N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for claims involving damage to property.

Fraser v. 134 Quincy St., LLC · filed 2025-07-23(4)

It is undisputed that the plaintiff incorrectly named and served L & C Associates, LLC, and that the plaintiff failed to serve the defendant within the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]).

Section 214 (4) gives a property owner three years from the time of a taking to bring an inverse condemnation claim.

Kegelman v. Town of Otsego · filed 2024-07-18(4)

An action to recover damages for inverse condemnation must be commenced within three years from the time of the taking (see CPLR 214 [4]; Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d at 787; see also Savo v City of New York ,208 AD3d 1377, 1378 [2d Dept 2022]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims seeking damages for injury to property.

Kingstone Ins. Co. v. Marion Pharm. Inc. · filed 2024-02-15(4)

The original amended complaint, which asserted against Marion only a negligence claim subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[4]), should have been dismissed as time-barred as against Marion upon Marion's initial motion.

Section 214(4) gives an inverse condemnation claim three years from the taking to be commenced.

Board of Mgrs. of the Lido Beach Towers Condominium v. City of Long Beach · filed 2024-01-24(4)

"An inverse condemnation cause of action accrues at the time of the taking and is subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(4)" ... Here, since the parties agree that the cause of action alleging inverse condemnation accrued on January 29, 2019, and the plaintiff commenced this action on January 10, 2022, within the three-year statute of limitations, the Supreme [*2]Court properly denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for claims asserting injury to property.

Lee Tai Enters. USA, Ltd. v. Tal Dagan, M.D., P.C. · filed 2022-11-29(4)

As for the portion of the counterclaim relating to the damage caused by the power surge, plaintiff established that the counterclaim, asserted in May 2021, is untimely under CPLR 214(4), which provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims asserting injury to property.

Section 214(4) gives inverse condemnation claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the taking occurs.

Savo v. City of New York · filed 2022-09-28(4)

An inverse condemnation cause of action accrues at the time of the taking ( see Sarnelli v City of New York , 256 AD2d 399, 400-401; Sassone v Town of Queensbury , 157 AD2d 891, 893) and is subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(4) ( see Linzenberg v Town of Ramapo , 1 AD3d 321, 322).

Section 214(4) gives property damage and inverse condemnation claims a three-year limitations period, which equitable estoppel does not extend absent affirmative misconduct preventing a timely suit.

Liberty Sq. Realty Corp. v. The Doe Fund, Inc. · filed 2021-12-21(4)

On this appeal, plaintiff concedes that the statute of limitations for its claims of property damage and inverse condemnation is three years, and this action was commenced more than three years after both claims accrued (see CPLR 214[4]). ... Thus, defendants are not precluded under doctrine of equitable estoppel from asserting the statute of limitations defense as to the claims of property damage and inverse condemnation, which we find are time-barred.

An action for injury to real property must be commenced within three years of accrual; evidence of new injuries from ongoing activity can raise a question of fact about timeliness.

Listwon v. 500 Metro. Owner, LLC · filed 2020-11-18(4)

Generally, an action to recover damages for injury to real property must be commenced within three years of accrual ( see CPLR 214[4]; Verizon N.Y. Inc. v Consolidated Edison, Inc. , 127 AD3d 621, 621-622). ... We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny those branches of the motions which were to dismiss the property damage causes of action insofar as asserted against RAC and ECD as untimely. RAC and EDC established, prima facie, the untimeliness of the property damage causes of action by demonstrating that the injuries to the subject property were apparent by April or May 2013. In opposition, however, the plaintiff averred evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether ongoing construction activities at 500 Metropolitan Avenue caused new injuries to the subject property between the spring of 2013 and through the date of his opposition to the motions.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for an action seeking damages for injury to property.

Alko Manufacturing Corp. v. Neptune Meter Co. · filed 1964-01-30(4)

In our opinion, if any cause of action is stated, it is one for injury to property which is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(4) gives a party three years to bring an action for injury to property when negligence is the essence of the claim, even if the complaint invokes lease covenants.

Alyssa Originals, Inc. v. Finkelstein · filed 1964-10-26(4)

Accordingly, we hold that the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 4), governing actions “to recover damages for an injury to property ”, is applicable; and that the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on that ground should have been granted.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limit for tort claims for injury to property, including claims for inducing a breach of contract.

Buscarello v. Guglielmelli · filed 1964-12-17(4)

Accordingly, unless plaintiff’s causes of action can be spelled out in contract, they may be classified in tort and subject to three-year limitation under CPLR 294 (subd. 4). ... Motion is granted to the extent that causes of action against individual defendants only are dismissed.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal-injury actions, including injuries resulting from unseaworthiness regardless of negligence.

Izquierdo v. Cities Service Oil Co. (Pa.) · filed 1965-07-16(5)

The quoted language certainly is broad enough to cover a claim for personal injuries resulting from unseaworthiness and the legislative history shows that the precise purpose of the new statute’s draftsmen was to eliminate the former time bar distinction which depended on whether the personal injury sued on resulted from negligence or otherwise.

Section 214(4) requires an action for damages from injury to property to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Gluck v. Reuben Rose & Co. · filed 1968-01-22(4)

CPLR 214 (subd. 4) requires that an action to recover damages for an injury to property be commenced within three years from the date on which it accrued.

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to claims for inducing the breach of existing contracts and probable contract expectancies.

Von Ludwig v. Schiano · filed 1965-04-19(4)

The third and fourth causes of action are to recover damages for inducing the breach of existing contracts and also contracts which were probable expectancies. These are governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to injury to property ('CPLR 214, subd. 4).

CPLR 214 gives a payee three years to sue a drawee bank for conversion when it pays a check bearing the payee’s forged indorsement, even if the payee has an account at the bank.

Forman v. First National Bank of Woodridge · filed 1971-02-24

This is not to say that a payee-depositor whose name is forged on a check drawn against another account in the same bank has no recourse against the bank; rather, it is to say his action is one in conversion and governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims seeking damages for personal injuries that accrue in New York.

Myers v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. · filed 1972-03-27

Thus, the tire having been manufactured in New York, that is where the cause of action accrued, rather than in Kentucky, where the plaintiff was injured. Accordingly, plaintiff’s cause of action sounding in negligence is governed by CPLR 214, and is not time-barred.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on a bailment claim for the physical loss of property.

Werner Spitz Construction Co. v. Vanderlinde Electric Corp. · filed 1970-09-14(4)

Although the court is not aware of any direct appellate authority in the Fourth Department (not viewing Great Amer. Ind. Co. v. Lapp Insulator Co., 282 App. Div. 545, mot. for lv. to app. dsmd. 306 N. Y. 851, or Chevron Oil Co. v. Atlas Oil Co. of Utica, 28 A D 2d 644, as applicable here), it is persuaded by the Third Department’s reasoning in Atlas Assur. Co. v. Barry Tire & Serv. Co. (3 A D 2d 787), bolstered by the language of the Court of Appeals in Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp. (305 N. Y. 140, 147-148), that the defendant’s bailment claim falls within the three-year limitation. (CPLR 214, subd. 4.)

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a bailment claim whose grounds of recovery are negligence.

Tischler Roofing & Sheet Metal Works Co. v. Sicolo Garage, Inc. · filed 1970-10-13(4)

This action to recover for breach of contract of bailment of plaintiff’s automobile is governed by the three-year negligence statute (CPLR 214, subd. 4) and not the six-year “contractual obligation or liability” statute (CPLR 213, subd. 2).

Section 214(4) gives three years to commence an action for injury to property.

Esso Transport Co., Inc. v. Terminales Maracaibo, CA · filed 1973-04-17(4)

The analogous New York statute of limitations is CPLR § 214(4) which provides that an action to recover damages for an injury to property must be commenced within three years. It is, therefore, clear that the commencement of this action on July 21, 1972 was within the analogous limitation period.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for injury to property begins when the wrongful invasion causes injury; later consequential damage does not start a new period.

Clover Park Garden Apartments v. Bates & Rogers Construction Co. · filed 1974-02-22(4)

Here the injury to plaintiff’s property occurred when there was a wrongful invasion of plaintiff’s property by the dust emitted from defendant’s plant. It is immaterial that the dust that entered the air conditioners may have later created additional damages.

Section 214(4) limits damages for a continuing trespass or nuisance to injuries sustained during the three years before the action begins, but does not bar an injunction or damages for those injuries.

Kearney v. Atlantic Cement Co. · filed 1969-12-11(4)

Although damages are recoverable only to the extent that they were sustained during the three years immediately prior to the commencement of the respective actions (CPLR 214, subd. 4; ...), plaintiffs are not precluded by the Statute of Limitations from seeking a permanent injunction or damages in the instant actions.

CPLR 214(2)’s three-year limitation does not govern a fee claim based on an agreement to be bound by the law authorizing the fees.

City of New York v. Kingsview Homes, Inc. · filed 1975-11-20(2)

The defendant argues that CPLR 214 (subd 2) is applicable, and that the city cannot recover on the fees owed prior to the three-year Statute of Limitations contained therein. This court is of the opinion that the contract of April 23, 1953 evidences an agreement to be bound by the Redevelopment Companies Law (subsequently the Private Housing Finance Law) and that CPLR 213 is applicable.

Section 214’s three-year period runs from the issuance of a patent that discloses a misappropriated trade secret; later use does not start a new period.

M & T Chemicals, Inc. v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1975-11-20(3), (4)

Hence, the issuance of the -059 patent totally destroyed any value the trade secret might have had, and the only action available to plaintiff was one for misappropriation and complete destruction of the secret upon such issuance, and not for any future or continued use by defendants.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for injury to personal property; when confidential trade secrets remain undisclosed, each continued use gives rise to a successive cause of action.

Kistler Instrumente A. G. v. Pcb Piezotronics, Inc. · filed 1976-09-15(3), (4)

The pertinent New York period of limitations involving the taking of, or injury to, personal property is three (3) years. CPLR § 214(3) and (4). ... Absent the public disclosure of trade secrets, however, the continued use of confidential information gives rise to successive causes of action under the law of New York. ... Therefore the misappropriation and use of the confidential information by the defendant within three years prior to the commencement of this suit remains actionable for damages and other appropriate relief.

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to a claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship.

Williams v. Arpie · filed 1977-02-17(4)

Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that there was, this action would be barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 4; Rolnick v Rolnick, 29 AD2d 987, affd 24 NY2d 805) because plaintiff was removed from her position at St. Cabrini in November of 1971.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for claims alleging injury to property.

Mishkin v. Dormer · filed 1977-05-19(4)

At best, this cause of action may be construed as alleging injury to plaintiffs property or person, and that is governed by the three-year statute (CPLR 214, subd 4).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on an injury-to-property claim based on infringement of an easement.

Oneida County Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 1978-07-13(4)

A cause of action for injury to property is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 4). Since the cross claims by Niagara Mohawk are based upon an alleged infringement of an easement, the cause of action sounds in trespass and the three-year limitation applies (509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48; O’Shaughnessy v John J. Barrett, Inc., 186 Misc 1040; 1 Weinstein-KornMiller, NY Civ Prac, par 214.16).

Section 214(4) requires an action for injury to property to be brought within three years.

Suffolk Roadways, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance · filed 1978-07-20(4)

The complaint, insofar as the corporate plaintiff is concerned, essentially pleads an injury to property which must be brought within three years (CPLR 214, subd 4).

CPLR 214 (subd 4) sets a three-year limitations period for claims alleging injury to property rights.

Shiffer v. Bristol Myers Co. · filed 1979-03-29(4)

We are in agreement with Special Term that the complaint, properly construed, alleges a cause of action only for injury to property rights, clearly barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 (subd 4).

Section 214(4) allows three years to bring an action for injury to property; the period begins when the injury occurs and is not tolled by incomplete knowledge of the facts.

Eazor Express, Inc. v. United States · filed 1980-01-15(4)

The analogous statute of New York, the forum state here, is Civil Practice Law & Rules § 214(4) (CPLR), which provides a three-year limit for the commencement of actions to recover damages for injury to property. Plaintiff’s claim accrued at the time it was injured by the invasion of its rights — here, at the time of the dredging by Weeks which allegedly caused damage to plaintiff’s terminal — and the statute of limitations is not tolled by plaintiff’s lack of complete knowledge of the facts.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action for injury to property; in an ordinary negligence action, the period runs from the wrong or injury.

Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. Canadair, Ltd. · filed 1980-05-01(4)

In New York, CPLR 214 (subd 4) provides that an action to recover damages for an injury to property must be commenced ...within three years. This period of limitation, in a negligence action without fraud, ordinarily runs from the time of the commission of the wrong or injury. ... Since the crash occurred on December 2, 1970, the New York State action is within the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(4) applies to actions to recover for injury to property, not claims for breach of an insurance contract.

Van Hoesen v. Hogan · filed 1980-11-12(4)

CPLR 214 (subd 4) is inapplicable to plaintiff’s cause of action against Millers, since that statute relates to limitations of actions to recover for injury to property.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limit for damages arising from injury to an easement; it does not govern an action seeking an injunction.

Rahabi v. Morrison · filed 1981-07-06(4)

Thus, had plaintiff brought this action to recover the legal remedy of damages for the alleged injury to his easement, the three-year period of limitations contained in CPLR 214 (subd 4) would have applied. Even then, because the injury was allegedly accomplished by the erection of a permanent structure which constituted a continuous interference with the exercise of plaintiff’s rights, it gave rise to successive causes of action, and the statute would only have barred recovery of damages therefor insofar as they accrued more than three years prior to the commencement of this action (cf. 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48, 52-53). Plaintiff does not, however, sue for damages. He seeks the equitable remedy of injunction which is governed by the six-year period of CPLR 213 (subd 1) (see 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.01). Thus, the action for an injunction was timely commenced.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to commence a personal injury action.

Roberts v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. · filed 1982-07-30

Under N.Y. CPLR § 214, she had until November 8, 1981, in which to deliver the summons to the U.S. Marshall. Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to the sixty-day extension under § 203(b)5(i), service of the summons would have to have been effected on February 7, 1982, to have been timely. Since Lilly was not served until March 16, 1982, the action is time-barred.

Section 214(4)'s three-year period for injury to property does not apply to a buyer's claim for breach of warranty seeking the diminished value of defective goods.

Springs Mills, Inc. v. Carolina Underwear Co. · filed 1982-03-11(4)

The action is not for “injury to property,” for an injury to property is defined as excluding “the breach of a contract.” (General Construction Law, § 25-b.) It follows that the case is governed by the four-year Statute of Limitations prescribed by subdivision (1) of section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code for “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale”.

Section 214(4) gives three years to bring a trade secret misappropriation claim; each use of a secret kept confidential can start a new limitations period, but disclosure does not.

Lemelson v. Carolina Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1982-06-22(4)

In New York, the rule may be stated as follows. If a defendant misappropriates and discloses a trade secret, he becomes liable to plaintiff upon disclosure. On the other hand, if the defendant keeps the secret confidential, yet makes use of it to his own commercial advantage, each successive use constitutes a new, actionable tort for the purpose of the running of the Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(5) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within three years of the injury.

Megnauth v. Edwards & Kelcey · filed 1984-09-21(5)

CPLR 214 (subd 5) provides that an action to recover damages for personal injury must be commenced within three years of the date of the injury.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for injury to property.

United Euram Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. · filed 1984-01-11(4)

Since the original complaint gave full notice of the transactions sought to be proved, an amendment that would merely add a new theory of liability is not barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations for injury to property (CPLR 214, subd 4), because the complaint was served within that period and the amendment would relate back to the time of such service. (CPLR 203, subd [e].)

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to claims for intentional interference with contractual relations because they are actions for injury to property.

Kartiganer Associates, P. C. v. Town of New Windsor · filed 1985-02-25(4)

A claim for damages based on intentional interference with contractual relations is deemed “an action to recover damages for an injury to property” (CPLR 214 [4]) so that a three-year Statute of Limitations applies (Frigi-Griffin, Inc. v Leeds, 52 AD2d 805, 806, n 2; Von Ludwig v Schiano, 23 AD2d 789, 790).

Section 214 requires actions for personal injury or property damage to be commenced within three years after the cause of action arises.

Pettus v. Havrda · filed 1986-01-31

New York law provides that an action to recover damages for personal injuries and injury to property must be commenced within three years from that date. See CPLR § 214 (McKinney Supp.1984).

Section 214(4) gives a claim for misappropriation of a business opportunity a three-year limitations period when fraud allegations are incidental to the claim.

Powers Mercantile Corp. v. Feinberg · filed 1985-06-11(4)

Thus, since the first cause of action is essentially for misappropriation of a business opportunity, it is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(2) requires an action to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute to be commenced within three years.

Fraccola v. City of Utica Board of Water Supply · filed 1988-07-07(2)

An action to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214 [2]). Plaintiffs’ action was time barred under that Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for claims of intentional interference with contractual relations.

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Schiferle · filed 1987-11-10(4)

The fourth counterclaim sought damages for intentional interference with contractual relations and was likewise based on conduct occurring on or before September 1978. That counterclaim was barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [4]; Kartiganer Assocs. v Town of New Windsor, 108 AD2d 898, 899; see also, Williams v Arpie, 56 AD2d 689, 690, affd 44 NY2d 689).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a claim of intentional interference with contractual relations.

Fitzpatrick v. County of Suffolk · filed 1988-03-14(4)

Moreover, the court correctly found that a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations was time barred because the construction contract was terminated on April 10, 1979, i.e., more than three years prior to service of the initial complaint in August 1982 (see, CPLR 214 [4]; Kartiganer Assocs. v Town of New Windsor, 108 AD2d 898).

Section 214(4) sets the limitations period for claims seeking damages for injury to personal property.

Lyons v. Butler · filed 1987-11-30(4)

Their engineer’s report pertains to claims apparently barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214’s three-year period for a motor-vehicle negligence claim runs from the accident; the No-Fault Law does not delay its start.

Jackson v. L.P. Transportation, Inc. · filed 1988-10-13

The time for bringing a common-law negligence action begins to run from the date of the occurrence (see, e.g., Smalley v Hutcheon, 296 NY 68, 72). The No-Fault Law does not alter that general rule or justify an exception for personal injury claims based upon the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for injury to property, which the court applied to Lanham Act false advertising claims.

Construction Technology v. Lockformer Co., Inc. · filed 1989-01-10(4)

Accordingly, the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(4) is the most appropriate one for Lanham Act claims.

Under CPLR 214(4), continuing negligence can keep a property damage action from being wholly time barred, although some damages may be barred.

Zoller v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 1988-02-25(4)

Supreme Court also properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the Zollers’ claim for damages for negligence as time barred under CPLR 214 (4). The Zollers allege continuous damage from January 1978 through January 1984. The action was commenced in October 1985. Although some of the damages may be barred by the Statute of Limitations, the continuing nature of the negligence alleged prevents the Statute of Limitations from operating as a complete defense.

Section 214(4) gives a damaged party three years to sue a gasoline discharger for injury to property.

Town of Guilderland v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. · filed 1990-03-22(4)

a suit against a discharger initiated by the damaged party is one for damages caused by injury to property and is subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

CPLR 214 requires an action for personal injury, including conscious pain and suffering, to be commenced within three years of the injury.

Charbonneau v. State · filed 1990-10-18

CPLR 214 provides that an action for personal injury (as asserted in these claims for conscious pain and suffering) must be commenced within three years of the date of injury.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limit on claims whose underlying nature is injury to property.

State v. King Service, Inc. · filed 1990-11-29(4)

Finally, while the "twelfth” cross claim may properly state a cause of action pursuant to Navigation Law § 190 for King’s direct damages, it is clearly untimely as its underlying nature was to recover for injury to property (see, CPLR 214 [4]) and was properly dismissed.

Section 214(4) bars a trespass action brought more than three years after a de facto appropriation of the property.

Sassone v. Town of Queensbury · filed 1990-01-04(4)

Although this action is time barred (CPLR 214 [4]), defendant intimates in its brief and unequivocally represented at oral argument that it will not raise the Statute of Limitations defense to plaintiffs claim for the value of the subject property as of the time of its appropriation in 1978.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a claim alleging interference with prospective contracts when the injury is to economic interests rather than reputation.

Classic Appraisals Corp. v. DeSantis · filed 1990-03-12(4)

Inasmuch as the gravamen of the plaintiffs first cause of action is that the defendant’s conduct interfered with prospective appraisal contracts, and inasmuch as the injury alleged is essentially to its economic interests rather than its reputation ... the Supreme Court properly determined that the three-year Statute of Limitations applied (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) limits recovery for continuous interference with an easement to damages incurred within three years before the action began.

Cranesville Block Co. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 1991-07-18(4)

Whether pleaded in trespass or nuisance, this continuous interference Avith plaintiffs right to use of the easement gives rise to successive causes of action, and the Statute of Limitations would only bar recovery of damages more than three years prior to commencement of the action (see, 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, at 52; Rahabi v Morrison, 81 AD2d 434, 438-439).

Section 214(4) gives claims for property injury, including trespass and nuisance, a three-year limitations period.

Sova v. Glasier · filed 1993-04-14(4)

We modify the order, however, insofar as it dismissed the trespass and nuisance claims as time-barred. Those claims seek "to recover damages for an injury to property” and thus ... are governed by the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (4).

Section 214(4) gives an injury-to-property claim a three-year limitations period; here, the period began when the notice of easement was filed.

Hanbidge v. Hunt · filed 1992-05-04(4)

Although governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations, this cause of action accrued in July 1984, when the defendants filed the "Notice of Easement and Right of Way”. Therefore, it too was untimely (see, CPLR 214 [4]; 203 [a]; see, Citibank v Suthers, 68 AD2d 790, 795; Lezynski v Kasprzyk, 281 App Div 346, affd 306 NY 900).

Section 214 gives claims for intentional interference with contractual relations a three-year limitations period.

Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Pyramid Champlain Co. · filed 1993-05-13

A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214 (see, Fitzpatrick Constr. Corp. v County of Suffolk, 138 AD2d 446, 449, lv denied 73 NY2d 807).

Section 214(4) gives a claim for tortious interference with contractual rights a three-year limitations period.

Omega Industries, Inc. v. Chemical Bank · filed 1993-02-22(4)

However, as the defendants accurately contend, the claim for tortious interference with the plaintiffs’ contractual rights is barred by the running of the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]; ...).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a claim alleging interference with an existing contract.

Mannix Industries, Inc. v. Antonucci · filed 1993-03-08(4)

Inasmuch as the gravamen of Mannix’s second cause of action is that the defendants’ conduct interfered with an existing contract, it is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Classic Appraisals Corp. v DeSantis, 159 AD2d 537; Jemison v Crichlow, 139 AD2d 332, affd 74 NY2d 726; CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on trespass claims for injury to property, barring recovery for damages incurred more than three years before the action began.

Ferran v. Williams · filed 1993-06-17(4)

Trespass is an action to recover damages for an injury to property governed by the three-year limitations period contained in CPLR 214 (4) (Jemison v Crichlow, 139 AD2d 332, 336, affd 74 NY2d 726) and, therefore, plaintiff is barred from recovering under her trespass causes of action for any damages which occurred more than three years prior to the commencement of the action.

CPLR 214 (4)’s three-year period for actions to recover damages to property does not govern these counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition.

Katz v. Bach Realty, Inc. · filed 1993-04-01(4)

The proposed counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition are not, as plaintiff argues, governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (4) for actions to recover damages to property, but by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) for breach of fiduciary duty and in CPLR 213 (2) for breach of contract (see, *308Butler v Gibbons, 173 AD2d 352; Sachs v Cluett, Peabody & Co., 265 App Div 497, affd 291 NY 772).

Section 214(4) limits damages from a continuing public nuisance to losses sustained during the three years before the action commenced.

State v. General Electric Co. · filed 1993-12-02(4)

Damages for this claim would be recoverable to the extent that they were sustained during the three years immediately prior to the Town’s commencement of the action (see, CPLR 214 [4]; Kulpa v Stewart’s Ice Cream, supra, at 207).

Section 214 limits recovery for a continuing nuisance to damages sustained during the three years before the action began.

Cippitelli v. Town of Niskayuna · filed 1994-04-07

However, Supreme Court should have also precluded plaintiffs from offering evidence regarding their alleged exposure to human remains, as the undisputed evidence established that this occurrence fell outside the applicable three-year period.

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for claims alleging infringement of an easement.

Oliphant v. McCarthy · filed 1994-10-20(4)

The claim of an infringement on an easement sounds in trespass and is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Oneida County Mobile Home Sales v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 63 AD2d 385, 390, mod on other grounds 47 NY2d 954; see also, CPLR 214 [4]). ... Thus, the three-year period of limitations in which to commence such an action expired well before the commencement of this action.

Section 214(4) gives a claim for negligent injury to property a three-year limitations period.

Stage Club Corp. v. West Realty Co. · filed 1995-02-23(4)

The claim against F&K for negligent injury to property was barred by the 3-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [4]). Since F&K assigned its roof lease to Winston in 1982, the statute must necessarily have run by the time this action was commenced four years later.

Section 214(4)'s three-year limitations period for property damage applies to a private Oil Spill Act claim for petroleum contamination.

Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny International, Inc. (In Re Allegheny International, Inc.) · filed 1993-07-30(4)

The facts of the instant case make the New York statute of limitations for property damage right on point. ... Therefore, the statute of limitations has expired and AL Tech’s Oil Spill Act claim is precluded.

Section 214 gives a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim three years from when all its elements, typically including injury, first exist; later injuries do not restart the period.

Johnson v. Nyack Hospital · filed 1995-06-27

The parties agree that the claim is governed by New York’s three year statute of limitations. N.Y. CPLR § 214 (McKinney 1990). ... A tort claim of this nature accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, under New York law when the last of the elements of the cause of action, typically injury, exists. ... The subsequent injuries alleged are immaterial to the issue of timeliness. ... In consequence, this claim is time-barred as well.

For a personal injury claim based on negligent construction, the three-year period begins when the injury occurs, rather than when the dangerous condition was created.

Marrero v. Marsico · filed 1996-03-14

Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the personal injuries were sustained, not when the dangerous condition was first created by Mar-Feld’s negligent construction work (see, Gile v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 App Div 95, 96-97; see also, Cubito v Kreisberg, 69 AD2d 738, 742-746, affd 51 NY2d 900).

Section 214’s three-year period for replevin against a good-faith purchaser runs from the owner’s demand for return and the purchaser’s refusal.

Georgeton v. Gruber · filed 1997-02-18

The court found that the plaintiff’s cause of action for replevin against the appellants as good-faith purchasers of a converted vehicle accrued at the time that the plaintiff made demand for return of the vehicle and the appellants refused to do so (see, Guggenheim Found, v Lubell, 77 NY2d 311, 317-318). The action against the appellants is thus not barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214).

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with contractual relations; the period begins when the plaintiff suffers actual injury.

Vanderminden v. Vanderminden · filed 1996-04-25(4)

It is well settled that the appropriate period of limitations for causes of action alleging a tortious interference with contractual relations is three years (see, CPLR 214 [4]; Omega Indus. v Chemical Bank, 190 AD2d 843, 844-845). Here, the shares were transferred to Rathbun in September 1989. Although plaintiffs commenced this action in July 1994, more than three years after the transfer, the transfer did not immediately effectuate any actual injury to plaintiffs because the voting trust agreement established that power would be equalized for the years that the voting trust was in effect. Therefore, although shares were transferred to Rathbun disturbing the equalization of the shares, it did not have any effect until the expiration of the voting trust.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of injury to bring a negligence or strict products liability claim for property damage.

Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Hunter Turbo Corp. · filed 1997-07-21(4)

CPLR 214 (4) provides that an action to recover damages for an injury to property must be commenced “within three years”. ... Accordingly, the causes of action sounding in negligence and strict products liability, asserted on October 21, 1994, were not time-barred.

Section 214 bars asbestos property damage tort claims when the owner sustained the claimed injury more than three years before suing.

MRI Broadway Rental, Inc. v. United States Mineral Products Co. · filed 1997-09-16

It is clear that by April 1987 plaintiff had already discovered the injury on which its claim is based, the presence of asbestos, as well as the need to abate it. In fact, by no later than April 1987, plaintiff had discarded ceiling tiles as “ACM Waste” because of its contamination. Thus, its tort claims are barred in any event.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for trespass actions.

Weichert v. O'Neill · filed 1997-12-31(4)

The action, which is based on alleged conduct since April 1995, is timely because the Statute of Limitations for trespass is three years (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with contract claims; insufficient allegations of fraudulent concealment do not toll that period.

Solow v. Stone · filed 1998-01-29(4)

Apart from its facial insufficiency, the tortious interference claim is also time-barred. ... Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to justify tolling the limitations period, and because that period expired well before he filed this action, the claim for tortious interference is time-barred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4).

Section 214(4) gives a landowner three years from a de facto taking to bring a claim for damages arising from the appropriation.

Sarnelli v. City of New York · filed 1998-12-14(4)

Since the plaintiffs’ claim for damages arising from the de facto appropriation of the property accrued in March 1983, it is time-barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]; Gache v Town of Harrison, 813 F Supp 1037 [SD NY]; Sassone v Town of Queensbury, supra).

Section 214(4) gives a claim for tortious interference with contract a three-year limitations period.

Kenneth D. Laub & Co. v. Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. · filed 1999-06-08(4)

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, against the Koeppel defendants for tortious interference with contract, was properly dismissed as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [4]; see, Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90, 92).

Section 214(4) bars a property damage claim based on tree cutting when the action is brought after the limitations period measured from when the damage was apparent.

Mandel v. Estate of Tiffany · filed 1999-07-22(4)

Turning to plaintiff’s property damage claim emanating from the alleged removal of trees prior to 1984 which plaintiff contends caused a landslide on his property in 1991, we find the action to be time barred pursuant to CPLR 214 (4). With the gravamen of the action, seeking treble damages, premised upon a violation of RPAPL 861 (see, Axtell v Kurey, 222 AD2d 804, lv denied 88 NY2d 802; Cunningham v Brischke, 167 AD2d 604; Whitaker v McGee, 111 AD2d 459), the injury — the cutting of trees — must be deemed to have occurred, if at all, no later than 1984 “when the damage [was] apparent” (Cranesville Block Co. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 175 AD2d 444, 446).

Section 214 bars an untimely defective construction claim grounded in negligence; calling the claim fraud does not avoid the limit when fraud is not properly alleged.

Shurka v. Thurman · filed 1999-09-13(4), (6)

The Supreme Court was correct in granting the motion of the respondent Abraham Rubenstein for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him as barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4], [6]; Matter of Oriskany Cent. School Dist. [Booth Architects], 85 NY2d 995; Harbour Pointe Vil. Homeowners Assn. v Marrano/Marc Equity Joint Venture, 185 AD2d 648; Board of Mgrs. of Yardarm Beach Condominium v Vector Yardarm Corp., 172 AD2d 303). The plaintiffs may not avoid dismissal of their complaint insofar as asserted against the respondent by characterizing their claim as one to recover damages for fraud. The complaint does not properly allege fraud on the part of the respondent, and the essence of the plaintiffs’ action against the respondent is negligence rather than fraud (see generally, Middle Country Cent. School Dist. v O’Healy Constr. Corp., 230 AD2d 777).

Section 214(4) gives a tortious interference with contract claim a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff sustains injury.

Cary Oil Co., Inc. v. MG Refining and Marketing · filed 2000-03-30(4)

A cause of action for tortious interference with contract accrues at the time the injury is sustained, rather than the date of defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct or the date of breach. ... In consequence, the three year statue of limitations began running on that date.

Section 214(4)'s limitations period for interference with possession begins when the property is removed, rather than when its return is first demanded.

Funding Assistance Corp. v. Mashreq Bank, PSC · filed 2000-11-21(4)

The applicable Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [4]) for interference with possession began to accrue in 1991, when the marshal removed the property from the premises and not at the time plaintiff made its first demand for the return of the property in 1997.

Section 214(4) gives a tortious interference with contract claim a three-year limitations period that begins when actual damages are sustained.

Runcie v. Interfaith Medical Center · filed 2001-07-16(4)

The remaining cause of action, that defendants attempted to extort plaintiffs waiver of his contract rights by threatening to withhold credits if plaintiff asserted his rights under the contract is, in essence, a tortious interference with contract. Such actions are governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]; 72 NY Jur 2d, Interference § 21) and begins to run when the actual damages as a result of the tortious conduct are sustained (see, Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90). In the case at bar, the damages were sustained after defendant’s contract was terminated and he left Interfaith’s employ, to wit, on or about July 1, 1992. Inasmuch as the summons was dated October 30, 1997, the cause of action was time barred and summary judgment as to it should also be granted.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for tortious interference with contract.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Freed · filed 2001-11-09(4)

... and a three-year ... Statute of Limitations for the cause of action for tortious interference with contract (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(2)'s three-year limit does not bar an entire claim based on continuing violations; acts or omissions within the three years before filing remain actionable.

State v. CSRI Ltd. Partnership · filed 2001-12-17(2)

In light of the continuing nature of the violations, i.e., the continued presence of the debris and waste on the property, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint in its entirety as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [2]), even though debris and waste were last placed upon the property more than three years before the action was commenced (see, Jensen v General Elec. Co., 82 NY2d 77, 85; 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48, 52; Sova v Glasier, 192 AD2d 1069; State of New York v Schenectady Chems., 103 AD2d 33).

Section 214(4) requires an action for injury to property to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Coleman & Co. Securities, Inc. v. Giaquinto Family Trust · filed 2002-09-27(4)

In New York, “an action to recover damages for an injury to property” — here, investment losses — must be commenced within three years from the time the cause of action accrues.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tortious-interference-with-contract claim after the facts necessary for relief exist.

Spinap Corp. v. Cafagno · filed 2003-02-24(4)

Thus, the complaint, filed more than three years later, is time-barred (see CPLR 214 [4]; Kartiganer Assoc. v Town of New Windsor, 108 AD2d 898, 899 [1985]).

Section 214(4) treats property damage as accruing when the damage becomes apparent and bars a claim brought more than three years later.

Alamio v. Town of Rockland · filed 2003-02-27(4)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (4), the injury must be deemed to accrue “ ‘when the damage [was] apparent’ ” (Mandel v Estate of Frank L. Tiffany, 263 AD2d 827, 829, quoting Cranesville Block Co. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 175 AD2d 444, 446). ... With the water damage to this property apparent more than three years prior to the commencement of this action, the claim was properly dismissed as untimely.

Section 214(4) gives claims for interference with contractual and business relationships a three-year limitations period.

Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. AAK LTD. · filed 2003-09-08(4)

Pursuant to New York law, a claim alleging interference with contractual and business relationships is subject to a three year statute of limitations.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for an inverse condemnation claim seeking damages.

Linzenberg v. Town of Ramapo · filed 2003-11-03(4)

Since the gravamen of the complaint was to recover damages for inverse condemnation, the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (4) applies (see CPLR 214 [4]; Gache v Town of Harrison, 813 F Supp 1037, 1047 [1993]; cf. Sarnelli v City of New York, 256 AD2d 399, 401 [1998]; Sassone v Town of Queensbury, 157 AD2d 891, 893 [1990]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for property damage claims.

Allianz Insurance v. City of New York · filed 2003-12-23(4)

Any such claims are now barred by the three-year statute of limitations for property damage (CPLR 214 [4]) and may not be pursued in a new action.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for property damage claims.

Allianz Ins. Co. v. City of New York · filed 2003-12-23(4)

Any such claims are now barred by the three-year statute of limitations for property damage (CPLR 214 [4]) and may not be pursued in a new action.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for an action to recover damages for injury to property.

Gem Flooring, Inc. v. Kings Park Industries, Inc. · filed 2004-03-15(4)

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s second action, which was commenced after the expiration of the statute of limitations, should have been dismissed as time-barred insofar as asserted against Kings Park (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for a failure-to-warn claim seeking recovery for property damage.

Ito v. Dryvit Systems, Inc. · filed 2005-03-21(4)

The fifth cause of action asserted in the complaint, alleging failure to warn, is essentially to recover for damage to property and thus is governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR. 214 (4). Therefore, that cause of action also should have been dismissed as time-barred.

A property damage claim against an engineer accrues when the engineer completes the work, rather than when the owner discovers the damage.

Witt v. Merrill · filed 2005-06-10(4)

Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, her cause of action against defendant accrued when defendant completed his work, i.e., when he conducted his soil study and issued his report to plaintiff in 1993, not in January 2003 when plaintiff discovered the damage to the foundation of her residence (s*ee Gelwicks v Campbell,* 257 AD2d 601, 602 [1999]; Johnson v Marianetti, 202 AD2d 970, 970-971 [1994]).

Section 214(4) requires a property damage action to be brought within three years of the injury, rather than discovery of the damage.

Verizon-New York, Inc. v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp. · filed 2005-06-28(4)

A review of the record reveals that defendant produced sufficient evidence to establish that the property damage at issue existed as of April 1999, rendering this action, commenced in June 2002, time-barred (see CPLR 214 [4]; Cast the Sleeping Elephant Trust v Friends World Coll., 210 AD2d 122, 123 [1994], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 86 NY2d 759 [1995]). Moreover, and contrary to plaintiffs argument, the claim accrued upon the date of injury, and not upon discovery of the damage (see Manhattanville Coll. v Romeo Consulting Engr., 5 AD3d 637, 641 [2004]; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v Hunter Turbo Corp., 241 AD2d 505, 506 [1997]).

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal claim for damages from injury to property, even when the defendants are alleged to be de facto corporate officers or directors.

Steinfeld Ex Rel. Estate of General Vision Services, Inc. v. Richard A. Eisner & Co. (In Re General Vision Services, Inc · filed 2006-06-12(4)

“[E]ven if the defendants were de facto officers or directors of GVS, the general three-year statute of limitations for claims based on injuries to property, N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214(4), governs Steinfeld’s claims and bars the instant action.”

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with contractual relations claims.

Buller v. Giorno · filed 2006-04-11(4)

The fourth cause of action, for tortious interference with contractual relations, should have been dismissed as time-barred. ... but was not interposed until 2002, well beyond the applicable three-year statutory period (CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for strict products liability claims involving property damage.

Wyandanch Volunteer Fire Co. v. Randon Construction Corp. · filed 2006-05-09(4)

However, we agree that the cause of action against Advantage sounding in strict products liability was time-barred since the plaintiff did not commence its lawsuit until more than three years after delivery of the stone panels (see CPLR 214 [4]; Wyandanch Volunteer Fire Co., Inc. v Radon Constr. Corp., 19 AD3d 590, 591 [2005]).

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to recover money owed under a statute; a counterclaim to recoup overpayments is subject to a six-year limit.

Lavin v. Town of East Greenbush · filed 2007-06-15(2)

CPLR 214 (2) applies a three-year statute of limitations to actions “to recover upon a liability . . . imposed by statute.” ... While the three-year statute of limitations would apply to plaintiffs claim to recover unpaid money pursuant to statute, the statute of limitations for defendant’s counterclaim is six years.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tortious interference with contract claim, which is not a continuing tort.

Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v. Svane, Inc. · filed 2007-01-18(4)

We agree with defendants, however, that plaintiffs claim against the individual defendants for tortious interference with contract is time-barred. Such a claim is also governed by a three-year statute of limitations but is not a continuing tort (see CPLR 214 [4]; Spinap Corp. v Cafagno, 302 AD2d 588, 588 [2003]; American Fed. Group v Edelman, 282 AD2d 279, 279 [2001]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a tortious-interference-with-contract claim.

Shared Communications Services of ESR, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. · filed 2007-03-15(4)

It is undisputed that, unless the relevant New York and Pennsylvania statutory periods (see CPLR 202), respectively of three and two years (CPLR 214 [4]; Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90 [1993]; and see 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5524 [7]), are tolled, the action, which accrued no later than September 1998 but was not commenced until July 2003, is untimely.

Section 214(4) requires an action for injury to property to be commenced within three years after the damage becomes apparent.

Russell v. Dunbar · filed 2007-05-22(4)

An action to recover damages for injury to property must be commenced within three years of accrual (CPLR 214 [4]). ... Here, the record does not demonstrate that the damage to the plaintiffs apartment was apparent prior to May 3, 2002, more than three years before the plaintiff commenced this action.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury claim.

Tricoche v. Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Co. · filed 2008-02-19(5)

Since the incident from which this action arose occurred in February 2003, more than three years earlier, the action, insofar as asserted against the Viacom defendants, was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year deadline for property damage claims; a claim against a newly added defendant after that deadline is barred if relation back is not established.

Raymond v. Melohn Properties, Inc. · filed 2008-01-22(4)

...the court properly precluded plaintiff from asserting claims against 93rd Street for damages allegedly incurred in 2003 as they are time-barred (CPLR 214 [4]), and plaintiff did not sustain her burden of establishing the applicability of the relation-back doctrine (see Valmon v 4 M & M Corp., 291 AD2d 343 [2002], Iv denied 98 NY2d 611 [2002]).

Section 214(4) allows a property damage claim for damage occurring within three years before the action began, even if similar damage began earlier.

Livichusca v. M & T Mortgage Co. · filed 2008-03-25(4)

The plaintiffs action, to the extent it seeks to recover for property damage which occurred in 2004 during the appellant’s ownership of the building, was timely commenced (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for property damage caused by loss of lateral support begins when the damage becomes visible.

Atlantic Express Transportation Corp. v. Weeks Marine, Inc. · filed 2008-11-26(4)

This court holds that the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (4) does not commence in an action for real property damage caused by the loss of “lateral support” due to the defendant’s drilling, blasting and dredging of an adjacent waterway until the damage is visible.

Section 214(4) gives a tortious interference with contract claim three years from accrual and injury; a later increase in damages does not create a new injury date.

Turecamo v. Turecamo · filed 2008-10-28(4)

The claim for tortious interference with contract is time-barred, having been brought more than three years after the cause of action accrued and damages were suffered (CPLR 214 [4]; see Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90, 92 [1993]). The transfer of stock was completed no later than 1999, after which defendant began receiving income from his ownership. The fact that the stock became more valuable with the 2005 sale of real property held by the corporation did not create a separate date of injury, but merely increased the potential damages.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years from the procurement of inadequate insurance coverage to bring a negligence claim against the broker.

Atlantic Balloon & Novelty Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance · filed 2009-05-26(4)

Rather, the plaintiffs sustained an injury in the form of losing a property right to the proper insurance protection when Wagner purportedly procured an inadequate policy on December 16, 1994 (see Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90 [1993]; Neary v Tower Ins., 32 AD3d 920 [2006]; Mauro v Niemann Agency, 303 AD2d 468 [2003]; Cappelli v Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 276 AD2d 458, 459 [2000]). Thus, the statute of limitations on the negligence cause of action expired on December 16, 1997 (see CPLR 214 [4]). Since the plaintiffs joined Wagner as a defendant on April 3, 1998 their negligence claim against Wagner is time-barred.

Section 214(5) gives a strict products liability claim for property damage a three-year limitations period measured from the injury.

Momentive Performance Materials USA, Inc. v. Astrocosmos Metallurgical, Inc. · filed 2009-09-23(5)

Therefore, Plaintiffs strict products liability claim is time-barred with respect to any damage that the failure of the tantalum-lined reactor caused to property other than the reactor itself which occurred prior to May 25, 2004. At this early stage of the litigation, the Court is unable to determine what the exact nature of the property damage is and whether any of that damage occurred within three years of the filing of this action. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant AstroCosmos’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs strict products liability claim insofar as that claim encompasses property damage that occurred after May 25, 2004, and grants Defendant AstroCosmos’ motion to dismiss this claim as time-barred with respect to any property damage that occurred prior to that date.

CPLR 214 (4) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for injury to property.

Nandlal v. City of New York · filed 2009-10-06(4)

The action was timely commenced within the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (4), which governs actions to recover damages for injury to property (see Ito v Dryvit Sys., Inc., 16 AD3d 554, 555 [2005]).

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for injury to property.

Wild v. Hayes · filed 2009-12-17(4)

Thus, the three-year statute of limitations expired in 2004, prior to plaintiffs commencement of this action (see CPLR 214 [4]), and any claims for trespass, conversion and negligence are, therefore, time-barred.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tortious interference claim. The period begins when the alleged interference occurs and does not restart with each later lost contract opportunity unless the defendant takes a further step.

Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation · filed 2009-12-01(4)

The time on that claim begins to run when the defendant performs the action (or inaction) that constitutes the alleged interference. It does not commence anew each time the plaintiff is unable to enter into a contract, unless the defendant takes some further step.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years from the occurrence of property damage to sue for that damage.

Atlantic Express Transportation Corp. v. Weeks Marine, Inc. · filed 2009-12-15(4)

Since this action was commenced on June 9, 2006, within three years of the time the plaintiffs alleged the parking lot damage occurred, summary judgment was properly denied as to that branch of the appellant’s motion which was to dismiss so much of the complaint as sought to recover damages for the parking lot damage (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the appellant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as sought to recover damages for any injury to property that occurred prior to June 9, 2003.

CPLR 214(4) requires actions to recover damages for injury to property to be commenced within three years.

Chargo v. Simons · filed 2010-03-19(4)

We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred inasmuch as the statute of limitations for “action[s] to recover damages for an injury to property” is three years (CPLR 214 [4]), and it applies to actions seeking treble damages for the removal or destruction of trees and any resulting damage to property pursuant to RPAPL 861 (see Mandel v Estate of Frank L. Tiffany, 263 AD2d 827, 829 [1999]; see also Wild v Hayes, 68 AD3d 1412, 1414-1415 [2009]; Weichert v O’Neill, 245 AD2d 1121 [1997]).

Section 214(4) requires actions for injury to property to be commenced within three years of the wrongful act.

Lucchesi v. Perfetto · filed 2010-04-20(4)

The defendants made a prim'a facie showing that the negligence claim was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]) through the submission of evidentiary proof that the fill which raised the elevation grade of their property was deposited during the construction of their home, which was completed by early 1997, more than six years prior to the commencement of this action.

CPLR 214(4) gives inverse condemnation claims a three-year limitations period that starts when the taking occurs.

Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc. · filed 2010-09-14(4)

Inverse condemnation or de facto appropriation is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Linzenberg v Town of Ramapo, 1 AD3d 321, 322 [2003]; Sarnelli v City of New York, 256 AD2d at 401). Such a claim begins to accrue at the time of the taking (see Sarnelli v City of New York, 256 AD2d at 401; Greenman v City of Cortland, 141 AD2d 910, 911 [1988]; Carr v Town of Fleming, 122 AD2d 540, 541 [1986]). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim would be time-barred unless saved by some exception (see Sarnelli v City of New York, 256 AD2d at 401).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limit on actions to recover damages for injury to property.

Petti v. Town of Lexington · filed 2012-02-16(4)

As any such injuries would have been apparent at that time (see Mandel v Estate of Frank L. Tiffany, 263 AD2d 827, 829 [1999]), such a claim would be time-barred (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) requires an action to recover damages for injury to property to be commenced within three years.

Zamor v. L&L Associates Holding Corp. · filed 2011-06-28[4]

The plaintiffs cause of action to recover damages for injury to property was brought beyond the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Hanbidge v Hunt, 183 AD2d 700, 702 [1992]), and, therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of L&L’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action insofar as asserted against it.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period for property injury claims, with each separate interference giving rise to a separate cause of action.

Urbont v. Sony Music Entertainment · filed 2012-03-27(4)

We therefore hold that Urbont’s state law claims allege mere interference with his property and each alleged wrongful act gave rise to a separate common law cause of action. ... Thus, Urbont’s federal and state claims are both limited to alleged wrongful acts occurring subsequent to May 21, 2007.

Section 214(4) gives injury to property claims a three-year limitations period that accrues upon substantial completion of construction, regardless of when damage is discovered.

Village of Lindenhurst v. J.D. Posillico, Inc. · filed 2012-04-24(4)

In an action against a construction contractor, the three-year statute of limitations to recover damages for injury to property (see CPLR 214 [4]) accrues upon substantial completion of the work “irrespective of when the damage was actually discovered” (Suffolk County Water Auth. v J.D. Posillico, Inc., 267 AD2d 301, 302 [1999]; see 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48, 51-52 [1964]).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limit on claims for injury to property, measured from when the damage becomes visible and apparent.

Public Service Mutual Insurance v. 341-347 Broadway, LLC · filed 2012-06-07(4)

None of the documents submitted by appellants establish that damage to areas other than the ground floor, cellar and subcellar was apparent more than three years prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 214 [4]; Mark v Eshkar, 194 AD2d 356, 357 [1993]).

Section 214(4) requires actions to recover damages for injury to property to be commenced within three years of the injury.

Town of Oyster Bay v. Lizza Industries, Inc. · filed 2013-12-17(4)

An action to recover damages for injury to property must be commenced within three years of the date of the injury (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(3) requires a claim to recover converted stock or other business interests to be brought within three years of the conversion.

Matter of Perelman · filed 2014-12-04(3)

Any claim by decedent to recover Hudson stock or other business interests allegedly converted by respondents would have accrued at the time of the conversion and thus would have been barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [3]) long before decedent’s death in 2007 ... [2007]).

Section 214(5) provides three years from accrual to bring a negligence-based personal injury claim.

Gandica v. Sibilio · filed 2014-12-22(5)

We further note that, to the extent defendant’s counterclaim asserts a cause of action for personal injury based on negligence, it was timely, as it was interposed within three years from the time it accrued (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for property damage claims; a factual dispute about when the damage was discovered can prevent summary judgment on timeliness.

Verizon New York Inc. v. Consolidated Edison, Inc. · filed 2015-04-28(4)

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages on July 24, 2008, alleging that it became aware of the damage no earlier than July 30, 2005, which was within the applicable three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [4]). ... While defendants made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment based upon the invoice from the outside contractor, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact in opposition by relying on contemporaneous documents that identified the discovery date of the property damage as August 1, 2005, and providing affidavits of employees with personal knowledge of the relevant documents.

Section 214(4) requires an action for injury to property to be commenced within three years after the damage becomes apparent.

Payano v. Patel · filed 2015-07-22(4)

An action to recover damages ...for injury to property must be commenced within three years of accrual (see CPLR 214 [4]). The cause of action accrues when the damage is apparent (see Wild v Hayes, 68 AD3d 1412, 1414 [2009]; Russell v Dunbar, 40 AD3d 952, 953 [2007]; Alamio v Town of Rockland, 302 AD2d 842, 844 [2003]). ... Since this action was commenced within three years after that inspection, it was not time-barred.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to seek damages for common law copyright infringement as an injury to property.

ABS Entertainment, Inc. v. CBS Corp. · filed 2016-02-18(4)

Thus, the plain language of C.P.L.R. § 214(4) and New York case law on analogous causes of action supports applying the three-year statute of limitations in C.P.L.R. § 214(4) for injury to property to the common law copyright infringement claim.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to commence a negligence action; a claim filed after that period is time-barred unless the limitations period is tolled.

Bethune v. Mount Sinai Beth Israel Medical Center · filed 2016-03-28(5)

The statute of limitations for a negligence action in New York is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Her claim is therefore time-barred.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for property damage claims.

MITCHELL, MICHAEL G. v. OLAR, CALIN · filed 2016-04-29(4)

Plaintiff commenced the underlying action on September 20, 2013 by filing the complaint (see CPLR 203 [c]), which was before the three-year statute of limitations for Crisafulli’s property damage claim expired on October 6, 2013 (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty when the remedy sought is purely monetary.

Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. · filed 2016-09-23(4)

Where, as here, the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging "injuries to property" within the meaning of CPLR 214 (4), which has a three-year limitations period.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a property damage claim.

Gordon v. ROL Realty Co. · filed 2017-05-11(4)

Plaintiff’s claim for damage to his photocopier, art poster, antique furniture, and television is time-barred, since the damage to these items occurred more than three years prior to service of the complaint, and the prior dismissal of the claims ... without prejudice did not toll the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; 205 [a]).

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a property damage claim, measured from when the damage becomes apparent; continuing damage from an original objectionable act does not restart the period.

EPK Props., LLC v. PFOHL Bros. Landfill Site Steering Comm. · filed 2018-03-23(4)

On the merits, we conclude that the court properly determined that the causes of action for nuisance and trespass are time-barred. "An action to recover damages for injury to property must be commenced within three years of the date of the injury" ( Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc ., 22 NY3d 1024, 1031 [2013], rearg denied 23 NY3d 934 [2014]; see CPLR 214 [4]), and "[t]he cause of action accrues when the damage [is] apparent' " ( Russell v Dunbar , 40 AD3d 952, 953 [2d Dept 2007]; see Wild v Hayes , 68 AD3d 1412, 1414-1415 [3d Dept 2009]; Cranesville Block Co. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp ., 175 AD2d 444, 446 [3d Dept 1991]).

Section 214(4) gives trespass claims for property damage a three-year limitations period.

Piccolo v. Singleton · filed 2019-09-09(4)

New York claims for trespass are governed by the three-year statute of limitations for property damage claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4); ... Any trespass claim arising from the incident that occurred on or around March to June 2013 is thus time-barred.

Section 214(4) gives actions for damages to property a three-year limitations period.

Zirvi v. Flatley · filed 2020-01-14(4)

Apart from the state law fraud claim and the claims for injunctive relief, which are subject to six-year statutes of limitations, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1), (8), the plaintiffs’ state law claims for damages are subject to three-year statutes of limitations because they are all actions to recover damages for an injury to property.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury claims but excludes claims governed by section 215’s shorter limit, including assault claims.

Tatas v. Ali Baba's Terrace, Inc. · filed 2020-04-29(5)

aese statutes of limitations are shorter than the general statute of limitations for personal injury under New York Law. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (setting three-year statute of limitations for “an action to recover damages for a personal injury except as provided in section[] . . . 215.” (emphasis added)).

CPLR 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Pirozzi v. Garvin · filed 2020-07-15(5)

Nevertheless, we agree with the defendants that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against the additional defendants as time-barred. As there is no dispute that the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]) had expired when the amended complaint was filed, the question of whether the additional defendants may be added as defendants depends on [*3]whether the relation-back doctrine applies ( see CPLR 203[b]; Matter of Germain v Town of Chester Planning Bd. , 178 AD3d 926, 927).

Section 214(4) gives a claim for destruction of property a three-year limitations period that runs from the date of the damage, not its discovery.

Troy-McKoy v. Mount Sinai Beth Israel · filed 2020-04-30(4)

This action, commenced June 22, 2018, is barred by the three-year limitations period for destruction of property claims ( see CPLR 214[4]). Plaintiff's claim accrued on the date of the fire, not on the date of discovery of the damage ( Verizon-New York, Inc. v Reckson Assoc. Realty Corp. , 19 AD3d 291, 291 [1st Dept 2005]; see Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp. , 81 NY2d 90, 94 [1993]).

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim for apparent property damage.

Americon Constr., Inc. v. Cirocco & Ozzimo, Inc. · filed 2022-05-24(4)

The motion court should have denied Americon leave to amend its complaint to add a negligence claim against Laquila, because such a claim would be time-barred. The original complaint was not filed until over three years after the subject incident took place and the alleged property damage was apparent ( see generally CPLR 214[4]; Russell v Dunbar , 40 AD3d 952, 953 [2d Dept 2007]).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from when liability arises to bring a negligence claim.

Miyamoto v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2022-09-12(5)

Negligence claims must be brought within three years of the date liability arises. CPLR § 214(5). ... Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence therefore survives to the extent it is based on BANA’s conduct within three years of filing this suit.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years from the injury to bring a property damage claim.

Webster Golf Club, Inc. v. Monroe County Water Auth. · filed 2023-08-11(4)

The construction defendants met their initial burden of establishing that plaintiffs' first four causes of action against them were untimely insofar as the allegations were based on the alleged deposit of sediment into the ponds inasmuch as the action was commenced against them over three years from the date of the alleged injury ( see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Parker v. New York State Division of Parole · filed 2024-06-27(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Plaintiff did not file this complaint, however, until May 3, 2023, more than 10 years beyond the limitations period.

CPLR 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an idea misappropriation claim seeking monetary damages as an injury to property.

Select Research Ltd. v. Amazon.com · filed 2025-09-02(4)

Under New York law, “courts determine the applicable limitations period by analyzing the substantive remedy that the plaintiff seeks. Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging ‘injury to property’ within the meaning of CPLR 214(4), which has a three-year limitations period.” ... Thus, its idea misappropriation claim under New York law is time barred.

Section 214(4) gives a negligence claim for property damage a three-year limitations period.

Mario's Pizzeria of Commack, Corp. v. State of New York · filed 2025-08-28(4)

The statute of limitations for a negligence cause of action for property damage is three years (CPLR 214 [4]). In the present matter, it is undisputed that the motion was made within that limitations period and is therefore timely.

Section 214(4) gives a negligence claim for property damage a three-year limitations period.

M&A Beauty, Inc. v. State of New York · filed 2025-08-28(4)

The statute of limitations for a negligence cause of action for property damage is three years (CPLR 214 [4]). In the present matter, it is undisputed that the motion was made within that limitations period and is therefore timely.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims seeking recovery for property damage.

Commack Veterinary Ctr., PLLC v. State of New York · filed 2025-08-28(4)

The statute of limitations for a negligence cause of action for property damage is three years (CPLR 214 [4]). In the present matter, it is undisputed that the motion was made within that limitations period and is therefore timely.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for actions alleging damage to property or private nuisance.

Ogundiran v. Spira · filed 2026-06-03(4)

A cause of action alleging damage to property is governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]; Listwon v 500 Metro. Owner, LLC , 188 AD3d 1028, 1030; Russell v Dunbar , 40 AD3d 952, 953). Likewise, a cause of action alleging private nuisance is governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]; TJO, Inc. v Keyspan Corp. , 176 AD3d 1000, 1003).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year deadline for commencing an action to recover property damage.

Kitch v. Markham · filed 1997-11-03(4)

On September 23, 1996, the last possible day for commencing his action (CPLR 214 [4]), plaintiff purchased an index number and filed his summons and complaint.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limit for injury-to-property claims, but negligent misrepresentation claims closely aligned with intentional fraud claims receive a six-year limit under § 213.

Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Technology, Inc. · filed 2011-07-12(4)

New York applies a three-year statute of limitations to claims that involve an “injury to property,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), and a six-year statute of limitations to claims that are “based upon fraud,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8), as well as those “for which no limitations is specifically prescribed by law,” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1). ... Regardless of which subsection of § 213 provides the limitations period for negligent misrepresentation claims, the six-year limitations period applies to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims because the claims are closely aligned with plaintiffs’ intentional fraud claims.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limit for property damage claims; an amended claim may still be timely if it relates back to a timely complaint.

JEM Transportation Corp. v. Blennau · filed 2012-09-21(4)

Yet, under the “relation back” doctrine applicable to amended claims in complaints (CPLR 203 [f]), the new and amended claims cannot be deemed untimely simply because they were not asserted within the usual three-year time limit for property damage claims (CPLR 214 [4]; see Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d at 177).

Section 214(3) gives an owner three years to seek recovery of a chattel; against a good-faith possessor, the period begins when the owner demands its return and the possessor refuses.

Gammon Collection Inc. v. Athena Art Fin. Corp. · filed 2025-06-02(3)

Accordingly, based on the allegations of the complaint, the limitations period began to run upon plaintiffs’ demand and Athena’s refusal.

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for a discovery proceeding treated as an action for replevin or conversion.

Matter of Catapano · filed 2025-03-20(3)

Respondents are correct in advancing that "the [s]tatute of [l]imitations for a discovery proceeding is the three year [s]tatute of [l]imitations provided under CPLR 214 (3) for replevin and conversion actions" ( Matter of Kraus , 208 AD2d at 729; see Matter of Neshewat , 237 AD2d at 525).