N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a matrimonial action when the party seeking support is domiciled in New York and the defendant’s support obligation accrued under New York law.

Geiser v. Geiser · filed 1980-02-01(b)

Reference must be made to CPLR 302 (subd [b]) which sets forth the circumstances under which this court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, as the defendant at bar is, in matrimonial actions. Having established that plaintiff, the party seeking support, is a domiciliary of this State and that the defendant’s obligation to support her accrued under the laws of New York, the court finds that service upon him in New Jersey was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on this court.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse for alimony and child support when the spouse’s New York contacts satisfy due process.

Crofton v. Crofton · filed 1980-12-15(b)

Thus, it is the decision of the court that the application of CPLR 302 (subd [b]) to the facts of this case satisfies the mandate of constitutional due process.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident in a claim arising from a separation agreement negotiated and executed in New York when related acts occurred there, even after a long gap in New York contacts.

Hurlbut v. Hurlbut · filed 1979-09-24(a)(1)

Courts increasingly have held that the negotiation and/or execution of a separation agreement in New York, along with the performance in New York of underlying and/or related acts, constitute the transaction of business, so as to vest in a New York court in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. ... In this case, the defendant’s activities in New York included his marriage and the negotiation and execution of the separation agreement. Further, the parties resided in New York as husband and wife and purchased a marital residence here, and this was one of the subjects of the separation agreement. ... the court is constrained to hold that it does have personal jurisdiction over this defendant.

Section 302(b) provided personal jurisdiction over a Florida resident served there in a proceeding to enforce a New York support order.

Fusco v. Roth · filed 1979-07-20(b)

This court obtained in personam jurisdiction over respondent (CPLR 302, subd [b]> see, also, Gersten v Gersten, 61 AD2d 745; Matter of Arlene W. v Robert W., 70 Misc 2d 1041; Matter of Frances B. v Robert B., 66 Misc 2d 227).

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction in a Family Court support enforcement proceeding against an absent respondent when the party seeking support resides in New York and New York was the parties’ matrimonial domicile before separation.

Pearson v. Pearson · filed 1978-12-04(b)

The clear intent of CPLR 302 (subd [b]) was to allow a New York resident to exercise personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant for the purpose of receiving support. Enforcement proceedings before the Family Court provide a forum through which a party may pursue an order or decree granting alimony, and so would come within the purpose of this statute so long as New York was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction in a matrimonial support action when the party seeking support is domiciled in New York, the parties had their matrimonial domicile there before separation, and the support obligation accrued under New York law.

Gersten v. Gersten · filed 1978-02-07(b)

Jurisdiction of both the person and the subject matter was properly obtained by the New York court in this action pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [b]). We see no merit to defendant’s contention that the statute extending long-arm personal jurisdiction to matrimonial actions, as applied, is unconstitutional. The case plainly falls within the provisions of the statute. The party seeking support is a resident of and domiciled in this State; this State was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation; and the obligation to pay support accrued under the laws of this State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a claim arising from a matrimonial agreement negotiated and entered into in New York.

Underwood v. Underwood · filed 1977-09-07(a)(1)

Clearly, it has now been long recognized and established, at least in this jurisdiction, that the negotiation and execution of a matrimonial agreement constitutes "transaction of business” for purposes of the statute.

Section 302(b) does not confer jurisdiction over a matrimonial claim when the parties’ last substantial matrimonial domicile before separation was outside New York.

Richardson v. Richardson · filed 1977-07-11(b)

New York has no jurisdiction over the first cause of action since the last substantial matrimonial domicile before the separation took place was in Texas (see CPLR 302, subd [b]; Lieb v Lieb, 53 AD2d 67).

Section 302(b) does not give Family Court jurisdiction to enforce another state's support order when the Domestic Relations Law assigns enforcement to the court that made the order.

Becker v. Becker · filed 1976-12-06(b)

Thus, an examination of article 3-A of the Domestic Relations Law is necessary to ascertain whether CPLR 302 (subd [b]) comes into play. To our mind, a reading of the pertinent statutes reveals that it does not.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a matrimonial action when the circumstances provide a sufficient basis.

Susskind v. Susskind · filed 1976-11-04(b)

Under the circumstances presented we find a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over defendant (CPLR 302, subd [b]) and no abuse of discretion in denying a change of venue to Suffolk County.

CPLR 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a matrimonial action when its statutory conditions are met and the defendant’s New York contacts satisfy due process.

Browne v. Browne · filed 1976-07-02(b)

While we recognize that in particular circumstances the application of CPLR 302 (subd [b]) may well present constitutional problems ... We find, therefore, that the statute as drafted, and as applied here, satisfies the mandate of constitutional due process.

Subdivision (b) supports personal jurisdiction in an action to recover money owed under a separation agreement made before divorce.

MacGilvray v. MacGilvray · filed 1976-06-28(b)

In this action, moneys are allegedly due under a separation agreement which antedates the parties’ divorce. Respondent’s intestate, appellant’s former wife, obtained personal jurisdiction over appellant upon service of the summons and complaint on him. Jurisdiction lies under the authority of Kochenthal v Kochenthal (28 AD2d 117); any reservations to the contrary, as in the case of Whitaker v Whitaker (56 Misc 2d 625, affd 32 AD2d 595), have been dissolved by the addition of the new subdivision (b) to CPLR 302 (L 1974, ch 859, § 1, eff June 7, 1974).

Section 302(b) requires the parties’ matrimonial domicile to have been in New York at the time of their separation to establish personal jurisdiction on that basis.

Lieb v. Lieb · filed 1976-03-04(b)

Continuity and constitutionality dictate that the first alternative be interpreted so that there be an equally strong contact with this State, to wit: that matrimonial domicile be in this State at the time of the separation (Venizelos v Venizelos, 30 AD2d 856, supra; but, see, McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 302).

Section 302(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction in a support action merely because New York was the parties’ matrimonial domicile at some earlier point in their marriage.

Lieb v. Lieb · filed 1976-06-28(b)

There is nothing in the language of subdivision (b) of CPLR 302 which indicates that it was the legislative intent to give the courts of this State personal jurisdiction of a defendant simply because the matrimonial domicile was located in this State at some time in the course of the marriage.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary party to a separation agreement executed in New York who is served outside the state.

Kassuto v. Yalon · filed 1974-02-07(a)

This contention runs contra to the holding in Kochenthal v. Kochenthal (28 A D 2d 117), in which the court determined that the provisions of subdivision (a) of CPLR 302 apply with equal effect to a separation agreement as it does to a commercial transaction and thus service outside the State of New York on a nondomiciliary party to a separation agreement executed in New York confers jurisdiction of his person in the New York courts. ... It is thus evident that nothing stated in Kochenthal has been overruled.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction in a New York resident assignee’s suit for payments due under a separation agreement executed in New York.

Zindwer v. Ehrens · filed 1970-06-09(a)(1)

Plaintiff-appellant, who is a resident of this State and the assignee of defendant-respondent’s former wife, no longer resident here, has sued for payments due under a separation agreement executed here. This circumstance alone is sufficient to justify jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(b) applies only to matrimonial actions or family court proceedings; it does not provide personal jurisdiction in a federal action to enforce Family Court money judgments.

Campbell v. Azrak · filed 2019-06-06(b)

Therefore, because § 302(b) applies only to “matrimonial actions” and “family court proceedings,” and Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of showing that either applies here, § 302(b) does not establish this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 302 does not provide personal jurisdiction over a paternity claim that does not arise from one of its enumerated acts.

Anonymous v. Anonymous · filed 1966-03-17

Here, the gravamen of the petition is sounded neither in tort nor contract. To put it another way, this paternity proceeding did not necessarily arise from any of the acts enumerated in CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a husband's material participation in his wife's New York legal representation as transacting business in the state.

Strasser v. Schlesinger · filed 1967-03-03(a)(1)

Her engagement of a New York attorney and his rendition of legal services in New York in which defendant played a material part constitute the transaction of business in New York by defendant (see Nasaw v. Safford, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 4, 1966, p. 20, col. 5).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for breach of a separation agreement made in New York while both spouses lived there, where the agreement creates continuing obligations in the state.

Kochenthal v. Kochenthal · filed 1966-11-21(a)(1)

Accordingly, since I see no violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in this instance, and since the defendant herein admits personal service of process upon him in the State of Indiana, this court is of the opinion that the provisions of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) and 313 are applicable to the situation at bar to the extent of giving this court jurisdiction over the defendant in view of all the circumstances pertaining hereto. The motion is denied.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary party to a separation agreement executed in New York when that party is served outside the state.

Kochenthal v. Kochenthal · filed 1967-07-10(a)(1)

I conclude that a separation agreement, executed in New York, is within the ambit of CPLB 302 (subd [a], par. 1), and that a summons served upon a nondomiciliary party thereto, outside the State of New York, confers jurisdiction of his person upon the New York court.

Section 302(a)(2) does not treat a nonresident husband's failure to provide marital support as a tortious act within New York.

Inkelas v. Inkelas · filed 1968-11-13(a)(2)

Clearly, the failure to carry out his marital obligations of support and maintenance by a nonresident husband, did riot constitute tortious conduct within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2).

Section 302 does not confer jurisdiction over an absent spouse in an action for necessaries based solely on an implied promise to pay, and subsection (b) does not cover that action because it is neither a matrimonial action nor a Family Court proceeding.

Hafner v. Security Pacific National Bank · filed 1987-06-15

The mere fact that plaintiff now seeks to recover for necessaries based on an implied promise to pay does not serve as a basis for jurisdiction, as Charles did not commit a purposeful act within this State which would constitute a "business transaction”. ... Second, long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (b) was equally unavailable to the plaintiff in an action to recover necessaries. CPLR 302 (b) provides that long-arm jurisdiction may be obtained only in "[a] matrimonial action or family court proceeding”. An action for necessaries, while based upon a spouse and parent’s duty of support, is neither a matrimonial action nor a Family Court proceeding.

Section 302(a)(2) cannot be used to establish personal jurisdiction in an Article 8 family offense proceeding without authorization under the Family Court Act.

Jane O. J. v. Peter L. J. · filed 1988-06-30(a)(2)

Although it is apparent that if the provisions of CPLR 313 and 302 (a) govern, the Family Court would have personal jurisdiction over respondent as to the commission of tortious acts within New York, a careful review of the provisions of the Family Court Act as well as of the cases construing and applying the Act’s provisions regarding personal jurisdiction makes clear that neither section 165 (a) nor any other provision of the Family Court Act permits resort to CPLR 313 and 302 (a) in the case at bar.

Section 302(b) does not provide personal jurisdiction for matrimonial claims arising from a separation agreement and divorce judgment made in Connecticut when those claims did not accrue under New York law.

Klette v. Klette · filed 1990-11-13(b)

...plaintiffs claims herein did not accrue under the laws of New York (CPLR 302 [b]).

Section 302(b) requires minimum contacts with New York to establish personal jurisdiction in a support proceeding, even if the support claim accrued in the state.

Leslie GG. v. William HH. · filed 1991-07-11(b)

Even assuming that the birth of the child in New York was sufficient to give rise to a claim accruing here, the absence of some "minimum contacts” by respondent with this State precludes a finding that personal jurisdiction may be constitutionally acquired (see, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac If 302.19; see also, International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316; cfi, Browne v Browne, 53 AD2d 134, 137, appeal dismissed 40 NY2d 917).

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse in a support modification proceeding when New York was the matrimonial domicile and the support claim arose under New York law and an agreement executed there.

Erb v. Kuwik · filed 1992-11-18(b)

It is clear that this court has long-arm jurisdiction over the respondent pursuant to CPLR 302 (b) as to the petition seeking a modification of support. New York was the matrimonial domicile, and the claim for support accrued both under the laws of this State, and under a prior agreement executed in this State.

Under § 302(b), a support claim must accrue under New York law or an agreement executed in New York to satisfy those grounds for personal jurisdiction.

Porter v. Porter · filed 1993-01-04(b)

After reviewing the Arizona orders, this court finds that the petitioner has presented no proof to support her allegation that there were divorce or any other proceedings in New York. Hence, the petitioner’s claim cannot be said to accrue under the laws of this State or under an agreement executed in this State, pursuant to CPLR 302 (b).

CPLR 302(b) sets no fixed time limit on when New York must have been the parties’ matrimonial domicile before separation.

Levy v. Levy · filed 1993-01-07(b)

As the Legislature declined to fix a specific time limit within which the parties must have been domiciled in New York before separation despite the opportunity to do so, it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to fix such a limit (see, supra, at 111, 113).

Section 302(b) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident in a matrimonial action based on a prior New York matrimonial domicile only when that domicile is supported by proof.

Meindl v. Meindl · filed 1993-02-05(b)

Supreme Court properly held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff. CPLR 302 (b) authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents in matrimonial actions in specified circumstances. Although defendant argues that New York was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation, no such proof is contained in the record.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse when New York was the parties’ last substantial matrimonial domicile before separation.

Staron v. Staron · filed 1995-05-22(b)

In order to sustain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a matrimonial action, inter alia, the plaintiffs claim for relief must have accrued under the laws of this State or this State must have been the marital domicile of the parties before their separation (CPLR 302 [b]; Sovansky v Sovansky, 139 AD2d 724). ... It is clear that New York State was the last substantial matrimonial domicile before the parties separated, since the parties continued to maintain a marital residence in New York until June 1992 when the defendant moved out, and the plaintiff commenced the instant action for divorce in December 1992.

CPLR 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary parent in a support proceeding when a support claim accrued under New York law through an earlier paternity proceeding.

Spak v. Specht · filed 1995-06-15(b)

Additionally, by virtue of the 1988 paternity proceeding, petitioner established a claim for support which accrued under the laws of New York and, therefore, jurisdiction over respondent may properly be exercised pursuant to CPLR 302 (b) (see, e.g., Matter of Gordon J. Y. v Erin L. M., 124 Misc 2d 677, 678-679; cf., Matter of Leslie GG. v William HH., supra, at 379-380; Matter of Rebecca B. W. v Stephen B., 131 Misc 2d 651, 653-654).

CPLR 302(a) requires sufficient New York contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary; support payments made in Virginia and visits and calls with children in New York did not establish purposeful activity in New York.

Birdsall v. Melita · filed 1999-04-15(a)

Instead, our review reveals that, unlike the contacts in Lynch v Austin (supra), defendant’s payment of child support in Virginia, received by plaintiff in New York, coupled with defendant’s visitation and phone calls to the parties’ children, does not amount to purposeful activity within the State sufficient to “invokfe] the *811 benefits and protections of its laws” (Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253).

Section 302(b) requires a basis for personal jurisdiction in a matrimonial action; the parties’ Vermont matrimonial domicile did not establish one.

Lipski v. Lipski · filed 2002-04-16(b)

Nevertheless, we affirm, since plaintiff fails to show in the instant case any of the bases for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (b). Specifically, the documentary evidence demonstrates that well before the parties separated in 1997 or 1998, the matrimonial domicile had been Vermont, where, among other things, defendant has continuously resided since 1994, the parties have drivers’ licenses and register their cars, plaintiff applied for and became a citizen, and which has been listed as the parties’ residence on federal, Vermont and New York tax returns since at least 1997.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse for support when the spouse seeking support resides in New York and the defendant abandoned that spouse there.

Zahra v. Zahra · filed 2004-02-02(b)

The Court credits the wife's assertions that the parties purchased a co-op in New York and were living there prior to the husband's abrupt departure and abandonment. The Court finds that the husband has the necessary minimal contacts with the State to acquire personal jurisdiction over him for the purpose of seeking support, if the wife be so advised.

Section 302(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction in a matrimonial action based on a New York marital domicile that ended 13 years before the action began.

Senhart v. Senhart · filed 2004-07-12(b)

In accordance with Staron (215 AD2d 646 [1995]), Klette (167 AD2d 197 [1990]), Lieb (53 AD2d 67 [1976]), and Babu (229 AD2d 758 [1996]), the court finds that, even assuming plaintiff was successful in establishing that New York was the marital domicile of the parties through 1990, residence here 13 years before the commencement of the instant action is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over him premised upon the parties’ marital domicile having been located in this state.

Section 302(b) does not establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse based on matrimonial domicile without evidence that New York was ever the parties’ matrimonial domicile.

Senhart v. Senhart · filed 2005-05-16(b)

The evidence in the record was insufficient to show that the matrimonial domicile was ever in New York.

Section 302(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff was neither a New York resident nor domiciliary when she filed her motion.

Holloway v. Holloway · filed 2006-12-28(b)

While Supreme Court obtained personal jurisdiction over defendant under the Domestic Relations Law, it did not obtain personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (b) as plaintiff was not a resident or domiciliary of New York when she filed her motion.

Section 302(b) provides a basis for personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary on a claim to recover an engagement ring after the parties lived together and became engaged in New York.

Dreznick v. Lenchner · filed 2007-06-26(b)

The plaintiff established, as a matter of law, a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction on this cause of action pursuant to CPLR 302 (b) and his entitlement to the return of the ring.

Section 302(b) requires a New York matrimonial domicile before separation; earlier residence together in New York does not suffice when the matrimonial domicile before separation was elsewhere.

Julien v. Julien · filed 2010-11-30(b)

Although the parties resided together in New York between 2001 and 2002, it is clear that New York was not the matrimonial domicile “before their separation,” as that term is used in CPLR 302 (b) (see Klette v Klette, 167 AD2d 197, 198 [1990]).

Section 302(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse based on the child’s visits to the New York spouse when those visits do not establish sufficient contacts with New York.

Valone v. Valone · filed 2013-08-06(b)

Mere visitation of the child with her father pursuant to an unwritten understanding between the parents does not establish sufficient contacts between the husband and wife sufficient to permit New York’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over the divorce or the child. ... There are no other facts sufficient to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over the wife or the child in this divorce action under the general long-arm jurisdiction under 302 (b).

Section 302(b) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non domiciliary when its requirements are fulfilled.

Matter of Henshaw v. Hildebrand · filed 2021-02-05(b)

We further agree with the father that the court acquired personal jurisdiction over the mother with respect to the family offense petition, despite the fact that she was residing in Texas, inasmuch as the father fulfilled all necessary requirements ( see CPLR 302 [b]; Family Ct Act § 154 [c]), and the mother admitted service of the family offense petition by mail ( see CPLR 312-a).

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign executor for qualifying New York business transactions or tortious acts committed by the decedent or the executor.

Nexsen v. Ira Haupt & Co. · filed 1964-12-09(a)(1), (a)(2)

Thus, the executor, having been personally served in New York, is subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, not only for Ira Haupt’s transaction of “ any business within the State ” prior to death, but also for his own transaction of business within the State as executor for the deceased Ira Haupt, both before and after the expiration of the partnership agreement on December 31, 1963. ... As I stated previously, CPLR 302 (subd. [a]) applies whether the act complained of was committed in New York State by the decedent or by his executor. Therefore, the executor may be sued in New York on this cause of action.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident executor when the decedent transacted business in New York and the claim arose from that business.

Johnson v. Jay · filed 1965-01-06(a)(1)

During the course of her trusteeship, the late Helen King Bollinson, a non-domiciliary, acting as a partner in the New York partnership, transacted business within the State, and the cause of action which seeks an accounting of her proceedings as trustee of said partnership clearly stems from her activities while transacting such business and, therefore, she or her executor would be subject to our jurisdiction.

Section 302(a) reaches executors and administrators of non-domiciliaries, but does not extend to de facto estate fiduciaries merely because they perform similar duties.

Struna v. Leonardi · filed 2022-09-07(a)

The New York long-arm statute, however, does not purport to reach “de facto executors or administrators” of an estate but rather, “executor[s] or administrator[s].”

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident decedent’s executor for a claim arising from the decedent’s New York business transaction, consistent with due process.

Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corp. of America · filed 1967-05-25(a)

As to the substantive issue presented on this appeal, viz., the constitutionality of the out-of-State service upon the nonresident executors, in light of the clear legislative intent embodied in CPLR 302 and 313, the many cases upholding similar if not identical laws in other jurisdictions, and the philosophical trend of the decisions in both the United States Supreme Court and our own Court of Appeals, we are convinced that to declare such out-of-State service invalid and unconstitutional would be unwarranted and not in conformity with the mainstream of current American jurisprudence.

Section 302(a)(2) and (3) do not provide personal jurisdiction for a defamation action.

Guccione v. Flynt · filed 1985-09-17(a)(2), (a)(3)

Because these claims were subsequently dismissed, however, the grounds set out in the opinion for maintaining jurisdiction over Flynt no longer exist, since CPLR § 302(a)(2) and (3) are expressly inapplicable to a defamation action.

Sections 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) exclude defamation causes of action from personal jurisdiction based on tortious acts in or outside New York, while § 302(a)(1) can support jurisdiction when the defendant transacts business in New York with a nexus to the claim.

Atas v. The New York Times Company · filed 2022-11-09(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

The defamation exceptions in §§ 302(a)(2) and (3) apply “if a plaintiff’s claims are all ‘based upon [the same] alleged defamatory statements’ such that the ‘entire complaint sounds in defamation.’”

Section 302(a) permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident through specified business, tort, and real-property contacts with New York.

Friedman v. Univest National Bank and Trust Co. · filed 2023-07-20(a)

Specific jurisdiction is also lacking here. Under Section 302 of the C.P.L.R., specific jurisdiction may exist over a non-resident defendant where the defendant: (1) “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state”; (2) “commits a tortious act within the state”; (3) “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state”; or (4) “owns, uses or possesses any real property” in New York. 4.W.L.[. Grp., 828 F. Supp. 2d at 565 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)). ... As such, neither C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) or (4) provides the Court jurisdiction over Defendant. Nor does Plaintiff assert any tort claims against Defendant, see Compl, and thus neither C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) or (3) can serve as the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) excludes defamation claims from jurisdiction based on an in-state tortious act, even if the defendant was a New York resident when the act occurred but a nondomiciliary when served.

Collesano v. Calabro · filed 1985-11-15(a)(2)

A "court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary * * * who in person * * * commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act” (CPLR 302 [a] [2]). ... Plaintiffs argument that CPLR 302 (a) (2) does not apply here because defendant was a resident of New York when he allegedly committed the tortious act in New York is wholly without merit.

Section 302(a)(3) excludes claims based on defamation from personal jurisdiction, even when they are labeled as tortious interference.

Jolivet v. Crocker · filed 1994-08-08(a)(3)

Section 302(a)(3) specifically excepts from its purview causes of action based on defamation. In an attempt to circumvent this statute, Jolivet has labelled his claims for relief as “libel” and “tortious interference with a contractual relationship.” However, both of these claims are based on the alleged defamatory letter, and thus § 302(a)(3) cannot serve to supply a basis for personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) is construed narrowly in defamation cases; brief visits and charitable assistance in New York did not establish jurisdiction over a later online statement made in Vermont.

SPCA of Upstate New York, Inc. v. American Working Collie Ass'n · filed 2010-06-03(a)(1)

Although defendants’ contacts could support long-arm jurisdiction for causes of action other than defamation and the issue here is a close one, we are unpersuaded that extending jurisdiction on these facts would be consistent with this state’s narrow approach to long-arm jurisdiction in defamation cases (see e.g. Talbot v Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 NY2d 827, 829 [1988]; Copp v Ramirez, 62 AD3d 23, 28-30 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 711 [2009]; Kim v Dvorak, 230 AD2d at 290-291; Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d at 244-251; Nardiello v Allen, 2007 WL 4119182, *3-4, 2007 US Dist Lexis 85080, *7-12 [ND NY 2007]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between business transacted in New York and the defamation claim.

Penachio v. Benedict · filed 2012-01-04(a)(1)

In order to evaluate whether personal jurisdiction exists pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), we must determine: (1) whether Benedict or Van Pelt transacted any business in New York, and, if so, (2) whether there was an articulable nexus, or substantial relationship, between the defamatory conduct and the actions that occurred in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a defamation claim when the defendant purposefully transacts business in New York and the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

SPCA of Upstate New York, Inc. v. American Working Collie Ass'n · filed 2012-02-09(a)(1)

Through CPLR 302, the Legislature has manifested its intention to treat the tort of defamation differently from other causes of action and we believe that, as a result, particular care must be taken to make certain that nondomiciliaries are not haled into court in a manner that potentially chills free speech without an appropriate showing that they purposefully transacted business here and that the proper nexus exists between the transaction and the defamatory statements at issue.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a defamation defendant when its New York business activity relates to creating the challenged publication and the claim arises from that activity.

Goldfarb v. Channel One Russia · filed 2020-03-04(a)(1)

In sum, because Channel One transacts business in New York and Plaintiff’s cause of action arises from that conduct, Channel One is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in a defamation claim when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that activity.

Rajaratnam v. Motley Rice, LLC · filed 2020-03-26(a)(1)

Instead, jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for defamation must satisfy CPLR § 302(a)(1), which provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that “transacts any business within the state” so long as the cause of action arises from the in-state activity.

Section 302(a)(3) excludes tortious interference claims that arise from allegedly defamatory statements and therefore sound in defamation.

Giannetta v. Johnson · filed 2021-06-24(a)(3)

Accordingly, her tortious interference claim also sounds in defamation and therefore is expressly excluded from CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) does not provide personal jurisdiction over claims based on defamatory statements, regardless of how the claims are labeled.

Mirza v. Dolce Vida Medical Spa, LLC · filed 2024-01-26(a)(3)

And because all of Plaintiffs’ claims are based upon Defendants’ defamatory statements, Plaintiffs may not utilize N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) as a basis for specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) can provide personal jurisdiction over nonappearing defendants when the plaintiff adequately establishes jurisdiction.

Deepdale Specialty Fin. I LLC v. Harvard Med. Supplies LLC · filed 2024-12-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff adequately establishes that the court has jurisdiction over the non-appearing defendants under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction in a defamation action merely because an allegedly defamatory article is available online in New York.

Donner v. Der Spiegel GMBH & Co. KG · filed 2024-09-04(a)(1)

The defendants are therefore correct that simply publishing an article containing allegedly “defamatory utterances” that is circulated on the internet in New York is not sufficient on its own to qualify as “transacting business” under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

The defamation exception to CPLR 302(a)(2) and (3) applies to a claim styled as tortious interference when the claim sounds in substance in defamation.

Karageorgis v. Papachristos · filed 2025-01-17(a)(2), (a)(3)

The claim thus sounds in substance in defamation for purposes of CPLR 302 (a) (2) and (3) (and for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations).

Section 302(a)(1) requires more than distribution of an allegedly defamatory publication in New York to establish that its publisher transacted business there.

Donner v. Der Spiegel GMBH & Co. KG · filed 2025-10-23(a)(1)

Even accepting that there is a link – however attenuated – to Der Spiegel, the mere distribution of Der Spiegel’s publications through the Buffalo location is insufficient to establish jurisdiction over Der Spiegel in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) can support specific jurisdiction based on a contract’s creation or performance in New York, but the plaintiff must allege facts supporting those contacts.

Beskrone v. Berlin · filed 2023-02-15(a)(1)

First, the circumstances surrounding the contracts—their creation or performance—could potentially have conferred such jurisdiction. Had, for example, the contracts been negotiated in New York, or had the transactions contemplated by the contracts taken place in New York, or had the contracts given rise to obligations that were to be performed in New York, arguments for specific performance drawing on these circumstances could have been made. The SAC, however, does not allege facts to support such a theory.

Section 302 requires sufficient New York contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Dunes Hotel & Country Club of Las Vegas v. Mayo · filed 1974-02-21

There being no proof of New York contacts sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in this court under CPLR 302, defendant is correct in asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the plaintiff to show sufficient contacts between the defendant and New York to sustain personal jurisdiction.

G. S. C. Associates, Inc. v. Rogers · filed 1977-04-08(a)(1)

Having considered all the circumstances in this, case, the court must conclude that plaintiff has not shown that defendant has enough contacts with New York to sustain personal jurisdiction over her under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits long-arm jurisdiction when a defendant’s purposeful association with a New York franchise makes suit in New York foreseeable.

Carvel Corp. v. Ross Distribution, Inc. · filed 1988-02-08(a)(1)

In any event, the court properly found that long-arm jurisdiction existed in New York as to Ross (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]). Ross’s purposeful association with the New York franchise rendered jurisdiction in New York foreseeable.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose guarantee of strict performance of a New York real estate lease creates a sufficient relationship with the State.

Wong v. Slotkin · filed 1992-05-28(a)(1)

It appears to this court that under all the circumstances, this defendant, by guaranteeing the strict performance of the terms of the lease relating to real estate in New York, rather than just guaranteeing payment of a debt, established a sufficient relationship with the State of New York to bring him within the long-arm jurisdiction of this court.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who executes a guaranty directed to a New York creditor, even without physical contact with New York.

Key Bank of New York, N.A. v. Patel · filed 1992-08-18(a)(1)

Similarly, this court concludes that Khatiwala’s lack of physical contact with this forum is inconsequential because his execution of the guaranty by itself automatically subjected him to personal jurisdiction in this court pursuant to section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims arising from a non-domiciliary’s financial guaranty payable in New York because the guaranty is a contract to supply services in the state.

A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank · filed 1993-03-15(a)(1)

We predict that the New York Court of Appeals would construe a financial guaranty payable in New York as a contract to perform services within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a nonresident deposits checks drawn on New York banks or uses out-of-state branches of firms headquartered in New York.

Goldstock v. Restrepo · filed 1994-11-07

We agree with the Supreme Court that neither the mere act of depositing checks drawn on New York banks, nor the fact that the deposits were made in Panama and Florida branch offices of Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Paine Webber, Inc., entities which happen to be headquartered in New York, is sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (see, Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank—N. Y., 39 NY2d 391; First Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Wilson, 171 AD2d 616; Faravelli v Bankers Trust Co., 85 AD2d 335; Nemetsky v Banque de Developpement de la Republique du Niger, 64 AD2d 694).

A choice of law clause is relevant to whether a defendant transacted business in New York, but alone does not establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Goulds Pumps, Inc. v. Mazander Engineered Equipment Co. · filed 1995-07-14(a)(1)

Although the choice of law clause contained in the parties’ distributor sales agreement is a relevant factor in determining whether defendant transacted business in New York, "absent more, it is insufficient to warrant a finding of long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1)” (Lisec Glastechnische Industrie GmbH v Lenhardt Maschinenbau GmbH, 173 AD2d 70, 72).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over nonresident song licensors when their New York licensing transactions give rise to the claims.

Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc. · filed 1995-11-14(a)(1)

Even excluding the alleged actions of Seasons Four when it was a viable entity, Valli and Gaudio do have sufficient contacts with New York to present this Court with jurisdiction, and the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Renewal Rights Claims and Licensing Claims are sufficient to bring Valli and Gaudio within the ambit of New York’s long-arm statute. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Valli and Gaudio have licensed the Songs through BMI and Fox, which conduct their activities, including passing on royalties to Valli and Gaudio, in New York. In so doing, Valli and Gaudio have contracted to sell goods or services in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims arising from the parties’ joint New York bank account and transactions involving that account.

Tarrab v. Tarrab · filed 1997-05-20(a)(1)

The motion court correctly held that long-arm jurisdiction (CPLR 302 [a] [1]) could have been obtained over defendant with respect to both of plaintiff’s causes of action, the first of which alleges the parties’ maintenance of a joint bank account in New York and defendant’s drawing of a check on that account to plaintiff’s order that was dishonored for insufficient ... funds, and the second of which alleges defendant’s withdrawal of funds from the account in an amount that exceeded his interest therein (see, Bankers Trust Co. v Suarez, 526 F Supp 1262; Catauro v Goldome Bank for Sav., 189 AD2d 747; cf., Masonite Corp. v Hellenic Lines, 412 F Supp 434, 438-439).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary merely because it furnished a guaranty for a foreign corporation’s contract to be performed outside New York.

Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. v. Kvaerner · filed 1998-04-07(a)(1)

With respect to the issue of personal jurisdiction over defendant Jones, this Court has consistently held that “New York may not extend long-arm jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who was never physically present in New York, and who never agreed to provide any goods or services here, other than a promise to a New York corporation that he would make good if a corporation of another state defaulted on its debt” (First Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Wilson, 171 AD2d 616, 618).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when a contract claim arises from a contract negotiated in New York.

BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi · filed 1999-01-05(a)(1)

Because the contract was negotiated in New York, the Court finds that Jain was subject to New York’s long-arm jurisdiction.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a guarantor when the guaranteed repayment obligation is to be performed in New York.

State Bank of India v. Taj Lanka Hotels Ltd. · filed 1999-03-04(a)(1)

The guarantee of the repayment obligation expressly to be performed in New York was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction upon appellant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Skrabalak v Rock, 208 AD2d 1100, 1102; A.I. Trade Fin. v Petra Bank, 989 F2d 76, 81; Lone Star Indus. v Chieftain Cement Corp., 795 F Supp 87, 89-90).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction merely because a contract was signed in New York when its terms were settled elsewhere and performance was to occur elsewhere.

Anderson v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc. · filed 2000-01-20(a)(1)

Williams’ presence in New York was merely the “last act marking the formal execution of the contract,” ... and, without more, does not suffice to subject either the Expo or Williams to jurisdiction within the forum state.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a defendant that signed a contract outside New York solely because the plaintiff signed it in New York.

Libra Global Technology Services (UK) Ltd. v. Telemedia International, Ltd. · filed 2001-01-16(a)(1)

Further, where, as here, a defendant has signed a contract outside of this State, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over that defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) based simply on the circumstance that the plaintiff signed in New York (see, Standard Wine & Liq. Co. v Bombay Spirits Co., 20 NY2d 13, 17; Millner Co. v Noudar, Lda., 24 AD2d 326, 329-330).

Section 302 does not provide personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant with no contacts with New York.

Deitz v.Renaissance Capital Group, Ltd. · filed 2002-12-17

Defendant, an investment banking company domiciled in Bermuda and with its headquarters and principal place of business in Moscow, Russia, had no contacts with New York upon which jurisdiction over it pursuant to CPLR 302 might have been premised.

An indemnity agreement alone does not establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) merely because the events triggering indemnification occur in New York.

Chase Manhattan Bank v. AXA Reinsurance UK PLC · filed 2002-12-03(a)(1)

Finally, CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not confer jurisdiction. ... “[t]he rule in New York is clear that an indemnity agreement alone does not provide a sufficient contact with New York simply because the underlying events that trigger the indemnification occur in New York”

Section 302(a) provides no basis for personal jurisdiction when the defendant has no connection to New York.

Bookstaver v. Saintfort · filed 2004-09-09(a)

Insofar as defendant had absolutely no connection to New York State, no predicate exists for personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 302 [a]).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer long-arm jurisdiction merely because an out-of-state buyer orders goods shipped from New York and sends, or fails to send, payment.

Spencer Laminating Corp. v. Denby · filed 2004-05-17(a)(1)

The classic instance in which personal jurisdiction is found not to exist is the one in which the in-state plaintiff ships goods to the out-of-state defendant, who sends (or, more accurately, fails to send) payment. Without more, this is insufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York and either qualifying New York business or revenue, or foreseeable New York consequences and substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

NANOVIBRONIX, INC. v. Weiss · filed 2004-09-02(a)(3)

What Plaintiff has failed to allege, however, is that Weiss either: (1) regularly does business within New York or derives substantial revenue from goods used within the state or, (2) expects or should reasonably expect his acts to have consequences within New York and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3). The absence of these allegations are fatal to the claim of long arm jurisdiction.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction based on New York employment unrelated to the contract underlying the claim.

O'Brien v. Miller · filed 2009-03-26

New York’s long-arm statute does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant Miller (CPLR 302). ... Here, the record shows that while Miller is employed in New York, his employment here is unrelated to the contract between himself and plaintiffs, which he entered into personally in New Jersey, and not on behalf of his employer.

CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) permit personal jurisdiction when a respondent’s presence in New York during loan negotiations involved alleged misrepresentations central to the dispute.

Invar International Inc. v. Sirketi · filed 2011-07-07(a)(1), (a)(2)

Moreover, respondent’s presence in New York during negotiations for the loan agreement, during which respondent allegedly made misrepresentations that are central to the underlying dispute, was a sufficient basis to establish personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) and (2) (see George Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648 [1977]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction based on communications about the transaction with people in New York and receipt of transaction proceeds through a New York bank.

FIA Leveraged Fund Ltd. v. Grant Thornton LLP · filed 2017-05-16(a)(1)

This is sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see e.g. Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327, 330-332, 339-341 [2012]; C. Mahendra [NY], LLC v National Gold & Diamond Ctr., Inc., 125 AD3d 454, 457 [1st Dept 2015]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer whose New York marketing and coverage of New York risks connect it to the dispute.

MF Global Holdings Ltd. v. Allied World Assurance Co. (In re MF Global Holdings Ltd.) · filed 2016-12-21(a)(1)

Further, both state and federal courts have upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the “transacting business” clause of section 302 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, which provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domieiliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state ....” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) (McKinney). ... By marketing its insurance policies to entities and individuals in New York, and insuring risks in New York, the Bermuda Insurers have established the requisite connection between this dispute, the Plaintiffs and New York to establish a jurisdictional basis for this Court to entertain this dispute.

Section 302 does not confer long-arm jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries whose contacts with New York are insufficient.

McSpedon v. Levine · filed 2018-02-07

The Erdos defendants lived in Massachusetts, conducted all of their business from their Connecticut office, and had insufficient contacts with New York to subject them to New York's long-arm jurisdiction ( see CPLR 302; see generally America/International 1994 Venture v Mau , 146 AD3d 40).

Section 302(a) requires specific facts connecting a non-domiciliary defendant to New York; vague, collective allegations do not establish personal jurisdiction.

Weng v. Does 1-35 · filed 2023-09-25(a)

The complaint’s vague and conclusory allegations do not establish any personal connection between Roadget and New York and, therefore, fail to satisfy the requirements of the state’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction based on qualifying New York business or tort connections.

Mendez v. Primitive Christian Church · filed 2025-01-31(a)

In addition, under CPLR § 302(a), a court has jurisdiction over a defendant if the entity transacts business within New York, commits a tortious act within the state, or derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce. ... Thus, Movant-Defendants’ claim of jurisdictional immunity is unpersuasive and denied.

Section 302(a) does not authorize personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants when the complaint alleges no relevant events, business transactions, or injury in New York.

MacKwashie v. Mensah · filed 2025-02-07(a)

Accordingly, the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not be appropriate under C.P.L.R. § 302.

Section 302(a) does not provide personal jurisdiction over defendants when the only alleged connection to New York is the plaintiff’s location there.

Seatig, Inc. v. BizLog · filed 2025-11-06(a)

It also cannot establish personal jurisdiction under either New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), or federal due process. Indeed, the SAC is bereft of any allegations connecting TripLog and Advance to this forum, except for the fact that Seatig is based in New York.

In a defamation claim against an out-of-state journalist, Section 302(a)(1) looks to the journalist’s activities in New York; employment by a New York company alone is insufficient.

The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Newsweek Digital LLC · filed 2026-05-28(a)(1)

We think this analysis suggests that New York courts applying Section 302(a)(1) look beyond the mere fact of a journalist’s in-state employment to the nature of the journalistic activities completed in New York.

CPLR 302(b)'s matrimonial long-arm jurisdiction does not apply to a divorce action commenced before the subsection was added.

Chodos v. Chodos · filed 1983-01-24(b)

The divorce action, upon which the application to recover arrears is based, was commenced prior to the addition of the new CPLR 302 (subd [b]) providing for “long arm” jurisdiction in matrimonial actions (L 1974, ch 859, § 1).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a claim arising from business transacted in New York and can be applied in a pending action.

William Rand, Inc. v. De Fantasia · filed 1964-01-20(a)(1)

Under said section, among other things, personal jurisdiction may now be acquired over a nondomiciliary as to causes of action arising out of transaction of any business by the defendant in New York. It cannot be disputed that the cause of action herein arises out of such transaction of business (CPLR 302). ... The question is whether or not the new act should be retroactively applied. Such intention can be gleaned from section 10003 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules which provides for the application of the new Civil Practice Law and Rules to all further proceedings in pending actions, except to the extent that the court determines that such application to a particular pending action would not be feasible or would work injustice. ... Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Section 302(a) may apply retroactively to causes of action that accrued before it took effect.

Developers Small Business Investment Corp. v. Puerto Rico Land & Development Corp. · filed 1964-01-29(a)

It seems fairly clear that subdivision (a) of section 302 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules may be applied retroactively to causes of action which matured before the new practice became operative (1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 302.04).

Section 302 applies to an action commenced after its effective date even if the cause of action arose before that date.

Petterson v. Van Auken · filed 1964-04-30

The defendant claims that service made pursuant to CPLR 302 is ineffective to confer jurisdiction of this court of a defendant in a cause which arose prior to the effective date of this rule. ... This court is inclined to agree with the foregoing holdings and determines that the service on the moving defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 was properly made. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Section 302 does not retroactively validate jurisdictionally defective service of process in an action filed before its effective date.

Simonson v. International Bank · filed 1964-06-04

It is unnecessary for us now to determine the exact reach of the new statute or to decide whether its provisions would encompass the cause of action here involved (cf. 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., pars. 302.06-302.08), in view of our conclusion that the statute does not have the effect of retroactively validating the jurisdictionally defective service of process made in this action.

CPLR 302 cannot validate service of process that was jurisdictionally defective when made before the provision took effect.

Utilities & Industries Management Corp. v. Barton Distilling Co. · filed 1964-11-05

The provisions of CPLR 302 and 313, in effect on September 1, 1963, may not be applied to validate the “attempted service of process which was jurisdictionally defective when made” (Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N Y 2d 281, 290).

Section 302(a)(3) could not support jurisdiction based on an out-of-state act when the challenged service preceded the provision’s effective date.

Balogh v. Rayner-Smith · filed 1966-10-10(a)(3)

Triggs’ participation in the profits of the American partnership did not of itself constitute a basis for sustaining the jurisdiction. If it did, the recent enactment (L. 1966, ch. 590, eff. Sept. 1, 1966) of paragraph 3 to subdivision (a) of CPLR 302 would be meaningless, insofar as it includes, within its ambit, one who commits an act without the State, causing injury within the State, and who “ derives substantial revenue from goods * * * or services * * * in the state ”. This subdivision was not effective as of the date of the attacked service herein.

Section 302(a)(3) does not apply to actions instituted before its effective date.

Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n. v. Moss · filed 1967-02-09(a)(3)

CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 3) does not apply to actions instituted prior to its effective date (Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N Y 2d 281).

Section 302 applies retroactively because it is procedural and provides an additional forum for enforcing existing rights.

Mermis v. Weeden & Co. · filed 1968-08-20

The above-mentioned statute was to become effective September 1, 1963. The sale of the stock in question occurred the previous April of 1963. The first question, therefore, would be to determine whether the act applies to the instant case. We believe so. The New York Court has held that the statute is procedural and one which merely makes available an additional forum to a plaintiff to enforce whatever substantive right he might have against a defendant, and, as such, may be applied retroactively.

Section 302(b) may be applied retroactively to establish personal jurisdiction where there is a prior judgment of separation.

Sciame v. Sciame · filed 1976-11-29(b)

Personal jurisdiction over the defendant was properly acquired pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [b]), which may be given retroactive effect because of the prior judgment of separation (see Lieb v Lieb, 53 AD2d 67).

Section 302(b) may be applied retroactively when determining personal jurisdiction in a support action.

Gumley v. Gumley · filed 1976-12-01(b)

While the defendant also has pointed out that the provisions of §302 (b) have been enacted, subsequent to the institution of the action in New York, we see no error in the inclusion of the current §302, sub-section (b).

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury to a person or property in New York when the alleged tort occurred outside the state.

Vassilliades v. Margaronis · filed 1970-06-23(a)(3)

Nor may it be said, since the corporate plaintiff is a foreign corporation not doing business in New York and the individual plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Canada, that a tortious act committed without the jurisdiction caused “ injury to person or property within the state” (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 3).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires direct injury in New York from an out-of-state tort; harm arising only from the plaintiff’s New York domicile is insufficient.

Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v. Birenbaum · filed 1975-01-29(a)(3)(ii)

We do not think that there is a sufficient showing of harm within New York to meet this requirement of CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii). The required injury in New York must be of a direct nature and not “remote or consequential injuries which occur in New York only because the plaintiff is domiciled, incorporated or doing business in the state.”

Section 302(a)(3) requires injury to person or property in New York; lack of insurance coverage resulting from a certificate issued in New Jersey does not satisfy that requirement.

Vamosy v. Gateway Insurance · filed 1975-12-11(a)(3)

Paragraph 3 of subdivision (a) of CPLR 302 requires that a tortious act committed by a nondomiciliary without the State cause "injury to person or property within the state” before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary. Assuming that there was a fraudulent misrepresentation, it is not established that it caused injury to the plaintiff’s person or property within this State. The sole injury to the respondent is the lack of insurance coverage.. This failure would necessarily have occurred in the State of New Jersey at the time the certificate was issued.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not confer jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes injury outside New York, even if resulting damage occurs in New York.

Attanasio v. Ferre · filed 1977-10-28(a)(3)(ii)

The injury alleged occurred in the State of Florida with resultant damage in the State of New York. Thus, jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]) cannot be obtained (see Black v Oberle Rentals, 55 Misc 2d 398; see, also, Chemical Bank v World Hockey Assn., 403 F Supp 1374; Security Nat. Bank v Ubex Corp., 404 F Supp 471; Vamosy v Gateway Ins. Co., 49 AD2d 489).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury to a person or property within New York.

Lámar v. American Basketball Ass'n · filed 1979-04-12(a)(3)

Under that subsection, the tortious act, if committed outside the state, must cause injury within the state. ... Lamar,'who neither lives nor works in New York, has failed to demonstrate the initial requirement of “injury to [his] person or property within the state.”

Section 302(a)(3)(i) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York; the plaintiff’s New York residence and alleged financial or goodwill loss alone do not establish that injury.

Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc. · filed 1983-03-14(a)(3)(i)

Arbitran fails to establish jurisdiction based upon this test as the tort outside the state did not cause an injury within the state. ... The only tie that the alleged tort in the present action has with New York is that the plaintiff resides here and that plaintiff claims to have suffered financial loss or loss of good will. These are inadequate links.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort when the immediate injury also occurs outside New York.

Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy & Junior College · filed 1984-08-06(a)(3)

It is uncontradicted in the case at bar that (1) the alleged tort of improper refusal to supply the infant plaintiff with his medication occurred in Pennsylvania, and (2) the infant plaintiff suffered immediate injury while in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, long-arm jurisdiction was not acquired over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3) (see Rose v Sans Souci Hotel, 51 Misc 2d 1099).

A plaintiff’s New York residence or domicile alone does not establish an injury within the state for personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a).

Bissinger v. DiBella · filed 1988-06-13(a)

The mere residence or domicile of an injured plaintiff in New York does not constitute injury within the State for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (Bramwell v Tucker, 107 AD2d 731, 732).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York before it can support personal jurisdiction.

Avato v. Walker Manufacturing Co. · filed 1989-03-03(a)(3)

Although § 302(a)(3) creates personal jurisdiction for torts committed “without the state” under certain circumstances, any tort covered by this provision must also “[cause] injury to person or property within the state.” Plaintiff in this action was injured in Pennsylvania, not New York. Therefore, § 302(a)(3) cannot subject Voss to personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; indirect financial loss suffered by a corporation based there does not suffice.

Precision Concepts, Inc. v. Bonsanti · filed 1991-04-22(a)(3)

... and there is no evidence of any injury having been caused within the State by virtue of the nondomiciliary defendants’ allegedly tortious conduct, other than indirect financial loss allegedly suffered by the plaintiff corporation which has its principal place of business in the State (see, CPLR 302 [a] [3]; Fantis Foods v Standard Importing Co., 49 NY2d 317, 326).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that contracts to supply machines for use in New York, and § 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction when it foresees New York consequences and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Torrioni v. UNISUL, Inc. · filed 1991-10-22(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Defendant UNISUL is subject to long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1), permitting the courts of this State to exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who, in person or through an agent "transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state”, since defendant UNISUL manufactured a machine in Florida which allegedly caused an injury in New York, contracted to sell that and other machines to New York purchasers for use in New York, and subsequently arranged for direct shipment of those machines (see, Anderson Dev. Corp. v Isoreg Corp., 154 AD2d 859). Similarly, defendant UNISUL is subject to long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii), since defendant UNISUL could have foreseen that the sale and delivery of the machine, as well as parts therefor, to a New York company would have consequences in this State and since defendant UNISUL, through the sale of its machines via an 800 "Hot-Line” number, derived substantial revenue from interstate and international commerce (Tonns v Spiegel’s, 90 AD2d 548).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer when its exclusive nationwide distribution agreement results in injury from its product in New York.

Thompson v. Nishimoto Trading Co. · filed 1999-03-29(a)(3)(ii)

This court holds that an exclusive sales agreement to distribute a foreign manufacturer’s product in the United States that results in a tort in New York is sufficient activity to justify invoking New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a direct injury in New York; a resident’s resulting pain and expenses there do not satisfy that requirement when the accident occurred elsewhere.

Maldonado v. Rogers · filed 2000-06-07(a)(3)

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the fact that they reside in New York and suffer resultant damages, e.g., medical expenses and pain and suffering, in New York is insufficient to satisfy the “ ‘direct injury within the State’ ” requirement under section 302(a)(3) in an instance where the accident at issue occurred outside of New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) may subject a foreign manufacturer to personal jurisdiction when its efforts to serve a market make it foreseeable that its allegedly defective product will be marketed in New York and cause injury there.

Napolitano v. Mastic Bicycles & Fitness Co. · filed 2001-01-08(a)(3)(ii)

It is well settled that a nondomiciliary may be subjected to suit if, inter alia, the sale of one of its products arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly the market for its product in other countries or States, and its allegedly defective merchandise has been a source of injury (see, CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]; World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 US 286; LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210). The Supreme Court properly concluded that Bell submitted sufficient facts to demonstrate that Kinesis engaged in activities which made it at least foreseeable that its products would be marketed and found in New York, thereby possibly subjecting it to personal jurisdiction (see, LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., supra; Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463; Cordero v City of New York, 236 AD2d 577).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause personal or property injury in New York; financial loss there alone does not establish that injury.

Polansky v. Gelrod · filed 2005-07-07(a)(3)

Finally, for jurisdiction to exist under CPLR 302 (a) (3), the commission of a tortious act outside the state must, among other things, cause personal or property injury within the state. Here, plaintiff failed to show that he sustained any injury— other than financial loss—in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an adequate link between a nonresident’s out-of-state conduct and injury in New York to support personal jurisdiction.

Rivas v. AmeriMed USA, Inc. · filed 2006-06-27(a)(3)

The claim against defendant Engelman for tortious interference with contractual relations was subject to ... dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, since this Arizona resident’s alleged extrajurisdictional conduct was not adequately linked to injury in New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [3]).

Section 302(a)(3) does not provide personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort when the event causing the injury occurred outside New York.

Qudsi v. Larios · filed 2019-06-12(a)(3)

Here, since the accident which caused the injuries occurred in New Jersey, CPLR 302(a)(3) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants in New York ( see Abad v Lorenzo , 163 AD3d at 905; Vaichunas v Tonyes , 61 AD3d at 851).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort; for a traditional commercial tort, the injury occurs where the original harmful event occurred, not where the plaintiff feels financial loss.

Study Logic LLC v. Farmer Bros Co · filed 2019-07-29(a)(3)

As this case mirrors a traditional commercial tort, the Court must use the injury-situs test. Since Chesney allegedly committed all! crimes that led to the injury in Texas, the locus of the injury is not New York, and therefore this Court does not have specific jurisdiction under the long arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer specific jurisdiction merely because a manufacturer placed a product into the stream of commerce and knew it might be used in New York.

Ainette v. The Market Basket Inc. · filed 2021-08-02(a)(1)

Similarly, the argument that Grammer placed its product into the stream of commerce, and therefore “cannot deny that it was aware that its product would be . . . in use in New York,” is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; economic loss felt there solely because the plaintiff resides there is insufficient.

Astier v. Ondimba · filed 2024-01-02(a)(3)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim that the effects of the Individual DeleJ1dants' alleged tortious conduct were felt by Plaintiffs in New York merely because Plaintiffs were New York residents suffering economic injury in New York, is not sufficient to establish injury to person or property within the state for purposes ofCPLR 302(a).

CPLR 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; a plaintiff’s residence there and resulting financial loss do not establish the required in-state injury.

Astier v. Ondimba · filed 2024-01-02(a)(3)

Accordingly, Plaintil'fs' claim that the effects of the Corporate De fendants' alleged tortious conduct '·would reasonably be expected lo have consequences to Plaintiffs in New York;' is not suflicienl lo allege that the Corporate Defendants commiucd a tortious act causing injury to Plaintiffs ' person or property in l\ew York under Cl'LR 302(aX2) or (a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort; the injury occurs where the original event happened, rather than where the plaintiff later feels damages.

Shepperson v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 2024-03-06(a)(3)

CPLR § 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a tort occurring outside of New York if it caused injury to a plaintiff within New York, so long as the non-domiciliary does business in the state. ... Thus, personal jurisdiction does not exist under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) locates an injury at the original event causing it, rather than where the plaintiff later feels the resulting harm.

Dynamic Star, LLC v. Zackson · filed 2024-08-06(a)(3)

Thus, the complaint fails to allege that the “original event[s] which caused the injury” occurred in New York.

Section 302(a) requires a cause of action based on an enumerated act to be asserted when a nondomiciliary is served; a later amendment cannot retroactively cure service made without personal jurisdiction.

Lebensfeld v. Tuch · filed 1964-08-25(a)

If, at the time of service, no canse of action based on an act specified in CPLR 302 was asserted against Weisz, no personal jurisdiction of Weisz was obtained. Without such personal jurisdiction, the court may not grant leave to amend the complaint and cure retroactively a service which was not good when it was made.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary based on representations that it is present in New York.

Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd. · filed 1964-12-09

Accordingly we hold that the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel seems not to be embraced within the purview of § 302.

Section 302 applies to a nondomiciliary even when the parties’ agreement says New York law in force when they signed governs the agreement’s substantive provisions.

Stewart v. Stewart · filed 1980-03-03(a)(1)

The agreement itself contains no provision relating to the manner in which an action thereon might be commenced. Hence it was plainly the intention of the parties that the law in effect at the time of the execution of the agreement would control its substantive provisions. CPLR 302, therefore, applied to the case at bar, and Special Term did indeed have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) does not extend personal jurisdiction to Article 52 judgment-enforcement process against a nondomiciliary national bank.

Sulil Realty Corp. v. Rye Motors, Inc. · filed 1965-01-19(a)(1)

Although a restraining order under CPLR 5222 (subd. [a]) shall be served personally in the same manner as a summons, and CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) and 313 enable a New York court to exercise personal jurisdiction over any- nondomiciliary as to a cause of action arising from an act of transacting business within this State, in the same manner as if he or it were a domiciliary of the State, by service of a summons without the State in the same manner as service is made within the State, we find nothing in these sections or elsewhere in article 3, CPLR which warrants us in concluding that these provisions were legislatively intended to apply to process issued in the enforcement of money judgments under the provisions of article 52, ...CPLR with respect to a nondomiciliary foreign national banking association.

Section 302(a)(1)–(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a bank that only serves its depositor outside New York and satisfies none of the subdivisions’ business or tort requirements.

Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank · filed 1975-05-15(a)(1)-(3)

The section simply does not reach Aroostook. CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) requires the transaction of business here; CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 2) requires the commission of a tortious act here and CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3) is based upon a tortious act committed without the State causing injury within the State. The jurisdictional requisites of these subdivisions, or any one of them, have not been demonstrated.

Section 302 provided a basis for jurisdiction over the defendant throughout the period he was absent from New York.

Rescigno v. Montefiore Hospital & Medical Center · filed 1978-10-23

Under the long-arm statute, CPLR 302, a basis of jurisdiction over Dr. Enker existed during the entire period in question.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction merely because a defendant dealt with a New York resident and attended depositions there, while section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort.

Weiss v. Greenberg · filed 1981-12-31(a)(1), (a)(3)

The fact that defendant knew it was dealing with a New York resident, or that its employees traveled to New York on two separate occasions to attend depositions is not sufficient in and of itself to establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) (Presidential Realty Corp. v Michael Sq. West, 44 NY2d 672). ... Plaintiff’s other claim that jurisdiction is obtained under the “tortious act” provision of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3) is without merit. This provision, among other things, insofar as pertinent, requires that plaintiff show that defendant committed a tortious act: “without the state causing injury to person or property within the state”.

CPLR 302 authorizes personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries in specified circumstances, but does not reach every case in which due process would permit it.

Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd. · filed 1984-05-10

Importantly, in setting forth certain categories of bases for long-arm jurisdiction, CPLR 302 does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York, while section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from an out-of-state tort.

Current Textiles Corp. v. AVA Industries, Inc. · filed 1985-12-03(a)(1), (a)(3)

In general, telephone conversations between litigants inside and outside of the state about the contract at issue will not sustain personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) absent additional evidence that the out of state litigant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York State. ... Courts have construed the language of CPLR § 302(a)(3) literally to mean that the relevant harm must occur within New York. ... Because Current has failed to make a prima facie factual showing that defendants’ activities bring it within the ambit of §§ 302(a)(1) and (a)(3) of New York’s long-arm statute, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 302(a)(1) and (a)(3) provide no basis for personal jurisdiction over nonresident companies whose relevant negotiations, bottling, and distribution occurred outside New York and who had no New York business or supply contracts.

Showell v. White Rock Products Corp. · filed 1992-11-16(a)(1), (a)(3)

Clearly, the papers submitted in support of the summary judgment motion establish a prima facie showing of a lack of a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of this State over the respondents ... pursuant to either CPLR 302 (a) (1) ... or CPLR 302 (a) (3) ... .

CPLR 302 does not provide long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant when the plaintiff alleges no facts supporting it.

Jurlique, Inc. v. Austral Biolab Pty., Ltd. · filed 1992-11-23

Further, the plaintiff has alleged no facts that would give rise to jurisdiction over Austral under the long-arm provisions of CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits a representative’s New York activities to be attributed to a nondomiciliary that requested and benefited from them; jurisdiction under (a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York.

Barbarotto International Sales Corp. v. Tullar · filed 1992-12-14(a)(1), (a)(3)

The plaintiffs’ New York activities could thus be attributed to the appellant for jurisdictional purposes because the appellant requested performance of those activities and the activities were for its benefit (see, Lupton Assocs. v Northeast Plastics, supra). ... We note that the court erred by finding that there was long-arm jurisdiction over the appellant under CPLR 302 (a) (3), as there was no evidence that the appellant committed a tortious act outside New York which caused injury to the plaintiffs in New York.

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident investors merely because their out-of-state accounts may pass through New York or their investment firms are headquartered there.

Goldstock v. Restrepo · filed 1993-07-15(a)

Applying the aforestated principles of law to the matter at bar, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the Mejia or Grandstone defendants pursuant to CPLR 302. ... Finally, a banking or investment relationship with a bank or investment company without the State does not establish jurisdiction simply because those entities have their headquarters in New York.

CPLR 302 (a) (3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury in New York, while CPLR 302 (a) (1) requires the defendant to transact business in New York.

Ingraham v. Carroll · filed 1997-01-16(a)(1), (a)(3)

Turning first to the question of whether Loy subjected himself to jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3), we find that plaintiff failed to establish that Loy committed a tortious act outside of New York which caused injury to decedent inside the State. ... Furthermore, there is no evidence that Loy transacts business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York beyond mere solicitation, and § 302(a)(3) locates a medical malpractice injury where the malpractice occurred.

O'Brien v. Hackensack University Medical Center · filed 2003-05-13(a)(1), (a)(3)

The purported solicitation in the present case, even accompanied by what really amounts to treatment of New York residents in New Jersey, does not provide a stronger case for finding that defendant transacted business in New York. ... Hence, CPLR 302 (a) (3) is inapplicable as a basis for jurisdiction.

A plaintiff invoking CPLR 302 must present evidence supporting a basis for long-arm jurisdiction.

DDR Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Burnham Pacific Properties, Inc. · filed 2003-08-28

Although plaintiff intimates that there may be sufficient contacts to establish long-arm jurisdiction, it has failed to present any evidence from its own client to show any basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Section 302(a) requires evidence that a specified jurisdictional category applies; a defendant’s New York contacts alone do not suffice.

N.A.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Pafundi · filed 2004-11-04(a)

Despite these minimum contacts with the state, plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence which would establish that any of the jurisdictional categories specified in CPLR 302 (a) exist (see Bunkoff Gen. Contrs. v State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 296 AD2d 699, 700 [2002]).