N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(2) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act in New York in person or through an agent.

Neuman v. Garcia · filed 2022-09-23(a)(2)

Neuman relies on New York’s long-arm statute for personal jurisdiction over Mol and Heggelman. The statute, insofar as relied on here, provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary. . . who in person or through an agent: 2. commits a tortious act within the state. . . .” N.Y. CPLR §302(a)(2). “New York courts and the Second Circuit have ‘consistently interpreted § 302(a)(2) jurisdiction narrowly.’” Krisko v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 288, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Carlson v. Cuevas, 932 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). “[A] defendant’s tortious act must have occurred while the defendant was physically present in New York.”

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claim arises from an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York and the defendant has the required additional connections.

Logistic Dynamics, LLC v. Rood Logistics LLC · filed 2022-12-21(a)(3)

A plaintiff relying on CPLR 302(a)(3) must show that (1) the defendant committed a tortious act outside New York; (2) the cause of action arises from that act; and (3) the act caused injury to a person or property within New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on a tortious act committed in New York.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP v. Koukis · filed 2023-04-11(a)(2)

We find, however, that there are insufficient allegations in the complaint that Koukis participated in the allegedly fraudulent conveyance to hinder legitimate creditors such as plaintiff, which warranted the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2).

CPLR 302(a)(2) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who commits a tortious act within New York when the cause of action arises from that act.

WCVAWCK-Doe v. Boys & Girls Club of Greenwich, Inc. · filed 2023-04-19(a)(2)

Applying these principles to the instant matter, we find that since the plaintiff has demonstrated, prima facie, that the Club, a nondomiciliary defendant, allegedly committed a tortious act in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(2), that is, in and of itself, sufficient to establish minimum contacts such that the Club "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in New York (Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d at 331; see Nick v Schneider, 150 AD3d at 1253-1254; Weitz v Weitz, 85 AD3d at 1154; Ed Moore Adv. Agency v I.H.R., Inc., 114 AD2d at 486; see also Factors Etc., Inc. v Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F Supp at 291; Honda Assoc., Inc. v Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F Supp at 889).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors when their failure to perform duties required in New York constitutes a tortious act there.

Platt Corp. v. Platt · filed 1964-03-04(a)(2)

The plaintiff’s claim, upheld in the Referee’s report, is that these defendants are subject to the personal jurisdiction of our courts under 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, since they committed a tortious act within the State. The issues are treated so exhaustively in the careful and illuminating report of the Referee that nothing need be added here. The court is in agreement with the Referee’s conclusion and adopts and confirms the report in all respects. Accordingly, the motions to vacate the service of the summons which were held in abeyance pending the coming in of the Referee’s report are respectively denied, and the defendants may answer the complaint within 20 days after service of a copy of this order with notice of entry.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when its agents allegedly make fraudulent misrepresentations in New York, with personal service outside the state.

Hoard v. U. S. Paint, Lacquer & Chemical Co. · filed 1964-07-31(a)(2)

Hence, the complaint does allege a “ tortious act within the state ” within CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) and as such permits the obtaining- of personal jurisdiction on the defendant nondomiciliary corporation by personal service on the defendant outside of the State of New York.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the alleged tort occurred outside New York.

Bryant v. Finnish National Airline · filed 1964-10-22(a)(2)

The accident complained of did not occur here. This would exclude any application of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction when the claim did not result from a tortious act committed in New York.

Kramer v. Vogl · filed 1965-02-15

...; and the said clause of action did not result from a tortious act committed in this State within the meaning of OPLR 302 (cf. ...).

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a component manufacturer merely because an allegedly defective component causes injury in New York.

Newman v. Charles S. Nathan, Inc. · filed 1965-11-01(a)(2)

Thayer Coggin served a third-party complaint on appellant, a Kentucky corporation, in Kentucky, alleging that appellant manufactured and sold to it swivel boxes for use on chairs manufactured by it and that, if plaintiff was injured, it was because of appellant’s negligence in the manufacture of the swivel box used on the chair. Special Term held, in substance, that the third-party complaint sufficiently alleged a tortious act in this State so as to make appellant amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the New York courts under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) (46 Misc 2d 407). Order reversed, without costs, and motion to dismiss the third-party complaint granted, without costs.

Section 302(a)(2) requires specific allegations of tortious acts committed in New York when personal jurisdiction is challenged.

Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co. · filed 1965-12-07(a)(2)

Plaintiff’s affidavits shall state with specificity what tortious acts, if any, were committed in the State of New York; when they were committed; and who committed them.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the alleged tortious act occurred outside New York, even if the resulting injury occurred in New York.

Harvey v. Grunenthal · filed 1965-12-15(a)(2)

Though it was quite foreseeable that the consequence of the negligent manufacture in Illinois might cause injury elsewhere than in Illinois, the New York court placed the locus of the tortious act in Illinois, the place of the defective manufacture. This construction of New York's "long arm" statute is binding upon us and therefore we hold that CPLR § 302(a) (2) does not support the appellant's allegation that we have jurisdiction in personam over the appellee.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a driver for an out-of-state accident merely because the driver became intoxicated and drove in New York beforehand.

Chaitman v. Jaycox · filed 1966-01-05(a)(2)

The said defendant’s act in New York (becoming intoxicated and driving in such condition there), while it may have some causal nexus with the accident is not the act, within the expressed purpose of the draftsmen of CPLR 302 (subd. [a]), which gives rise to a cause of action.”

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the complaint alleges that the defendant committed a tortious act in New York.

Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n v. Moss · filed 1966-03-31(a)(2)

It is not necessary to determine whether the defendants transacted business within this State (CPLR 302, subd. [a], par. 1), for it is clear that the complaint alleges the commission of a tortious act within this State by them.

Section 302(a) permits jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when a claim arises from its transaction of business in New York or from a tortious act it committed there; waste of corporate assets is a tortious act.

Vernon v. Rock-Ledge House, Inc. · filed 1966-01-12(a)(1), (a)(2)

An action for waste of corporate assets is for injury to property sounding in tort and any act of such a nature is a tortious act. Since it was committed within the State, service was properly effected under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2). Moreover, since this was part of the “ transaction ” of business by Rutgers Construction Co. within the State, as clearly indicated in the Special Referee’s report, and plaintiff’s cause of action arises therefrom, service can also be sustained under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1).

Section 302(a)(1) does not reach an out-of-state seller whose only New York connection is selling goods to a local distributor, and § 302(a)(2) requires the defendant’s tortious act to occur within New York.

Kramer v. Vogl · filed 1966-02-17(a)(1), (a)(2)

The plain meaning of the Feathers and Singer decisions (supra) is that jurisdiction under 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) requires that a defendant’s act of omission occur within the State. Here, in common sense and reality, everything defendants Yogi did was done in Europe. ... Despite the comparative liberality with which we have construed the first paragraph of subdivision (a) of 302 we do not think that the facts displayed here show the case within that paragraph. The cause of action here sued upon cannot be said to have arisen out of any transaction of business in the State.

Section 302 permits jurisdiction when the preliminary evidence gives reasonable grounds to believe tortious acts were committed in New York in furtherance of the alleged fraud.

Swiss Bank Corp. v. Eatessami · filed 1966-10-25(a)(2)

The single question is whether there is sufficient proof of tortious acts committed within the State of New York in furtherance of the swindle so as to confer jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 and warrant denial of the motion to vacate the attachment. ... Sufficient is shown preliminarily to establish reasonable grounds for believing plaintiff on a trial can establish the fraud claimed and that torts were committed in this State in furtherance thereof (see 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Prac., par. 302.09).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act in New York; allegations arising from a product’s manufacture in Pennsylvania do not satisfy that requirement.

Goldstein v. COMPUDYNE CORPORATION · filed 1966-11-01(a)(2)

Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence and breach of warranty arising out of the manufacture of defendant’s Engine Test Trailer and Stand (hereinafter Engine) in Pennsylvania are not allegations of tortious acts committed in New York within the meaning of CPLR § 302(a) (2).

Section 302(a)(2) does not support service based on alleged fraud when the plaintiff seeks to enforce an agreement rather than obtain relief for the fraud.

Raschitore v. Fountain · filed 1966-12-27(a)(2)

It is thus apparent that the relief sought is based not on the alleged fraud but on the agreement, and service may not be predicated on CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2).

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer jurisdiction when a veterinarian prepares an allegedly false certificate outside New York and the horse’s owner, rather than the veterinarian’s agent, delivers it in New York.

Gluck v. Fasig Tipton Co. · filed 1970-02-02(a)(2)

The examination of the horse and the certificate were both made in Kentucky for the prior owner. It was he who delivered it to the auctioneer at Saratoga. By no means can he be deemed the agent of the veterinarian for the purpose of delivering the allegedly false certificate in this State. ... Personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) must similarly be denied.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a tortious act committed in New York.

Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti · filed 1970-06-16(a)(2)

The alleged wrong being a tortious act committed here in the State of New York, the New York long-arm statute (CPLR § 302(a) (2)) may be availed of to secure personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a claim to arise from a tortious act committed in New York; it does not confer jurisdiction over trade-secret misappropriation that occurred elsewhere.

RFD Group Limited v. Rubber Fabricators, Inc. · filed 1971-01-14(a)(2)

Section 302(a)2 requires that the cause of action “arise from” the torts committed in New York. The unlawful misappropriation of trade secrets occurred, if at all, in West Virginia, where defendant’s manufacturing plants are located; it certainly did not occur in New York. Consequently § 302(a)2 does not confer jurisdiction of the misappropriation itself.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when the negotiation of a license in New York is itself the alleged tortious act that injured the plaintiff.

ECC CORPORATION v. Slater Electric, Inc. · filed 1971-07-14(a)(2)

Viewing the negotiation of the Slater-Lucerne license in New York as, in addition, an act integral to the alleged violation of the anti-trust law, and, bearing in mind that no conspiracy is charged but, rather, the acquisition of the license right is itself treated as the tortious act which damaged plaintiff, it similarly follows that the case can be commenced here as against Lucerne under CPLR 302(a) (2).

Section 302(a)(2) requires the defendant’s alleged tortious acts or omissions to occur in New York; completion of the tort there alone does not confer jurisdiction.

Gildenhorn v. Lum's Inc. · filed 1971-12-15(a)(2)

That the alleged tort here may have been completed or “came to rest” in New York will not confer jurisdiction unless the acts or omissions complained of also occurred in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant alleged to have committed a tortious act within New York State.

Johnson v. City of Newburgh · filed 1974-10-15(a)(2)

Viewing the allegations of the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must, it is clear that a cause of action has been set forth against defendant the City of Philadelphia for the commission by it of a tortious act within New York State. Thus, under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2), this State has personal jurisdiction of that defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in New York through purposeful contract negotiations there, even if the contract is executed elsewhere.

Moser v. Boatman · filed 1975-04-17(a)(1)

Therefore, it is apparent that personal jurisdiction may properly be exercised over Bill and Ellen Boatman because they have transacted business within New York and their motion must accordingly be denied.

Section 302(a)(2) does not treat an out-of-state tortious act as one committed in New York merely because the injury occurs there.

Young v. Mallet · filed 1975-07-08(a)(2)

The Special Referee erred in concluding that though Davis’ acts were limited to the authorship of the book in the State of California, the tort is to be deemed to have been committed in New York if the injury occurs here.

Section 302(a)(2) requires the defendant’s tortious act to occur in New York; a letter sent from New Jersey to a New York bank does not satisfy that requirement.

Glucoft v. Northside Savings Bank · filed 1976-04-23(a)(2)

As indicated, the service upon Herman is sought to be sustained on the theory that the sending of the letter by Herman’s attorneys from New Jersey to the bank in New York constituted a tortious act committed in this State within the contemplation of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 2). I conclude that such "act” was not committed within the State of New York and that the provision of the long-arm statute may not be relied upon to confer jurisdiction over the New Jersey resident, Herman.

Mailing an allegedly false representation to a plaintiff in New York does not, on these facts, establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2).

Bauer Industries, Inc. v. Shannon Luminous Materials Co. · filed 1976-05-17(a)(2)

In light of the decisions in Feathers v McLucas (15 NY2d 443) and Kramer v Vogl (17 NY2d 27), personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 2) must be denied on the present facts.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s trademark infringement occurs in New York, even if the defendant was not physically present there.

Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer Planning, Inc. · filed 1976-09-27(a)(2)

As we read the opinion it requires only that the tortious act occur in the state, 15 N.Y.2d at 459-60, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-24, 209 N.E.2d 68, 76-80. ... A requirement of physical presence would introduce a totally artificial and unrealistic barrier to jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires tortious conduct outside New York; a speculative, anticipated tort does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel · filed 1978-04-07(a)(3)

The alleged tortious act here, malicious interference with contract rights, is both speculative and anticipatory. The only act performed by defendant De Dietrich thus far is to employ Wetzel. The agreement executed by Wetzel with the plaintiff in 1961 does not prohibit his employment by a competitor, but merely the divulging of trade secrets. There is nothing to prevent him from employment with defendant corporation and that is the only act which has taken place. Therefore the first requirement of the statute has not been fulfilled, namely, there has been no tortious conduct.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on lost commercial profits felt in New York solely because the plaintiff is domiciled or does business there.

Glacier Refrigeration Service, Inc. v. American Transportation, Inc. · filed 1979-04-03(a)(3)

Assuming for present purposes that defendants have satisfied the additional statutory requirements of subsections (a)(3)(i) or (ii), and that the tortious conduct, if any, occurred outside New York, the paragraph is nonetheless “not satisfied by remote or consequential injuries such as lost commercial profits which occur in New York only because the plaintiff is domiciled or doing business here.” ... Section 302(a)(3) is therefore inapplicable.

Section 302(a)(2) supports personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who come to New York to collect checks alleged to be fraudulent conveyances or preferences.

Sarf v. Arnovitz · filed 1982-03-17(a)(2)

Jurisdiction over Ufberg and Fragin is clearly available under CPLR § 302(a)(2), since they came into New York to pick up certified checks which allegedly are part of the claimed fraudulent conveyances and preferences.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act within New York committed by the defendant; foreseeable transport of a local advertisement into the state does not suffice.

Hertz System, Inc. v. Hervis Corp. · filed 1982-10-21(a)(2)

However, to sustain jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(2) it is necessary not only that a tortious act be committed within the forum, but also that the alleged tortious act be committed by the defendant.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury within New York; a New York plaintiff’s lost profits alone do not establish that injury when the alleged tort occurred elsewhere.

Trafalgar Capital Corp. v. Oil Producers Equipment Corp. · filed 1983-01-19(a)(3)(ii)

Other than the alleged loss of profits, there simply is no locus or contact within the state upon which a claim of injury within the state can be predicated. The Court concludes that Tennessee Capital is not subject to jurisdiction within the State of New York under CPLR 302(a)(3), and its motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction only when the defendant performed the injury-causing tortious act in New York.

Bulk Oil (USA) Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co. · filed 1983-08-11(a)(2)

While there is authority to the contrary, ... we believe the weight of authority establishes that jurisdiction under section 302(a)(2) is only proper when the defendant performed the act that caused the injury in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort to cause injury within New York for personal jurisdiction to apply.

Bramwell v. Tucker · filed 1985-01-22(a)(3)

There has been no showing that the alleged tortious act committed without the State caused “injury to person or property within the state” (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 3).

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction when both the alleged tort and the resulting injury occurred outside New York.

Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound School, Inc. · filed 1985-02-21(a)(3)

The facts of the case preclude resort to the “long-arm statute” embodied in CPLR § 302 to obtain jurisdiction over “COBS”, a Colorado corporation. ... Similar facts are presented by the case at bar in which both the alleged tortious conduct and the death of Sonya Ross occurred in Colorado.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary on a tortious-interference claim when its New York contacts, including visits to displace an existing agent, satisfy the statute’s requirements.

Roundball Enterprises, Inc. v. Richardson · filed 1985-09-11(a)(2)

While PSM calls these contacts with New York “minimal,” I find that they are clearly sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) supports long-arm jurisdiction at the dismissal stage when alleged collusive asset transfers tend to show the defendant participated in tortious conduct in New York.

Ed Moore Advertising Agency, Inc. v. I.H.R., Inc. · filed 1985-10-28(a)(2)

Given the defendant’s failure to make such a disclosure and in view of the circumstances surrounding the asset transfers which suggest collusion among the three corporations in an effort to place Mirage’s assets beyond plaintiff’s reach, the defendant’s motion to dismiss should have been denied since the facts as alleged tend to prove the latter’s participation in tortious conduct within New York (see, CPLR 302 [a] [2]; Nielson v Sal Martorano, Inc., supra, at p 626; see also, Ghazoul v International Mgt. Servs., 398 F Supp 307).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; a plaintiff’s New York domicile or business presence alone does not establish one.

Tri-State Judicial Services, Inc. v. Markowitz · filed 1985-12-20(a)(3)

Plaintiff must overcome the threshold requirement that there was an injury within New York. An injury does not occur in New York merely because a plaintiff is domiciled here or does business here.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on a plaintiff’s receipt of statements by mail when no fraudulent conduct by the defendant in New York is alleged.

Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand · filed 1986-07-01(a)(2)

However, plaintiffs Commodore Business Machines, Inc. and LJN Toys, Ltd. alleged only that each had received Northern’s statements through the mail, and neither alleged any fraudulent conduct on the part of Schnitzer in New York. Therefore, we modify solely to dismiss the actions of these two plaintiffs without leave to replead for lack of personal jurisdiction (CPLR 302 [a] [2]) and failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over an individual whose alleged fraud was committed in New York.

Wallach Marine Corp. v. Donzi Marine Corp. · filed 1987-12-18(a)(2)

As to Collins, however, his allegedly tortious act in New York, the commission of fraud, under CPC International Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, 70 N.Y.2d 268, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 514 N.E.2d 116, Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) 1193, 419 (1987) constitutes a jurisdictional basis under CPLR 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for tortious acts committed in New York, with service of process outside the State.

CPC International Inc. v. McKesson · filed 1987-09-15(a)(2)

Because the lawsuit against defendants is based on the tortious acts they allegedly committed within the State, personal jurisdiction was acquired over them under CPLR 302 (a) (2) by service of process outside the State (see, Kramer v Vogl, 17 NY2d 27, 31; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac If 302.13, at 3-142.7 — 3-142.8).

Section 302(a)(2) requires the defendant to be physically present in New York when committing the tortious act.

Roth v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. · filed 1989-04-05(a)(2)

Section 302(a)(2) requires that the tort be committed in New York and defendant must actually be in New York when the tort is committed.

Section 302(a)(3) can provide personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant for tort claims arising from cease-and-desist letters.

Thompson Medical Co. v. National Center of Nutrition, Inc. · filed 1989-08-31(a)(3)

In addition, I agree with Thompson that in respect of its tort claims, jurisdiction over NCN is properly founded under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) did not provide personal jurisdiction over a Washington law firm where the critical events occurred in Washington and the firm was absent from New York at the time of the alleged tort.

National Union Fire Insurance v. Davis · filed 1990-01-23(a)(2), (a)(3)

Plaintiff contends that defendant was subject to jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2), (3); 301. However, the critical events associated with the action took place in Washington (Weiss v Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, 85 AD2d 861); defendant was not physically present in New York when the alleged tort was admitted (Feathers v McLucas, 15 NY2d 443), and defendant is not authorized to do business in this State.

Section 302(a)(3) does not provide jurisdiction when an injury occurs outside New York, even if the plaintiff later suffers damages in New York.

Twine v. Levy · filed 1990-10-09(a)(3)

Thus, while plaintiff may have suffered damages in New York, his injury did not occur in New York. Therefore, CPLR § 302(a)(3) does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over defendants.

Under section 302(a)(3)(ii), the expense of defending a New York action is too remote a consequence of alleged out-of-state misrepresentations to establish injury in New York.

Mid-Atlantic Residential Investors Ltd. Partnership v. McGuire · filed 1990-10-09(a)(3)(ii)

We conclude that, in these circumstances, there can be no long-arm jurisdiction over third-party defendants Perkins or Perkins & Zures, Inc. Jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) is predicated on the basis of an alleged injury to defendant in New York State arising from the necessity of defending the action here. ... Further, the expenditure of funds in defense of the main action must be regarded as a remote consequence of the Perkins’ alleged misrepresentations (Fantis Foods v Standard Importing Co., 49 NY2d 317, 326-327).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose fraudulent representations in New York give rise to a tort claim, even if the conduct may also support a contract claim.

Spier v. Erber · filed 1991-03-18(a)(2)

The third cross-claim sounds in tort, and could be brought regardless of whether or not Waste Tech could recover for breach of contract. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over Gould pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a nondomiciliary’s failure to prevent a former spouse’s crime when the nondomiciliary had no legal duty to act.

O'Guin v. Estate of Pikul · filed 1991-05-03(a)(2)

An ex-wife has no legal duty to restrain her former spouse from committing illegal acts. ... Based upon the foregoing, even viewing plaintiffs’ allegations in a most favorable light, plaintiffs have failed to establish that defendant Jarvinen committed a "tortious act within the state”.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a tort committed outside New York to cause direct injury within the state for personal jurisdiction to arise.

Keramchemie GmbH v. Keramchemie (Canada) Ltd. · filed 1991-08-09(a)(3)

The plain meaning of § 302(a)(3) mandates that where the defendant commits a tortious act outside of the state, that act must cause injury within the state to create personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Such injury in the state must be direct and not remote or consequential.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement case when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the alleged passing off occurred in New York.

Dave Guardala Mouthpieces, Inc. v. Sugal Mouthpieces, Inc. · filed 1991-12-17(a)(2)

In cases of trademark infringement, to establish jurisdiction under 302(a)(2), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the wrong under trademark law—the “passing off”— occurred within the jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tortious act to cause injury in New York; later pain and suffering in New York does not satisfy that requirement.

Lancaster v. Colonial Motor Freight Line, Inc. · filed 1992-02-25(a)(3)

While subdivision (a) (3) of CPLR 302, which provides jurisdiction under specified circumstances where the nondomiciliary "commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state”, may superficially appear to have some relevance to the case at hand, upon more careful analysis it is clear that it does not apply here, because the out-of-State tortious act did not cause injury in New York within the meaning of the statute. Here the injury actually occurred in South Carolina notwithstanding that plaintiff’s pain and suffering largely took place in New York, her place of domicile.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when a non-domiciliary, acting through an agent in New York, wrongfully refuses there to turn over estate property.

Re v. Truck-A-Tune, Inc. · filed 1993-03-18(a)(2)

The Surrogate correctly determined that such refusal was wrongful and without justification, and, since it took place in the State of New York, sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over respondents (SCPA 201; CPLR 302 [a] [2]; see also, Gasarch v Ormand Indus., 346 F Supp 550; Matter of Cooke, 112 Misc 2d 167).

Section 302(a)(2) requires facts showing that a nondomiciliary exercised control over an alleged in-state agent before jurisdiction can rest on that agent’s tortious act.

Jacobs v. United States · filed 1992-06-25(a)(2)

The absence of the element of control bars a finding of jurisdiction over Gladys on an agency theory.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a nondomiciliary to be physically present in New York when committing the tort; a telephone call into New York from another state does not qualify.

Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America · filed 1995-05-11(a)(2)

As to § 302(a)(2), one telephone call made to New York by an out-of-state defendant does not constitute a “tortious act within the state” because the defendant must be physically present in New York when committing the tort.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when an alleged infringer offers one copy of an infringing work for sale in New York, even without an actual sale.

Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc. · filed 1995-05-18(a)(2)

Offering one copy of an infringing work for sale in New York, even if there is no actual sale, constitutes commission of a tortious act within the state sufficient to imbue this Court with personal jurisdiction over the infringers.

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a single mailing into New York of a shareholder report bearing an allegedly infringing logo when the mailing does not solicit business.

Taurus International Inc. v. Titan Wheel International Inc. · filed 1995-03-10(a)(2)

Titan Wheel’s mailing of its Third Quarter Report was not intended to derive business or profits. Taurus is relying on decisions involving solicitations which are designed to sell goods or services. These mailings are not comparable to the distribution of a quarterly report to shareholders.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident accused of trademark infringement when the allegedly infringing goods are passed off in New York, even if the defendant was never physically present there.

Pilates, Inc. v. Pilates Institute, Inc. · filed 1995-07-10(a)(2)

Thus personal jurisdiction is proper over a non-domiciliary who has never been to New York and who is alleged to have committed the tort of infringement within New York so long as the allegedly infringing goods are passed off in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) requires the alleged infringing product to be offered, displayed, or sold in New York for a copyright infringement or Lanham Act claim to establish jurisdiction based on a tortious act within the state.

Mantello v. Hall · filed 1996-11-15(a)(2)

To satisfy § 302(a)(2), in cases involving copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham Act, the offering, display or sale of the allegedly infringing product must occur in New York. That is to say, the conduct that occurs in New York must be the infringer’s misrepresentation of the source of the product or his unauthorized presentation of the product.

Section 302(a)(2) can confer jurisdiction for an attempted passing off in New York; an actual sale is unnecessary.

Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd. · filed 1996-12-24(a)(2)

Plaintiff correctly argues that for CPLR § 302(a)(2) purposes, a Lanham Act violation sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction need only amount to an attempt to “pass off’ a good as that of the plaintiffs — no actual sale is required.

CPLR 302(a)(2) confers personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who commit tortious acts in New York, including by attending meetings there to plan and carry out a fraudulent scheme.

Bernstein v. Kelso & Co. · filed 1997-07-01(a)(2)

However, the complaint alleges that these defendants attended meetings in New York at which the scheme to defraud plaintiff was planned and carried out, and, therefore, committed tortious acts within this State, conferring jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2).

Section 302(a)(2) does not require a defendant to be physically present in New York when the tortious act occurs there.

Banco Nacional Ultramarino, S. A. v. Chan · filed 1996-03-14(a)(2)

Having found that the tort occurred within New York the court concludes that defendant’s bodily presence is not an indispensable requirement for long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) and (3) do not support long-arm jurisdiction based on an alleged breach of an insurance contract because the breach is not a tortious act.

Terry v. Farmer's Insurance Co. of Arizona · filed 1997-02-07(a)(2), (a)(3)

Further, the alleged breach of the insurance contract by Farmer’s does not constitute a tortious act and will not support the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (2) or (3) (see, Amigo Foods Corp. v Marine Midland Bank, 39 NY2d 391, 396; Pride Labs, v Athea Labs., 54 AD2d 976, 977).

Section 302(a)(2) requires the defendant or an agent to commit a tortious act while physically in New York; injury in New York from acts performed elsewhere does not suffice.

Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. Richard B. King, Individually and Doing Business as the Blue Note · filed 1997-09-10(a)(2)

Applying these principles, we conclude that Bensusan has failed to allege that King or his agents committed a tortious act in New York as required for exercise of personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(2). The acts giving rise to Bensusan’s lawsuit — including the authorization and creation of King’s web site, the use of the words “Blue Note” and the Blue Note logo on the site, and the creation of a hyperlink to Bensusan’s web site — were performed by persons physically present in Missouri and not in New York. Even if Bensusan suffered injury in New York, that does not establish a tortious act in the state of New York within the meaning of § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; financial effects attributable solely to a plaintiff’s New York residence do not suffice.

Kowalski-Schmidt v. CLS Mortgage, Inc. · filed 1997-09-30(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing personal jurisdiction under the section they cite, 302(a)(3). Any effect on Plaintiffs in New York is purely the result of the fortuitous circumstance of the residence of Kowalski-Schmidt and Curtis in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act within New York.

Eavzan v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. · filed 1998-11-19(a)(2)

Eavzan has made a prima facie showing that Quirk and IRG are subject to ... personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2), which provides that jurisdiction may be obtained over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act within New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant whose conduct contributes to or induces copyright infringement in New York.

Blue Ribbon Pet Products, Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp. · filed 1999-09-17(a)(2)

A review of the record demonstrates that Blue Ribbon proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hagen Canada is subject to personal jurisdiction in this action under CPLR § 302(a)(2). ... Hagen Canada’s out-of-state acts contributed to or induced Hagen USA’s infringement (as discussed below) within New York and are sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) requires the tortious act to occur while the nondomiciliary or its agent is in New York.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Transpacific Corp. (In Re Commodore International, Ltd.) · filed 1999-12-15(a)(2)

To qualify for jurisdiction under this subsection, TPC’s act must have occurred while it, or its agent, was in the state.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when allegations accepted as true on a dismissal motion establish that a defendant committed a tortious act within New York.

Corpuel v. Galasso · filed 2000-01-04(a)(2)

In view of defendants’ failure to make such showing, the IAS Court properly accepted the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint as true, and found, for purposes of deciding the motion, that defendants had committed a tortious act within the State, and are thus subject to the jurisdiction of this State’s courts, pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant for tortious conduct committed in New York.

Weimer v. Lake · filed 2000-01-13(a)(2)

In the case at hand, the events giving rise to plaintiffs claims center upon allegedly tortious conduct committed by defendant in New York on March 3, 1994. Such conduct provides a basis for acquiring long-arm jurisdiction over defendant in Arizona (see, CPLR 302 [a] [2]) and service could have been effected upon him there through any of the modes permitted in this State (see, CPLR 313, 308).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction based on a tortious act committed in New York even when the resulting injury occurred outside the state.

Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 2000-03-03(a)(2)

Nothing in this language either expressly or impliedly excludes claims connected to injuries incurred outside the state. The focus of the section is on the locus of the act not that of the resulting injury.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who participate in a fraudulent conveyance committed in New York, even if they are not physically present in the State.

Morgenthau v. A.J. Travis Ltd. · filed 2000-05-12(a)(2)

Under New York’s long-arm statute, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who in person or through an agent commits a tortious act within the State. ... Since New York was therefore intimately involved in the conveyance, the alleged tort may be said to have been committed in this State. ... Moreover, for jurisdiction to be so acquired, it is not necessary that the defendant be physically present in the State. ... As coparticipants in a tortious act committed in New York State, the defendants are properly subject to the State’s long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a tortious act by the defendant even if the alleged injury occurred in New York.

Carell v. Shubert Organization, Inc. · filed 2000-06-27(a)(3)

Even if it could be established that the situs-of-injury for certain of the alleged infringements was New York, jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3) would still not he because plaintiff is unable to point to a tortious act committed by these defendants.

Section 302(a)(2) does not provide personal jurisdiction when the alleged tortious act occurred outside New York.

Keane v. Kamin · filed 1999-12-16(a)(2)

Moreover, the relevant provision of New York’s long-arm statute is inapplicable because the alleged tortious act occurred in Vermont (CPLR 302 [a] [2]).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for a tortious act committed in New York by the nondomiciliary’s agent.

Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L. · filed 2000-09-08(a)(2)

Second, by virtue of the agency relationship between Semeraro and Kindler, Kindler’s actions within New York subject Semeraro to jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary on a fraud claim when the defendant commits the fraudulent conduct while physically present in New York.

Borumand v. Assar · filed 2001-12-19(a)(2)

Nonetheless, based upon the foregoing principles of law which the Court has set forth, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that, on two occasions, at her home in Rochester, New York, defendant Bijan Assar engaged in the fraudulent conduct which is the basis of her fraud claim. Therefore, New York CPLR § 302(a)(2) is satisfied as to the fraud cause of action.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a prima facie showing that an agent committed a tortious act in New York for the defendant’s benefit, with the defendant’s consent and knowledge, and in furtherance of a conspiracy involving the defendant.

de Capriles v. Carmen C.L. · filed 2002-04-25(a)(2)

Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., as the agent of the Venezuelan defendants, committed a tortious act in New York, for the benefit and with the consent and knowledge of defendants, and in furtherance of a conspiracy that included the foreign defendants (cf., In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 120 F Supp 2d 328).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction for a tort committed in New York only when the defendant was physically present in the state.

Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan · filed 2004-12-28(a)(2)

There is, accordingly, no basis for asserting jurisdiction over those defendants pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(2), which only applies to the commission of a tort by a defendant physically present in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) requires a New York nexus for the alleged tort; an offer made from outside the state does not establish jurisdiction without evidence that it reached New York.

Overseas Media, Inc. v. Skvortsov · filed 2006-01-03(a)(2)

Whether viewed in the light of Bensusan or Pilates, the lack of any New York nexus here is fatal to the jurisdictional analysis under Section 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on a defendant’s agent moving property out of New York, if those actions are proved.

AMP Services Ltd. v. Walanpatrias Foundation · filed 2006-11-02(a)(2)

The actions of defendants through their agent in New York to move the subject property from this state, if proved, would be sufficient to subject them to personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2) (see Banco Nacional Ultramarino v Chan, 169 Misc 2d 182, 188 [1996], affd sub nom. Banco Nacional Ultramarino v Moneycenter Trust Co., 240 AD2d 253 [1997]).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction merely because goods pass through a New York freight forwarder on their way to a buyer abroad.

Oy v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. · filed 2007-09-10(a)(1)

This was not a contract to supply goods in New York, but rather a contract to supply goods to Copterline in Finland. New York was merely a pit stop en route to Finland.

Section 302(a)(2) allows personal jurisdiction when allegations establish prima facie that a defendant participated in a fraudulent conveyance of a New York property interest through New York coconspirators.

CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. HSBC Guyerzeller Bank AG · filed 2008-11-13(a)(2)

These allegations establish prima facie that Cavazza and Chinablue committed a tortious act within the state (see CPLR 302 [a] [2]; Banco Nacional Ultramarino v Chan, 169 Misc 2d 182 [1996], affd 240 AD2d 253 [1997]; Neilson v Sal Martorano, Inc., 36 AD2d 625 [1971]; Ed Moore Adv. Agency v I.H.R., Inc., 114 AD2d 484 [1985]).

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on financial harm felt in New York when the events causing the injury occurred elsewhere.

NewMarkets Partners LLC v. Oppenheim · filed 2009-07-28(a)(3)

The events giving rise to the alleged injury — the publication of the private placement memoranda and sales of the German Funds — occurred exclusively in Germany. Accordingly, Section 302(a)(3) cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction, even if Plaintiffs suffered financial harm in New York.

Section 302(a)(2) requires the alleged tortfeasor to be physically present in New York; the presence of transferred money alone does not suffice.

Tamam v. Sal · filed 2010-01-05(a)(2)

However, New York law requires the physical presence in the forum state of the alleged tortfeasor, not the money transferred. As the Amended Complaint sets forth no facts establishing that any of the defendant banks maintain branch offices in New York or that any representative of any of the Lebanese banks ever set foot on U.S. soil, personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) will not lie.

Section 302(a)(2) does not treat telephone calls originating outside New York as tortious acts committed within the state.

Bank v. Green Bullion Financial Services, LLC · filed 2011-03-17(a)(2)

While plaintiff cites a case from another jurisdiction which found that an out-of-state phone call constituted a tortious act for jurisdictional purposes (Brentwood Travel, Inc. v Lancer, Ltd., 2001 TCPA Rep 1018 [Mo Cir Ct 2001]), in New York telephone calls originating outside the state may not constitute tortious acts “commit[ted] within the state” under CPLR 302 (a) (2) (see DirecTV Latin Am., LLC v Park 610, LLC, 691 F Supp 2d 405, 425 [SD NY 2010]; Ahava Food Corp. v Donnelly, 2002 WL 31757449, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 23731 [SD NY 2002]; Heinfling v Colapinto, 946 F Supp 260, 264 [SD NY 1996] [citing cases]).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who commits a tortious act within New York.

Weitz v. Weitz · filed 2011-06-28(a)(2)

Here, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that Ellen committed a tortious act within the state and is therefore subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (2).

Section 302(a)(3) requires the foreign defendant to commit the out-of-state tort personally or through an agent; a minority ownership interest in the manufacturer alone does not establish agency.

Gallelli Ex Rel. Gallelli v. Crown Imports, LLC · filed 2010-03-20(a)(3)

The mere fact that GM SAB is a minority shareholder in aspects of the beer business, including, for the sake of argument, the business of bottle manufacture, is not enough to establish the control necessary to show an agency relationship. In the absence of such a relationship, it cannot be said that GM SAB has, either in person, or through an agent, committed the tortious act necessary to sustain jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(2) does not authorize personal jurisdiction based on tortious conduct that occurred outside New York.

Lyons v. Rienzi & Sons, Inc. · filed 2012-04-11(a)(2)

Nor can personal jurisdiction be premised on either Section 302(a)(2) or 302(a)(3)(ii). The former section is unavailing because any tortious act or failure to act on Nuvolari’s part took place in Italy, where the boat was designed. Conduct occurring outside of New York cannot be the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under that portion of the statute.

CPLR 302(a)(2) requires a sufficiently alleged tortious act in New York to establish personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.

Mosaic Caribe, Ltd. v. AllSettled Group, Inc. · filed 2014-05-01(a)(2)

Jurisdiction does not lie over Krasnerman pursuant to New York’s long-arm statute because the complaint fails to sufficiently allege that he committed any tortious act, including making any fraudulent misrepresentation, in New York (CPLR 302 [a] [2]).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a pleaded tortious act to establish long-arm jurisdiction based on an alleged agent’s conduct in New York.

Alliance Network, LLC v. Sidley Austin LLP · filed 2014-03-20(a)(2)

Since no tortious acts by the Slates defendants have been stated, the court concludes that it cannot exercise long-arm jurisdiction and grants the CPLR 3211 (a) (8) motion.

Section 302(a)(2) requires the defendant to physically commit the tortious act in New York.

Thackurdeen v. Duke Univ. · filed 2015-09-02(a)(2)

In light of controlling Second Circuit precedent, the Court is required to apply the majority rule requiring the defendant to physically commit the tortious act within New York.

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury within New York; the injured party’s New York residence alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Bloomgarden v. Lanza · filed 2016-10-19(a)(3)

Nor did the plaintiffs establish that the defendants caused injury within New York that would subject them to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3).

CPLR 302(a)(2) does not confer jurisdiction merely because information allegedly misappropriated outside New York was stored on a New York server when the alleged tort occurred elsewhere.

Delfasco, LLC v. Powell · filed 2016-04-25(a)(2)

Thus, the court turns to CPLR 302 (a) (2) to determine whether Powell can be deemed to have committed a tortious act within the State by accessing information stored in Delfasco’s New York server using his laptop in Tennessee. ... Under these circumstances, Powell’s alleged misappropriation of information, technically stored on Delfasco’s New York servers, is insufficient to submit him to New York’s jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) treats internet copyright infringement as occurring where the website is created for purposes of the in-state tort requirement.

Jewell v. Music Lifeboat · filed 2017-05-19(a)(2)

When the infringement occurs over the internet, however, Bensusan teaches that personal jurisdiction lies where the website is created.

Section 302(a)(3) does not establish jurisdiction for an injury sustained outside New York merely because the plaintiff later suffers medical consequences in New York.

Zeidan v. Scott's Dev. Co. · filed 2019-06-07(a)(3)

It is undisputed that the alleged injuries were sustained in Pennsylvania, and the fact that plaintiff may have suffered medical consequences in New York after returning home is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (3) ( see McGowan v Smith , 52 NY2d 268, 274-275 [1981]; cf. Halas , 105 AD3d at 1412; see also Paterno v Laser Spine Inst. , 24 NY3d 370, 381 [2014]; Bloomgarden v Lanza , 143 AD3d 850, 852 [2d Dept 2016]).

Section 302(a)(3) does not provide long-arm jurisdiction for an action sounding essentially in breach of contract rather than tort.

Cordero v. Barreiro-Cordero · filed 2018-06-14(a)(3)

Plaintiff failed to carry his burden in pleading activities sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3) ( see generally Fischbarg v Doucet , 9 NY3d 375, 381 n 5 [2007]; Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch , 149 AD3d 485, 486 [1st Dept 2017]), since this action sounds essentially in breach of contract, and not in tort ( see e.g. Warck-Meister v Diana Lowenstein Fine Arts , 7 AD3d 351, 352 [1st Dept 2004]).

Section 302(a)(2) can support personal jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to all claims asserted against it.

Starr Russia Invs. III B v. v. Deloitte Touche Tohumatsu Ltd. · filed 2019-02-07(a)(2)

The court has personal jurisdiction over defendant ZAO Deloitte & Touche CIS under CPLR 302(a)(2) with respect to all the claims.

Section 302(a)(2) requires an alleged tortious act by the defendant in New York; a complaint alleging no such act cannot support jurisdiction.

Margouleff v. Beck · filed 2019-07-23(a)(2)

This argument is meritless. First, in his Complaint, Plaintiff nowhere makes mention of any tortious act committed by Beck.

Subsection (a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes a claim and injury in New York, the defendant should reasonably expect consequences there, and the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Nowelle B. v. Hamilton Med., Inc. · filed 2019-08-22(a)(3)(ii)

Here, HMAG does not explicitly challenge Supreme Court's determination with respect to any of those five elements and, in any event, we conclude that plaintiff made the requisite prima facie showing that HMAG was subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) ( see Halas v Dick's Sporting Goods , 105 AD3d 1411, 1412-1413 [4th Dept 2013]).

Section 302(a)(3) authorizes personal jurisdiction in certain circumstances when a tortious act occurs outside New York.

Cole v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. · filed 2020-12-23(a)(3)

CPLR 302 (a) (3) authorizes personal jurisdiction under certain circumstances in which the tortious act occurs outside New York, and defendant does not dispute plaintiff's assertion that CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) applies here.

Section 302(a)(2) allows New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when an agent commits a tortious act in New York and the claim arises from that act.

Love v. West · filed 2021-02-08(a)(2)

Because the Loves have sufficiently alleged that West was its agent when the tortious activity occurred in New York, the Court concludes that it has specific jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant only when the defendant’s tortious act or omission occurs within New York, requiring physical presence there when the tort is committed.

Global Edge Design Inc. v. Michel · filed 2021-04-20(a)(2)

To qualify for jurisdiction under section 302(a)(2), “a defendant’s act or omission [must have] occur[red] within the State.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 790 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 31 (1966)). This means that the defendant must have been “physically present in New York when he committed the tort.” Madison Capital Markets, LLC v. Starneth Europe B.V., 15 cv 7123, 2016 WL 4484251, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (Sweet, J).

Section 302(a)(2) does not permit personal jurisdiction over a defendant for alleged fraud committed outside New York.

Bartosiewicz v. Nelsen · filed 2021-09-29(a)(2)

Even if Plaintiff’s fraud claim could stand separately from his breach of contract claim, the alleged fraud and resultant damages occurred outside of New York, and therefore CPLR 302(a)(2) does not permit the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on a tortious act committed within New York.

Garcia v. Lewis Tree Service, Inc. · filed 2022-03-10(a)(2)

Accordingly, there is no plausible basis on which to find that CPLR 302(a)(2) allows the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Gaston.

Section 302(a)(2) generally requires a nondomiciliary or its agent to be physically present in New York when committing the alleged tort; fraudulent statements sent from outside the state do not satisfy that requirement.

SOS Capital v. Recycling Paper Partners of PA, LLC · filed 2023-08-31(a)(2)

For the reasons that follow, we find that the language "within the state" in CPLR 302(a)(2), means that a nondomiciliary is only subject to New York's long-arm jurisdiction under subsection (a)(2) when they have committed a tortious act, in person or through an agent, while physically present within the boundaries of this state.

CPLR 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that commits a tortious act within New York through its agent.

Tiny 1, Ltd. v. Samfet Marble Inc. · filed 2022-01-04(a)(2)

The complaint properly pleads jurisdiction over Samfet, a Canadian company, since it pleads that Samfet was directly involved in the conduct at issue over a period of years and committed a tortious act within the state through its agent, Berberi, thus conferring jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an allegedly harmful product manufactured outside New York when the defendant committed no tortious act within the state.

Redell-Witte v. Algoma Hardwoods, Inc. · filed 2023-12-28(a)(2)

The court should have granted the motion to dismiss the complaint as against this defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(2) because there is no evidence that the fire doors that allegedly caused decedent plaintiff's injury by exposing him to asbestos were manufactured in New York.

Section 302 supports personal jurisdiction over defendants who did business in New York for alleged tortious conduct committed there.

Metropolitan Partners Fund IIIA, LP v. GemCap Lending I, LLC · filed 2024-01-30

The registration to do business filed with the State of California (NYSCEF Doc. No. 320, exhibit A) constitutes prima facie evidence that they maintained an office in New York and are thus subject to general jurisdiction under CPLR 301, and otherwise further corroborates the holding that they and the other Defendant affiliates who did business in New York are subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302 as to the tortious conduct allegedly committed in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an injury in New York; an injury that occurs elsewhere does not qualify because its effects are later felt in New York.

DiBenedetto v. Hard Rock Cafe International (USA), Inc. · filed 2024-03-22(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff’s injury did not occur in New York; thus, jurisdiction cannot be premised on § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) require facts connecting the defendant’s tortious act or the resulting injury to New York; a conclusory allegation of involvement is insufficient.

McGrady v. Montgomery County (Maryland) · filed 2024-04-17(a)(2), (a)(3)

But McGrady’s second amended complaint does not include facts establishing either basis. See Docket Item 44. He alleges that “Montgomery County Probation and Parole Officers were directly involved in this matter,” see id. at 1, but that conclusory allegation does not plausibly suggest that the county defendants harmed McGrady while either they or he were “within” New York State.

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York only if the defendant meets one of the provision’s additional business or interstate-commerce requirements.

Trotman v. Priority Auto, Inc. · filed 2024-10-23(a)(3)

Accepting as true for [*2]purposes of these motions the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants committed tortious acts without New York State causing injury to him within the State ( see Serota v Cooper , 216 AD3d 1019, 1022), the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendants regularly did or solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in New York ( see CPLR 302[a][3][i]; Ingraham v Carroll , 90 NY2d 592, 597; cf. Allen v Canadian Gen. Elec. Co. , 65 AD2d 39, 43, affd 50 NY2d 935) or that the defendants expected or should reasonably have expected their alleged tortious conduct to have consequences in New York and that they derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce ( see CPLR 302[a][3][ii]; Ingraham v Carroll , 90 NY2d at 598-599; cf. LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co. , 95 NY2d 210, 215; Allen v Canadian Gen. Elec. Co. , 65 AD2d at 41).

Section 302(a)(2) requires allegations of tortious acts in New York by a defendant or its agent to establish personal jurisdiction.

Fouad v. Milton Hershey Sch. & Sch. Trust · filed 2024-10-31(a)(2)

The original complaint does not contain any allegations of tortious acts in New York by defendants or by agents that could provide personal jurisdiction over defendants under CPLR 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act committed in New York by a defendant physically present there or acting through an agent.

My Goals Solutions, Inc. v. Coiana · filed 2025-03-14(a)(2)

Section 302(a)(2) “reaches only tortious acts performed by a defendant who was physically present in New York when he performed the wrongful act,” or who committed the tortious act within the state “through an agent.”

Section 302(a)(2) requires the defendant to be physically present in New York when committing the tortious act.

Sigma Lithium Corporation v. Gardner · filed 2025-05-01(a)(2)

Sigma does not contend that Valim was physically present in New York at the time of the alleged misappropriation; CPLR § 302(a)(2) is therefore inapplicable.

Section 302(a)(2) allows personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when sufficient facts show that its agents allegedly committed tortious acts in New York.

Canfield Funding, LLC v. Focalpointe Group, LLC · filed 2025-07-25(a)(2)

We conclude that plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to render UHG/Optum defendants subject to the court's jurisdiction based on their agents' allegedly tortious conduct in New York ( see Frisco Mktg. of NY LLC , 93 AD3d at 1353-1354; Tucker , 75 AD3d at 1097).

Section 302(a)(3) requires facts showing that an out-of-state defendant could reasonably foresee consequences in New York.

Robbins v. United Van Lines, LLC · filed 2025-09-25(a)(3)

Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over either Daryl or Suddath in this case under Section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) requires the initial injury to occur in New York; later medical treatment or continuing effects in New York do not establish an in-state injury.

Barrett · filed 2025-12-10(a)(3)

Third, § 302(a)(3) cannot confer jurisdiction. This provision requires an “injury within the state,” which New York courts define as the initial, first-occurring injury, not the location of later medical treatment or residuary effects.

Section 302(a)(2)'s requirement to plead a tortious act within New York is not met by a prelitigation letter sent from a New York law firm to a California company when the defendant has no other New York nexus.

Corvus Capital Ltd. v. Strand Hanson Ltd. · filed 2026-01-29(a)(2)

A prelitigation letter allegedly sent by a law firm in New York on behalf of its overseas client to a company in California, with no other nexus between defendant and New York, does not fulfill CPLR 302(a)(2)'s requirement to plead a tortious act within the state.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a prima facie showing that an out-of-state act caused injury within New York.

Mahdi · filed 2026-03-30(a)(3)

Although Mahdi satisfies the first two elements, he fails to make a prima facie showing of the third element—that the act caused injury to a person or property within the state.

Section 302(a)(2) provides specific jurisdiction for a tortious act committed within New York.

Khan v. Western Express, Inc. · filed 2020-08-12(a)(2)

The accident here occurred in New Jersey, not New York, and plaintiff has made “no serious attempt to show that [his] suit either arises out of, or is related to, [defendants’] contacts” with New York, Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008); cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (providing specific jurisdiction when an individual commits a tortious act within the State).

Section 302(a)(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate employee alleged to have committed an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the employee acted for personal benefit or violated a statute or duty of care.

Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA · filed 1986-03-13(a)(3)

The Court concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over Messrs. Hunger-ford and Murphy. ... The alleged taking and demanding of bribes and concomitant fraud are such tortious wrongs performed for personal benefit and violative of statutory prohibitions, both state and federal. Accordingly, if the acts are proven, Messrs. Hungerford and Murphy are personally liable and not protected from personal jurisdiction by the fiduciary shield.

Section 302(a)(2) allows personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer alleged to have directed tortious acts within New York when the circumstances overcome the fiduciary shield.

Kinstler v. Saturday Evening Post Co. · filed 1981-02-23(a)(2)

In brief, plaintiff alleges that at the direction of defendant SerVaas the corporation committed tortious acts (obtaining the portrait from plaintiff and subsequently distributing reproductions without proper authority) within the state. Should these allegations be established jurisdiction would, in the circumstances of this case, attach under CPLR § 302(a)(2). Accordingly, defendant SerVaas’ motion — like that of defendant Curtis — is denied.

A corporate owner may be subject to personal jurisdiction for acts done on behalf of a shell corporation without proof that the shell was used to commit fraud.

Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller · filed 1981-11-20(a)(2)

If the corporation is merely a shell, it is equitable, even if the shell may not have been used to perpetrate a fraud, to subject its owner personally to the court’s jurisdiction to defend the acts he has done on behalf of his shell.

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not shield a corporate agent from personal jurisdiction merely because the agent acted for a corporation.

Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp. · filed 1988-03-29(a)(1)

Turning then to the interpretation of CPLR 302, we determine that it is neither necessary nor desirable to adopt the fiduciary shield doctrine in New York. Nothing in the statute’s language or the legislative history relating to it suggests that the Legislature intended to accord any special treatment to fiduciaries acting on behalf of a corporation or to insulate them from long-arm jurisdiction for acts performed in a corporate capacity.

Section 302 considers a defendant’s acts in a corporate capacity when assessing personal jurisdiction over that defendant.

Sirius XM Radio Inc. v. Aura Multimedia Corporation · filed 2022-04-06(a)

CPLR 302 does not distinguish actions taken in a defendant’s personal capacity from actions taken in his “corporate” capacity.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a substantial relationship between a New York business transaction and the claim, while Section 302(a)(2) requires a tortious act in New York.

Cellura · filed 2025-09-24(a)(1), (a)(2)

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over any Defendant. ... Accordingly, there is no jurisdiction over Defendants under Section 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign insurer whose group policies cover New York employees when the insurer's contacts with New York support jurisdiction.

Comprehensive Foot Care Group v. Lincoln National Life · filed 1987-05-22(a)(1)

However, defendant fails to recognize that all the corporations to whom it had issued policies had sufficient minimum contacts in New York State to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant. ... In the instant proceeding plaintiff served defendant at its New Jersey office pursuant to CPLR 302 and 313.

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction when the defendant has no qualifying New York business transaction, service contract, tort, or in-state injury.

Sarracco v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2016-12-07

This does not meet the stringent “doing business” standard imposed by C.P.L.R. § 301, nor does it meet the C.P.L.R. § 302 requirement of showing that a defendant either (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York or (2) commits a tortious act either within New York or causing injury to person or property within New York.

Under § 302(b), a plaintiff who is not domiciled in New York must show that the defendant had minimum contacts with the State.

Glick v. Glick · filed 1985-06-04(b)

Although CPLR 302 (b) has been liberally construed to protect New York domiciliaries, plaintiff, a nondomiciliary, is required to show that defendant had "minimum contacts” within the State in order to satisfy due process requirements (see, International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310; Browne v Browne, 53 AD2d 134,136, appeal dismissed 40 NY2d 917).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over claims arising from purposeful New York business activity, while § 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York beyond the plaintiff’s residence there.

Interface Biomedical Laboratories Corp. v. Axiom Medical, Inc. · filed 1985-01-11(a)(1), (a)(3)

Defendant’s conduct in New York demonstrates sufficiently purposeful activity to constitute the transaction of business under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... The commercial tort claims in Counts 2, 3 and 4 do not, however, arise from those meetings and therefore this Court cannot assert § 302(a)(1) jurisdiction over those claims. ... In the present case, the plaintiff has not offered any evidence indicating that there would be injury to plaintiff in New York if plaintiff resided in another state. ... This Court cannot assert jurisdiction over those claims under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a single New York visit when negotiations and contracting occurred elsewhere, or on tort allegations that establish neither a tort in New York nor an out-of-state tort affecting New York.

Roddy v. Schmidt · filed 1981-12-03(a)(1)-(3)

The record is further quite clear that defendants did not in any way engage in doing business in New York, as all of their negotiating and contracting occurred in Florida. The single visit to New York by one of the defendants is insufficient. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to establish a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to the provision of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1). Plaintiffs contend that they have pleaded a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [a], pars 2, 3). However, their pleading fails to establish a tortious act having any effect in New York. The allegations are insufficient to establish any fraud and deceit as to the payment of a fee to defendants or their subsequent transfer of such assets. The remaining allegations are inadequate either to establish a tort in New York State or any tort in Florida having an effect in New York State.

CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) can provide a basis for personal jurisdiction without deciding whether clause (ii) applies.

Allen v. Canadian General Electric Co. · filed 1980-06-24(a)(3)(i)

Order affirmed, with costs, for reasons stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice J. Clarence Herlihy at the Appellate Division, insofar as that opinion relates to the significance and effect of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [i]). We are not required to pass upon and thus do not address the significance and effect of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 3, cl [ii]) (cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 US 286).

CPLR 302 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based on New York contract negotiations, fraudulent asset transfers through an agent in New York, or out-of-state torts causing injury in New York when accompanied by persistent conduct and substantial revenue from commerce there.

Miller v. Glant Swedish Metal Corp. · filed 1979-10-23(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)

In personam jurisdiction was obtained over the nonresident defendants under CPLR 302 in that: (1) the employment agreement was originally negotiated in New York between plaintiff and the individual defendants (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 1), (2) the nonresident ... defendants through Keesing as their agent purportedly transferred assets of Giant Swedish Metal Corporation in a fraudulent endeavor to defeat plaintiff’s claim as a creditor employee (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 2) and (3) they allegedly committed tortious acts in Sweden causing injury within this State while engaging in a persistent course of conduct and deriving substantial revenue from commerce in this State (CPLR 302, subd [a], par 3).

CPLR 302(a)(1) does not limit jurisdiction independently available under CPLR 301 over an individual doing business in New York to claims arising from that business.

ABKCO Industries, Inc. v. Lennon · filed 1976-06-08(a)(1)

We reject also the assertion that CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) limits CPLR 301 to causes of action arising out of the business being done in New York (thereby rendering CPLR 301 redundant when applied to individuals doing business), and hold that where jurisdiction over an individual is obtained independent of CPLR 302 because the individual was "doing business” in New York, jurisdiction will also attach with respect to causes of action which did not arise in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from business transacted or a tortious act committed in New York.

Davis v. Gahan · filed 1964-03-31(a)(1), (a)(2)

It allows jurisdiction if the cause of action asserted against him arises from (1) the transaction of any business within New York or (2) the commission of a tortious act within New York.

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for an out-of-state tort when the claim arises from it, the injury occurs in New York, the defendant expected New York consequences, and the defendant derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Prashaw v. Titan Mining Corporation · filed 2022-08-24(a)(1), (a)(3)

To establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(3), a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant committed a tortious act outside New York; (2) the cause of action arose from that act; (3) the tortious act caused an injury to a person or property in New York; (4) the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in New York; and (5) the defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claims arise from that business activity.

Lopez v. Cookies SF, LLC · filed 2022-09-22(a)

Courts therefore “exercise ‘personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if two conditions are met: first, the non-domiciliary must transact business within the state; second, the claims against the non-domiciliary must arise out of that business activity.’”

Section 302(a)(1) requires a defendant to transact business in New York and the claim to arise from that activity, while section 302(a)(3) excludes defamation causes of action from its reach.

Fahey v. Breakthrough Films & Television Inc. · filed 2022-09-29(a)(1), (a)(3)

For a plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), “two requirements must be met: (1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state, and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... Accordingly, Section 302(a)(3) cannot supply a basis for personal jurisdiction.

Section 302 permits specific personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries when the statutory contacts with New York and the claims are established.

Cruz v. City of New York · filed 2022-11-17(a)(1), (a)(3)(i), and (a)(3)(ii)

Defendants have also failed to establish specific jurisdiction over the Miller parties pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), CPLR 302 (a)(3)(i) or CPLR 302 (a)(3)(ii).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant when the requirements of an applicable subsection are met.

Helio Logistics, Inc. v. Mehta · filed 2023-01-03(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

Specific personal jurisdiction may apply if the criteria of § 302(a)(1), § 302(a)(2), or § 302(a)(3) are met.

Section 302(a)(1)-(3) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for specified business transactions or tortious acts connected to New York.

Suber v. VVP Services, LLC · filed 2023-01-06(a)(1)-(3)

The District Court concluded, and we agree, that the recruitment of Suber did not constitute a business transaction for purposes of the long-arm statute. ... Accordingly, jurisdiction is not available under section 302(a)(1). ... Because Defendants did not commit any alleged torts against Suber while Defendants were physically present in New York, section 302(a)(2) is not a basis for personal jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, jurisdiction is not available under section 302(a)(3).