaining that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article or to attempt to do so.” ... To be found liable under § 296(6), an individual need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but still must have “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination.”

Section 296(6) permits individual liability under the New York Human Rights Law when a person aids, abets, incites, compels, coerces, or attempts to engage in a forbidden discriminatory act, even if the person is not an employer.

Sloth v. Constellation Brands, Inc. · filed 2012-06-08(6)

First, under the New York Human Rights Law, individual defendants may be held liable for discrimination if it can be shown that they have “aidfed], abet[ted], incite[d], compelled] or coeree[d] the doing of any ... forbidden [discriminatory act]” under this article, or attempted] to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Therefore, individuals who may or not be employers as that term is defined in the Human Rights Law may nevertheless be held personally liable for employment discrimination under § 296 of the Human Rights Law.

Section 296 makes individuals liable for discrimination as employers only when they have ownership or hiring-and-firing authority, but also permits aider-and-abettor liability for actual participation and prohibits retaliation for opposing unlawful practices.

Edwards v. Jericho Union Free School District · filed 2012-11-16(1), (1)(a), (6), (7)

An individual may be liable for discrimination in violation of the NYHRL as either an employer, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), or as an “aider and abettor,” id. § 296(6). Section 296(1) of the New York Executive Law prohibits an “employer” from discriminating based upon the “race, creed, [or] color” of an employee or job applicant. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). Individuals are liable as employers under Section 296(1) only if they have “an ownership interest,” or if they “themselves, have the authority to ‘hire and fire’ employees.” ... Section 296(6), however, “provides a broader sense of personal liability” under the NYHRL. ... An individual can be liable under Section 296(6) so long as he “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” ... Section 296(7) of the NYHRL prohibits “any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.... ” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7).

Section 296(1) governs discriminatory employment actions by employers, § 296(7) prohibits retaliation by any person for opposing forbidden practices, and § 296(6) imposes aider-and-abettor liability on a person who actually participates in the violation.

Malena v. Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC · filed 2012-08-16(1), (6), (7)

Individual liability may lie under § 296(1) but is “limited to individuals with *366ownership interest or supervisors, who themselves, have the authority to hire and fire employees.” ... Accordingly, O’Malley cannot be held directly liable as an employer under the NYSHRL’s § 296(1) and is granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs discrimination claim pursuant to that section. ... The NYSHRL also provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under this article.” ... O’Malley may be subject to liability under this provision because it applies to “any person,” not only employers. ... The NYSHRL’s § 296(6) states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article [including discrimination and retaliation], or to attempt to do so.” ... To be liable under § 296(6), an individual employee need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but must have “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.”

Section 296(1)(a) permits individual liability for employment discrimination only when the individual has an ownership interest or authority to hire and fire employees; § 296(6) separately permits aider-and-abettor liability.

Warshun v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc. · filed 2013-08-01(1)(a)

However, the Court does not make a similar determination with respect to the Plaintiffs’ NYSHRL gender discrimination claim against the Individual Defendants because an individual may be liable for discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL as either an employer, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), or as an “aider and abettor,” id. § 296(6). Section 296(1) of the New York Executive Law prohibits an “employer” from discriminating based upon the “race, creed, [or] color” of an employee or job applicant. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a). Individuals are liable as employers under Section 296(1) only if they have “an ownership interest,” or if they “themselves, have the authority to ‘hire and fire’ employees.”

Under § 296(6), a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can constitute actual participation, but the defendant must qualify as a supervisor.

Conklin v. County of Suffolk · filed 2012-05-03(6)

Moreover, Conklin’s claim against Garcia under NYSHRL 296(6) does not survive because although “a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can rise to the level of ‘actual participation’ under [NYHRL] § 296(6)”, Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel *445Auth., 77 F.Supp.2d 376, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1999), the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Garcia qualifies as a supervisor.

Section 296 permits individual liability when a person is the employer in an individual capacity or aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces discriminatory conduct.

Matusick v. Erie County Water Authority · filed 2014-01-06(1)(a), (6)

Under section 296, a person can be found individually liable for violations of the State’s Human Rights law if either (1) he or she can be said to constitute the employer in his or her own individual capacity, see Patrowich v. Chem. Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 543, 473 N.E.2d 11, 13, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (1984); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(l)(a); or (2) if he or she “aid[s], abet[s], incite[s], eompel[s] or coerce[s] the discriminatory conduct,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).

Section 296(6) makes an individual liable for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, coercing, or attempting to do an act of discrimination forbidden by the NYSHRL.

Glaser v. Gap Inc. · filed 2014-01-31(6)

Under the NYSHRL, an individual may be held liable for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing any act of discrimination forbidden by the NYSHRL or attempting to do so. ... Defendants have not otherwise established the requisite absence of genuine issues of material fact to warrant summary judgment, and their motion is DENIED with respect to the “aid and abet” claim against Mejorado.

Section 296 permits individual liability when an individual is the employer in his or her own capacity or aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces discriminatory conduct; passive acceptance of a hearing officer’s recommendation may be insufficient, while direct participation with knowledge of harassment can support aider-and-abettor liability.

Matusick v. Erie County Water Authority · filed 2014-02-25(1)(a), (6)

Under section 296, a person can be found individually liable for violations of the State’s Human Rights law if either (1) he or she can be said to constitute the employer in his or her own individual capacity, see Patrowich v. Chem. Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 543, 473 N.E.2d 11, 13, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (1984); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a); or (2) if he or she “aid[s], abet[s], incite[s], compel[s] or coercefs] the discriminatory conduct,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). ... The defendants’ argument that there was insufficient evidence to establish that other individual defendants — Kuryak, who investigated the disciplinary charges, and Lisinksi, the Coordinator of Employee Relations — aided and abetted the improper dismissal also fails. ... The jury’s conclusion as to the responsibility of Kuryak and Lisinksi as aiders and abettors of the ECWA must stand.

Section 296(1) permits individual liability under the NYSHRL for owners of an employer who have authority to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Suffolk Laundry Services, Inc. · filed 2014-10-01(1)

In sum, because they are co-owners of Suffolk Laundry with the authority to “do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others,” the Sullivans are subject to individual liability under § 296(1).

Section 296(1) permits discrimination liability against an individual who qualifies as an employer, including one with power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Marinen v. City of New York · filed 2016-03-01(1)

Under the NYSHRL, “an individual is properly subject to liability for discrimination when that individual qualifies as an ‘employer.’” Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)). “An individual qualifies as an ’employer’ when that individual has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the ‘power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.’” Id. (quoting Patrowich v. Chem. Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y.1984) (per curiam)).

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discrimination when the individual actually participates in another party's discriminatory conduct; an individual cannot aid and abet their own violation, and there must be an underlying violation by another party.

Bliss v. MXK Restaurant Corp. · filed 2016-11-14(6)

Under the NYSHRL, it is unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to' do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). A defendant violates this section when he “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” ... First, "as a matter of law as well as logic, “an individual cannot aid or abet his or her own violation of the Human Rights Law.” ... Second, “[w]here no violation of the Human Rights Law by another party has been established ... an individual employee cannot be held liable for aiding or abetting such a violation.”

Section 296(6) permits individual defendants to be sued personally when they aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce conduct prohibited by the NYSHRL.

Johnson v. J. Walter Thompson U.S.A., LLC · filed 2016-12-13(6)

“[I]ndivid-ual defendants may be sued in their personal capacities,” Lopes, 548 F.Supp.2d at 54, where they “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce” an action prohibited by State and City Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(6).

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits sex discrimination by an employer in compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, but an employee without ownership or personnel decision-making power is not individually liable.

Martin v. New York State · filed 2019-05-09(1)(a)

The HRL provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . for an employer or licensing agency, because of . . . sex . . . to discriminate against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... It is well established, however, that an employee “is not individually subject to suit with respect to discrimination based on . . . sex under [the HRL] . . . if he is not shown to have any ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... Because he was not an “employer,” Rorick is not subject to liability under the HRL.

Section 296(1)(a) permits individual liability for owners or supervisors with authority to hire and fire, while § 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on a coworker who actually participates in discriminatory conduct even without hiring or firing authority.

Smith v. Factory Direct Enterprises LLC · filed 2019-09-05(1)(a), (6)

The NYHRL provides for the imposition of liability on individual defendants under two of its provisions: §§ 296(1) and 296(6). “Individual liability under § 296(1) ... is limited to individuals with ownership interest or supervisors, who themselves have the authority to hire and fire employees.” ... Section 296(6) of the NYHRL attaches individual liability to “aiding and abetting” § 296(1)(a) violations.” ... The Second Circuit has construed Section 296(6) to extend to a co-worker who “‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim’ ... even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.” ... Here, the Complaint asserts bases for holding Chrinian liable under either prong. ... Second, assuming Chrinian lacked such authority, these allegations directly allege that he actually participated in the discriminatory conduct, so that the Plaintiff easily states a claim for aiding and abetting liability under Section 296(6). Therefore, the Court dismisses the individual claims against Chrinian under Title VII, but not the NYHRL.

Section 296(6) can impose liability on a coworker who aids and abets the employer’s unlawful discrimination, even without authority to hire or fire, but only when employer liability is first established.

De Figueroa v. New York State, State University of New York at Stony Brook · filed 2019-09-05(6)

“The NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: [(1)] if the defendant has ‘an ownership interest’ in the employer or has ‘the authority to hire and fire employees,’ [N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)], [or (2)] if the defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).”

Section 296(6) permits individual aider-and-abettor liability only after liability has been established against the employer.

Seitz v. New York State · filed 2019-09-30(6)

Crucially, however, the liability of an employer must be established as a predicate to individual liability for aiding and abetting. ... In light of these allegations, Plaintiff must first establish a viable claim of liability against the University under § 296(1) of the NYSHRL; only then could she assert claims against the Individual Defendants under § 296(6) for aiding and abetting the University’s violations of the NYSHRL. As discussed supra, however, Plaintiff cannot do so because the University and New York State are immune from NYSHRL claims under the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 296(7) makes retaliation for opposing practices forbidden by the NYSHRL unlawful and permits individual liability when the individual actually participates in the retaliatory conduct.

Olaechea v. City Of New York · filed 2019-09-30(7)

Unlike Title VII, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL provide for individual liability in retaliation cases. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7) (providing that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person... to retaliate or discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL]”); NYCHRL § 8--107(1)(7) (same with respect to practices forbidden under the NYCHRL). Individual liability under those provisions, as their text suggests, is limited to where “an individual defendant ... ‘actually participates in the conduct giving rise to’ the plaintiffs retaliation claim[s].”

Section 296(1) permits individual liability for an employer who actually participates in the discriminatory conduct; an employer is an individual with an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out personnel decisions.

Deveaux v. Skechers USA, Inc. · filed 2020-04-09(1)

Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), individual liability may be imposed on an “employer” who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination.”

Section 296(1)(a) allows individual employer liability when an individual owns the organization or has power beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions, while § 296(6) permits aider-and-abettor liability even for the person who committed the underlying discrimination and permits pleading the theories in the alternative.

Colbert v. FSA Store, Inc. · filed 2020-04-27(1)(a), (6)

NYSHRL makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, because of an individual’s . . . race . . . to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). An individual is liable as an “employer” under Section 296(1) “when that individual has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others,” i.e., the power to hire or fire. ... Tomka held that defendants could be found liable under Section 296(6) even though they were responsible for the underlying conduct giving rise to direct liability for their employer. ... Likewise, here, the allegation that Miller caused FSA Store to terminate Plaintiff’s employment is sufficient to satisfy 296(6). ... It is sufficient to state that the Federal Rules permit claims to be plead as an alternative, to wit, if Plaintiff fails to establish that Miller is an owner he is liable as an aider and abettor.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting unlawful discriminatory acts when the individual actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.

Miranda v. South Country Central School District · filed 2020-05-21(6)

Unlike Title VII and Title IX, however, NYSHRL permits individual liability, which is actionable under two theories: (1) if the individual has an “ownership interest in the relevant organization or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others” (i.e., the power to hire or fire), Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012); or (2) if the defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); see also Gorman v. Covidien, LLC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “[A]n individual defendant may be held liable under the aiding and abetting provision of the NYSHRL if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 107 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011).

Section 296 permits individual liability for discrimination when a person is an employer with authority to hire or fire, and permits aiding-and-abetting liability for a coworker who participates in discriminatory conduct, including conduct serving as the basis for the employer's liability when the employer is also liable.

Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC · filed 2020-06-11(1), (6)

“Unlike Title VII, the NYSHRL allows for individual liability. There are two available theories of liability: where the individual defendant is considered an ‘employer,’ or where the defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others.” ... “An individual defendant is liable as an ‘employer’ under § 296(1) ‘when that individual has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others,’ i.e., the power to hire or fire.” ... “The NYSHRL’s aiding and abetting provision makes it unlawful ‘for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.’” ... “The Second Circuit has held that ‘this language allows a co-worker who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim to be held liable under the NYSHRL even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.’” ... “This extends to personal liability for aiding and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by an employer even where an individual defendant’s actions serve as the predicate for the employer’s vicarious liability, so long as the employer’s conduct has also been found to be discriminatory under the NYSHRL.”

Section 296(1) permits direct personal liability for an employer who actually participates in discrimination, while § 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct, including by a participating coworker without hiring or firing authority.

Green v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2020-09-21(1), (6)

NYSHRL allows individuals to be sued in their personal capacities under theories of direct or indirect liability. Under a direct liability theory, an “employer” who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination” can be held liable. N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(1). ... Under a theory of indirect liability, an individual can be sued in their personal capacity if they “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Under the indirect theory of liability, a co-worker who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim” can be held liable under the NYSHRL “even though that co-worker lacked the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff.” ... Defendant Larrier actively participated in the conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s discrimination claims and may be liable under either the direct or indirect theory of liability. Larrier was Plaintiff’s supervisor and had the authority to take Plaintiff out of service for misconduct, so he may qualify as an “employer.” If he does qualify as an “employer,” then he can be held liable under a direct theory of liability pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law §296(1). Larrier can also be held liable under an indirect theory pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law §296(6) because of his participation in the allegedly discriminatory conduct.

Section 296(1)(a) permits individual liability for an owner or a person with power to hire and fire, while section 296(6) permits aiding-and-abetting liability for actual participation, including a supervisor's failure to investigate, and section 296(7) requires protected activity, employer awareness, an adverse action, and causation for retaliation.

Rodriguez v. Metro Electrical Contractors, Inc. · filed 2021-03-05(1)(a), (6), and (7)

Specifically, a plaintiff may proceed against an individual defendant under the direct liability provision of NYSHRL, § 296(1)(a), if the defendant either, first, has an ownership interest in the employer or, second, has the power to hire and fire the plaintiff. ... As a third option, a defendant who “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim” may be found liable under NYSHRL's aiding and abetting section, § 296(6). ... Second, failure to investigate as a supervisor can constitute “active participation” to support an “aiding and abetting” claim. ... To state a claim for retaliation under § 296(7), a plaintiff must establish that “(1) she has engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action based upon her activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.”

Section 296(7) imposes individual liability on a person who actually participates in an employer’s discriminatory conduct, even if that person is not an employer.

Facci-Brahler v. Montgomery County · filed 2021-03-31(7)

Specifically, an individual defendant is liable under the NYSHRL when he “actually participates in” an employer’s conduct giving rise to a violation of the statute. Torres v. New York Methodist Hosp., No. 15-CV-1264, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2365, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2016) (citing Hozer v. Pratt Indus. (USA), No. 10-CV-3874, 2012 WL 2049498, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cramer did so participate: he filed both the original and amended accusatory instruments in Glen Town Court, thus “commenc[ing] a criminal prosecution of [Plaintiff],” and as a direct result, “she was terminated from her employment as a Correction Officer.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 47, 64. Plaintiff thus states discrimination claims under § 1983 and, in turn, the NYSHRL, based on allegations that she was disciplined and terminated on the basis of her race.

Section 296(6) permits personal liability under the NYSHRL for a person who actually participates in conduct underlying a discrimination claim by aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing it.

Torres v. Central Avenue Nissan, Inc. · filed 2021-03-31(6)

Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Based on the language of § 296 of the NYSHRL, several courts in this Circuit have held that a defendant who actually participates in the conduct that gives rise to a discrimination claim pursuant to the NYSHRL may be held personally liable under the statute.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for an employee who has authority to hire or fire or who aids or abets discriminatory conduct.

Wilkins v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2022-02-28(6)

Second, unlike Title VII, the NYSHRL allows for individual liability if the defendant (i) has an “ownership interest” in the employer or the authority to “hire or fire” employees or otherwise “do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others,” Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; or (ii) aided or abetted conduct giving rise to a claim of discrimination. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6).

Section 296(6) imposes aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual who actually participates in discriminatory conduct, even without supervisory or hiring-and-firing authority.

Makhsudova v. City of New York · filed 2022-05-18(6)

Unlike Title VII, the NYSHRL provides for the imposition of liability on individual defendants under two of its provisions: §§ 296(1) and 296(6). Individual liability under § 296(1) lies where a defendant actually participates in the conduct giving rise to discrimination, and is limited to individuals with ownership interest or supervisors, who themselves have the authority to hire and fire employees. Barry v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 20 Civ. 10692 (CM), 2022 WL 1104847, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2022) (quoting Hubbard v. No Parking Today, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7228 (DAB), 2010 WL3835034, at *10). Section 296(6) of the NYSHRL provides for “aiding and abetting” § 296(1)(a) violations, explaining that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). To be found liable under § 296(6), an individual need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but still must have “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim of discrimination.” Barry, 2022 WL 1104847, at *11 (quoting Hubbard, 2010 WL3835034, at *10).

Section 296(1) permits individual liability when a defendant is an employer with ownership or power beyond carrying out others' personnel decisions, while § 296(6) permits liability for actually participating in another's discriminatory act.

Santana v. Mount Vernon City School District/ Board of Education · filed 2023-03-31(1), (6)

The NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: where the individual defendant is considered an “employer” of the plaintiff, or where the individual defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1), (6); see also Gorman v. Covidien, LLC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing the two theories of individual liability under the NYSHRL). An “employer” under Section 296(1) “has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” ... Meanwhile, the aiding and abetting provision makes it unlawful “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). An individual may be liable for aiding and abetting unlawful discriminatory acts if the individual “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” even though that individual lacked the authority to hire or fire the plaintiff. ... Here, as observed by this Court in the First Opinion & Order (First Opinion & Order at 29), Duffy has not plausibly alleged that any of the individual Defendants are “employers” under the NYSHRL, as “Section 2554(2) of New York Education Law vests the Board of Education with the power to appoint a superintendent, principals, and teachers, among other employees and personnel.” ... Nor does Duffy allege that any of the individual Defendants aided or abetted discriminatory acts in violation of the NYSHRL. ... As such, Duffy’s NYSHRL claims are dismissed with prejudice against all Defendants.

Section 296(6) permits individual employees to be liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct, but not for aiding and abetting their own violation.

Baptiste v. The City University of New York · filed 2023-06-29(6)

Boudreau can be held liable under the state statute only on an aider-and-abettor theory. ... (“[U]nder the NYSHRL, individual employees may be liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct.” (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6))). But “an individual cannot aid and abet his or her own violation” of the statute. ... That is all Baptiste alleges here — namely, that Boudreau himself retaliated against her and, thus, that Boudreau was the principal violator. It follows that Boudreau cannot be held liable as an aider-and-abettor under the NYSHRL.

Section 296(6) permits individual liability for aiding or abetting discriminatory acts, and a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures may constitute actual participation.

Achee v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream · filed 2023-10-30(6)

“[T]he case law establishes beyond cavil that a supervisor’s failure to take adequate remedial measures can rise to the level of ‘actual participation’ under NYSHRL § 296(6).” Lewis v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 77 F. Supp. 2d 376, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Plaintiff has raised questions of fact as to whether his supervisors Ms. Werbeck and Mr. Torres participated in discriminatory conduct by ignoring his complaints and telling him to forget about the racist comments of his coworkers.

Sections 296(1) and 296(6) permit individual liability for discrimination when a person has authority over hiring and firing or actually participates in and shares the intent of the principal actor's unlawful discrimination.

Andrade v. Cultural Care, Inc. · filed 2023-12-13(1), (6)

“The NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: (1) if the defendant has ‘an ownership interest’ in the employer or has ‘the authority to hire and fire employees,’ and (2) if the defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others.” ... “Here, it is undisputed both Michael Eposito and Danielle Esposito had authority to hire and fire Plaintiff. ... Thus, both Individual Defendants are subject to the NYSHRL’s requirements.” ... “Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL prohibit “aid[ing], abet[ting], incit[ing], compell[ing] or coerc[ing] the doing” of any unlawful acts of discrimination under either title, including sexual harassment and retaliation. ... To state a claim for aiding and abetting unlawful harassment, discrimination, or retaliation, a plaintiff must instead plead that the defendant “actually participate[d]” in such unlawful conduct by the employer. ... Further, aiding and abetting “liability requires that the aider and abettor share the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” ... “Here, the Court agrees with Cultural Care: Plaintiff has not put forth evidence that Cultural Care was aware of Defendant Michael Esposito’s criminal conduct, let alone that it shared his intent or participated in his surveillance scheme. ... Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Cultural Care on Plaintiff’s aiding and abetting claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.”

Section 296 permits individual liability only against a manager who actually participated in the alleged discriminatory conduct or encouraged, condoned, or approved it.

Perez v. City of New York · filed 2024-02-29

Finally, to the extent that Commissioner Sewell is sued under the NYSHRL, the claims are dismissed because, while individual liability can be imposed under that statute, it can only be imposed on a manager who actually participated in the discriminatory conduct alleged, or who “encouragefed], condon[ed], or approvfed]” the discrimination. ... There is not a single allegation of fact in the complaint tending to show that Commissioner Sewell was aware of the existence of the Plaintiff officers, let alone that she “encouraged, condoned, or approved” of any discrimination against them. It is perfectly obvious that the Commissioner was sued simply and solely because she was the police commissioner. She has no liability under the NYSHRL on that basis, so any claims asserted against her under that statute are also dismissed.

Section 296(7) permits personal liability for retaliation because it authorizes suit against any person; more generally, the NYSHRL permits individual liability for an employee's own discriminatory conduct or for aiding and abetting another's discrimination.

Lovallo v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2024-03-27(7)

The anti-retaliation provision of the NYSHRL provides for suit against “any person” and so does allow for personal liability. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7).

The NYSHRL permits individual liability for discrimination when an individual qualifies as an employer or aids and abets unlawful discriminatory acts; under § 296(6), a coworker may be liable when they actually participate in the discriminatory conduct and share the principal actor’s intent.

Ferrando-Dehtiar v. Anesthesia Group of Albany, P.C. · filed 2024-03-29(1)(h), (6)

“The NYSHRL . . . permit[s] individual liability for discrimination only if the individual qualifies as an ‘employer’ or ‘aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others.’ ... “A co-worker who lacks the authority to either hire or fire the plaintiff may still be held liable as an aider-abettor under NYSHRL § 296(6) if he actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” ... “In order to be liable under an aiding and abetting theory, ‘the aider and abettor must share the intent or purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose.’”

Section 296(1)(a) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of race; an individual may also be liable under the NYSHRL for aiding and abetting discrimination.

Atherley v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2024-03-29(1)(a)

Like Title VII, the NYSHRL states that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer “to discriminate against” an employee because of their race. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a). ... An employee however, can be held individually liable under both the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. “With respect to the NYSHRL, an individual defendant may be held liable for a violation of the statute in circumstances in which: (1) the individual defendant is considered an employer; or (2) the defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others.” ... Through his personal involvement, Plaintiff has also adequately pled that Caldwell can be held liable under the NYSHRL for aiding and abetting discrimination.

Section 296(7) authorizes retaliation claims against any person, including an individual employee, rather than limiting direct liability to the employer.

Dougherty v. Ferrari Express, Inc. · filed 2024-08-15(7)

Doe and its progeny make clear that an employee may not be held liable for discrimination under the NYSHRL where the employer was a corporate defendant, but, that employee may be subject to liability for retaliation and as an aider and abettor.

Section 296(7) permits individual liability for retaliation, including against a corporate employee who is not the plaintiff's employer.

Chamberlain v. Splashlight, LLC · filed 2024-10-10(7)

The NYSHRL does,however, permit individual liability for claims of retaliation. ... Because Summers is a corporate employee and Chamberlain did not allege she was his employer during the relevant period, Summers can, at most, be held liable for retaliation under the NYSHRL.

Section 296 permits individual liability, but a plaintiff must show that the individual defendant actually participated in the conduct underlying the claim.

Stein v. Town Of Greenburgh · filed 2025-03-25

Unlike Title VII, Section 1983 and the NYSHRL provide for individual liability. ... Moreover, under the NYSHRL, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant “actually participate[d] in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim,” Feingold, 366 F.3d at 189-59. ... Cerone therefore was not involved in any of the alleged retaliatory conduct toward Plaintiff. Accordingly, Matthews and Cerone are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Section 1983 and NYSHRL claims asserted against them.

Section 296(1)(a) permits individual liability for a corporate supervisor or manager with an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions, while § 296(6) permits liability for an individual who actually participates in or contributes to the discriminatory conduct, including a failure to provide reasonable accommodations.

Scalera v. Electrograph Systems, Inc. · filed 2012-03-26(1)(a), (6)

Section 296(1) states that it shall be an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for an “employer” to discriminate against an individual on the basis of their disability. See N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(1)(a). In addition, Section 296(6) states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” ... Under the direct liability provision of Section 296(1), a corporate supervisor or manager may be held liable if that person has: (1) any ownership interest in the employer; or (2) the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. ... An individual can also be held liable under § 296(6) when he or she “actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim.” ... liability can attach under circumstances where the individual contributed to the failure to make reasonable accommodations as well.

Section 296(1) treats an individual as an employer, and permits individual liability on that basis, only when the individual has an ownership interest in the organization or power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Koppar v. Orange Regional Medical Center · filed 2022-02-03(1)

Moreover, while “[t]he NYSHRL allows for individual liability under two theories: where the individual defendant is considered an ‘employer,’ of the plaintiff, or where the individual defendant aided and abetted the unlawful discriminatory acts of others,” ... “An ‘employer’ under [§] 296(1) ‘has an ownership interest in the relevant organization or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.’” ... There is no genuine dispute that the Individual Defendants were not “employers” under the NYSHRL.

Section 296 applies only to employers and does not impose civil liability on a fellow employee.

Tumminello v. City of New York · filed 1995-02-16

To the extent that the first, second and fourth causes of action seek damages against Jenkins individually under New York’s Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), the pleading fails to state a cause of action because that statute applies only to employers.

A corporate employee may be sued for discrimination under § 296 only if the employee has an ownership interest or authority beyond carrying out personnel decisions made by others.

Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. · filed 1995-04-28

Barnett, as a corporate employee, is not subject to a discrimination suit under the Human Rights Law unless it is shown that he has an ownership interest in the corporation or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others (see, Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541, 542).

Section 296(6) does not make a coemployee liable as an aider and abettor for employment discrimination when the coemployee lacks an ownership interest or authority to make personnel decisions.

Trovato v. Air Express International · filed 1997-04-07(6)

We reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the individual defendants could be held liable as aiders and abettors pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6). The Legislature and the Court of Appeals have determined that only employers and employee-owners or those with specified authority are subject to employment discrimination suits under the Human Rights Law (see, Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Patrowich v Chemical Bank, supra; compare, Executive Law § 296 [3-b]). To find a coemployee liable as an aider and abettor would ignore the statutory and legal authority limiting the parties who may be sued for employment discrimination (but see, Tomka v Seiler Corp., 66 F3d 1295; Steadman v Sinclair, 223 AD2d 392; Peck v Sony Music Corp., 221 AD2d 157).

Section 296 may impose individual liability on a person with power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

Cirillo v. Muss Development Co. · filed 2000-12-18

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint and in her affidavit submitted in opposition to the defendants’ motion, and affording her every favorable inference (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268), she has sufficiently alleged that Markowitz had the authority to make personnel decisions and salary and benefit determinations. If, in fact, Markowitz had the “power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others,” he may be subject to liability under the Human Rights Law (see, Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541, 542; Executive Law § 296).

Section 296(1) prohibits age discrimination in employment and does not impose liability on a corporate employee who lacks ownership interest or power beyond carrying out personnel decisions made by others.

Layaou v. Xerox Corp. · filed 2002-10-01(1)

A claim of discrimination in violation of the Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15) does not lie against a corporate employee where, as here, “he is not shown to have any ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others” (Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541, 542; see Young v Geoghegan, 250 AD2d 423, 424; Trovato v Air Express Intl., 238 AD2d 333, 333-334; Monsanto v Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 141 AD2d 514, 515).

Section 296 permits an individual with an ownership interest in a corporate employer to be held individually liable for discriminatory conduct.

Gallegos v. Elite Model Management Corp. · filed 2005-12-29

Pillard never objected to this instruction, which, in any event, was appropriate. Pillard, as cofounder, president and a 10% shareholder of Elite, with significant managerial responsibilities, clearly met the test for employer status set out by the Court of Appeals in Patrowich v Chemical Bank (63 NY2d 541, 543-544 [1984]; see also Brotherson v Modern Yachts, 272 AD2d 493, 494 [2000] [corporate employee may be subject to individual liability under Human Rights Law if he or she has an ownership interest in corporate employer]).

Section 296(6) permits a claim against individual coemployees for aiding and abetting alleged employment discrimination.

Moskal v. Utica College · filed 2009-02-06(6)

Contrary to defendants’ contention, plaintiff stated a cause of action against the individual defendants under Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting the alleged discriminatory conduct (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]; see also Nesathurai v University at Buffalo, State Univ. of N.Y., 23 AD3d 1070, 1072 [2005]; D’Amico v Commodities Exch., 235 AD 2d 313, 315 [1997]).

Section 296 permits individual liability when a person has an ownership interest or power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.

New York State Division of Human Rights v. ABS Electronics, Inc. · filed 2013-01-30

The Commissioner, however, properly imposed liability on Fielman individually. An individual will not be subject to liability under the Human Rights Law unless he or she is shown to have an ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others (see Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541, 542 [1984]).

A § 296 race discrimination claim against individuals requires facts supporting discrimination and allegations that the individuals had an ownership interest or power beyond carrying out others’ personnel decisions.

Song Yong Yu v. Envision Physician Servs., LLC · filed 2024-10-23

With respect to the ninth cause of action, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Executive Law § 296, the plaintiff's allegations of racial discrimination were unsupported by any factual allegations and insufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Executive Law § 296. The plaintiff also failed to allege that the moving defendants had "ownership interest or power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others" ( Patrowich v Chemical Bank , 63 NY2d 541, 543-544; see Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc. , 151 AD3d 915, 920; Carrea v Imagimed, LLC , 74 AD3d 860, 862).