N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a nondomiciliary’s purposeful acquisition of an interest in a New York company, and (a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on its participation in an allegedly fraudulent conveyance.

Atwal v. Atwal · filed 2005-12-22(a)(1), (a)(2)

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the acquisition by C.A. Trust of defendant’s 99% interest in the limited liability company was purposeful activity that constitutes the transaction of business in New York (see Black Riv. Assoc. v Newman, 218 AD2d 273, 279-281 [1996]; Catauro, 189 AD2d at 748). We further conclude that the participation by C.A. Trust in the allegedly fraudulent conveyance warrants the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2) as well (see Corpuel v Galasso, 268 AD2d 202 [2000]; Ed Moore Adv. Agency v I.H.R., Inc., 114 AD2d 484, 485-486 [1985]; Morgenthau v A.J. Travis Ltd., 184 Misc 2d 835, 843 [2000]).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a plaintiff’s New York residence or the possibility that an out-of-state rental car might be driven in New York when the claim arose from an accident elsewhere.

Williams v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car of Boston, Inc. · filed 2006-12-14(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

The motion court properly found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Enterprise under either CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) or CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... While its vehicles may be driven here, this contact is too attenuated to submit Enterprise to the jurisdiction of a New York State court, especially in this case, where although the alleged “journey” of plaintiff decedent and defendant decedent may have begun in the Bronx (as plaintiff claims, without any record support), the accident out of which plaintiffs claims arose occurred in Connecticut.

Section 302(a) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a basis for long-arm jurisdiction; proper service alone does not establish jurisdiction.

Morgan v. A Better Chance, Inc. · filed 2010-02-16(a)

While appellant was properly served pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 307 (a) (see CPLR 311 [a] [1]), jurisdiction is established only if plaintiffs sustain their burden of demonstrating long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (see Stewart v Volkswagen of Am., 81 NY2d 203, 207 [1993]).

Under CPLR 302(a), plaintiffs bear the burden of showing long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.

American Bank Note Corp. v. Daniele · filed 2011-02-15(a)

The Special Referee properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing the existence of long-arm jurisdiction (CPLR 302 [a]) over defendants, citizens and residents of Argentina (see Stewart v Volkswagen of Am., 81 NY2d 203, 207 [1993]). There is no evidence that any of the allegedly diverted funds were deposited into any bank account in New York in which defendants had an interest.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when purposeful New York activity substantially relates to the claim; section 302(a)(3) requires specified business or commerce contacts for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York.

Paolucci v. Kamas · filed 2011-05-03(a)(1), (a)(3)

Personal jurisdiction can be conferred under CPLR 302 (a) (1) “even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]; see Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007]). ... The Supreme Court also properly determined that personal jurisdiction over the defendants was not conferred pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) based upon tortious activity occurring outside New York, causing injury within New York. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate prima facie that the defendants “[1] regularly do[ ] or solicit[ ] business, or engage[ ] in any other persistent course of conduct, or derive[ ] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state,” or “[2] expect[ ] or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derive[ ] substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce” (CPLR 302 [a] [3] [i], [ii]; see Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592 [1997]; cf. LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210 [2000]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; section 302(a)(3) requires injury in New York from an out-of-state tort and one of its additional business or commerce conditions.

Magwitch, L.L.C. v. Pusser's Inc. · filed 2011-05-12(a)(1), (a)(3)

Although CPLR 302 (a) (1) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who, in person or through an agent, “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” defendants’ actions here did not amount to purposeful activity by which they availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in New York. ... The court also properly found that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3). ... Rather, the injury was caused by misrepresentations about the transfer of assets and the transfer and diversion of funds, which occurred in the BVI and locations other than New York, and resulted in the unavailability of funds to pay plaintiff the amounts due on the note.

Allegations that a nonresident regularly transacts business with New York customers, ships goods into New York, and earns significant income from New York sales provide a facially sufficient basis for long-arm jurisdiction under § 302(a).

Jerez v. JD Closeouts, LLC · filed 2012-03-20(a)

Plaintiffs complaint asserts a facially sufficient factual basis for long-arm jurisdiction over defendants (see CPLR 302 [a]), through allegations (complaint ¶¶ 5-8) that JD Closeouts (i) regularly solicits and transacts business with customers in the State of New York, (ii) regularly ships merchandise from other states into the State of New York, and (iii) earns significant income from selling goods to residents of the State of New York.

Section 302(a) does not support long-arm jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts no business, owns no property, and has no other contacts with New York.

Pursnani v. Stylish Move Sportswear, Inc. · filed 2012-02-07(a)

...appellants submitted evidence in support of that branch of their motion which established that Bhambhani is not domiciled in New York, transacts no business and owns no property in this state, and maintains no other contacts with New York which would support the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction (see CPLR 302 [a]).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on responsive contacts concerning out-of-state medical treatment, and section 302(a)(3) places a malpractice injury where the event causing it occurred rather than where its effects were felt.

Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute · filed 2014-11-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

In any event, even considering the defendants' contacts following the surgeries, they are similar in kind to the pre-surgery contacts and for the same reasons do not constitute the transaction of business required by CPLR 302(a)(1). ... Rather, the situs of the injury in medical malpractice cases is the location of the original event which caused the injury, and not where a party experiences the consequences of such injury (Hermann, 135 AD2d at 683, citing McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 273-274 [1981], and Kramer v Hotel Los Monteros SA, 57 AD2d 756 [2d Dept 1977]).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient connection between New York business activity and the claim, while section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York from a tort committed outside the state.

Stern v. Four Points by Sheraton Ann Arbor Hotel · filed 2015-11-19(a)(1), (a)(3)

Although ZLC’s participation in the interactive website for Sheraton hotels may demonstrate that it transacted business in New York, the relationship between ZLC’s website activities and plaintiff’s negligence action arising from an allegedly defective condition of premises in Michigan is too remote to support the exercise of long-arm or specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 24 NY3d 370, 377 [2014]; Mejia-Haffner v Killington, Ltd., 119 AD3d 912, 914 [2d Dept 2014]). Long-arm jurisdiction also cannot be asserted under CPLR 302 (a) (3), which applies when a tortious act committed outside the state causes injury within the ... state, because plaintiff’s injury occurred in Michigan (see Paterno, 24 NY3d at 381; Kramer v Hotel Los Monteros S. A., 57 AD2d 756 [1st Dept 1977], lv denied 43 NY2d 649 [1978]).

Section 302 permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose work supports solicitations to New York consumers under (a)(1), and whose out-of-state conduct foreseeably affects New York while generating substantial interstate revenue under (a)(3)(ii).

People v. Orbital Publishing Group, Inc. · filed 2015-11-30(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Since these are Adept’s clients, and provide Adept’s revenue, Adept has availed itself of the laws of New York, under which Henry Cricket Group is organized. Moreover, Pugsley’s affidavit shows that Adept not only processes the mailing addresses, payments, and refunds of New York consumers, but also has a role in formulating the content of the solicitations sent to New York consumers. In these circumstances, jurisdiction is appropriate under CPLR 302 (a) (1). ... Moreover, it is clear that Adept derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce and that Adept should have anticipated that the solicitations would have consequences within New York. Thus, long-arm jurisdiction over Adept is appropriate under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii).

CPLR 302 permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state physician who provides services to New York patients and transmits findings into the State, or whose out-of-state misdiagnosis foreseeably causes injury in New York.

Allen v. Institute for Family Health · filed 2018-03-22(a)(1), (a)(3)

Under these circumstances, New York courts may exercise jurisdiction over Dr. Dauito pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), notwithstanding his lack of physical presence in New York, because he transacted business with Madison Avenue Radiology and provided radiology services to patients in New York, including plaintiff, projecting himself into the State by electronically or telephonically transmitting his diagnostic findings ( see Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs. , 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]; Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn , 26 NY2d 13, 16—17 [1970]). New York courts may also exercise jurisdiction over Dr. Dauito pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3), because, as alleged, Dr. Dauito's negligent misdiagnosis resulted in a delay in plaintiff's treatment, thereby causing injury to plaintiff in New York, and Dr. Dauito should reasonably expect his out-of-state negligent misdiagnosis in plaintiff's case to have consequences in New York ( see Pomerantz v Wolfin , 236 AD2d 379 [2d Dept 1997]; see also Ingraham v Carroll , 90 NY2d 592, 598 [1997]).

Section 302(a)(1) and (a)(3)(ii) do not confer jurisdiction over an out-of-state donor registry whose New York contacts were responsive and which derived no substantial revenue from the transaction or New York.

Aloisio v. New York-Presbyt./Weill Cornell Med. Ctr. · filed 2022-05-17(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

There is no jurisdiction pursuant to either CPLR 302(a)(1) or (3)(ii) over BSB, a stem donor registry located in Bavaria. ... BSB did not engage in a regular course of conduct, nor did it purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York State ( see Etra v Matta, 61 NY2d 455, 458-459 [1984]) and its contacts with decedent's physicians and transplant center were responsive in nature ( see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst ., 24 NY3d 370, 377-378 [2014]). ... There is no evidence that BSB derived substantial revenue from the transaction or from New York, where it has no offices, employees, agents, marketing, registrations, or presence ( see Ingraham v Carroll , 90 NY2d 592, 596-598 [1997]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York, and CPLR 302(a)(3) requires an alleged injury within New York.

Musial v. Donohue · filed 2024-03-15(a)(1), (a)(3)

Even accepting as true the allegations set forth in the complaint and in the opposition to the motion to dismiss, and according plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Bloomgarden , 143 AD3d at 851), we conclude that, although plaintiffs signed the Button defendants' retainer agreement in New York and were in New York while on a telephone conference call with defendant Russell Button, who was in Texas at the time, this occurred during the course of the Button defendants' performance of legal services in Texas and because plaintiffs were New York domiciliaries, not because the Button defendants were purposefully engaging in any business activities in New York ( see id. at 852; cf . State of New York v Vayu, Inc. , 39 NY3d 330, 332-335 [2023]). Plaintiffs also failed to make a prima facie showing of long-arm jurisdiction over the Button defendants pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3), inasmuch as plaintiffs' alleged injuries did not occur within New York but, rather, in Texas, where the Button defendants' alleged legal malpractice occurred ( see Bloomgarden , 143 AD3d at 852; see generally Zeidan v Scott's Dev. Co. , 173 AD3d 1639, 1640 [4th Dept 2019]).

A plaintiff seeking jurisdiction under § 302 must allege facts supporting long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant; assertions in counsel’s memorandum do not suffice.

Simmons v. Baccarat Inc. · filed 2025-06-23

The complaint does not contain any allegations that would allow this Court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR § 302 over Salmon or Vales. Plaintiff's arguments in opposition, such as Salmon taking "meetings at the New York office" or Vales and Salmon having "close control of Baccarat’s operations in New York", are not pled or alleged in the complaint. A plaintiff's attorney's memorandum of law is not evidence and certainly cannot be used to establish personal jurisdiction.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over someone who transacted business in New York while domiciled there but was a non-domiciliary when served.

Brown v. Henrich · filed 1967-10-10(a)(1)

The New York Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Davies, 1966, 18 N.Y.2d 950, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146, 223 N.E.2d 570, that CPLR 302 does apply to a defendant who was domiciled in New York at the time he transacted the business but a non-domiciliary at the time of service.

CPLR 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who left New York after a claim accrued there while he resided and conducted business in the state.

Polgar v. Morse · filed 1980-05-15

The defendant Morse was subject to personal jurisdiction in this State even though no longer a resident (CPLR 302). The cause of action accrued in this State and he was a resident and engaged in business here when it accrued.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a defendant who transacted business in New York and later moved out of state when the claim arises from that business.

Le Blanc v. Kahn · filed 1979-04-06(a)(1)

The court cannot agree with this novel and strained interpretation of the long-arm statute. If anything, there should be greater rights against a defendant who formerly lived here than one who never did. ... The defendants are nonresidents, they have transacted business within the State, and they are therefore amenable to State jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Section 302(a) reaches a defendant who becomes a nondomiciliary after committing the acts giving rise to the claim in New York, if those acts establish the requisite minimal contacts.

Levin v. Ruby Trading Corporation · filed 1965-12-22(a)

The language “any non-domiciliary” is broad enough to include all nondomiciliaries no matter when they become such, provided that the acts out of which the cause of action arises were committed within the state and reflect the requisite minimal contacts.

CPLR 302 applies when a defendant was domiciled in New York at the time of the qualifying act but became a nondomiciliary before service.

Meadow Brook National Bank v. Burton · filed 1966-03-14

I agree with the Appellate Division, Third Department; it is inconceivable that the Legislature intended a “ gap ” between CPLR 302 and CPLR 313, which would preclude personal jurisdiction over the instant defendant.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction through service outside New York over a defendant who committed alleged tortious acts in the state, even if the defendant was domiciled in New York when the acts occurred but was a nondomiciliary when served.

Massik v. Zimmerman · filed 1966-10-27(a)(2)

By reason of the provisions of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a nondomiciliary at the time of service but who was a New York domiciliary at the time of the commission of alleged tortious acts within the State, was effected by personal service outside the State.

A court deciding jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) must know the nature of the plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether it arose from the nondomiciliary’s transaction of business in New York.

Fraley v. Desilu Productions, Inc. · filed 1965-04-13(a)(1)

However, any proper determination of a motion under CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 8) based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction attempted to be exercised under CPLR 302, must depend upon the nature of the cause or causes of action relied on by a plaintiff.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not confer jurisdiction over a contractual insurance claim merely because the insured is subject to jurisdiction in a separate New York tort action.

Nautilus Insurance v. Adventure Outdoors, Inc. · filed 2007-12-27(a)(3)(ii)

Nautilus’s claim is based upon a contractual dispute between an Arizona based insurance company and two Georgia based parties, not upon a tort action in which Adventure’s and Wallace’s conduct outside of New York caused tortious injury to Nautilus within New York. The fact that Adventure is a defendant in a nuisance action in New York in which personal jurisdiction is based on New York’s long arm statute does not mean that New York courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over Adventure or its alleged owner Wallace in any action. The court does not have personal jurisdiction over Adventure and Wallace in this action.

CPLR 302(a)(2), as construed and applied to the defendant, was valid under the Fourteenth Amendment.

American Cyanamid Co. v. Rosenblatt · filed 1965-06-10(a)(2)

Upon the appeal herein there was presented and necessarily passed upon a question under the Constitution of the United States, viz.: whether CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2), as construed in this case and applied to defendant, was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Court of Appeals, in passing upon this contention, held that CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2), as construed and applied, was valid.

Section 302 is available in a civil action brought by the State even if the action is penal in nature.

State v. Davies · filed 1965-12-20

However, despite the fact that the present action seeks redress for a public rather than private wrong and thus is arguably penal in nature (Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99), we find that CPLR 302 is still available.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when its purposeful New York activity, including substantial contract negotiations, gives rise to the claim.

Northland Paper Company v. Mohawk Tablet Company · filed 1967-05-18(a)(1)

In sum, the purposeful activity of Golden while he was physically present in New York makes the defendant Mohawk subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts under CPLR Section 302(a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York through an agent and the claim arises from that business.

Legros v. Irving · filed 1973-05-18(a)(1)

Since it has already been established in the instant case that Irving transacted business within the State with respect to the publication of the book '(38 A D 2d, at p. 56), and since Irving was also deHory’s agent, it follows that deHory transacted business within the State “through an agent,” sufficient to empower our courts to “exercise jurisdiction” over deHory (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign principal based on the plaintiff-agent’s ordinary execution of the principal’s trading orders in New York.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Alexiou · filed 1975-07-08(a)(1)

As a result, we are constrained to find that defendant did not “transact business” within the state, within the meaning of CPLR § 302(a)(1), as authoritatively interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully uses the State’s courts through its attorneys.

Kazlow v. A. Goodman & Co. · filed 1977-09-16(a)(1)

The affirmative and deliberate use of the courts of this State by defendant through its attorneys renders it amenable to our long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary through an agent’s New York business contacts when the dispute arises, at least in part, from those contacts.

Paribas Corp. v. Shelton Ranch Corp. · filed 1990-07-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, taking Paribas’ allegations as true on this motion to dismiss, Shelton and the persons or corporations he acted as agent for are subject to jurisdiction in New York under § 302 on the basis of Shelton’s contacts constituting the transaction of business, including multiple visits and communications with Paribas in New York, because the present dispute arises, at least in part, out of those contacts.

Section 302(a) permits jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation for claims arising from a New York subsidiary's acts when the subsidiary operates as a mere department of the parent.

Donetto v. S.A.R.L. De Gestion Pierre Cardin · filed 2004-05-04(a)

Given the financial and managerial relationship between Cardin France and the subsidiary that employed plaintiff, as well as the nature of the action, a sufficient basis has been established to give this court jurisdiction over the parent company for plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination pursuant to CPLR §302(a).

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a parent company merely because its subsidiary is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Moreau v. RPM, Inc. · filed 2005-07-11

Mere ownership by a parent company of a subsidiary that is subject to personal jurisdiction is insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the parent (see Snyder v Ply Gem Indus., Inc., 200 F Supp 2d 246 [2001]; L’Europeenne de Banque v La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F Supp 114 [1988]; see also Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v Philip Morris, Inc., 26 F Supp 2d 593 [1998]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent through a subsidiary acting as its agent in New York.

Uebler v. Boss Media AB · filed 2006-05-30(a)(1)

In such a case, the CPLR requires that the subsidiary be functioning as either an “agent” or a “mere department” of the parent. ... Having determined jurisdiction over Boss Media is proper because Web-Dollar was acting as its agent, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss whether WebDollar or Boss Casinos qualify as a “mere department” of Boss Media.

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit jurisdiction through a New York affiliate without a prima facie showing that the affiliate is the nondomiciliary’s agent or mere department.

CNY Fair Housing, Inc. v. Clover Group Inc. · filed 2022-02-28(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged, or submitted supporting materials showing, that any New York entities at issue could be said to be either an “agent” or “mere department” of Welltower. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to demonstrate that this Court has the statutory authority to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Welltower under CPLR § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires an agency relationship to establish jurisdiction through another person’s New York business transactions; a civil conspiracy alone does not suffice.

QBE Americas, Inc. v. Orcutt · filed 2022-03-25(a)(1)

It makes sense that civil conspiracy, a creature of tort law, could form a basis for CPLR 302(a)(2) jurisdiction, since that subsection concerns tortious acts in New York, whereas civil conspiracy would not establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), since that subsection concerns business transactions within the state.

Section 302 does not support personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary on an alter ego theory without factual support for that relationship.

Cedar Capital Mgt. Group Inc. v. Lillie · filed 2023-08-07

Thus, plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is proper under an alter ego theory. The complaint against Kent is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a) does not attribute a subsidiary’s activities to its parent merely because the parent owns it; an agency relationship requires the parent’s control.

Sewell v. Inbev · filed 2024-09-03(a)

In other words, the bare assertion that a corporation owns another company is not enough to make the latter an “agent” of the former under section 302.

CPLR 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when a claim arises from a single purposeful transaction in New York.

V.R.W., Inc. v. Weiss · filed 1986-03-03

In successfully completing the transaction here, he purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the State. This single transaction, out of which the cause of action arose, was sufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction over him under CPLR 302 (see, Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443, 452, cert denied sub nom. Estwing Mfg. Co. v Singer, 382 US 905).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based on a brief telephone call into New York in these circumstances.

Fox v. Boucher · filed 1985-02-06

While diversity jurisdiction has been established, personal jurisdiction has not. Fox seeks to invoke New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302, claiming that the telephone call into New York during which Boucher called Fox a rich lawyer constituted a prima facie tort giving rise to jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction over defendant Boucher.

A single telephone call to New York is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant under § 302’s contract or tort provisions.

Fox v. Boucher · filed 1986-06-20

One single telephone call made to New York State is insufficient contact to support a suit initiated in that forum against an out-of-state resident under either the contract or tort provisions of CPLR 302.

Section 302 requires evidence of purposeful activity in New York to establish long-arm jurisdiction based on a nondomiciliary’s own acts.

Cato Show Printing Co. v. Lee · filed 1981-11-13

Since there must be evidence, absent here, of some “purposeful activities” within the State that would justify bringing the nondomiciliary before the courts of New York, CPLR 302 does not authorize long-arm personal jurisdiction over Alpha based on its own acts (McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 271).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s business activities are purposefully directed toward New York.

Round One Productions, Inc. v. Greg Page Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1982-09-23(a)(1)

The instant defendants’ activities directed toward New York are sufficiently purposeful to be within the ambit of § 302(a)(1) in contrast to the situation of the defendants in Mayes v. Leipziger, supra.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a successor that completes contracts and thereby adopts its predecessor’s purposeful business activity in New York.

Applied Hydro-Pneumatics, Inc. v. Bauer Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1979-05-07(a)(1)

Having thus concluded that jurisdiction may be sustained pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1), it is unnecessary to determine whether it may also be sustained pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3) predicated upon the alleged commission of a tortious act without the State (Bauer/Electro’s alleged participation in the fraudulent transfer of BMI’s assets) causing injury to persons or property within the State (the alleged rendering insolvent of BMI and its resultant financial inability to meet its contractual obligations to AHP).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when solicitation and shipment together connect the defendant’s business to New York.

Sterling Television Presentations, Inc. v. Shintron Co. · filed 1978-06-14(a)(1)

However, solicitation plus shipment does constitute a sufficient tie with the State of New York to warrant the finding of jurisdiction under CPLR Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who negotiates and makes a continuing employment contract in New York when the claim arises from that contract.

George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz · filed 1977-04-28(a)(1)

Here, Schwartz was physically present in New York at the time the contract, establishing a continuing relationship between the parties, was negotiated and made and, the contract, made in New York, was the transaction out of which the cause of action arose.

Trademark licensing agreements and related enforcement procedures cannot support long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 in a suit over an automobile purchased out of state.

Wehringer v. Dank Volvo of America Cor. · filed 1976-12-21

But we need not concern ourselves with pruning the subpoena to acceptable standards as we find that the trade-mark licensing agreements between defendants and their licensees, including any enforcement procedures thereunder, irrelevant to the issue of whether defendants are doing business in New York so as to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 301. Nor could the requested information support a determination of jurisdiction under CPLR 302, the long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over an individual when the claim does not arise from business that individual transacted in New York on their own behalf.

Schenin v. Micro Copper Corp. · filed 1967-07-12(a)(1)

Because the cause of action asserted here does not arise out of business transacted in New York by the individual defendants on their own behalf, they are not subject to the reach of subdivision (a) 1 of CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit an inference that an out-of-state manufacturer transacted business in New York merely because its product was found there.

Naples v. Janesville Apparel Co. · filed 1968-04-15(a)(1)

We do not regard the unexplained presence of the coat in New York as showing that appellant had sent it into this State in response to an order received from here; under CPLR 302 as it existed at the time the action was commenced, it would be equally as reasonable to infer that appellant had shipped it to a wholesaler or distributor in some other State in response to an order received therefrom.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a transaction in New York even if the defendant resides abroad when served.

Krebs v. Raborg · filed 1968-05-21(a)(1)

While defendant may well have been a resident of Brazil at the time of service, he resided here at the time of the transaction in suit which took place in New York. There is no question that jurisdiction was acquired pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s officer purposefully acts in New York in relation to the contract sued on.

Management & Technology Inc. v. Logetronics, Inc. · filed 1969-03-27(a)(1)

We are satisfied that the activities of its officer Knibiehly, recited above, constituted purposeful acts performed by defendant in this State in relation to the contract being sued on.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when a claim arises from a separation agreement executed in New York that constitutes a transaction of business.

Lawrenz v. Lawrenz · filed 1971-02-11(a)(1)

The court finds that the execution in New York of a separation agreement, particularly one as broad and far-ranging as the instant agreement, confers the requisite personal jurisdiction upon New York courts as a transaction of business under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over claims on replacement notes merely because the notes are payable in New York; plaintiffs must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

Lewis & Eugena Van Wezel Foundation, Inc. v. Guerdon Industries, Inc. · filed 1971-07-07(a)(1)

The only certain contact in New York in regard to the replacement notes here in suit is the conceded fact that these notes are payable in New York. To date, however, the New York courts have rejected the view that demand obligations which are payable in New York without more are sufficient to establish jurisdiction. ... Hence I conclude that plaintiffs have not and cannot establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an action on replacement notes when the underlying borrowing occurred in New York, even if the replacement notes were signed elsewhere.

Lewis and Eugenia Van Wezel Foundation, Inc. v. Guerdon Industries, Inc. · filed 1971-11-12(a)(1)

The transaction of business in this case was the borrowing of money. This clearly took place in New York, and the fact that the original loans are now embodied in new pieces of paper, signed outside of the State, does not deprive the New York courts of jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident in a defamation action when the claim arises from business transacted in New York.

Legros v. Irving · filed 1971-12-23(a)(1)

The question thus presented is whether jurisdiction in an action for defamation may be based upon the transaction of business pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1). ... It is sufficient if the cause of action is related to and grows out of the transaction of business in New York. ... We conclude that jurisdiction was properly acquired by virtue of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nonresident sends property to New York for services ordered by phone or mail from outside the state.

Margaret Watherston, Inc. v. Forman · filed 1972-06-19(a)(1)

How about all three factors combined — will they together support jurisdiction? I answer in the affirmative where defendants import into New York the res of the contract upon which services are to be rendered here pursuant to defendants’ order telephoned or mailed from out of State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s activities in New York satisfy the transaction-of-business criterion.

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Hernreich · filed 1972-11-21(a)(1)

Defendant’s activities in the State satisfy the statutory criterion of the transaction of business within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who contacts a New York service provider and sends a chattel there for work, knowing the work will be performed in New York, when the provider sues for payment.

Margaret Watherston, Inc. v. Forman · filed 1973-04-13(a)(1)

When a nonresident selects and contacts a New York resident to perform services on a chattel he owns, knowing the work is to be performed in New York and sends the chattel to New York where the work is thereafter done, he has demonstrated sufficient reasonable contacts with New York and has deliberately invoked the protection of the laws of New York so as to make ... him amenable to jurisdiction in a suit by the New York resident for payment of the work.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because payments are due and made in New York.

Pacific Concessions, Inc. v. Savard · filed 1973-06-08(a)(1)

The mere fact that the payments of money were due and made in this State is insufficient to confer jurisdiction as this does not constitute a purposeful act or the transaction of business within CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign franchisor whose New York contacts consist of advertising and communications from out of state, where its negotiations occurred in Florida.

Del Bello v. Japanese Steak House, Inc. · filed 1974-02-22(a)(1)

Plaintiffs further contend that the acts of defendant, enumerated by Special Term as above set forth, constitute sufficient contacts in New York in connection with this contract so as to subject defendant to New York jurisdiction under New York’s “ long arm ” statute (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1). We find, however, that such acts were insufficient to confer jurisdiction over defendant. It is undisputed that defendant had and has no office in this State, no agent or employee or telephone listing here, and that all of its negotiations with plaintiff were in and from Florida.

Listing an out-of-state hotel's toll-free reservation number in a New York telephone directory does not constitute transacting business in New York under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Ziperman v. Frontier Hotel of Las Vegas · filed 1975-11-10(a)(1)

Neither does such activity constitute the transaction of business within this State requisite for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

Executing a separation agreement in New York constitutes transacting business there under CPLR 302(a)(1), supporting personal jurisdiction in a dispute over support payments.

Bruno v. Borak · filed 1976-05-18(a)(1)

We are in agreement with the determination of Special Term to the extent that it found in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, since the execution of the separation agreement in New York constituted transaction of business within the State sufficient to obtain jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) (Kochenthal v Kochenthal, 28 AD2d 117), and would be sufficient to cover the subject matter of support payments.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; calls, letters, and a mailed purchase order were insufficient under the circumstances here.

Rainbow Industrial Products v. Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1976-08-18(a)(1)

Under these facts taken as a whole, defendant has not conducted the purposeful activities in New York which are needed to constitute the transaction of business under CPLR 302.

A bank’s limited activity in New York as an advising bank for a foreign issuer does not establish long-arm jurisdiction over the issuer under § 302(a)(1).

National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria · filed 1977-02-08(a)(1)

In light of the limited nature of its participation, i. e., advising the beneficiary of the issuance of the credit and its authorization to pay upon the presentation of appropriate documents, its transactions in this state on behalf of the issuing bank cannot form a basis for long-arm jurisdiction under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) treats a non-domiciliary’s execution of a guarantee in New York as transacting business there for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Huntington Towers, Ltd. · filed 1977-12-29(a)(1)

Defendants’ execution of the guarantee in New York constitutes a transaction of business within the meaning of CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign party for disputes arising from its agreement to form a New York corporation and govern its shareholders’ relations with that corporation.

Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane · filed 1979-03-08(a)(1)

For much the same reasons, we think that at least as to disputes arising under this agreement, respondent French Motobecane was subject to in personam jurisdiction of the New York courts under the long-arm statute (CPLR 302, subd a, par 1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction for a conversion divorce based on living separate and apart, even when the parties executed a separation agreement in New York.

Guccione v. Guccione · filed 1979-06-05(a)(1)

Therefore the cause of action does not arise from the separation agreement but from the fact of living separate and apart. Living separate and apart is not the transaction of any business which is required for the exercise of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1).

CPLR 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who transact business in New York when the claim has a nexus to that business.

Goldberg v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 1980-12-04(a)

Clearly, these defendants did transact business in New York and the alleged injury to plaintiff’s professional reputation flows directly from Empire’s relationship with the Sitomer law firm. There is a nexus between defendants’ transaction of business in New York and plaintiff’s cause of action, because the misrepresentations purportedly made by Empire and the falsity in the registration statement are the alleged causes of civil actions against plaintiff, and his tarnished reputation.

Section 302(a)(1) requires facts showing that a nondomiciliary defendant conducted business in New York to support personal jurisdiction based on a transaction of business.

Teplin v. Manafort · filed 1981-04-16(a)(1)

The predicate for personal jurisdiction over defendant, a nondomiciliary, was based, it is alleged, on the transaction of business within this State (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1). The complaint and affidavits in opposition to the instant motion have failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that defendant conducted any business within the State.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a foreign corporation to transact business in New York and the cause of action to arise from that business.

Barcelona Hotel, Ltd. v. Hadlow · filed 1981-06-30(a)(1)

It has not been shown that the foreign corporation transacted business in New York and that the cause of action arose from that business (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1; see Frummer v Hilton Hotels Int., 19 NY2d 533, cert den 389 US 923).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when a claim arises from purposeful business activity in New York.

Action Associates v. Schine · filed 1981-12-01(a)(1)

Sufficient facts were set forth to compel denial of the motion based on lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants. Under CPLR 302 (subd [a], pars 1,2), a nondomiciliary who “transacts any business within the state or * * * commits a tortious act within the state” is subject to personal jurisdiction as to a cause of action arising therefrom. The test under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) is whether the nondomiciliary engaged in “purposeful business activity” in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an attorney performing services outside New York solely because the attorney contacts a New York client by letter and telephone to report on the work and request what is needed to perform it.

Mayes v. David A. Leipziger and Levy, Leipziger and Normington, a Professional Law Corporation · filed 1982-03-17(a)(1)

We do not believe that in these circumstances the New York courts would exercise jurisdiction solely on the basis that the defendants, from California, reported to their New York client and sought the wherewithal (i.e., funds, authority, and information) by means of letters and calls to New York to perform their non-New York services.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-State buyer merely because it telephones or mails orders to a New York seller.

Lichtenstein v. Jewelart, Inc. · filed 1982-09-21(a)(1)

The contacts alleged by plaintiffs are also insufficient to establish longarm jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). Courts have consistently held that the mere telephoning or mailing of orders to a New York seller by an out-of-State buyer does not subject the buyer to in personam jurisdiction under § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident guarantor who authorizes delivery of a co-endorsement to New York for a loan advanced there.

Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Goyak · filed 1984-05-24(a)(1)

The defendant invested in a New York partnership by authorizing delivery to New York of his co-endorsement of a loan he knew was being advanced in New York by a New York bank. He thereby “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York]” and accordingly is properly subject to jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to New York CPLR § 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York; a foreign buyer’s mailed order to a New York seller, without more, does not establish jurisdiction.

Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Molon Motors & Coil, Inc. · filed 1984-06-28(a)(1)

To be amenable to jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1), plaintiff’s cause of action must arise out of the transaction of any business within the State. Under this provision, it is the activities of defendant with respect to the specific contract at issue which determine whether defendant is subject to jurisdiction. The fact that plaintiff is a New York seller, and defendant a foreign buyer who sends an order to plaintiff by mail without more, does not expose defendant to long-arm jurisdiction under this provision (see Siegel, NY Prac, § 86, p 99, and cases cited therein).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who come to New York to negotiate and sign contracts from which the claims arise, even if the visit lasts only one day.

New Generation Foods, Inc. v. Spicer's International, Common Trust · filed 1987-07-30(a)(1)

Therefore, because defendants came to New York in order to negotiate and sign two written contracts, personal jurisdiction can thus be said to extend to them.

A plaintiff-agent’s own work in New York cannot establish jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) over an out-of-state principal whose independent New York contacts are insufficient.

Metropolitan Air Service, Inc. v. Penberthy Aircraft Leasing Co. · filed 1986-10-17(a)(1)

Plaintiff may not, as it attempts to do here, use its own contractual performance in New York as a basis to gain this Court's jurisdiction over the action.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction solely because a defendant made telephone calls and sent a mailing into New York in connection with an out-of-state transaction.

Fiedler v. First City National Bank of Houston, Meridith Organization, Inc. v. First City National Bank of H · filed 1986-12-17(a)(1)

Instead, this case is closer to the “order solicitation” cases, which hold the telephone orders not involving visits or consultations in New York do not confer personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when contract negotiations in New York constitute a transaction of business from which the claim arises.

Catsimatidis v. Innovative Travel Group, Inc. · filed 1986-12-29(a)(1)

Any contract negotiations evidencing a purposeful invocation of the laws of the forum state are transactions of business for purposes of New York’s long arm statute. ... In light of these assertions, I find that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a transaction of business in New York to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state cooperative that regularly acts as a purchasing agent and supplies services to New York members in connection with the matter under investigation.

American Dental Cooperative, Inc. v. Attorney-General · filed 1987-04-14(a)(1)

It is undisputed that more than 10% of ADC’s members, for which it acts as a purchasing agent for the transmittal and billing of orders on a continuing basis, are located in New York. ADC also sponsors and develops private label products for its New York members and prepares and distributes product information books to them. In addition, its New York members must conform to ADC’s bylaws, thus allowing it to exert influence over various aspects of their operation. In such circumstances, ADC is both transacting business and supplying services here.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in New York, directly or through an agent, and the claim to arise from that business.

Itel Containers International Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Service, Ltd. · filed 1987-05-04(a)(1)

As interpreted by the New York courts, the statute requires a plaintiff to prove first, that business was transacted in New York by the defendant either in person or through an agent, and second, that its claim arises out of that transaction of business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when defendants transact business in New York and the claims arise from those transactions.

Nee v. HHM Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1987-06-18(a)(1)

It appearing that defendants have transacted business in New York, that plaintiff’s claims arise from such transactions, and that jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) is well-founded, the Court need not reach the question of whether defendants are amenable to jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2) or 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) treats attendance at New York meetings tied to the alleged injuries as transacting business for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

In Re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Products Business Securities Litigation · filed 1987-07-31(a)(1)

Here, the record establishes that both Dudley and Egler attended a series of meetings, including those held at Morgan Stanley’s offices and other meetings described previously, which give rise in part to the alleged injuries of the Rights holders. This Court determines that the attendance by Dudley and Egler of the meetings described above constitutes the transacting of business within the State of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on an association’s passive holding of a master insurance policy for its members.

Grinell v. Bankers Trust Co. · filed 1987-12-22(a)(1)

Nor has plaintiff shown any basis for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) by transacting any business within this State. True, from January 1977 until January of 1981 APMA was the named insured under the Bercanus policy, but it is clear that APMA held this master policy in a wholly passive manner, simply gratuitously as a convenience to its members such as plaintiff.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who purposefully obtain loans through New York agents and undertake continuing obligations to a New York bank.

First City Federal Savings Bank v. Dennis · filed 1988-01-26(a)(1)

Here, in addition to agreeing to perform their payment obligations in New York, the defendants signed additional agreements whereby they authorized a New York agent to solicit and negotiate the loans in New York, agreed to provide updated financial information to a New York bank in New York, and agreed to assign their interests in the limited partnership to the New York bank as a condition precedent to the making of the loan. Having knowingly signed such agreements, the defendants were clearly aware that they were entering into an ongoing transaction with a New York bank for the purpose of obtaining a personal loan to finance a limited partnership investment. Although such financing activity presents a “close question” for personal jurisdiction, see Sterling, 510 F.2d at 873, these purposeful acts to obtain the benefits of the competitive New York banking market are sufficient to subject defendants to the process of New York courts.

A visit to New York lasting less than a day on an employer’s behalf, without agreements or business solicitation, does not constitute transacting business under § 302(a)(1).

Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Coastal Oil Co. · filed 1988-03-21(a)(1)

Gargano did not “transact business” in New York, either. He spent less than one day in this state on his employer’s behalf, without entering into any agreements or soliciting any business.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state defendant transacts business through purposeful activity in New York, including regular communications, policy delivery, invoicing, and premium collection.

Rung v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1988-04-08(a)(1)

We find that personal jurisdiction over Wilson does exist in New York pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13, 16-17). Wilson transacted business and engaged in purposeful activity in New York, by regularly corresponding, by mail or telephone, with Kary, plaintiffs’ insurance agent in New York; by delivering the insurance policy to Kary in New York; by sending invoices to Kary, seeking plaintiffs’ premium payments; and by collecting those premiums from Kary.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident borrower when the loan contract was made in New York.

State of New York Higher Education Services Corp. v. Langus · filed 1988-05-05(a)(1)

Here, since the loan contract was made in New York, plaintiff had an alternative vehicle for obtaining jurisdiction by service outside the State (see, CPLR 302 [a] [1]; 313; State of New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Zamore, 59 NY2d 933, 934).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because a non-domiciliary agrees to pay a promissory note in New York.

First City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Zuckerman · filed 1987-09-14(a)(1)

Rather, defendant agreed to pay a promissory note in New York, an act which does not create jurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when an in-state meeting leads to related dealings giving rise to the claim, even if the meeting alone would not confer jurisdiction.

M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. v. Adrianne Kahn, Inc. · filed 1988-11-10(a)(1)

That meeting, which involved defendant’s personal presence here, led to further contacts and dealings which collectively are sufficient to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1). While, in the circumstances, personal jurisdiction did not attach as a result of that first meeting, one of its apparent purposes was to develop a Christmas season marketing strategy for defendant.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a tort or contract claim arising from the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Finesurgic Inc. v. Davis · filed 1989-03-06(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1), the provision in issue on this appeal, authorizes the court to exercise jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries for tort and contract claims arising from a defendant’s transaction of business in this State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose active participation in a New York meeting and numerous communications with New York constitute purposeful activities connected to the claim.

Otterbourg v. Shreve City Apartments, Ltd. · filed 1989-06-27(a)(1)

Here, defendants’ participation in a meeting in New York through West’s use of an open telephone line during which he made and responded to proposals as to the terms of the contemplated agreement and was, generally, actively involved, as well as the numerous letters and telephone calls, rises to the level of purposeful activities required for CPLR 302 (a) (1) jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on purposeful business activity in New York; dismissal is unwarranted when the record does not establish that such activity was lacking.

Firegreen Ltd. v. Claxton · filed 1990-04-17(a)(1)

Certainly, the existing record does not clearly demonstrate the lack of sufficient purposeful activity in New York so as to preclude long-arm jurisdiction from attaching. ... Since the absence of jurisdiction cannot be ascertained from the papers, the Supreme Court appropriately declined to dismiss the complaint at this time.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on a nonresident’s telexes and telephone calls to a New York party about a contract negotiated outside New York.

Tripmasters, Inc. v. Hyatt International Corp. · filed 1988-09-27(a)(1)

CPLR § 302(a)(1) provides long arm jurisdiction over a defendant as to a cause of action arising from that defendant’s transaction of business in New York. ... The contract was negotiated in person in Mexico, and ACH sent two telexes to plaintiff in New York and participated in telephonic discussions. ... These “contacts” of ACH with plaintiff in New York by telex and telephone are plainly insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a few telephone calls and mailings to finalize an out-of-state contract.

Feigenbaum v. Marble of America, Inc. · filed 1989-10-27(a)(1)

In examining the facts, the Court notes that Marble did not establish a pattern of commercial dealings in New York as a result of the few telephone calls and two mailings accomplished to finalize the contractual agreement. This Court does not find these acts to be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on one purposeful New York transaction when the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Staten Island Hospital v. Alliance Brokerage Corp. · filed 1990-10-15(a)(1)

Proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to confer jurisdiction as long as the activities of the defendant in question were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460; Town of Hempstead v Certain Underwriters, 148 AD2d 527; Rung v United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 139 AD2d 914).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on a separation agreement negotiated and executed in New York.

Deutsch v. Deutsch · filed 1990-10-25(a)(1)

A separation agreement, negotiated and executed in New York, constituted a "transaction of business” within the State sufficient to obtain jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (Lynch v Austin, 96 AD2d 196; Bruno v Borak, 52 AD2d 800; Kochenthal v Kochenthal, 28 AD2d 117).

Section 302 does not support personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant’s duty to remit payments to a party in the forum.

Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd. v. Emo-Trans, Inc. · filed 1990-09-14

It is clear that neither of the bases of jurisdiction articulated by the Tokyo Court would support jurisdiction under New York law. With regard to ETI’s duty to remit payments to NET, New York courts have rejected attempts to uphold jurisdiction on such grounds.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on purposeful activity in New York, including holding a bond and mortgage on New York property and using a New York attorney for the transactions.

Drew v. Hooper · filed 1990-12-21(a)(1)

We agree with Supreme Court that plaintiffs acquired personal jurisdiction over defendant under CPLR 302 (a) (1). Defendant holds a bond and mortgage executed in New York covering property located in New York and used an attorney in New York for the real estate transactions, which demonstrate she has engaged in purposeful activity in this State (see, International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310; Reiner & Co. v Schwartz, 41 NY2d 648).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s acts, considered together, show purposeful activity in New York amounting to a transaction of business.

Bank of New York v. Strumor · filed 1992-01-21(a)(1)

The totality of the defendant’s acts, whereby the defendant availed himself of the benefits and protection of New York law, shows sufficient purposeful activity in New York to constitute a transaction of business under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from, or be closely related to, the defendant’s business activities in New York.

CBS, INC. v. Snyder · filed 1992-07-29(a)(1)

Rather, it is Snyder’s burden to show that the alleged defamation, tortious interference with the Snyder/CBS contract, and interference with economic advantage arose out of business transacted by WRC-TV in New York, or at least that such claims are closely related to WRC-TV’s New York business activities to a degree satisfying § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on a proposed letter of credit to be confirmed by a New York bank when no instrument payable in New York was issued.

New Hampshire Insurance v. Wellesley Capital Partners, Inc. · filed 1994-05-26(a)(1)

Having concededly omitted to issue the letter of credit, to be confirmed by the Bank of New York, there exists no instrument payable in this country so as to constitute commercial activity within the contemplation of the FSIA or the long-arm statute of this State (CPLR 302 [a] [1]; compare, Chemco Intl. Leasing v Meridian Eng’g, 590 F Supp 539 [SD NY]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits a court to consider purposeful business activity before a contract was executed when that activity is substantially related to the claim.

Fisher v. McClain · filed 1995-06-27(a)(1)

We agree with the IAS Court that jurisdictional fact finding should not be limited to the transactions and occurrences immediately surrounding defendants’ execution of the promissory note sued upon, but should include the transactions and occurrences surrounding defendants’ request for a loan and plaintiff’s subsequent issuance of a check to defendant Thomas McClain some 18 months before defendants’ issuance of the note to plaintiff, the note representing nothing more than the obligation that was due in the check plus interest.

CPLR 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who engaged in no purposeful activity in New York connected to the suit.

Schultz v. Hyman · filed 1994-02-04

Additionally, and apart from the due process claim, the movants contend that New York’s long-arm statute (CPLR 302) does not confer in personam jurisdiction over them. We agree. ... The movants established that they did not engage in such purposeful activity in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on mailing a claim statement to the NYSE’s New York office and retaining a New York attorney.

Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Mathes · filed 1995-02-23(a)(1)

Jurisdiction over respondent was not properly exercised by the IAS Court pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful activity in New York; merely filing an arbitration claim there does not establish it.

Painewebber Inc. v. McAdams · filed 1995-02-23(a)(1)

The IAS Court erred when it found that the mere filing of the Statement of Claim in New York constituted purposeful activity under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary whose New York negotiations concern the contract at issue.

LaCorte Electrical Construction & Maintenance, Inc. v. Centron Security Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-08-14(a)(1)

CPLR § 302(a)(1) sets out as one method of obtaining jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, a “transaction of business” doctrine. ... Given the defendant’s certificate of authorization to do business, the negotiations in New York State, and the defendant’s agreement to submit their contract to New York State law, it is clear then that this court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant sufficient to satisfy state law requirements and constitutional due process.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat an exploratory New York meeting that leads only to a proposal subject to further negotiations as a transaction of business in New York.

C-Life Group Ltd. v. Generra Co. · filed 1997-01-16(a)(1)

The parties’ initial, 45-minute meeting in New York was clearly exploratory in nature, leading to nothing more than a proposal that was itself the subject of further negotiations over the phone, by mail, and in meetings outside of New York. Such is not a transaction of business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Liederman Assocs. v Robotool Ltd., 154 AD2d 515).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a sufficient relationship between a defendant’s purposeful New York business and the claim; jurisdiction cannot be imputed from a corporation to its officer when the corporation’s contacts do not meet that requirement.

Packer v. TDI Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-03-31(a)(1)

In light of the totality of the circumstances, it does not appear that it would be fair to deem the action to have arisen out of TDI’s purposeful activities in the forum. Accordingly, no basis for long-arm jurisdiction exists that can be imputed to DesOrmeaux.

Section 302(a)(1) measures a defendant’s New York business contacts when the cause of action arose, rather than when suit was filed.

Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc. · filed 1996-02-06(a)(1)

Although the defendants’ present contacts with New York are not clear, Section 302 requires that the defendants had business contacts in New York at the time the cause of action arose and not that a defendant had contacts with the state when the suit was brought.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary leaseholder whose rights over New York operations amount to purposeful activity, even if the leaseholder has not exercised those rights.

Whitesell v. Walchli · filed 1996-06-05(a)(1)

What this court finds persuasive are the rights defendant has with respect to the oil and gas operations, notwithstanding that he may not have exercised those rights. Defendant must affirmatively consent to the surrender or abandonment of the lease; that is considerably more than a passive interest. Further, defendant’s other rights with respect to the drilling, such as access to the premises, samples and all records, seem sufficient to bring defendant within the reach of New York’s long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff makes a sufficient start toward showing that solicitation through mailings into New York constituted the transaction of business.

Sovik v. Healing Network · filed 1997-11-19(a)(1)

Plaintiffs have made a “sufficient start” in demonstrating that facts may exist to establish that solicitation of funds by dissemination of the letter to members of the Institute constitutes the transaction of business under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 NY2d 463, 467; see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467); that defendants Young, Hughes and Patel drafted the letter and either distributed or authorized the distribution of the letter in the Buffalo area and, thus, that their active involvement and personal control over the writing and distribution of the allegedly defamatory statement is a sufficient basis for the acquisition of long-arm jurisdiction over those defendants as individuals (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., supra, at 470-471; Softel Computers v Grosky, 183 AD2d 527); and that defendant Wolfe “engaged in purposeful activities in this State in relation to [her] transaction for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of [THN and its officers] and that [the officers] exercised some control over [defendant Wolfe] in the matter” (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., supra, at 467).

Section 302(a) does not confer jurisdiction over a carrier when the plaintiff shows no claim arising from business or services in New York and the freight merely passes through the state.

William Systems, Ltd. v. Total Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 1998-12-03(a)

Plaintiff submits no evidence tending to suggest that his claims arise from any business transacted in New York or any services rendered in New York. Defendant avers that it performed no purposeful activity in New York and that New York’s only connection to this matter is the incidental passage of the freight through New York on its way from New Jersey to Connecticut. Jurisdiction may not be asserted under CPLR 302(a) because there was no injury in the state as required by the statute.

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who solicits a lawyer in New York and repeatedly consults that lawyer there about the matter underlying a claim for payment.

Kaczorowski v. Black & Adams · filed 2002-04-18(a)(1)

In view of the evidence demonstrating that plaintiff was solicited by defendant in New York for the purpose of rendering legal services; that, subsequent to his retention by defendant, plaintiff was repeatedly consulted in New York by defendant respecting the matter in which he was retained; and that the present action was brought to obtain payment for services rendered by plaintiff in the very matter in connection with which plaintiff was solicited and retained by defendant, plaintiff has sufficiently established that defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of New York courts in this action pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 466-467; Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston & Rosen v Shreve City Apts., 147 AD2d 327; Murray, Hollander, Sullivan & Bass v HEM Research, 111 AD2d 63, 65-66).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for claims arising from a purposeful New York business transaction.

Houbigant, Inc. v. Development Specialists, Inc. · filed 2002-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiffs assert, and this Court agrees, that these allegations are sufficient to make out a prima facie ease for personal jurisdiction over Miller pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) with respect to claims arising from that transaction.

CPLR 302 requires purposeful New York activity with a substantial nexus between the business transacted and the claim asserted.

Richbell Information Services, Inc. v. Jupiter Partners, L.P. · filed 2003-09-23

Jurisdiction over AGIT was predicated solely on CPLR 302 “transaction” of business or long arm jurisdiction for commission of a tort in this state, not for “doing business” under CPLR 301. However, there was no purposeful activity alleged as to AGIT establishing a substantial nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action (see Liberatore v Calvino, 293 AD2d 217, 220 [2002]).

Section 302(a)(1) allows jurisdiction based on one purposeful transaction in New York that has a substantial relationship to the claim.

Bunkoff General Contractors, Inc. v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance · filed 2002-07-11(a)(1)

CPLR 302 (a) (1) is a “single act statute” and, as such, one transaction will suffice to confer jurisdiction over the defendant if such defendant’s activities in this state were purposeful and there exists a substantial relationship between the transaction at issue and the claim asserted (see, Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467).

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat a few links to retail sites or competitors on an otherwise informational website as sufficient to establish a transaction of business in New York.

Rescuecom Corp. v. Hyams · filed 2006-07-05(a)(1)

Moreover, as discussed above, the fact that the website contained a few links to retail sites and/or possible competitors of plaintiff is insufficient in these circumstances to support a finding that the website was sufficiently commercial in nature to support section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction.

Ministerial communications with New York mortgagors do not establish transaction-of-business jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) when they are not purposeful activity substantially related to the claim.

Farkas v. Farkas · filed 2007-01-30(a)(1)

However, under the totality of the circumstances, we disagree that these communications, which were ministerial in nature as to the New York mortgagors, constituted purposeful activity in New York, substantially related to this action, such that they were sufficient to support long-arm jurisdiction (see e.g. Kimco Exch. Place Corp. v Thomas Benz, Inc., supra).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over a claim that does not arise from the defendant’s New York-related acts.

Ned B. Einstein & Associates, Inc. v. Gillen · filed 2007-09-10(a)(1)

Based on the parties’ submissions in the instant matter and the legal principles set forth in the above cases, it is clear that plaintiffs claim is not embraced by CPLR 302 (a) (1) or CCA 404. The court finds that plaintiffs claim does not arise from any New York City-related act of defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a foreign litigant’s demand letter, service of papers, and mailings concerning the foreign suit because those acts do not purposefully invoke New York law.

Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz · filed 2007-12-20(a)(1)

Confronted, as we are, with a demand letter sent by English solicitors requesting—among other things—“[a]n undertaking to the High Court in England” not to repeat plaintiffs alleged defamatory statements as well as defendant’s service of documents and other mailings related to the English action, we, too, conclude that the defendant has not purposefully availed himself of the laws of New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over out-of-state clients who establish a continuing relationship with a New York attorney through their retention and repeated communications concerning the representation.

Fischbarg v. Doucet · filed 2007-12-20(a)(1)

Because we conclude that defendants’ retention and subsequent communications with plaintiff in New York established a continuing attorney-client relationship in this state and thereby constitute the transaction of business under CPLR 302 (a) (1), we hold that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper.

Section 302 does not confer jurisdiction based on a generally accessible sales website and purchases the plaintiff made to create New York contacts; under subsection (a)(2), an allegedly infringing website maintained outside New York does not constitute a tortious act within the state.

ISI Brands, Inc. v. KCC International, Inc. · filed 2006-10-19

The Plaintiff admits that the Defendant’s only direct contact with New York was a result of the Plaintiffs own initiation of contact. As stated above, the Plaintiff ordered goods during the pendency of this matter in an attempt to manufacture contact with New York. Therefore, the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant as a result of the Defendant’s web site or the Plaintiffs own purchase of products from the web site. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that it may not exercise jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to the transacting of business prong of section 302(a)(1). ... While KCC’s website can be accessed anywhere in the world, the Plaintiff does not dispute that KCC’s web server is located in the state of Florida. Therefore, any tort arising from KCC’s use of the Plaintiffs mark on its website is committed in the state of Florida, not New York. ... Accordingly, the Court may not assert personal jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Section 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s Internet sales to New York customers are purposeful contacts substantially related to the claim.

Pearson Education, Inc. v. Shi · filed 2007-12-11(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants consummated multiple sales of their copyrighted books with New York customers through the Internet constitute an adequate showing of Defendants’ purposeful contacts with New York. In addition, there is a substantial relationship between the transactions occurring within the state and the cause of action sued upon because the alleged copyrighted books were sold over Defendants’ web sites to purchasers in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activities in New York; minimal contacts alone are insufficient for long-arm jurisdiction.

Alberta & Orient Glycol Co. v. Factory Mutual Insurance · filed 2008-03-04(a)(1)

The record evidence also demonstrates that said companies’ minimal contacts with New York are not sufficient to constitute the purposeful business activities required to subject them to this State’s long-arm jurisdiction (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; Professional Personnel Mgt. Corp. v Southwest Med. Assoc., 216 AD2d 958 [1995]).

Section 302(a)(1) treats a respondent’s court-mandated activities in New York as transacting business in the state.

C.V. v. T.B. · filed 2008-03-04(a)(1)

To be sure, the conduct referred to in the August 2007 order clearly satisfies CPLR 302 (a) (1) in that the respondent is mandated to transact business within New York State.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when it transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that activity.

Duravest, Inc. v. VISCARDI, AG · filed 2008-10-07(a)(1)

Under CPLR section 302(a)(1), New York’s long-arm jurisdiction statute, a court may assert specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if the defendant “transacts ... business” within the state and the claim against the defendant “aris[es] from” activity within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction merely because allegedly defamatory statements made outside New York are accessible on a website in New York.

Gary Null & Associates, Inc. v. Phillips · filed 2010-06-28(a)(1)

As noted above, the making of allegedly defamatory statements outside New York about a New York resident does not, without more, provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1), even if those statements are posted on a Web site originating from New York and accessible to New York readers.

Section 302(a)(1) considers New York efforts to further a joint venture and promote participation in its cruises, even without solicitation of individual customers.

Stardust Dance Productions, Ltd. v. Cruise Groups International, Inc. · filed 2009-06-04(a)(1)

The question of whether defendants’ activities in New York are sufficient to confer jurisdiction in this state turns on whether such activities consisted of efforts in furtherance of the joint venture and promotion of participation in the cruises and is not limited to whether defendants actually solicited individual customers (see generally Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d at 467; Corporate Campaign, v Local 7837, United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 265 AD2d at 274-275).

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit personal jurisdiction based solely on a website that may reach New Yorkers when there is no showing of purposeful New York solicitation, targeting, or ticket sales.

O'Keefe v. Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. · filed 2009-07-06(a)(1)

Here, the Plaintiff does not allege that the Defendant purposefully solicits New York customers or that its website is in any way targeted towards New York. Indeed, the Plaintiff offers no evidence of in-forum ticket sales. Under the circumstances, the bare allegation that the Defendant operates a website that may reach New Yorkers is insufficient to trigger the application of 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York; an accessible website and a short sale of shares listed on a New York exchange do not establish jurisdiction without such activity.

Deer Consumer Products, Inc. v. Little · filed 2012-01-27(a)(1)

Accordingly, the court holds that, in the absence of any evidence that Little “purposefully avail [ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State” (McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 NY2d at 382, quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357 US at 253), neither Little’s Web site nor his short sale of Deer shares constitute “transacting business” in New York as to render Little amenable to jurisdiction within CPLR 302 (a) (1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires more than a contract with a New York corporation to establish that a non-domiciliary transacted business in New York.

Aquiline Capital Partners LLC v. Finarch LLC · filed 2012-05-17(a)(1)

Since the “mere existence of a contract with a New York corporation is not sufficient to constitute the transaction of business under section [302(a)(1) ] of the CPLR,” the three letter agreements must be considered along with other factors in order to determine whether Financial Architects transacted business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises directly from that activity.

In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litigation · filed 2012-03-06(a)(1)

Under section 302(a)(1) a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, provided that two conditions are met: the non-domiciliary defendant transacts business within New York and the claim against the non-domiciliary defendant arises directly out of this activity.

Allegations that defendants deposited funds into a New York bank account and transferred money from it to a non-domiciliary are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over that non-domiciliary under CPLR 302(a)(1).

DirecTV Latin America, LLC v. Pratola · filed 2012-04-24(a)(1)

Plaintiffs’ sole allegation in support of their position is that defendants deposited funds into a New York bank account owned by Clemente, from which they tunneled money to Pratola and Zunda. This is insufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over Zunda pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), which authorizes exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within the state” (see Framer S.C.A. v Abaplus Intl. Corp., 76 AD3d 89, 95 [2010]).

Unspecified calls and emails to a plaintiff in New York are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Gordon ex rel. SkyLink Aviation (Wyoming), Inc. v. Credno · filed 2013-01-29(a)(1)

Nor were unspecified calls and emails to plaintiff in New York a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Warck-Meister v Diana Lowenstein Fine Arts, 7 AD3d 351 [1st Dept 2004]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction based on one purposeful New York transaction when the claim has a substantial relationship to that transaction.

Explorers Club, Inc. v. Diageo plc · filed 2014-08-04(a)(1)

It is a “single act statute” and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to involve jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 466 [1988]). Both elements are undoubtably present here.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat a defendant’s indirect use of New York banks as transacting business in New York.

Bluewaters Communications Holdings, LLC v. Ecclestone · filed 2014-11-06(a)(1)

However, Ecclestone’s and Bambino’s indirect use of the New York banking system does not constitute the transaction of business in New York pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Pramer, 76 AD3d at 96-97; see also Magwitch, L.L.C. v Pusser’s Inc., 84 AD3d 529 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 803 [2012]).

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not provide long-arm jurisdiction based on an agreement negotiated and executed abroad when no performance or breach in New York is alleged.

Magdalena v. Lins · filed 2014-12-16(a)(1)

Nor is there any basis for long-arm jurisdiction (CPLR 302 [a] [1]). The record shows that the parties negotiated and executed the fee sharing agreement while they were out of the country, and it is not alleged that the agreement was performed or breached in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s purposeful New York activities have a substantial relationship to the claim.

Unitrade Corp. v. International Data Systems, Inc. · filed 2014-02-26(a)(1)

“Personal jurisdiction can be conferred under CPLR 302 (a) (1) ‘even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted’ ” ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not attribute a plaintiff’s New York activities to a defendant when deciding whether the defendant transacted business in New York.

Kennedy v. Yousaf · filed 2015-04-14(a)(1)

Plaintiffs’ own New York activities relating to their management agreement with defendants cannot be attributed to defendants (see Royalty Network, Inc. v Harris, 95 AD3d 775 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 302(a)(1) treats negotiating the terms of a note guaranty in New York as transacting business.

Kleinfeld v. Rand · filed 2016-10-13(a)(1)

Negotiating the terms of a note constitutes the transaction of business (see San Ysidro Corp. v Robinow, 1 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2003]; CPLR 302 [a] [1]), and by analogy, so does negotiating the terms of a guaranty of a note.

Section 302(a)(1) requires facts showing that a nondomiciliary purposefully transacted business in New York to establish personal jurisdiction.

Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v. Gasarch · filed 2017-01-26(a)(1)

Here, plaintiffs failed to carry their burden in pleading purposeful activities in New York by defendant John Wampler, allegedly a resident of Switzerland and Texas, sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) requires sufficient facts showing a nondomiciliary’s purposeful business activity in New York to establish personal jurisdiction.

Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v. Gasarch · filed 2017-04-13(a)(1)

Here, plaintiffs failed to carry their burden in pleading purposeful activities in New York by defendant John Wampler, allegedly a resident of Switzerland and Texas, sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1).

CPLR 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in New York through an employee who regularly meets tour participants there for orientation.

Lerner v. Friends of Mayanot Institute, Inc. · filed 2017-05-16(a)(1)

The record evidence supports the exercise of jurisdiction over Tannenbaum pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), under the theory that Tannenbaum transacted business in New York, through its employee, who regularly met with tour participants at JFK Airport for an orientation (see Front, Inc. v Khalil, 103 AD3d 481, 482 [1st Dept 2013], affd 24 NY3d 713 [2015]; New Media Holding Co. LLC v Kagalovsky, 97 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state escrow agent who accepts funds under an agreement with a New York escrowee and thereby transacts business in New York, even while working elsewhere.

First Manhattan Energy Corp. v. Meyer · filed 2017-05-16(a)(1)

Plaintiff made a sufficient showing of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) to withstand dismissal (see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988] [“proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction”]). ... In so doing, pursuant to his agreement with the New York escrowee, defendant “affected local commerce” in New York by “changing] [plaintiff’s] economic position,” and in receiving the funds into his California account via wire transfer, he transacted business here by availing himself of modern technology to participate in and confer upon himself the benefit of the transaction while living and physically working elsewhere (see Opticare Acquisition Corp. v Castillo, 25 AD3d 238, 245 [2d Dept 2005]).

Telephone and email contacts with a person in New York are not necessarily insufficient to support personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

IRX Therapeutics, Inc. v. Landry · filed 2017-05-09(a)(1)

Defendant, a Texas resident, did not establish that his telephone and email contacts with plaintiff’s chief executive officer in New York were, as a matter of law, insufficient to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (see Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375 [2007]; C. Mahendra [NY], LLC v National Gold & Diamond Ctr., Inc., 125 AD3d 454, 457 [1st Dept 2015]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose New York business transactions have a substantial relationship to the plaintiff’s claim.

D&R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro · filed 2017-06-08(a)(1)

Because we conclude that plaintiff's claim arises from defendant's transaction of business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (1), the Appellate Division order granting summary judgment to defendant for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction should be reversed.

Section 302(a)(1) requires the defendant’s own purposeful business activity in New York; separate New York hotels using the same licensed or franchised name do not establish it.

Leuthner v. Homewood Suites Ex Rel. Hilton · filed 2017-06-28(a)(1)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, even if there were other, separate hotels operating in New York under the licensed or franchised name Homewood Suites by Hilton, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in New York.