N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302 permits specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when its statutory conditions for in-state business activity or tortious conduct are met.

Bonhac World Corporation v. Mellin Works LLC · filed 2023-01-20(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)

Specific personal jurisdiction may apply if the criteria of § 302(a)(1), § 302(a)(2), or § 302(a)(3) are met. ... Therefore, specific jurisdiction does not apply to Defendant under § 302(a)(1). ... § 302(a)(2) permits courts to exercise “personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... commits a tortious act within the state....” ... Thus, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over any Defendant under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful availment through New York business or a contract to supply goods or services there, plus a nexus between that activity and the claim.

Economy Premier Assur. Co. v. Miflex 2 S.p.A. · filed 2023-01-25

In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1), the court must determine (1) whether the defendant "purposefully availed itself of 'the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State' by either transacting business in New York or contracting to supply goods or services in New York" (D & R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 NY3d 292, 297, quoting Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316, 323; see Transcan Sys., Inc. v Seldat Distrib., Inc., 209 AD3d 911, 913), and (2) whether the claim arose from that business transaction or from the contract to supply good or services (see D & R Global Selections, S.L. v Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 NY3d at 297; Transcan Sys., Inc. v Seldat Distrib., Inc., 209 AD3d at 913).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when it transacts business in New York and the claim arises from those transactions, while section 302(a)(2) requires the tortious act to have been committed in New York.

Matter of New York Asbestos Litig. · filed 2023-01-31(a)(1) and (a)(2)

A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary so long as two elements are satisfied: (1) the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state and (2) the claims must arise from those transactions (see Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316, 323 [2016]). ... The court should have granted the motion to dismiss the complaint as against defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) because there was no record evidence suggesting that defendant's minimal activity in New York had an articulable nexus to plaintiff's injury. ... Plaintiff also failed to demonstrate that defendant was subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2), which requires that a tortious act be committed within the state. In this case, plaintiff's alleged exposure to defendant's valves — that is, the purportedly tortious act — occurred in Connecticut, not in New York.

Section 302 allows New York courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants when they engage in specified acts connected to New York.

Machado v. Hershey Entertainment and Resorts Company · filed 2023-02-13(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

Applying these standards to the allegations at hand, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Section 302(a)(1). ... The Court thus lacks Section 302(a)(2) specific jurisdiction over Defendants. ... Plaintiffs’ Complaint is insufficient to confer this Court’s Section 302(a)(3)(i) jurisdiction. ... Based on these pleading failures, the Court finds that it cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over either Defendant pursuant to Section 302(a).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in the state or commit qualifying tortious acts connected to New York, subject to the statute’s requirements.

Shelbourne Global Solutions, LLC v. Gutnicki LLP · filed 2023-02-27(a)(1), (a)(3)(i), (a)(3)(ii)

Therefore, the factual allegations and record do not support a proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants as to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims pursuant to § 302(a)(1). ... Consequently, § 302(a)(3) is not a sufficient basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants based on specified business activity or tortious conduct connected to New York.

Birittieri v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. · filed 2023-02-28(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (“§ 302(a)(1)”) provides that personal jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary defendant that “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” ... N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (“§ 302(a)(2)”) provides that personal jurisdiction may apply where a defendant commits tortuous conduct while physically present in New York. ... N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (“§ 302(a)(3)”) provides that personal jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary defendant that “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state ... if [she] (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.”

Section 302(a)(3) allows New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tort outside the state that causes in-state injury and meets specified contact requirements.

Chowdhury v. Veon Ltd. · filed 2023-02-28(a)(3)

That provision allows for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary “who in person or through an agent . . . commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state . . . if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).3 ... Because Chowdhury has failed to sufficiently allege any basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over VEON under New York’s long-arm statute, the Court need not analyze whether jurisdiction would comport with due process. ... Accordingly, the Court grants VEON’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that purposefully avails itself of conducting business in New York, while section 302(a)(3) does not confer jurisdiction when the event causing the injury occurred outside New York.

Peldman v. Kalahari Resorts, LLC · filed 2022-09-27(a)(1), (a)(3)

The Kalahari defendants did not invoke the benefits and protections of New York's laws under CPLR 302(a)(1), as their activities alleged in the complaint were insufficient to demonstrate that they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in New York (see Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 24 NY3d 370, 376 [2014]). ... Thus, the event giving rise to the injury — namely, the bedbug infestation itself — actually occurred in Pennsylvania, not in New York, and CPLR 302(a)(3) therefore does not confer jurisdiction (see Paterno, 24 NY3d at 381; Marie v Altshuler, 30 AD3d 271, 272 [1st Dept 2006]).

Section 302(a)(3) requires an injury in New York; for an unlawful termination claim, the injury occurs at the place of employment.

Schenck v. United Airlines · filed 2023-02-22(a)(3)

So the situs of the injury here is New Jersey, not New York, and United therefore is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court under section 302(a)(3).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business or contracts to supply goods or services in New York, or commits a tortious act in New York.

Transcan Sys., Inc. v. Seldat Distrib., Inc. · filed 2022-10-19(a)(1) and (a)(2)

CPLR 302 provides, in relevant part, that New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who "transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state" (CPLR 302[a][1]), or "commits a tortious act within the state" (CPLR 302[a][2]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services there and the claim arises from those acts, while section 302(a)(3) covers certain out-of-state torts causing in-state injury when additional conditions are met.

Dental Recycling North America, Inc. v. Stoma Ventures, Inc. · filed 2023-01-24(a)(1) and (a)(3)

To establish specific jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), two conditions must be met. First, the defendant must “transact ... business within the state or contract[ ] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Second, the cause of action must arise from “[a]cts which are the basis of jurisdiction.” Id. ... Section 302(a)(3) also permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant “who in person or through an agent ... commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over non domiciliary defendants when the statutory requirements are met.

Taxi Tours Inc. v. Go N.Y. Tours, Inc. · filed 2022-11-03

As to the jurisdictional issues, Go New York's allegations against Big Bus Tours Limited failed to set forth facts sufficient [*2]to support the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants when the statutory requirements for transacting business or committing tortious acts in or outside New York are met.

Birittieri v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. · filed 2023-02-28(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)

Plaintiffs must meet two requirements to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1): “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... Accordingly, Defendant is not subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). ... Given Second Circuit precedent, the Court must apply the majority rule requiring the defendant to physically commit the tortious act in New York. ... Accordingly, Defendant is not subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2). ... To determine an injury has occurred within the state, courts apply a “situs-of-injury test, which asks [courts] to locate the original event which caused the injury.” ... Accordingly, Defendant is not subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3).

A party invoking § 302(a)(3) must make a substantive argument showing that it is likely to establish personal jurisdiction under that provision.

Mercer Health & Benefits LLC v. DiGregorio · filed 2018-04-05(a)(3)

Mercer does not make any substantive argument in support of jurisdiction on this basis and thus has not shown that is it likely to succeed in establishing that Lockton Co. is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction based on specified New York contacts; none of the listed grounds applied to the New Jersey justices.

Anonymous v. Kaye · filed 1996-12-23

Pursuant to § 302, a party may be subject to personal jurisdiction in New York if that party transacts business in New York, see § 302(1); committed a tort outside the state, the effects of which are felt in New York, see § 302(c)(2)-(3); or possesses real property in New York, see § 302(c)(4). Because the NJ Justices do not fit into any of these categories, the district court properly held that none of these bases for jurisdiction apply.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a temporary, random, or tenuous connection to New York through one telephone call.

Walter M. Thompson and Hollis Headrick v. Cornet Stores, Inc. A/K/A Cornet Stores · filed 1997-02-12(a)(3)

A temporary, random, or tenuous relationship with the forum through one telephone call is not the type of purposeful contact required under New York's long-arm jurisdiction statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a) requires evidence of the relevant New York contacts to support personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary.

Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. · filed 1997-09-25(a)

Altai has failed to show that the New York federal court adjudicating Computer Associates’s United States copyright claims would have had jurisdiction over FASTER under New York’s long arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). ... There is no evidence in the record that FASTER either transacts business within New York or derives substantial revenue from the state.

Section 302(a)(1)-(2) requires a nondomiciliary’s New York business transaction to be substantially related to the claimed injury, or a tortious act in New York to have caused it; supervising an agency whose reach includes New York is insufficient.

Nwanze v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 2000-06-07(a)(1)-(2)

Other than the improperly pleaded conspiracy allegation, however, the Complaint fails to allege any facts which might establish that Director Hawk either committed tortious acts in New York, or that the injuries of which Plaintiffs complain were related to business she transacted in New York. Mere supervision over the Bureau of Prisons, the reach of which extends into every state, is insufficient to establish a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(2) provides a basis for personal jurisdiction when alleged tortious acts occurred in New York.

Sty-Lite Co. v. Eminent Sportswear Inc. · filed 2000-09-20(a)(2)

Finally, many of the alleged tortious acts occurred within New York providing an additional basis of personal jurisdiction over the parties. See N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction for in-state tortious acts committed through an agent, and § 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a party that contracts to supply goods in New York.

Mario Valente Collezioni, Ltd. v. Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., Confezioni Mario Valente-Firenze, S.R.L. And Paolo · filed 2001-08-27(a)(1), (a)(2)

Since Kindler acted as Semeraro’s agent, Kindler’s actions in New York to divert business away from Mario Valente subject the defendants to the court’s jurisdiction on the tort claims under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (tortious acts committed in state permit the exercise of jurisdiction). ... On the contract claim, the district court correctly found jurisdiction exists under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), which permits jurisdiction over anyone who “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.”

Section 302(a) requires a qualifying New York connection to establish personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.

Brooks v. Lenthe · filed 2006-12-05(a)

The VGH defendants did not transact business in New York, commit tortious acts in New York, commit tortious acts with effects in New York, or own, use, or possess any real property or assets in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a direct relationship between the claim and in-state conduct; under section 302(a)(3), later consequences in New York do not make an injury suffered elsewhere an injury within the state.

Intermor v. Walt Disney Co. · filed 2003-03-06(a)(1), (a)(3)

Plaintiffs’ claim for personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) must fail because there is no “direct relationship between the cause of action and the in state conduct.” ... For the purposes of CPLR 302(a)(3), it is irrelevant that Plaintiffs’ injuries resulted in consequences in New York, or even worsened while here.

Section 302(a)(3) excludes defamation claims, while § 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business transactions.

Curto v. Medical World Communications, Inc. · filed 2005-08-02(a)(1), (a)(3)

Section 302(a)(3) specifically exempts from its purview causes of action based on defamation and is therefore inapplicable. ... Section 302(a) confers jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts business within New York and the claim arises out of those transactions. ... Plaintiffs defamation claim does not arise out of Conselyea’s purported acts within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) supports jurisdictional discovery when a plaintiff makes a sufficient start toward showing that a defendant transacted business in New York.

Hollins v. United States Tennis Ass'n · filed 2006-07-10(a)(1)

In sum, plaintiffs have “made a sufficient start toward establishing personal jurisdiction” over ITF under either section 301 or 302(a)(1) to warrant jurisdictional discovery.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those business contacts.

San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n v. Maounis · filed 2010-03-15(a)

Hunter’s trading on the NYMEX does, however, create a basis for personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302, New York’s long-arm statute. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary if that party “transacts any business within the state” and if the claim arises from these business contacts.

Section 302(a)(3) requires a basis under New York law or another pertinent jurisdiction for treating the defendant’s conduct as tortious.

Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz · filed 2007-06-08(a)(3)

Nonetheless, there must be some basis for considering the defendant’s actions to be tortious, either under the law of New York or some other pertinent jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff has shown no basis for considering defendant’s actions to be tortious. Therefore, the District Court properly found that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(3) permits an act that is tortious under the law of a pertinent foreign jurisdiction to support personal jurisdiction, even if the act does not violate New York law.

City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc. · filed 2007-12-18(a)(3)

Thus, even in circumstances in which New York law is not violated, foreign law of a pertinent jurisdiction can suffice to supply the “tortious act” on which CPLR 302(a)(3) jurisdiction is predicated.

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit a plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction by orchestrating an in-state purchase through a defendant’s website.

Krepps v. Reiner · filed 2008-11-24(a)(1)

Although courts have held that the purchase of goods through a party’s website can establish personal jurisdiction under New York’s long arm statute, ... plaintiffs are not permitted to “manufacture” personal jurisdiction over defendants by orchestrating an in-state web-based purchase of their goods.

Section 302 permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from those acts, and for certain out-of-state tortious acts causing in-state injury when the defendant should reasonably expect New York consequences and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Capitol Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc. · filed 2009-03-09(a)(1) and (a)(3)(ii)

Under C.P.L.R. Section 302(a)(1), jurisdiction is proper over an out-of-state defendant who “transacts any business within the state [of New York]” when the cause of action “arises from” such acts. ... Consequently, these actions constitute the requisite “something more” that, when combined with the volume of Hi5’s internet activity in New York, make clear that Hi5 “transacts business” in New York within the meaning of Section 302(a)(1). ... Therefore, jurisdiction is proper under Section 302(a)(3)(ii) so long as Hi5 should reasonably have expected its actions to have had consequences in New York. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have made factual, allegations that establish a prima facie showing that Hi5 is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court under Section 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York, commits specified torts, or owns, uses, or possesses New York real property.

Rusyniak v. Gensini · filed 2009-05-05(a)

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent: (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or (2) commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). ... After carefully considering the matter, the Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, when the cause of action arises from those acts.

Musket Corporation v. Pdvsa Petroleo, Sa · filed 2009-09-18(a)(1)

Under CPLR § 302(a)(1), “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary [defendant]” if that defendant “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (2006). The statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary only when the “cause of action aris[es] from” the “[a]cts which are the basis of jurisdiction.” § 302(a).

Section 302 allows New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary only when the defendant has one of the statute's listed contacts with New York.

Hubbard v. Kelley · filed 2009-09-24

Upon a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, and after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from the parties, the Court adopts the proposed findings of the Report and Recommendation. ... Not only is the application of New York or Ontario substantive law to this action completely irrelevant to the issue of whether Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, but the record is devoid of any evidence establishing any basis under § 302 for subjecting either Defendant to personal jurisdiction in New York, the burden for which lies with Plaintiffs.

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries when the facts establish that they are subject to New York's long-arm jurisdiction.

Maersk, Inc. v. NEEWRA, INC. · filed 2009-12-17

In light of these and the other facts developed to date, the Court has little trouble concluding that Maersk has established personal jurisdiction over the Remaining Defendants by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, it is more likely than not that Joginder, Parker and Help Line were co-conspirators with the New York-based defendants in the commission of the alleged frauds, and are thus subject to jurisdiction pursuant to New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful New York business connected to the claim, while § 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a tort causing in-state injury, reasonably foreseeable New York consequences, and substantial interstate or international revenue.

FORTIES B LLC v. America West Satellite, Inc. · filed 2010-07-23(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

The Court holds that plaintiffs have failed to make prima facie showing of jurisdiction under either provision through their pleadings and affidavits, and have certainly not adduced evidence that, if credited by a trier of fact, would establish jurisdiction. ... To determine the existence of jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), a court must decide (1) whether the defendant “transacts any business” in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action “aris[es] from” such a business transaction. ... For these reasons, the mere facts that PBSG may have sold advertisements to at least one company with a New York office location and that some Pars TV advertisers may have sold their products to New York consumers are insufficient to establish that PBSG “transacted business” in New York. ... For related reasons, there is no jurisdiction over PBSG under CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who purposefully transacts business in New York or commits a tort outside New York that causes in-state injury and satisfies an additional statutory requirement.

House of Diamonds v. BORGIONI, LLC · filed 2010-08-25(a)(1) and (a)(3)

New York’s long-arm statute grants personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant if the defendant “transacts business within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). A defendant is found to transact business within the state if it “purposefully avails itself of the privileges of conducting activities within New York.” ... Thus, by purposefully creating a continuous relationship with a New York corporation and by maintaining constant communications with it over the period of approximately one year, Zrelak availed himself of the benefits and privileges of transacting business in New York and is therefore subject to jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Thus, for jurisdiction to be proper under the statute, the Court must determine that Zrelak has caused injury in New York by committing a tortious act outside of New York, and that he meets the requirements of either subsection (i) or subsection (ii). ... Accordingly, Zrelak meets the jurisdictional criteria set out in C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) and is therefore subject to personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3) does not permit personal jurisdiction based on a breach of contract because a breach of contract is not a tortious act.

Skrodzki v. Marcello · filed 2011-08-19(a)(3)

However, it is well-settled that a breach of contract does not constitute a tortious act under CPLR § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a) requires facts showing sufficient ties between a non-domiciliary and New York for long-arm jurisdiction to apply.

Eades v. Kennedy, PC. Law Offices · filed 2013-12-03(a)

Plaintiffs, who do not allege that Kennedy conducts business or supplies goods or services in New York, that it owns any property here, that it has engaged in an ongoing course of conduct within the state (as opposed to a single letter, service of process for the Pennsylvania lawsuit, and a single phone call), or that it has committed a tort (as opposed to a statutory violation), have failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Kennedy has sufficient ties to New York for long-arm jurisdiction to apply.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s New York business activity, and § 302(a)(4) requires a relationship between the claim and the defendant’s New York real property.

Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2015-03-10(a)(1), (a)(4)

Assuming, only for purposes of resolution of this motion, that Defendants transacted business in New York, Plaintiffs submissions are void of any allegations that Plaintiffs claims regarding the “masticated chicken nuggets” arise out of Defendants’ New York activities. ... Similar to personal jurisdiction requirements under Section 302(a)(1), to allege personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant under Section 302(a)(4), a plaintiff must demonstrate “a relationship between the property and the cause of action sued upon.” ... Accordingly, there is no authority for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants under Section 302(a)(4).

Section 302(a) does not establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the allegations fail to connect it to the alleged fraud.

JGB Enterprises, Inc. v. Beta Fluid Systems, Inc. · filed 2015-09-29(a)

These allegations are patently insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over McAleese under § 302(a). Plaintiff has not alleged any role by .McAleese in the alleged fraud, such as would give rise to jurisdiction under either § 302(a)(2) or § 302(a)(3).

A nondomiciliary witness who is subject to personal jurisdiction under § 302(a) cannot claim immunity from service while in New York to testify.

Continental Industries Group, Inc. v. Altunkilic · filed 2016-03-07(a)

Consequently, the district court was obliged to consider whether Altunkilic was subject to personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), such that he would have been amenable to service without regard to physical presence in New York and, thus, not entitled to immunity.

Section 302(a)(1) requires sufficient business activity in New York, while Section 302(a)(2) requires an in-state tort by the defendant or an agent over whom the defendant exercises control.

Hill v. HSBS Bank PLC · filed 2016-09-15(a)(1), (a)(2)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Foreign Defendants have transacted business sufficient under Section 302(a)(1) to confer personal jurisdiction over them in New York. ... Plaintiffs have made no non-conclusory allegations demonstrating that HSBC exercised control over Madoff or BLMIS in any way, and have failed to demonstrate the requisite agency relationship for asserting personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(1) allows jurisdictional discovery to determine whether a foreign bank purposefully transacted business in New York through a correspondent account.

Vasquez v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. · filed 2019-05-30(a)(1)

The Court concludes that jurisdictional discovery is required to enable the Court reliably to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction under the first prong of § 302(a)(1), insofar as the requirement there that the defendant have transacted business within the state has been held to require purposeful availment by the defendant.

Section 302(a) requires facts connecting a non-domiciliary to a listed basis for specific personal jurisdiction; a conclusory assertion of jurisdiction is insufficient.

Hewes v. Alabama Secretary of State · filed 2020-07-23(a)

There is no allegation that the out-of-state Moving Defendants transact business of any kind in New York, that they have committed a tortious act of any kind, that they own property within the state, or any other allegation that could support a finding of personal jurisdiction for a non-domiciliary.

Section 302(a)(1)’s requirements may be assessed after jurisdictional discovery when the expected evidence bears on both prongs.

Vasquez v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. · filed 2019-07-19(a)(1)

It remains the Court’s judgment that jurisdictional discovery will provide clarity as to the resolution of all questions. Although there may be cases where the facts bearing on the first prong of the long-arm statute are entirely distinct from the facts bearing on the second, the record here suggests that evidence to be adduced will likely inform the Court’s assessment of each prong.

Section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction over claims sounding in defamation, including disparagement claims based on allegedly false statements.

Golden Ring International, Inc. v. Cullen · filed 2019-08-26(a)(3)

Second, plaintiffs' claims arising from the Hollywood Reporter article and their other disparagement claims, relying as they do on an allegedly harmfully false statement, sound in defamation, and therefore also cannot confer jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a) requires facts showing that a defendant’s specified New York related acts connect to the asserted claim before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction.

Kim v. Lee · filed 2019-09-24(a)

In addition, a defendant may be subject to New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, if he engages in the following acts either in person or through an agent and such acts relate to an asserted claim: (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state but injuries a person or property in the state; or (4) owns, uses, or possesses any real property in the state. ... He also does not set forth any facts demonstrating that Defendants are subject to New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim arising from business transacted in New York; § 302(a)(3) requires an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York plus the specified business contacts or commerce-related conditions.

North Fork Partners Investment Holdings, LLC v. Bracken · filed 2020-05-18(a)(1), (a)(3)

The Complaint fails to properly allege personal jurisdiction over Defendants Erb or Elias through either provision. With respect to Section 302(a)(1), there are no well-pled allegations that either Defendant transacted business in New York or that the cause of action arose in New York. With respect to Section 302(a)(3), even assuming an injury in New York—which is not alleged in the Complaint—the Complaint is devoid of any allegation that either Defendant regularly does business in New York, expected their acts to have consequences in New York, or that either Defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Section 302(a) requires facts showing that a defendant’s conduct falls within New York’s long-arm statute; allegations of conduct in another state without a tortious injury or other qualifying basis are insufficient.

Gladyshev v. Shea · filed 2020-07-29(a)

Moreover, Plaintiff states that the actions giving rise to his claim occurred in Seattle, Washington, and he does not allege his injury resulted from tortious action. He therefore fails to demonstrate that Defendants are subject to New York’s long- arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful business activity in New York, while § 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York, foreseeable consequences there, and substantial interstate or international revenue.

Yak v. BiggerPockets, L.L.C. · filed 2020-09-10(a)(1); (a)(3)(ii)

When the facts are viewed holistically alongside the four factors outlined by the Second Circuit, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that Curelop “transact[ed] any business” in New York such that he projected himself into, or purposefully availed himself of the benefits and responsibilities of transacting business in, New York. ... In sum, Plaintiff has not pled facts suggesting prima facie personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a New York business transaction from which the claim arises, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a prima facie showing of actual or threatened injury in New York.

Homeschool Buyers Club, Inc. v. Brave Writer, LLC · filed 2020-03-11(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing with respect to section 302(a)(1), because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a single act directed at New York out of which these claims arise. ... Plaintiff certainly alleges a belief that its customer base is in jeopardy, (Choi Aff. ¶ 14), but merely alleging a belief in a likelihood of harm is insufficient to make a prima facie showing under section 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) does not permit specific jurisdiction based on limited recruiting communications about an out-of-state job when the employer did not target recruitment at New York.

Yih v. Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. · filed 2020-05-19(a)(1)

Absent any allegation of recruiting targeted at New York, the sole communications tying TSMC to New York were those it had with Yih. These communications -- two Skype interviews and emails through a third-party agent regarding a position in Taiwan for which Yih was not hired -- were too limited to amount to a purposeful transaction of business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction based on a composer’s employment merely because his employer later sells his work to companies that distribute it in New York.

Krisko v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC · filed 2020-07-21(a)(1)

Any connections Wasserman’s work on the X-Men theme song have to New York are random, fortuitous, and attenuated, and, thus, do not merit this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him pursuant to C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1)’s transacting-business requirement can be met when a defendant retains a New York consultant and attends meetings in New York to obtain those services.

Mercury Public Affairs, LLC v. Airbus Defence and Space, S.A.U. · filed 2020-08-21(a)(1)

Even if actions taken at the U.N. are excluded from the jurisdictional analysis, ADSS’s retention of Mercury, a citizen of New York, to provide consulting services and, in particular, its employees’ attendance at meetings held in New York to obtain those services is sufficient to meet both the “transacting business” requirement of the New York long-arm statute and the constitutional “minimum contacts” test.

Section 302(a)(1) requires defendant-specific facts supporting personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in New York.

Hunter v. Shanghai Huangzhou Electrical Appliance Manufacturing Co., Ltd. · filed 2020-09-03(a)(1)

As a result, Plaintiffs’ approach of treating Defendants as a collective, rather than addressing the Shanghai Huangzhou Defendants specifically, fails to provide the factual specificity necessary for the Court to assert jurisdiction over the Shanghai Huangzhou Defendants under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

An online storefront offering shipping to New York does not establish jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) without evidence of a transaction in New York.

Spin Master Ltd. v. 158 · filed 2020-09-04(a)(1)

Plaintiffs still fail to evidence a “single act” or “transaction” in New York sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the Remaining Defaulting Defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) requires facts showing that each defendant transacted business in New York; a general allegation that online sellers offer or sell products to New York customers is insufficient.

OFF-WHITE LLC v. ALI JR · filed 2020-09-28(a)(1)

The general allegation that all Defendants “offer for sale and/or sell” Counterfeiting Products to customers located in New York, without more, does not establish that the Defaulting Defendants transacted business with the forum and purposefully availed themselves of the protections of the forum.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York in person or through an agent when the claim arises from that transaction.

Spetner v. Palestine Investment Bank · filed 2020-10-16(a)(1)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) is lacking because PIB is not alleged to have transacted business in New York in person or through an agent as required for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York, contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, or commits a tortious act in New York.

Love Grace, Inc. v. Santos · filed 2020-11-05(a)

New York’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over “any non-domiciliary” who, inter alia, “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” or “commits a tortious act within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). Even if Ms. Santos no longer resides in New York, she continues to transact business in New York as a shareholder of Love Grace, which maintains its principal place of business in New York, and Plaintiff alleges that she committed tortious acts in New York that form the basis of its complaint.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose purposeful New York business transaction has a substantial relationship to the claim, while § 302(a)(3) excludes claims sounding in defamation.

Real Selling Group LLC v. ESN Group Inc. · filed 2021-02-12(a)(1), (a)(3)

“To establish personal jurisdiction under this provision, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in a purposeful business transaction in or directed to New York and that such contacts with the state had a ‘substantial relationship’ to the claim asserted in the underlying litigation.” ... ESN’s in-state sales through its websites are clearly insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, as Real Selling’s claims do not arise from these sales. ... Section 302(a)(3) provides a basis for personal jurisdiction where defendant “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation.” ... Having rejected § 302(a)(1), the remaining original claims sound in defamation and thus Real Selling may not rely on § 302(a)(3) to exercise personal jurisdiction over ESN.

Section 302(a)(1) requires purposeful in-state business and a claim arising from it, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury plus specified business or commerce conditions.

Mednik v. Equifax Information Services, LLC · filed 2021-02-23(a)(1), (a)(3)

Section 302(a)(1) has two prongs: (1) the defendant must “have transacted business within the state,” either itself or through an agent, and (2) the cause of action “must arise from that business activity.” ... Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over SLS under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... In order to successfully assert jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3)(ii), a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant’s tortious act was committed outside New York, (2) the cause of action arose from that act, (3) the tortious act caused an injury to a person or property in New York, (4) the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected that his or her action would have consequences in New York, and (5) the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. ... Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over SLS under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) covers certain out-of-state torts causing in-state injury.

Metamorfoza D.O.O. v. Big Funny, LLC · filed 2021-02-25(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Under § 302(a)(1), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant if that defendant “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Plaintiff has thus failed to carry its burden of plausibly pleading that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Under § 302(a)(3), a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant if that defendant “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state,” so long as the defendant either (i) “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state,” or (ii) “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3). ... Plaintiff has thus failed to carry its burden of plausibly pleading that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) requires a New York business transaction or contract to supply goods or services in New York and a claim arising from that activity, while Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a plausible showing that the defendant discernibly attempted to serve the New York market.

Century Sports, Inc. v. Ross Bicycles, LLC. · filed 2021-03-23(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

Therefore, Defendants “did not transact business in New York State under the meaning of § 302(a)(1) due to the nature of [their] website.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not made a prima facie showing that jurisdiction over Defendants is proper pursuant to Section 302(a)(1). ... In any event, personal jurisdiction does not exist under Section 302(a)(3)(ii) because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead that Defendants “discernibly attempted to serve the New York market.”

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction for qualifying tortious acts committed in New York by a defendant or agent, while section 302(a)(1) requires a New York business transaction connected to the claim.

Orlando v. Nxt-ID, Inc. · filed 2021-03-23(a)(1), (a)(2)

Section 302(a)(2) “reaches only tortious acts performed by a defendant who was physically present in New York when he performed the wrongful act,” or who committed the tortious act within the state “through an agent.” ... To determine the existence of jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), a court must decide (1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such a business transaction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Lear v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. · filed 2021-04-07(a)(1)

“To establish personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction over RCCL under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York, while § 302(a)(3)(ii) permits it for an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury when the defendant reasonably expects New York consequences and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

AMERICAN GIRL, LLC v. ZEMBRKA · filed 2021-04-28(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

I conclude, based on the record before the Court,that Defendants here have not “transacted business” in New York. ... In short, absent some action by Defendant to specifically target New York with itssales and website, or consummated transactions in the state of New York, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants “transact business” in New York for the purposes of personal jurisdiction. ... As a result, Section 302(a)(1) of the long-arm statute does not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants on the facts before the Court. ... Because Plaintiff fails to establish a New York injury, the Court need not analyze the final two elements of the tortious injury provision of the long-arm statute. ... In sum, state law does not permit the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants here.

Section 302(a) gives New York courts personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants based on specified business, tort, and property related contacts with New York.

Pellegrino v. Fallahee · filed 2021-06-28(a)

New York’s long-arm statute provides that a court has personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant who: ... 4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). ... Pellegrino’s efforts to remove all references to Florida from the body of the Amended Complaint cannot cure his ongoing failure to establish personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

Section 302 allows New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in New York or commit qualifying tortious acts causing in-state injury, subject to the subsection’s conditions.

Brownstone Investment Group LLC v. Bonner & Partners, LLC · filed 2021-08-05(a)(1), (a)(3)

Plaintiff argues that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants based on two provisions of the New York long-arm statute—C.P.L.R. §§ 302(a)(1) and (a)(3). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants under either provision of the New York long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that activity, while § 302(a)(3) excludes defamation claims and requires a New York injury from an out-of-state tort.

Common Cents Distributors, LLC v. CURLS Beauty Brands, LLC · filed 2021-09-15(a)(1), (a)(3)

Defendant’s New York contacts may well be substantial, but they have nothing to do with the claims alleged in this complaint. ... It is clear from the pleadings that each of Plaintiff’s claims, including its claim for tortious interference, arise out of Defendant’s allegedly false complaints to Amazon -- exactly as was the case in Real Selling Group LLC, where this Court found the § 302(a)(3) exemption to be applicable. ... While it is not necessary to reach any of Plaintiff’s other arguments, it bears noting that personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(3) is lacking because the Plaintiff suffered no injury in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary transacting business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction, while section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury when additional contacts conditions are met.

Lensky v. Turkish Airlines, Inc. · filed 2021-09-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

The relationship between Plaintiffs’ claims and THY’s contacts with New York is merely coincidental. Thus, Plaintiffs have not established a sufficient nexus between their claims and THY’s contracts with New York to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over THY under section 302(a)(1). ... The Court does not have jurisdiction over THY under section 302(a)(3) because Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries occurred in Turkey rather than New York. ... Thus, section 302(a)(3) does not confer personal jurisdiction over THY.

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries based on qualifying business transactions or tortious acts connected to New York.

Suber v. VVP Services, LLC · filed 2021-09-27(a)(1)–(3)

Therefore, the Court does not have personal jurisdictionover any of the Defendants for any of Plaintiff’s claims under § 302(a).

Section 302 permits specific jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary based on suit-related conduct connected to New York.

Xue v. Jensen · filed 2020-11-19(a)(2)

To establish specific jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, the court must “focus on the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the defendant[’s] suit-related conduct” to evaluate personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York through an agent when the claim arises from that business.

Fischman v. Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings America, Inc. · filed 2020-12-16(a)(1)

In short, the Court holds that it has personal jurisdiction over MCHC pursuant to Section 302(a)(1) and that this exercise of jurisdiction does not violate MCHC’s due process rights.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Lin v. The Dolar Shop Restaurant Group, LLC · filed 2021-02-22(a)(1)

Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded specific jurisdiction over Shanghai Shenzhuang under New York’s long-arm statute. They invoke Section 302(a)(1) of New York’s Civil Practice Law, which provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). To establish such jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, “two requirements must be met: (1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that Shanghai Shenzhuang transacted business in New York for purposes of Section 302(a)(1) under these principles. ... Taking these factors together, plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that Shanghai Shenzhuang “transacted business” in New York. ... Plaintiffs have also adequately pleaded that their claims “arise out of” Shanghai Shenzhuang’s contacts with New York. The “arising out of” requirement of Section 302(a), requires “a substantial nexus” between the defendant’s “transaction of business” in New York and the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from a defendant's purposeful business activity in New York for specific jurisdiction.

Kerman v. Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources LLC · filed 2021-03-11(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s negligence claim accordingly does not arise from Defendant’s purported contacts with New York, and the requirements of § 302(a)(1) are not satisfied.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction.

IN RE TEEKAY OFFSHORE PARTNERS L.P. COMMON UNITHOLDERS LITIGATION · filed 2021-03-31(a)(1)

Accordingly, even if the merger was not finalized in New York, Brookfield Reply at 3 n.15, that “multiple key events” occurred in New York is enough to satisfy § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Kelly Toys Holdings LLC v. Pearlbuy Limited · filed 2021-07-07(a)(1)

For substantially the reasons set forth in Kelly Toys’ papers [ECF #12 at 3–5; 18 at 3–11; 19 ¶¶ 19–23], the Court concludes that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1) of New York’s long-arm statute and that the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process.

Section 302(a)(1) confers specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, and the claim arises from those acts.

Pena v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company · filed 2021-07-15(a)(1)

C.P.L.R. § 302(a) confers “specific” jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” and the cause of action arises from those acts. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... To satisfy § 302(a), the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s acts in New York. The cause of action here, arising from an insurance contract between two New Jersey companies for a New Jersey vehicle, does not arise from any act by NJM in New York. Accordingly, there is no specific personal jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a non-domiciliary to transact business in New York or contract to supply goods or services there, and the claim must arise from that activity.

Nixon v. Inquisitr, LTD. · filed 2021-08-17(a)(1)

Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had successfully alleged that Inquisitr transacted business in New York, either through the allegations regarding Defendant’s financial gain or by Dysleximedia’s performance of services for Defendant in New York, the Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the second prong for specific jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) -- that the specific cause of action asserted arose out of the party’s transaction of business in New York. In other words, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the infringing publication of the Photograph took place in New York, involved Defendant’s personnel in New York, or “otherwise arose out of any of its activities in New York.” Philpot, 2017 WL 2270248, at *9. He has failed to meet that burden.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business.

Zhou v. Slim Grass Beauty Corp. · filed 2021-01-06(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute, “two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants when claims arise from the defendants’ transaction of business in the state.

In re Lifetrade Litigation · filed 2021-03-29(a)(1)

Under 302(a)(1), a court may take jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants if the claims arise from “the defendants’ transaction of business within the state.”

Section 302(a)(4) permits specific jurisdiction based on New York real property only when the cause of action arises out of that property.

George Moudreas & Co SA v. Jinhai Intelligent Manufacturing Co Ltd · filed 2021-01-18(a)(4)

But for C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(4) to bestow specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign company, Petitioner must allege that the cause of action arises out of Respondents’ New York property. See Karoon v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG, No. 15-CV-4643, 2016 WL 815278, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016). Petitioner has failed to allege any connection between any of the property HNA allegedly owns in New York and the arbitration awards or the underlying contracts. Thus, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(4) does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Moving Respondents.

Section 302(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant transacted business in New York and that the claim arises from that business activity.

HSM Holdings, LLC v. Mantu I.M. Mobile LTD. · filed 2021-03-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s allegations are best understood to claim jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). “To establish jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), Plaintiff must allege that a defendant has ‘transacted business’ in New York and the claim asserted arises from that business activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) lets New York courts exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the claim relates to those contacts.

Sharbat v. Iovance Biotherapeutics, Inc. · filed 2021-03-26(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) provides “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state[.]” To determine whether there is a basis for personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1), courts evaluate “the totality of the defendant’s activity within the forum” and whether “there is an articulable nexus, or a substantial relationship, between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.” ... The Court has specific jurisdiction over Iovance under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York only when the claim arises from that business activity.

Assaf v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey · filed 2021-06-14(a)(1)

Even assuming United transacts business in New York, Plaintiffs have not shown that the injury arose out of any such contacts, since purchasing a ticket in New York does not give rise to jurisdiction for a personal injury action for an incident that occurred outside of the state.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose out-of-state tort causes in-state injury, where the defendant reasonably expects in-state consequences and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

V&A Collection, LLC v. Guzzini Properties Ltd. · filed 2021-03-15(a)(3)(ii)

The Court interprets this comment as a reference to a subsection of New York’s long-arm statute that provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, … if he … expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce[.]” N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii); accord Krisko v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 288, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Defendant argues that “V&A has not alleged or submitted proof that the supposed conversion occurred in New York; that Guzzini was even aware of V&A’s place of business when it allegedly converted the Guyton; or that any act by Guzzini was directed to V&A in New York.” (Def. Reply 6). The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks these crucial allegations, as well as an allegation regarding the revenue Defendant derives from interstate or international commerce. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to make a prima facie case that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) allows New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity.

Car-Freshner Corporation v. Scented Promotions, LLC · filed 2021-03-19(a)(1)

Under CPLR § 302(a)(1) specifically, a plaintiff must establish that (a) the defendant transacted business within the state, and (b) the claim asserted arises from that business activity. ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs have both alleged and provided evidence of sufficient contacts to show that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of transacting business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction under narrower conditions than the Due Process Clause.

Knight v. Standard Chartered Bank · filed 2021-03-31(a)(1)

The Court begins by determining whether personal jurisdiction exists under the Due Process Clause, because “the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of jurisdiction in a broader range of circumstances” than C.P.L.R § 302, such that if there is no personal jurisdiction under the former, there also is none under the latter.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Barakati v. China Southern Airlines Company Limited · filed 2021-06-23(a)(1)

Pursuant to New York’s long-arm statute, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that, “in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Thus, “[t]o establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... The Court sees no reason to depart from established precedent and recently decided cases holding that Plaintiffs’ purchase of tickets in New York and round-trip itinerary beginning and ending in New York are insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over Defendant under section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) allows specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Diamond v. Shiftpixy, Inc. · filed 2021-07-13(a)(1)

To establish jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Absher has “transacted business” in New York, and (2) the claim asserted arises from that business activity.

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over defendants transacting business in New York for claims arising from that business and over defendants committing qualifying torts outside New York that cause in-state injury.

IBE Trade Corp. v. Dubinsky · filed 2021-07-02(a)(1) and (a)(3)(ii)

Under that provision, a defendant who transacts business in New York is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York for claims “arising from” the business he transacts here. ... Thus, Section 302(a)(1) does not subject Dubinsky to jurisdiction here. ... The statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a defendant who “commits a tortious act,” other than “defamation,” outside of New York that “caus[es] injury to person or property within the state,” provided that the defendant “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.” ... The Court, therefore, rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that Section 302(a)(3)(ii) subjects Dubinsky to personal jurisdiction in New York.

C.P.L.R. § 302 permits personal jurisdiction under narrower conditions than the Due Process Clause, so jurisdiction unavailable under due process is also unavailable under § 302.

Alwand Vahan Jewelry, Ltd. v.Lustour, Inc. · filed 2021-08-13

The Court begins by determining whether personal jurisdiction exists under the Due Process Clause, because “the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of jurisdiction in a broader range of circumstances” than C.P.L.R § 302, such that if there is no personal jurisdiction under the former, there also is none under the latter.

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction over tortious acts committed outside New York when specified requirements are met, including injury to a person or property within New York.

Jean-Louis v. Carrington Mtg. Servs., LLC · filed 2021-03-04(a)(3)

Section 302(a)(3) permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over tortious acts committed outside New York if certain requirements are satisfied, but the act must “caus[e] injury to person or property within the state.”

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for an out of state tort causing in state injury when the statute's listed business, revenue, or foreseeable consequences conditions are met.

Yoomi Babytech, Inc. v. Anvyl, Inc. · filed 2021-09-22(a)(3)

For the same reasons, § 302(a)(3) does not apply to MCTRON.

Section 302(a)(1) gives New York personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in the state or contracts to supply goods or services there.

Cunningham v. General Motors LLC · filed 2021-03-04(a)(1)

New York’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction on a non-domiciliary, who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a tortious act committed in New York only when the defendant is physically present in New York.

Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes Inc. · filed 2021-08-09(a)(2)

The defendant, however, must actually be present in New York to be subject to personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the claim has an articulable nexus or substantial relationship to the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Taurisano v. Tabb · filed 2021-03-15(a)(1)

Under the second prong, the plaintiff’s claim must have an “articulable nexus” or “substantial relationship” with the defendant’s transaction of business in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the plaintiff’s claim arises from that transaction.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(a)(1)

Applying these standards, we have no difficulty concluding that plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that there is specific personal jurisdiction over defendants for claims related to payments by New York-based Assignors, regardless of where the prescriptions were ultimately filled. That is because, according to the Second Amended Complaint, defendants marketed and distributed Actos nationally, including in New York, and thus voluntarily reached into New York to make representations about Actos that ultimately led to the New York Assignors’ decision to reimburse prescriptions of the drug. The claims here arise from those contacts, and thus defendants could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in New York to answer for claims brought on behalf of Assignors located in New York. As defendants do not raise compelling policy or burden arguments against exercising personal jurisdiction over them related to these claims, the requirements of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) and due process have been met.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat separate attempted transactions as one when they involve different parties and joint ventures and have no legal or contractual connection.

Southern Oil of Louisiana Inc. v. Saberioon · filed 2021-11-08(a)(1)

They involve different parties, two completely different attempted joint ventures, and share no legal or contractual connections. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, therefore, do not support my treating and analyzing the two transactions together as one single transaction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that activity.

Deltoro v. Novus Equities LLC · filed 2021-11-29(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under this section, “two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” ... These alleged contacts are sufficient to satisfy the statute. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Novus’ alleged contacts with New York satisfy Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, when the claim arises from that activity.

Nike, Inc. v. www.perfectkicks.me · filed 2021-12-16(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within the State or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the State.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that “(1) the defendant . . . transacted business with the State; and (2) the claim asserted . .. arise[s] from that business activity.” ... The operation of a “highly interactive website” with shipments to and clients based in New York may, in totality, demonstrate a defendant’s “purposeful availment of the benefits of transacting business in New York” under section 302(a)(1). Chloe, 616 F.3d at 170-71; see also Vandermark v. Jotomo Corp., 42 A.D.3d 931, 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). ... Thus, the Court is satisfied that plaintiffs have set forth facts sufficient at this stage to demonstrate the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Liu.

Section 302(a)(1) allows New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in the state or contracts to supply goods or services there.

Smart Study Co., Ltd. v. >TC Toy City Store · filed 2021-12-17(a)(1)

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the cause of action arises from that conduct.

Solvents and Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Cyber Solutions Integration Inc. · filed 2022-03-16(a)(1)

Thus, in weighing each of the relevant factors and considering that the bulk of the agreement between the parties was to be performed in New York, the Court finds that Defendant's conduct constituted "transacting business" in New York sufficient to trigger Section 302(a)(1) of the long-arm statute; and, thus, Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under New York law.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the cause of action arises from that business activity.

Shi v. Le · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

Here, the relevant provision of New York’s long-arm statute is § 302(a)(1), which permits courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary “who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1); see also Obj. 3–9 (arguing that § 302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction in this case).2 Courts in this circuit have explained that § 302(a)(1) “has two prongs: (1) the defendant must have transacted business within the state, either itself or through an agent, and (2) the cause of action must arise from that business activity.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, when the cause of action arises from that activity.

Wilson v. Jord Inc. · filed 2022-03-30(a)(1)

“So, in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised under section 302(a)(1), ‘a court must decide (1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action arises from such a business transaction.’” ... “But that sort of “conclusory allegation that [the] [d]efendant used its nationally-available website to solicit [customers] in New York” is “not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction” under the New York long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity.

Precision Wellness, LLC v. Demetech Corporation · filed 2022-03-31(a)(1)

Under Section 302(a)(1), specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant “transacts business within the state” and the claim “arises out of defendant‘s business activity in the state.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity, including a single sale of counterfeit goods into the state.

MATTEL, INC. v. WWW.FISHER-PRICE.ONLINE · filed 2022-07-18(a)(1)

Plaintiff cites Section 302(a)(1) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules to support personal jurisdiction over Defendant for allegedly shipping counterfeit products to New York through Defendant’s website. Compl. ¶ 30. Section 302(a)(1) states that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), (a)(1). In other words, to establish personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1): “(1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Eades v. Kennedy PC Law Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013)). Because Section 302(a)(1) is a “single act statute,” “the ‘single act’ of selling counterfeit goods into New York satisfies the long-arm statute under section 302(a)(1).” Chloe, 616 F.3d at 170.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a plaintiff to show that an out-of-state tort caused an injury in New York, and financial consequences felt there may be insufficient.

Jerusalem NY Enterprises LLC v. Huber Erectors & Hoisting, LLC · filed 2021-10-09(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over the Lauer Defendants under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) because Plaintiff has not shown that it suffered an injury in New York.

Section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction over a defendant whose out-of-state tort causes injury in New York when the defendant reasonably expects in-state consequences and derives substantial interstate or international commerce revenue.

Skatteforvaltningen v. The Goldstein Law Group PC 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan · filed 2021-10-26(a)(3)

However, courts “determining whether there is injury in New York sufficient to warrant § 302(a)(3) jurisdiction must generally apply a situs-of-injury test, which asks them to locate the ‘original event’ which caused the injury.’’’ ... Accordingly, it has not established that jurisdiction is proper under New York’s long arm Statute.

Section 302(a)(3) supports personal jurisdiction when defendants allegedly infect devices in New York with malware.

Google LLC v. Starovikov · filed 2022-04-27(a)(3)

Google has alleged sufficient contacts between each of the defendants and the State of New York to establish personal jurisdiction under New York’s long arm statute and the Due Process Clause. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3). Google has alleged that the defendants operate a botnet that has infected over one million devices, at least thousands of which are located in New York City.

Section 302(a)(2) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary whose agent commits a tortious act in New York.

Farrell v. The United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee · filed 2021-10-15(a)(2)

To establish specific personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant, "in person or through an agent . . . (1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or (2) commits a tortious act within the state . . . " N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)-(2). ... The Court concludes that New York's long-arm statute gives the Court specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant USS.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business activity.

Hart v. The Tri-State Consumer, Inc. · filed 2021-11-06(a)(1)

To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for a tortious act outside New York that causes in-state injury when the defendant could reasonably expect New York consequences and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Yak v. BiggerPockets, L.L.C. · filed 2022-01-07(a)(3)(ii)

C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) provides for jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, . . . if he . . . expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.”

Section 302(a)(3) permits New York courts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary for certain tortious acts committed outside New York when the statutory New York contacts and revenue requirements are met.

E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Sire Spirits LLC · filed 2022-01-10(a)(3)

Plaintiff’s evidence supports a finding that I may exercise specific personal jurisdiction. VSPA’s conduct plainly falls within Section 302(a)(3), satisfying the statutory requirement. The Complaint alleges that VSPA engaged in tortious conduct—manufacturing or causing to be manufactured, goods that infringed Plaintiff’s rights under federal and state intellectual property law. The imports listings and bills of lading establish that VSPA has been exporting glass product to New York for at least the past several years, and in that time, shipped hundreds of metric tons. The emails also establish that VSPA caused a sample of the allegedly infringing product to be shipped to New York for Sire’s approval. This single shipment coupled with VSPA’s substantial exporting business is sufficient to satisfy Section 302(a)(3). See Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, 616 F.3d at 169–71 (finding personal jurisdiction over defendant that shipped one item to New York when defendant also had extensive business activity involving New York).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that activity.

Caliko, SA v. Finn & Emma, LLC · filed 2022-02-28(a)(1)

Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Defendant ships its infringing goods into New York and almost seven percent of its baby rocker sales were to New York customers. Those facts are more than sufficient to establish that Defendant has transacted business in the state.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on a co-conspirator’s tortious acts in New York when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie conspiracy, the defendant’s membership, and an overt act in New York during the conspiracy.

Reinhardt v. The City of Buffalo · filed 2022-07-05(a)(2)

To establish jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary on the basis of the New York acts of a co-conspirator, plaintiff must “(1) establish a prima facie case of conspiracy; (2) allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) demonstrate the commission of an overt act in New York during, and pursuant to, the conspiracy.” ... Accordingly, this court may assert personal jurisdiction over Mr. Mikheail under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2).

Section 302 permits specific jurisdiction over a defendant who commits a tortious act in New York and satisfies the statute’s additional business or commerce requirements.

Ahmad v. Day · filed 2022-07-06

Construing Plaintiff’s claims liberally, Plaintiff appears to argue that these new allegations establish that Vista committed a tort in New York, which would provide a basis for specific jurisdiction under New York law. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (establishing specific jurisdiction for defendant who commits a “tortious act” within the state and either regularly does or solicits business in New York, or reasonably expects the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce). ... The Court, accordingly, reviews this portion of the R&R for clear error only, and finds none. The R&R correctly concludes that Plaintiff’s limited factual allegations do not establish that Vista “committed a tortious act merely by investing money in iCIMS.” R&R at 12. It further finds that Plaintiff failed to plead the other statutory requirements necessary for specific jurisdiction under New York law.

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary based on significant activities in New York.

Vale S.A. v. BSG Resources Limited · filed 2021-10-15(a)(1)

The Court also finds that there is personal jurisdiction over Steinmetz under New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1), in view of Steinmetz’s significant activities in this District.

Section 302(a) permits New York courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or commits certain tortious acts connected to New York.

Siasia v. Federation Internationale de Football Association · filed 2021-10-29(a)

Alternatively, under N.Y. CPLR § 302, a court may exercise “specific jurisdiction” over any non-domiciliary who “(1) transacts any business within the state …;” “(2) commits a tortious act within the state …;” or “(3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state . . . if he [] regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct . . . .” N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302(a). ... Plaintiff’s injuries neither relate to nor arise out of whatever that “contact” entails. ... Defendant is therefore not subject to specific jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) allows personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York when the claim arises from those acts.

Global Art Exhibitions, Inc. v. Kuhn & Bulow Italia Insurance Broker GmbH · filed 2021-11-16(a)(1)

The applicable portion of New York’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant when (1) that party either “transacts any business within the state” or “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” and (2) a plaintiff asserts “a cause of action arising from” those acts. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a), (a)(1). The Second Circuit has held that insuring a risk in New York satisfies the “contracts anywhere to supply . . . services in the state” prong.

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in New York or commit certain tortious acts outside the state causing in-state injury.

Antsy Labs, LLC v. The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Associat · filed 2021-12-16(a)(1) and (a)(3)

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” ... As such, on the record before it, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs have satisfied N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendants’ infringement caused injury in New York so as to subject the defendants to personal jurisdiction under this prong of the New York long-arm statute.

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary only when the defendant commits a specified act and the claim arises from that act.

Trombetta v. Novocin · filed 2021-12-21(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the complaint is insufficient to support a finding of personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... But this assertion misconstrues § 302(a)(2), which concerns the location of the defendant at the time of the tort, not the location of the harm. ... Because there are no allegations that Seippel ever personally engaged in conduct while physically present in New York, there is no jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2). ... The complaint thus fails to make a prima facie showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Seippel under § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for claims arising from acts such as transacting business, contracting to supply goods or services, or committing a tortious act in New York.

HomeEnergy Inc. v. AEC Yield Capital LLC · filed 2022-02-28(a)

New York’s long-arm statute specifies the circumstances under which personal jurisdiction may be extended to non-domiciliaries. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302. A foreign defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction on a claim arising out of certain acts committed by the defendant or its agent. These acts conferring jurisdiction include transacting any business within the state, contracting to supply goods or services in the state, and committing a tortious act within the state. Id. § 302(a). To establish that the out-of-state defendant engaged in such acts through an in-state agent, the plaintiff must plead that the alleged in-state agent acted for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of, the out-of-state principal.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that activity, and section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction for an out-of-state tort causing in-state injury when the defendant expected New York consequences and derives substantial interstate or international revenue.

Palmer v. Cora Italian Specialties, Inc. · filed 2022-03-07(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii)

"'To establish personal jurisdiction under [N.Y. C.P.L.R. §] 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) [t]he defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claims asserted must arise from that business activity.'" ... "To establish specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii), five elements must be met: (1) the defendant's tortious act was committed outside New York, (2) the cause of action arose from that act, (3) the tortious act caused an injury to a person or property in New York, (4) the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected that his or her action would have consequences in New York, and (5) the defendant derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce."

CPLR § 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary transacting business in New York when the claim arises from that transaction, and § 302(a)(2) permits jurisdiction for a tort committed in New York when the claim arises from that tort.

Ecogensus LLC v. Pacella · filed 2022-03-24(a)(1), (a)(2)

Here, the FAC does not allege facts sufficient for CPLR § 302(a)(1) to apply. ... CPLR § 302(a)(2) cannot apply, either,because Plaintiffs do not plead any cause of action based on any tort Pacella committed while “physical[ly] presen[t] in New York.” ... Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirement of CPLR § 302,necessary to all of its subsections,that the claims asserted can support long-arm jurisdiction only where they “aris[e] from” Defendants’ contacts with New York, which at minimum requires that “at least one element [of an asserted claim] arises from the New York contacts.”

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries for specified in-state business, contractual, or tortious acts and certain out-of-state tortious acts.

Brown v. National Bank of Pakistan · filed 2022-04-19

Under Section 302, a court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries that transact business in New York, contract to supply goods or services in New York, or commit a tortious act within the state. N.Y. C.P.L.R § 302(a)(1), (2). Section 302 also authorizes jurisdiction based on tortious acts committed outside the state, if the defendant engages in a course of conduct in New York or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in New York, § 302 (a)(3)(i), or if a defendant expects, or should reasonably expect, the tortious act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. § 302(a)(3)(ii). ... The TAC’s generalized allegations are insufficient to satisfy either New York’s long-arm statute or the Due Process Clause.

Section 302(a) allows New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or commits certain tortious acts outside New York that cause in-state injury and meet additional contact requirements.

Harris v. American Accounting Association · filed 2021-11-24(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)

New York's law arm statute provides, in relevant part: ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). ... Even construing the amended complaint and Plaintiff's opposition papers in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction over the Defendant Authors. ... Plaintiff, however, does not allege or argue that the Defendant Authors directly, in person, (1) transacted any business within the state or contracted anywhere to supply goods or services in the state, as required by section 302(a)(1); (2) regularly did or solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in the state, as required by section 302(a)(3)(i); or (3) derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, as required by section 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there when the claim arises from that activity.

Sanchez v. Germack Pistachio Company · filed 2022-03-22(a)(1)

The New York long-arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over “any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state[.]” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Therefore, this Court must examine “(1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such a business transaction.”

Section 302(a)(1) grants jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claim directly relates to that conduct, and section 302(a)(3) covers an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York.

Mapfre Peru Compania De Seguros Y Reaseguros S.A. v. M/V As Fortuna · filed 2022-03-31(a)(1), (a)(3)

“Section 302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary corporation that transacts business within the state or contracts anywhere to provide goods and services in the state if there is a direct relationship between the cause of action and the in state conduct.” ... Thus, OPCO is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York, and financial consequences felt in New York because of the plaintiff’s location there do not establish the required injury in New York.

Jerusalem NY Enterprises LLC v. Huber Erectors & Hoisting, LLC · filed 2021-12-08(a)(3)(ii)

The situs of the injury for the purpose of section 302(a)(3)(ii) “is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are felt by the plaintiff.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York, while section 302(a)(3) requires a qualifying tortious act causing injury in New York.

Zuru (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorpora · filed 2021-12-08(a)(1), (a)(3)

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” ... However, this Court has held that where a plaintiff “cannot point to a single sale that Defendants made into New York or any action that Defendants took to target their sales activity into this state,” no specific personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants. ... The apparent ability to order into New York without more is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York.

Ideavillage Products Corp. v. A1559749699-1 · filed 2022-01-24(a)(1)

As such, on the record before it, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has met the requirements of N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York when the claim has a substantial connection to that business.

Yehuda v. Zuchaer · filed 2022-06-21(a)(1)

But Yehuda has not alleged adequately that his claims arose from that business transaction, the second element of section 302(a)(1). That element requires a “substantial nexus” between the transaction in New York and the cause of action.

Section 302 permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for business transacted in New York when the claim arises from that business, or for an out-of-state tort causing injury in New York when the statute's additional conditions are met.

Conrad v. Latido Mitu Holdings LLC · filed 2021-12-10(a)(1), (a)(3)

Plaintiffs, however, fail to plead facts that satisfy the second prong of the long-arm statute analysis under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient factual basis for this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LMH and GDMG under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... Here, the copyright holders Conrad and Dlugolecki are located in California, not New York. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient factual basis for this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LMH and GDMG under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts to supply goods or services there, while section 302(a)(3) permits jurisdiction for in-state injury only when the defendant has specified ongoing business or revenue connections to New York.

Antetokounmpo v. Inverso · filed 2022-02-15(a)(1), (a)(3)

New York’s long-arm statute provides, in relevant part, that a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(1). Under N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(3), a court can also exercise jurisdiction over a defendant for “causing injury to a person or property within the state,” but only if the defendant “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue in the state.”

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants in four listed circumstances, including transacting business in the state when the claim arises from that activity.

Sutton v. Quinnipiac University · filed 2021-12-13(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4)

“Under CPLR § 302(a)(1) specifically, a plaintiff must establish that (a) the defendant transacted business within the state, and (b) the claim asserted arises from that business activity.” ... “Because Plaintiff’s PAC does not contain factual allegations sufficient to establish the requisite elements of specific personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, the Court may not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this case.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business in New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York, when the cause of action arises from those acts.

The Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Riverside Brass & Aluminum Foundry, Limited · filed 2022-01-14(a)(1)

Yet, even assuming an ongoing contractual relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff still fails to allege that Defendant transacted business in New York within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the cause of action arises from that transaction.

Romero v. 88 Acres Foods, Inc. · filed 2022-01-18(a)(1)

Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), a court in New York may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if (1) the defendant “transacts any business within the state”; and (2) the “cause of action aris[es] from” that business transaction.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction over a non domiciliary whose out of state tort causes injury in New York that the defendant should reasonably have expected and who derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Damian v. Click Intelligence Ltd. · filed 2022-02-11(a)(3)(ii)

The Receiver has failed to establish jurisdiction under this provision because she has not plausibly alleged that Click caused injury in New York or should reasonably have expected to do so. ... The fact that some New York investors may have suffered harm as a result of TCG’s fraudulent scheme is therefore insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction for an out-of-state injury whose only New York connection is advertising and contracting in New York.

Luke v. Sunwing Travel Group · filed 2022-02-28(a)(1)

That Plaintiff saw the advertisement and booked her trip on Sunwing’s website while in New York is insufficient, because “out-of-state injuries do not suffice for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) when their only connection to New York is that they were sustained in the course of an activity that was advertised and contracted for within the state.”

Section 302(a)(2) allows New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who personally or through an agent commits a tortious act in New York.

In Re: Libor-Based Financial · filed 2022-02-25(a)(2)

To establish conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction pursuant to New York’s long arm statute, a plaintiff must—after making a prima facie showing of a conspiracy—plausibly allege that: “(a) the defendant had an awareness of the effects in New York of its activity; (b) the activity of the co-conspirators in New York was to the benefit of the out-of-state conspirators; and (c) the co-conspirators acting in New York acted at the direction or under the control, or at the request of or on behalf of the out-of-state defendant.” Lawati v. Montague Morgan Slade Ltd., 961 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (1st Dep’t 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

Section 302 authorizes specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when the claim arises from specified New York contacts, including transacting business, committing tortious acts, or certain out-of-state acts causing in-state injury.

Bergrin v. United States of America · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(i), (a)(3)(ii), and (a)(4)

Because no other provisions under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 apply here,I do not have personal jurisdiction over Judge Cole.

Section 302(a) permits New York courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who personally or through an agent commit specified acts connected to the claim.

Tshiamala v. Cohen · filed 2022-04-04(a)

In addition, a defendant may be subject to New York State’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, if he engages in the following acts either in person or through an agent, and such acts relate to an asserted claim: (1) transacts any business within New York State or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in New York State; (2) commits a tortious act within the New York State; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state but injures a person or property in New York State; or (4) owns, uses, or possesses any real property in New York State. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a). ... Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. He does not allege that Defendant is domiciled or is continuously and systematically doing business in New York State, caused injury to Plaintiff within New York State, contracted to supply goods or services in New York State or possesses real property here. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant resides in New York City, but provides only a Michigan address for him, and any allegedly wrongful behavior appears to have occurred outside of New York State, and no injury in New York State is alleged. He therefore fails to demonstrate that Defendant is subject to New York State’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a company that transacts business in New York when the claim arises from that business.

Austin Environmental Corp. v. Margarita Express, LLC · filed 2022-05-06(a)(1)

“[I]n determining whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised under section 302(a)(1), a court must decide (1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action arises from such a business transaction.” ... Accordingly, this Court does not have specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant Valley. Because this Court concludes that there is no specific personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 3 302, it does not reach the due process analysis.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that activity, while section 302(a)(3) covers certain tortious acts outside New York causing injury in the state.

JDM Import Co. Inc. v. Shah · filed 2021-11-19(a)(1), (a)(3)

While Plaintiffs have adequately pled that Defendants conducted business in New York, they have not shown that their claims arise from the business Defendants conducted in New York. Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). ... In short, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction for business transacted in New York connected to the claim, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction for an out of state tort causing New York injury when New York consequences were expected and substantial interstate or international revenue exists.

48th Restaurant Associates LLC v. Avra Hospitality LLC · filed 2022-01-24(a)(3)(ii) and (a)(1)

With regard to the facts presented here, although section 302(a)(3)(ii) creates a somewhat closer call than does section 302(a)(1), Plaintiff still fails to meet the requirements of this part of New York’s long-arm statute, because Plaintiff fails to plead facts showing why Defendants should have had any expectations of consequences in the State of New York.

Section 302(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary for a tortious act committed in New York by the defendant or an agent.

Thani A.T. Al Thani v. Hanke · filed 2022-02-17(a)(2)

To establish jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based on the acts of that defendant’s co-conspirator under New York law, a plaintiff must (1) “establish a prima facie case of conspiracy,” (2) “allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy,” (3) “demonstrate the commission of a tortious act in New York,” and (4) “demonstrate the requisite agency relationship between the nondomiciliary defendant and the in-state tortfeasor.”

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity.

Perna v. Sacred Heart University, Incorporated · filed 2023-03-01(a)(1)

Under New York's long-arm statute, a court has specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant that: 1) “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” 2) “commits a tortious act within the state,” 3) “commits a tortious act [outside] the state causing injury to person or property within the state,” or 4) “owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a).

Section 302 permits New York courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on specified business transactions or tortious acts connected to New York.

Twin Hills Holdings LLC v. e3 Holding AG · filed 2023-03-31

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that its claims against Defendants arose out of alleged in-state transactions of business,7 the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that transacts business in New York when the claims arise from those transactions.

The Pinkfong Company, Inc. v. ADS-SS · filed 2023-06-02(a)(1)

WHEREAS, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1), and exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Section 302(a)(1) permits long-arm jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the claim arises from the nondomiciliary's transaction of business in New York.

Great Lakes Ins. SE v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Assn. Inc. · filed 2023-03-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction over the Gourdomichalis defendants in accordance with CPLR 302(a)(1).