N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(2) requires the tortious act to occur in New York, while section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York substantially related to the claim.

Henkin v. Qatar Charity · filed 2023-03-31(a)(1), (a)(2)

Accordingly, section 302(a)(2) does not confer jurisdiction over either defendant. ... Accordingly, the Court cannot at this point determine whether there is personal jurisdiction under the first prong of § 302(a)(1) because of the deficiencies in the complaint.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the cause of action arises from those acts.

Pearson v. Daily Harvest, Inc. · filed 2023-04-12(a)(1)

New York’s long arm statute provides “[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent: transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (emphasis added). ... The cause of action in this case arises from contracts between defendants to supply ingredients for and produce the French Lentil + Leek Crumbles. Smirk’s Am. Mot. Transfer 12, ECF 27; Silver Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 45 (describing Stone Gate Foods as “the supplier” of the ingredients and Smirk’s as “the manufacturer” of the product). ... Thus, plaintiff “might have . . . brought” this action in the Southern District of New York against all of the defendants, and the threshold issue under § 1404(a) is satisfied.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for an in-state tort through an agent only when the agent acted for the principal’s benefit with its knowledge and consent and under some control; section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business activity.

Edwardo v. the Roman Catholic Bishop · filed 2023-04-17(a)(2), (a)(1)

To be considered an agent under section 302, the alleged agent must have acted “for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent” of the non-resident principal and the non-resident principal must have “exercised some control over” the alleged agent. ... Even assuming Defendants transacted business in New York, the district court correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because Edwardo’s claims do not “arise from” Defendants’ business activity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that activity, while Section 302(a)(3) covers specified out-of-state torts causing injury in New York when its additional conditions are met.

Moonbug Entertainment Limited v. 640350 Store · filed 2023-06-06(a)(1) and (a)(3)

Plaintiffs must meet two requirements to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1): “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... It is also insufficient to allege that a defendant merely offers a product outside New York for sale in New York if no sale actually takes place in New York or to a New York resident, even if the defendant operates a commercial website capable of reaching customers in New York. ... Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing that each Defendant engaged in transactions in New York. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead personal jurisdiction over each Defendant.

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries when the defendant’s qualifying business or tortious conduct meets the statute’s listed conditions.

Highmore Financing Co. I, LLC v. The Greig Companies, Inc. · filed 2023-07-31(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

New York’s long-arm statute also provides for specific jurisdiction under CPLR § 302. ... In any event, none of the § 302 subsections provide for personal jurisdiction over the PJ Defendants.

Section 302(a) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the cause of action arises from an enumerated act, including transacting business in New York or committing an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury with expected New York consequences and substantial interstate or international revenue.

Jakob v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-08-19(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, in the absence of contradictory information and in light of the Court’s obligation to construe the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Exceeding Grace pursuant to section 302(a)(1) of the CPLR. ... Accordingly, in light of the Court’s obligation to construe the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Exceeding Grace pursuant to section 302(a)(3)(ii) of the CPLR.

Section 302(a) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from an enumerated act, including transacting business in New York or committing an out-of-state tort that causes in-state injury with expected New York consequences and substantial interstate or international revenue.

Sound Around Inc. v. Shenzhen Keenray Innovations Limited · filed 2023-06-23(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet its burden of establishing personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1). ... As Plaintiff fails to establish the first and second elements of the test as set forth in Penguin against Defendant Wu, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to establish personal jurisdiction against Defendant Wu pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a claim arises from a nondomiciliary’s purposeful sales activity in New York; the plaintiff need not prove ultimate liability on a jurisdictional motion.

Buckley v. Redi-Bolt, Inc. · filed 1966-03-29(a)(1)

It is not required, for the purposes of this motion, to establish defendant’s responsibility by the same degree of proof required upon the trial of the action. This dispute bears upon the question of ultimate liability, and in order to ascertain whether New York courts have jurisdiction, it is not necessary to determine the existence or theory of liability in advance of trial. Enough has been shown to indicate the existence of a controversy which, if resolved in plaintiffs’ favor on the facts and the law, would warrant the assumption of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a) requires a plaintiff seeking personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary to show the statute’s essential requirements through the complaint and supporting affidavits; it does not expand liability.

Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n v. Moss · filed 1966-12-27(a)

CPLR 302 (subd. [a]) is a procedural statute and in no way enlarges or extends the liability of the appellants. The plaintiff has the burden of proof and for the purpose of this motion must show by the complaint and supporting affidavits the essential requirements of the statute.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from business transacted in New York, and section 302(a)(3) requires an injury within New York.

Wilcox v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY · filed 1967-01-04(a)(1), (a)(3)

Assuming arguendo that the sale of a ticket to the plaintiff by Pennsylvania was a sufficient transaction of business in New York by Richmond, it is still incumbent upon the plaintiff, in order to successfully invoke CPLR 302(a) (1), to prove that the cause of action upon which the suit is based arose from the transaction found to have occurred in New York. This the plaintiff has not done and, indeed, could not do. ... Beyond a peradventure, fundamental to the application of this section is the presence of an injury which was incurred within the State of New York.

Section 302(a)(1), (2), and (4) did not provide jurisdiction where the claim arose from neither New York business nor a tort committed in the state, and the defendant did not appear to own property there.

Tokyo Boeki (U. S. A.), Inc. v. Navarino · filed 1971-02-16(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4)

The cause of action did not arise out of either the transaction of business within New York (§ 302(a) 1) or a tort committed within the state (§ 302(a) 2), and Boeki Japan does not appear to own property within the state (§ 302(a) 4).

Section 302(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts no business or commits no tort in New York and its out-of-state conduct causes no injury there.

Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transportation Corporation · filed 1974-04-15(a)

It did not transact any business in New York. (See Finding of Fact No. 10; see CPLR § 302(a) 1) It did not commit a tort within New York. (See CPLR § 302(a) 2) Its conduct outside of New York did not cause injury to plaintiff “within the state.” (See CPLR § 302(a) 3) In these circumstances, Hudson is not amenable to the court’s jurisdiction in its capacity as an originally-named defendant.

CPLR 302(a)(4) did not provide personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate successor whose obligation arose from a merger.

Armour Handcrafts, Inc. v. Miami Decorating & Design Center, Inc. · filed 1984-01-23(a)(4)

Special Term correctly concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant Miami under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 4).

Section 302(b)'s New York law accrual ground does not cover claims arising from a Michigan property settlement agreement incorporated into a Michigan divorce decree.

Sovansky v. Sovansky · filed 1988-04-25(b)

We find that the plaintiffs claims clearly did not accrue under the laws of New York (see, CPLR 302 [b]).

Section 302 requires a basis in the record to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.

Manzares v. Orofino · filed 1992-11-09

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint as the record presents no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, a non-domiciliary of this State (see, CPLR 302).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction when a contract is negotiated entirely by facsimile or mail and the plaintiff performs all New York activities; section 302(a)(3)(i) does not apply when no tortious act is alleged.

Success Marketing Electronics, Inc. v. Titan Security, Inc. · filed 1994-05-31(a)(1), (a)(3)(i)

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that it had obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) and CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i). With regard to CPLR 302 (a) (1), the parties’ contract was negotiated entirely by facsimile or mail, and all of the activities in New York relating to the contract were performed by the plaintiff. Thus, it cannot be said that the defendant transacted business within New York (see, Spectra Prods, v Indian Riv. Citrus Specialties, 144 AD2d 832; Paradise Prods. Corp. v Allmark Equip. Co., 138 AD2d 470; Cooperstein v Pan-Oceanic Mar., 124 AD2d 632; J.E.T. Adv. Assocs. v Lawn King, 84 AD2d 744). Moreover, since there is no allegation that the defendant committed a tortious act, CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i) does not apply.

Section 302(a) requires a factual basis for exercising long-arm jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants.

Leis v. Finkelstein · filed 1994-06-27(a)

Under the facts and circumstances of this case we perceive no basis upon which a New York court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary defendants (CPLR 302 [a]; see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in New York, including through an agent; section 302(a)(2) permits it based on tortious acts committed in the state.

Banco Internacional, S. A. v. Vilaseca · filed 1994-12-29(a)(1), (a)(2)

Here, the record sufficiently establishes facts that demonstrate this court’s long-arm jurisdiction over defendant. Specifically, this court has jurisdiction under the provisions of CPLR 302 (a) (1) ("transact[ed] business”) and (a) (2) C'committfed] tortious act[s] within the state”).

CPLR 302 does not confer jurisdiction over beneficiaries of a Maryland estate in a guarantor’s action to collect funds for an unpaid hospital bill.

North Shore University Hospital v. Katzenberg · filed 1995-02-21

Jurisdiction cannot be obtained against these individuals under CPLR 302 and accordingly dismissal was proper.

CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) permits a plaintiff to plead personal jurisdiction by alleging that the defendant’s agent entered New York for discussions directly related to the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct.

Philan Insurance v. Frank B. Hall & Co. · filed 1995-05-02(a)(1), (a)(2)

By alleging that Heath Fielding’s agent entered New York to take part in discussions directly related to Heath Fielding’s allegedly tortious conduct, plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded facts (see, Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463) showing jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) and (2) (see, Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 653; Travelers Indem. Co. v Inoue, 111 AD2d 686).

Section 302(a)(1) does not provide personal jurisdiction when the transactions’ only New York connection is the plaintiff’s incorporation and principal place of business there.

North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. P.T. Kodeco Electronics, Indonesia · filed 1997-02-25(a)(1)

Jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) was properly found lacking in the absence of any evidentiary facts suggesting that the subject transactions had any contacts with New York other than that plaintiff importer is a New York corporation with a New York principal place of business (see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 271-272).

CPLR 302(a) places the burden on the plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.

Purification v. Kindler · filed 1998-09-28(a)

We agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff did not sustain her burden of establishing jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Sara Elizabeth Kindler under the long-arm statute (see, CPLR 302 [a]; Bramwell v Tucker, 107 AD2d 731).

Section 302 supports personal jurisdiction over trespass, conversion and replevin claims based on defendants’ acts in New York.

Rivera v. Feinstein · filed 1997-12-16(a)(2), (a)(4)

The causes of action for trespass, conversion and replevin are clearly based on defendants’ acts in New York, including resort to its courts, evicting plaintiff from the apartment he shared with the decedent and taking possession of the decedent’s other assets here (CPLR 302 [a] [2], [4]).

Section 302(a)(1)–(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on specified New York business activity, a service contract, or qualifying tortious conduct.

Seevers v. Tang · filed 2000-01-11(a)(1)–(3)

A non-domiciliary may be subjected to personal jurisdiction in New York if he commits an out-of-State tort causing in-State injury and does business in the State (CPLR 302 [a] [3]), not demonstrated under these facts, or else transacts business here or contracts anywhere to provide services here (CPLR 302 [a] [1]). Although plaintiff alleges that the misappropriations, starting in 1997, were a continuation of his transaction of business in New York commencing in the 1980’s with her entrustment of investment funds to him, there is no factual basis to find, as a basis for New York long arm jurisdiction, either that he committed tortious conduct in New York (CPLR 302 [a] [2]) or transacted business here contemporaneous with the alleged misappropriations.

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction when the transaction occurred abroad, the defendants committed no tortious acts in New York, and their actions outside New York caused no injury there.

Lebard v. De Krassny · filed 2001-02-15

No basis exists for jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to CPLR 302. The transaction from which plaintiff’s claims arose occurred in Europe and there is no indication that defendants committed any tortious acts in New York or that their actions outside of New York caused an injury to plaintiff in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) require a plaintiff seeking jurisdiction over a nonresident on these grounds to establish that the defendant transacted business or committed a tort within New York.

Coudert Bros. v. Malmrose · filed 2000-01-11(a)(1), (a)(2)

The motion court properly dismissed the complaint against defendant Malmrose based on plaintiffs failure to establish at the pretrial hearing that Malmrose, who is not a New York resident, had transacted business within the State, subjecting him to jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), or that he had committed a tort within the State, subjecting him to jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2).

A formal agency relationship is unnecessary for a distributor to act as a nondomiciliary’s agent for personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3)(ii).

Banegas v. Five Counties Carting Recycling Corp. · filed 2000-10-23(a)(3)(ii)

The plaintiff need not establish the existence of a formal agency relationship between Magnets and Global (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on five telephone stock orders to New York, and section 302(a)(3) does not treat an alleged intent not to pay for the stock as a tortious act.

Barington Capital Group, L.P. v. Arsenault · filed 2001-03-01(a)(1), (a)(3)

Even if it were so, as plaintiff alleges, that defendant, a California domiciliary, made five phone calls over the course of three days to plaintiffs office in New York to place orders for the purchase of stock, such activity would not be sufficient to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of this State over defendant. ... Also unavailing is plaintiffs contention that defendant, by contracting for the purchase of stock for which he did not intend to pay, committed a tort so as to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3).

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for claims arising from alleged tortious acts in New York or ownership of New York real property.

In Re Fischer · filed 2001-03-02(a)

Here, the claims asserted against Fischer are plainly within the scope of New York’s long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. 302(a), as they relate to (among other things) tortious acts allegedly performed by Fischer in New York as well as to Fischer’s ownership of real property in New York.

Section 302 requires a defendant’s New York contacts to satisfy an enumerated statutory factor before a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction.

Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L. · filed 2001-12-06

As courts repeatedly have held and as defendant concedes, rather than codifying the International Shoe minimum contacts test, the New York legislature enacted a narrower long arm statute, CPLR 302, which requires that a defendant’s minimum contacts with New York meet one of the additional enumerated factors before a New York court will be permitted to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over that defendant.

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction when the defendant neither transacts business nor contracts to supply goods or services in New York and the plaintiff’s injury occurred abroad.

Duffy v. Grand Circle Travel, Inc. · filed 2003-02-27

Plaintiff fares no better in attempting to establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302 since defendant does not transact business in New York or contract to supply goods or services in New York, and plaintiffs injury occurred in France (see Bramwell v Tucker, 107 AD2d 731, 732-733 [1985]).

CPLR 302 is not the exclusive basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary.

Karen W. v. Roger S. · filed 2004-12-22

The father argues that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over him because the criteria of CPLR 302 are not met. This argument is without merit. While the CPLR does provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, it is not the only and exclusive basis.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer long-arm jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary lacking sufficient contacts with New York.

Insurance Co. of North America v. EMCOR Group, Inc. · filed 2004-07-22(a)(1)

The court properly dismissed the complaint as against UMEC, a California corporation with its principal place of business in California, on the ground that UMEC did not have sufficient minimum contacts with New York to be subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302 does not provide specific or transactional jurisdiction when the alleged New York contacts are unrelated to the dispute.

Estate of Yaron Ungar v. Palestinian Authority · filed 2005-11-07

General jurisdiction must be shown in this case because the jurisdictional contacts alleged by plaintiffs have nothing to do with the Ungars or the debt allegedly owed by Orascom to the PA. Therefore, there is no basis for finding specific or transactional jurisdiction under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not provide personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurer without sufficient contacts in New York.

Eveready Insurance v. Modeste · filed 2006-01-24(a)(1)

By order dated November 16, 2004, the Supreme Court properly granted Southern United’s motion to dismiss the proceeding insofar as asserted against it pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction (see Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v Johnson, 260 AD2d 638 [1999]).

Section 302(a)(3) allows a court with jurisdiction over a covered claim to hear related claims arising from the same nucleus of operative fact.

Hanly v. Goldstein · filed 2008-08-26(a)(3)

We have held that once a defendant properly is brought before a district court on a claim covered by Section 302(a)(3), the court may entertain claims that are not expressly covered by the long-arm statute, so long as they derive from the same nucleus of operative fact as claims that are. ... Since the libel claim is based on the same factual predicate as the malicious prosecution and IIED claims, the district court was permitted to hear that claim under the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)(ii) provide grounds for personal jurisdiction; when those grounds are lacking, further jurisdictional discovery may be unwarranted.

Stravalle v. Land Cargo, Inc. · filed 2007-04-17(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(ii)

The Supreme Court also properly found that personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendant Chemquest, Inc. ... pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), (2), or (3) (ii) was lacking, and that further discovery on the jurisdictional issue with respect to Chemquest was unwarranted (see Warck-Meister v Diana Lowenstein Fine Arts, 7 AD3d 351, 352 [2004]; Turbel v Societe Generale, 276 AD2d 446, 447 [2000]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from business transacted in New York; § 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the defendant has the specified business ties to the state.

Schultz v. Safra Nat'l Bank of N.Y. · filed 2010-05-17(a)(1), (a)(3)

As the district court determined, neither of these sections afforded personal jurisdiction over Banco Safra. Because Schultz conceded that his claims arose from alleged transaction by Banco Safra in Brazil, jurisdiction was not available under § 302(a)(1). Moreover, given our discussion above, Schultz could not show that Banco Safra regularly and consistently engaged in any business in the State of New York so as to create jurisdiction pursuant to § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) requires evidence of business transacted in New York or a contract to supply goods or services there, while § 302(a)(3)(i) requires an injury in New York.

Minella v. Restifo · filed 2015-01-20(a)(1), (a)(3)(i)

Personal jurisdiction does not exist pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), as there is insufficient evidence that defendant “transacts any business within [New York State]” or that he “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” ... Personal jurisdiction does not exist pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i), as plaintiff was injured outside New York State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Richardsons.

Prime Properties USA 2011, LLC v. Richardson · filed 2016-12-13(a)(1)

New York has specific personal jurisdiction over the Richardsons pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see e.g. George Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648, 653 [1977]; Kleinfeld v Rand, 143 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 302 permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when claims arise from business the defendant transacted in New York or when the defendant committed a tortious act there, including the alleged conversion of funds held in New York.

Nick v. Schneider · filed 2017-05-31(a)(1), (a)(2)

Here, in opposition to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that the defendant, a Florida domiciliary, transacted business in New York and that the plaintiffs’ claims arose from those transactions so as to establish that jurisdiction was proper under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d at 323; Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d at 380; America/Intl. 1994 Venture v Mau, 146 AD3d at 52; Weitz v Weitz, 85 AD3d at 1153-1154). ... The plaintiffs also made a prima facie showing that the defendant committed tortious acts within New York, as the defendant is alleged to have converted funds held in New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [2]; America/Intl. 1994 Venture v Mau, 146 AD3d at 52; Weitz v Weitz, 85 AD3d at 1153-1154; Ed Moore Adv. Agency v I.H.R., Inc., 114 AD2d at 485-486; Neilson v Sal Martorano, Inc., 36 AD2d at 626).

Section 302(a)(1) requires New York business activity connected to the claim, while section 302(a)(3) does not confer jurisdiction for an out-of-state accident when the injury occurred there.

Santiago v. Highway Freight Carriers, Inc. · filed 2017-08-16(a)(1), (a)(3)

“In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302 (a) (1), a court must determine (1) whether the defendant transacted business in New York and, if so, (2) whether the cause of action asserted arose from that transaction” (Pichardo v Zayas, 122 AD3d 699, 701 [2014]; see Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327, 334 [2012]; Johnson v Ward, 4 NY3d 516, 520 [2005]). ... The Supreme Court also properly determined that personal jurisdiction over the defendants was not conferred pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) based upon alleged tortious activity occurring outside New York, causing injury within New York (see Penguin Group [USA] Inc. v American Buddha, 16 NY3d 295, 302 [2011]; Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592, 597 [1997]). Here, the situs of the injury is Virginia, where the accident occurred (see Bloomgarden v Lanza, 143,AD3d 850, 852 [2016]; Minella v Restifo, 124 AD3d 486, 486 [2015]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant’s New York business transaction and the claim, while section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act committed in New York.

Kyowa Seni, Co., Ltd. v. ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., Ltd. · filed 2018-07-05(a)(1), (a)(2)

Thus, although the complaint states that the ANA Companies' passenger plane "destinations in the United States include inter alia John F. Kennedy International Airport, located within the City of New York and the State of New York," it utterly fails to state a specific "articulable nexus" between New York and the claims arising out of the MOU's termination and the alleged misrepresentations/fraud regarding the TSO C127a labels. ... The complaint, however, fails to allege any tortious act that the ANA Companies committed in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) provides a basis for personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants.

GOLDEN GOOSE S.P.A. D/B/A GOLDEN GOOSE DELUXE BRAND v. ADASHOE001 · filed 2020-09-16(a)(3)

The Complaint makes out a prima facie case that this Court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3) and Exhibit C to the Complaint identifies allegedly infringing conduct by each defendant.

CPLR 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on specified New York acts, business activity, or substantial interstate or international revenue.

Barbato v. Giacin · filed 2020-11-19(a)(2), (a)(3)

The Supreme Court correctly determined that plaintiff established personal jurisdiction over the husband under CPLR 302(a)(2). However, the complaint does not establish personal jurisdiction over the wife. As defendants persuasively argue, there is no basis to infer that the husband's actions toward plaintiff in New York benefitted the wife or that the husband acted in New York at the behest of his wife ( see CPLR 302[a][2]; Lawati v Montaque Morgan Slade Ltd. , 102 AD3d 427, 428 [1st Dept 2013]). Further, the record does not support an inference that the wife regularly transacted business in New York or derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce during the relevant time period ( see CPLR 302[a][3]).

CPLR § 302 permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that activity, commits a tort in New York, or commits an out of state tort causing in state injury while meeting the statute’s additional requirements.

Astor Chocolate Corp. v. Elite Gold Ltd. · filed 2020-12-21(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

Under CPLR § 302(a)(1), two conditions must be met. First, the defendant must “transact . . . business within the state or contract[] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” CPLR § 302(a)(1). Second, the cause of action must arise from the “act[s] which are the basis of jurisdiction.” Id. ... Section 302(a)(2) provides an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant who “in person or through an agent . . . commits a tortious act within the state.” CPLR § 302(a)(2). ... Finally, section 302(a)(3) also permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant “who in person or through an agent . . . commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state.” CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on specified New York contacts, including transacting business or owning real property, when the claim has a substantial relationship to those contacts.

Weik v. LSG Sky Chefs N. Am. Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-01-28(a)(1), (a)(4)

The court did not have personal jurisdiction over NAS or SCS under CPLR 302. Although both transact business in New York (CPLR 302[a][1]), and SCS owns CFG, a company that owns real property in New York ( see CPLR 302[a][4]), plaintiff failed to show a substantial relationship between his accident on a LaGuardia Airport tarmac and defendants' New York business contacts ( see Johnson v Ward , 4 NY3d 516, 519 [2005]).

Section 302(a)(2) allows personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a tortious act committed in New York.

Allegany Capital Enterprises, LLC v. Cox · filed 2021-02-12(a)(2)

Looking at the totality of alleged contacts of Cox with New York stated above, Plaintiffs have alleged personal jurisdiction over Cox under CPLR 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on a business transaction in New York related to the claim.

Breakaway Courier Corp. v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. · filed 2021-03-16(a)(1)

They assert conclusorily [*2]that BHI issued "parental guarantees" to the Applied Defendants in New York, but the guarantee to which they cite bears no relationship to the transactions at issue ( see CPLR 302[a][1]).

CPLR 302 allows personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the long-arm statute permits it and due process is satisfied; residence outside New York alone does not defeat jurisdiction.

Matter of Robinson v. Kathleen B. · filed 2021-07-09

New York courts may "exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary [where] two requirements are satisfied: the action is permissible under the long-arm statute (CPLR 302) and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process" ( Williams v Beemiller, Inc. , 33 NY3d 523, 528 [2019]), and Kathleen does not argue that exercising personal jurisdiction over her would contravene either CPLR 302 or due process. Thus, the mere fact that Kathleen was a Nevada resident when the proceeding was commenced does not relieve her from the resulting order and judgment ( see generally Cole v Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. , 189 AD3d 2168, 2169 [4th Dept 2020]).

Section 302 provides specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant arising out of particular acts.

Bruin v. Bank Of America, N.A. · filed 2022-03-31

It is axiomatic that CPLR § 302 provides only specific jurisdiction over a non- domiciliary defendant arising out of particular acts.

Section 302(a)(1) and (a)(3) can support personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who recruits New York employees and allegedly misuses a New York business’s confidential information.

CrossBorder Solutions, Inc. n/k/a Exactera Inc. v. Macias, Gini, & OConnell, LLP · filed 2022-02-23(a)(1), (a)(3)

Here, contrary to MGO’s assertions, the PSAC provides sufficient, specific allegations indicating that personal jurisdiction over Agarwal is proper under § 302(a)(1) and (3).

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts related business in New York or commits a tortious act there.

Altman v. DiPreta · filed 2022-04-27(a)(1), (a)(2)

Here, in opposition to Slagle's motion, the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over Slagle existed under CPLR 302(a)(1) or (2). The conduct alleged by the plaintiffs pertaining to Slagle either occurred in Connecticut in connection with the conservatorship proceeding or did not constitute a "tortious act" ( id. § 302[a][2]). The record is also insufficient to establish that Slagle conducted sufficient purposeful activities in New York, which bore a substantial relationship to the subject matter of this action, so as to avail himself of the benefits and protections of New York's laws ( see id. § 302[a][1]; Abad v Lorenzo , 163 AD3d 903, 905; Daniel B. Katz & Assoc. Corp. v Midland Rushmore, LLC , 90 AD3d 977, 979-980).

Section 302(a)(1)–(3) requires, respectively, a claim arising from New York business, a tort committed in New York, or an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York.

Arzu v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2023-08-31(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)

The Court finds that the facts alleged in the proposed Amended Complaint do not establish specific jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1). ... Since the tortious conduct did not occur in New York, there can be no jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(2). ... Thus, personal jurisdiction does not exist under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a) requires a qualifying connection between the defendant’s conduct and New York to establish specific personal jurisdiction.

Meehan v. VIPKid · filed 2024-01-25(a)

Second, Plaintiff has failed to establish Sequoia has any relationship to the state of New York, or that Sequoia has committed or is responsible for a tortious act in New York, such that personal jurisdiction may be conferred under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a).

A defendant challenging personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) must provide facts based on personal knowledge; conclusory allegations from counsel do not adequately raise the issue.

Alghafly v. Ewiess · filed 2024-04-30(a)(1)

Defendant supported his motion to vacate the default judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(4) only by an affidavit by his counsel containing conclusory allegations not based on personal knowledge. He failed to submit his own affidavit by defendant averring that he never transacted business in New York ( see cf. Liu Yu v Ma , 145 AD3d 577, 577 [1st Dept 2016]) . Accordingly, defendant did not adequately raise the issue that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) Furthermore, based on the record, plaintiff at least "demonstrated a basis for jurisdiction" ( see SOS Capital v Recycling Paper Partners of PA, LLC , 220 AD3d 25, 38 [1st Dept 2023]) and the motion to vacate on this ground was properly denied.

A complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Innovative Sec. Ltd. v. OBEX Sec. LLC · filed 2024-03-29

The allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over Cowen International under New York's long-arm statute (CPLR 302; Starr Russia Investments III B. V v Deloitte Touche Tohumatsu Ltd., 169 AD3d 421,422 [1st Dept 2019]).

Section 302(a) does not confer specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the required New York business, tort, or property contacts are absent.

Langella v. Amchem Prods., Inc. · filed 2024-08-23(a)

Thus, moving defendant has established that it does not transact business in New York State, it did not commit a tortious act against plaintiff within the state, it did not commit a tortious act against plaintiff without the state which caused injury to plaintiff within the state, and it does not own real estate within the state. Based upon these facts, the Court finds that specific jurisdiction has not been established as to defendant BHI.

Section 302(a) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleges none of its enumerated New York acts.

Sadiant, Inc. v. Penstock Consulting, LLC · filed 2024-05-30(a)

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant transacted business in New York; committed a tort in New York; injured a person in New York, or owned, used, or possessed real property in New York.

Section 302 does not confer specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state employer merely because an employee worked remotely in New York against the employer’s wishes; the alleged in-state injury also did not establish jurisdiction without sufficient New York business or reasonably foreseeable consequences there.

DeMaria v. Nutritional Beverages, LLC · filed 2024-09-11(a)(1), (a)(3)

Plaintiff cannot manufacture personal jurisdiction by working remotely in New York against Defendants’ wishes, particularly where there is no evidence that Defendants’ hired her as part of an effort to target New York. ... Accordingly, Defendants did not “transact business” in New York pursuant to § 302(a)(1). ... Even if Defendants’ conduct caused an injury in New York, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficiently that Defendants solicited business, derived substantial revenue, or reasonably should have expected their acts to have consequences in New York.

Section 302(a) does not confer specific jurisdiction when plaintiffs merely speculate about New York contacts and fail to connect a New York act to the alleged injury.

Cosom v. Mack Trucks, Inc. · filed 2025-01-09(a)

With respect to specific long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a), plaintiffs have neither established jurisdiction in opposition, nor made a "sufficient start" in that regard ( see Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. , 226 AD3d 60, 74 [1st Dept 2024]). They offer mere speculation that defendant has sufficient contacts within New York, and have not connected any New York-based act to the alleged defective door handle that caused plaintiff's injury in New Jersey.

Section 302 does not confer specific personal jurisdiction when the defendant has no qualifying New York business transactions, tortious conduct, or real property.

Nautilus Insurance Company v. Roadrunner Restoration Company, LLC · filed 2025-01-16(a)(1)-(4)

Of course no provision of New York’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over Key Allegro — it transacted no business within New York, it committed no tort in New York, committed no tort outside New York that caused injury in New York (let alone satisfied the additional conditions authorizing long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state torts), and it owns no real property in the New York. CPLR 302(1-4).

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant's New York activities and the claims; section 302(a)(2) does not provide jurisdiction when the tortious conduct occurred outside New York.

Kyowa Seni, Co., Ltd. v. ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., Ltd. · filed 2025-06-03(a)(1), (a)(2)

Specific jurisdiction is not appropriate pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) because there is no "articulable nexus" between defendants' activities in New York and plaintiff's claims, which relate to the termination of an agreement that was negotiated, signed, and performed in Japan, by Japanese companies, and involve alleged misrepresentations made by a Japanese company in Japan and injury suffered by plaintiff in Japan, where it is located ( see generally D&R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro , 29 NY3d 292, 297-299 [2017]). ... Specific jurisdiction is likewise not appropriate pursuant to [*2]CPLR 302(a)(2) because none of the tortious conduct at issue was committed in New York.

Section 302 permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business in New York, or when an out-of-state tort causes injury in New York and the statutory requirements for New York activity, foreseeable consequences, and revenue are met.

Ludwig v. IMI Fabi LLC · filed 2025-09-23(a)(1), (a)(3)(i), (a)(3)(ii)

Considering the totality of the record, the Court concludes that while Fabi is not subject to general jurisdiction in New York, Plaintiffs have established specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and 302(a)(3). Fabi purposefully transacted business in New York through its distributor CSI and through direct shipments into the State. It reasonably should have expected [*5]its conduct to have consequences in New York, and it derives substantial revenue from interstate and international commerce.

Section 302(a)(1) governs personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries; its transacting business rule does not determine venue under CCA 305(b).

Neurologic Services, P. C. v. American Transit Insurance · filed 1999-12-10(a)(1)

The defendant’s contention that the “transacting business” clause of CCA 305 (b) must be read in conjunction with the jurisdictional provisions of CPLR 302 (a) (1) is without merit.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based on tortious acts committed in New York by alleged coconspirators.

Chiosie v. Chiosie · filed 1984-10-22(a)(2)

While appellant is a domiciliary of the State of New Jersey, and asserted that she never entered New York, it is sufficient for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction that tortious acts of the alleged coconspirators were committed in New York (Reeves v Phillips, 54 AD2d 854; American Broadcasting Cos. v Hernreich, 40 AD2d 800; Lamarr v Klein, 35 AD2d 248, affd 30 NY2d 757).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a prima facie factual showing of conspiracy before an in-state tortious act by a co-conspirator can support jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.

Mandaglio v. UNITED BROTH. OF CARPENTERS, ETC. · filed 1981-12-09(a)(2)

Rather, there must be a "prima facie factual showing" that the conspiracy exists. Merkel Associates, Inc. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F.Supp. 612, 617 (S.D.N.Y.1977).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who participates in a New York tort through a co-conspirator when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of supporting facts.

Ghazoul v. International Management Services, Inc. · filed 1975-07-25(a)(2)

We conclude, therefore, that although Spire may never have entered New York, the facts before us warrant our finding that plaintiff has established ... “threshold jurisdiction” under CPLR 302(a)(2) by making a prima facie showing of facts from which the finder of the facts could reasonably conclude that Spire was a conspirator and thereby participated in a New York based tort.

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) can support personal jurisdiction when a defendant comes to New York and has property removed from a vault and delivered to her for safekeeping.

Dzundzev v. Dzundzev · filed 1975-10-30(a)(1), (2)

Order entered June 19, 1975, in the Supreme Court, New York County, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without disbursements, for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Markowitz at Special Term, with the added observation that, according to plaintiff, defendant came to New York in January, 1973 and, at his suggestion, certain property in her husband’s vault (or in a vault in the joint names of defendant and plaintiff’s husband) was removed and handed to defendant for safekeeping. Sufficient basis is shown to warrant application of CPLR 302 (subd [a], pars 1, 2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits acts committed in New York by a co-conspirator to be attributed to an out-of-state defendant for personal jurisdiction when the defendant was aware of and benefited from those acts.

Madanes v. Madanes · filed 1997-10-08(a)(2)

It is well established under New York law that “the acts of a co-conspirator within the state may be attributed to an out-of-state defendant for the purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction.”

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s New York tortious acts when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the conspiracy and alleges specific facts connecting the out-of-state defendant to it.

Cleft of the Rock Foundation v. Wilson · filed 1998-01-31(a)(2)

Before long-arm jurisdiction can be exercised over an out-of-state co-conspirator, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a prima facie factual showing of a conspiracy to commit a tort in New York, and (2) allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy. ... The Court finds that the plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to establish Boyd’s co-conspirator status for purposes of conferring personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state conspirator when acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are committed in New York.

Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc. · filed 2000-03-31(a)(2)

Since sufficient facts warranting the inference of a conspiracy by and between Mazur, Campbell, GFI, and GFDI have been demonstrated, and specific acts in furtherance of that conspiracy have been carried out in New York, this Court has, under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2), personal jurisdiction over such defendants with respect to Best Cellars’ trade dress infringement, trade dress dilution, unfair competition, and copyright infringement claims.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s New York tort only when the plaintiff shows the required agency relationship between the defendant and the in-state tortfeasor.

First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Brickellbush, Inc. · filed 2002-07-29(a)(2)

To establish jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary defendant on the basis of the New York acts of a co-conspirator, the plaintiff must (1) establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, (2) allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, (3) demonstrate the commission of a tortious act in New York, and (4) demonstrate the requisite agency relationship between the nondomiciliary defendant and the in-state tortfeasor. ... Plaintiffs, however, have not made a sufficient showing regarding her direction or control of his bankruptcy frauds.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s tort in New York when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of conspiracy and alleges specific facts supporting the defendant’s membership.

Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. · filed 2005-01-18(a)(2)

To establish personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy theory, Plaintiffs must make a pri-ma facie showing of conspiracy, allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and show that the defendant’s co-conspirator committed a tort in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s New York tort when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of conspiracy and alleges specific facts supporting the defendant’s membership in it.

In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 · filed 2005-01-18(a)(2)

To establish personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy theory, Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing of conspiracy, allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and show that the defendant's coconspirator committed a tort in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits a co-conspirator’s acts to support personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the conspiracy.

City of Almaty v. Ablyazov · filed 2017-09-26(a)(2)

New York courts have recognized that agency jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2) includes the so-called “conspiracy theory” of personal jurisdiction, which allows “the acts of a co-conspirator [to] be attributed to a defendant for the purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” ... •The Court finds that the complaint alleges a prima facie showing of a conspiracy involving Viktor Khrapunov.

Section 302(a)(2) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary through a tortious act committed in New York when the pleaded conspiracy or agency requirements are met.

Harris v. Am. Accounting Ass'n · filed 2023-04-06(a)(2)

Rather, he asserted that they either conspired with AAA or engaged AAA and non-party SSRN (both of which, it appears to be conceded, are subject to jurisdiction in New York) as their agents to commit a tortious act, bringing them within the ambit of New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a)(2). ... Like the district court, we are unpersuaded. ... Nor can Harris demonstrate personal jurisdiction through an agency theory. ... Accordingly, the district court properly determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants.

Section 302(a)(2) permits a co-conspirator’s New York contacts to be imputed to an out-of-state defendant when the requirements for agency-based jurisdiction are met.

FAT Brands Inc. v. Ramjeet · filed 2023-07-25(a)(2)

Upon considering this theory, we hold that the district court has jurisdiction over both Fields and Edison because the jurisdictional contacts of their co-conspirators may be imputed to them.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s New York acts when the plaintiff offers definite facts connecting the nonresident defendant to New York transactions.

Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of US · filed 1974-03-29(a)(2)

Pláintiffs are correct that under certain circumstances a person may be subjected to jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a) (2) on the theory that his co-conspirator is carrying out activities in New York pursuant to the conspiracy. ... But, in order for a plaintiff to subject an out-of-state defendant to jurisdiction in New York, it is necessary to do more than put forward an unsupported allegation. The plaintiff must come forward with some definite evidentiary facts to connect the defendant with transactions occurring in New York.

Section 302 requires evidentiary facts supporting a reasonable inference that an out-of-state defendant knowingly joined a conspiracy before a co-conspirator’s New York acts can establish personal jurisdiction.

Singer v. Bell · filed 1984-12-21

However, for plaintiffs to “presume the connection, concert or conspiracy” to include the Sheriff defendants is a quantum leap forward that assumes the very fact to be established, without the slightest evidential support of any fact which permits an inference that, assuming the existence of the conspiracy as alleged, the Sheriff defendants were knowing participants.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based on a co-conspirator’s tortious act in New York committed pursuant to the conspiracy.

Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp. · filed 1991-11-15(a)(2)

It is well established that acts committed in New York by the co-conspirator of an out-of-state defendant pursuant to a conspiracy may subject the out-of-state defendant to jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2). ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ pleadings have met all the requirements for this Court to assert jurisdiction over San Diego under CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) does not permit jurisdiction over an out-of-state alleged coconspirator based on a conclusory assertion of conspiracy.

Qantel Corp. v. Niemuller · filed 1991-08-21(a)(2)

Second, the evidence that is before the Court constitutes no more than the “bland assertion of conspiracy” that the Second Circuit held to be insufficient. ... Even the basic allegation of an agreement between Karl and Christl is lacking.

Section 302 permits a coconspirator’s tortious acts in New York to be attributed to a nondomiciliary for personal jurisdiction when evidence supports a prima facie conspiracy.

Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 1997-10-28(a)(2)

Courts have held that the tortious acts of a coconspirator committed within the State may be attributed to a nondomiciliary defendant for purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction. ... Therefore, at this early stage of the proceeding, the motions to dismiss must be denied without prejudice to the B.A.T. defendants to assert the jurisdictional objections by affirmative defense in their respective answers.

Section 302(a) requires facts showing a prima facie conspiracy before a defendant can be subject to New York jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s acts in the state.

Universal Marine Medical Supply, Inc. v. Lovecchio · filed 1998-06-30(a)

Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden as it has provided no facts to suggest that Fleet was a co-conspirator of defendants Musial and Bellore. Surely the fact that Fleet’s incorporation was contemporaneous to this alleged conduct by Musial and Bellore does not establish a prima facie showing of a conspiracy. Finally, even were it true that Marine has placed Lovecehio on its payroll solely in order to avoid the appearance that defendant was working with Musial, such activity has occurred in Louisiana, not New York. Therefore, this court does not have personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendants and all claims against Fleet and Marine are dismissed.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s participation in a conspiracy involving acts by co-conspirators in New York.

National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 2000-03-03(a)(2)

In a similar motion in a related case, Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), evidence of BAT’s participation in an industry-wide conspiracy with significant links to New York supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2). CPLR 301 and 302(a)(3)(ii) afforded additional jurisdictional bases. Personal jurisdiction over BAT was held to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The same conclusion is required in the instant case.

When jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2) or (a)(3) rests on a conspiracy or agency theory, the allegations must establish the requisite jurisdictional predicate.

Wyser-Pratte Management Co. v. Babcock Borsig AG. · filed 2005-11-17(a)(2), (a)(3)

While plaintiff purports to allege that these defendants conspired to perpetrate a fraud either through agents within New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [2]) or by causing injury in New York (CPLR 302 [a] [3]), plaintiffs allegations of conspiracy and agency are wholly inadequate to set forth the requisite jurisdictional predicate.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when an agent’s or co-conspirator’s tortious acts in New York are imputed to that person.

Emerald Asset Advisors, LLC v. Schaffer · filed 2012-09-06(a)(2)

Under the co-conspirator or agency theory, Wong’s allegedly tortious acts in New York are therefore imputed to Schaffer, and the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Schaffer pursuant to Section 302(a)(2).

CPLR 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state conspirator when the complaint sufficiently alleges that the conspiracy involved overt tortious acts in New York.

Lawati v. Montague Morgan Slade Ltd. · filed 2013-01-08(a)(2)

The complaint sufficiently alleges jurisdiction over Rigby under CPLR 302 (a) (2) insofar as the complaint pleads that Rigby was a part of a conspiracy involving the commission of several overt tortious acts in New York (see Best Cellars Inc. v Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F Supp 2d 431, 446 [SD NY 2000] [for purposes of personal jurisdiction, “(t)he requisite relationship between the defendant and its New York co-conspirators is established by a showing that (a) the defendant had an awareness of the effects in New York of its activity; (b) the activity of the co-conspirators in New York was to the benefit of the out-of-state conspirators; and (c) the co-conspirators acting in New York acted at the direction or under the control, or at the request of or on behalf of the out-of-state defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Cleft of the Rock Found. v Wilson, 992 F Supp 574, 582-583 [ED NY 1998]).

Section 302 does not provide personal jurisdiction over a New Jersey doctor based on ad hoc treatment there of patients referred from New York without a financial referral arrangement; for an out-of-state medical malpractice claim, the injury occurs where the malpractice took place.

Jackson v. Sanchez-Pena · filed 2013-03-26(a)(1), (a)(3)

Given defendant’s affidavit denying any payment or other financial arrangement for the New York doctor’s referrals, it cannot be said that defendant ... was transacting business in New York based solely on his treatment, wholly in New Jersey, on an ad hoc basis, of the referred patients ... Accordingly, jurisdiction does not exist under CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... Nor does jurisdiction exist under CPLR 302 (a) (3) based on a “tortious act without the state causing injury to [decedent] . . . within the state” (id.). ... However, “[i]n a medical malpractice case, the injury occurs where the malpractice took place” (O’Brien, 305 AD2d at 202). Accordingly, the injury here occurred in New Jersey, not New York.

Section 302(a)(2) can support jurisdiction over an out-of-state conspirator when the complaint alleges that the conspirator knew of tortious acts committed in New York.

Lawati v. Montague Morgan Slade Ltd. · filed 2013-01-08(a)(2)

While the complaint alleges that Rigby was acting under the control and at the behest of MMS and the co-conspirators, rather than directing MMS to commit tortious acts in New York, jurisdiction is nonetheless established since the complaint alleges that Rigby was aware of the torts being committed by MMS and other defendants in New York (Dixon v Mack, 507 F Supp 345, 351-352 [SD NY 1980] [last prong of the test set out in Best Cellars Inc. (90 F Supp 2d at 446) is satisfied when it is alleged that the out-of-state co-conspirator has knowledge of the tortious acts being perpetrated in New York]).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a prima facie showing that an alleged conspirator committed a tort in New York for the defendant’s benefit, with the defendant’s consent and knowledge, and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Aramid Entertainment Fund Ltd. v. Wimbledon Financing Master Fund, Ltd. · filed 2013-04-30(a)(2)

Plaintiffs failed to set forth a prima facie basis for jurisdiction over defendant Bergstein under CPLR 302 (a) (2). In particular, plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that defendants, including defendant Bianco, as the agent of Bergstein, committed a tortious act in New York for the benefit and with the consent and knowledge of Bergstein, and in furtherance of a conspiracy that included Bergstein (see de Capriles v Lugo, 293 AD2d 405 [1st Dept 2002], lv dismissed and denied 98 NY2d 717 [2002]).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who participates in a conspiracy involving tortious acts committed in New York.

Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v. Weston Capital Mgt. LLC · filed 2018-04-26(a)(2)

The Supreme Court properly concluded that defendants are subject to jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute because they were part of a conspiracy that involved the commission of tortious acts in New York (CPLR 302[a][2]; Lawati v Montague Morgan Slade Ltd. , 102 AD3d 427, 428 [1st Dept 2013]; see also LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co. , 95 NY2d 210, 217-219 [2000]).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based on tortious acts in New York attributed to the defendant through a co-conspirator agency theory.

Floyd's of Leadville, Inc. v. Alexander Capital LP · filed 2023-09-22(a)(2)

Accordingly, the Court finds that FOL has made a prima facie showing that Clapham is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under Section 302(a)(2), based on a co-conspirator agency theory of jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) requires concrete facts showing a non-domiciliary’s participation in an alleged conspiracy to establish conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction.

P & L Development, LLC v. Gerber Products Company · filed 2024-02-06(a)(2)

In sum, PLD has not made a prima facie showing that CPLR 302(a)(2) provides a statutory basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Nestlé S.A.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer conspiracy-based jurisdiction without facts supporting an inference that the New York tort benefited the out-of-state defendant or that the in-state actors acted at that defendant’s behest.

Bangladesh Bank v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. · filed 2024-02-29(a)(2)

However, the complaint does not sufficiently allege conspiracy jurisdiction over Reyes, Pineda, Capina, and Agarrado because there is no basis to infer that the theft in New York was to their benefit or that the hackers acted at their behest.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state conspirator through a co-conspirator’s acts in New York when the required conspiracy and New York conduct are alleged.

Bur-Tex Hosiery Inc v. World Tech Toys Inc · filed 2024-03-07(a)(2)

Under Section 302(a)(2), a conspirator’s actions in New York as the agent for an out-of-state co-conspirator can provide a basis for jurisdiction over the out-of-state party. ... This theory of jurisdiction fails because the FAC alleges no conspiracy, no conduct in New York or any of the other necessary facts.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer who supervises and controls infringing activity.

Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. De Tabacos · filed 1999-07-19(a)

Section 302(a) also confers jurisdiction over individual corporate officers who supervise and control an infringing activity.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on a corporation’s New York activities to show that the corporate officer was a primary actor in the transaction; the officer’s title alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc. · filed 2006-03-30(a)(1)

Plaintiffs have not alleged that Thorkelson was a “primary actor” in the matters in question; control cannot be shown based merely upon a defendant’s title or position.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over corporate officers based on the corporation’s purposeful New York activity when the officers know of, consent to, and control that activity.

City of New York v. Cyco. Net, Inc. · filed 2005-01-27(a)(1)

Personal jurisdiction over the Teutenbergs comports with the requirements of New York CPLR § 302(a)(1) because Dirtcheapcigs.com engaged in purposeful activities in New York vis-á-vis its interactive web-site, ... with the consent and knowledge of its President and Vice President, the Teu-tenbergs.

Section 302(a)(1) requires specific facts tying a corporate officer to the corporation’s relevant New York conduct before its contacts can establish personal jurisdiction over that officer.

Arma v. Buyseasons, Inc. · filed 2008-12-08(a)(1)

Given that Plaintiffs do not allege in the Amended Complaint any facts that Getz personally engaged in any business in New York sufficient to confer jurisdiction over him as an individual under § 302(a)(1), Plaintiff's argument necessarily relies on New York's agency theory of personal jurisdiction. ... Here, while Plaintiffs do provide detailed accounts of Getz's role in the Distribution Agreement and the company's activities in connection with that Agreement, they offer no specific allegations of the role Getz played in maintaining the website after the Agreement terminated, and accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established that personal jurisdiction over Getz under an agency theory is appropriate.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer merely because the corporation is subject to jurisdiction.

Arma v. Buyseasons, Inc. · filed 2008-12-08(a)(1)

Although Defendants have, for the purposes of this motion, assumed that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Bu-yseasons, it does not necessarily follow that the Court has jurisdiction over Getz as President and CEO of Buyseasons pursuant to § 302(a)(1).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident participants in a fraud scheme carried out through actors in New York.

Maersk, Inc. v. Sahni · filed 2011-11-21

We find no error in the district court’s determination that Maersk established that the appellants were subject to personal jurisdiction in New York and that they had participated in the alleged frauds.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident mother whose acts placed her children in New York care and relieved her of their support.

In re the Guardianship of the Person & the Custody of Ellick · filed 1972-01-14

Such acts on the respondent’s part must be regarded as acts subjecting her to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this court. (CPLR 302.)

Section 302 reaches nonresident officers charged with misapplying funds of a union headquartered in New York, but personal jurisdiction still requires actual service.

Morrissey v. Curran · filed 1979-12-19

Although both of them were apparently residents of New Jersey at the time the action was commenced, as officers charged with misapplication of the funds of a union headquartered in Manhattan, they were clearly subject to service under the New York long-arm statute, CPLR § 302. However, the mere fact that they could readily have been served does not dispense with the necessity of actual service.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a nexus between the defendant’s New York business and the claim; section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York.

McGowan v. Smith · filed 1981-02-19(a)(1), (a)(3)

Essential to the maintenance of a suit against a nondomiciliary under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) is the existence of some articulable nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon (but cf. Singer v Walker, 15 NY2d 443). ... Although most of the criteria set forth in this statute have been satisfied here, it is obvious that the provision is inapplicable, since there has been no allegation that the tortious conduct in question caused injury in New York.

Section 302(b) supports personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse in a matrimonial action seeking maintenance and counsel fees.

Bennett v. Bennett · filed 1984-07-23(b)

We have considered the defendant husband’s remaining contention that the New York court lacks in personam jurisdiction and find it to be without merit (see CPLR 302, subd [b]).

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a decedent’s executors when the court had personal jurisdiction over the decedent.

Gordon v. Gordon · filed 1985-04-01(b)

The cause of action for accrued alimony and to enforce the previously obtained judgments survives James’ death (EPTL 11-3.1; Van Ness v Ransom, 215 NY 557; Joffe v Spector, 27 AD2d 406) and inasmuch as the court had personal jurisdiction over James, it has personal jurisdiction over his executors (CPLR 302 [b]; see, Rosenfeld v Hotel Corp., 20 NY2d 25).

Section 302 does not make a nonresident corporate officer personally subject to jurisdiction solely because the corporation may be subject to jurisdiction.

Baran Computer Services, Ltd. v. First Bank · filed 1988-08-01(a)(2)

His status as an officer of a corporate defendant which might be subject to jurisdiction in this State does not render him personally subject to such jurisdiction (see, Laufer v Ostrow, 55 NY2d 305; Sheldon v Kimberly-Clark Corp., 105 AD2d 273).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity in New York by the individual defendant; a corporation’s New York business does not alone establish jurisdiction over one of its directors.

Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (U.S.A.) · filed 1990-01-08(a)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that defendant Henderson is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1). It is our view that looking at the totality of Henderson’s alleged activities relating to New York — his vote to ratify the GPD contract at a Northern Ireland board meeting and his countersignature on a letter addressed to a New York firm — is insufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction over him since in our view he engaged in no purposeful activity in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over individuals whose purposeful activity in New York relates to the transactions giving rise to the complaint, even when they acted for a corporation.

Softel Computers, Inc. v. Grosky · filed 1992-05-19(a)(1)

As in Kreutter, the individual defendants herein cannot be shielded from personal jurisdiction by having acted on behalf of the defendant corporation. Moreover, jurisdiction was properly obtained ... over the individual defendants pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) since they engaged in purposeful activity in New York in relation to the transactions giving rise to the complaint (supra; Fabrikant & Sons v Adrianne Kahn, Inc., 144 AD2d 264).

Section 302(a) requires a corporate officer’s personal involvement in the activities giving rise to the action; corporate position alone does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Ontel Products, Inc. v. Project Strategies Corp. · filed 1995-09-14(a)

Ontel cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over Ziskind based solely on his position as President of P.S.C.; instead, Ontel must show that Ziskind personally took part in the activities giving rise to the action at issue.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over corporate officers when the corporation’s purposeful New York activity gives rise to the claim and occurs with the officers’ knowledge, consent, and benefit.

Houbigant, Inc. v. ACB Mercantile, Inc. · filed 1995-10-17(a)(1)

Furthermore, the officers of a corporation are subject to jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) if the corporation engages in purposeful activity in New York out of which the claim arises with the knowledge and consent of the individual officers and for their benefit.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a co-conspirator when a sufficient nexus connects that person to the alleged tortious conduct in New York.

Battanta v. Bunzl · filed 1997-05-08(a)(2)

... a sufficient nexus exists between Farina and the purported tortious conduct to confer jurisdiction over Farina as a co-conspirator under CPLR 302 (a) (2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate officer through a corporation’s New York conduct only when the officer controlled the conduct at issue; the officer’s title alone does not establish control.

Karabu Corp. v. Gitner · filed 1998-08-03(a)(1)

However, plaintiffs have not satisfied the “control” prong of the agency test, which requires plaintiffs to show that defendants “exercised some control” over the tortious actions allegedly committed in New York by TWA personnel. To make a prima facie showing of “control,” a plaintiffs allegations must sufficiently detail the defendant’s conduct so as to persuade a court that the defendant was a “primary actor” in the specific matter in question; control cannot be shown based merely upon a defendant’s title or position within the corporation, or upon conclusory allegations that the defendant controls the corporation.

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit a corporation’s New York activities to be attributed to an officer based on position alone; the plaintiff must show the officer exercised control over those activities.

King County, Wash. v. Industriebank · filed 2011-01-18(a)(1)

... their positions within the corporation, plaintiffs do not offer any evidence to indicate that either Reinke or Ortseifen exercised control over IKB’s activities in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires evidence that a corporation transacted business in New York before jurisdiction can be imputed to its individual agents.

TAGC Management, LLC v. Lehman · filed 2012-01-31(a)(1)

Neither can this Court impute long-arm jurisdiction to the individual defendants as agents of the corporate defendants, since plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that any corporate defendant transacted business in New York and is therefore subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires an individual basis for long-arm jurisdiction over a company employee or agent; the company’s New York business alone is insufficient.

Excess Line Ass'n v. Waldorf & Associates · filed 2013-05-03(a)(1)

The court concludes, however, that there is no showing that the defendant Pamela Waldorf is doing business in the State individually and not merely as an employee or agent of the Waldorf defendants (Laufer v Ostrow, McGowan v Smith). Thus, this court declines to disregard the general rule requiring an individual basis for long-arm jurisdiction over her pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a corporate officer based solely on the officer’s title and responsibility for daily management when the corporation transacts business in New York.

Leon v. Shmukler · filed 2014-01-17(a)(1)

Even if Mednikov were responsible for daily management, that fact and his officer title alone cannot suffice to impute jurisdiction under an agency theory, because in that case any corporate executive of a similar business would be subject to long-arm jurisdiction in New York so long as the corporation transacted business here.

Section 302(a)(1)-(3) does not support personal jurisdiction over an individual based solely on his position in a corporation whose activities occurred in New York; allegations must show his control over those activities.

New York v. Mountain Tobacco Co. · filed 2014-10-08(a)(1)-(3)

According to the State, the New York long-arm statute provides three alternative bases — namely, CPLR § 302(a)(1), (2), and (3) — for personal jurisdiction over Wheeler. However, the Court finds that personal jurisdiction is lacking under each of these provisions. ... In this regard, aside from Wheeler’s position within King Mountain, the State does not offer any allegations to indicate that Wheeler exercised control over King Mountain’s activities in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction based on New York business activity connected to the claim, including activity attributed to a defendant through its alter ego.

Arista Coffee Inc. v. Casale · filed 2020-04-16(a)(1)

The allegations against the Paramount Vendors therefore satisfy the requirements to exer- cise personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302 permits specific jurisdiction over a nonresident for a single purposeful New York transaction substantially related to the claims and over a corporate principal for qualifying corporate acts.

Wallace Church & Co. Inc. v. WyattZier, LLC · filed 2020-07-30(a)(1), (a)(3)

Because § 302(a) is a so-called “single act” statute, even a single purposeful transaction conducted in New York can give rise to specific jurisdiction, as long as the plaintiff’s claims raised have a “substantial relationship” to the transaction. ... Unlike CPLR § 301, CPLR § 302 allows courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over corporate principals based on transactions made or acts taken in a corporate capacity.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s New York business contacts and a corporation’s contacts attributable to the defendant through agency.

Williams v. Equitable Acceptance Corporation · filed 2021-01-14(a)(1)

Here, plaintiffs have established that both Jeffrey’s personal contacts in the state and his agency relationship with EAC are sufficient for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a commercial seller who conducts regular business in New York through Amazon when a New York sale is substantially related to the claim.

Poppington, LLC v. Brooks · filed 2021-07-27(a)(1)

Brooks’ purpose and volume of sales place her in the latter category of commercial vendors conducting regular business through Amazon, thereby creating the factual predicate for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction. ... That plaintiffs’ counsel purchased the allegedly infringing book through Amazon and had it shipped to New York creates the requisite nexus between Brooks’ Amazon sales, a New York transaction, and the claim asserted. See Eades, 799 F.3d at 168. Accordingly, specific personal jurisdiction over Brooks is proper under § 302(a)(1), and the Court’s exercise of that jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause.

CPLR 302(a) did not provide personal jurisdiction over the defendant in his individual capacity.

Wolff v. Krasner · filed 2021-08-04(a)

Furthermore, the court properly directed dismissal of the causes of action asserted against the defendant in his individual capacity for lack of personal jurisdiction ( see CPLR 302[a]).

Section 302 requires specific facts connecting a corporate officer or the officer’s activities to New York; an allegation of control over the corporation alone is insufficient.

Planck LLC v. Particle Media, Inc. · filed 2021-11-03

The FAC lacks any specific allegations about Zheng or his activities in New York that would confer general or specific personal jurisdiction over him under the Constitution and New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a) requires a basis for jurisdiction over a corporation before its New York activities can support agency based jurisdiction over a corporate officer.

Cullum v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts Corp. · filed 2024-02-12(a)

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Mr. Ballotti, an out-of-state corporate officer of WHR, are also insufficient to support long-arm personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 302(a). ... As explained above, Plaintiffs have not established that WHR is subject to jurisdiction in the state, which is an initial requirement under the agency theory.

Section 302 does not confer specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer based solely on the officer’s position when no specific action related to the claim is alleged.

The Seren Fashion Art and Interiors, LLC v. Sands, personally and as Founder & CEO of Lendistry, LLC · filed 2024-04-22

Nor is there specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302. ... In this case, the plaintiff fails to allege that the defendant took any specific action related to the Company’s loan application.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer merely because the officer acted on behalf of the corporation.

The Seren Fashion Art and Interiors, LLC v. Sands, personally and as Founder & CEO of Lendistry, LLC · filed 2024-04-16(a)(1)

Nor is there specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302. ... Even if the plaintiff were to allege specific action taken by the defendant, such action alone would not support specific jurisdiction over the defendant, a corporate officer acting on behalf of a corporate employer.

Section 302(a)(1) requires specific facts showing a corporate officer's control over the New York conduct; titles and conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

People v. Vintage Travel Servs., Inc. · filed 2025-05-08(a)(1)

These allegations are insufficient to establish control under Kreutter because they are not of any specific conduct by Lewis directly involving himself in, actively overseeing, or having knowledge of and tacitly acquiescing to the offending conduct and are otherwise conclusory.

Section 302(a)(1) can provide personal jurisdiction over a defendant outside New York, preventing the defendant’s absence from tolling the limitations period.

New York State Higher Education Services Corp. v. Handler · filed 1990-12-13(a)(1)

Since defendant was subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) and could have been served under CPLR 308 (5) or CPLR 313 (see, State of N. Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v McGarry, 151 AD2d 819, 820; State of N. Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Langus, 140 AD2d 792, 793), we conclude that plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of establishing that the limitations period was tolled.

CPLR 302 provides a basis for personal jurisdiction over individual defendants under New York’s long-arm statute.

Corcoran v. Haddon S. Fraser Associates, Ltd. · filed 1991-03-19

Personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants was obtained pursuant to both the doing-business doctrine (CPLR 301) and the long-arm statute (CPLR 302; Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., supra).

Repeated harassing telephone calls directed into New York can constitute a persistent course of conduct under Section 302(a)(3)(i).

Davis v. Masunaga Group, Inc. · filed 2002-05-22(a)(3)(i)

In view of the fact that the complaint alleges that Ellingson made about twenty telephone calls as part of the alleged course of harassment, there is no serious question that it asserts a “persistent course of conduct” within the meaning of Section 302(a), subd. 3(i).

Section 302(a)(3)(i) requires a persistent course of conduct within New York to establish personal jurisdiction on that basis.

Davis v. MASUNAGA GROUP, INC. · filed 2002-05-30(a)(3)(i)

The difficulty, however, is that there is no suggestion that Ellingson engaged in that “persistent course of conduct” within the state, as subdivision 3(i) requires.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) requires a persistent course of conduct in New York; a website with limited interactive content does not meet that requirement merely because New York residents can access it continuously.

Girl Scouts of the United States v. Steir · filed 2004-06-24(a)(3)(i)

Second, the mere fact that the Steirs’ website, which invites only limited interactive content, is continuously accessible to New York residents does not establish the sort of persistent course of conduct in the state fairly to require the Steirs to answer in New York for their out-of-state actions in maintaining the website.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) does not treat a nonresident medical provider’s New York insurance arbitrations arising from its treatment of New York patients as a separate persistent course of conduct supporting jurisdiction.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Mah, D.C. · filed 2019-10-25(a)(3)(i)

These arbitrations are part of accepting New York patients with New York insurance, rather than a separate course of conduct. Therefore, under New York law, they do not invoke personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) permits jurisdiction over nonresident corporate directors when their alleged misconduct forms a persistent course of conduct in New York.

Kossoff v. Samsung Co. · filed 1984-02-27(a)(3)(i)

The conduct complained of constitutes engagement in a “persistent course of conduct” within this jurisdiction and the ambit of the laws of this State (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 3, cl [i]).

Under CPLR 302(a)(3)(i), regularly entering New York to transport referred patients to an out-of-state medical facility qualifies as a persistent course of conduct in New York.

Reyes v. Sanchez-Pena · filed 2002-04-30(a)(3)(i)

Although this conduct might not pass muster with a conservative application under the first prong of this clause (i.e., “regularly solicits business in New York”) it clearly qualifies as a “persistent course of conduct in New York.” Under these circumstances it does not appear unfair to subject the defendant Gregory Surgical to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i).

Section 302(a)(3)(i)'s persistent course of conduct can include a firm's long-term rental and use of a New York apartment, even when some use is recreational.

Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez · filed 2002-09-20(a)(3)(i)

We therefore agree that this long-term apartment rental was sufficient to constitute a persistent course of conduct by-the firm.

Section 302(a)(3)(i)’s persistent course of conduct requirement can be met by repeated visits, property ownership, and litigation in New York considered together.

United States v. Wiesel · filed 2024-02-26(a)(3)(i)

Defendant Greenberg’s visits to New York, her ownership of property in New York, and her litigation in New York relating to her father’s estate, which is probated in a New York court, taken together, are “regular, persistent, [and] substantial” courses of conduct in New York that warrant a finding of specific jurisdiction over Greenberg under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(i).

Section 302(a)(3)(i) requires ongoing activity in New York; securing a lease and overseeing one completed renovation do not establish regular business or a persistent course of conduct.

Anderson v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2024-05-31(a)(3)(i)

They played no role in her recruiting, and “secur[ing]” a lease for Amazon Music and then overseeing a single, completed renovation in New York aren’t enough.

Section 302(a)(3)'s long-arm jurisdiction inquiry considers whether a nondomiciliary regularly does business or persistently engages in conduct in New York.

Lee v. Grimblat · filed 2024-06-27(a)(3)

The sisters showed that they are French citizens and that neither of them engaged in any regular business or persistent conduct in New York that would bring their conduct within the ambit of CPLR 302(a)(3).

CPLR 302(b) permits long-arm jurisdiction in a paternity proceeding only if the party seeking support resides or is domiciled in New York when the demand is made.

Rebecca B. W. v. Stephen B. · filed 1986-03-27(b)

CPLR 302 (b) is applicable only if "the party seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time such demand is made”. Petitioner’s papers indicated that she is a resident of the State of Washington. Therefore, she is not entitled to the benefits of this section.

Section 302(b) may confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident wife even when the husband does not formally seek support in his pleadings.

Abbott v. Abbott · filed 1984-09-24(b)

Therefore the court holds that CPLR 302 (subd [b]) may confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident wife where the husband does not formally seek support in his pleadings, because he is entitled to do so under section 236 (part B, subd 6) of the Domestic Relations Law.

Section 302(b) governs personal jurisdiction in a matrimonial action for equitable distribution based on rights arising from the marriage.

McCasland v. McCasland · filed 1985-10-31(b)

As noted above, however, plaintiff’s action is a matrimonial action and is governed by CPLR 302 (b). Plaintiff’s action seeks relief created by Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) based upon obligations or rights which flow from the marriage.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident when a claim arises from a separation agreement connected to New York rights and substantially performed there, even if the agreement was negotiated and signed elsewhere.

Lynch v. Austin · filed 1983-11-03(a)(1)

Both sides agree that the controlling procedural statutory provision is CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1), which authorizes the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has transacted any business within this State when the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of that transaction of business. ... Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that, under the contract itself, defendant purposefully availed himself of the potential benefits of New York law to protect his New York property interests and for the enforcement of his contractual rights. ... For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that personal jurisdiction over defendant was properly obtained and that defendant’s motion was, therefore, properly denied.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent when children born in New York give rise to a continuing claim for support.

Ifland v. Ifland · filed 1983-08-31(b)

As previously noted, the two children of the marriage were both born in New York State, giving rise to a continuing claim for support barring circumstances which would lift the obligation. It is, therefore, clearly apparent that the long-arm section of the CPLR relating to matrimonial matters encompasses the facts and circumstances relating to the respondent in this present case.

CPLR 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, non-domiciliary defendant in a support proceeding when New York was the parties’ matrimonial domicile and the plaintiff resides there, the support claim accrued under New York law, or the claim accrued under an agreement executed in New York.

Morgan v. Morgan · filed 1983-10-20(b)

In addition, jurisdiction over the nonresident, non-domiciliary defendant could clearly be exercised by the court pursuant to several separate grounds furnished by CPLR 302 (subd [b]), to wit: plaintiff was a New York resident at the time of the application and New York was the matrimonial domicile of the parties prior to their separation; the claim of support accrued under the laws of this State; and the claim accrued under an agreement executed in this State (see Domestic Relations Law, § 35).

Section 302(b) gives New York personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary in a divorce action where the spouses married and lived in New York and the plaintiff resided there for the year before filing.

Mebert v. Mebert · filed 1981-11-10(b)

The parties to the divorce were married in New York and resided in New York as husband and wife. The husband was a resident of New York at the time the divorce action based upon the provisions of a separation agreement entered into in New York was commenced, and he had been a resident of New York for a continuous period of one year immediately preceding the commencement of the action. (Domestic Relations Law, §§ 170, 230.) New York law provides that in such a situation New York has personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries. (CPLR 302, subd [b].)

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction in a matrimonial support action when the party seeking support resides in New York and the state was the parties’ matrimonial domicile before separation or the support obligation arose under an agreement executed there.

Avery v. Avery · filed 1981-05-11(b)

The basis for jurisdiction is supplied by CPLR 302 (subd [b]) which provides, inter alia: ... As that statute requires, plaintiff resides in New York, which was the “matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation”. In addition, the obligation to pay support “accrued under *** an agreement executed in this state”.