N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on fleeting New York transactions from which the plaintiff's claims do not arise.

AMT Capital Holdings, S.A. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. · filed 2018-05-08(a)(1)

These transactions are not only too fleeting to provide a jurisdictional foundation, but are also not the acts from which plaintiff's claims arise ( see CPLR 302[a][1]; see also Kasprzak v Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Canada , 1 F Supp 915 [WD NY 1932]; 1 Couch on Ins. § 3:14 [3d ed 2017]; McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg Corp. , 20 NY2d 377 [1967]).

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat responsive correspondence with a client's New York medical providers as purposeful transaction of business in New York.

Gottlieb v. Merrigan · filed 2019-03-07(a)(1)

Further, although defendants sent numerous letters and emails to the client's medical providers in New York, those actions were "responsive in nature, and not the type of interactions that demonstrate the purposeful availment necessary to confer personal jurisdiction" ( Paterno v Laser Spine Inst. , 24 NY3d at 378; see Collins v Yodle, Inc. , 105 AD3d 1178, 1178-1179 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose activity in New York is sufficiently purposeful under the totality of the circumstances.

Sager v. City of Buffalo · filed 2017-06-30(a)(1)

We conclude that Supreme Court properly determined that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) ( see Fischbarg v Doucet , 9 NY3d 375, 381 n 5). ... Thus, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Habib " has engaged in sufficient purposeful activity to confer jurisdiction in New York' " ( Grimaldi v Guinn , 72 AD3d 37, 44-45; see generally Fischbarg , 9 NY3d at 380).

Section 302(a)(1) can support specific jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully targets New York patients through activities substantially related to the claim.

Robins v. Procure Treatment Ctrs., Inc. · filed 2018-01-25(a)(1)

With regard to specific jurisdiction (CPLR 302[a][1]), the record shows that PPM's activities in New York were "purposeful and [that] there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" ( Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs. , 7 NY3d 65, 72 [2006] [internal quotation and citation omitted], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]; see also Fischbarg v Doucet , 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007]). PPM chose and marketed its Somerset, New Jersey, location to target New York residents, touting its proximity to New York in advertising, entered into an agreement with a consortium of New York City hospitals for the referral of cancer patients for treatment at its facility, and provided the consortium's doctors with privileges at its facility.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a component supplied under a manufacturing contract ends up in New York.

Glazer v. Socata, S.A.S. · filed 2019-03-22(a)(1)

Inasmuch as Aerospace's purposeful activity consisted of contracting with Socata to provide a component to the manufacturing of a plane that happened to end up in New York, that activity does not subject Aerospace to personal jurisdiction in New York ( see generally Fischbarg , 9 NY3d at 380).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient nexus between the defendant's New York activity and the injury to confer personal jurisdiction.

Aston v. Algoma Hardwoods, Inc. · filed 2019-06-04(a)(1)

She has identified no activity of defendant in New York, either before or after its headquarters moved to New Jersey, that has a sufficient nexus to the injury to confer jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) ( see generally D & R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro , 29 NY3d 292, 297-298 [2017]; cf. Robins v Procure Treatment Ctrs., Inc. , 157 AD3d 606 [1st Dept 2018] [where injury occurred as result of medical treatment at New Jersey facility by New Jersey defendant, evidence of defendant's advertising in New York and referral agreement with New York facility warranted jurisdictional discovery under CPLR 302(a)(1)]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a seller whose website allows New York customers to purchase the plaintiff’s goods.

Mcgraw-Hill Global Educ. Holdings, LLC v. Mehul Mathrani, Ankush Sharma, Anshoo Sharma, & Ibestbargains, LLC · filed 2017-12-12(a)(1)

In any event, Plaintiffs' averments that iBestBargains operates a website through which customers in the United States-including those in New York-may purchase Plaintiffs' textbooks provides an additional basis for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an out-of-state trustee’s requests that a New York party send royalty payments to him.

ABKCO Music, Inc. v. McMahon · filed 2019-09-24(a)(1)

The trustee's requests from Ohio, by letter, telephone, and/or email, to plaintiff in New York to send him monies due under the royalty agreement that plaintiff had entered into in 1986 with nonparty Denise Somerville, a/k/a Denise Somerville Cooke (Somerville) — which would merely continue plaintiff's previous practice of sending royalties to Somerville in Ohio — do not constitute the transaction of business under CPLR 302(a)(1) ( see e.g. Ehrenfeld v Bin Mahfouz , 9 NY3d 501, 511 [2007] ["The mere receipt by a nonresident of a benefit or profit from a contract performed by others in New York is clearly not an act by the recipient in this State sufficient to confer jurisdiction under our long-arm statute"] [internal quotation marks omitted]; Courtroom Tel. Network v Focus Media , 264 AD2d 351, 353 [1st Dept 1999] ["a passive buyer of a New York . . . service" would not be subject to this State's jurisdiction]; Liberatore v Calvino , 293 AD2d 217, 220 [1st Dept 2002] ["Telephone calls and written communications, which generally are held not to provide a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, must be shown to have been used by the defendant to actively participate in business transactions in New York"] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business activity in New York is substantially related to the claim; offering licensed images online and seeking to enforce the license in New York can satisfy that requirement.

Lisa Coppola LLC v. Higbee · filed 2020-03-10(a)(1)

On this basis, although a close question, Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing that RM transacted business in New York sufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business activity and the claim; a nationally accessible website alone does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Mercer v. Rampart Hotel Ventures, LLC · filed 2020-02-24(a)(1)

Second, Mercer ignores § 302(a)(1)’s requirement that a defendant’s transaction of business within the forum state have been “substantially relat[ed]” to the plaintiff’s cause of action. ... Rampart’s national web presence, without more, does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

Resetarits Construction Corporation v. E&N Construction, Inc. · filed 2021-04-29(a)(1)

CPLR 302(a)(1) extends New York State personal jurisdiction to the transaction of business in New York or for contracts anywhere to supply goods and services in New York. Section 302(a)(1) applies to contracts executed in New York. But this Master Subcontract was for services in New Jersey, not in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not support personal jurisdiction based solely on an allegedly infringing mark displayed on a website that lets users exchange information but does not directly facilitate purchases.

Blockchange Ventures I GP, LLC v. Blockchange, Inc. · filed 2021-07-22(a)(1)

As a result, the publication of the infringing “Blockchange” mark on Defendant’s website alone is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction under New York law.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York when the transaction has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Black v. Phoenix Cayman Ltd. · filed 2024-02-15(a)(1)

Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), a New York court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if he has purposefully transacted business within the state, and there is "a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" ( Paterno v Laser Spine Inst ., 24 NY3d 370, 376 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The court properly found that, after engaging in jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden of demonstrating long-arm jurisdiction over Visweswaran ( see Fischbarg v Doucet , 9 NY3d 375 [2007]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires New York business contacts that existed when the lawsuit was filed; later transactions cannot establish jurisdiction.

Fab Habitat Corporation v. Houselights, LLC · filed 2023-09-29(a)(1)

Post-lawsuit contacts are insufficient to show that a defendant was transacting business within New York for the purposes of long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully transacts business or contracts to supply goods or services in New York and the claim arises from that activity.

Custom Truck One Source, LP v. Clearway Indus., LLC · filed 2024-01-25(a)(1)

In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1), the Court must determine (1) whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York by either transacting business or contracting to supply goods or services there, and (2) whether the claim asserted arises from that business transaction or from the contract to supply goods or services. ... Here, the transaction at issue has no apparent connection to New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(i) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state tortfeasor whose conduct causes injury in New York when its sales through Amazon constitute regular business activity in the state.

Dannenfelser v. Flexi North America, LLC · filed 2024-02-15(a)(3)(i)

Flexi’s sales via Amazon, however, constitute transacting business in New York for the purposes of § 302(a)(3)(i).

Receipt of mail in New York alone does not establish that a defendant transacts business there under § 302(a)(1).

Mavashev v. Kaldykulov · filed 2024-03-30(a)(1)

To the extent that Plaintiffs’ evidence of an “IRS notice sent to defendant Elefund Continuity II LLC at its New York address” is intended to cure such ambiguity, it does not do so, as “mail contacts [generally] do not provide a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).”

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction when the defendant’s only act substantially related to the claims occurred outside New York.

Grosso v. Cy Twombly Found. · filed 2024-06-02(a)(1)

The court does not have jurisdiction over Del Roscio under CPLR 302 (a) (1) because the Authentication which is the only act by Del Roscio which has a substantial relationship with the claims in this action was performed in Italy.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer specific jurisdiction based on occasional recruiting interviews in New York when the defendant’s other contacts do not establish a related transaction of business.

Goldman v. Trinity School of Medicine · filed 2024-06-04(a)(1)

The Court does not find Trinity’s contacts with the state of New York sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1). First, the presence of a Trinity employee to conduct interviews of prospective students on a handful of occasions is insufficient to satisfy New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's role in procuring vessel insurance and handling a claim through communications with the insurer's New York office.

Great Lakes Ins. SE v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Assn. Inc. · filed 2024-06-06(a)(1)

Nothing in his affirmation contradicts the evidence, which demonstrates that he facilitated the procurement of the vessel's insurance from The American Club; Adamastos Shipping, through its principal Gourdomichalis, notified The American Club of the potential insurance claim; after The American Club transferred the matter to its New York office, Gourdomichalis communicated with The American Club about the incident; and ultimately, Gourdomichalis terminated the insurance and abandoned the vessel. Therefore, long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) over Gourdomichalis was established ( Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. , 226 AD3d 60 [1st Dept 2024]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s purposeful New York transactions have a substantial relationship to the claim.

JMRNNY Doe v. Opus Dei · filed 2024-06-10(a)(1)

Moreover, as alleged in the complaint and demonstrated by the documentary evidence, McCloskey engaged in specific, continuous, and systematic transactions that subject him to long- arm jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(l).

Section 302(a)(1) requires evidence that an online seller purposefully transacted business in New York; an interactive website alone is insufficient.

Zelvin v. H Heritage, Inc. · filed 2024-08-09(a)(1)

Defendant’s Website is interactive because it permits for the purchase and exchange of goods. However, Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence demonstrating that Defendant has purposely availed itself of New York, including that New York customers have made purchases from Defendant’s Website.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction based on a third party’s unilateral assignment of a contract when the defendant did not otherwise transact business in New York concerning that contract.

New York Embroidery Studio, Inc. v. Unifire, Inc. · filed 2024-08-13(a)(1)

Contollo’s unilateral assignment of its contractual obligations to NYES is not sufficient to establish that Unifire has transacted business in New York or otherwise purposefully availed itself of the New York market with respect to the contract at issue here.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction merely because a defendant’s website is accessible from New York.

Cawthon v. Lishuang · filed 2024-09-16(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant has transacted business in New York. “Operating a website that may be accessed from New York, without more, does not bring the operator within jurisdiction of New York courts.”

Section 302(a)(1) requires a transaction, but does not require goods to be shipped to New York.

American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka · filed 2024-09-17(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) does not require a shipment. It requires a transaction.

Section 302(a)(1) requires New York contacts to bear a substantial relationship to the claim; an office unrelated to the underlying events does not establish jurisdiction.

Beckman v. Sahar · filed 2024-10-07(a)(1)

Here, none of the moving defendants have contacts with New York that bear “a substantial relationship to the cause of action” (Corporate Campaign, 265 AD2d at 274-275). At best, plaintiffs allege that Inokim has an office in the state, but nothing alleged in the complaint indicates that that office has anything to do with the events underlying plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish jurisdiction based on a website’s user tracking when the tracking is not directed at New York.

Creative Photographers, Inc. v. Grupo Televisa S.A.B. · filed 2025-02-04(a)(1)

The Infringing Websites’ other user tracking behavior does not indicate Defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum as Plaintiff does not allege such tracking was directed at New York; instead it seems that alleged behavior is indistinguishable from Defendant’s interaction with users located in any other jurisdiction.

Section 302(a) requires an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the defendant’s New York business transaction and the claim asserted.

Sokka International Ent Ltd v. Oregon Tools Inc · filed 2025-03-31(a)

Simply put, Plaintiff has failed to articulate a nexus or substantial relationship between its business transaction with Defendant and the causes of action for which it has sued Defendant to warrant a finding of specific jurisdiction over Defendant in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires more than attendance at preliminary meetings to establish that a non-domiciliary transacted business in New York.

Knocking Inc. v. Carter · filed 2025-08-07(a)(1)

Attendance at preliminary meetings, without more, does not amount to a prima facie showing of the transaction of business necessary to establish jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a seller whose website delivers goods to New York when the claim arises from an attempted purchase through that website.

Contreras v. TD Associates, LLC · filed 2025-03-06(a)(1)

I therefore find that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) would have been proper in this case, defeating Defendant’s argument that lack of personal jurisdiction rendered this lawsuit frivolous.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; an interactive website available to New York users alone is insufficient.

Arthur v. Orchestrate Business LLC · filed 2025-08-01(a)(1)

However, the interactive or commercial nature of Defendants’ website or the availability of Defendants’ website to users in New York is, by itself, insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, given that Arthur has not shown that Defendants in fact used their website to purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an online retailer that ships to New York when a New York customer’s claim arises from an attempted purchase on its website, even if the sale was not completed.

Fernandez v. Katie May, LLC · filed 2025-03-20(a)(1)

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant ships orders made online to customers in New York and that Plaintiff attempted to complete a transaction on Defendant’s website from her New York home. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 20, 37. Her claim arises directly out of the fact that she was unable to complete that transaction. Nothing more is needed to satisfy the long-arm statute.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully acts toward New York and those acts substantially relate to the plaintiff's claims.

First Trinity Life Ins. Co. v. Advance Funding LLC · filed 2025-05-22(a)(1)

Supreme Court properly found that it had personal jurisdiction over Ray under New York's long-arm statute, as the second amended complaint alleges that she engaged in purposeful actions directed at New York and that her actions substantially related to plaintiff's claims ( see CPLR 302[a][1]; Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs. , 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York and an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between that activity and the claim; unresolved facts about that nexus can make dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction premature.

Manning v. Budget Rent A Car · filed 2025-08-13(a)(1)

Here, Budget's submissions, including Motosko's affidavit, established that Budget purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, thus satisfying the first prong. However, upon the record before this Court, there are questions of fact as to whether there is an "articulable nexus" or "substantial relationship" between the plaintiffs' claim and Budget's transactions within New York. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Budget's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, in effect, as premature ( see Qudsi v Larios , 173 AD3d at 923).

Section 302(a)(1) requires particularized facts showing purposeful activity in New York that gives rise to the claim.

Robert L. v. Madison Sq. Boys & Girls Club · filed 2025-08-13(a)(1)

However, as BGCA persuasively notes, these allegations are unaccompanied by factual detail linking BGCA's alleged conduct to the plaintiffs' abuse claims, or demonstrating that BGCA engaged in purposeful activity in New York giving rise to the claims ( see CPLR § 302[a][1]; see also Williams Aff., ¶¶ 3—4, 11—12).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction at the pleading stage when the alleged New York distribution and use of a defendant’s product connects its business transactions to the claimed injury.

Deliotte v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. · filed 2025-08-12(a)(1)

This is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction at the pleading stage, especially because Beauty Bell has failed to come forward with any affirmative evidence that it did not manufacture or design the allegedly dangerous products at the time of Plaintiffs use, nor has it established that it did not distribute any products in New Yark at the time of Plaintiff's alleged use.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a party conducts business underlying the dispute in New York and has sufficient contacts with the state.

Prodigy Finance CM2021-1 DAC v. Janak Singh Jasvinder Singh Sethi · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)

Since Respondent incurred the debts underlying the arbitration awards while living in New York, New York, submitted the forbearance assessment from Brooklyn, New York, and appears to have lived in Brooklyn around the time of filing, Petitioner has demonstrated that Respondent conducted some of the business underlying this case in New York and had sufficient contacts with New York so as to establish personal jurisdiction under New York law.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat a threat to sue a New York plaintiff for copyright infringement in an unspecified forum as transacting business in New York.

Twin Beauty LLC d/b/a Kool Krafts LLC v. NR Interactive LLC · filed 2025-12-01(a)(1)

Threatening to sue a New York plaintiff for copyright infringement “in an unspecified locale and threatening litigation in an unspecified forum” does not constitute “transaction of business” under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction merely because a New York resident uses a website there, without facts showing that the defendant targeted New York.

Daly · filed 2026-01-28(a)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation that he used BolsaDX’s website in New York, without more, does not constitute a prima facie showing that BolsaDX or any other Defendant transacted business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction when alleged discriminatory conduct in New York is a foreseeable consequence of purposeful business activities there.

Arizzo v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2026-05-26(a)(1)

Parenthetically, we must also emphasize that plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ethicon US pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1). Under these circumstances, the alleged sexual discriminatory conduct cannot be characterized as merely fortuitous or incidental to New York contacts. Rather, it is alleged to be a foreseeable consequence of Ethicon's purposeful business activities within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on a communication with someone in New York about services rendered abroad when the communication was not for the purpose of engaging in a sustained and substantial transaction of business in New York.

Gorgia v. Dolan · filed 2026-06-10(a)(1)

Similarly, Harman's alleged communication with Dolan failed to confer jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) because the communication regarded services rendered in Italy, and, therefore, was not for the purpose of engaging in a sustained and substantial transaction of business in New York ( see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst. , 24 NY3d 370, 377; Bloomgarden v Lanza , 143 AD3d 850, 851-852).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully conducts business in New York and at least one element of the claim arises from those contacts.

Katz v. Navios Mar. Holdings, Inc. · filed 2026-06-11(a)(1)

Supreme Court improperly determined that defendant did not engage in sufficient purposeful activity in New York to bring it within the purview of CPLR 302(a)(1). ... Contrary to defendant's contention, these New York-based contacts are sufficiently related to plaintiff's underlying breach of contract claim because "at least one element [of the cause of action] arises from the New York contacts" ( Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL , 20 NY3d 327, 341 [2012]).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction when the negotiations, closing, and transfer of the down payment for an agreement occurred in New York.

Decisionware, Inc. v. System Equipment Lessors, Inc. · filed 1974-09-30

Further, the complaint alleged that negotiations leading up to the agreement and the closing, including transfer of the down payment, all occurred in New York and hence personal jurisdiction was acquired pursuant to CPLR 302 (see Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N Y 2d 13; see, also, Peterson v. Spartan Ind., 33 N Y 2d 463).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction based on purposeful negotiations and execution of an agreement in New York.

Genicom Corp. v. Ekco Group · filed 1990-04-19

In that connection, the record reveals that New York has jurisdiction over the dispute due to the purposeful acts of the negotiations and execution of the agreement in New York (see, CPLR 302; Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648), along with defendant’s authorization to do business in this State (see, CPLR 301; Augsbury Corp. v Petrokey Corp., 97 AD2d 173, 176; Muollo v Crestwood Vil., 155 AD2d 420).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over nonresident general partners when the partnership’s New York business activities support jurisdiction and the claim arises from those activities.

Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Comark · filed 1984-06-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, Owens and Bell are subject to suit in this Court if Comark’s activities are adequate to satisfy New York’s long-arm statute. ... Since Comark is subject to New York jurisdiction it follows that Owens and Bell are also subject to the jurisdiction.

CPLR 302(a) permits jurisdiction based on a partnership relationship.

Balogh v. Rayner-Smith · filed 1968-07-09(a)

The partnership relationship was sufficient to invoke the application of CPLR 302 (subd. [a]) and to sustain jurisdiction (Schneider v. J & C Carpet Co., 23 A D 2d 103; Banco Español de Credito v. Du Pont, 24 A D 2d 445; CPLR 302 (subd. [a]); see also, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ.Prac.,par. 301.15; Partnership Law, § 20, § 4, subd. 3).

A correspondent bank relationship alone does not establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank · filed 1976-05-04(a)(1)

In sum, we conclude that, standing by itself, a correspondent bank relationship, without any other indicia or evidence to explain its essence, may not form the basis for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

A correspondent bank relationship standing alone does not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Taub v. Colonial Coated Textile Corp. · filed 1976-10-26(a)(1)

Furthermore, "standing by itself, a correspondent bank relationship, without any other indicia or evidence to explain its essense, may not form the basis for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) [sic]” (Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank-N. Y, 39 NY2d 391, 396).

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit long-arm jurisdiction based solely on a correspondent bank relationship, but additional New York contacts can provide a basis for jurisdiction.

Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston · filed 1980-04-03(a)(1)

Although "standing by itself, a correspondent bank relationship, without any other indicia or evidence to explain its essence, may not form the basis for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1)" ( Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank-New York , 39 N.Y.2d 391, 396), the facts alleged here, which we accept as true for this purpose, show substantially more (cf. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v Barnes & Reinecke , 15 N.Y.2d 443).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant’s wiring money into New York.

Symenow v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1997-11-19(a)(1)

The wiring of money into New York State is insufficient, by itself, to confer personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Continental Field Serv. Corp. v ITEC Intl., 894 F Supp 151, 154; Colson Servs. Corp. v Bank of Baltimore, 712 F Supp 28, 31; cf., Black Riv. Assocs. v Newman, 218 AD2d 273).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on calls into New York made solely to ensure compliance with contract terms.

Roper Starch Worldwide, Inc. v. Reymer & Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-04-09(a)(1)

Defendant’s phone calls into New York do not suffice to confer personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank solely because it maintains a New York correspondent account.

Licci v. American Express Bank Ltd. · filed 2010-03-31(a)(1)

The mere maintenance of correspondent bank account with a financial institution in New York is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis to subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

A bank does not purposefully avail itself of New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) merely by using a New York correspondent account to carry out clients’ wire instructions.

Al Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie · filed 2015-04-23(a)(1)

Thus, unlike LCB, defendants merely carried out their clients’ instructions and have not been shown to have “purposefully availed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities in New York” (id. at 336).

Section 302(a)(1) treats a foreign bank’s purposeful, repeated use of New York correspondent accounts as transacting business in New York.

Rasheed Al Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie · filed 2016-11-22(a)(1)

Defendants' correspondent banking activity is sufficient to establish a purposeful course of dealing, constituting the transaction of business in New York under CPLR 302 (a)(1).

Under § 302(a)(3)(i), New York sales of $8.79 million can constitute substantial revenue even when they represent only 1% of a corporation’s total sales.

Allen v. Canadian General Electric Co. · filed 1978-12-07(a)(3)(i)

Whether a "quantitative” or "qualitative” approach is used, the sum of $8.79 million is too large to be considered insubstantial without further analysis or proof of the business which would show such fact.

Section 302(a)(3)(i)’s substantial revenue requirement can be satisfied when New York sales exceed 7% of a defendant’s gross sales revenue and the aggregate dollar volume is significant.

Nichols v. Surgitool, Inc. · filed 1976-08-30(a)(3)(i)

In the instant case, defendant has derived over 7% of its gross sales revenue from sales to purchasers in New York. This is held by me to satisfy the substantial revenue requirement of CPLR § 302(a)(3)(i) because the aggregate dollar volume was not insignificant.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer whose product causes injury in New York when it derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce and reasonably expects New York consequences, even if it sells through an intermediary.

Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc. · filed 1980-05-12(a)(3)(ii)

From this perspective, it must be concluded that the statutory criteria that Selbern derived substantial revenue from interstate commerce is fully satisfied. Similarly, in view of the knowledge of Selbern’s principals, albeit acting in their dual capacity as Gutman’s principals, that approximately 5% of their product would be sold to consumers in New York, it must be inferred that Selbern did or should have reasonably expected forum consequences to arise in New York (see Allen v Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 45 AD2d 331). As to the particular shipment containing the allegedly defective shoe, although shipped to Tennessee, it was nevertheless known that the shoes would then be redistributed to stores in the Wise chain, including those located in New York. Thus, the stated requirements of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]) have been met.

A nationwide exclusive distributorship can support a finding that a manufacturer should reasonably expect its product to be used in New York; substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce also supports jurisdiction under this subsection.

Adams v. Bodum Inc. · filed 1994-10-25(a)(3)(ii)

Defendant-appellant manufacturer’s exclusive distributorship agreement with co-defendant distributor, covering as it did the entire United States, provided ample basis for the IAS Court’s finding that appellant should have reasonably expected that persons in New York would be purchasing and using its coffee maker (see, Darienzo v Wise Shoe Stores, 74 AD2d 342). Moreover, it is not disputed that defendant-appellant received substantial revenues from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a plaintiff to establish injury in New York and that the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Grimaldi v. Woodbury · filed 2000-10-10(a)(3)(ii)

The Supreme Court erred when it found a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii), as the plaintiffs failed to establish either that they sustained an injury within this State (see, Ingraham v Carroll, 235 AD2d 778; Carte v Parkoff, 152 AD2d 615; Hermann v Sharon Hosp., 135 AD2d 682), or that the appellants derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce (see, Rosenberg v Cosgrove, 212 AD2d 521).

Section 302(a)(3)(i) requires substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in New York; sales to a New York resident alone do not establish that requirement.

WILLIAMS, DANIEL v. BEEMILLER, INC. · filed 2012-10-05(a)(3)(i)

The fact that Brown garnered significant revenue from gun sales to a New York resident, however, does not establish that he “derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed . . . in [New York]” (CPLR 302 [a] [3] [i] [emphasis added]). Rather, plaintiffs must establish that Brown profited from guns “used or consumed” – i.e., possessed or discharged – in New York (see Tonns, 90 AD2d at 549).

Section 302(a)(3)(i)'s substantial revenue requirement can be met by out-of-state sales of goods later used or consumed in New York.

Williams v. Beemiller, Inc. · filed 2018-02-09(a)(3)(i)

Here, with respect to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (i), we agree with plaintiffs that Brown's sales to the gun trafficking ring establish that he derived substantial revenue from guns used or consumed in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose online storefront transacts business with New York customers when the claim arises from that business.

Foxmind Canada Enterprises LTD. v. Beijing Hui Xin Zhi Xiang Shangmao Youxian Gongsi · filed 2024-02-09(a)(1)

The Defaulting Defendants have transacted business within the state by virtue of their operation of online user accounts and merchant storefronts through which customers in New York can view and purchase the counterfeit products at issue in this case.

Section 302(a)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who used real property in New York, even if that use ended before the action began.

Porisini v. Petricca · filed 1982-11-09(a)(4)

CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 4) permits the courts of New York to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who “owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state” whether or not the nondomiciliary was using the property at the time the action was commenced ... Accordingly, under New York law a similar action for unpaid rent could be maintained by a New York resident by personal service on a nondomiciliary former tenant (see Hempstead Med. Arts Co. v Willie, NYU, Dec. 9, 1963, p 18, col 6).

Section 302(a)(1) and (4) provide jurisdiction over a nonresident partnership that transacts business in New York and owns, uses, or possesses real property there.

Chazen v. Dutchess Properties · filed 1980-11-24(a)(1), (a)(4)

The uncontroverted facts before the court clearly indicate that the partnership defendant transacted business within the State (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1) and owned, used and/or possessed real property situated within the State (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 4). It seems clear that, barring other defect, service upon a partner outside the State is sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over the partnership.

Section 302(a)(4) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that possessed New York real property involved in the action, even after it assigned the lease.

Genesee Scrap & Tin Baling Corp. v. Lake Erie Bumper Plating Corp. · filed 1977-05-27(a)(4)

The jurisdictional defense is that defendant, a Pennsylvania Corporation at the time the action was commenced, is not a nondomiciliary defendant who "owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state” (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 4). However, defendant did possess the real property which is the subject of this action and, therefore, it is subject to the jurisdiction and process of the courts of New York State (Karrat v Merhib, 62 Misc 2d 72).

Section 302(a)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a constructive trust claim arising from ownership of a New York cooperative apartment.

Werner v. Werner · filed 1979-10-02(a)(4)

The court finds, however, that it does have complete jurisdiction in one aspect of this case. CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 4) provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who own, use or possess real property situated within the State as to a cause of action arising from such ownership, use or possession. Quite clearly to the extent that plaintiff’s second cause of action seeks to impose a constructive trust regarding apartment 12K at 10 Park Avenue the court has both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over the defendant wife.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents for claims arising from their ownership and activity concerning New York property under (a)(4), or from business transacted in New York under (a)(1).

Kalichman v. Beverly Holding Co. · filed 1987-10-15(a)(4), (a)(1)

New York, in our view, had jurisdiction over defendants under CPLR 302 (a) (4). Furthermore, plaintiffs causes of action can be viewed as seeking to hold defendants partially liable for a partnership debt arising out of their ownership and receipt of income from the property, which constitutes the transaction of business in New York under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(4) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary based solely on a beneficial interest in New York real property held in trust.

Henning v. Rando Machine Corp. · filed 1994-12-23(a)(4)

Nor may long-arm jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary Wilder children be obtained under CPLR 302 (a) (4). ... A mere beneficial interest in real property possessed by a-beneficiary of a trust, as here, is too tenuous an interest to support personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary buyer whose contract to purchase New York real property, under the circumstances, constitutes transacting business in New York.

Black River Associates v. Newman · filed 1996-02-02(a)(1)

We conclude that, under the circumstances presented here, defendant’s entering into a contract to purchase New York realty constitutes the transaction of business in New York, and that the interest of defendant as a contract vendee in New York property satisfies the "minimum contacts” test for maintenance of a suit to enforce that contract in New York.

Section 302(a)(4) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose agent uses New York real property to secure its loan when a foreclosure action arises from that use.

5-Star Management, Inc. v. Rogers · filed 1996-09-25(a)(4)

Because Rogers was the acting general partner for the joint venture, his contacts with New York in the course of doing business for the joint venture are properly attributed to Allsuite. ... Thus, this Court concludes that the present action arises from real property situated in New York which Allsuite used. Accordingly, plaintiff has succeeded in making a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Allsuite under CPLR § 302(a)(4).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who owns New York real property or transacts business there.

Board of Managers of Surfside Village Condominium II v. Tsoukas · filed 2003-04-24(a)(1), (a)(4)

CPLR 302 provides that a court may obtain personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary or his agent where he transacts business within the state or owns, uses or possess any real property situated within the state. ... In view of the foregoing, the defendant’s additional contention that the plaintiff did not comply with the provisions contained in CPLR 313 is without merit since personal jurisdiction of the court may be exercised over the nondomiciliary by service upon his attorney-in-fact (CPLR 302).

Section 302 permits long-arm jurisdiction when a defendant’s ownership and use of New York real property is the subject of the proceeding.

Salamon v. Friedman · filed 2004-10-25(a)(1), (4)

The Supreme Court had long-arm jurisdiction over the appellant through his ownership and use of real property in the State of New York, which was the subject of the petition to confirm the arbitration award (see CPLR 302 [a] [1], [4]; Black Riv. Assoc. v Newman, 218 AD2d 273, 278-280 [1996]; Porisini v Petricca, 90 AD2d 949, 950 [1982]).

Section 302(a)(4) requires the action to directly implicate the ownership, possession, or use of New York real property.

Marie v. Altshuler · filed 2006-06-20(a)(4)

The New York cooperative apartment that is a main focus of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant Burton did not provide a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (4), since the action does not directly implicate its ownership, possession or use.

A plaintiff relying on property ownership under § 302(a)(4) must make a prima facie showing that the defendant owns property in New York.

Greco v. Ulmer & Berne L.L.P. · filed 2009-01-26(a)(4)

Similarly, jurisdiction may not be premised upon CPLR 302 (a) (4), since plaintiffs fail to make a prima facie showing that the Ulmer defendants own any property in this state.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident tenants when a claim arises from their allegedly negligent use of a New York apartment; unrebutted allegations of negligent conduct there also support jurisdiction under subsection (a)(2).

Sen v. GR Realty Holdings LLC · filed 2022-02-17(a)(4), (a)(2)

The motion court correctly determined that it had personal jurisdiction over tenants under CPLR 302(a)(4) and (a)(2), since plaintiff's claims arise out of the allegedly negligent use and tenancy of the apartment (CPLR 302[a][4]; see Matter of CDR CrÉances S.A.S. v First Hotels & Resorts Invs., Inc. , 140 AD3d 558, 563 [1st Dept 2016]; Lancaster v Colonial Motor Freight Line, Inc. , 177 AD2d 152, 159 [1st Dept 1992]). In addition, CPLR 302(a)(2) provides a separate basis to confer personal jurisdiction over tenants, as they did not adequately refute the complaint's allegations that they acted negligently in failing to secure the lounge chair at their leased apartment in New York ( see Corpuel v Galasso , 268 AD2d 202, 202 [1st Dept 2000]).

Section 302(a)(4) does not confer jurisdiction based on ownership of New York real property unless the claim relates to the property's ownership, possession or use.

Behre Piano Assoc., Inc. v. Suchomel · filed 2024-10-28(a)(4)

Furthermore, the First Department has held that mere ownership of an apartment in New York does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under CPLR §302(a)(4) unless the action directly implicates its ownership, possession or use (see Karam v Karam, 197 AD3d 1041 [1st Dept 2021]; Marie v Altshuler, 30 AD3d 271, 272 [1st Dept 2006]). Accordingly, there is no basis to assert jurisdiction over Michael Suchomel based on his former ownership of real property in New York.

Section 302(a)(4) supports personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity whose business involves the use or possession of real property in New York.

477 Realty, L.L.C. v. Wing Soho, LLC · filed 2025-01-09(a)(4)

Plaintiff's factual allegations, documentary evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom also support a prima facie claim of personal jurisdiction over IWG and RCI under, inter alia, CPLR 302(a)(4), inasmuch as IWG's business, and that of The Wing, involved the use and/or possession of real property in New York in its operations to provide remote flexible work space.

A defendant seeking summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3) must first offer proof negating jurisdiction; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient.

McInnis v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. · filed 2026-04-24(a)(3)

Here, we conclude that defendant did not meet its initial burden on the motion inasmuch as it merely pointed to gaps in decedent's proof in asserting that decedent could not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3) because decedent could not establish that defendant sold the asbestos-containing parts that allegedly caused injury to him or that decedent—a Canadian citizen and resident—was exposed to asbestos from defendant's products in New York (see generally Horning, 243 AD3d at 1286).

A plaintiff bears the burden of proving a jurisdictional basis under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Progress Capitol, Inc. v. Ampower Semiconductor Corp. · filed 1985-08-05(a)(1)

Contrary to the finding of Special Term, plaintiff has sustained its burden of proving a jurisdictional basis with respect to defendant 246057 Investments, Ltd. (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13).

A plaintiff invoking § 302 must prove facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Merkel Associates, Inc. v. Bellofram Corp. · filed 1977-09-15

Inasmuch as plaintiffs seek to invoke CPLR § 302 to obtain jurisdiction over the persons of defendants, it is they who must prove sufficiently the existence of facts lending themselves to personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 302(a)(2) is not satisfied by an attorney’s bare conclusory allegations.

Great Neck Car Care Center Inc. v. Elian · filed 1990-03-05(a)(2)

In addition, the bare conclusory allegations by the plaintiff’s attorney were insufficient to support the plaintiff’s position or to satisfy the requirements of CPLR 302 (a) (2) (see, Badger v Lehigh Val. R. R. Co., 45 AD2d 601, 602).

A plaintiff asserting personal jurisdiction under § 302 must produce evidence supporting a jurisdictional basis, or show that such evidence may exist, when the defendant disputes its New York contacts.

Roldan v. Dexter Folder Co. · filed 1991-12-23(a)(1), (a)(3)(i)

Since the burden of proving jurisdiction is on the party asserting it, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, in the face of Atlantic’s allegations, to come forward with evidence to support the existence of a basis upon which to predicate the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Atlantic (see, Spectra Prods, v Indian Riv. Citrus Specialties, 144 AD2d 832) or to at least show that such evidence may exist (see, Glassman v Catli, 111 AD2d 744). The plaintiff failed to do so.

A plaintiff invoking section 302(a)(3) must make a prima facie showing that long-arm jurisdiction exists.

Lang v. Wycoff Heights Medical Center · filed 2008-10-21(a)(3)

Here, the plaintiffs, who contended that the Supreme Court could exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the appellant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3), failed to make such a showing (see O’Brien v Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 305 AD2d 199, 201-202 [2003]; Carte v Parkoff, 152 AD2d 615, 616 [1989]; Hermann v Sharon Hosp., 135 AD2d 682, 683 [1987]).

A sufficient start for jurisdictional discovery does not itself establish a prima facie basis for long-arm jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3)(ii).

Marist College v. Brady · filed 2011-05-31(a)(3)(ii)

However, since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the appellants were subject to the Supreme Court’s long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) (cf. Alden Personnel, Inc. v David, 38 AD3d at 698), we modify the order appealed from to allow the appellants to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) upon the completion of discovery (see Ying Jun Chen v Lei Shi, 19 AD3d 407, 407-408 [2005]; Lettieri v Cushing, 80 AD3d 574, 575-576 [2011]).

To defeat a motion to dismiss under CPLR 302(a)(1), a plaintiff need only show that facts may exist to support personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. FRISCO MARKETING OF NY LLC · filed 2012-03-23(a)(1)

Here, we conclude that plaintiff “demonstrate[d] that facts may exist to exercise personal jurisdiction over the [individual] defendant[s]” (Tucker, 75 AD3d at 1096 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 302 requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that a statutory ground supports personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant.

Shatara v. Ephraim · filed 2016-03-30

Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that Ephraim was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Ccourt pursuant to CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s allegations and submissions, viewed favorably, make a prima facie showing that the defendant is subject to jurisdiction.

Doller v. Prescott · filed 2018-12-20(a)(1)

In our view, accepting plaintiff's allegations to be true and construing them in a light favorable to him, plaintiff's submissions were sufficient to establish that jurisdiction was proper pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) ( see Nick v Schneider , 150 AD3d at 1253-1254).

Section 302(a) requires a plaintiff opposing dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction to make a prima facie showing that the defendant is subject to New York jurisdiction.

Clevenger v. Yuzek · filed 2023-12-27(a)

Here, viewing the plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that Bloom was subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ( see CPLR 302[a]; Serota v Cooper , 216 AD3d 1019, 1022).

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), unsupported assumptions about a nondomiciliary’s control over church operations do not make a sufficient start toward establishing personal jurisdiction.

Fields v. General Conference of the United Methodist Church · filed 2024-10-03(a)(1)

Because plaintiff's allegations in support of jurisdiction over Global Ministries rest entirely on unsupported assumptions regarding Global Ministries' control over the church operations based on the mortgage and its status in the Methodist Church hierarchy, it has failed to make a "sufficient start" in demonstrating the existence of personal jurisdiction ( Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. , 226 AD3d 60, 74 [1st Dept 2024]; see Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch , 149 AD3d 485, 487-488 [1st Dept 2017]).

A plaintiff may meet the burden to assert CPLR 302(a)(3) jurisdiction without a preliminary trial when material jurisdictional facts remain in dispute.

Beagan v. Akebono Brake Corp. · filed 2025-01-28(a)(3)

The court also properly found, without first conducting a preliminary trial on the jurisdictional issue pursuant to CPLR 3212(c), that plaintiff met his burden for asserting CPLR 302(a)(3) jurisdiction. As the record does not foreclose the possibility of such a finding and relevant material issues of fact exist, the motion was properly denied ( see Mateo v Rish , 86 AD2d 736 [1st Dept 1982]).

A plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a) at the motion-to-dismiss stage by making a prima facie showing that the defendant is subject to the court’s jurisdiction.

Lercara Provisions, Inc. v. Boar's Head Provisions Co., Inc. · filed 2026-02-18(a)

Here, viewing the allegations in the amended complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs demonstrated, prima facie, that Boar's Head was subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ( see CPLR 302[a]; Sacco v Reel-O-Matic, Inc. , 183 AD3d 567, 569; Piccoli v Cerra, Inc. , 174 AD3d at 756; Paradigm Mktg. Consortium, Inc. v Yale New Haven Hosp., Inc. , 124 AD3d 736, 737).

CPLR 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction to avert threatened injury in New York from a planned out-of-state misappropriation of trade secrets; the tort need not already be complete.

Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel · filed 1978-12-07(a)(3)

As noted, the admitted and controverted facts give rise to the probable inference that there is a conscious plan to engage in unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets. That should be enough to justify application of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3). If a tort must already have been committed for jurisdiction to be available under the statute, then that section would never be usable by a plaintiff seeking anticipatory injunctive relief. Such a result is unacceptable.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident guarantor when performance of the guaranty requires payment in New York.

Gaines Service Leasing Corp. v. Ashkenazy · filed 1986-05-30(a)(1)

The first possible predicate for an assertion of jurisdiction is found in New York’s long-arm statute. ... It may therefore be assumed on this record that the payments due under the lease, and by extension those due under the guarantee, were to be made in New York. ... There was jurisdiction over defendant Ashkenazy.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who guarantees a payment obligation to be performed in New York, even if the guarantee is executed outside the state.

Chemco International Leasing, Inc. v. Meridian Engineering, Inc. · filed 1984-06-07(a)(1)

While concededly there have been no post-amendment cases on point, commentaries drawing on legislative history as to the scope of the amendment and the post-amendment Culp case support the view that a guarantee of a payment obligation to be performed in New York is sufficient to establish jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a foreign agent merely because its principals do business in New York; the agent’s work must have a sufficient connection to the state.

Birmingham Fire Insurance v. Koa Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 1983-07-22(a)(1)

Unless some evidence is furnished to show that the foreign agent has had some contact with New York in relation to its agency or that the services that the agent provides the principal are more than tangentially related to the principal’s doing business in New York — neither of which KOA has shown — then the fact that AAU and KOA, both foreign corporations, may do business in New York, without more, is not reason to conclude that the foreign agent, i.e., Le-Blanc, that AAU contacted to find foreign reinsurers transacted business or supplied services in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) broadly permits jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries that supply services in New York through visits to perform contractual duties.

Island Wholesale Wood Supplies, Inc. v. Blanchard Industries, Inc. · filed 1984-05-29(a)(1)

In light of the legislative intent to extend jurisdiction to the limits of due process, we give a broad construction to the phrase “supply goods or services in the state” ... and hold that jurisdiction over the defendants may be predicated on that basis.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident tenant whose New York commercial lease obligates it to supply goods or services in the State.

Pyramid Co. v. Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. · filed 1980-02-14(a)(1)

Under the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, defendant also contracted to supply goods or services in the State. Therefore, CPLR 302 (subd [a]) as amended, directly applies to the instant case and gives the court personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on a contract to supply goods or services in New York when the agreement excludes the United States.

Plastistarch International Corp. v. Plastistarch Corp. · filed 1980-02-26(a)(1)

It is clear beyond doubt that Canadian did not contract to supply any goods or services in New York — there is no such contract and the 1973 joint venture agreement expressly excludes the United States and Canada from applicability to Delaware.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a party that contracts outside New York to perform services in the state.

Argonaut Insurance v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. · filed 1980-07-28(a)(1)

As Philip D. Pakula, Esq., counsel for Home Insurance Company, has indicated, all carriers, whether or not properly served at this time, are amenable to process under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1), since this court has jurisdiction over a party who enters into a contract outside of New York which calls for performance of service in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) extends personal jurisdiction to an out-of-state guarantor obligated to complete construction work in New York if the principal cannot perform.

Culp & Evans v. White · filed 1981-01-13(a)(1)

However, we are compelled to recognize the September 1, 1979 amendment to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) which extended personal jurisdiction over a nondomicilary to include any person who “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state”. ... Under the terms of the guarantee and as recognized by defendant White in his deposition, as guarantor defendant was obliged to complete performance of the construction contracts within New York State if defendant Proctor was otherwise unable to do so.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that contracts outside New York to supply goods in the state when the claim arises from that contract.

West Mountain Corp. v. Seasons of Leisure International, Inc. · filed 1981-06-04(a)(1)

The Supreme Court has personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendant foreign corporation, COMO, pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary guarantor obligated to complete construction in New York if the contractor fails to perform.

Culp and Evans v. White · filed 1981-10-08(a)(1)

While there are few other decisions dealing with this specific subject matter, the 1979 legislative amendments to the Civil Practice Law and Rules were intended, in part, to extend long arm jurisdiction to non-domiciliaries who make contracts to be performed in New York, and then fail to perform. ... In this respect, I concur with the decision of Justice Johnson that defendant White’s obligations were sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the New York State long arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat an agreement to pay a promissory note in New York as a contract to supply goods or services in the state.

American Recreation Group, Inc. v. Woznicki · filed 1982-03-15(a)(1)

The agreement herein to pay a promissory note in New York does not fall into the category of “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (see CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a manufacturer that contracts to supply goods in New York when a personal injury claim arises from its purposeful activity in the state; the provision is not limited to breach of contract claims.

Tonns v. Spiegel's · filed 1982-10-25(a)(1)

We further conclude that jurisdiction may also be exercised pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) because Pro-Tec is one who “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state”. Pro-Tec is clearly correct in urging that for jurisdiction to be exercised pursuant to this provision, the claim must arise out of its purposeful activity in the State. But its argument that this remedial language, added to the statute in 1979, is limited to breach of contract actions is ill founded (see McLaughlin, 1979 Practice Commentary, 1981-1982 Pocket Part, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B CPLR C302:13; see, generally, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 302.11a).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state physician based on the incidental supply of a drug during treatment rendered elsewhere.

Etra v. Matta · filed 1984-03-29(a)(1)

The incidental provision of a drug, as part of a course of treatment rendered in another State, cannot be said to fall within the contemplation of the statute so as to confer personal jurisdiction over the physician.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside New York to supply goods or services in the state, even if they are never delivered, when the claim arises from that contract.

Alan Lupton Associates, Inc. v. Northeast Plastics, Inc. · filed 1984-12-14(a)(1)

Accordingly, New York courts may now exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside this State to supply goods or services in New York even if the goods are never shipped or the services are never supplied in New York, so long as the cause of action, as here, arose out of that contract (see 1979 Report of NY Law Rev Comm. McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, 1979, pp 1450-1453; Key Bank v Lake Placid Co., 103 AD2d 19, 29-30; West Mountain Corp. v Seasons of Leisure Int., 82 AD2d 931).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, including through a guarantee to be performed there.

Fashion Tanning Co. v. Shutzer Industries, Inc. · filed 1985-06-06(a)(1)

Since that amendment (L 1979, ch 252), it has not been necessary to prove the transaction of business within the State in order to qualify under the long-arm statute. The applicable statute at the time of the events underlying this case established personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in this State (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]). Performance of the guarantee would have been in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that contracts to supply goods in New York.

Davidson Extruded Products v. Babcock Wire Equipment Ltd. · filed 1987-08-10(a)(1)

The court finds that the plaintiff has acquired in personam jurisdiction over BWE pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) since BWE did unquestionably contract to supply goods in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a contractual relationship with the defendant to establish personal jurisdiction based on a contract to supply goods or services in New York.

Lana Mora, Inc. v. S.S. Woermann Ulanga · filed 1987-10-28(a)(1)

Where there is no contractual relationship, there can be no personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) based upon a defendant’s ... having contracted to supply goods or services in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a seller merely because it knows goods purchased in another state may be brought to New York by the buyer.

Paradise Products Corp. v. Allmark Equipment Co. · filed 1988-03-14(a)(1)

Knowledge that a product may be destined for a particular forum is insufficient, in the context of this case, to sustain jurisdiction. Here, title to the property passed in New Jersey. The plaintiff agreed to assume responsibility for shipping the product to New York.

A contract allowing freight on shipments consigned to New York City warehouses can establish that a nondomiciliary contracted to supply goods in New York under § 302(a)(1).

Drake America Corp. v. Speakman Co. · filed 1988-11-21(a)(1)

In any event, we conclude that the last sentence in the shipment clause allowing freight on shipments over 500 pounds consigned to warehouse facilities in the metropolitan New York City area establishes that the defendant contracted to supply goods in the State of New York (see, Lupton Assocs. v Northeast Plastics, 105 AD2d 3).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state lawyer who contracts to provide legal services for a New York business transaction through letters and telephone calls into the state.

Schur v. Porter · filed 1989-05-30(a)(1)

By letters and telephone calls into New York, Porter represented the plaintiffs in the negotiation and drafting of the Trio and the Schur Realty partnership agreements. Both partnerships were formed in New York to own and operate New York properties, and were governed by New York law. Thus, Porter agreed to and did supply services in New York for a New York business transaction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that contracts to supply goods in New York even when the goods are shipped F.O.B. from outside the state.

Anderson Development Corp. v. Isoreg Corp. · filed 1989-10-26(a)(1)

Finally, recognizing that the jurisdictional significance of delivery terms has been an area of great conflict (see, Island Wholesale Wood Supplies v Blanchard Indus., 101 AD2d 878, 879, supra), we reject the assertion that shipment of the equipment F.O.B. defendant’s place of business acted to divest New York of jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts to supply goods or services in New York when the claim bears a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Feigenbaum v. Marble of America, Inc. · filed 1990-04-03(a)(1)

Reading the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to plaintiff, ... it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who retain counsel in New York to perform legal services there.

Jarblum, Solomon & Fornari, P.C. v. Wadsworth · filed 1987-09-17(a)

Since the limited partners retained JSF in New York to perform legal services in New York, however, they are subject to personal jurisdiction here, under the New York CPLR 302(a).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on an out-of-state guarantee of payment to a New York corporation; that guarantee is not a contract to supply goods or services in New York.

Waldorf Associates, Inc. v. Neville · filed 1988-07-29(a)(1)

Accordingly, this court concludes that New York has no long-arm jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who was never physically present in New York, and never agreed to provide any goods and services here, other than a promise to a New York corporation that he would make good if an Ohio corporation defaulted on its debt.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat deliveries by a chartered tramp vessel as a contract by its owner or operator to supply goods in New York.

Loberiza v. Calluna Maritime Corp. · filed 1992-01-14(a)(1)

CPLR § 302(a)(1) provides for jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who, in person or via an agent, “transacts any business within the state or contracts any where to supply goods or services in the state,” so long as the cause of action arises out of that transaction of business or supply of goods or services. ... Because deliveries of oil to New York were made while the Amazon was operating in the tramp trade, neither Calluna or European contracted to supply oil in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) treats a guaranty of payment to a New York corporation as supplying goods or services in New York for personal jurisdiction.

Bankers Trust Co. v. Nordheimer · filed 1990-09-21(a)(1)

Defendants are also subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) for supplying goods and services in New York. Making a guaranty of payment to a New York corporation is “supplying goods or services” in the state.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident merely because a promissory note is payable in New York.

Generale Bank, New York Branch v. Choudury · filed 1991-10-09(a)(1)

It is well-established under New York law and in this Court that even if New York is the site for payment on a promissory note, that designation, standing alone, is insufficient to permit New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), an f.o.b. delivery term does not by itself preclude personal jurisdiction in New York.

SBR Realty Corp. v. Pave-Mark Corp. · filed 1991-07-22(a)(1)

The inclusion of such terms in a contract does not automatically mean that the defendant will not be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer that ships a product into New York under its agreement with a retailer.

Seaman v. Fichet-Bauche North America, Inc. · filed 1991-10-15(a)(1)

New York may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1). The plaintiff established that the defendant manufactured the safe in question and shipped it into New York pursuant to its agreement with the retailer.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose licensing agreement supplies goods in New York.

Lipton v. the Nature Co. · filed 1992-01-16(a)(1)

Nature supplied the allegedly infringing goods to consumers in New York pursuant to its license agreements with Wein; under CPLR 302(a)(1), this is a contract to supply goods or services in the state.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that knowingly supplies goods destined for New York and helps design them and secure final approval there.

Eugene Iovine, Inc. v. Rudox Engine & Equipment Co. · filed 1992-03-16(a)(1)

Accordingly, this Court holds that in the instant case, where Rudox alleges that Horlick not only knew that its motor generator sets, valued at $162,320, were destined for New York, but assisted in specially designing those sets and in procuring final approval of the contract by the NYCH & HC, Horlick has supplied goods for New York pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1) and has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York so as to satisfy the requirements of Due Process.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary contracts to supply goods in New York; one transaction is sufficient.

Editorial Musical Latino Americana, S.A. v. Mar International Records, Inc. · filed 1993-07-16(a)(1)

Further, there is a prima facie showing that MAR has contracted to supply goods in this state and are thus subject to jurisdiction pursuant to the “contracts anywhere” clause in CPLR 302(a)(1). Proof of one transaction is sufficient.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction merely because a nonresident agrees to indemnify a New York plaintiff.

Benjamin Sheridan Corp. v. Benjamin Air Rifle Co. · filed 1993-07-20(a)(1)

Therefore, the fact that defendants agreed to indemnify BSC, standing alone, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business or contracts to supply goods or services in New York; administering a health plan through significant, continuous contact with New York providers qualifies.

Peekskill Community Hospital v. Graphic Media Inc. · filed 1993-11-15(a)(1)

Thus, Extended had "transacted” business and contracted to supply goods and services in New York under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg Corp., supra; Fashion Tanning Co. v Shutzer Indus., 108 AD2d 485).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that ships a machine into New York and conducts substantial sales there, even if the machine was shipped F.O.B. outside the state.

Melendez v. Professional Machine & Tool Co. · filed 1993-02-01(a)(1)

The Supreme Court properly concluded that in personam jurisdiction existed over the defendant Professional Machine & Tool Company, Ltd. (hereinafter PROMA) pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... The fact that the machine was shipped F.O.B. Canada is immaterial since the totality of the defendant’s actions in New York reveals that PROMA purposefully invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of New York (see, Seaman v Fichet-Bauche N. Am., 176 AD2d 793; SBR Realty Corp. v Pave-Mark Corp., 175 AD2d 240).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who contracts to supply goods in New York when the claim arises from that contract, even if the goods are never shipped.

En Vogue v. UK Optical Ltd. · filed 1994-02-14(a)(1)

The defendants miss the underlying purpose of section 302(a)(1) by arguing that because the contract was breached, they never shipped the goods to New York and, therefore, are not amenable to personal jurisdiction. That is precisely why personal jurisdiction exists in this case: because a claim has arisen with respect to a contract, pursuant to which goods were intended to be, but never were, shipped to the plaintiffs in New York.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside New York to supply goods in the state when the claim arises from that contract.

People v. Concert Connection, Ltd. · filed 1995-05-22(a)(1)

Although the contract was arguably made in Connecticut since the corporate employee was on the telephone in the appellants’ Connecticut office (see, e.g., Greenberg v R. S. P. Realty Corp., 22 AD2d 690), this fact does not preclude the exercise of New York’s long-arm jurisdiction over the appellants since the statute specifically covers "contracts [made] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that supplied goods in New York as part of the transaction giving rise to the suit.

Sambee Corp. v. Moustafa · filed 1995-06-27(a)(1)

Finally, it is clear that the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) having supplied goods in this State, which were the part and parcel of the transaction which gave rise to this litigation.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that contracts to supply goods in New York, even if the contract designates an out-of-state F.O.B. point, when the claim arises from that contract.

Laumann Manufacturing Corp. v. Castings USA, Inc. · filed 1996-02-09(a)(1)

Therefore, this Court holds that an F.O.B. out-of-state designation does not preclude Castings from contracting with Laumann out of state, to supply goods in New York, thereby subjecting it to personal jurisdiction by the New York state courts.

Section 302(a)(1) requires evidence that the defendant transacted business in New York or contracted anywhere to provide goods or services in New York.

Appollon Waterproofing & Restoration Corp. v. Kodiak Insurance · filed 1997-03-31(a)(1)

The plaintiffs failed to produce evidence demonstrating that Kodiak transacted business in New York or contracted anywhere to provide goods or services in New York (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when a claim arises from its contract to supply goods or services in New York.

Micro-Assist, Inc. v. Cherry Communications, Inc. · filed 1997-04-16(a)(1)

Mercury falls under CPLR § 302(a)(1) because this action arises from Mercury’s contract to supply goods and services in New York State for MAI.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state laboratory that analyzes a New York patient’s biopsies and sends its reports to the patient’s New York doctor.

Pomerantz v. Wolfin · filed 1997-02-03(a)(1)

The appellants analyzed those biopsies, and sent reports of their findings back to the New York doctor. Under these circumstances, the appellants are subject to in personam jurisdiction in New York (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467; People v Concert Connection, 211 AD2d 310, 315; Schur v Porter, 712 F Supp 1140; see also, CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]).

Section 302(a)(1)'s contract-to-supply prong requires the claim to arise from a contract to supply goods or services in New York; separate customer contracts do not establish jurisdiction over a claim on an agreement that does not provide for New York services.

Worldwide Futgol Associates, Inc. v. Event Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1997-11-10(a)(1)

Under Section 302(a)(1), Event may be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction if it “contract[ed] anywhere to supply goods or services in New York,” so long as the action arises from that contract. ... The contract which is the subject of this action, however, was not one for the provision of goods or services in New York. To the extent Event may have provided New York access to the October 16 Match, that service was pursuant to secondary contracts with its customers, and not the Agreement.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurance broker that contracts to insure a horse quartered in New York for most of the year.

Caronia v. American Reliable Insurance · filed 1998-03-23(a)(1)

The facts of this case clearly support jurisdiction under Armada Supply’s interpretation of the “contracts anywhere” language of § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident that affirmatively delivers photographs to a New York syndicator under a contract giving rise to the suit.

Sipa Press, Inc. v. Star-Telegram Operating, Ltd. · filed 1999-06-02(a)(1)

Because, upon these facts, Texas Hot Looks, Inc. could certainly sue both Sipa and Star-Telegram in New York’s courts, or a Federal District Court located here, the court finds that jurisdiction for Sipa’s lawsuit lies under CPLR 302 (a) (1), since the delivery of the AJ photos was an affirmative act by Star-Telegram.

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish jurisdiction from a supplier’s knowledge of a product’s New York destination alone, without proof of business transactions or contracts to supply goods or services in the State.

Carpino v. National Store Fixtures, Inc. · filed 2000-08-24(a)(1)

While plaintiffs and defendants correctly point out that shipment of a product F.O.B. Conner’s plant will not cause divestiture of jurisdiction (see, Anderson Dev. Corp. v Isoreg Corp., 154 AD2d 859), their reliance on the Kingston designation in the subject purchase order to establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (contracts anywhere to supply goods in the State) must be rejected since knowledge of a product’s destination, in and of itself, has been determined insufficient to establish jurisdiction (see, SBR Realty Corp. v Pave-Mark Corp., 175 AD2d 240, 241-242; see also, Paradise Prods. Corp. v Allmark Equip. Co., 138 AD2d 470) and there has been no other proof of business transactions or contracts to supply goods or services within the State (see, e.g.. Courtroom Tel. Network v Focus Media, 264 AD2d 351).

Section 302(a)(1) requires evidence that the defendant transacted business or contracted to provide goods or services in New York to establish personal jurisdiction on those grounds.

Franklin v. Catawba Insurance · filed 2002-02-04(a)(1)

The plaintiffs failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the defendants transacted business or contracted to provide goods or services in New York (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v Johnson, 260 AD2d 638; Appollon Waterproofing & Restoration Corp. v Kodiak Ins. Co., 237 AD2d 552).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary attorney whose representation of a New York claim involves transacting business in the state or contracting to provide services there.

Liberatore v. Calvino · filed 2002-05-30(a)(1)

Calvino’s conceded activities in representing plaintiff in New York included both contracting to supply services in the state and a transaction of business within the state.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a contract to perform services entirely outside New York, even when the customer is a New York resident.

Bill-Jay Machine Tool Corp. v. Koster Industries, Inc. · filed 2006-05-02(a)(1)

Significantly, LA Machine did not contract “to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]). To the contrary, it contracted only to pack the equipment in California for transportation to New Jersey by PTI, an unrelated third party.

CPLR 302(a)(1) supports personal jurisdiction over a nonresident alleged to have contracted for services to be performed in New York.

Stock v. Regan · filed 2006-05-09(a)(1)

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, a resident of the State of Georgia, contracted for the performance of services in the State of New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Courtroom Tel. Network v Focus Media, 264 AD2d 351 [1999]; Alan Lupton Assoc. v Northeast Plastics, 105 AD2d 3 [1984]). Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) for lack of personal jurisdiction was properly denied.

Section 302(a)(1) does not provide jurisdiction under its goods or services prong when the disputed contract involves no goods delivered or services performed in New York.

C.B.C. Wood Products, Inc. v. LMD Integrated Logistics Services, Inc. · filed 2006-10-07(a)(1)

The Plaintiff does not assert that the present dispute involves goods delivered or services to be performed in New York. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 302(a)(1) provides no basis for jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a claim arises from a contract to supply goods or services in New York, but the exercise of jurisdiction remains subject to purposeful-activity and due process limits.

Sayeedi v. Walser · filed 2007-02-27(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) was amended in 1979 (the language was subsequently incorporated into CCA 404) to permit the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction where the plaintiffs cause of action arises from a contract “to supply goods or services in the state,” without regard to where the contract was made. It is clear that the exercise of jurisdiction is not proper under every set of facts that seemingly fit a straightforward reading under the statute. The stated purpose of CPLR 302 and CCA 404 was to embrace nonresidents who have engaged in purposeful activities in connection with the matter in suit and to extend as far as due process will allow.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that guarantees payment to a New York entity because the guaranty supplies a service in New York.

Sirius America Insurance v. SCPIE Indemnity Co. · filed 2006-11-01(a)(1)

In sum, SCPIE is subject to New York’s long-arm statute because its “guaranty to make payments to a New York entity constitutes a contract to provide services in New York pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1).” Key Bank, 796 F.Supp. at 676.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on negotiations initiated by a New York buyer through a seller’s website when the goods are to be picked up outside New York.

Arouh v. Budget Leasing, Inc. · filed 2009-06-11(a)(1)

Defendant’s negotiation of the potential purchase of an automobile via e-mail and telephone, which was initiated by plaintiff after viewing the car on defendant’s web site, is insufficient to constitute the “transaction” of business within New York (see Granat v Bochner, 268 AD2d 365 [2000]), and, since the car was to be picked up in Texas, there was no contract to “supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over out-of-state attorneys whose representation involves substantial communications with New York counsel and trips to New York, even when the underlying litigation is elsewhere.

Millennium Import, LLC v. Reed Smith LLP · filed 2009-06-23(a)(1)

While third-party defendants were retained in California by a non-New York plaintiff with respect to a California action, in conducting their representation of plaintiff they had contacts with this state of sufficient quantity and quality to confer jurisdiction over them (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007]; Scheuer v Schwartz, 42 AD3d 314 [2007]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits long-arm jurisdiction based on an alleged breach involving a licensee’s sales in New York and a settlement agreement with substantial New York connections.

Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Tequila Cuervo La Rojeña S.A. de C.V. · filed 2009-06-23(a)(1)

Long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) was correctly found where the complaint alleges that defendant breached the' subject agreement in New York by permitting its licensee to sell nonconforming products here, and where the agreement regulates defendant’s use of the subject trademark throughout the entire United States, was negotiated in New York by .defendant’s long-standing New York counsel, contains a New York choice-of-law clause, and extends to “all those acting in concert or participation with [defendant] or under [its] direction and control” (see Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006]; Sunward Elees., Inc. v McDonald, 362 F3d 17, 22, 23 [2d Cir 2004]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who purposefully transacts business in New York when the transaction has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Zottola v. AGI Group, Inc. · filed 2009-06-23(a)(1)

To satisfy the “transacting business” requirement under CPLR 302 (a) (1), a nonresident defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York, thus invoking the benefits and protections of New York law (see McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 271 [1981]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; negotiating by telephone, fax, and e-mail and faxing an agreement to New York did not establish it here.

Executive Life Ltd. v. Silverman · filed 2009-12-01(a)(1)

Although negotiations may have taken place by telephone, fax, and e-mail, and the defendant allegedly faxed the agreement to Executive’s office in New York, the defendant’s actions did not amount to a purposeful invocation of the privileges of conducting business in New York.